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1918-1945

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## PREFACE<sup>1</sup>

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents."<sup>2</sup> In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

The editors wish to state that they have been not only permitted, but enjoined, to make their selection exclusively "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." In the selection of documents for publication, and in the editing of the documents, the editors have had complete freedom. No effort has been made at any time by any of the participating Governments to influence their work. The editors, therefore, accept complete responsibility for the volumes as published.

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In this fifth volume of the series the editors turn to certain topics and geographical areas not so far directly treated in their coverage of the immediate prewar years, although chronologically the documentation presented here runs parallel to that given in preceding volumes. Mussolini's visit to Berlin at the end of September 1937, which marked the consolidation of the Axis, was chosen as the starting point for the series. For certain topics, notably the treatment of Austria in volume I and of Spain in volume III, it was felt necessary

<sup>1</sup> In each of the volumes previously published in the series there appears a "General Introduction." The editors have not felt it necessary to repeat this introduction in the present and succeeding volumes. Interested readers may wish to refer to it for information on the nature of the German Foreign Ministry archives on which this publication is based, their present condition, and some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

<sup>2</sup> It was in accordance with this provision that the Department of State, in January 1948, published the volume of documents entitled *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*.

to go back to more logical starting points in 1936. In the present volume the starting point is again the autumn of 1937 for most of the topics, although in a few cases the course of German policy in a particular area has suggested deviation by some months from this rule. The closing date in this volume parallels that in volume IV, that is, German entry into Prague on March 15, 1939, subject again to minor deviations where the logic of the story in any particular area required. With the present volume, therefore, the reader will find completed the coverage for all topics from the beginning of Series D down to March 15, 1939.

Where volumes I and IV covered German relations with the Great Powers for the same period, this volume deals more particularly with German relations with smaller powers. This is not to say, however, that this volume deals with issues of minor importance or merely fills in geographical gaps in the record of German policy as previously given. In its opening chapter it provides a record of German relations with Poland, particularly over Danzig, and sets the scene for the crisis in German-Polish relations which was to bring war on September 1, 1939. The second chapter, on Southeastern Europe, is largely a portrayal of German efforts to break up the French-sponsored security system in that area which had been designed to contain a revival of German power. To some extent the material in these two chapters, which together constitute almost half of the volume, supplements that found in volumes I and II on the Austrian and Czechoslovakian crises, providing further evidence on the involvement of Poland and the states of Southeastern Europe in those crises and their aftermaths. Chapter III documents the relations between Germany and the Baltic States and ends with the German-Lithuanian Treaty of March 22, 1939, and the return of the Memel Territory to Germany.


German minorities as a factor in the formulation of German policy bulk relatively large in this period. This affected not only the relations with Poland, Lithuania, Denmark, and Belgium, to which territory had been lost at the close of the First World War, but also with the states of Southeastern Europe and even Latin America, where German policy took an active interest, political as well as cultural, in "volksdeutsch" communities.

The chapters on the Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland show German policy, aside from local and transient issues, to have been preoccupied primarily with the attempt to detach these smaller neighbors from the League of Nations collective security system. In Turkey and the Near East German policy is seen to have been active in the attempt, particularly by means of the arms trade, to regain the German position lost there after the First World War. While chapter VIII has to do primarily with



the development of German policy toward the possible formation of a Jewish state in Palestine, chapter X treats the repercussions on foreign policy of the German racial laws and the related refugee problem.

The documents in this volume were selected jointly by the American, British, and French editors. Footnotes and other editorial apparatus are the work of the American editors, although the British and French editors made numerous suggestions which have been incorporated. Translations were done by the Division of Language Services of the Department of State, and were then reviewed and revised by the American editors. Readers who are interested can check the translation against the original language in the German edition of this volume.



# ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937			
June 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain, the Consulate General in Jerusalem and the Legation in Iraq</i> The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, which would provide World Jewry with an international basis, is not in the German interest, although Germany is at present promoting Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine; German sympathy for Arab aspirations should be expressed more clearly, though without making concrete promises.	561	746 ✓
June 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Personal Staff of the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry</i> The Haavara Agreement, which utilizes Germany's total export to Palestine for transferring to that country the capital of Jewish emigrants, ought to be revised drastically, since it does not provide Germany with foreign exchange and instead supports the formation of a Jewish national state with German capital.	562	747 ✓
June 11	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol</i> Referat Deutschland agrees with the position of the Auslandsorganisation that Germany should not sacrifice foreign exchange to promote Jewish emigration under the Haavara Agreement; it is recommended instead to "encourage the Jew's own urge to emigrate" through anti-Jewish domestic legislation.	563	749 ✓
June 22	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> The establishment of a Jewish-controlled political structure in Palestine, which may be recommended in the report of the Peel Commission, would be against Germany's interest; all Missions are requested to report any Jewish agitation in favor of a Jewish state.	564	750 ✓
July 13	<i>The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is feared that ultimately there will be no future for German settlers in Palestine under the triple partition plan recommended by the Report of the Peel Commission; instructions are requested as to whether the Consul should demand that the German settlements be placed directly under Mandate administration.	565	753 ✓

<sup>1</sup> The list has been arranged chronologically by date, the documents for each day following the order of the ten chapters of the volume. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace one of the chapter topics through the list, the following summary of document numbers by chapters is given:

Chap. I . . . . .	Nos. 1-140	Chap. VI . . . . .	Nos. 507-534
Chap. I Suppl. . . . .	Nos. 668-677	Chap. VII . . . . .	Nos. 535-560
Chap. II . . . . .	Nos. 141-315	Chap. VIII . . . . .	Nos. 561-592
Chap. III . . . . .	Nos. 316-406	Chap. IX . . . . .	Nos. 593-639
Chap. IV . . . . .	Nos. 407-472	Chap. X . . . . .	Nos. 640-667
Chap. V . . . . .	Nos. 473-506		

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937			
July 15	<i>The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Grand Mufti, stating that the Arab world rejected the partition scheme, inquired whether Germany would take a public stand against it and indicated his intention to send a private agent to Germany to discuss matters of common interest; Dohle assured him in general terms of German sympathy and promised to forward his requests to Berlin.	566	755
July 16	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> A proposed draft for a German-Turkish agreement providing for Germany's accession to the Montreux Convention is being transmitted; in conformity with an Italo-German understanding of May 4 these negotiations ought to be conducted parallel to the Italo-Turkish talks on the same subject.	535	706
July 17	<i>The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Minister President said that he was counting on Italian and Turkish influence in the League to support him in his fight against the partition plan for Palestine, and stated that a loan which would enable Iraq to stand up against British financial pressure was absolutely necessary.	567	756
July 22	<i>The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Grand Mufti's confidential agent will arrive in Berlin at the end of July and identify himself by a letter of recommendation and by references to previous reports from the Consul.	568	757
July 29	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII</i> The Islamic world, though bitterly opposed to a Jewish state in Palestine, will not quarrel seriously with Britain over this issue; a Berlin visit of the Grand Mufti's representative should be discouraged, but Iraq's struggle in the League might be supported; a decision on the future of the German settlements in Palestine should be taken before it is too late.	569	758
Aug. 7	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey</i> The Embassy is instructed to inform the Turkish Government at once of Germany's proposal on the Straits question and to notify the Italian Ambassador of this step.	536	710
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Referat Deutschland</i> Germany must not compromise her relations with Britain by arming the Arabs or by a German-Italian action in favor of the Arabs in the fight against the scheme for a Jewish state in Palestine; however, she might exert pressure on other countries against supporting the plan.	570	760
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum of Political Division VII</i> A general review of the Palestine question; in case the Jewish state materializes, the German settlements might best be protected by placement under the British Mandate, or else by a League guarantee of self-government to them.	571	762

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937 Aug. 10	<i>The Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Grand Mufti was grateful for Germany's stand against the plan for a Jewish state and asked Germany to induce Poland, who was supporting this scheme for domestic reasons, to change her attitude; united Arab action against the partition scheme seems unlikely.	572	766 ✓
Aug. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Turkish Foreign Minister Aras was informed of Germany's position on the Straits question; he saw certain legal obstacles to Germany's accession to the Convention by way of a bilateral treaty, but promised to examine the problem thoroughly.	537	710
Sept. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Polish Ambassador Lipski proposed a joint declaration reaffirming the validity of the Danzig Statute; Neurath replied that Germany did not wish to give any new recognition to the peace treaties, but he promised to study the Polish draft.	1	1
Sept. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Foreign Minister Neurath told the Polish Ambassador that he preferred to delay publication of the joint declaration on minorities until a moment when an interval in other events permitted the newspapers to give it their full attention.	2	2
Sept. 15	<i>The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> The High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Danzig, Professor Burckhardt, succeeded in persuading the Committee of Three that the situation in Danzig had improved and did not require the attention of the League Council.	3	3
Sept. 18	<i>The Chief of the Presidential Chancellery to the Foreign Minister</i> Burckhardt told the Führer that he had prevented the question of Danzig from being agitated at Geneva and said he hoped for a direct German-Polish agreement; Hitler complained of interference by the British.	4	4
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Press Attaché of the Legation in Switzerland</i> Hungarian Foreign Minister Kánya stated that his negotiations with members of the Little Entente in Geneva would probably lead to agreements easing their relations; he said that lack of Axis support for Hungary and the overtures Italy made to Yugoslavia stiffened the Little Entente's attitude and forced him to include Czechoslovakia in the agreements.	141	184
Sept. 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Turkish Ambassador asked the German Government to use its influence with certain German firms in order to speed deliveries of arms and industrial equipment which had been contracted for.	538	712
Sept. 24	<i>The Consulate General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Burckhardt gave Senate President Greiser a full account of his activities in Geneva; he complained of the pernicious influence of the Secretariat in trying to turn the League into an anti-fascist union; his interview with Hitler had been "the greatest experience of his life."	5	6

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937			
Sept. 24	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassies in France and Great Britain</i> An exchange of notes with Belgium is planned which will put her relations with Germany on the same basis as her relations with France and Britain as laid down in the Anglo-French note of April 24; the formulation of the German note is intended to counter the anti-German emphasis of the latter.	473	631
Sept. 28	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Minister President Stoyadinovich would like to make an official visit to Berlin to repay the Reich Foreign Minister's visit to Belgrade, coming at the end of November after he has been to Paris, London, and Rome.	142	189
Sept. 29	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich said that although he could not make a separate agreement with Hungary, the pressure he had brought had led the other members of the Little Entente to adopt a more accommodating attitude; he thought agreement would be reached in time.	143	190
Sept. 29	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Köcher reports that Swiss public opinion is generally hostile to Germany except on the issue of anti-communism.	507	670
Oct. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Lipski sought to have Minister President Göring influence Neurath in favor of the joint declaration on Danzig proposed by Poland.	6	11
Oct. 4	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland</i> The Polish desire to accompany the German-Polish declaration on minorities with a similar joint declaration on Danzig has been refused by the Führer on the ground that it would constitute renewed recognition of the Treaty of Versailles.	7	12
Oct. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Contrary to Lipski's statement, Foreign Minister Beck does not seem to insist on linking a declaration on Danzig with the joint declaration on minorities, and there is therefore no reason for delaying release of the latter.	8	13
Oct. 5	<i>Ambassador Moltke to State Secretary Mackensen</i> Lipski believes, on the basis of his conversation with Göring, that Germany will agree to a declaration on Danzig, and has so informed his Government on a visit to Warsaw.	9	13
Oct. 5	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Kánya continued to oppose permitting the Ortsgruppe of the NSDAP in Hungary to organize as a Landesgruppe; he complained vigorously of pan-German tendencies in the propaganda issuing from Germany.	144	191
Oct. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although Moltke told Beck that Germany's rejection of a declaration on Danzig would not be altered, Beck said he hoped that Lipski could still obtain some suitable arrangement in Berlin.	10	15

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937			
Oct. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> State Secretary Mackensen informed Lipski that Germany's rejection of a joint declaration on Danzig was final; the secret undertaking desired by Poland was pointless since the Führer stood by the assurances conveyed to the Polish leaders in November 1936.	11	16
Oct. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Rumania</i> At the request of his Hungarian colleague, Fabricius explored with the Foreign Minister the possibility of further progress toward a Rumanian-Hungarian agreement; Antonescu said it was impossible at the moment to make the concessions demanded for the Hungarian minority.	145	193
Oct. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> In view of the impending visit of Latvian Foreign Minister Munters, it must be said that the attitude of the Latvian Government towards the volksdeutsch minority is still unfriendly, even though no new oppressive measures have been taken recently.	316	418
Oct. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen questioned Munters' optimistic viewpoint in regard to the recent policies of the League, and rejected his complaints regarding the Auslandsorganisation as vague and without foundation.	317	419
Oct. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Lipski attempted another approach to Göring on behalf of the declaration on Danzig, but without success.	12	18
Oct. 12	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Missions are informed that the exchange of notes with Belgium is intended to relieve that country of exclusive dependence on Britain and France and to enable her to conduct an independent, balance-of-power policy.	474	633
Oct. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Minister of Belgium</i> In the absence of a treaty to replace the lapsed Locarno Pact, Germany undertakes to respect the integrity and inviolability of Belgian territory so long as Belgium does not take part in military action directed against Germany.	475	634
Oct. [13]	<i>Memorandum</i> The German press is directed, in its treatment of the German-Belgian exchange of notes, not to emphasize too strongly that relations between the two countries have taken a particularly friendly turn; but it is to be pointed out that Germany has made a generous contribution toward peace.	476	635
Oct. 13	<i>The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Spaak expressed his own and the King's satisfaction over the German-Belgian exchange of notes; his one anxiety was about its reception by his own party.	477	636
Oct. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told Belgian Minister Davignon that in view of the friendly relations signaled by the exchange of notes he had two requests, one, that Belgium do something about its still outstanding list of German war criminals, and two, that the Eupen-Malmédy question not be agitated in the Belgian press.	478	637

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937 Oct. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker replied to an inquiry from the War Ministry that he did not think any special military preparations were necessary to fulfill the pledge of military assistance to Belgium.	479	638
Oct. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Mackensen told Lithuanian Minister Šaulys that the new Lithuanian expropriation measures in the Memel Territory would put a severe strain on German-Lithuanian relations.	318	421
Oct. 15	<i>Minister Blücher to Senior Counselor Grundherr</i> The Minister in Finland suggests topics to be discussed when Foreign Minister Holsti visits Neurath; Germany desires Finland's neutrality, and is concerned about her criticisms of Germany and about certain economic matters.	407	533
Oct. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> When Lipski brought up the question of a declaration on Danzig again, Neurath told him frankly that eventually there would have to be a solution which returned Danzig to the Reich.	13	19
Oct. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Press Department</i> In a conversation with Aschmann, former President Svinhufvud of Finland expressed hostility toward Soviet Russia and distrust of Holsti's attempt to improve relations with Moscow.	408	535
Oct. 21	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Minister of State Bech sounded out Radowicz about the possibility of a "modern guarantee" for Luxembourg such as Belgium had received from Germany.	480	638
Oct. 22	<i>Ambassador Moltke to Senior Counselor Schnurre</i> Poland failed to respond to proposals made in 1935 for construction of a highway across the Corridor; Moltke recommends exerting pressure by building the road up to the Corridor on both sides.	14	20
Oct. 23	<i>Minute by an Official of Political Division V</i> The President of the Bank of Danzig believes that the Poles, even if they learned of German acquisition of British-owned shares in the Danzig dockyards, would not boycott the yards because they lack adequate facilities in Gdynia.	15	21
Oct. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Lipski proposed that in connection with release of the minorities declaration, delegations of the minorities should be received by the respective chiefs of state, and that a communiqué be issued reaffirming the Agreement of 1934 and stating that Danzig would not disturb the harmony of German-Polish relations.	16	22
Oct. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath states that he reminded Holsti of Germany's interest in Finland's independence and neutrality; he protested against Finnish refusal of a German contract at Petsamo as an "unfriendly act."	409	537



Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937			
Oct. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Dutch Minister expressed satisfaction over the Belgian-German agreement but indicated plainly that the Netherlands did not desire a similar agreement.	481	640
Oct. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath told the British Chargé d'Affaires that in the event of a partition of Palestine Germany would have to insist upon guarantees for those German settlers who would come within the Jewish territory.	573	768
Oct. 29	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Gauleiter Forster of Danzig urged purchase of British-owned shares in the Danzig dockyards to obtain majority control; Neurath approved the project.	17	23
Oct. 29	<i>Minister Renthe-Fink to Counselor Schwager</i> The Minister in Denmark approves of the proposal of the Cultural Policy Department for educating the youth of the German minority in Denmark; he stresses the importance of training them for the specific situation in Denmark.	410	538
Nov. 1	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> In conformity with instructions, Foreign Minister Munch of Denmark has been told that loss of civil rights seems an unduly harsh punishment for the indiscreet conduct of Möller and others in agitating against Danish justice.	411	539
Nov. 2	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is proposed to enact several new laws which would effect changes in the Danzig Constitution by employing delegated powers of the Senate under the 1933 Enabling Act; Burckhardt recommends this procedure to avoid the agitation of the press and world opinion which voting on the measures in the Volkstag would arouse.	668	941
Nov. 4	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> New laws affecting youth organizations and banning new political parties will be proclaimed as ordinances in order to avoid submitting them to the League of Nations for approval; later it is intended to introduce anti-Jewish legislation similar to Germany's.	669	943
Nov. 5	<i>German-Polish Joint Declaration on Minorities</i> To promote neighborly relations and the welfare of their minorities the two states agree not to resort to enforced assimilation, and to accord the minorities the rights to free use of their languages, to separate associations, schools and churches, and to free and equal economic activity.	18	24
Nov. 5	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> In view of French offers to extend arms credits to Bulgaria, it is suggested that a new camouflaged loan to fund old and future obligations be considered to meet Bulgaria's desire for a longer period of repayment.	146	197
Nov. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Führer assured Lipski that he did not intend to alter the Danzig Statute, would not confront Poland with a <i>fait accompli</i> there, and would not infringe on Polish rights in Danzig.	19	26

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937 Nov. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> The Counselor of the Polish Embassy complained of a speech by Gauleiter Forster in which he attacked Poland and implied that Danzig would be reincorporated into the Reich; Lubomirski requested that Forster be informed of the assurances on Danzig given Lipski by the Führer on November 5.	20	27
Nov. 9	<i>The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry</i> A personal envoy of King Ibn Saud stated that his ruler was opposed to the partition scheme for Palestine, as were most of the Arab states; he also informed the Minister of Ibn Saud's desire to have a German diplomatic representative accredited to Saudi Arabia.	574	769
Nov. 18	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> It is in Germany's interest that the present German-Rumanian economic negotiations be successful, since economic ties with Germany would lead to an abandonment of Titulescu's Russian-oriented Eastern policy.	147	198
Nov. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Belgian Minister suggested that it would serve the new atmosphere in German-Belgian relations if the usual New Year speech by a Rhenish Gauleiter to the German minority in Eupen could be omitted this year; the development sought there by Germany would materialize ultimately anyway.	482	640
Nov. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Hungarian Minister President Darányi told Mackensen privately that he intended to appeal to the Führer to permit German participation in the Eucharistic Congress, and also to raise the question of more co-operation on minorities.	148	198
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> The Polish Chargé d'Affaires complained of plans reported in the press to conduct numerous demonstrations in the Reich on behalf of Danzig, and asked that they be canceled in the interest of preserving good relations.	21	28
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> On instructions of the Foreign Minister, Bismarck informed the Polish Chargé d'Affaires that Reich Minister Goebbels had canceled the demonstrations planned on behalf of Danzig.	22	28
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> Bismarck reminded the Polish Chargé d'Affaires that Poland had not replied to the German suggestion that there be continuing discussion of minorities problems on the basis of the Minorities Declaration; he also called attention to dismissals of members of the German minority from Upper Silesian industries.	23	29
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery</i> Darányi gave the Führer an account of his efforts to reach an agreement with Yugoslavia separate from the other members of the Little Entente; Hitler said that he welcomed this effort to weaken the internal cohesion of the group.	149	200

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1937			
Nov. 25	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink has informed Minister of State Stauning that relations with Germany could be greatly improved if Denmark would liquidate her League of Nations "mortgage"; Stauning agreed to consider renouncing participation in sanctions.	412	540
Nov. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Kánya stated that he had the impression that Foreign Minister Ciano was tending to replace Mussolini in the direction of Italian foreign policy, a development which he considered unfortunate; Mackensen denied any knowledge of such a tendency.	150	202
Nov. 29	<i>Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker to Minister Rümelin</i> Contrary to expectations King Boris did not visit Germany after going to Paris and London; there are rumors that he obtained a loan and may have placed arms orders; information on this is desired.	151	202
Nov. 30	<i>The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Richthofen has been told by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff that, although Belgian frontier defenses had hitherto been maintained only against Germany, they would now be set up along the frontier with France also.	483	641
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> It is improbable that the principal South American countries would adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	593	815
Dec. 1	<i>Minister Erdmannsdorff to Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker</i> Regent Horthy denied reports of a Hungarian-Austrian-Czech agreement in anticipation of a German-Austrian conflict; he said that he regarded <i>Anschluss</i> as inevitable, but the Germans should be patient; he also said he recognized that a Hapsburg restoration was impossible for Hungary.	152	203
[Dec. 7]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI</i> Neutrality regulations for the Danish straits are being considered; Germany desires unlimited free passage by sea and air for her forces.	413	541
Dec. 7	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> To an inquiry from the War Ministry Weizsäcker replied that he did not believe the improved relations with Belgium would justify dispensing entirely with defenses on that frontier.	484	641
Dec. 7	<i>The Reich Foreign Exchange Control Office to the Foreign Ministry</i> A summary of the results of past Jewish emigration, together with suggestions for further promoting it, is being submitted; it will make a strong case for continuation of the Haavara system.	575	772
Dec. 8	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich is reported to have told Mussolini that he rejected the plans of French Foreign Minister Delbos, he would not recognize Soviet Russia and would not commit Yugoslavia to aid Czechoslovakia; he also told the Duce that he was not sympathetic to the idea of <i>Anschluss</i> .	153	204

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1937			
Dec. 11	<i>Minister Renthe-Fink to Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker</i> Tension continues on the Danish-German frontier; Renthe-Fink recommends tighter control over the hot-heads on the German side of the frontier as well as closer liaison with the Propaganda Ministry.	414	542
Dec. 13	<i>Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Minister President General Göring</i> The successful outcome of the German-Rumanian economic negotiations—an increase of one-third in the volume of trade between the two countries and a stabilized higher rate of exchange for the reichsmark—was obtained only through German concession of higher prices for Rumanian agricultural products.	154	205
Dec. 14	<i>Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Minister President General Göring</i> Wohlthat reports on his audience with the King of Rumania and conversations with members of the Government, during which questions of economic policy and German-Rumanian cooperation were discussed; he recommends that Schacht pay a visit to Bucharest, in order to overcome opposition by the Rumanian National Bank.	155	209
Dec. 14	<i>The Propaganda Ministry to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Syrian Arab leader, carrying letters of introduction from Arab organizations as well as from German diplomatic and Party officials in the Near East, has appeared in Berlin with proposals for political cooperation between Germany and Arab nationalism.	576	777
Dec. 15	<i>Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker to Minister Renthe-Fink</i> The German press is understandably excited by Möller's jail sentence, and the Foreign Ministry has inspired an article in the <i>Völkischer Beobachter</i> about it, but it is now time to pour oil on troubled waters again.	415	543
Dec. —	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V</i> The transaction to acquire British-owned shares in the Danzig dockyards through a dummy owner has been completed despite a desperate Polish bid for the shares.	24	30
Dec. 16	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink has expressed displeasure to Munch at the sentencing of Möller by a Danish court; he suggests that the German press continue to show interest in the case but that it avoid Irredentism.	416	544
Dec. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter reports that the Brazilian Minister of Justice has asked for German assistance in arranging an anti-Comintern exhibit; Ritter urges that assistance be given and discusses various related questions.	594	816
Dec. 31	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Improvement in the conditions of the German minority in Slovenia, particularly as to schools, should be demanded of the Yugoslav delegation coming to Berlin with Stoyadinovich; elsewhere in Yugoslavia the conditions are not so unfavorable.	156	211

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1938			
Jan. 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Presidential Chancellery</i> The new Rumanian Minister President, Goga, has addressed a message to the Führer expressing his hope for cordial relations; since the message also implies the Führer's approval of the present Rumanian boundaries, the reply should be limited to an oral statement by the German Minister in Bucharest.	157	214
Jan. 3	<i>Memorandum of Political Division IV</i> Although troubled by a strong domestic opposition, the Yugoslav Government under Stoyadinovich has pursued a steady course in foreign policy aimed at avoiding commitments to the Great Powers; the easing of relations with Italy has contributed to good relations with Germany.	158	215
Jan. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Since the economic agreement of 1934, Germany has obtained first place in Yugoslav exports and imports; it would be politic to express satisfaction to Stoyadinovich, but care should be taken not to arouse suspicion that economic penetration means political dependence.	159	217
Jan. 9	<i>The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recent expropriation measures taken by Lithuania against the German element in Memel constitute a violation of the Memel Statute; nevertheless, they will not invalidate the favorable effect of the German-Lithuanian trade agreement upon the Memel Territory.	319	422
Jan. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> The <i>Deutsche La Plata Zeitung</i> is in serious financial difficulties; the Embassy requests that 25,000 RM be granted to it because of its importance for German interests in Argentina.	595	819
Jan. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> In a review of Polish policy in anticipation of a Beck-Neurath meeting, it is stated that no progress has been made on the minorities issue since publication of the joint declaration.	25	31
Jan. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Hungarian Minister said that the Führer had promised to guarantee a Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement on frontiers and minorities and hoped this would be recalled during the Stoyadinovich visit; Mackensen denied that Hitler had gone so far.	160	219
Jan. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck denied that his reference to the Franco-Italian Protocol of January 1935 in his speech to the Polish Sejm had any significance; in his talk with Neurath he intends to inquire what the latter meant by his statement that the Danzig problem would eventually require a final settlement.	26	34
Jan. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> The Counselor of the Polish Embassy said that his Government rejected the German plan for continuing discussions among experts on minorities issues on the ground that it was "premature."	27	35

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Jan. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> After investigating the records of the Führer's conversation with the Hungarian ministers on their November visit, Mackensen informed Minister Sztójay that there had been no intention of committing Germany to a "guarantee" of a Hungarian-Yugoslav settlement.	161	220
Jan. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker recommends a special grant to Ernst Schröder, editor, of Flensburg, in order that his services on minority questions may be retained.	417	545
Jan. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Neurath and Beck agreed that the removal of the League High Commissioner from Danzig might be anticipated but Neurath did not wish the matter pressed at Geneva; he told Beck that the latter's suggestion of a revival of a Franco-Italian protocol on the Danube region was unacceptable to Germany, and added that Germany regarded Austria as her own affair; Beck indicated disinterest in Austria.	28	35
Jan. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Reviewing German policy for Beck, the Führer told him that his first concern remained the struggle against Bolshevism; he reaffirmed his intention not to alter the Danzig Statute; his aim in Czechoslovakia was better treatment for the German minority, but he regarded the Czech state as an impossible structure harboring seeds of Bolshevism; to this Beck heartily agreed.	29	38
Jan. 14	<i>The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry</i> By continuing the present economic policy toward Palestine, Germany is increasingly running the risk of losing the sympathies of the Arabs there.	577	780
Jan. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Stoyadinovich said that Britain would make colonial concessions in return for a German guarantee of stability in Europe; Neurath replied this would mean abandoning the German minorities to their fate; the Yugoslav Minister President said his Government would build up relations with Poland and Rumania in view of the tendency of the Little Entente to disintegrate.	162	221
Jan. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Yugoslavia</i> In a statement of German policy for Stoyadinovich, the Führer emphasized that Germany desired a strong Yugoslavia and that the drive of the German nation toward the Adriatic as it had been pushed under the Hapsburgs was abandoned; he would guarantee a Hungarian-Yugoslav border agreement on the present line; Stoyadinovich said that he would meet Hungarian demands as far as he could within his obligations to the Little Entente; he declared his disinterest in the Austrian question.	163	222
Jan. 18	<i>The Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Minister</i> Lammers requests an inquiry in the Foreign Ministry concerning reports that large quantities of propaganda material and other aid are being supplied the Rumanian Iron Guard from sources in Germany.	164	229

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1938			
Jan. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Turkish law forbids foreigners living in Turkey to form political associations; only because the functions of the German community have been held exclusively on extraterritorial premises have the Turkish authorities so far refrained from taking action against them.	539	713
Jan. 19	<i>Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker to Ambassador Moltke</i> A pleasant atmosphere surrounded Beck's visit in Berlin; it was of interest that he termed Polish-Czech relations as hardly capable of improvement; surprisingly, he seemed willing to consider abolition of the post of High Commissioner in Danzig, a development which Burckhardt himself considers inevitable.	30	40
Jan. 20	<i>The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ibn Saud's spokesman stated in a letter that the former consented to accreditation to Saudi Arabia of a German representative accredited in another country; contrary to facts, however, he also claimed that this suggestion originated with Germany.	578	781
Jan. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr pointed out the danger of irresponsible agitation for German-Danish relations and for the German minority in Denmark to Gauleiter Lohse of Schleswig-Holstein, who agreed to consult with the Foreign Ministry before taking any important actions.	418	546
Jan. 22	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker replied to a query from the War Ministry that reports did not indicate either a Polish or German coup in Danzig in the foreseeable future; he did not think that in any case the First Army Corps in East Prussia would be expected to act without orders from Berlin.	31	40
Jan. 22	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> A telegram on the Stoyadinovich visit states that the occasion went off satisfactorily in every respect and that the Yugoslav Minister President left a good impression; statements about it by German Missions are to be confined to the published communiqué.	165	230
Jan. 24	<i>Counselor Clodius to Minister Rümelin</i> A representative of the Export Cartel for War Material will come to Sofia to negotiate; while the Bulgarian requests for deliveries under a long-term loan cannot be met in full, every effort must be made to preserve Bulgaria's political and economic ties with Germany.	166	232
Jan. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Recent discussions, also with other agencies concerned, have produced certain suggestions for a letter to the Ministry of the Interior stating the Foreign Ministry's readiness to carry out the Führer's directive to promote Jewish emigration; the problem of a substitute for the Haavara system will be examined jointly with the Ministry of Economics.	579	783
Jan. 29	<i>Minister Richthofen to Senior Counselor Rintelen</i> Having been informed by the Agricultural Association of the German minority in Eupen-Malmédy that it has been denied financial support from Germany, allegedly because of political intrigues, Richthofen requests an investigation.	485	642

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1938 Feb. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Although Bulgaria has proposed an arms credit on a scale and on terms of payment which the German economic authorities feel could not be met, the Foreign Ministry has urged that, for political reasons, the negotiators go as far as possible to meet the Bulgarian request.	167	233
Feb. 7	<i>Senior Counselor Rintelen to Minister Richtshofen</i> The Agricultural Association in Eupen-Malmédy is regarded as well worth maintaining but an annual grant of funds cannot be guaranteed on an indefinite basis.	486	643
Feb. 8	<i>State Secretary Körner of the Four Year Plan to the Bulgarian Minister in Austria, Draganov</i> Although negotiations in Sofia have so far failed to bring any agreement on the scope and terms of the proposed arms credit, it is hoped that due weight will be given to the considerations advanced by the German representative who was bound by instructions from Göring.	168	234
Feb. 10	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> His Polish colleague has informed Fabricius that Rumanian Minister of War Antonescu is less concerned by a Russian than by a German danger which he sees increased by the recent shift in the High Command.	169	235
Feb. 10	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Möller's sentence has been reduced, but press comment should be guarded, since the Pärksen case is now coming before the Danish Supreme Court.	419	548
Feb. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV</i> The cabinet change in Rumania appears to have resulted not only from economic factors but also from French and British and perhaps American pressure on the Jewish question; no immediate change in foreign policy seems likely.	170	237
Feb. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> After talking with Minister Comnen, who said that much against his will he would be called back to Bucharest to take over the Foreign Ministry in the new cabinet, Weizsäcker reported to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that no sudden change in Rumanian foreign policy need be feared.	171	238
Feb. 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In order to counter Jewish-liberal press attacks on Germany for refusing to participate in the Eucharistic Congress, Ribbentrop would favor German participation in the Hungarian national celebration of the 900-year jubilee of St. Stephen; he will ask the Führer's approval.	172	238
Feb. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker has been assured by the Belgian Minister that a recent meeting of Belgian diplomats in Brussels brought no change of policy; Belgium would continue steadily on her "policy of independence."	487	644
Feb. 22	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Köcher reports on Swiss reactions to the Führer's speech of February 20.	508	673



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1938			
Feb. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Turks are treating the German proposals for an agreement on the Straits question in a dilatory fashion in order to avoid an irrevocable commitment.	540	716
Feb. 28	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Hungary</i> A proposal made to State Secretary Bohle by the Hungarian Foreign Minister's <i>chef de cabinet</i> , Count Csáky, indicates that the Hungarians are now thinking of a unilateral military guarantee by Germany of the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier; clarification is to be sought from Kánya himself.	173	239
Mar. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told Yugoslav Minister Cincar-Markovich that Germany would brook no intervention by other powers in the Austrian question; Germany was armed in the west and would know how to defend herself; Cincar-Markovich said that his Government regarded Austria as an internal German affair.	174	242
Mar. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The special negotiators sent by King Boris to Berlin have agreed to limit the arms credit to Bulgaria to 30 million reichsmarks but refuse to reduce the period of repayment from 8 to 5 years; they will attempt to carry their argument to Göring.	175	242
Mar. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> To questions from Ribbentrop, Davignon replied that Belgium was building fortifications on her border with France, had no General Staff exchanges with her any longer, and had no air agreement with Britain.	488	645
Mar. 7	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hungary has made an attempt to resume negotiations with the Little Entente for a pact recognizing Hungary's military equality in exchange for a pledge of nonaggression, but Rumania has failed to respond to the initiative.	176	244
Mar. 7	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Kánya explained that Csáky's proposal for a unilateral German military guarantee of the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier had been his personal suggestion only; since the Führer had not felt able apparently to press the original Hungarian proposal on Stoyadinovich, Hungary could do no more.	177	245
Mar. 7	<i>Minister Erdmannsdorff to Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker</i> The Minister in Hungary points out that already on his November visit to Berlin Kánya offered to guarantee the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier in exchange for a pledge of Yugoslav neutrality; contrary to the German record of this conversation, he had not asked also for cultural autonomy for the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia.	178	247
Mar. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Chile to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schoen assesses the possible influence of United States pressure upon Chilean neutrality.	596	821

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1938 Mar. 9	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> In an analysis of the situation in Rumania which led to the fall of the anti-Semitic Goga government, it is stated that German policy has suffered no setback, since, although there was an ideological affinity with Goga, no close ties had been developed with him, and the King, who has in effect erected a royal dictatorship, appears inclined to draw closer to Germany.	179	249
Mar. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Dutch sentiments and interests both dictate an attempt to remain neutral in a Western European war but to join with Britain against Germany if necessary.	489	645
Mar. 10	<i>Memorandum of Referat Deutschland</i> The Ministry of the Interior, about to submit a memorandum on Jewish emigration to the Führer, has requested the opinions of other agencies; with the exception of the Commercial Policy Department, all interested departments of the Foreign Ministry oppose the concentration of Jewish emigration in Palestine and continuation of the Haavara system.	580	785
Mar. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Hungarian Minister expressed his gratitude that he had been able to speak to the new Foreign Minister at length; Sztójay had reminded him that Germany had promised to inform Hungary in advance of any intention to conclude a nonaggression pact with Czechoslovakia.	180	253
Mar. 12	<i>Secret Protocol Between Germany and Bulgaria</i> Germany will deliver war matériel to the value of 30 million reichsmarks within a period of two years; payment will be made in part in raw materials, the remainder to be financed by a 5-year credit which will begin to fall due in 1942.	181	254
Mar. 12	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior</i> It is recommended that the Baltic Aid Society again be permitted to collect funds for the support of the German minority in the Baltic states; however, this campaign must be kept secret from the public and especially from the Latvian Legation.	320	426
Mar. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Moltke has been informed that Poland regarded events in Austria with complete calm; her interests there were economic and she assumed that these would not be prejudiced.	32	41
Mar. 15	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> A Polish soldier has been shot by a Lithuanian frontier guard and the Lithuanians fear that this incident might result in a Polish demand for restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries.	321	427
Mar. 16	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> It has been suggested by a private source that Germany consider returning to Hungary the territory incorporated in Austria by the Treaty of Trianon; the Führer is alleged to have made such a promise to the late Minister President Gömbös.	182	255

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Mar. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Lithuanian Minister, in giving Mackensen an account of the border incident, said that Polish demands for a resumption of diplomatic relations seemed imminent.	322	428
Mar. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> The War Ministry has inquired whether military and naval preparations should be made for a German advance into the Memel Territory in case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict; Bismarck replied that this question would be referred to higher authorities.	323	429
Mar. 16	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> On the basis of reports from Warsaw, the Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister thought that Poland would use military force against Lithuania and that the latter would give in, since she could not expect military support from any power.	324	430
Mar. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II</i> Rintelen records a conversation with an official of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle about the possibility of a Nazi Government in Liechtenstein.	509	675
Mar. 16	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Köcher requests instructions on Germany's attitude toward the neutrality and possible mutual defense of Switzerland and Liechtenstein.	510	676
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Hungarian Minister said it appeared from press reports that all states now neighbors of Germany as a result of the reincorporation of Austria, except Hungary, had received assurances of the inviolability of their frontiers; a similar pledge to Hungary would enable the Government to counter its Jewish and press opposition.	183	256
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Yugoslav Minister reported instructions of his Government to frontier officials to cooperate with German officials on the former Austrian frontier, and suggested a German statement as to the inviolability of this frontier; to the Minister's query on British reaction, Mackensen replied that he thought they would come to regard <i>Anschluss</i> as a sound development.	184	257
Mar. 17	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich offered his congratulations on the <i>Anschluss</i> ; he said he felt sure that fears being raised by his opposition about the fate of the Slovenian minority in Austrian Carinthia were groundless; Heeren assured him that they were.	185	259
Mar. 17	<i>Note by the Foreign Minister for the Führer</i> An official of the Polish Foreign Ministry told Moltke that in settlement of the recent border incident, Poland would be satisfied with nothing less than restoration of diplomatic relations with Lithuania.	325	431
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Moltke reported that a Polish communiqué spoke of "appropriate steps" to be taken, without specifying them; the nationalist opposition was going farther in its demands on Lithuania than the Government.	326	431

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Mar. 17	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> Moltke telephoned that a small newspaper had published the text of an alleged Polish note to Lithuania which contained far-reaching demands.	327	432
Mar. 17	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Lithuanian Minister expressed to Ribbentrop his Government's reluctance to accept a settlement with Poland which would imply Lithuanian renunciation of Vilna; Ribbentrop advised a realistic policy.	328	432
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Since a Polish-Lithuanian conflict is not in the German interest, Germany should urge Lithuania to accept the Polish demands; in case of an open conflict, Germany must occupy Memel immediately.	329	433
Mar. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck told Moltke that Polish demands on Lithuania would be moderate, but an unsatisfactory reply would have serious consequences; in that case, however, he promised to keep in touch with Germany if matters should become serious.	330	434
Mar. 18	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry gave the German Minister a copy of the Polish note and requested the friendly advice of the German Government.	331	436
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In a conversation with the Lithuanian Minister, Ribbentrop urged unconditional acceptance of the Polish proposals but refused to mediate in the conflict; he suggested also that release of German political prisoners in Lithuania would improve German-Lithuanian relations.	332	436
Mar. 18	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces to the Foreign Minister</i> The Army requests a decision by the Führer on its proposal for a German-Polish line of demarcation in anticipation of a German occupation of Memel in case of a Polish-Lithuanian military conflict.	333	437
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop informed Lipski of his refusal to comply with a Lithuanian request for German mediation and stressed that Germany expected to be notified in advance if Poland should take action against Lithuania.	334	438
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department</i> Germany might be able to bring about a peaceful re-incorporation of the Memel Territory by offering aid in developing a substitute port on the coast of Lithuania.	335	438
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Detailed listing of German complaints regarding Lithuanian violations of the Memel Statute in political, economic and cultural affairs.	336	440

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1938			
Mar. 18	<i>The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Belgium has been thrown into a violent state of alarm by the German entry into Austria; Spaak says he is doing what he can to calm public opinion, but insists that the German "methods" have given a justifiable basis for the public's attitude.	490	647
Mar. 18	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Minister in Switzerland</i> Weizsäcker directs Köcher not to oppose moves toward neutralization of Liechtenstein, but to show surprise at any talk of her inclusion in the Swiss defense system.	511	677
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle</i> The Fatherland Union in Liechtenstein is calling for Anschluss with Germany.	512	677
Mar. 19	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Fabricius denied to King Carol that the German Legation had transmitted a telegram for the Iron Guard leader Codreanu; the King said that would be a "very serious matter" and suggested that he would welcome a German declaration disavowing the Iron Guard.	186	260
Mar. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Moltke was informed of Lithuania's unconditional acceptance of the Polish demands, and of Beck's grateful appreciation of the Reich Foreign Minister's attitude in this conflict.	337	441
Mar. 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Lithuanian Minister in Moscow stated that Foreign Commissar Litvinov, displaying great interest in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, had told him that he could not object to the Polish demands; that, however, a continuation of the conflict might lead to a dangerous situation; the Lithuanian expressed scepticism as to the possibility of Soviet assistance in case of a military conflict with Poland.	338	442
Mar. 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Lithuanian Military Attaché in Moscow expressed regret over Lithuania's past failure to accept Soviet offers of political and military cooperation; in his view Poland wanted to seize all of Lithuania to compensate for the anticipated loss of the Corridor.	339	443
Mar. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Moltke believed that the Polish-Lithuanian crisis gave evidence of Poland's desire to develop a Baltic policy by gradually acquiring hegemony over Lithuania, and particularly control of Memel, a development which would be serious for German interests.	33	41
Mar. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires informed Mackensen that his Government consented to the setting up of a Landeskreis of the Auslandsorganisation in Hungary provided it was called not Landeskreis Hungary but "in" Hungary.	187	261

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1938			
Mar. 22	<i>The State Secretary to the Minister in Switzerland</i> Mackensen directs Köcher to deny rumors of an impending German attack on Switzerland.	513	678
Mar. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> On instructions from Ribbentrop, the Foreign Ministry has drawn up a detailed list of grievances relating to the tendency of the Lithuanian authorities in the Memel Territory forcibly to assimilate the Memel Germans to the rest of the Lithuanian population.	340	444
Mar. 23	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> The Embassy is instructed to point out to the Italian Government that in regard to the Montreux Convention, German and Italian naval interests are identical; thus it is desirable that the two countries currently exchange information on their negotiations with Turkey in this matter.	541	718
Mar. 24	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Kánya has made a parliamentary address intended to calm Hungarian opinion alarmed by the <i>Anschluss</i> ; he said that the cultivation of friendship with Germany would remain one of the main objects of Hungarian policy.	188	263
Mar. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Weizsäcker emphasized to Saulys the desirability of allowing German political prisoners to return to the Memel Territory after their release; he insisted upon Germany's right to official discussions of Memel affairs with Lithuania.	341	446
Mar. 25	<i>The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Richthofen calls attention to the fears that have been aroused in Belgium by events in Austria in connection with the unresolved problem of Eupen-Malmédy; he suggests that these might be exploited to effect early return of the territory by negotiation.	491	650
Mar. 26	<i>The Minister in Peru to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schmitt urges that Peru be allocated the 88 mm. guns asked for by President Benavides; he thinks this would demonstrate to the coming Pan-American Conference that Peru could defend herself even against the United States Air Force.	597	822
Mar. 28	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Department of the OKW</i> Grundherr reports that he told the Finnish Commander in Chief that Germany would not oppose fortification of the Åland Islands.	420	548
Mar. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister has requested Schacht not to raise the Eupen-Malmédy question on his visit to Brussels; the Legation is to be instructed that it is desired to have the Belgians take up the question on their own initiative.	492	651
Mar. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> The Mexican statement in the League of Nations denouncing the annexation of Austria should be answered not by an official protest but by an expression of surprise; Germany stands for self-determination.	598	823

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1938 Mar. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter reports on anti-German sentiment in Brazilian official circles; it seems to be based largely on the nonassimilation of the Volksdeutsche into Brazilian culture.	599	824
Mar. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Lipski pointed out that the new German census law placed the Polish minority under undue pressure; Ribbentrop stated his desire for closer cooperation with Poland against Communism, but did not openly invite Poland's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	34	44
Mar. 31	<i>Minister Renthe-Fink to Senior Counselor Grundherr</i> The Minister in Denmark urges that the German minority's banking institution, the Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang, must not be compromised by the militant political activities of its official, Stehr.	421	549
Apr. 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In presenting proposals for economic talks to embrace Austria in the existing Polish-German Trade Treaty, Lipski pointed out that Beck had told Göring as early as January 14 that Poland would assert no political interest in the Austrian question but would expect economic concessions in return.	35	46
Apr. 4	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Köcher reports that, as instructed, he notified the Swiss Government that Germany could not accept the inclusion of Liechtenstein in the Swiss national defense system.	514	679
Apr. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Turkish Ambassador assured Ribbentrop of Turkey's genuine desire to keep out of all coalitions of powers and referred to her rejection of a Russian offer for an assistance pact; Hamdi Arpag promised to see to Ribbentrop's complaint about the attitude of the Turkish press.	542	719
Apr. 6	<i>The Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Ministry of the Interior has provided a Reich contribution of 14,200 RM to cultivate Germanism in the Nordmark; an equal sum will be granted annually in the Prussian budget.	422	550
Apr. 7	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Belgium</i> During Schacht's visit to Brussels the former secretary of the King of the Belgians asked him whether an arrangement by which the Walloon villages of Eupen and Malmédy were retained by Belgium and other purely German villages were returned would be acceptable; Schacht said he thought so.	493	651
Apr. 8	<i>The Minister in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rüdt has noticed no United States effort to create sentiment against Germany; on the other hand, there seems to be a real attempt to disrupt Mexican-German oil negotiations; there is a strong current of anti-fascism in Mexico.	600	827
Apr. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Moltke expressed German satisfaction to Beck over the latter's earlier promise to consult with Germany in case of an aggravation of the conflict with Lithuania and stressed Germany's permanent interest in Lithuanian affairs.	342	447

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1938			
Apr. —	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Fabricius</i> No initiative toward the development of closer relations with Rumania is to be undertaken; the effect of developing economic ties is to be awaited.	189	265
Apr. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Hungarian Minister presented a private note urging the advantages of a settlement of the Hungarian-Yugoslav border issue to release Hungarian forces for possible military action against Czechoslovakia; German-Hungarian staff talks are desirable for this latter contingency.	190	266
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Hitler-Stoyadinovich conversation did not reveal to what extent Hungary is willing to accept the present Hungarian-Yugoslav border in exchange for a neutrality guarantee by Yugoslavia; Heeren might now state the Hungarian view more precisely in Belgrade.	191	267
Apr. 11	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary</i> The subject of German-Hungarian staff talks should be avoided; General Keitel has put off the Hungarians until some time during the summer.	192	268
Apr. 13	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Erdmannsdorff</i> Inquiries as to the possibility that Germany might turn over the Austrian Burgenland to Hungary should be answered with a flat negative; the Führer regards the Hungarian frontier as definitive, and there are more Germans in Hungary than Hungarians in the Burgenland.	193	269
Apr. 13	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink recommends some reply in the German press to Munch's defense of the frontier established by the Versailles settlement; in a marginal note, the opinion of the Foreign Ministry is stated that the matter is not important enough to pursue.	423	551
Apr. 13	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink reports that the Oslo meeting of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers reached no major decisions; the League of Nations, the Hull refugee proposal, and proposed neutrality regulations were discussed.	424	552
Apr. 19	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> A speech in the Folketing by the Deputy for the German minority has stimulated Danish fears for their boundary with Germany, and the evident increase of German power has excited the minority; the latter should be restrained in order that the boundary issue may be raised at a moment suitable to Germany.	425	553
Apr. 21	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> No progress has been made toward an accord between Hungary and the Little Entente; Hungary no longer regards the right to rearm as a major concession; efforts to separate Yugoslavia from the other two states have so far failed.	194	270



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1938			
Apr. 21	<i>Minister Erdmannsdorff to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Although the Hungarian Government has been criticized for not seizing the Burgenland, Erdmannsdorff has not been approached officially; the principal interest seems to lie in the hope of gains at the expense of Czechoslovakia.	195	271
Apr. 21	<i>The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> Langmann reports that despite various countertendencies, Uruguay would support Great Britain and the United States in any conflict with Germany.	601	330
Apr. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> On receiving the new Rumanian Minister, Djuvara, the Führer told him that Germany had no territorial aspirations in the Balkans and was pursuing only economic aims; further, Germany was disinterested with respect to territorial issues between Balkan states.	196	273
Apr. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told Djuvara that in consequence of the <i>Anschluss</i> Germany hoped to increase trade with Rumania; their common stand against Bolshevism was also a basis for good relations.	197	273
Apr. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Heeren was instructed to remind Stoyadinovich of the Hungarian offer of a frontier guarantee in exchange for a nonaggression treaty, and to tell him also that Germany would welcome his using his influence with the Czechs for a direct settlement between them and the Sudeten Germans.	198	274
Apr. 29	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> The Italian Chargé d'Affaires was informed that Germany would not object if Italy acceded to the Montreux Convention without insisting on a simultaneous agreement between Turkey and Germany; thus there was also no further interest in the Italo-German naval conversations on the same subject.	543	721
Apr. —	<i>Memorandum of the Cultural Policy Department</i> Brazil is taking various measures against foreign schools and political organizations; similar steps are expected elsewhere in South America, partly at the instigation of the United States; cooperation with Italian diplomats in South America is recommended.	602	332
May 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann told Swiss Minister Dinichert that Germany would receive favorably Switzerland's proposed statement to the League of Nations on her neutrality.	515	680
May 5	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher reports that Holsti told him the Aland question was not raised in the Oslo Conference; Finland and Sweden seem to differ on how the question should be handled.	426	555
May 5	<i>Senior Counselor Grundherr to Minister Renthe-Fink</i> Grundherr asks Renthe-Fink for a full report on the Nordic Society, which is under fire from all sides.	427	556
May 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich frustrated an attempt by Czechoslovakia to have the Little Entente constitute itself a front against Germany; the Council of the three states resolved to continue negotiations with Hungary.	199	274

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1938			
May 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> In the military talks which accompanied the meeting of the Little Entente, Yugoslavia in effect withdrew its offer to commit troops in the event of an attack by Hungary on one of the other members.	200	275
May 7	<i>The Ambassador in Chile to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schoen discusses official and unofficial Chilean attitudes toward Germany; the country is basically not unfriendly, but external pressures and influences, chiefly from the United States, may lead it to take measures similar to those of Brazil.	603	834
May 9	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> In a long conversation with Saulys, Grundherr dwelt upon the familiar grievances of the Memel Germans, while the Lithuanian Minister complained about German propaganda against Lithuania; it was obvious that Lithuania was greatly concerned over the future of the Memel Territory.	343	449
May 11	<i>Memorandum of the Ministry of Economics</i> Lack of foreign exchange threatens to reduce the supply of aviation gasoline under minimum requirements; Göring's approval for additional sale of arms to Rumania is to be sought.	201	276
May 12	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter reports on the insurrection against President Vargas; he suggests that it be given "sensational" treatment in the German press; there are rumors of German complicity.	604	837
May 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The new Bulgarian Minister Draganov said that stories were going about Sofia that Germany intended to make an economic colony of the Balkans; intervention by Germans in Bulgarian domestic politics could also cause bad feeling.	202	278
May 13	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Munters, who is expected in Berlin shortly, is to be told that the new Latvian State Cultural Council would threaten the cultural activity of the German minority and further aggravate German-Latvian relations; recall of the Minister in Latvia should be considered.	344	453
May 13	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Several Nazis were arrested in São Paulo; the Brazilian Government is permitting propaganda charging that Germans organized the revolt of May 11.	605	839
May 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires discussed the question whether the League's presence in Geneva would be compatible with Swiss neutrality in time of war.	516	680
May 14	<i>The State Secretary to the Ambassador in Brazil</i> Weizsäcker asked the Brazilian Ambassador to try to persuade his Government to rescind the measures affecting Germans in Brazil; he authorized Ritter to sharpen the tone of his démarches.	606	839

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1938			
May 14	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter reports press accounts of alleged German complicity in the revolt of May 11; he would warn the Brazilian Government that continued agitation against Germany might injure good diplomatic relations between the two countries.	607	840
May 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker and Aschmann found little interest in Italy for collaboration in Brazilian questions.	608	841
May 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Brazil</i> Instructions for Ritter to give Ribbentrop his unreserved opinion as to whether Brazilian reproaches and measures against Germany have any factual justification.	609	842
May 17	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The indictment against Codreanu plainly implies but does not openly charge that he had connections with Germany; the Minister of the Interior has promised to keep Germany out of the proceedings in view of the reserve the Germans have lately shown toward the Iron Guard.	203	279
May 17	<i>Ambassador Keller to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> A Turkish request to admit an additional number of Turkish officers for assignment to German units should be granted for political reasons, in spite of objections from the military; in return, Germany might ask for certain minor concessions.	544	722
May 18	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr conveyed to Munters Germany's dissatisfaction with the poor treatment of the German minority in Latvia in economic and cultural matters; Munters was impressed by his emphasis on the agitation among Germans in the Reich and in the Baltic states and on the deterioration of German-Latvian relations resulting from it.	345	454
May 18	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter assures Ribbentrop that Germans in Brazil have given no provocation for anti-German measures.	610	842
May 18	<i>Circular of the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry</i> Bohle directs AO activities in Latin America to go underground; Reich nationals are to be dissociated from Volksdeutsche.	611	843
May 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Brazilian Ambassador expressed hope that the outstanding problems between the two countries could be cleared up; Weizsäcker replied that he was not so optimistic, and made certain demands.	612	843
May 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker describes an inconclusive private conversation with Argentine Ambassador Labougle, who was displeased by the activity of German nationals in his country.	613	845
May 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker summarizes a second private conversation with Labougle on German organizations in Argentina; Labougle recommends certain changes.	614	846

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1938 May 18	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Thermann proposes measures for reducing hostility toward German activities in Argentina.	615	848
May 19	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Nordic Society could be very useful if it were managed more intelligently.	428	559
May 20	<i>Minister Fabricius to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Not only is the prosecution of the Iron Guard very embarrassing for Germany but to destroy it will not be in the King's own interest; perhaps King Carol could be influenced through his uncle Prince Frederick of Hohenzollern.	204	281
May 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker describes an interview between Ribbentrop and Dinichert regarding Switzerland's reduced obligations in the League of Nations; Dinichert's note is attached.	517	681
May 20	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Gaus told Dinichert, unofficially, that he saw no occasion for Germany now to give any formal assurances respecting Swiss neutrality.	518	683
May 21	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassies in Argentina, Brazil and Chile</i> Weizsäcker directs the Ambassadors to study Italy's experience in organizing her nationals in Latin America.	616	852
May 22	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Comnen stated that documents found in the investigation of the Iron Guard showed that the latter's contacts with Nazi Party agencies still continued; he asked that steps be taken to stop this.	205	282
May 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Gauleiter Forster of Danzig had been well received on his unofficial visit to Poland, which Göring had promoted to counteract Forster's anti-Polish reputation.	36	46
May 25	<i>The Consulate General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Burckhardt reported to Danzig officials on his visit to Geneva; he found British Foreign Secretary Halifax sympathetic to the cause of Danzig, but the latter stated that because of opposition at home his Government was obliged to move cautiously.	37	48
May 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Dinichert told Woermann that the Swiss Government asked for a favorable reply to its note of May 20, or for no reply at all.	519	683
May 25	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter reports on a "small incident" between the Brazilian Foreign Minister and himself.	617	853
May 28	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bücher evaluates the activities of the Nordic Society in Finland.	429	560
May 28	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Northern European countries have agreed on new neutrality regulations; flight over Swedish waters in the Sound is provided for.	430	564

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May 31	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop informed Forster that he was to refrain from occupying himself with problems of the German minority in Poland.	38	51
May 31	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bulgarian opinion was entirely friendly to Germany during the crisis with Czechoslovakia despite the Slav relationship; Bulgaria's friendly neutrality can be counted on in case of war; it will be best for Germany if Bulgaria faces the future with as few commitments as possible.	206	283
June 1	<i>Counselor of Legation Freiherr von Bibra to State Secretary Böhle</i> Frölicher, the new Swiss Minister, has supported the AO in Switzerland; he may be helpful in an effort to regain official recognition of the Landesgruppe there.	520	684
June 2	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Counselor Below lists several blunders of the Nordic Society and recommends a new policy.	431	565
June 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker learned from Ambassador Attolico that Italy enjoyed a favorable position in Brazil and planned no protest at recent legislation; he suggested that Germany follow a more considerate policy.	618	854
June 3	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink finds that the Nordic Society has been fairly useful in Denmark.	432	571
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Changes in leadership of the Nordic Society.		573
June 3	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Renthe-Fink does not consider that an approach to Stauning on the frontier question through a personality known in Denmark as a German agent would be well-advised; he believes Stauning's domestic opposition would not permit him to discuss the question in any case.	433	574
June 4	<i>The Minister in Peru to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Minister reports that despite the absence of any real conflict of interests, Peruvian public opinion is gradually becoming suspicious of Germany.	619	854
June 7	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Fabricius</i> No intervention in Rumanian politics on behalf of the Iron Guard is desirable despite the ideological kinship and an indirect approach to the King would amount to intervention; an anti-Bolshevist policy in Rumania does not depend only on the Iron Guard.	207	284
June 7	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Thermann describes the position of Italian fascism in Argentina.	620	857
June 7	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Thermann warns of possible anti-German measures by Argentina; he attributes this danger to United States pressure and urges that provocative acts be avoided.	621	858

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June 9	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> It is suggested that the Foreign Minister call the attention of Lipski to the malicious exploitation by the Polish press of complaints made by the Polish minority in Germany, and renew the German proposal for a standing committee of experts on minorities.	39	52
June 9	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> It should be pointed out once more to the proper Rumanian authorities that Germany entertained no relations with Codreanu; his trial produced no evidence to support such charges.	208	285
June 9	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker records separate conversations with Attolico and Frölicher regarding Switzerland's neutrality.	521	686
June 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker pointed out to the Hungarian Minister that although Austria had tolerated the map propaganda claiming the province of Burgenland for Hungary, this territory now belonged to the Reich, and the situation was therefore altered.	209	286
June 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Lipski, who mentioned the complaints brought by the Polish minority, that minorities questions could only be handled on the basis of reciprocity, but did not go into the subject further as German minority complaints were to be saved for a more suitable moment.	40	53
June 13	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann records a conversation with Frölicher on improving press relations between Germany and Switzerland.	522	688
June 14	<i>Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> When Frölicher presented his credentials, the Führer expressed satisfaction that Switzerland had recovered her full neutrality.	523	688
June 14	<i>Memorandum by the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry</i> Bohle records a cordial conversation with Frölicher on the possibility of re-establishing the Landesgruppe in Switzerland.	524	689
June 17	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister requests that a dossier on grievances of the German minority in Poland be assembled so that he can employ it in eventual discussions with Lipski.	41	54
June 19	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Schulenburg reports that Litvinov has spoken to the Finnish and Swedish Ministers about the Åland question; both replied that in the absence of instructions they could not make any statement.	434	575

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1938			
June 20	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> A conference at the Ministry of the Interior agreed that some grievances of the Poles in Germany were justified and should be remedied, although complaints of Germans in Poland were far more serious; it was agreed to propose again to the Polish Government a standing committee of experts to take minorities questions out of politics.	42	54
June[21]	<i>Note to the Swiss Minister</i> Ribbentrop replies to the Swiss note of May 20; the German Government welcomes Switzerland's release from obligations likely to endanger her neutrality.	525	690
June 22	<i>Minister Rümelin to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> King Boris expressed his annoyance at tactless attempts of the Italian Minister to apply pressure for Bulgarian adherence to the Axis; he also said the Czechs were using Soviet funds for subversion in Bulgaria.	210	286
June 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Frölicher expresses the Swiss Government's gratitude for the German reply to the Swiss note of May 20.	526	690
June[24]	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop did not respond to the soundings of Lithuanian Foreign Minister Lozoraitis about a German-Lithuanian nonaggression pact, but expressed misgivings over Lithuania's ties with Russia and emphasized the need first for a fundamental change in the "unsatisfactory state of affairs in Memel."	346	457
June 24	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr told the Lithuanian Foreign Minister that the agitated state of mind of the Memellanders was a result of Lithuanian infringements of the Statute, not of German influence; Lithuania's distrust of the Memel Germans and of the Reich's ultimate aims was apparent in the discussion.	347	458
June 25	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Moltke advises that a new attempt be made to get Poland to agree to a standing technical commission on minority questions; if the attempt fails, the tactical position vis-à-vis Poland would at least be improved.	48	55
June 27	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ritter suspects that Kopp, a volksdeutsch Nazi, was murdered by police.	622	859
June 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Poland</i> Beck is to be informed that Germany is remedying the grievances of its Polish minority, but considers the complaints of Germans in Poland far more serious; to avoid deterioration in good-neighborly relations a joint study by experts of minority grievances is to be proposed.	44	57
June 29	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Copenhagen meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers will probably discuss problems of neutrality and the League of Nations; Munch thinks they will seek a formula of "impartiality" as distinct from mere neutrality.	435	576

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June 29	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> During the impending German-Turkish economic negotiations it will be possible to concede an increase of 75 percent in Turkish exports to Germany; this, as well as a possible offer of German credits to Turkey, would link her economically closer to Germany, thus counteracting England's recent efforts in Turkey.	545	723
June 29	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Embassy has been compromised by Kopp's misuse of its name in certain documents presumably now in the hands of Brazilian authorities.	623	860
June 30	<i>The Consulate General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Staatsrat Böttcher of Danzig was given a friendly reception by Halifax on his visit to London; in accordance with the Foreign Secretary's wish, he agreed to inform him in advance of any steps taken in Danzig which might become the subject of discussions in Geneva.	45	59
July 5	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Estonian Chief of State indicated his country's opposition to the passage of Soviet troops through its territory and hoped for German support in such a case; the Minister replied that Estonia's position would be stronger if Latvia would abandon her pro-Russian course.	348	460
July 5	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Menemencioglu, the leader of the Turkish economic delegation, stated Turkish wishes for an expansion of trade with Germany and for an increase in the guaranteed rate of exchange; he also said that no discrimination against Germany was implied in the new Anglo-Turkish credit agreement.	546	726
July 5	<i>The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Minister</i> Iraqi Foreign Minister, Taufik al-Suwaydi, said that already existing British sympathies for the Arabs in Palestine would be greatly intensified if Germany indicated to Britain that she favored the Arab cause in Palestine.	581	787
July 6	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> The Oslo States are to be discreetly advised to repudiate their obligations under article 16 of the League Covenant.	436	578
July 6	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> It is advisable to yield to the Turkish request for unrestricted exports to Germany and also to make some concessions in the question of the guaranteed rate of exchange.	547	728
July 7	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The press campaign planned on the situation of the German minority in Poland had better be abandoned since instructions telephoned by German newspapers to their correspondents in Poland will have revealed its purpose to the Poles.	46	61



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1938			
July 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker asked Davignon whether Belgium would be interested in raising the respective legations in Berlin and Brussels to embassies; the Belgian Minister said he thought such a step would be welcomed by his Government.	494	652
July 7	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In a conversation with Menemencioglu, Ribbentrop objected to the legal argument against Germany's accession to the Montreux Convention by a bilateral agreement, and also criticized Turkey's refusal to conclude with Germany an agreement on mutual neutrality.	548	730
July 8	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> The Foreign Minister is presented with an account of the grievances of the German minority in Poland, accompanied by the suggestion that he present the German plan for a standing commission on minorities to Lipski in support of the <i>démarche</i> being made in Warsaw.	47	61
July 8	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> The Foreign Minister rejected in principle the British Ambassador's suggestion that Germany should cooperate with the Evian conference in a solution of the problem of Jewish emigration by facilitating the transfer of Jewish capital.	640	894
July 9	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck, embarrassed by the excesses of the Polish press and Poland's failure to uphold the spirit of the Minorities Declaration, felt obliged to react favorably, at least in his provisional reply, to the German proposal for a commission on minorities.	48	63
July 14	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Attolico informed Weizsäcker that Italy had raised no objections to annulment of the military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly as agreed between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente.	211	288
July 15	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> King Carol was pleased with Göring's offer to deliver antiaircraft guns in exchange for additional oil from Rumania and would seek his Cabinet's approval; in Fabricius' view, prompt arms deliveries will foil British plans to erect an economic barrier against Germany in Southeastern Europe.	212	289
July 18	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Burckhardt told a representative of the Consulate General that provocative actions in Danzig alarming to other powers should be avoided, as German control was complete anyway; it was also in the German interest to preserve his reputation for objectivity; he had sought with some success to allay Polish suspicion of Germany.	49	65
July 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Polish reply to the German proposal for a minorities commission was favorable in principle but betrayed a desire, probably for tactical reasons, to treat the matter with reserve.	50	69

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1938 July 19	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Minister President Colijn says that the Netherlands is not ready to abrogate article 16 of the League Covenant; Foreign Minister Patijn has been instructed not to commit himself at the Copenhagen meeting of the Oslo Powers.	437	578
July 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hensel states that he presented the German view of neutrality to the Danish Foreign Ministry in anticipation of the impending conference of the Oslo Powers.	438	579
July 20	<i>The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Richthofen states that the Belgians prefer to call their policy "independent" rather than "neutral"; they seek some indirect way to cast off their obligations under article 16.	439	581
July 20	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Legation reports that Sweden stresses the optional character of League sanctions; she reserves full freedom of action.	440	582
July 20	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Chamberlain's remark that small nations should not rely on the League of Nations has not been forgotten in Finland; Holsti spoke optimistically of the League's future, however.	441	584
July 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ciano said that during their Rome visit the Hungarian Ministers indicated that in case of armed conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia Hungary would proceed against the latter; but they were concerned about the attitude of Yugoslavia.	213	290
July 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> It is intended to impress upon Dr. Neumann, the Memel German leader, during his impending visit to Berlin, the imperative need for a united German effort in the forthcoming election and for imposing stricter discipline on those who favor a quick and violent solution.	349	462
July 23	<i>The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a conversation with Richthofen, King Leopold showed great alarm and pessimism over the outcome of the German-Czech crisis.	495	654
July 26	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Göring's private visit to Denmark was greeted with unexpected and spontaneous cordiality.	442	585
July 26	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Köcher reports that Germany could count on little Swiss economic assistance in case of war.	527	691
July 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told the American Ambassador not to entertain the hope that Germany might cooperate with the Evian Intergovernmental Committee for Jewish refugees.	641	895

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1938			
July 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Minister President Imrédy evaded the question whether Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were discussed during his visit in Rome, but mentioned that Italy showed great interest in an improvement of these relations; the stand of Yugoslavia in case of a Hungarian military action against Czechoslovakia was also discussed.	214	291
July 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Hensel reports that the Copenhagen conference did not denounce article 16 or return to "prewar neutrality" as urged by Germany; the Spanish and refugee problems were also discussed.	443	586
July 29	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> A talk with Kánya on his visit to Rome leaves the impression that Italy made some promises but no binding commitment for the contingency of war between Hungary and Czechoslovakia; the Italians had urged coming to terms with Yugoslavia but Kánya felt that the minorities issue would not be easy to resolve.	215	293
July 30	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Radowitz describes a talk with Beck about the Copenhagen conference; the participants had expressed confidence in the Führer's peaceful intentions but were uneasy about Göring.	444	588
Aug. 1	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher analyzes possible Finnish attitudes in case of war; he concludes that factors unfavorable to Germany predominate.	445	589
Aug. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Thermann transmits the memorandum drawn up July 29 at Montevideo by the Chiefs of Missions to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.	624	863
Aug. 3	<i>The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry</i> Sahm reports that Foreign Minister Koht does not think "prewar neutrality" can be restored; circumstances, rather, must govern policies.	446	593
Aug. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann told the Lithuanian Minister that very few of the points raised by Germany in connection with the Memel Statute had so far been settled; Saulys replied that martial law would soon be terminated for all of Lithuania.	350	463
Aug. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> A summary of the recent German-Turkish economic negotiations concludes that Turkey was eager to demonstrate great interest in the development of her economic relations with Germany, and that the expected increase in German-Turkish trade will impede Britain's economic penetration of Turkey.	549	732

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1938 Aug. 9	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> A new attempt is being made to negotiate an agreement between Hungary and the Little Entente, but the main stumbling block is that Hungary does not want an agreement with the Czechs except at the price of larger concessions than she is demanding from the others.	216	295
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Clodius told the Bulgarian Minister that the present moment had been very ill-chosen from a political point of view for Bulgaria to enter into a loan agreement with France; it would also make it more difficult for Bulgaria to maintain a trade balance with Germany.	217	296
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Frölicher told Woermann that Switzerland was considering cutting down on Jewish immigration from Germany, reintroducing a visa requirement for German nationals.	642	895
Aug. 11	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Below reports that the Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry officially and confidentially notified him that Swedish-Finnish discussions were in progress on the Åland question.	447	594
Aug. 16	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumania has agreed to the purchase of antiaircraft guns to the value of 8,600,000 reichsmarks, of which 60 percent is to be paid for with supplementary oil shipments to be begun at once and completed by the first quarter of 1939.	218	298
Aug. 16	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> A summary of the recent economic and political negotiations with Turkey concludes that German-Turkish relations remain unchanged and that Turkey is still hesitant about reshaping and expanding these relations at present.	550	735
Aug. 18	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> There are signs of progress in negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente and the Bled meeting of the latter is expected to issue a statement promising early success; there is some belief, however, that Hungary will not settle with Czechoslovakia until the outcome of the Sudeten German issue is known.	219	298
Aug. 19	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Rumanian Minister in Budapest has stated that negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente have broken down because of Hungary's refusal to reciprocate the far-reaching concessions on minorities offered by Czechoslovakia.	220	300
Aug. 22	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> State Secretary Menemencioglu called entirely unfounded recent French propaganda presenting the Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship as a French diplomatic victory that had brought Turkey into the London-Paris alliance; it might be advisable for Germany to stage a counterpropaganda campaign.	551	736

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1938			
Aug. —	<i>Senior Counselor Schliep to Obergruppenführer Lorenz</i> In a draft letter which was not sent it was argued that relations with the German minority in Poland should be conducted through a central agency which would not, however, attempt direct control of the minority's affairs; Reich policy may require temporary disregard of the minority's interests, but the preservation of the minority is a long-range interest of the Reich.	51	69
Aug. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Hungarian Regent Horthy on his visit to Berlin offered Hungarian intercession in Warsaw for return of the Corridor to Germany, but the Führer asked that such a step not be undertaken.	52	74
Aug. 26	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> The Bled announcement that the Little Entente had concluded an agreement with Hungary not yet to be published occasioned surprise in Berlin; the Hungarians have been told that the moment for relieving pressure on Czechoslovakia was ill-chosen.	221	300
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII</i> During a brief visit to Berlin Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Fuad Bey Hamza, though stressing Ibn Saud's special ties with England, spoke of the King's sympathy for Germany and of his confidence in her Near Eastern policy; Hentig outlined a cultural exchange program between Germany and the Arab countries.	582	789
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Bulgarian Minister assured Weizsäcker that the loan obtained from France was from private sources, was tentative in its terms and involved no political features whatever.	222	301
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum</i> Estonian Foreign Minister Selter promised Dr. Karl Megerle that Estonia would soon issue a declaration of absolute neutrality; Megerle feels that in view of her fear of Russia, Estonia might with German support become the leading power of the Baltic Entente.	351	464
Aug. 31	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Belgium would make every effort to preserve neutrality in a European war, but if forced to take sides, the increasingly anti-German tenor of public opinion would require any Belgian Government to declare for Britain and France.	496	655
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Kánya has made it clear in several public statements that by the provisional agreement between Hungary and the Little Entente announced at Bled, Hungary has not come to any agreement with Czechoslovakia renouncing the use of force.	223	302
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Moltke reports a widespread increase of anti-German agitation in Poland as a result of the Sudeten crisis; the Polish Government is doing nothing to restrict this tendency which will in future hamper its freedom of decision in relations with Germany.	53	75

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1938	<i>Editors' Note</i> Documents dealing with Poland's role in the September crisis over the Sudetenland published in volume II.		78
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> A representative of the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP spoke to Woermann about a proposed armament credit for Saudi Arabia which had been under negotiation for some time and requested a speedy approval by the Foreign Ministry.	583	791
Sept. 6	<i>An Official of the Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a public speech Imrédy interpreted the Bled Agreement to mean that Hungarian military equality was now recognized but pending settlement of the minorities issue in Czechoslovakia no more far-reaching agreement with the Little Entente was possible.	224	304
Sept. 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Assurances have been obtained from the Belgian Foreign Ministry that no special military measures had been taken opposite the German frontier; Belgium was determined to remain neutral but might have to adopt special security measures later if the Germans did so.	497	657
Sept. 15	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Turkey is to be informed that Germany is prepared to guarantee a credit to Turkey of 150 million marks; in view of alleged French intentions to offer Turkey a similar credit, the German proposal ought to be transmitted promptly.	552	738
Sept. 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Davignon called attention to Belgium's complete fidelity to her policy of independence and neutrality during the Czech crisis; Bülow-Schwante suggests that a friendly word of appreciation be conveyed to the Belgian Minister for his efforts in this connection.	498	658
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr evaded the Lithuanian Chargé d'Affaires' question as to whether the Führer's statements in Nuremberg regarding the right of self-determination applied also to the Memel Germans; voluntary acceptance by Lithuania of this right for the Memellanders in return for economic concessions was suggested by a Lithuanian journalist.	352	466
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr describes a long conversation with the departing Swedish Naval Attaché on Scandinavian neutrality and Swedish ore deliveries.	448	595
Sept. 21	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Finland</i> Woermann directs Blücher not to discuss the Åland question with the Finnish Government except perhaps to indicate that Germany would not "make difficulties" for Finland.	449	596

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1938			
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Brazilian Government objects to Ritter's resuming his post there; the matter will be referred to Ribbentrop.	625	868
Sept. 23	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Discussions on the credit agreement are to be speeded up as much as possible since Minister Funk considers it important that during his stay in Ankara an agreement be signed, or at least a complete accord in the negotiations be publicly announced.	553	739
Sept. 24	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> In the light of the Czechoslovak mobilization Hungary has informed Yugoslavia and Rumania that she regarded the Bled Agreement as binding with respect to the latter two countries.	225	306
Sept. 24	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Grundherr circulates reports and comments on recent Finnish and Swedish utterances on the Åland question.	450	597
Sept. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II</i> Frölicher asks Rintelen for assurances that Switzerland will receive needed supplies even in time of war; similar assurances are being sought of France and Italy.	528	692
Sept. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Auslandsorganisation</i> Results of a conference between Thermann and Party officials on German activities in Argentina are presented to Bohle.	626	869
Sept. 26	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> There is no threat to German interests implied in the recent loan obtained by Bulgaria from French sources; Bulgaria would prefer to buy arms in Germany and will do so if pending negotiations for a new arms credit of 45 million reichsmarks work out favorably.	226	306
Sept. 26	<i>An Official of the Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi Party to the Foreign Ministry</i> A speedy decision is urged as to whether there is a political necessity for credits to Saudi Arabia since the Arabs are now pressing for a final answer.	584	792
Sept. 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Consulate General in Memel</i> The Czechoslovak crisis does not alter Germany's policy of vigorous support for the autonomy demands of the Memellanders; the principles contained in the Führer's Nuremberg speech of September 12 apply to the Memel problem also.	353	469
Sept. 28	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Munch assured Renthe-Fink that Denmark would preserve neutrality and participate in no sanctions against Germany if a general war should result from the Czech crisis; Denmark's participation in a mediation action was under study.	451	598
Sept. 28	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bech inquires whether, in the event of war, Germany would abide by her previously stated position, that she would respect the inviolability of Luxembourg territory.	499	659

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1938 Sept. 29	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Through a court official King Carol has put out a feeler toward closer relations with Germany; the King wants to learn whether Germany would give backing against Russia since the possibility of French aid seems more and more remote.	227	307
Sept. 29	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Latvian Foreign Minister replied rather vaguely to the question whether Latvia would consider her neutrality violated by flights over her territory; a German declaration that she would not encroach upon Latvian territory would help him in advocating a policy of strict neutrality for Latvia.	354	469
Sept. 29	<i>The Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi Party</i> In view of Ibn Saud's pro-British orientation, the Foreign Ministry cannot at present recommend the armament credit to Saudi Arabia; however, the matter should be discussed again after a report is received from the German Minister who is soon going to Jidda.	585	793
Sept. 30	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Fabricius thinks that there are many possibilities for developing closer relations with Rumania—by aiding rearmament, grain purchases, even a limited promise of support against Russia—and urges that steps in this direction be taken at once.	228	309
Sept. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann describes his conversation with the Brazilian Ambassador concerning the demand for Ritter's recall.	627	872
Oct. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck informed Moltke that an ultimatum had been issued to Czechoslovakia demanding immediate cession of Teschen; he inquired whether the German attitude would be benevolent if armed action should prove necessary.	54	78
Oct. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told Ciano by telephone that Germany could not go as far as Italy in urging restraint in Warsaw; he then informed Lipski that while Germany hoped Czech-Polish hostilities would not occur, Germany's attitude would be benevolent.	55	79
Oct. 1	<i>The Legation in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché in Prague reports Czech acceptance of the Polish demand for Teschen; military authorities of the two parties have met to arrange the transfer.	56	80
Oct. 1	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> On being informed of the intention to introduce new racial laws in Danzig, Burckhardt advised postponement; the British had assured him there would be no difficulties with the League if the scheduled elections were held first.	670	945
Oct. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Luxembourg</i> Germany's position on the inviolability of Luxembourg territory is unchanged from that which has been stated in recent negotiations.	500	660



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1938			
Oct. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker suggested to Lipski that steps should be taken to reach agreement on a demarcation line between the German and Polish plebiscite areas in Czechoslovakia; he did not think any overlapping was desirable.	57	81
	<i>Editors' Note</i> The Hungarian demands presented to Czechoslovakia on October 3, 1938.		310
Oct. 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Brazil</i> Weizsäcker directs the Chargé d'Affaires to request the recall of the Brazilian Ambassador in Berlin.	628	874
Oct. 3	<i>The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of German Police to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a new German-Swiss visa agreement regulating the entry of Jews into Switzerland, whereby the need for reintroduction of a general visa requirement is obviated.	643	896
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Göring told Weizsäcker it was essential that the area south of the southeastern corner of Silesia become German; if the Poles disputed this, Danzig might be traded for it; otherwise, it would be best to pass it to the Czechs.	58	81
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> A representative of the German iron industry pointed out that acquisition of Teschen by the Poles raised a danger that they would also acquire Witkowitz, which had a valuable coal and iron industry; Wiehl replied that an effort was being made to include the place in the German plebiscite area.	59	82
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker informed Lipski that a conflict of German and Polish claims in Czechoslovakia would need to be discussed, but did not mention Oderberg; when this is claimed by Germany, Lipski will allege promises made by Hitler and Göring; the latter denies that he has made any.	60	82
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Führer's decision is requested as to whether the German claim to the Czech town of Oderberg, also claimed by the Poles, should be pressed in Warsaw following Lipski's refusal to transmit Woermann's statement on the subject to his Government.	61	83
Oct. 4	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich expressed satisfaction over the gains made by Germany at Munich, but Yugoslavia would be alarmed if Hungarian claims on Czechoslovakia were pressed to the point of demanding territory other than that occupied by the Hungarian minority.	229	311
Oct. 4	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey</i> A Turkish request for a credit of RM 40 million for the purchase of aviation equipment is looked upon favorably by Germany; the Embassy is instructed to give an opinion and to avoid discussions with the Turks meanwhile.	554	740

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Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Clodius agrees with the Ministry of Economics that relations with Brazil are very important for Germany; unfortunately, the present unpleasantness was initiated by the Brazilians.	629	874
Oct. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> The Führer decided that there was no German interest in the acquisition of Oderberg; he preferred to be generous rather than to haggle with the Poles.	62	84
Oct. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann informed representatives of the German minority in Teschen that Germany would not support an appeal for a plebiscite there; and warned them against the armed resistance to the Polish occupation which they planned.	63	85
Oct. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann refused to discuss with the Lithuanian Minister the Führer's recent statement that Germany had no longer any territorial claims and he again urged a speedier fulfillment of German wishes regarding conditions in the Memel Territory.	355	471
Oct. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reviewing Polish policy during the Czech crisis, Moltke finds it marked by a desire to pursue an independent course and aimed at making Poland the decisive factor in Eastern Europe at the head of a bloc of states constituting a security zone against both Russia and Germany.	64	85
Oct. 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comnen expressed his concern at Hungarian attempts to acquire from Czechoslovakia territory occupied by Slovaks and Ruthenians; Fabricius replied that while Germany was not supporting such claims by Hungary he did not think his Government would wish to intervene.	230	312
Oct. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker informed Lipski on "higher authority" that the Polish claim to Oderberg would not be disputed, but Germany would ask consideration for her economic interests, and would expect that there be no deterioration in the position of the German minority.	65	88
Oct. 7	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Fabricius has replied to queries about development of German-Rumanian relations that Rumania should initiate proposals, that a better tone in the press was desirable; he pointed out that Germany's controlled economy could take Rumania's grain surplus and Germany was willing to assist rearmament.	231	313
Oct. 7	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The dramatic events of recent weeks demonstrating the superior power of the Axis over the Western democracies has caused a feeling of panic in Yugoslavia; favorable feeling for Germany has been reversed and can be won back only if Germany makes it clear she will not misuse her power against either Czechs or Yugoslavs.	232	315

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1938			
Oct. 7	<i>The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry</i> In case of war many young Germans would probably openly side with Germany, in spite of Estonian neutrality, thus seriously endangering the German minority; they might be influenced, however, by a letter from the Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle stating Germany's interest in the preservation of Estonian neutrality.	356	472
Oct. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Poles have promised full consideration for German interests in rail and canal traffic in the Oderberg region; Germans resident there may leave with their property and those remaining will be treated in accordance with the Minorities Declaration.	66	89
Oct. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> In talks with the Hungarians Beck promised Poland's full support to Hungarian claims upon the Carpatho-Ukraine; Rumanian opposition has been disregarded in the interest of obtaining a common Polish-Hungarian frontier.	67	90
Oct. 8	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> While the Metaxas Government which is not anti-German might wish to remain neutral in a general war, internal and external pressure would prevent this; Greek public opinion and press were hostile and unfair to the German viewpoint during the Czech crisis.	233	316
Oct. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The semi-official Polish press explains the occupation of Oderberg ahead of schedule as due to the formation of German shock troops there; continued agitation about Mährisch-Ostrau reveals Poland has not given up hope of obtaining it.	68	92
Oct. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Calling on Weizsäcker to arrange for his reception in his new rank of Belgian Ambassador, Davignon expressed the view that following France's abandonment of her East European alliances at Munich the cultivation of Franco-German ties was the best line for German policy.	501	661
Oct. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> The visit to Turkey of Funk which led to an accord on the credit agreement is considered by diplomatic circles here as an important political event, indicating the decline of Russian power as well as Turkey's decision to avoid a one-sided pro-British policy.	555	741
Oct. 11	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> A decree of the Ministry of the Interior rules that all German passports of Jews be stamped with a red "J"; this has become necessary as a result of the agreement of September 29 with Switzerland.	644	898
Oct. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Lipski that the free hand given Poland on Oderberg could not be extended to Mährisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz where, if there was any question of a Czech withdrawal, Germany would demand a plebiscite; Lipski denied his Government had designs on these places.	69	92

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1938			
Oct. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Information and Press Department</i> The Foreign Minister, after conferring with the Führer, upheld the instruction that the press was to carry no material unfavorable to Poland; incidents involving the German minority were also excluded.	70	93
Oct. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker describes a conversation in Berlin with the Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry on a proposed Swedish-Finnish arrangement for the Åland Islands.	452	600
Oct. 13	<i>State Secretary Bohle to Ambassador Thermann</i> Bohle issues special instructions for German organizations in Argentina.	630	875
Oct. 14	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Poland has demanded the cession of additional territory by Czechoslovakia, failing which the Poles will demand a still larger plebiscite area.	71	93
Oct. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr expressed surprise to Zechlin at Lithuania's failure in view of recent events to remove the restrictions on Memel's autonomy; it was regrettable that the Führer's remarks concerning territorial demands were being distorted by Lithuanian propaganda.	357	474
Oct. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> The Finnish Minister told Grundherr that the Swedish Government had consented to fortification of the Åland Islands solely from fear of a German attack on them.	453	601
Oct. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Moltke has received Polish representations against Ukrainian propaganda activity originating in Germany, especially on the Vienna radio, and requests authorization to make a reassuring reply.	72	94
Oct. 15	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> With the prospect that British offers of assistance to Rumania in disposing of her grain surplus will come to nothing, the time is ripe for Germany to come forward with an offer; the effect of the transaction would be to bind Rumania more closely to Germany.	234	318
Oct. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker informed Greiser in response to the latter's inquiries that no provocation of the Poles was indicated at the moment, and that the enactment of anti-Jewish laws by Danzig might be examined further in the light of Poland's reaction.	73	95
Oct. 17	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky requested that Germany exercise a restraining influence on Poland which was now demanding territory that was almost wholly Czech-populated; he wished to settle the remaining frontier disputes quickly so that the Führer's guarantee to Czechoslovakia might take effect.	74	96

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1938			
Oct. 17	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> Germany is willing to meet the Rumanian desire for the development of closer relations; expansion of trade is possible, but on the political side it is up to the Rumanians to indicate how they visualize such a development.	235	321
Oct. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Lipski called to solicit German support for the Hungarian territorial claims in Slovakia; Weizsäcker replied vaguely that influence had been brought to bear in Prague, that Germany hoped for a direct settlement, but that he lacked recent information on the status of the negotiations.	75	96
Oct. 18	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Köcher reports on Swiss neutrality, military measures, and public opinion during the Czech crisis.	529	693
Oct. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The British and American Ambassadors handed Weizsäcker memoranda proposing a visit to Berlin by Rublee, the Director of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, to discuss methods to facilitate the removal of the Jews from Germany; Weizsäcker replied that no positive results would be likely to come of such discussions.	645	900
Oct. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck's surprise visit to Bucharest was undertaken to overcome Rumanian opposition to the transfer of the Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary; penetration of German influence to this area is feared by the Poles and Germany will be blamed if the plan fails.	76	98
Oct. 19	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> An interview with the Minister of Economics reveals a change of attitude on his part; while he intends to develop economic relations with Britain he will expand them with Germany also and will give Germany oil if the latter will assist in Rumanian rearmament.	236	321
Oct. 20	<i>Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate</i> Böttcher urges that hasty unconstitutional action not be taken to adopt racial laws in Danzig, as this would cause difficulties for German policy and might result in the fall of the British Government.	77	101
Oct. 20	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Czechoslovakia</i> It is not intended to comply with the Czech request for moderating influence by Germany on Poland, and discussion of the subject should therefore be avoided.	78	102
Oct. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> It is recommended that the Foreign Minister instruct Forster to postpone the racial laws in Danzig on the ground that no disturbance of German-Polish relations is desired at the moment.	671	946
Oct. 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The American Ambassador expressed his Government's view that Rublee intended to visit Berlin merely to explore later possibilities for a discussion of Jewish emigration.	646	901

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1938			
Oct. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck is reported to have returned disappointed from Rumania, Comnen having refused to accept a territorial adjustment separating Rumania from Czechoslovakia; Beck is said to be determined to get a common frontier with Hungary, by force if necessary.	79	102
Oct. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Lipski again presented to Woermann the Polish view that the Carpatho-Ukraine should go to Hungary; after Beck's visit the Rumanians had given out the false story that Germany supported their opposition to this step; Woermann replied only that Germany stood for the right of self-determination.	80	102
Oct. 22	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comnen said that King Carol after going to London would visit Prince Frederick of Hohenzollern and would like to meet leading German personalities while in Germany; to a question he replied that he assumed this did mean the King intended to give expression to his desire for closer relations with Germany.	237	322
Oct. 22	<i>The Minister in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rüdt analyzes Mexican sentiment and policy during the Czech crisis; he cites various factors favorable or unfavorable to German interests.	631	876
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> To Lipski, who came to ask German support for transfer of the Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary, the Foreign Minister hinted that this could be had if there was a general settlement of Polish-German problems, for which the time was now ripe; he outlined a plan including return of Danzig to the Reich and an extra-territorial road across the Corridor.	81	104
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Counselor of the French Embassy presented a note suggesting that the Director of the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee be received in Berlin; Woermann doubted that much could be expected from this visit, since Germany would not supply foreign exchange for purposes of emigration.	647	902
Oct. 25	<i>Ambassador Moltke to Senior Counselor Schliep</i> In a letter to Schliep, Moltke states that the Poles have ground for their mistrust of Germany in view of the failure to reply to their complaints against the Ukrainian radio propaganda; he cannot understand a policy which in the interest of good relations suppresses news of the German minority and then alarms the Poles on a much more sensitive subject.	82	107
Oct. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck urged strongly the annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary; he thought it would contribute to pacification of Eastern Europe and denied that Poland was pursuing power politics in seeking a common frontier with Hungary or that she was concerned about her Ukrainian minority.	83	109
Oct. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Acting on instructions of the Führer, the Foreign Minister has authorized Forster to proceed with the introduction of the racial laws at Danzig.	672	947

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1938			
Oct. 25	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Public opinion in Denmark seeks to interpret the Führer's statement that he has no more territorial demands in Europe as recognition of the German-Danish frontier; the NSDAPN has replied that nothing was expressly said about the Danish-German frontier.	454	601
Oct. 25	<i>Minister Renthe-Fink to Senior Counselor Grundherr</i> Renthe-Fink has so far avoided discussion of the Führer's statement that Germany had no territorial demands in Europe other than in the Sudetenland; while realizing that there may be no desire in Berlin to interpret the statement with respect to the Danish frontier, he requests guidance.	455	602
Oct. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> German-Brazilian relations have noticeably deteriorated during the past year; the weakened position of Foreign Minister Aranha may provide Germany with a useful opportunity.	632	880
Oct. 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry</i> Uruguay's attitude during the Czech crisis was not favorable to Germany; her neutrality in a European war would have depended upon the amount of pressure from Britain and the United States.	633	882
Oct. 26	<i>The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Poland</i> Some tens of thousands of Polish Jews residing in Germany will be expelled at once unless the Polish Government modifies new passport regulations to be effective October 29 which would bar their re-entry into Poland.	84	111
Oct. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> The Estonian Military Attaché, who spoke of the widespread pro-Russian sentiment in Latvia during the September crisis, was told that Germany appreciated the very different stand taken by the Estonian Government and Army; unfortunately the attitude of the Estonian press was less favorable toward Germany.	358	475
Oct. 27	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department</i> A visit to Western Poland revealed that members of the German minority there are being widely used by German military intelligence; discovery of this by the Poles would give them a pretext for destroying the German organizations.	85	112
Oct. 27	<i>The General Inspector for German Highways to the Foreign Minister</i> After a conversation with the Führer, who informed him that an extraterritorial road must be the condition of a German guarantee for the Polish Corridor, Todt reminds Ribbentrop of the plans for such a road which had been discussed several years earlier.	86	113
Oct. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Poland is trying to induce Slovakia to establish her independence, but there is no indication that it would prejudice its relations with Hungary by attempting a later union of Slovakia with Poland.	87	115

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Oct. 27	<i>Aide-Mémoire From the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i> Poland denies that new passport regulations are designed to prevent re-entry of Polish Jews residing in Germany; however, Poland does not desire the mass return of Polish Jews impoverished by German legislation and proposes conversations on the subject.	88	115
Oct. 27	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> If the matter is brought up again, it may be stated that a visit by King Carol to Germany would be welcome.	238	323
Oct. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann explained to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires that Germany's only concern was that Polish Jews should not be barred from re-entry into Poland; Lubomirski said that the only purpose of the Polish decree had been to make a single check on passports.	89	116
Oct. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker evaded a request brought by the Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires that Germany commit herself to oppose the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier; he said that German policy favored frontier adjustments in the Carpatho-Ukraine in accordance with the wishes of the population.	90	117
Oct. 28	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> George Bratianu will visit Germany and seek contact with leading personalities; he believes that the faction of the Liberal Party led by his uncle, and even Maniu of the Peasant Party, are now ready to adopt his own view that Rumania should associate herself with Germany rather than France.	239	323
Oct. 29	<i>The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> The German police rounded up all Polish Jews in Germany and succeeded in forcing 12,000 across the border despite the refusal of the Polish police to receive them; when the Poles took steps to expel German Jews a truce was called for further negotiations.	91	117
Oct. 29	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann informed Gestapo official Best that the Foreign Ministry did not want Polish Jews whom the Poles would not accept at the border placed in concentration camps; he instructed the Embassy in Warsaw to offer to halt deportation of Polish Jews if the Poles would halt deportation of Germans.	92	119
Oct. 31	<i>The Consul at Pressburg to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Slovak Government requests German support against excessive Polish territorial demands under the guise of frontier adjustments.	93	120
Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department</i> Bismarck received with some reserve the Lithuanian Minister's statement that individual German grievances were gradually being settled; he stated that before recognition by Germany of Lithuania's territorial integrity could be discussed, German wishes concerning the Memel Territory must be satisfied.	359	476



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1938			
Nov. 1	<i>The Legation in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Chvalkovsky informed the Legation that Polish territorial demands had been accepted to avoid armed conflict; an attempt was being made to retain one industrial center despite heavy Polish pressure.	94	121
Nov. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Estonian Minister Tofer emphasized his country's part in influencing the Baltic Entente against the policy of collective security and sanctions, to the great annoyance of Russia. Grundherr appreciated this, but also expressed concern over the pro-Russian attitude of Latvia.	360	479
Nov. 2	<i>Senior Counselor Grundherr to Minister Renke-Fink</i> The Foreign Ministry declines to clarify the Führer's statement beyond stating that it does not mean any withdrawal of interest in the welfare of the Volks-deutsche; a policy of silence is most expedient toward Denmark.	456	603
Nov. 2	<i>The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Iraqi Foreign Minister attempted to explain his recent interview published in a British magazine in which he had spoken of Iraq's obligations as an ally of Britain and had also been very indiscreet about German-Arab cooperation in Palestine.	586	793
Nov. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Bulgarian Minister brought up for discussion Bulgaria's revisionist claims against Rumania, Greece, and Yugoslavia; when Weizsäcker said the war season was past, the Minister stated that Bulgaria would not press her claims for the present.	240	325
Nov. 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told the Bulgarian Minister that Germany would have to be cautious about new arms credits desired by Bulgaria since the recent French loan accepted by her would render difficult the repayment of advances made by Germany.	241	326
Nov. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker assured George Bratianu that Germany would not encourage Hungary in a policy of revisionism by force aiming at Rumanian territory.	242	326
Nov. 5	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> The Führer would be glad to receive King Carol on his visit to Germany; if the Rumanians revert to the suggestion to raise the Legation to an Embassy they are to be told that the time is not ripe for such a decision.	243	327
Nov. 5	<i>The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry</i> The German community celebrated with great enthusiasm the termination of martial law in Memel, thus a favorable outcome of the Landtag elections may be expected although, on the other hand, even slight Lithuanian provocations might lead to serious incidents.	361	482
Nov. 7	<i>Minister Erdmannsdorff to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> In letters for the Führer and the Foreign Minister expressing gratitude for the Vienna Award, Darányi renews promises made at Munich that Hungary would leave the League, join the Anti-Comintern Pact, and tie her policy more closely to the Axis.	244	327

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Nov. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In answer to inquiries by the British Chargé d'Affaires, Weizsäcker said that the question of a visit to Berlin by Rublee was being discussed with the domestic authorities but that any decision would take time.	648	903
Nov. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Lipski that Germany could not consent to keep the mass of Polish Jews whom Poland chose to deprive of citizenship; why should Poland object to the return of Polish property, which was what they were?	95	122
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr assesses the actions and attitudes of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries during the Czech crisis.	457	604
Nov. 9	<i>Minute by an Official of the Information and Press Department</i> Burckhardt is reported to have told an informant that he inferred there were difficulties between Poland and Germany because the Poles had begun again to carry Danzig problems to the League rather than to negotiate directly with Danzig.	96	123
Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister's personal secretary telephoned a request for a memorandum which would enable the Foreign Minister to prove to the Führer that there had been no slackness on the part of the Foreign Ministry in halting the deportation of Jews to Poland.	97	123
Nov. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the State Secretary's Secretariat</i> A member of the Foreign Minister's staff complained that he had been able to obtain only a legalistic explanation of the action taken to halt deportations of Polish Jews; what the Foreign Minister needed for his report to the Führer was an account of the brutal countermeasures taken by the Poles.	98	124
Nov. 11	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich denied that the Prince Regent's visit to Rumania was political; Yugoslavia regarded Rumania as unstable, would keep aloof and would also adjust her relations with Hungary separately.	245	329
Nov. 11	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius proposes to interrupt the negotiations with Rumania over the exchange rate and grain deliveries; he thinks the break may undermine the Minister of Economics and make the Rumanians more tractable.	246	330
Nov. 12	<i>Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department</i> It is learned confidentially that the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle has had its view that the position of the German minority in Poland has become intolerable and requires Reich intervention submitted to the Führer by General Haushofer; Hitler is supposed to have replied that he "did not intend to put up any longer with the conduct of our eastern neighbors toward his fellow Germans."	99	125

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Nov. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Poles and Hungarians, especially the former, are covertly promoting a campaign for a common frontier despite the Vienna Award; Woermann suggests a possible German-Italian <i>démarche</i> in Budapest and economic aid to the threatened Carpatho-Ukraine.	100	125
Nov. 12	<i>An Official of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry to the Executive of the Auslandsorganisation</i> The Auslandsorganisation is urged to take a vigorous initiative once more towards elimination of the Haavara Agreement.	587	798
Nov. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Anti-Jewish measures decided upon at a conference of representatives from various ministries, with Göring as chairman, are listed.	649	904
Nov. 13	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> King Carol's intervention in the negotiations has resulted in a satisfactory increase in the Rumanian commitment to deliver grain; Fabricius suggests a compromise on the exchange rate, however.	247	331
Nov. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Agreement has been given to the final Rumanian offer on exchange rates, subject, however, to immediate negotiations on a new rate if there should be currency revision.	248	331
Nov. 14	<i>The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> No interviews for Bratianu other than those with Weizsäcker and Göring could be arranged during his stay in Berlin; he remarked before he left that he felt he had obtained assurances that Germany's position on Hungarian revisionism had not changed.	249	332
Nov. 14	<i>The Minister for Central America and Panama to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Czech crisis showed that Central America will follow the lead of the United States; improved German information services are urgently needed.	634	884
Nov. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Fischböck, a member of the Austrian Cabinet, proposed a scheme linking Jewish emigration with promotion of German exports and suggested that he be authorized to negotiate on this basis with Rublee. Woermann recommends acceptance of Fischböck's proposal.	650	905
Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Wiehl recommends that the Foreign Ministry urge the Ministry of Economics to approve the granting of a new arms credit to Bulgaria; there is a political interest in seeing to it that the Bulgarians use German arms and do not go elsewhere for credits.	250	333
Nov. 15	<i>The Legation in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Swiss Government, despite criticism from various elements within the country, is prepared to allow the Ortsgruppen of the AO of the NSDAP to continue operation.	530	698

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Nov. 18	<i>Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate</i> Burckhardt said he hoped that there would be no more anti-Semitic measures; they had weakened the British Government, which was sincerely trying to avoid war and would disinterest itself in Danzig if allowed to do so without too much loss of prestige.	673	948
Nov. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Lipski brought Beck's reply to Ribbentrop's proposal of October 24, stating that a German demand to incorporate Danzig would seriously endanger relations, and offering instead a bilateral treaty to replace the League statute; Ribbentrop expressed surprise and disappointment, declared that Germany wanted a long-term settlement of their relations, and advised that Beck reconsider.	101	127
Nov. 20	<i>The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> Minister President Kiosseivanov, referring to rumors that King Carol would see the Führer and request a guarantee of Rumania's existing territory, took occasion to record Bulgaria's deep interest in the Dobruja.	251	334
Nov. 21	<i>Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate</i> Burckhardt reported that on his visit to Warsaw Beck seemed willing to modify the status of Danzig but not to abandon Polish economic rights; Burckhardt had persuaded the British Ambassador that to summon the League Committee of Three over the anti-Jewish disorders would only lead to more trouble.	102	130
Nov. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told the Hungarian Minister that Hungary's threat to move against Czechoslovakia had shaken German confidence in the partnership of the two countries; Sztójay replied by presenting a memorandum containing Hungary's offer to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	252	335
Nov. 21	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> In Finnish and Swedish opinion Germany has gradually superseded Russia as the main threat to the Åland Islands; Blücher suggests that Germany should only agree to their fortification on conditions allowing her access to the Gulf of Bothnia.	458	607
Nov. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The anti-Semitic action in Germany has been treated in the Polish press with calm and reserve largely because of Government instruction; the Government is unprepared for similar action so long as the Ukrainian problem remains unsolved; public opinion generally has had old fears of Germany aroused by the violence of events in Germany.	103	132
Nov. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> When informed of the German-Italian warning in Budapest against any violent revision of the Vienna Award, Beck agreed that the Hungarians should be restrained but insisted that a peaceful transfer of the Carpatho-Ukraine to them would be in the interest of peace.	104	134

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Nov. 22	<i>Minister Zechlin to Senior Counselor Grundherr</i> Urbšys, the Secretary General of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, told Zechlin of his idea to go to Berlin for a discussion of all questions pending between the two countries; Zechlin urged that such a visit be prepared most carefully.	362	485
Nov. 22	<i>The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry</i> During the September crisis the Luxembourg population displayed very hostile attitudes toward Germans in the country; the Government was correct, however, and representations which Radowitz made to Socialist leaders had a good effect.	502	661
Nov. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department</i> At a meeting of interested officials conducted by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, it was decided that the German minority in Rumania would not cooperate politically with the Hungarian minority and the German press would not support Hungarian revisionism.	253	337
Nov. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Führer told King Carol that with her principal foreign policy problems solved Germany looked forward to a period of peaceful consolidation; Germany's aim in Southeastern Europe was to increase her trade, also with Rumania; to the King's question on Germany's attitude toward Hungarian revisionism, the Führer replied that he had always urged moderation on the Hungarians, but the issue was not of primary concern to Germany.	254	338
Nov. 24	<i>The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Lithuania</i> Urbšys' contemplated visit to Berlin would be undesirable; Zechlin is to explain Germany's negative attitude by pointing to the unsettled situation in Memel.	363	486
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> It will be possible to base the reincorporation of Memel on the right of self-determination as expressed by the Landtag elections of December 11, and to reject on those grounds formal objections which may be expected from England and France.	364	487
Nov. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Hungarian Minister in Rome has not yet undertaken a formal step concerning Hungarian adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact; Ciano was willing to have an agreed reply made by Italy and Germany.	255	342
Nov. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet-Polish agreement reflects the Polish need to preserve the markets of the new industries acquired from Czechoslovakia, and on its political side, shows fear of increasing German strength.	105	136
Nov. 28	<i>Counselor Doertenbach to Minister Zechlin</i> Within the next few days Germany's policy following the Memel elections will be decided; no final solution will be considered which would leave the Memel Territory under Lithuanian sovereignty.	365	490

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1938 Nov. 28	<i>SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> The Memel Germans definitely expect to be reincorporated into the Reich after the December Landtag elections; if such a development is not in the interest of the Reich at present, the leaders of the German community must be given clear instructions, to forestall undesirable international developments.	366	491
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Despite the changed circumstances, General Keitel adheres to his view that a declaration which would insure the neutrality of Luxembourg would be desirable, assuming that Belgium also preserved her neutrality.	503	664
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann told the American Chargé d'Affaires that Germany rejected the idea of official contacts with the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, but negotiations between a private German personage and Pell, the Committee's assistant director, were under consideration and such a meeting has been proposed for December 7.	651	906
Nov. 29	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Lithuania</i> Without sounding out the Lithuanians, Zechlin is to give his opinion as to whether under diplomatic pressure Lithuania would cede Memel to Germany through negotiations.	367	492
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The closer economic relations with Germany which Hungary proposes can be developed by an increase of her agricultural and a curtailment of her industrial production; any more far-reaching form of economic union would encounter the opposition of states having most-favored-nation claims.	256	343
Nov. 30	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> A voluntary cession of the Memel Territory is not to be expected, owing partly to the internal weakness of the Lithuanian Government and partly to its hope that the recent Russo-Polish rapprochement might lead to a territorial guarantee of Lithuania by these powers.	368	493
Nov. 30	<i>Ambassador Dirksen to Under State Secretary Woermann</i> Discussing the Polish attitude toward Jews, Pell told a German go-between that the Polish policy of recent weeks had met with the strongest disapproval of both the British and the American Governments.	652	908
Dec. 1	<i>Ministerialdirektor Wohllhat to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl</i> The Four Year Plan official encloses a memorandum on Göring's talk with King Carol; Göring assured the King that Germany would support a Ukrainian liberation movement; there was agreement between them that negotiations should be begun for long-range economic cooperation.	257	344

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1938 Dec. 1	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> The Foreign Minister had informed Hungary that he favors in principle her desire to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact, but has also asked whether she would quit the League; he suggests to Ciano a simultaneous acceptance of the Hungarian offer after consultation with Tokyo.	258	347
Dec. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> At a conference with representatives of the Memel Germans and of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, Lithuania's willingness to give up Memel merely under diplomatic pressure was generally doubted, and the idea of an <i>Anschluss</i> declaration by the new Memel Landtag was put forward; the Foreign Minister stated that the matter would soon be decided by the Führer.	369	494
Dec. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Lipski explained that the Soviet-Polish declaration was intended to settle certain border skirmishes which had occurred during the Czech crisis and did not represent a new departure in policy; Ribbentrop said he understood that but thought that Poland might have informed Germany in advance.	106	137
Dec. 2	<i>The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> In the final days of October some 17,000 Polish Jews were deported to Poland; the subsequent negotiations with Poland resulted in no agreement and were suspended when the assassination of a member of the Paris Embassy by a Polish Jew occurred.	107	137
Dec. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann informed the Hungarian Minister that Germany approved in principle Hungary's desire to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact; Sztójay replied that he hoped that certain misunderstandings of recent date could now be considered overcome.	259	348
Dec. 3	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although the initiative for the Soviet-Polish declaration came from Poland the Soviets seized it eagerly because of their fear of growing German power; they no longer consider their ties with France and Czechoslovakia of any value and believe that Poland has a common interest with them against Germany.	108	138
Dec. 3	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Köcher records a long conversation with Federal Councillor Motta regarding anti-German sentiment in Switzerland.	531	699
Dec. 4	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comnen complained that the violent attacks in the German press against the shooting of Iron Guard leaders would undermine the position of Rumanian leaders who had come out for close cooperation with Germany.	260	348

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Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Lipski conveyed a message from Beck that Poland sincerely welcomed the new Franco-German declaration; he added confidentially that Polish reports indicated the Soviets did not have the same feelings.	109	140
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Information and Press Department</i> The ruling barring use by the German press of material relating to Polish treatment of minorities has been lifted for newspapers in the border regions, but for these only; to a certain extent the latter may also print comment.	110	141
Dec. 5	<i>The Director of the Press and Information Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> It is not possible to curb the German press treatment of the Iron Guard shootings since it reflects the real agitation aroused in Germany by the murder.	261	349
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Ribbentrop instructed Dr. Neumann to keep silent after his return to Memel and to maintain full discipline among the Memel Germans since action by force is out of the question for the moment.	370	495
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI</i> A forcible reincorporation of Memel is not contemplated at present but Lithuania is to be kept in the dark regarding German plans; the German press and radio should help Dr. Neumann to maintain strict discipline among the Memel Germans during the Landtag elections.	371	496
Dec. 5	<i>Ambassador Dirksen to Under State Secretary Woermann</i> It is reliably reported that the French representative in the Evian Committee stated that Chamberlain had asked Bonnet to take up the refugee problem during Ribbentrop's Paris visit; Chamberlain was apparently under strong pressure from Roosevelt to do something in this matter.	653	909
Dec. 6	<i>The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry</i> Bulgarian restlessness in the wake of territorial gains made by Germany and Hungary has caused alarm in Greece; Minister President Metaxas says Greece would fight if Bulgaria attacked one of the Balkan powers, and Turkey would aid her.	262	349
Dec. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Ribbentrop emphasized once more that the elections to the Memel Landtag must be conducted peacefully and promises to support Dr. Neumann, if necessary even with money and foreign exchange; the possible solutions of the Memel problem would be taken up at Urbšys' next visit.	372	497
Dec. 6	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Commander in Chief of the Lithuanian Army said that Lithuania was prepared to make far-reaching concessions to Germany, would even agree to a new Memel Statute somewhat along the lines of the Danzig Free State, and would like to send Minister President Mironas and Urbšys to Berlin to negotiate on such matters.	373	498



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Dec. 6	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Urbšys stated that Lithuania would like to learn the German complaints and to arrive at an agreement on the interpretation of the Memel Statute.	374	499
Dec. 7	<i>Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate</i> Burckhardt said he had told Forster that the racial laws violated the pledge given to Halifax not to change the Danzig Constitution without consulting him; Burckhardt himself felt that he was being made a "comic figure" despite his good intentions in coming to Danzig.	674	950
Dec. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa</i> The Bulgarian Minister expressed the hope that Bulgarian territorial claims upon Rumania in the Dobruja would find early satisfaction; Bulgaria still desired also the territory giving her access to the Aegean even though few Bulgarians were left there any more.	263	351
Dec. 9	<i>Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate</i> Böttcher and Burckhardt discussed an exchange of letters between the High Commissioner and Danzig Senate President Greiser to be submitted to the League's Committee of Three in explanation of the racial legislation.	675	951
Dec. 10	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> It is in Germany's interest at present to secure to the Memellanders fullest autonomy including the right to establish a Nazi regime, rather than to annex the Territory outright, since the latter might lead to a Polish seizure of the remaining Lithuanian territory.	375	500
	<i>Editors' Note</i> The elections to the Memel Diet on December 11, 1938.		501
Dec. 12	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to confidential disclosures by the Czech Foreign Minister's <i>chef de cabinet</i> , Polish politicians have made overtures to deter the Czechs from their pro-German course, offering even new frontier revisions in favor of Czechoslovakia.	111	141
Dec. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Woermann received from the British and French Embassies separate notes requesting Germany to use her influence with the Memellanders for the maintenance of the <i>status quo</i> in the Territory and stating the readiness of the two Governments to consult with Germany on that matter.	376	502
Dec. 12	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Reichsbank President Schacht is going to London on a private visit at the invitation of Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England; the Führer has approved of this visit.	654	911

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1938 Dec. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Clodius found during economic negotiations in Bucharest that Rumanian opinion has taken a profound shift toward Germany in consequence of the events of 1938; the King's position is shaken by the Iron Guard murders; the rift with Germany over the latter actually assisted the conclusion of a favorable economic treaty.	264	352
Dec. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The Foreign Minister will deal personally with any future <i>démarche</i> in the Memel question; Foreign Ministry officials, if approached privately concerning this <i>démarche</i> , are to express surprise at this continued meddling in Germany's affairs by the British and French.	377	503
Dec. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr suggests that an oral reply to the recent Anglo-French <i>démarche</i> might express German surprise at this sudden interest in the observation of the Memel Statute although its violation by Lithuania had been tolerated for years; furthermore, in view of the disciplined conduct of the elections, Germany saw no cause for exerting influence upon the Memellanders.	378	504
Dec. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Ribbentrop told Lipski that the treatment of the German minority in the Olsa area acquired by Poland from the Czechs was intolerable; to the proffer of Beck's invitation to visit Poland he replied that this could only be undertaken as the final act in a "general settlement".	112	142
Dec. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador to Poland</i> Beck summoned Moltke before the latter's departure for Berlin to say that he hoped there could soon be a thorough discussion between Poland and Germany; the recent tension in their relations resulted from the sudden changes which had occurred in European alignments in connection with the Czech crisis.	113	144
Dec. 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> After consulting with the Führer, the Foreign Minister himself will inform the French Ambassador and the British Chargé d'Affaires that their <i>démarches</i> on Memel were inappropriate since this was a problem affecting Germany's interests in the East.	379	505
Dec. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> A customs union between Germany and Lithuania would not present the same economic difficulties as one between Germany and Czechoslovakia, since Lithuania is a smaller country which needs only very few imported raw materials.	380	506
Dec. 17	<i>Circular of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle</i> Obergruppenführer Lorenz recommends caution in dealing with the Swiss National Socialist movement.	532	702
Dec. 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Foreign Minister has agreed with Burckhardt that if the latter should call the attention of the Danzig Senate to the unconstitutionality of the anti-Semitic laws, arrangements will be made to obtain the required legal sanction by a newly elected Danzig Assembly.	114	145

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Dec. 20	<i>Ambassador Moltke to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Beck stated that while he agreed that diplomatic preparations should precede the proposed meeting of the two foreign ministers in Warsaw, he would nevertheless like to have an informal talk with Ribbentrop early in January when he would be passing through Berlin anyway.	115	146
Dec. 20	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> On a hunting visit in Hungary, Ciano has informed the Hungarians that their entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact would be welcome but again pressed for their departure from the League; he discouraged any further hope of territorial gains in the Carpatho-Ukraine or at the expense of Rumania.	265	355
Dec. 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In reply to Weizsäcker's questions, on instruction of Ribbentrop, regarding his failure to consult the Foreign Minister before going to London, Schacht stated that his London conversations were authorized by Göring and had the Führer's approval.	655	912
Dec. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Sonderreferat Deutschland</i> A summary list of representations made to the Foreign Ministry by foreign diplomatic missions against recent legislation concerning the Jews.	656	914
Dec. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> According to reliable information the Schacht plan was accepted as a basis for negotiations by the financial experts of the Governments concerned; Rublee will go to Berlin early in January.	657	919
Dec. 22	<i>Minute by the President of the Danzig Senate</i> The Polish Minister in Danzig, Chodacki, complained bitterly of a new spirit of intransigence in Danzig and failure to reply to protests he had made; he said that Danzig was a vital question for Poland, he had advised his Government to exhaust the possibilities of peaceful negotiation but stronger measures were possible.	116	147
Dec. 22	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Foreign Minister said he told Ciano that Hungary desired closest collaboration with both Axis Powers and would leave the League when this had been publicly documented; he had authorized Ciano to suggest to Yugoslavia renewal of negotiations for a frontier guarantee.	266	356
Dec. 23	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Consulate General at Danzig</i> The Danzig Senate President and the Gauleiter are to be informed of the arrangement made between Ribbentrop and Burckhardt for an exchange of letters between the latter and the Senate President; assurances would be given in Danzig's reply that recent legislation was adopted by constitutional means.	117	150
Dec. 23	<i>The Head of Sonderreferat Deutschland to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Instructions to maintain absolute reserve in every respect vis-à-vis the Rublee Committee, and to decline any discussion "owing to lack of instructions."	658	919

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1938 Dec. 28	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Greiser suggested that the French be influenced to oppose a British plan for abolishing the office of High Commissioner and removing the League from Danzig; the office and particularly the personality of Burckhardt are useful from the German point of view.	118	151
Dec. 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Chargé d'Affaires urged Weizsäcker that arrangements for adherence by Hungary and Manchukuo to the Anti-Comintern Pact be made as early as possible.	267	356
Dec. 28	<i>The Minister in Peru to the Foreign Ministry</i> Noebel describes the Lima Conference as a partial success for anti-authoritarian forces.	635	885
Dec. 30	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker informed the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that Germany agreed that Hungarian adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact should be announced early in January, but insisted that the adherence of Manchukuo be announced simultaneously.	268	358
Dec. 31	<i>Danzig Gauleiter Forster to High Commissioner Burckhardt</i> Forster justifies the racial laws from the Party's standpoint and promises that following new elections in Danzig they will be sanctioned by a two-thirds majority in the Volkstag.	676	952
1939 Jan. 2	<i>Senior Counselor Grundherr to Minister Zechlin</i> Grundherr informs Zechlin confidentially that the Führer told Neumann that the Memel problem definitely would be settled by the middle of April; proper liaison via the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle has been arranged in case Neumann should no longer be able to communicate with Berlin through the Consulate General in Memel.	381	506
Jan. 2	<i>Counselor of Embassy von Levetzow to Minister Prince von Bismarck</i> Levetzow describes his efforts to improve relations with the Brazilian Government and asks whether these are approved by the Foreign Ministry; he stresses the need for amicable personal contacts and questions whether German interests would be served by continuing the conflict.	636	886
Jan. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> The Lithuanian Government is prepared to make far-reaching concessions in the Memel question if this will help to keep the Territory under Lithuanian sovereignty and seems even inclined to allow the Memel Germans to claim rights that go beyond the Statute.	382	509
Jan. 3	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stauning and Munch have again asserted that there is no German-Danish boundary problem; the German frontier press should reply although official silence from Berlin seems indicated.	459	609
Jan. 4	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Csáky readily gave an unequivocal commitment that Hungary would withdraw from the League if allowed to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	269	359

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Jan. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Schacht informed Weizsäcker that the Führer, to whom he had reported on his London conversations, had directed him to continue and he therefore was planning to send for Rublee; Schacht now wished to report also to the Foreign Minister.	659	920
Jan. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> In a conversation at Berchtesgaden the Führer explained to Beck that Germany was unwilling to support Hungary's claim to the Carpatho-Ukraine partly because Hungary's lack of support had made necessary the Munich settlement whereas Germany's real aim had been the liquidation of Czechoslovakia; he said that the reincorporation of Danzig in the Reich and a road across the Corridor would enable Germany to guarantee Poland's frontiers by treaty; Beck pleaded the impossibility of getting Polish opinion to accept the return of Danzig to Germany.	119	152
Jan. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Menemencioglu proposed to Weizsäcker that Germany's accession to the Montreux Convention take place in the form of an exchange of letters between the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the German Embassy in which Germany's equality with the signatories of the Convention was explicitly affirmed.	556	741
Jan. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Italian Ambassador reported that Bulgaria had approached Hungary suggesting parallel action on behalf of their territorial claims against Rumania; the Hungarians had declined; Weizsäcker said he had been noncommittal in reply to a Bulgarian inquiry about the German view.	270	360
Jan. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In a conversation with Ribbentrop on January 6 Beck said that although he had not wanted to state this bluntly to the Führer, he saw a danger in any attempt to alter the status of Danzig; Ribbentrop repeated that return of Danzig would be accompanied by a final German-Polish settlement, and hinted that this would enable Poland to pursue her aspirations in the Ukraine.	120	159
Jan. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Economic Policy Division W VIIIb</i> A summary of covert economic negotiations between the German Government and certain Chilean high officials.	637	889
Jan. 10	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> For their information and guidance German missions are informed that Beck's visit was attended by a friendly atmosphere, that Danzig was discussed but only in a theoretical way, that the Führer gave assurances against a <i>fait accompli</i> there, and also assurances on German Ukrainian policy.	121	161

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Jan. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VII</i> The Foreign Ministry considers Ibn Saud politically unreliable and therefore does not favor armament deliveries to Saudi Arabia, a view which is also shared by the High Command of the Armed Forces; moreover, there is no economic justification for this transaction.	588	798
Jan. 11	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Soviet Government has presented a note to Hungary demanding an explanation of its intention to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact; Hungary rejected curtly any attempt to influence or threaten her.	271	360
Jan. 12	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Burckhardt has taken to Geneva the letters exchanged between himself and Greiser on the racial laws and hopes to persuade the Committee of Three to postpone action on Danzig until May, when the League will probably abandon its guarantee of the Danzig Constitution.	677	955
Jan. 13	<i>Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> The Foreign Minister arranged with Forster that there would be no new measures in Danzig until the former's return from Warsaw, when, if no settlement with Poland was reached, the introduction of the German salute, German flag, and formation of an SS unit would be considered.	122	162
Jan. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker thought it advisable to warn the Estonian Foreign Minister not to let the Lithuanians involve him in any statement concerning Estonia's interest in the <i>status quo</i> in the Memel Territory.	383	512
Jan. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Foreign Minister approved Schacht's plan to carry out the removal of Jews from Germany by the establishment of a covert organization; the interests of the Foreign Ministry will be represented by one of its officials assigned to that organization.	660	920
Jan. 15	<i>The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry</i> An SA leader in East Prussia stated that SA formations in Memel should be formed speedily in order to intervene in the riots which could be expected when the Landtag convened; it is requested that the Foreign Ministry prevent such occurrences in future.	384	512
Jan. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> The Führer reproached the Hungarian Foreign Minister sharply for the anti-German attitude of the Hungarian press; it was Hungary's failure to back him which made the limited ethnographic solution of the September crisis necessary; if Hungary stood with the Axis in the future they could settle the affairs of Central Europe without Western intervention; Csáky said that his country had learned much since Munich.	272	361

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Jan. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop told Csáky that Germany was willing to turn over a new leaf in relations with Hungary but certain circles in Hungary would have to accept realities; the Axis represented the dynamic powers and would determine the future; Csáky said that Hungary was determined to draw closer to Germany, ideologically also.	273	367
Jan. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker informed Frölicher that the removal of Austria as a weak spot between the Axis and the French alliance system had greatly improved Switzerland's prospect of peace.	533	703
Jan. 16	<i>Memorandum by the President of the Reichsbank</i> An outline of the basic plan which Rublee discussed with Schacht and which attempts to solve the problem of Jewish emigration from Germany by linking it to a scheme for the increase in German exports.	661	921
Jan. 17	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Kiosseivanov Government's weak leadership is provoking increased popular discontent although the situation might be restored, possibly by the King; in any event, Germany ought not to neglect Bulgaria's economic and military potential.	274	371
Jan. 17	<i>Memorandum of Political Division VI</i> At a Foreign Ministry conference Woermann stated that even though fortification of the Ålands would be directed mainly against Germany, it would actually be in Germany's interest to have the islands secure against Soviet seizure; the relation of this problem to that of Swedish ore deliveries in case of war is also discussed.	460	610
Jan. 18	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Blücher describes a conversation with Foreign Minister Erko regarding the Åland question; Blücher said that German and Italian participation in any agreement sponsored by the League of Nations would be most unlikely.	461	613
Jan. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> No agreements with Rublee should be initialed nor should any promise be made to him concerning future treatment of Jews; the primary responsibility of the Foreign Ministry in this matter must not be revealed to other countries.	662	925
Jan. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Foreign Minister Gafencu conveyed King Carol's official denial that the King during his visit to Germany had known anything of the measures to be taken against the Iron Guard; nor had any other power had a hand in the affair.	275	373
Jan. 19	<i>Memorandum</i> The Danes are pressing their financial advantage in the frontier struggle; despite various expedients there is urgent need for 950,000 kroner to check further German land losses; foreign exchange difficulties will be referred to Göring as head of the Four Year Plan.	462	615

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Jan. 20	<i>The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Burckhardt stated that the British and the French had supported him in refusing to bring the Danzig question before the League Council for the present; Popular Front circles had been defeated in their efforts to make an issue of Danzig.	123	163
Jan. 20	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> The probable status of Swedish ore shipments in a European war is analyzed.	463	619
Jan. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Economic Policy Division III</i> A German-Turkish credit agreement was signed on January 16 which provided for a German credit to Turkey amounting to 150 million marks for the payment of orders to be placed with German industrial firms.	557	742
Jan. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Ribbentrop told Menemencioglu that he could not understand the subtle legal points which Turkey had raised in connection with the Montreux question and which would not prevent an agreement if Turkey was politically ready for a settlement.	558	743
Jan. 21	<i>Minute by an Official of the Reich Chancellery</i> Latvia's policy is not satisfactory to Germany, particularly her bad treatment of minorities and her pro-Soviet leanings; the Foreign Minister will not receive Munters this time, nor should the latter be received by the Führer.	385	513
Jan. 21	<i>The Consulate General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Consulate General has granted visas to 40 members of a Memel German militia formation, who will take part in a training course in East Prussia; according to Memel newspapers, they will be trained as SA leaders.	386	513
Jan. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Göring told Schacht that he would appoint a successor for him to continue the negotiations with Rublee; it was believed that this successor would privately contact the latter, since it was impossible for the German Government to contact him officially.	663	925
Jan. 22	<i>Danzig High Commissioner Burckhardt to State Secretary von Weizsäcker</i> Burckhardt gives an account of the attempts of "Marxists" in the League to force his resignation, but says he was faithfully supported by Halifax; he can now return to Danzig only with the approval of the Committee of Three but this can be arranged if a request comes from Danzig.	124	165
Jan. 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker suggests to Ribbentrop that after the previous discussions with Beck certain topics can hardly be carried any further with him, but other personalities in Warsaw from whom he may have concealed his policy should be sounded out.	125	166



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Jan. 23	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Stoyadinovich said that Ciano's visit to Yugoslavia had gone off very cordially, and he was convinced that Italy really wished a strong Yugoslavia as the keystone of Italian policy in the Balkans.	276	374
Jan. 25	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Disagreeing with the claim of the new Lithuanian Minister, Skirpa, that most German grievances had been settled, Weizsäcker called premature the idea of a German public declaration on the improvement of relations with Lithuania.	387	514
Jan. 25	<i>The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Although shaken by the events of 1938, the Dutch adhere firmly to their policy of independence; all commitments under the League Covenant have been disavowed, and it is certain that no engagements to other states have been undertaken.	504	664
Jan. 25	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> The ultimate aim of Germany's Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews from Germany; a financial basis and countries of settlement for an organized emigration have not yet been found; "a Jewish reservation" outside of Palestine would be desirable; with anti-Semitism everywhere on the increase, Germany might hope for an international solution of the Jewish question.	664	926
Jan. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker received a joint Finnish-Swedish <i>démarche</i> on fortification of the Åland Islands.	464	620
Jan. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> The Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires informed Woermann that Hungary had indicated to Stoyadinovich that she was quite ready to conclude a treaty arrangement with Yugoslavia but would not have Rumania included in any way.	277	376
Jan. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a conversation with Swedish Foreign Minister Sandler, Weizsäcker tried to discourage Swedish participation in League sanctions deliberations; he learned that Sweden had made a <i>démarche</i> in Moscow regarding fortification of the Åland Islands.	465	621
Jan. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a conversation with Frölicher, Weizsäcker discussed the German point of view on Swiss neutrality.	534	703
Jan. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Grundherr discussed with Sandler in Berlin the Russian interest in the Åland question, Swedish-German relations, and other current problems.	466	623
Jan. 29	<i>Minute by the State Secretary</i> Csáky has transmitted a message that he would like to see Hungary mentioned first among the smaller powers in the Führer's forthcoming speech; also, he would accept only Axis mediation, not Yugoslav, of the issues between Hungary and Rumania.	278	377

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1939 Jan. 31	<i>Under State Secretary Woermann to Minister Fabricius</i> The line to be followed toward Rumania is as follows: it is desired to bring Rumania into closer association with the Axis, but it is thought desirable to await first clarification of the uncertain internal situation.	279	378
Feb. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In Warsaw on January 26 Ribbentrop again put to Beck the German bid for return of Danzig and a road through the Corridor as the basis of a general settlement, holding out the prospect of German support for Polish ambitions in the Soviet Ukraine; Beck replied again that Polish opinion would not accept such a settlement.	126	167
Feb. 1	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> President İnönü's great caution to avoid seeming pro-German to Russia has aroused Soviet hopes for a closer alignment with Turkey; although Saracoglu and Menemencioglu have called these hopes illusory, Germany might urge Turkey to observe greater reserve vis-à-vis Russia.	559	744
Feb. 2	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Fabricius told Gafencu that Germany would have to see positive evidences of change in Rumania before better relations were possible; the action against the Iron Guard had aroused great resentment in Germany; the Jews would have to be eliminated from all influence in Rumania.	280	379
Feb. 3	<i>The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> Agreement has been reached with Poland that Polish Jews expelled by Germany in October 1938 will be allowed temporary re-entry into Germany to dispose of their affairs, but Poland must accept their wives and minor children when they again leave; no agreement could be reached on seven or eight thousand other Polish Jews still in Germany.	127	169
Feb. 3	<i>Minister Fabricius to Under State Secretary Woermann</i> The Rumanians were relieved to see Fabricius return to Bucharest since they feared a break in relations, a view which the British and the French encouraged; the Poles, who also want Rumanian oil, would likewise have welcomed a prolonged deterioration of German-Rumanian relations.	281	381
Feb. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa</i> Bratianu said that in a conversation with Göring the possibility of large-scale German-Rumanian economic negotiations had opened up; he asserted that the incidents surrounding the Iron Guard shootings had been greatly misunderstood in Germany and gave an explanation.	282	382
Feb. 3	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Litvinov insisted to the Hungarian Minister that by adhering to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Hungary had joined a pact against the Soviet Union; the Legations would be withdrawn but the Soviet Union nevertheless did not desire to break off relations.	283	383

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Feb. 3	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Erkko told Blücher of Soviet diplomatic opposition to any fortification of the Åland Islands; Estonian fortifications were also discussed.	467	625
Feb. 4	<i>The Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle to the Deputy of the Führer</i> Gauleiter Koch of East Prussia, allegedly on instructions from the Führer, has charged Neumann and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle with responsibility for undesirable political developments in Memel; actually, however, these were caused by the interference of East Prussian Party officials.	388	515
Feb. 6	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumania has indicated a desire for German technical assistance in the development of its air force and will place an order for equipment shortly; in this connection, the sending of a special economic mission has again been urged by Gafencu.	284	384
Feb. 6	<i>Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department</i> The Foreign Ministry and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle have agreed that the German Minister should not shun a private conversation with Latvian President Ulmanis on the situation of the German minority; however, he should not himself act as a mediator or a spokesman for the minority, but should recommend direct negotiations with the German minority.	389	516
Feb. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Cincar-Markovich, leaving his post in Berlin to become Yugoslav Foreign Minister after the fall of Stoyadinovich, told Ribbentrop that it would be his aim to adjust Yugoslavia's policy still further toward cooperation with the Axis.	285	385
Feb. 7	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gafencu said that his visit to Yugoslavia established the full identity of views between the two countries in their policies toward Germany; he was willing to make a new offer of an agreement to Hungary, but only if Germany approved.	286	386
Feb. 7	<i>The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Ranthe-Fink denied to Munch that the Führer's reference to "peacefully stabilized frontiers" in the North constitutes recognition of the German-Danish frontier; Denmark will abstain from all discussions of possible sanctions under article 16 in the League of Nations.	468	626
Feb. 8	<i>Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department</i> It was pointed out to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle that the agency could not remain camouflaged if it participated in minority negotiations with the Poles; the reply was that if the Foreign Ministry saw difficulties in the personal participation of a representative of the agency, that would not be insisted upon, but a full part in instructing the German delegation would be.	128	170

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Feb. 8	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> The Rumanian Foreign Minister is to be told that for Germany the Little Entente does not exist, and the suggestion that Germany support a signing of the Bled Declaration by Hungary is ridiculous.	287	387
Feb. 8	<i>The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry</i> Saucken explains why he and the others with him went to see Gauleiter Koch who, on that occasion, had informed them that Party circles in Germany must stop interfering with Memel affairs and that a conflict with Lithuania must be avoided at the moment.	390	517
Feb. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Krupp has asked a Reich guarantee for an arms transaction with Yugoslavia involving a credit of 100 million reichsmarks; some agencies are disposed to limit the guarantee but the fact that it is the first opportunity after many failures to sell arms to Yugoslavia argues for it.	288	387
Feb. 10	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gafencu said he was quite willing to accept the German view that the Little Entente no longer existed; he had suggested the final signing of the Bled declarations only to avoid having to begin the negotiations with Hungary all over again.	289	388
Feb. 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Menemencioglu discounted rumors of an alleged Black Sea Treaty and stated that Turkey would never enter into any agreement that ran counter to German interests; as a kind of warning, Weizsäcker pointed to recent reports about an increasing Russo-Turkish intimacy.	560	744
Feb. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> In addition to the Krupp order, it is learned that negotiations are under way for purchase by Yugoslavia of a further 100 million reichsmarks worth of airplanes; the Foreign Ministry view should be that the deal is politically desirable, but not worth an economic loss.	290	389
Feb. 11	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a conversation with Heeren, the new Yugoslav Minister President, Cvetkovich, was much concerned to establish that he was a friend of Germany; Heeren told him that the treatment of the German minority would be the test of German-Yugoslav friendship.	291	390
Feb. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa</i> The Hungarian Minister said that Hungary would not enter joint negotiations with Rumania and Yugoslavia in pursuance of Gafencu's desire for a three-power bloc; he assumed that this stand would have German approval.	292	391
Feb. 14	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rumania is willing to undertake a comprehensive program of economic collaboration with Germany; an opportunity is offered to regain the predominant economic position held by Germany before 1914 and to eliminate Western, Soviet, and Jewish influence.	293	392

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Feb. 14	<i>The Chief of the Security Police to the Foreign Ministry</i> At the first working session of the Central Reich Office for Jewish emigration, Heydrich stated that Jewish emigration should be primarily financed from Jewish resources in Germany and abroad, particularly since implementation of the Rublee plan was not yet assured.	665	933
Feb. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Clodius thinks that while the claims held out for the new economic agreement with Rumania are exaggerated, especially since approximately half of Rumania's foreign trade is already conducted with Germany, political considerations argue for concluding it.	294	394
Feb. 15	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gafencu's attention was called to the fact that a Jewish capitalist was intriguing with a British economic mission intent on increasing British economic activity in Rumania; Gafencu has put a stop to their negotiations.	295	395
Feb. 17	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> At the specific request of the Foreign Minister, Heeren explained that he had not reported the proposed arms transaction with Yugoslavia because he assumed the Air Attaché had done so and that the Foreign Ministry would have been consulted by the other Berlin authorities involved.	296	396
Feb. 17	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The plans for far-reaching economic collaboration with Rumania have the full support of the present Government leaders; the fall of this regime would prove damaging to German economic interests.	297	397
Feb. 18	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Rumania</i> Approval is given to prepare the proposed economic agreement with Rumania, but on a basis which procures as much immediate economic advantage for Germany as possible without involving political commitments.	298	398
Feb. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> After lengthy negotiations agreement has been reached on separate but identical declarations by France and Germany guaranteeing the inviolability of Luxembourg territory; approval of the higher authorities is requested.	505	667
Feb. 18	<i>The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a series of conversations King Ibn Saud and his advisers expressed their dislike and distrust of British policy and their desire for German political support and German arms; a speedy compliance with Ibn Saud's wishes, particularly in regard to armament deliveries, is urged.	589	800
Feb. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Rublee, informing the Evian Committee of his negotiations with Göring and Wohltat, expressed his conviction that Germany desired a methodical solution of the Jewish refugee problem; the Committee decided upon a favorable reply to the German suggestions.	666	937

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Feb. 21	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Cincar-Markovich, told Fabricius that there had been no developments of consequence at the meeting of the Balkan Pact partners; he had used the occasion to urge Rumania to develop her relations with Germany, he believed successfully.	299	399
Feb. 22	<i>State Secretary Weissäcker to Minister Heeren</i> Confirming that the Foreign Ministry had received no report of proposed economic negotiations with Yugoslavia, Weissäcker states that Ribbentrop is engaged in a struggle to recover prerogatives lost to the Ministry in recent years, especially in the field of trade policy.	300	400
Feb. 23	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the High Command of the Armed Forces</i> Explanation is requested of a statement made, without consulting the Foreign Ministry, to the Bulgarian Minister that an increased arms credit would depend on Bulgaria's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	301	401
Feb. 23	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weissäcker told Neumann that he should undertake the assimilation of Memel to the Reich in accordance with the instructions of the Foreign Minister and in close contact with the Consulate General at Memel.	391	518
Feb. 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> General Thomas admitted that his statement to the Bulgarian Minister that Bulgaria would have to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact to get an arms credit should have received Foreign Ministry authorization, but said he was acting on Göring's instructions.	302	402
Feb. 24	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weissäcker told the Bulgarian Minister that adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact was not a condition for an arms credit, and that, moreover, the Minister should not discuss political issues with other agencies than the Foreign Ministry.	303	402
Feb. 24	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Northern Foreign Ministers met at Helsinki to discuss current political problems as well as economic cooperation in a possible war.	469	627
Feb. 25	<i>The State Secretary to the Consulate General at Geneva</i> Burekhardt should not be encouraged in his idea that he might be continued as a conciliator in Danzig under a German-Polish agreement should the League withdraw and abolish the post of High Commissioner; an agreement of this sort with Poland would from the German point of view prejudice a final solution of the Danzig question.	129	171
Feb. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck himself has proposed a visit to London, planned for the end of March; his aim is to delay abrogation of the League guarantee for Danzig, and also, because of fear of Germany, to improve relations with the Western Powers which deteriorated during the Czech crisis.	130	172

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Feb. 27	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gafencu said that the Balkan Entente powers had agreed that the Entente should not be directed against Germany and that the German "Drang nach dem Osten" should be met by an offer of cooperation, especially in the economic field.	304	403
Feb. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Csáky intimated through the Hungarian Military Attaché that Hungary's desire for the Carpatho-Ukraine was not motivated by political aggressiveness but by economic considerations; failure of the Axis to help Hungary counter Moscow's recent rebuff put Csáky in domestic difficulties.	305	404
Feb. 27	<i>Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl</i> Wohlthat transmits a copy of his report to Göring on the negotiations with Rumania which he believes offer an opportunity to take a decisive step toward establishing German predominance in Southeastern Europe and eliminating Western and Soviet influence.	306	404
Feb. 27	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Yugoslavia</i> The Legation is to see to it that the economic negotiations being carried on by Göring's representative in Yugoslavia are not finally concluded without the Foreign Minister's approval; he wishes to exploit the agreement politically, particularly as to Yugoslavia's attitude on the Anti-Comintern Pact.	307	408
Feb. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> The Air Attaché in Yugoslavia told Wiehl that Göring intended to visit the Prince Regent before concluding the pending arms transaction; he thought it was more important to obtain certain military commitments rather than Yugoslavia's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	308	409
Feb. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX</i> Freytag reports a friendly overture by Brazil; this should offer an opportunity for exchanging ambassadors again; the initiative must come from Brazil.	638	891
Feb. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Ribbentrop warned Lipski that if anti-German demonstrations in Poland occasioned by student disorders in Danzig did not stop, the German press would start its own counter-agitation and Polish-German relations would then be seriously disturbed; Lipski expressed regret and said that everything was being done to curb the demonstrations.	131	172
Feb. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> Rights of minorities in frontier zones and questions of agrarian reform in Poland were discussed in the opening sessions of the Polish-German Minorities Commission; the Poles showed little inclination to make concrete agreements.	132	174

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Feb. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Backed by the new National Socialist Directorate, the Memel Germans are building up various National Socialist organizations, but Lithuanian resistance to German demands is stiffening; the Memel German leaders were instructed to delay the date of convening of the Landtag.	392	518
Feb. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII</i> For over a year the question of armament deliveries to Saudi Arabia has been under discussion, with the Foreign Ministry opposing and the Aussenpolitisches Amt actively supporting it; the High Command of the Armed Forces, though originally promoting the arms deliveries, reversed itself upon learning that the Saudi Arabian middleman was in British pay.	590	810
Mar. 1	<i>The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Burckhardt expects to have the Committee of Three authorize his return to Danzig shortly; he stated that if the Germans remain calm in the face of the recent Polish provocations there the Poles will not succeed in preventing the withdrawal of the League guarantee.	133	175
Mar. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V</i> School, church, and passport questions were discussed in the Polish-German Minorities Commission but the Polish delegation stated that it was not authorized to sign any agreements.	134	176
Mar. 3	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> The British are reported to be planning a major economic offensive in Rumania; Fabricius asks information as to when Wohlthat will resume his conversations so that he may persuade Rumania to handle the British proposals dilatorily.	309	410
Mar. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop</i> An influential French Senator told Abetz that certain Germans in Damascus were stirring up the Arabs against the French; if true, this should be stopped at once to avoid alienating the few remaining friends of Germany in the French Parliament.	591	812
Mar. 4	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Geneva</i> Burckhardt is to be informed that Germany would welcome withdrawal of the League guarantee of the Danzig Constitution, and will not oppose Anglo-French plans to retain a League interest in the Danzig Statute.	135	178
Mar. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Back from his visit to Warsaw, Ciano said that he believed Poland could not be committed either for or against the Axis, and in case of conflict would "hurry to the aid of the victor"; Beck had said that Danzig was a problem to be dealt with by Germany and Poland alone.	136	178
Mar. 7	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> The fall of Stoyadinovich means the end of the authoritarian government in Yugoslavia which suited German interests; with the Croats apt to have more influence in the future democratic government it would be well to revive the ties with them hitherto neglected.	310	411



Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Mar. 7	<i>Minister Heeren to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> The turn in Yugoslav domestic policy signaled by the fall of Stoyadinovich and the increased influence of the Croats and Serbian Left will impose a severe test on the cohesion of the Yugoslav state.	311	412
Mar. 8	<i>Minister Rümelin to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> When Kiosseivanov complained of rumors that he was insufficiently pro-German, Rümelin told him that some more open demonstration of Bulgaria's alignment with Germany might be indicated; a few days later the Minister President suggested a visit to Berlin.	312	413
Mar. 8	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> The Evian Committee has accepted Rublee's memorandum of February 1 on his talks with Schacht and Wohlthat as basis for solving the refugee problem; Germany should now await the outcome of the efforts to establish a financial commission and to find resettlement areas in the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, and the Guianas.	667	938
Mar. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Moltke told Beck that the recent anti-German demonstrations and press agitation showed that a policy of understanding with Germany had very little backing in Poland, and that it was high time the Government took action to end this poisoning of the atmosphere.	137	179
Mar. 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told the Hungarian Minister that Csáky's hint that Hungary might not be able to withdraw from the League was unacceptable since Hungary had made an agreement with Germany and Italy to this effect.	313	415
Mar. 10	<i>Minister Prince von Bismarck to Counselor of Embassy von Levetzow</i> The Foreign Ministry agrees that full diplomatic relations with Brazil should be resumed, if possible.	639	892
Mar. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker told Burckhardt that since the Poles seemed to be very nervous over the Czechoslovak question they might attempt to misuse the High Commissioner against Germany should he return to Danzig; in Burckhardt's own interest he, Weizsäcker, would prefer not to have him return for the time being.	138	181
Mar. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Contradictory reports on the Polish attitude toward Slovak independence can be explained by the fact that in Prague the Poles are opposing it because they fear Slovak alignment with Germany, but in Warsaw their attitude is outwardly friendly in order to keep open the possibility of German-Polish cooperation.	139	182
Mar. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Beck stated that his talks in London would be only general in nature, but in reply to a question from Moltke he admitted that he wished to have the League guarantee for Danzig continued until a German-Polish bilateral agreement could be reached and hoped to win British support for this.	140	183

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Mar. 14	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Consulate General at Memel</i> The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in agreement with the SA and with Dr. Neumann requests that SA instructors from the Reich or from Danzig be recalled immediately from the Memel Territory.	393	520
Mar. 14	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Erkko told Blücher that Finland had rejected a Soviet proposal to lease certain islands near Leningrad; Litvinov does not regard this refusal as final.	470	628
Mar. 15	<i>The Minister of Economics to the Foreign Ministry</i> In addition to the urgent political considerations which favor it, Bulgaria is well able to support economically the extension of a further arms credit.	314	415
Mar. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Finance Ministry</i> Approval is requested for the conclusion of a new arms credit to Bulgaria; the economic and military authorities have agreed and political circumstances make the conclusion of the agreement urgent.	315	416
Mar. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI</i> On receiving the news of the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, the population of Memel spontaneously hoisted Swastika flags and showed great excitement; serious incidents can be expected in case of Lithuanian provocations.	394	520
Mar. 15	<i>The Consulate General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry</i> Neumann today will make public a declaration requesting authorization from the German members of the Memel Landtag to take all measures necessary to secure the right of self-determination for the Memel Germans; he will obtain this authorization in writing.	395	521
Mar. 15	<i>The Consulate General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry</i> Informing the Memel German deputies of the complete failure of his negotiations with the Lithuanian authorities, Neumann declared that this compelled the Memel Germans to act for themselves.	396	523
Mar. 15	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Erkko is pressing for a German reply to the Finnish-Swedish <i>démarche</i> on Åland refortification.	471	629
Mar. 15	<i>An Official of the Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> A request of the Rexist party that the Embassy arrange for the German minority to cooperate with the Rexist in the Belgian elections has been refused; the Rexist have shown little inclination of late to show their alleged pro-German sympathies in public.	506	668
Mar. 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland</i> Weizsäcker explains, for Blücher's guidance, Germany's delay in replying to the Finnish-Swedish <i>démarche</i> .	472	630
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Reliable reports state that Lithuania has inquired of the signatories of the Memel Statute concerning their attitude in case of a German seizure of Memel and that nothing was yet known about a reply.	397	523

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939			
Mar. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI</i> Neumann was told not to obey Koch's order to come to Königsberg but to await Ribbentrop's further instructions in Memel; there are also indications that Koch, who disapproves of developments in Memel, intends to create a <i>fait accompli</i> by accelerating Memel's reincorporation with the help of the SA.	398	524
Mar. 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Ribbentrop told Lithuanian Foreign Minister Urbšys that a peaceful settlement of the Memel problem was still possible but that nobody could predict the outcome once violent incidents had occurred; he rejected an interim solution and urged that plenipotentiaries be sent to Berlin before the Landtag convened on March 25.	399	524
Mar. 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker informed Zechlin that Germany expected the arrival in Berlin of a Lithuanian delegation in a day and that he should urge the Lithuanians to make public this fact and the voluntary cession of the Memel Territory; they should be warned also that the outbreak of disorders would precipitate German military action.	400	526
Mar. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Zechlin telephoned that the Lithuanian parliament and Council of Ministers were in session and that a decision could be expected only later in the day.	401	527
Mar. 21	<i>The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry</i> In the conference with the President which is now under way, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister is going to advocate acceptance of the German proposal.	402	528
Mar. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Weizsäcker instructed Zechlin to request immediate retraction of an official Lithuanian statement which seemed to aim at drawing other powers into the Memel controversy; the definite text for a communiqué and the departure of a delegation for Berlin must be agreed upon this very night.	403	528
Mar. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> The Lithuanian Minister informed Grundherr of the composition of the Lithuanian delegation which would leave the same afternoon and also reported that the Memel German militia was occupying public buildings in Memel.	404	529
Mar. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Führer</i> Ribbentrop reports to Hitler that the treaty with Lithuania has been signed and that the Lithuanian troops will evacuate the Memel Territory by 7:00 a. m. (The text of the treaty is given in footnote.)	405	530
Mar. 23	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> In informing the foreign governments of the peaceful reincorporation of the Memel Territory, the missions are to point out that Lithuania's economic needs will be satisfied by the establishment of a free port zone and that, moreover, Germany's desire for friendly relations with Lithuania was clearly indicated by the ban on the use of force in the text of the treaty.	406	531

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1939 Apr. 18	<i>Under State Secretary Woermann to Minister Grobba</i> Ibn Saud is to be tactfully informed that at present Germany has no interest in a German-Saudi Arabian treaty of friendship, and that arms deliveries to Arabia are out of the question; this holds true also for Yemen, where Italian sensitivities are involved.	592	813

CHAPTER I  
POLAND AND DANZIG  
SEPTEMBER 11, 1937-MARCH 14, 1939

No. 1

147/78484-88

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 733

NUREMBERG, September 11, 1937.<sup>1</sup>

The Polish Ambassador told me this morning that M. Beck had instructed him to speak with me again about issuing a statement in regard to Danzig.<sup>2</sup> M. Beck had the impression that his suggestion on this point had been misunderstood. It was not a question of his desiring from us still another unilateral recognition of the Danzig Statute;<sup>3</sup> rather, he had in mind a bilateral declaration in order to put an end to the repeated attempts both in Poland and among us to create trouble over Danzig. This declaration might take the form of an exchange of notes and would not require publication.

I informed the Ambassador that Herr von Moltke had already told M. Beck that for reasons of principle we would not recognize anew the provisions of the peace treaties. I really saw no reason why we should issue declarations on the Danzig Statute at the present moment. At that M. Lipski said that it would also put an end to the repeated attempts of certain foreign elements to bring up the Danzig question

<sup>1</sup> A note in Neurath's handwriting states that copies of the memorandum were sent to Berlin for the attention of the State Secretary and the Director of the Political Department on Sept. 11. A similar note appears on another Neurath memorandum of this date, document No. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Polish Foreign Minister Beck had proposed in conversations with Ambassador Moltke in Warsaw on July 30 (1792/408409-16) and on Aug. 13, 1937 (1792/408429-30) that the two Governments issue declarations that they would respect the Danzig Statute (see footnote 3). On Sept. 6 (1823/417009-11) Moltke told Beck that he was "authorized to state that the Führer and Reich Chancellor regarded the Danzig Statute as a reality and that he did not intend to challenge it. A public declaration to this effect, however, could not be considered."

<sup>3</sup> The instrument establishing the Free City of Danzig under the protection of the League of Nations, in accordance with article 102 of the Treaty of Versailles. It was signed by the states represented in the Conference of Ambassadors (France, Britain, Italy, and Japan) on Oct. 27, 1920, was accepted by Danzig Nov. 9, and entered into force Nov. 15. On Nov. 17 the League Council assumed the guarantee of the Danzig constitution. See *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), vol. xiii, pp. 253-256.

in Geneva, if the two main parties declared themselves in agreement on the Danzig question.

M. Lipski thereupon drew from his pocket a draft of such a declaration, which is enclosed herewith.

I finally told him that I would have to examine this draft and the whole matter thoroughly and would inform him later of our position.

V. N[EURATH]

[Enclosure]

The Governments of the two States contiguous to the territory of the Free City of Danzig express their agreement that in the interest of neighborly relations between Poland and Germany, which constitute one of the essential guarantees for the preservation of peace, it is imperative to maintain the statute which designates Danzig as the Free City, the character of the city being determined on the one hand by the Germanism [*Deutschtum*] of the overwhelming majority of its population, and on the other by its particular ties with Poland, the State which possesses rights in Danzig by virtue of international agreements, which forms a natural economic hinterland for the port of Danzig, and whose population possesses cultural ties with the Polish population of Danzig.

## No. 2

147/78487

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 734

NUREMBERG, September 11, 1937.

This morning the Polish Ambassador visited me. He stated that he had been instructed by M. Beck to take up with me the question of the date for issuing the minorities declaration. I told him I had already been informed by Ambassador von Moltke that M. Beck had expressed the wish to be present at its release in Warsaw now that there were no further obstacles *per se* to issuing the declaration, and also that this release should not take place at a time when the newspapers would be prevented by other important events from commenting on the declaration in an appropriate manner. As M. Beck was in Geneva at the moment and the date of his return to Warsaw was not yet fixed, the question of the date of publication of the minorities declaration could not be discussed until later. I asked the Ambassador

to get in touch with the appropriate authorities in Berlin at the proper time in order to arrange a date for its publication.

V. N[EURATH]

### No. 3

1595/384420-21

#### *The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 75 of September 15

GENEVA, September 15, 1937—9:35 p. m.

Received September 15—11:30 p. m.

Pol. V 5757.

In a 2-hour conversation today with Eden, Delbos, Sandler, and Avenol, the High Commissioner obtained approval for having the Committee of Three<sup>1</sup> merely report briefly to the Council of the League of Nations that the situation in Danzig has improved and that consequently it appears unnecessary, in the opinion of the Committee of Three, for the League Council to concern itself with the Danzig question. This report is to be made public as soon as the members of the Council have signified their agreement.

With regard to the conference of the Committee of Three, Burckhardt informed me that the questions about Danzig had been very exhaustive and, in part, very difficult to answer, but finally (group missing) had been adroitly persuaded. Basically, however, the continuance for the time being of the present state of affairs in Danzig had been viewed as the touchstone for the correctness of B.'s description of the situation in Danzig. In particular B. mentioned that the persuasive power of Wiechmann's<sup>2</sup> letter from Spain was shaken

<sup>1</sup>The Committee of Three, composed of the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Sweden, who were on this occasion the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, was an organ of the League Council set up on July 4, 1936. The British delegate, as *rapporteur* on Danzig questions to the Council, was chairman of the Committee of Three. Its purpose was to give preliminary consideration to, and thus to relieve the Council's agenda of, the numerous Danzig issues referred to the League by the High Commissioner. The latter at this date was the Swiss, Carl J. Burckhardt, appointed Feb. 18, 1937. Joseph Avenol was the Secretary General of the League.

<sup>2</sup>Hans Wiechmann, secretary of the railway workers union in Danzig and Social Democratic member of the Volkstag, had disappeared after his arrest by the Danzig police on May 25. His wife and friends were unable to obtain any information as to his whereabouts, and, in view of the determined efforts of the National Socialists to obtain a controlling majority in the Volkstag, were seriously concerned about his fate. The finding of a corpse in Danzig three weeks after Wiechmann's disappearance led his friends to infer that he had been killed. To refute this story, the director of the elections committee of the Volkstag submitted to the chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Danzig an envelope purporting to have contained a letter written by Wiechmann from Spain on Aug. 20.

by the fact that Brill<sup>2</sup> and his wife were arrested a short time ago. B. urged that they be released and that Wiechmann's letter be published simultaneously in the German newspapers. In addition, B. called attention to the difficult position of Catholics in Danzig and the increasing difficulties between Danzig and Poland.

After the session of the Committee of Three, Eden had another conversation with B. Eden remarked that in itself British policy had no special interest as such in the situation in Danzig; however, if the British Government sincerely wanted to achieve its present aim of an understanding with Germany, a large section of British public opinion had to be won over first. Public opinion in England, however, whether rightly or wrongly, viewed events in Danzig as typical of the methods of the National Socialist German Workers Party. Hence, if the situation in Danzig took a peaceful development and gave no occasion for a disturbance of the international situation through a discussion of the Danzig question in the Council of the League of Nations, British opinion would be influenced in favor of cooperation with Germany.

The High Commissioner leaves Geneva tomorrow and awaits information by way of Danzig regarding an audience with the Reich Chancellor.

KRAUEL

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<sup>2</sup> Arthur Brill, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Danzig. According to a memorandum of Sept. 17 (7029/522438), written by Schliep, an official of the Political Division, on receipt of the report printed above, the Foreign Ministry directed an inquiry to the Danzig police. In their reply the latter described Burckhardt's statement "that the former Social Democratic Deputy Brill and his wife had been arrested" as "incorrect". They stated that only Frau Brill, in connection with a letter Wiechmann had sent her "from Red Spain" the "contents of which were offensive", had appeared at police headquarters.

#### No. 4

1729/401774-76

*The Chief of the Presidential Chancellery to the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, September 18, 1937.

Received September 20.

Pol. V 5881.

MY DEAR FOREIGN MINISTER: I am sending you herewith a short memorandum on today's visit to the Führer<sup>1</sup> by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, Dr. Burckhardt.

Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

MEISSNER

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Arranged by me. v. N[eurath], Sept. 21."



[Enclosure]

BERLIN, September 18, 1937.

Today the Führer and Chancellor received the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, President [*sic*] Burckhardt, in my presence.

Burckhardt gave the Führer a short report on the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. In spite of attempts by others to bring the Danzig question before the League of Nations for purposes of agitation, he had succeeded in avoiding a discussion of this question in the League. He emphasized that he understood the special conditions in Danzig and hoped that the Danzig question would at some time be settled by direct agreement between Germany and Poland.

The Führer remarked that he did not understand England's position on the Danzig question. The position Danzig took towards Germany should be a matter of indifference to England, but she always rendered the situation more difficult, for no reason at all and through pure malice.

Burckhardt replied that he believed England's conduct would be better now that Chamberlain had become the head of the British Government; Eden had told him that England was completely disinterested in Danzig and merely felt a certain obligation as a guarantor to protect the parliamentary system; the British had stated to him, Burckhardt, that they did not understand the theory by which a parliament transferred all power to an authoritarian government through a grant of full powers and enabling laws; this seemed a contradiction to them.

The Führer contradicted this with a reference to the fact that after his appointment by the President of the Reich he too had received legislative power from the Reichstag.<sup>2</sup>

The conversation then turned to German-Polish relations, and here the Führer stressed that it was difficult to solve the Danzig question by a plebiscite at the present time, because this would immediately evoke the wish for plebiscites in other parts of Europe and would have far-reaching consequences.

After the conversation Burckhardt presented his *chef de cabinet*, Giustiniani, to the Führer, who greeted him warmly.

The conversation lasted about 35 minutes.

MEISSNER.

<sup>2</sup> Under the Enabling Act passed by the Reichstag on Mar. 23, 1933.

## No. 5

116/66337-43

*The Consulate General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

DANZIG, September 24, 1937.

IG 1308

Subject: League of Nations Commissioner Burckhardt on the treatment of the Danzig question in Geneva and his visit to the Führer and Chancellor.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 5666 of September 15.<sup>1</sup>

I have the honor to enclose herewith copies of two minutes placed at my disposal by the head of the Foreign Department of the Senate, Staatsrat Dr. Böttcher, one of them concerning a conversation which took place on September 20 between Herr Greiser, President of the Senate, and Dr. Burckhardt on the treatment of Danzig affairs at this year's September meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, and the other dealing with Dr. Burckhardt's call on the Führer and Chancellor on September 19 [18].

V. GROLMAN

[Enclosure 1]

DANZIG, September 20, 1937.

The High Commissioner, Dr. Burckhardt, called on President Greiser to report to him on Geneva. He stated the following:

He had not found a very favorable atmosphere at Geneva and had had to fight against very great difficulties. He had talked with many politicians. The conversations had sometimes lasted until 1 or 2 o'clock at night. The anti-fascist attitude of the Secretariat and the numerous socialist petitions and attempts to exert influence, which always accumulate shortly before the Council meets, had been very noticeable. An attempt was now being made to eliminate the one-sided attitude of the Secretariat and its frequently pernicious influence. The Secretariat wanted to make out of the League of Nations a coalition against the fascist countries. Moreover, an American had confirmed to Burckhardt at the time that the United States was working for the withdrawal of Italy from the League of Nations so that an anti-fascist rump League would be left. As much as the present League of Nations was being used to influence the small countries—this had recently been done with success in the case of the Little Entente and, in particular, Yugoslavia—nevertheless England herself seemed increasingly to realize that this could not continue. It was being con-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1724/400594-96). The instruction transmitted a report of the Consul General at Geneva on the handling of the Danzig question at the September meetings of the League.

sidered whether the League of Nations should not rather be converted into a meeting place for the envoys of the various countries. The desire was especially strong to break up the Secretariat's independent policy by having its officials chosen by the individual countries as their representatives for 2 years only.

In Geneva Burckhardt had first seen Under Secretary General Walters, to whom he had submitted his report, with which President Greiser was already familiar. He had met with great understanding on the part of Walters.

Next he had visited Avenol, who had returned from his vacation suffering from a liver ailment. He had been very badly received by him. Avenol had told him that he would under no circumstances accept Burckhardt's report. He had reproached him for drawing a reassuring picture of a country in which political murders and arrests of persons belonging to the minorities were the order of the day. Delbos, too, would never declare himself in agreement with this report.

Burckhardt had replied that there could be no question at all of political murders in the plural. The Communist Plenikowski, for instance, had allegedly been murdered. But Burckhardt had received a letter from him from Sweden. Deputy Brill was said to have been arrested. He had explained this case also, and if Avenol was alluding to the Wiechmann case, he could furnish him the data (which he had received from President Greiser); and he then did so. He was no criminologist, to be sure, but it could nevertheless be assumed that the affair was in order.

He had then spoken with Eden and Vansittart. Eden, who had appeared much more amenable to German interests than before, had seemed somewhat agitated and depressed. Vansittart had an extraordinarily clear head and was a calm and fair politician, but was unfortunately no friend of Germany. Eden, however, had seemed very well-disposed and had intimated that England no longer had any special interest in Danzig. The best course would be to proceed to eliminate the post of High Commissioner. Burckhardt had approved of this view. Eden had remarked further that one would be less apt to encounter great difficulties with Delbos than with Sandler. Burckhardt should have a talk with the latter. Eden also held the view that the Constitution could not be amended in the existing Volkstag. A new Volkstag would have to be elected. England was now trying to understand National Socialism, to be sure, but she was a completely parliamentary country and had been the first to develop the parliamentary system and blaze the trail for other nations in this respect. England had to insist upon the preservation of parliamentary forms in Danzig.

Burckhardt had replied that in her political life England, too, had often known authoritarian forms of government—at the time of Cromwell, for example. Besides, Hitler had also come into power in a purely parliamentary manner, although the parliamentary forms had been supplemented by an overwhelming plebiscite in his favor.

Eden had mentioned further that Minister Beck had told him he had exerted a thoroughly calming influence on Sandler. But Beck talked a bit too much about his powers of persuasion. One did not always know how to take him. He made a little too much of himself.

Then Burckhardt had gone to see Sandler. Sandler was a Socialist, to be sure, but apparently a very decent fellow. He had just returned from Moscow quite disappointed at what he had encountered, but unwilling to admit it. Sandler was obliged to identify himself with his ideological comrades. Burckhardt had talked to him at length about the peaceful situation in Danzig, and had not failed to leave an impression.

A further conversation with Walters had followed; Walters had felt that Avenol had been so opposed to the report only because he wanted to see whether Burckhardt would not tone down the favorable report during the oral conference.

He, Burckhardt, had then seen Massigli<sup>2</sup>—since Delbos (as a member of the Committee of Three) had not been able to get away at the moment. Massigli had listened to Burckhardt's report very calmly. He had remarked that France had no great interest in Danzig. However, he had to take into consideration the leftist circles within the Government and in the opposition. Burckhardt should also get in touch with Rochat,<sup>3</sup> who was the specialist for Danzig questions.

He had also given Rochat a detailed description of the Danzig situation.

Then he had visited Beck, who had received him in a very friendly manner, as always, and had shown a great deal of understanding. Beck had stated, however, that the incidents in Danzig (the school and postmen incidents)<sup>4</sup> made his position much more difficult because the opposition seized avidly upon these and similar incidents in

<sup>2</sup> René Massigli, Deputy Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs; appointed Director on Oct. 16, 1937.

<sup>3</sup> Charles Antoine Rochat, technical counselor of the French delegation to the League of Nations and *chef de cabinet* of the French Foreign Minister.

<sup>4</sup> According to a memorandum by Schlief of Sept. 17, 1937 (7029/E522489-90), the "school incident" involved a Danzig-Polish conflict over the forcible transfer of three schoolchildren from a school of the Polish minority to a Danzig school, and was settled when the Danzig Senate ruled against the transfer. In the "incident of the postmen" tension had arisen over the arrest of some Polish mail carriers who had distributed banned Polish newspapers in Danzig.

order to influence his stand and to weaken the prestige of the Government. Nevertheless, Burckhardt had the impression that Beck, as always, had made sincere efforts to afford Danzig real help and eliminate difficulties. Beck had asked him to talk to Gwiazdowski<sup>5</sup> also. Beck had given him the impression of being ill.

Gwiazdowski had also referred to the incidents in Danzig and regretted that Danzig made it so difficult for Poland to play the part of mediator at the Council.

Litvinov had sent an official to him, Burckhardt, with the request that he call. But he had refused because he was of the opinion that his restricted report was intended only for the *rapporteur* and the Committee of Three, but not for the Council, and that the members of the Council should therefore not concern themselves with it.

In the Secretariat he had encountered a good deal of hostility. His impartiality had been questioned, and Pelt, the Director of the Information Division (of whom Burckhardt apparently does not think very highly) had told him that he had had great trouble in keeping the press from taking a completely unfavorable, one-sided attitude toward him.

He had also had a short conversation with Delbos, who likewise felt that French interest in Danzig problems was not very great.

After that he had been summoned before the Committee of Three. There he had had to defend himself for over an hour and render a complete account. Among other things, he had been reproached with not being impartial and not caring about the so-called minorities. An extraordinary amount of material had been put before him, originating in part with Brost<sup>6</sup> and containing names which he did not even know. Very trifling items had been brought up—for example, that a woman had been unfairly treated by a welfare agency. Finally they had demanded that Burckhardt repeat his explanations before the Council, and that the report be submitted to the Council for decision.

Burckhardt had replied that he had gone to Danzig with definite instructions. Although these instructions had not been very clear, a certain agreement with Danzig had nevertheless been reached in the session of the Council in January 1937. Danzig had kept to this agreement. Peace and order had prevailed. It should be remembered that when he had gone to Danzig he had found entirely different conditions from those prevailing in 1935-36. No obstacles had

<sup>5</sup>Tadeusz Gwiazdowski, Assistant Director of Political Affairs in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of international organizations.

<sup>6</sup>Erich Brost, onetime editor of the Danzig *Volksstimme*, active in the anti-Nazi opposition in Danzig.

been placed in his way. He had been able to receive and hear freely all groups of the population which wished to see him. He had received all information he wished to have. Danzig, on its part, had thus fully observed the agreements of January 1937. Now, however, the League of Nations also had to fulfill the obligations which it had assumed, namely, not to interfere unnecessarily in the affairs of Danzig. If the Council nevertheless took up the present report it could easily make itself ridiculous. He, Burckhardt, would then find himself compelled to resign his post. What would then take place he could not predict, of course, but perhaps it might be imagined.

England had taken Burckhardt's part, and the decision had finally been reached not to put the report on the Council's agenda.

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President Greiser thanked the High Commissioner for his statements, for his impartial report and for his gratifying stand before the Council of the League of Nations.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

[Enclosure 2]

M. Burckhardt then related that he had had a conversation with Foreign Minister von Neurath, and made some brief comments on his reception by the Führer, which had taken place at 1 o'clock on September 19. He had been with the Führer about 20 minutes. He had not had a chance to say much himself, however, as the Führer had immediately spoken of matters of high policy. In regard to Danzig he had said that Danzig could naturally play only a small role in the realm of high policy. But the people of Danzig had always been so loyal to Germany that they had to be supported in every way. However, if the Danzig question were broached in earnest, then the Corridor question, the Sudeten-German question, and the Austrian question would have to be opened simultaneously, and now was not the right time for this. The Führer had then spoken very impressively about England, toward whom he obviously did not feel very friendly. He had said that he had taken great pains on England's account; as he had encountered ill will time after time, however, he could no longer run after her. The Führer had then turned to Germany's relations with Japan. Burckhardt had had no opportunity to state his views on England or to speak in detail about Danzig. Nor had he wished to interrupt the Führer with descriptions of the petty conditions existing in the League of Nations.

He had been very deeply impressed. The conversation had been the greatest experience of his life. He had had the opportunity, while the Führer talked, of observing his wonderful eyes and his hands, which gave an astonishingly delicate effect like those of an artist.<sup>7</sup>

The High Commissioner then also mentioned that he had been invited by some Poles to a stag hunt in the Carpathians and also to a hunt in Thorn. As he had not yet had a vacation, he intended to go there the next morning.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

<sup>7</sup>In a minute of Dec. 3, 1937, a copy of which was forwarded to the Foreign Ministry by the Consulate General at Danzig (7031/E522534-36), Böttcher recorded Burckhardt's comments on criticism which had been voiced against him in the Committee of Three, criticism which had also focused on his visit to Hitler: "M. Burckhardt went on to say that he had also been criticized because he had not reported in detail on his conversation with the Führer. He had had no occasion to do this, he said, since he was not an observer for the League of Nations in general matters of high policy. He was considering, however, whether he ought not to convey to the English on some occasion, that the Führer had said to him in effect that he had attached great importance to cooperation with England. Since he, the Führer, had always been rebuffed, however, he was not now inclined to go further. He had been compelled to strengthen the Berlin-Rome Axis, and perhaps, if England continued stubborn, would also have to develop further his relationship with Japan.

"I gave it as my view that he ought to be very cautious in his statement about his conversation with the Führer, also to the English."

## No. 6

147/78488

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 776

BERLIN, October 1, 1937.

[Pol. V 6212.]<sup>1</sup>

This morning State Secretary Körner<sup>2</sup> called on me to give me the following information by instruction of Minister President Göring:

On the pretext of having instructions from Minister Beck, Polish Ambassador Lipski had approached Herr Göring and asked him to use his influence to persuade me to agree to the joint declaration proposed by Poland relative to the Danzig Statute.<sup>3</sup>

I asked Herr Körner to inform the Minister President that I was not in a position to comply with this wish. Signing the desired dec-

<sup>1</sup>File number found on another copy of the document (1792/408459).

<sup>2</sup>Of the Four Year Plan.

<sup>3</sup>No fuller record of the Lipski-Göring conversation has been traced in the Foreign Ministry files.

laration would mean that the Third Reich expressly recognized the settlement of the Danzig question laid down in the peace treaty of Versailles. We had always refused for reasons of principle to recognize anew any provision of the peace treaty whatsoever. I had already had M. Beck informed of our position through Herr von Moltke. Moreover, from the very beginning we had refused to have the pending minorities declaration linked with the Danzig question. The Führer, to whom I had already reported on the matter a few weeks ago, agreed with the above opinion.

Thereupon Herr Körner requested us to inform M. Lipski that Herr Göring had transmitted his wish to us, but that we were not in a position to comply with it.

V. N[EURATH]

### No. 7

1792/408480-81

#### *The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland*

Telegram

No. 108

BERLIN, October 4, 1937—4:00 p. m.  
zu Pol. V. 6212.

On the pretext of having instructions from Minister Beck, Ambassador Lipski approached Colonel General Göring a few days ago and asked him to use his influence to have the Foreign Ministry agree to the joint declaration proposed by Poland relative to the Danzig Statute. In compliance with the decision reached by the Führer weeks ago, it is entirely out of the question, as in the past, for Germany to issue such a declaration, which would mean renewed recognition of the pertinent provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

It is intended to give Lipski a reply to that effect, with simultaneous reference to your earlier communication to Marshal Rydz-Smigly.<sup>1</sup> In view of the fact that the joint German-Polish minorities declaration has not yet been made public and that the Polish Government might perhaps still attempt to link its publication with a joint declaration on Danzig, please inform me by telegram as to when you consider it most appropriate to have the German rejection of the suggested Danzig declaration announced to Lipski. We do not, however, wish to delay this reply very long.

MACKENSEN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 11, footnote 4.



## No. 8

1792/408462

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 56 of October 5

WARSAW, October 5, 1937—4:05 p. m.

Received October 5—5:30 p. m.

Pol. V 6213.

With reference to your telegram No. 103 of October 4.

I have not yet talked with Foreign Minister Beck, who did not resume his duties until yesterday. I learn from his *chef de cabinet* that Ambassador Lipski, who was here for several days for conferences, has instructions to confer with the Reich Foreign Minister in person regarding the date of publication of the communiqué, because "further clarification is necessary" in connection with this matter. I shall see M. Beck within the next few days, but I consider it highly improbable that it will be possible to initiate publication of the communiqué from here, since it is apparently the intention to await our reply with respect to the Danzig declaration. There is, consequently, no good reason for deferring this reply any longer.

Informally, M. Lipski has already told me repeatedly that the two questions must be treated as one, whereas M. Beck in the conversation of July 30, and more specifically in that of August 13, declared that there was no intention of combining the two.<sup>1</sup> In line with this, M. Beck has twice proposed definite dates for publication of the communiqué, without even mentioning the Danzig declaration.

MOLTKE

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 1, footnote 2.

## No. 9

1792/408463-66

*Ambassador Moltke to State Secretary Mackensen*

WARSAW, October 5, 1937.

DEAR HERR VON MACKENSEN: Lipski just called on me in great haste before leaving for Berlin, and I should like to take advantage of the few minutes remaining before the departure of the courier to inform you briefly of what he said:

First he told me of his conversation with Minister President Göring, with which—as I have also learned from other sources—he is ex-

tremely well satisfied. According to Lipski, Herr Göring had said that he did not have the slightest objection to the issuance of the Danzig declaration, since it contained only what he himself or the Führer had stated repeatedly; of course, he would discuss it further with Herr von Neurath and would then, after October 6, again be available in person.

M. Lipski then reported on his conversations here. He had been received today by Marshal Rydz-Smigly, who had expressed agreement with the entire plan. He had especially emphasized the importance of the Danzig declaration, because after the exchange of notes containing the declaration all the little incidents which occurred from time to time in Danzig and which now always assumed the character of important political matters would no longer have a disturbing effect on Danzig-Polish relations or, consequently, on German-Polish relations. M. Lipski had also been received by the President. The latter had likewise approved the step and agreed to receive a delegation of the minority after publication of the communiqué on minorities, in order to accept their declaration of loyalty as well as to hear their wishes and suggestions. This was, of course, conditional upon our arranging a corresponding reception by the Führer and Chancellor. M. Beck considered such a "state ceremony," during which, of course, there should be no discussion, to be necessary in order to give greater emphasis to the minorities declaration. M. Beck considered the minorities declaration alone insufficient preparation for the "psychological breakthrough" desired by him and wanted to show by a very plain gesture that a new era had begun in the minorities policy. Only thus could a psychological reorientation be achieved, without which, in Beck's opinion, the effect of the minorities communiqué would go up in smoke.

The Danzig declaration was conceived of as an exchange of notes which was not to be made public. The press would be informed only by a short statement to the effect that during the negotiations on the minorities declaration it had also been established that Danzig affairs would cause no further trouble.

So much for M. Lipski's statements. They indicate that he apparently interpreted Minister President Göring's remarks somewhat too optimistically, used them accordingly in his reports here, and, in the firm expectation of obtaining our assent to the Danzig declaration, has already initiated an important step here.

M. Beck will receive me tomorrow afternoon and will presumably talk to me in a similar vein.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

MOLTKE

## No. 10

141/78489-90

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

## Telegram

No. 57 of October 6

WARSAW, October 6, 1937—11:56 p. m.

Received October 7—3:50 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 56 of October 5.

M. Beck, who received me today in connection with the minorities declaration, began by emphasizing again the earnest desire of the Polish Government to make the communiqué the point of departure for a course of action calculated to improve not only the atmosphere but also the situation itself. A reception of the minority leaders by the President was also intended to serve this purpose, and it was expected that a corresponding gesture<sup>2</sup> would also be made in Berlin.

As far as the communiqué was concerned, the texts had been definitively drawn up, and only the day of publication remained to be fixed. He had instructed M. Lipski to discuss this with Herr von Neurath, and he thought that publication could take place about Tuesday of next week. He considered the question of the communiqué settled.

Independently of this, Lipski was also to negotiate regarding the Polish proposal on Danzig, in regard to which, furthermore, a misunderstanding had obviously arisen; for, of course, there never had been any intention of proposing a unilateral German declaration. He had provided Lipski with several alternatives. Naturally, the German Chancellor's arguments would be respected, but he hoped, nevertheless, that M. Lipski would succeed in reaching some settlement satisfactory to Polish interests; he attached the greatest importance to this, since only by a complete elimination of the disturbing factors could the desired political benefits be obtained.

I assured M. Beck first of all that there had been no misunderstanding on our part, pointing out that, in my opinion, even willingness to forego publication of the bilateral declaration proposed by him could hardly produce a change in our fundamentally negative attitude, of which I had informed him on September 6.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This document was printed in the German White Book, *Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges*, Auswärtiges Amt 1939 Nr. 2 (Berlin, 1939), document No. 100. It appeared there, however, in an altered version as did other White Book documents which are reproduced here in their original form. These are footnoted hereafter to the German White Book, with references to document numbers used in that publication. The document numbers are the same in subsequent English editions of the White Book.

<sup>2</sup> A marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "What gesture?"

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 1, footnote 2.

M. Beck replied that it was Lipski's task to make some progress in this question; he himself was quite hopeful.

Beck's utterances seem to indicate that he still does not propose to combine the two subjects formally. By emphasis on their intrinsic connection, an attempt is apparently to be made to obtain a guarantee that goes beyond the previous oral declarations on the Danzig question, with the intention of appealing to the Führer and Chancellor as a last resort.<sup>4</sup>

MOLTKE

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<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "In this matter I can negotiate further only after previous consultation with the Führer. v. N[eurath] Oct. 7."

## No. 11

147/78491-93

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 7, 1937.

[Pol. V 6330.]<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Lipski called on me by appointment this afternoon. I greeted him with the remark that his request for an appointment had crossed my request that he call on me, the latter being occasioned by the Foreign Minister's instructions in regard to Lipski's *démarche* with Colonel General Göring.<sup>2</sup>

The Ambassador again set forth at great length the views of his Government regarding the Danzig declaration, referring repeatedly to his conversation yesterday in Warsaw with the President, the Marshal, and the Foreign Minister, in order to emphasize the decisive importance which all three attached to a bilateral declaration on Danzig. The Ambassador did not bring up any new points, as might have been expected after the telegram from Herr von Moltke; and, when I expressly asked him whether he had anything new to add to the statements he had previously made, he even assured me that this was not the case. He repeatedly emphasized that the exchange of declarations on minorities would have complete psychological effect only if measures could be taken to calm Polish public opinion on the question of Danzig.<sup>3</sup> I tried to explain to him that this effect could never be achieved by a declaration which undoubtedly would never be published; any declaration which would be known only to a definite, very limited circle could not in any case serve the purpose he had in mind. Furthermore, this very circle, namely the Marshal, etc., knew

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<sup>1</sup> The file number is taken from another copy of the document (1792/408472-74).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "And our public opinion?"

the Führer's position as presented to both the Polish Foreign Minister and the Marshal last November by Herr von Moltke,\* and the Führer had not changed that declaration nor was he thinking of weakening it. M. Lipski could not answer these arguments, except by mentioning repeatedly M. Beck's difficulties in putting through the minorities declaration.

The Ambassador did not link the Danzig declaration to the minorities declaration, nor did he contradict my remark that in M. Beck's opinion, as expressed to Ambassador von Moltke, the Danzig declaration had nothing to do with the question of the minorities declaration. However, the Ambassador obviously evaded the issue when I asked him whether the date for exchanging the minorities declaration had been fixed, now that M. Beck was in Warsaw. He was visibly affected by my completely negative attitude and stated that for the time being all he could do was to report to Warsaw. Perhaps he would receive instructions to broach the question again upon the return of the Foreign Minister; he might perhaps even be instructed to request an audience with the Führer and Chancellor. Regarding both possibilities I remarked that, from my knowledge of the situation and the persons involved, I did not believe that he could change our present attitude. It involved a fundamental decision which, quite apart from the question of German-Polish relations, prevented us from formally reaffirming any obligation based on the Versailles Treaty. To this the Ambassador merely replied that the Poles had proposed a bilateral declaration for the very purpose of avoiding the appearance of recognizing an obligation based on the Versailles Treaty; but he made no reply when I retorted that the bilateral feature did not alter the fact that we ourselves would be reaffirming such an obligation in our part of the declaration.

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\*In an interview with Beck on Nov. 18, 1936, Moltke complained of a deterioration of the atmosphere in Polish-German relations as a result of Polish press agitation and the increasingly severe treatment of the German minority in Poland. According to his telegraphic report (1823/416920-22) he then made the following statement: "Referring to the increasingly manifest tendency for Poland to acquire new rights in Danzig, I stated, in accordance with the instruction given me by the Führer and Chancellor, how undesirable it was to touch upon issues of principle in the Danzig question, because of the danger that the whole delicate problem would be opened up. I declared as instructed that the Führer and Chancellor did not for his part intend to take up the problem and expected the Polish attitude to be the same. Otherwise, sharp repercussions seriously disturbing to Polish-German relations were unavoidable. The Führer and Chancellor saw in the German-Polish Agreement an important instrument of peace, and wished it to be extended for a further period. This Agreement, particularly in view of the increasing bolshevization of Europe and the need for a common defense, was one of the foundations of German foreign policy."

The same statement was made by Moltke to Marshal Rydz-Śmigły on Nov. 25 (1823/416939-40). Both of his telegrams reporting these interviews were published in the German White Book, documents Nos. 68 and 69, but in an altered version. Hitler's statement in the above quotation that he did not intend to open up the Danzig question, as well as references to the danger of the bolshevization of Europe, was omitted.

M. Lipski proposed calling on me again as soon as he received a reply from Warsaw. He seemed to think that when he reported the negative result of our conversation it was not impossible that he would once more be called to Warsaw for an oral report.

MACKENSEN

No. 12

147/78498-99

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 11, 1937.

State Secretary Körner informed me by telephone that he had received Ambassador Lipski Friday morning<sup>1</sup> and had wanted to telephone the result to me at once. He had been unable to reach me, however, and immediately afterwards had been summoned by Colonel General Göring, and had not returned to Berlin until today.

Ambassador Lipski had again presented his request in the most emphatic manner and in an almost whining tone, using as his chief argument the fact that it would be impossible for him to retain his post if he now failed in the Danzig question. He hoped that State Secretary Körner would do his utmost to obtain a favorable decision and also to help him obtain another interview with the Minister President. Herr Körner had replied that he could not promise anything from such an interview, since Herr Göring could not give him an answer without first consulting the Führer and the Foreign Minister. The Führer's attitude had been made sufficiently clear to M. Lipski by Freiherr Neurath and me. Moreover, Lipski's position was so strong here in Berlin that he need not fear any consequences of the kind intimated by him, especially since Warsaw must know that he still enjoyed the full confidence of the Führer, the Foreign Minister, and the Prussian Minister President. Ambassador Lipski had thereupon become somewhat calmer and had presented no further formal request. Herr Körner had the impression that he was now probably convinced of the impossibility of further attempts and would strive to correct the attitude of all the leading personages in Warsaw, whom he himself, with unwarranted optimism, had obviously influenced in the wrong direction on his last visit there.

State Secretary Körner added that he had reported to Colonel General Göring on the course of the conversation and its results and

<sup>1</sup> According to a minute by Mackensen of Oct. 7 (147/78494), within 20 minutes of leaving the interview with Mackensen on Oct. 7, recorded in document No. 11, Lipski attempted to see Körner. The latter put him off until the following morning, and obtained Mackensen's account of the conversation in the meantime.

also presented to him my memorandum of conversation. The Colonel General had stated that he would do nothing further on his own initiative, in any case not without consulting the Foreign Minister.

MACKENSEN

No. 13

147/78495-97

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 804

BERLIN, October 18, 1937.

The Polish Ambassador called on me this morning. He opened the conversation by stating that in detailed discussions in Warsaw he had advocated making the ceremony accompanying the minorities declaration as solemn as possible. For this purpose he had proposed that a delegation from the German minorities be received by the Polish President, and the latter having consented, he would like now to suggest that a delegation from the Polish minority be received at the same time by the Führer.

I told M. Lipski that I had not yet spoken to the Führer about this, but that I agreed in principle and would discuss it with him as soon as he returned to Berlin.

M. Lipski then brought up his "problem child", the bilateral Danzig declaration. I told him that there would be no object in discussing this further. He was familiar with our fundamental position, namely, to make no new formal declarations of any kind regarding separate parts of the Versailles Treaty. I had also had Herr von Moltke inform M. Beck of this. Furthermore, Herr von Moltke had informed M. Beck of the fact that the Chancellor did not wish to touch the Danzig question. This, in my opinion, ought to be sufficient. M. Lipski was still not satisfied and drew a new draft of a bilateral declaration from his pocket; I also rejected this, however. On the other hand, I promised to ask the Chancellor whether he might possibly receive him, the Ambassador, at the same time as the delegation from the Polish minority. He could then get the Chancellor's opinion from his own lips. Moreover, I would not conceal from him the fact that we must realize that some day there would have to be a basic settlement of the Danzig question between Poland and us, since it would otherwise permanently disturb German-Polish relations. The only possible aim of a discussion on this matter—which, to be sure, was not at all urgent—would be the restoration of German Danzig to its natural connection with the Reich, in which case extensive consideration could be given to Poland's economic interests.

The Ambassador seemed surprised at this turn of the conversation and inquired whether I intended taking up this question immediately,

or soon. I replied that such was not my intention. I merely wished to point out that Danzig was one of the questions between Poland and us that would in due time have to be definitively settled. I requested the Ambassador to inform M. Beck of this too.

M. Lipski then drew another document from his pocket and read me various grievances regarding conditions in Danzig which had caused anxiety in Poland. These concerned the formation of military clubs by Danzig residents discharged from the German Army and also the recruiting of Danzig citizens as volunteers for the German Army; and, lastly, he quoted several recent statements of Herr Ley,<sup>1</sup> of Senate President Greiser, and of Gauleiter Forster, all of which more or less openly referred to the reincorporation of Danzig into the Reich.

I replied merely that M. Lipski would see from all this also how necessary it was to reach a basic settlement of the Danzig question eventually.

In conclusion, the Ambassador again broached the question whether the Chancellor could not give him a declaration, which would still need to be formulated, to the effect that the Danzig question should not be allowed to prejudice German-Polish relations.

I told M. Lipski that I must first ascertain whether the Chancellor was even prepared to receive, first, the delegation from the Polish minorities, and then, him, the Ambassador; only then could I consider whether a special statement could also be made at that time by the Chancellor.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Ley, leader of the German Labor Front.

## No. 14

2906/566038-39

*Ambassador Moltke to Senior Counselor Schnurre*

WARSAW, October 22, 1937.

MY DEAR HERR SCHNURRE: With reference to your communication of October 11<sup>1</sup> in the matter of the motor road between East Prussia and Danzig I should like to make the following reply:

As early as 1935 the question arose as to what attitude Poland would take toward the proposed construction of an *Autobahn* through the Corridor between East Prussia and the other territory of the Reich. At that time, about May 1935, I spoke of it to Polish Foreign Minister Beck, who promised me that the question would be studied. In spite

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2906/566038-37). Schnurre wrote Moltke that in connection with plans for a Danzig-East Prussia highway the question of a highway through the Corridor had been raised, and asked for an account of earlier discussions with the Poles on this subject.



of repeated reminders, however, he never gave a clear answer—a fact which, as experience shows, should be considered a sure sign of a negative attitude on the part of the Government.

Then in September 1935 Herr Todt,<sup>2</sup> during his stay in Warsaw on the occasion of the Polish exhibition of road construction, spoke with the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Transportation, M. Piasecki. They discussed the possibility of having experts from both sides meet at a suitable moment for a conference. Under these circumstances I believe that it would be advisable if Herr Todt would take up the idea again in a private letter to M. Piasecki, referring to this conversation.

To judge from what has been said above, however, it is to be expected that the Polish Government will attempt to hinder as far as possible the construction of this *Autobahn* through the Corridor. For this reason I told Herr Todt as early as 1935 that in my opinion it would be advisable first of all to build the road up to the Corridor on both sides, if this is possible without first definitely staking out the road through the Corridor. Such a *fait accompli* would invalidate one of the chief Polish objections, namely, that potential German military approaches to the Corridor would be facilitated by the *Autobahn*. Furthermore, this method of procedure would put the Poles under pressure to the extent that they would certainly find undesirable the impression which travelers would inevitably obtain, in passing between the Reich and its East Prussian territory, from the condition of the Polish roads in comparison with that of the German Reichsautobahn.

Since there has been no change in this situation in the meantime, I should like to stand by my proposal.

With best wishes,

Heil Hitler!

VON MOLTKE

<sup>2</sup> Fritz Todt, General Inspector for Roads in Germany.

## No. 15

1728/401744-45

*Minute by an Official of Political Division V*

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, October 23, 1937.  
zu Pol. V 6128<sup>1</sup>

Drafting Officer: Counselor Bergmann.

The question of the shares of the International Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd., of Danzig, which are now in British hands

<sup>1</sup> Pol. V 6128: Not printed (1728/401733-43). See footnote 3.

and which Danzig is striving to acquire, was again discussed here in detail on October 16 with Herr Schäfer, the president of the Bank of Danzig. Particular attention was given to the question whether the Danzig shipyard would be boycotted by the Poles as soon as the actual transfer of the British block of shares to Reich-German or Danzig possession became known to the Polish Government. President Schäfer replied very definitely in the negative and stated that Poland was placing orders with the Danzig shipyard not primarily because she wanted to fulfill her obligations in this respect to the Danzig shipyard but principally because she did not yet have a shipyard of her own in Gdynia, and the Danzig shipyard could execute the Polish orders more cheaply than other foreign shipyards. Even after acquisition of the British block of shares by the Germans, Poland would therefore continue to place her orders in Danzig until she had her own shipyard. President Schäfer believes, moreover, that the contemplated transaction would not become known to the Polish Government, since it is provided that the formal owner of the British block of shares must remain an Englishman. Mr. Spencer<sup>2</sup> was contemplated for that purpose.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Charles F. Spencer, English businessman and vice president of the board of directors of the Danzig shipyard.

<sup>3</sup> A letter based on this minute, a draft of which is attached to it and initialed by Weizsäcker, was dispatched to Ministerialdirigent Gramsch of the Prussian Ministry of State on Oct. 23 (1728/401745-46). The letter stated that in the opinion of Danzig Bank President Schäfer there was "no danger that such an acquisition of shares would result in injury to the business of the shipyard by the possible loss of Polish orders. In view of this the Foreign Ministry has no objection to giving the Otto Wolff Industries a statement to the desired effect." This was in reply to a letter from Gramsch of Sept. 23 enclosing a copy of a memorandum by Schäfer in which it was stated that the Otto Wolff firm was willing to take over the British shares "if the highest political authorities of the Reich expressly affirmed that the acquisition of these shares was in the political interest of the Reich and of Danzig" (1728/401733-43). See also document No. 17.

## No. 16

147/78500

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 824

BERLIN, October 23, 1937.

Upon his return from Warsaw today the Polish Ambassador called on me and told me he had spoken with M. Beck about our last conversation and the handling of the minorities declaration. If the Führer and Chancellor agreed to receive a delegation from the Polish minorities—some two or three persons—and then him, the Polish Ambassador, the President of Poland would do likewise with the German minorities and the German Ambassador. A communiqué

should then be issued regarding the reception. This communiqué should express satisfaction over the conclusion of the minorities agreement and state that, contrary to repeated rumors disseminated by the world press, this bilateral agreement demonstrated that the German-Polish Agreement of 1934<sup>1</sup> still functioned very well, that harmony also prevailed between Poland and Germany regarding treatment of the Danzig question, and that German-Polish relations could not be disturbed by this question.

In reply to my statement during the last conversation with Lipski to the effect that the Danzig question would have to be settled some day between Poland and us, M. Beck sent word that he shared my view and, as I would recall, had already intimated as much 2 years ago. Of course, we would have to choose the right time for it.

I told the Ambassador I would submit a report to the Führer as soon as he returned to Berlin, and would then advise him further.

V. N[EURATH]

<sup>1</sup> Signed on Jan. 26, 1934, by Neurath and Lipski, the Agreement stated that it was intended "to open up a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland." It pledged the parties to conduct their relations in accordance with the principles of the Pact of Paris, to settle disputes by direct negotiation or other peaceful means, and "under no circumstances to resort to force." For the full text see *British and Foreign State Papers* (London, 1939), vol. cxxxvii, pp. 495-496.

## No. 17

116/66345

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 843

BERLIN, October 29, 1937.

Gauleiter Forster of Danzig brought up two questions here yesterday:

1) If delivery of steel from Germany for the proposed *Autobahn* and bridge is not possible, he asks that during the German-Polish economic negotiations we propose delivery of steel from Poland on a barter basis.

2) The Danzig Government would like to acquire the shares of the *Deutsche Werft*<sup>1</sup> of Danzig now in British hands in order to obtain majority control of this enterprise. The necessary capital for it was available. The firm of Otto Wolff (Kindt, director) offered to act as intermediary in the acquisition of the shares in England. Gauleiter Forster asked us to inform Herr Kindt that acquisition of the shares by the Danzig Government was a "matter of vital importance to the Reich" and to give it our support.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The International Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd., is meant. See documents Nos. 15 and 24.

<sup>2</sup> Neurath wrote "Secret" in the margin opposite this paragraph.

I consider acquisition of the shares by Danzig advisable and request that the necessary steps be taken.

V. N[EURATH]

## No. 18

1661/393568-72

### *German-Polish Joint Declaration on Minorities*

#### TEXT OF THE JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GERMAN AND POLISH GOVERNMENTS, PUBLISHED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1937, CONCERNING TREATMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MINORITIES

The German Government and the Polish Government have taken occasion to make the position of the German minority in Poland and of the Polish minority in Germany the subject of a friendly discussion. They agree in the conviction that the treatment of these minorities is of great importance for the further development of friendly and neighborly relations between Germany and Poland, and that in each of the two countries the well-being of the minority can be the more surely guaranteed if it is certain that the same principles will be observed in the other country. The two Governments are therefore pleased to be able to declare that each of the two States, within the framework of its sovereignty, regards the following principles as determining for the treatment of the said minorities:

1) Mutual respect for German and Polish nationality in itself precludes any attempt to assimilate the minority by force, to question membership in the minority, or to hinder profession of membership in the minority. In particular, no pressure of any kind will be exerted on youthful members of the minority in order to alienate them from their adherence to such minority.

2) Members of the minority shall have the right to the free use of their language in speech and in writing, in their personal and economic relations, in the press, and in public meetings.

The cultivation of their mother tongue and of the customs of their nationality, either in public or in private life, shall not entail any disadvantages for members of the minority.

3) The right of members of the minority to unite in associations, including those of a cultural and economic nature, shall be guaranteed.

4) The minority may maintain and establish schools in its mother tongue.

With respect to church life, the members of the minority shall have the right to practice their religion in their mother tongue and to organize their own churches. There shall be no interference with existing conditions in matters of faith and of charitable activities.

5) Members of the minority may not, because of their membership in such minority, be hindered or prejudiced in their choice or exercise of an occupation or economic activity. In the economic field they shall enjoy the same rights as the members of the majority nationality in the State, particularly with respect to ownership or acquisition of real property.

The above principles shall in no way affect the duty of members of the minority to give their undivided loyalty to the State to which they belong. These principles are laid down in an effort to assure the minority equitable living conditions and a harmonious coexistence with the majority nationality; this will contribute to progressive strengthening of friendly and neighborly relations between Germany and Poland.

COMMUNIQUE ON THE RECEPTION BY THE FÜHRER ON NOVEMBER 5, 1937,  
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLISH MINORITY IN THE REICH, ON THE  
OCCASION OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE MINORITIES DECLARATION

On the occasion of the declaration by the German Government, published today, regarding the treatment of the Polish minority in Germany, the Führer and Chancellor received Dr. Jan Kaczmarek, Herr Stefan Szczepaniak, and Dr. Brunon von Openkowsky as representatives of the Association of Poles in Germany. The Führer and Chancellor made the following statement:

"The agreed German-Polish declaration regarding the protection of their respective alien nationalities which is published today is designed to improve and strengthen the friendly relations between the two peoples. The practical application of the principles contained in this declaration can materially contribute to the attainment of this aim.

"It is the endeavor of the German Government to create a harmonious and genuinely peaceful coexistence of the Polish minority with the German majority in the State.

"I declare that the determination of the German Government to provide bread and work for every citizen of the Reich also extends to and is applied to the members of the Polish minority. At a time when members of the German minorities in Europe are still frequently exposed to great unemployment and great privation, the Polish minority is participating fully in the economic recovery of Germany. Similar progress has been made in the cultural activity of the Polish minority, as evidenced by the diversity of their organizations and, recently, the establishment of another Polish higher school in Germany. The Poles in Germany must, however, continually bear in mind that the protection granted them implies at the same time that they must loyally fulfill their duties toward the State and observe its laws.

"The protection of the German minority in Poland, especially of its right to work and remain on its ancestral soil, will also contribute to the protection of the Polish minority in Germany.

"The high aim of the pact which I concluded with the great Polish Chief of State, Josef Pilsudski, is brought nearer to realization by this joint German-Polish declaration relating to the minorities question."

Dr. Kaczmarek, the chief representative of the "Association of Poles in Germany," expressed in the name of the Poles living in Germany his gratitude and pleasure at the Führer's reception and his words and

assured the Führer and Chancellor of the Polish minority's complete loyalty to the Reich and its great Führer.

In the course of the ensuing conversation the Führer stated that he had given orders to release a number of the imprisoned members of the Polish minority in Germany whose political activities had brought them into conflict with German laws.

COMMUNIQUE BY THE FÜHRER ON NOVEMBER 5, 1937, ON THE RECEPTION OF THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN, ON THE OCCASION OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE MINORITIES DECLARATION

The Führer and Chancellor today received M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. In his conversation with the Ambassador, the Führer and Chancellor expressed his satisfaction that it had been possible to reach an agreement on the minorities problem, which was particularly important for German-Polish relations. This again proved the soundness of the German-Polish declaration of January 26, 1934 and the method of direct negotiation provided therein. At the same time it was confirmed during the conversation that German-Polish relations would not be disturbed by the Danzig question.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In a revision of the communiqué proposed by Lipski to Neurath on Nov. 2 and accepted by him this sentence read: "At the same time it was possible to confirm during the conversation that the two Governments were also in full agreement in their attitude on Danzig affairs and that German-Polish relations would not be disturbed by this question" (147/78502-04). The previous document in the file may explain in part the absence of this version from the communiqué as published. It is a handwritten note (147/78501) by Köppen of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat and is initialed by Neurath. It reads: "Telephone call with Berlin on Thursday [Nov. 4] at 6 p. m. The State Secretary received the Polish Ambassador today and gave him a negative decision. He has the impression that Ambassador Lipski will not let the matter drop."

## No. 19

1792/408503

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

RM 867

BERLIN, November 6, 1937.  
Pol. V 7617.

On receiving the Polish Ambassador yesterday, the Führer, in the course of the conversation and after some general remarks on German-Polish relations, stated to M. Lipski with regard to Danzig: He, the Führer, assured M. Lipski [1] that he did not intend to alter the Danzig Statute, and requested him so to inform his Government;

<sup>1</sup> A somewhat fuller account of this conversation was written by Ambassador Lipski. See Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939* (London, 1940), No. 34 (hereinafter referred to as Polish White Book).

(2) that he also did not intend ever to confront Poland with an accomplished fact in Danzig; and (3) that Polish rights in Danzig would not be infringed upon.

FREIHERR V. NEURATH

November 6, 1937.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister intends to inform Gauleiter Forster. It will be advisable to check on whether this has been done.<sup>3</sup>

Warsaw should receive instructions to demand in return active Polish cooperation in the practical handling of minorities questions.<sup>4</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup> The following minute was typed on above copy of the Foreign Minister's memorandum which Weizsäcker transmitted to Bismarck, the Deputy Director of the Political Department.

<sup>3</sup> A dispatch of Nov. 20 to the Consulate General at Danzig transmitted the text of this memorandum and requested that Senate President Greiser be "personally and confidentially" informed. In a marginal note of Nov. 27 on the file copy of this dispatch Neurath wrote that he had informed Gauleiter Forster (1792/408504-05).

<sup>4</sup> Handwritten marginal note: "To the Deputy Director of the Political Department—Personally I have no objection if this pointed instruction to Warsaw is omitted. My note above is based on a remark of the Foreign Minister; the suggestion originated with Herr Gaus. I suggest you ascertain the State Secretary's opinion. W[eizsäcker]/11."

## No. 20

1792/408506

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

BERLIN, November 9, 1937.

e. o. Pol. V 7707.

During his visit today the Counselor of the Polish Embassy, Prince Lubomirski, said among other things that Herr Forster, the Gauleiter of Danzig, made a very "fiery" speech at a public meeting in Düsseldorf on November 6 which, as the Polish Consul, who was present, had noted, not only contained attacks on Poland (discussion of the consequences of a possible Polish invasion of Danzig, for example) but also expressed clearly a tendency to seek reincorporation of Danzig into the Reich. Prince Lubomirski said that he assumed that the Führer's statements to Ambassador Lipski on November 5 were not yet known to the Gauleiter at the time of his speech. He asked, however, that Herr Forster be informed accordingly.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Deputy Director and the Director of the Political Department.<sup>1</sup>

SCHLIEF

<sup>1</sup> A notation indicates that the document was subsequently referred to the Foreign Minister. See also document No. 19, footnote 3.

## No. 21

147/78526-27

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, November 25, 1937.

The Polish Chargé d'Affaires called on me today and brought up yesterday's press report, according to which it was planned to hold nearly 150 demonstrations in the Reich during the next few months in the matter of Danzig. Prince Lubomirski presented a clipping from the official organ of the Danzig Gau of the NSDAP, dated Tuesday, November 23, in which this report is given in much greater detail than in the German press, and includes the names of the individual speakers. The Polish Chargé d'Affaires pointed out that such a wave of meetings would, of course, be bound to start a reaction in Poland which would not be confined to the press alone but would presumably cause the Polish organizations, etc., to stage counter-demonstrations. For the sake of German-Polish relations, which were now so satisfactory, the Polish Government would deeply regret such a development. He had therefore been instructed to take up the matter and to request that, if at all possible, the action be abandoned.

I replied to Prince Lubomirski that so far, except for the short press report with which I, too, was familiar, I had no details on the matter. My attempt to dispel Prince Lubomirski's misgivings by explaining to him that the demonstrations would be concerned only with enlightening the German population with regard to the situation in Danzig, and that I did not fear any international repercussions, apparently did not make the desired impression upon him.

BISMARCK

Press clipping attached.<sup>1</sup><sup>1</sup> Not reprinted (147/78528-29).

## No. 22

147/78521

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, November 25, 1937.

By direction of the Foreign Minister I called the Polish Chargé d'Affaires this evening and told him that the scheduled demonstrations on behalf of Danzig had been canceled by order of Minister Goebbels.

BISMARCK



## No. 23

1792/408507-08

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, November 25, 1937.

Pol. V 7865.

The Polish Chargé d'Affaires called on me today in another matter, and I utilized the opportunity to make reference to the paper handed the Polish Ambassador by the Foreign Minister<sup>2</sup> early in November on the occasion of the publication of the German-Polish Minorities Declaration, and to remind him that Germany had suggested in that memorandum that conversations between representatives of the two States should take place at regular intervals concerning the questions dealt with in the Minorities Declaration. No answer to this German suggestion had as yet been received and I should therefore be grateful if we might soon learn the position of the Polish Government on this matter. Prince Lubomirski replied that the matter was still being considered by the appropriate authorities in Warsaw, and referred to a talk a week ago with Geheimrat Schliep, the sense of which was that the conversations would deal less with the political than with the technical side of the implementation of the Minorities Declaration. I corroborated this and underscored the fact that these conversations were to serve the very purpose of divorcing these problems from politics and bringing them to a satisfactory solution by joint action. I explained in addition that our domestic authorities were considering very positive measures with regard to the Polish minority, and saw in the contemplated conversations an instrument for continuing the principles established in the Minorities Declaration. Hence it would be very desirable if we could soon receive a positive reply to our proposal, in order to be able to start the practical work. Prince Lubomirski on his part also considered this desirable and promised to deliver a reply in the near future.

I then pointed out with reference to the German minority in Poland that unemployment in Upper Silesia was causing us the gravest concern at the moment. Even after the publication of the Minorities Declaration the dismissals of German workers in the eastern part of Upper Silesia had not ceased, whereas we had hoped, on the contrary, that reemployment would take place. As proof of the Polish Govern-

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 107.<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7026/E522464, E522466). Neurath noted in a memorandum of Nov. 4 (1792/408487-88) that he had handed the Polish Ambassador an *aide-mémoire* containing the proposal mentioned in the document printed here.

ment's good will we therefore considered it necessary that Poland should utilize every means to put an end to the continued dismissals of German workers and should reemploy them instead. Prince Lubomirski pointed out that at the moment seasonal unemployment in the Polish industrial region of eastern Upper Silesia had increased, but promised also to take up this question with his Government in the sense I had indicated.

Lastly, I also asked the Polish Chargé d'Affaires to use his influence in Warsaw to the end that the greatest possible consideration might be shown in evacuating from Helia the Polish fishermen of German extraction.<sup>3</sup>

BISMARCK

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<sup>3</sup> On Dec. 11, 1937, Ambassador Moltke in Warsaw again raised the minorities issue with Foreign Minister Beck, stating that "there was already a certain feeling of disillusionment" in Berlin in view of Poland's failure to respond to Germany's desire for practical implementation of the joint declaration (1834/418901-04). On this same occasion Beck informed Moltke concerning his conversation with French Foreign Minister Delbos on Dec. 3 during the latter's visit to Warsaw. For documents relating to this episode see vol. 1, documents Nos. 53, 54, and 68.

## No. 24

1728/401749

### *Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V*

BERLIN, December 1937<sup>1</sup>

e. o. Pol. V 8587.

The President of the Bank of Danzig, Dr. Schäfer, has just given me the following information over the secret line:

The acquisition—long sought by Danzig—of the British-owned block of shares of the International Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd. (formerly the *Kaiserliche Werft*, Danzig) was completed yesterday evening. A foreign firm, acting as a dummy owner for Danzig, acquired this block at the price of 75,000 pounds sterling. At the last moment the Polish Government tried by every means to get the shares into Polish hands. It was even ready to go up to a price of 150,000 pounds.

By this transaction Danzig has acquired in effect predominant influence in the shipyard; this is of particular importance not only from the purely economic standpoint but politically as well.

BERGMANN

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<sup>1</sup> The document itself is undated but was initialed on Dec. 16 and subsequent days by various officials to whom it was referred.

## No. 25

1998/441757-61

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

BERLIN, January 11, 1938.

e. o. Pol. V 234 a.

BRIEF FOR THE CONVERSATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH POLISH  
FOREIGN MINISTER BECK<sup>1</sup>1. *German-Polish Relations*

## a) Beck's speech:

In his speech of January 10 (extracts enclosed)<sup>2</sup> Beck speaks of good-neighborly relations and mentions the Minorities Declaration as a tangible success.

## b) Minorities problem:

Implementation of Minorities Declaration still encounters great opposition from Grazynski, the voivode of Silesia, and other domestic authorities. In Polish Upper Silesia dismissals of workmen, clerks, etc., belonging to the German minority continue. Concern is felt among Germans over impending publication of agrarian reform list<sup>3</sup> and over the frontier zone ordinance, application of which gives Polish authorities the greatest latitude for de-Germanization (particularly by denial of right to inherit landed property).

## c) Press:

Unfriendly attitude of Polish press not affected by Minorities Declaration. So far no sign of "psychological breakthrough" such as Beck is striving to attain. Minister Aschmann is going to Warsaw at the beginning of March for discussions on the press.

2. *Danzig*

Danzig question is being used by Polish opposition, now as in the past, for attacks on Beck. To confront Beck with coups of any kind would be likely to shake his position. Discussion of Danzig question at Council session so far not contemplated. Senate President Greiser recently told a representative of the Polish Foreign Ministry that for the time being the flag question was not acute; should the occasion arise, they would confer with Beck. Gauleiter Forster is

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum by Neurath dated Jan. 10, 1938, states that the Polish Ambassador submitted Foreign Minister Beck's request for an unofficial meeting before Beck went to Geneva. They agreed on Jan. 13 as the date, the place, Berlin (1998/441756).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6216/E470167-69). See document No. 26, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Under Polish legislation for land reform, lists of estates scheduled for distribution as peasant holdings were issued at intervals.

planning visit to Warsaw. Final Polish reply is still pending. Danzig still feels in many ways lack of consideration for its economic interests on the part of Poland (utilization of the port, sharing in customs receipts).

### 3. *League of Nations*

#### a) Poland's attitude toward the League of Nations:

Was outlined again in Beck's speech: rejection of ideological blocs; marked aloofness; on the other hand, Poland will not take any separate initiative.

#### b) Raw materials and colonies:

Basic reason for Beck's trip to Geneva. Poland does not at the moment desire any territorial acquisitions, but wants zones of influence or areas of settlement for Polish emigrants, especially Jews. Negotiations with France in regard to Polish emigration to Madagascar are already far advanced.

### 4. *France*

Franco-Polish alliance is still cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. Delbos' visit left favorable impression in Poland without resulting in any new, concrete agreements.

### 5. *Soviet Union*

Relations still correct but becoming increasingly cool. Attitude of Beck and Marshal Rydz-Smigly decidedly anti-Communist. Severe repression of Communist propaganda at home but no tendency toward participation in Anti-Comintern Pact.

### 6. *Czechoslovakia*

Relations remain bad. Beck informed Delbos that the reason for this was not simply the minority problem but, above all, the association of Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union.

### 7. *Danube Area*

In his speech Beck expresses his agreement with "organization plans" which Laval and Mussolini prepared in January 1935.<sup>4</sup>

#### a) Austria:

In other respects, too, there are signs that of late Poland, contrary to her previous attitude, desires maintenance of Austrian independ-

<sup>4</sup>In the Rome Protocols of Jan. 7, 1935, Mussolini and Laval agreed that in the interest of security in central Europe a multilateral understanding, to be cemented by a pact of nonaggression and noninterference in internal affairs of other states, should be sought. It was intended that such an arrangement would embrace primarily Austria and all her neighbors, but adherence was also to be open to France, Poland, and Rumania. For the text see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1935*, vol. cxxxix, pp. 947-948.

ence. Legitimism<sup>1</sup> hardly tolerable for Poland because of effect on Galicia.

b) Hungary:

As in the past, very friendly and heartfelt relations, sympathy with Hungarian revisionist desires in relation to Czechoslovakia. Regent and Foreign Minister are going to Warsaw shortly for official visit.

c) Rumania:

Influence of Polish policy against Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as well as against French desire for a pact, strong since the fall of Titulescu. New regime is regarded by Poland with some concern, as it is feared that Goga is going too far.<sup>2</sup>

8. *Italy*

Beck will probably go to Rome in the spring. Polish interest in improvement of Franco-Italian relations.

9. *Western Pact*

There have been Polish attempts to obtain British, French, and Italian agreement to Polish participation.

10. *Internal Situation in Poland*

Still unclarified. Koc's<sup>3</sup> retirement does not mean any change in the course of the Government's policy, which is striving for some sort of synthesis of totalitarianism and liberalism. Efforts to win over the masses, especially the farmers, to the Government's system have not so far been successful. Of late the authority of Marshal Rydz-Smigly has diminished.

As subjects for conversation the following items are suggested:

Beck's speech,  
Minorities problem,  
Poland's attitude toward the League of Nations,  
Raw materials and colonies,  
Soviet Union,  
Hungary, and  
Rumania.

Submitted herewith as instructed to the Director of the Political Department through the Deputy Director.<sup>4</sup>

SCHLIEF

<sup>1</sup> i. e., the movement for a Hapsburg restoration in Austria.

<sup>2</sup> See ch. II.

<sup>3</sup> Col. Adam Koc, collaborator of Marshal Pilsudski and founder of the National Unity Group, the only authorized parliamentary party in Poland.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "Submit to the State Secretary. W[eizsäcker] Jan. 12."

## No. 26

1998/441787

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2 of January 12

WARSAW, January 12, 1938—11:00 p. m.

Received January 13—1:10 a. m.

Pol. V 350.

With reference to my report of January 11.<sup>1</sup>

I spoke to M. Beck, whom I met yesterday at the reception given by the President, about his statement before the Sejm and asked him the meaning of his reference to the Franco-Italian Protocol of January 1935 concerning the Danube area. Beck replied that, as he had told us at the time, he had from the beginning been in sympathy with the concept which formed the basis of the Protocol, that of a pacification of the Danube area. He had also had the impression that our early objections had been eliminated by the subsequent modification of the original project. Beck seemed, furthermore, to wish to minimize his reference to the Protocol and to deny that it had any practical significance; he said that the essential part of his statement was the treatment of the League of Nations problem.

Beck then expressed his special pleasure over the fact that the Berlin invitation gave him an opportunity for a political discussion, which seemed to him to be very useful just at the present moment.

I found out from the *chef de cabinet* of the Foreign Ministry that in Berlin Beck intends to take up particularly the Danzig question. He was not coming with any concrete proposals of his own but wanted information as to what the Foreign Minister had in mind recently when he referred to the need of a fundamental settlement of the Danzig problem.<sup>2</sup> From the hints of the *chef de cabinet* it appears that in return for the satisfaction of certain of Poland's economic desires they are thinking of concessions in the question of Danzig's internal policy, subject to the maintenance of the Danzig Statute.

MOLTKE

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1339/353243-45). The report is a summary of the statement made by Beck to the Polish Sejm on Jan. 10. The statement is published in *Documents on International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1942), vol. I, pp. 306-311.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 13.

## No. 27

1834/418907-08

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

BERLIN, January 12, 1938.

e. o. Pol. V 353.

The Counselor of the Polish Embassy, Prince Lubomirski, informed me today that the question of the implementation of the Minorities Declaration was the subject of conferences in the appropriate departments which would result in proper instructions to the subordinate offices. With reference to the German suggestion for periodic conferences between representatives of the two Governments, he was instructed to state that his Government considered such a procedure premature. As to the reasons which had led the Polish Government to take this negative attitude, the following emerged from the further conversation: Poland is afraid that by following Germany's proposal she would be entering upon a dangerous road which might finally lead to the establishment of a new international organ. Prince L. further expressed apprehension lest a "double track" treatment of minority questions might be introduced through such commissions, whereas Poland believed that members of the minority should generally have recourse to the competent domestic authorities. Furthermore, he could assure us that the Polish domestic authorities would always consider sympathetically the wishes of the German minority.

I replied to Prince L. that Germany was, of course, not contemplating an international organ but simply non-binding conversations between experts, from which, as had often been explained to him before, the most favorable results might be expected in the direction of eliminating politics and tensions in this field. I therefore regretted the Polish decision and hoped that in due time our proposal would be reconsidered.

Prince L. declared that it was not a question of a final rejection of our proposal, but that Poland considered it best, for the time being, to wait to see how things would develop in practice.

SCHLIER

## No. 28

147/78532-37

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 27

BERLIN, January 13, 1938.

This morning I had a conversation lasting an hour and a half with Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister. M. Beck began the conversation by saying that he had wished to discuss matters with me

in detail again after such a long time, and in particular before he left for Geneva. At my suggestion we started at once to discuss the Danzig question. M. Beck expressed his satisfaction at the fact that the Danzig-Polish affairs had developed almost without friction. It had been demonstrated that these could be handled much better without the League of Nations Commissioner than with him, although the present Commissioner, unlike his predecessor, was not pettifogging but thoroughly reasonable. In view of this he had been considering whether the time would not soon come when the League of Nations Commissioner would become superfluous, and he would like to hear my views on the subject. At the moment, because of the attitude of the present League Commissioner, there was no danger that he might, in the name of the authorities he represented, exploit the many opportunities available to him to influence affairs in Danzig. The situation might change, however, and then the League Commissioner would only cause trouble once more in Danzig.

I replied to M. Beck that I had also given some thought to the matter and was of the opinion that there was really no urgent need to raise the question of the removal of the League Commissioner, but that if the situation continued to develop peacefully, and particularly if German-Polish relations continued to take a satisfactory form, it might be advantageous to eliminate the possibility that the League Commissioner might bring his influence to bear in Danzig. I wanted to caution him, however, against bringing up for discussion only a curtailment of the rights of the League Commissioner. If the matter were taken up, it would have to be settled by complete elimination of the influence of Geneva. It seemed doubtful to me whether it was expedient to raise the question at the forthcoming meeting of the League of Nations Council, since I believed that as a result of Italy's departure and the criticism which not only he, M. Beck, but other statesmen as well had leveled at its activities, the League was probably particularly sensitive at the moment and therefore not disposed to renounce voluntarily any more of its powers. M. Beck admitted this and told me that during his conversation in London<sup>1</sup> Mr. Eden had shown that he was not averse to proposing the recall of the League Commissioner; at any rate he had promised not to take any action until he had been in touch with M. Beck once more.

We finally agreed that M. Beck should carefully sound out the mood in Geneva, and that we should then pursue the question further at some appropriate time.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the London *Times* of May 20, Beck, who was in London for the Coronation of King George VI, had a talk with Eden on May 19, 1937.



*The Danzig Flag:*

In reply to a remark of Beck's regarding the intended alteration in the Danzig flag I told him that the question was by no means acute and that he and Greiser could discuss it at their convenience.<sup>2</sup>

Passing on to the sudden change in Rumania,<sup>3</sup> M. Beck told me that he was naturally pleased with this development. It had happened so suddenly, however, that it was not yet possible to foresee clearly whether it would be permanent. This much seemed certain to him; the former liberal regime in Rumania would hardly return to power. He himself had used every means at his disposal to oppose the return of Titulescu, and he believed that this "sick man" had virtually no further prospects of playing a decisive role in Rumania. For Poland it was essential that Rumania be governed by a regime which would constitute a firm bulwark against Soviet Russia.

I then asked M. Beck what he thought would be the attitude of the new Rumanian Government toward Hungary. M. Beck replied that nothing could be said on this score at present, and he did not believe that any statement could be expected in this regard before the Rumanian elections. Furthermore, he was already doing his best, in view of the cordial relations of long standing with Hungary, to bring about a *modus vivendi* between Rumania and Hungary. He realized that this was not easy, but he had not given up hope of achieving it. I told M. Beck that we, too, had always advised the Hungarians to find a *modus vivendi* with Rumania, as well as with Yugoslavia.

As regards Poland's relations with Czechoslovakia, M. Beck stated that they could not be worse, and he could not imagine that they would ever change.

I then asked M. Beck what he had in mind when he referred to the Mussolini-Laval pact in his speech in the Sejm. M. Beck explained that he had really only meant to say that he welcomed a stabilization of conditions in the Danube area. To this I replied that I must tell him plainly, in case he did not know it already, that we had had to raise serious objections to this pact, which had been concluded at a time when our relations with Italy had not been so cordial as they were now. These objections still remained, and we should have to reject categorically any development along the lines of the ideas prevailing at that time; besides, the Italians had doubtless abandoned these ideas themselves. We had our own particular views regarding our relations with Austria, and we were not disposed to take

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 36.

<sup>2</sup> The National Liberal Cabinet, headed by George Tatarescu, suffered election reverses in December 1937, and was replaced by a Cabinet headed by Octavian Goga, leader of a minority anti-Semitic party, the National Christians, on Dec. 29.

instructions from others, as, for example, I had also told M. Flandin<sup>\*</sup> during his recent visit here. M. Beck emphasized that Poland had no political interest whatever in Austria; her interest was strictly confined to Rumania and to a certain extent Czechoslovakia.

M. Beck then asked: "And nothing new in the West?" I answered: No, peace and quiet reign there, the Western Pact was slumbering, and the discussion of our colonial demands would certainly require a fairly long period of preparation.

Regarding the situation in Spain, M. Beck stated that he had had news for sometime that the Red party's forces, and also conditions behind their front, had improved quite considerably during recent weeks. The victory at Teruel had at least raised the morale of the Reds once more, and probably a further prolongation of hostilities would have to be reckoned with. Nevertheless he shared my view that the Spanish affair had lost the dangerous aspect which it had borne last year. Despite the recent successes, the Spanish Civil War represented a considerable loss of prestige for the Comintern.

M. Beck emphasized particularly what he had said in his speech regarding Poland's attitude toward the League of Nations. I told him that we had made our attitude toward the League of Nations abundantly clear and had nothing to add to this at present. During the conversation Beck repeatedly took sharp issue with Bolshevism, the combatting of which was the primary aim of his policy. However, he dismissed as impracticable for Poland a participation in the Anti-Comintern Pact, which I only touched on.

In this conversation we did not get around to the question of minorities.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>\*</sup>The former French Premier and Foreign Minister who made a private visit to Berlin in December 1937. See vol. I, document No. 87.

## No. 29

147/78538-40

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 34

BERLIN, January 14, 1938.

This morning the Führer received Polish Foreign Minister Beck, who was accompanied by Polish Ambassador Lipski, in an audience of about an hour and a half.

After he had first expressed his pleasure at making the personal acquaintance of Minister Beck, the Führer described at length his attitude toward Bolshevism and the Bolshevist danger which was still threatening Europe. He based our support of Franco on the fear that the Bolshevist infection would almost automatically spread from a Red Spain to France, then grip Belgium and Holland, and so pro-

vide a new and powerful center of Bolshevik activity. He repeatedly stressed that—aside, of course, from a further strengthening of Germany—the struggle against Bolshevism was the unalterable aim of his policy. In this connection he mentioned the Anti-Comintern Agreement with Japan and presented his view of developments in the Far East.

With reference to relations between Poland and Germany, the Führer once more assured M. Beck that he would not support any change in the Danzig Statute;<sup>1</sup> he further stated, in regard to the wish M. Beck expressed to me yesterday concerning the intended change in the flag of Danzig, that he would summon Herr Forster and instruct him to refrain from changing the flag for the present.

With reference to the question of the League of Nations, the Führer said that he had read with interest and pleasure M. Beck's statements in his speech before the Sejm. Germany would never return to the League of Nations. All the attempts that were constantly made to this end, especially by England, were useless.

With reference to the colonial question, the Chancellor remarked that he would unquestionably pursue this matter further, and if England was not yet ready to pursue a farsighted policy perhaps she would in time be forced to do so.

In the course of the conversation the Chancellor frequently spoke very bitterly of England.

With reference to the central European question, the Führer said that he was striving further to develop our relations with Austria in a peaceful way. The only case in which he would intervene at once and without regard to the attitude of England and France would be the restoration of the Hapsburgs.

With regard to Czechoslovakia, our first desire was merely an improvement in the treatment of the German minority. The whole structure of the Czech State, however, was impossible and—as a result of the mistaken policy of the Czechs in central Europe—also involved the danger that it would become a hotbed of Bolshevism. M. Beck heartily agreed.

M. Beck thanked the Führer for his comprehensive statements and for his part stressed the purpose of the Polish Government to build relations with Germany into an increasingly friendly form and to continue the policy initiated by Marshal Pilsudski.

With regard to Poland's relations with Rumania and Hungary, Beck expressed himself as he had done to me yesterday, attaching the greatest importance to strengthening Rumanian policy as the outermost bulwark against Russian Bolshevism.

V. N[EURATH]

<sup>1</sup> For Beck's account of this statement see his memorandum printed in the Polish White Book, document No. 36.

## No. 30

4008/E058708-09

*Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker to Ambassador Moltke*

SECRET

BERLIN, January 19, 1938.

DEAR MOLTKE: I am enclosing for your personal information a copy of the memorandum on the reception of Foreign Minister Beck by the Führer and Chancellor.<sup>1</sup>

Beck's visit went off in a pleasant atmosphere. From our standpoint it was especially useful that M. Beck was informed by Herr von Neurath regarding our view of the Mussolini-Laval pact. It was also interesting that M. Beck characterized Polish-Czech relations as hardly capable of improvement. M. Beck on his part can be satisfied with the assurances of the Führer in the Danzig question. The conciliatory attitude which he showed Herr von Neurath in the question of abolishing the post of High Commissioner in Danzig is surprising to me, for according to our information heretofore Beck is by no means favorably disposed in this matter, as I also gathered from a remark by Professor Burckhardt last Friday.<sup>2</sup> For his part Burckhardt is of the opinion that the post of High Commissioner is a slowly dying organ of a decadent institution. He believes that he personally can still be of some help in Danzig, but regards himself as the last High Commissioner. Burckhardt considers natural the idea of a gradual release of the League of Nations from its obligations to guarantee the Danzig constitution.

Best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Burckhardt made a private call on Weizsäcker in Berlin on Jan. 14 while en route to Geneva. The remainder of this letter incorporates verbatim the greater part of the brief minute which Weizsäcker wrote on that meeting (116/66358).

## No. 31

116/66360

*Minute by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, January 22, 1938.

Captain [*Kapitän*] Frisius, representing General Keitel, called on me yesterday to inquire whether our information indicated that a *Putsch* was to be expected in Danzig in the foreseeable future. Certain reports at the War Ministry indicated something of that nature. Captain Frisius inquired what the First Army Corps in East Prussia would have to do in such an event.

I told Captain Frisius that as far as our information indicated no surprises were to be anticipated in Danzig from either the Polish or the German side. Should they occur nevertheless, it was my opinion that the First Army Corps in East Prussia would not have to do anything without instructions from Berlin. Captain Frisius concurred fully in this view.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 32

989/302513

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 13 of March 13

WARSAW, March 13, 1938—11:00 p. m.

Received March 14—1:00 a. m.

The Deputy Minister, Count Szembek, with whom I had an opportunity to speak today, informed me that on the occasion of a report to the President and Rydz-Smigly yesterday he had noted that events in Austria were still being observed with complete calm.<sup>1</sup> Here they had been prepared for the events and regarded future developments as an internal affair of Austria. Poland had only economic interests there and assumed that these would not be prejudiced.

Foreign Minister Beck is not expected to return until the middle of this week.

MOLTKE

<sup>1</sup> For documents concerning the *Anschluss* see vol. I, ch. II.

## No. 33

2069/449549-54

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P V 34

WARSAW, March 22, 1938.

Received March 23.

Pol. VI 640.

Subject: Establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania.

The foreign policy success in the Lithuanian question has called forth demonstrations of joy all over Poland. To be sure, the public had expected that the demands on Lithuania would go further than indicated by the text of the tardily published ultimatum;<sup>1</sup> however,

<sup>1</sup> Since the Polish seizure of Vilna in 1920 there had been no diplomatic or consular relations between Poland and Lithuania and the frontier between the two countries had been closed. Following a frontier incident on Mar. 11 Poland issued a 48-hour ultimatum on Mar. 17 requiring that Lithuania agree to establish normal diplomatic relations. Lithuania acceded. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. I, pp. 301-306. See also documents Nos. 321 ff.

the fact that a decisive step toward normalizing Polish-Lithuanian relations has been taken, that the Polish Government has enforced its demands, and that at the same time it was possible to preserve the peace outweighed any criticism and generally called forth a feeling of satisfaction and triumph.

The patriotic demonstrations which were renewed after the fortunate outcome of the crisis were generally carried out—like the manifestations of “aroused national feelings” during the preceding days of the crisis—under the aegis of the Government faction, which on this occasion was able to ensure itself a prominent place in the public eye. Homage was paid primarily to the Army, which during those days had assumed prominence as an instrument of power in foreign policy, and to the Supreme Commander of the Army, Marshal Rydz-Smigly, who had been the cynosure of all eyes during the crisis and who has gained in popularity.

M. Beck, however, can take the principal credit for the success achieved. It is due to his conception and his influence that the Polish action combined moderation in the demands with the application of strong pressure; thus was the outcome assured, a favorable impression attained abroad, and advantageous conditions created for the further development of Polish-Lithuanian relations.

In his statements to the Polish press after receipt of the Lithuanian reply M. Beck emphasized that Poland had a realistic attitude toward Lithuania: The Lithuanian people wished to have their own State; this was their right, and this right was respected by the Polish Government. M. Beck made a similar statement in an interview with Ward Price, the *Daily Mail* correspondent; he said that he was happy to utilize the opportunity to state solemnly that Poland would continue to respect Lithuania's full sovereignty. It had only been necessary to do away with the previous “absurd situation.” Now it could be expected that economic treaties would be concluded which would benefit both parties; Poland had no intention, however, of exerting pressure on Lithuania, but would rather await the normal development of events.

The conciliatory attitude expressed in these words of M. Beck is in accord with the general attitude adopted in Poland after Lithuania yielded. The animosity that was whipped up prior to acceptance of the ultimatum, which, for example, had led in Vilna to the breaking of all the windows in the building of the Lithuanian minority's representative there, has vanished. The former anti-Lithuanian inscriptions disappeared from the banners and placards which the participants in the patriotic demonstrations in Warsaw, Vilna, and other localities carried, and were replaced by new slogans, such as “The Poles and Lithuanians are brothers” or “Warsaw and Kaunas must

cooperate." The head of the Government faction, General Skwarczynski, declared during the demonstration at Pilsudski Square in Warsaw: "We extend the strong hand of brotherhood to Lithuania." Almost the entire press voices the same sentiment; all papers express joy over the great success achieved by Polish foreign policy and over the fact that the "Chinese wall" between Poland and Lithuania has been broken through; but no hostile words are spoken against the Lithuanian people or the Lithuanian State.

The "wise moderation" manifested by the Polish Government and the decided friendliness displayed by the Polish public characterize the tactics which are at present slated for adoption in the Lithuanian question. In contrast to the few critical voices which find fault with the fact that Lithuania was not immediately forced to make more far-reaching concessions, the press openly states that it is hoped that greater and more lasting advantages will be achieved for Poland by proceeding gradually. They recall the historical example of the Polish-Lithuanian Union which, as is known, nominally guaranteed Lithuania a special position and equality, but actually led to her complete subordination to Poland and to the *Polonisierung* of the Lithuanian upper classes. Even though national assimilation of the newly developed Lithuanian intelligentsia now no longer seems probable in the foreseeable future, even in the opinion of the Poles, nevertheless Poland is doubtless once again pursuing long-range objectives in Lithuania, and only the tempo of their realization is under dispute. A well-known representative of the Polish Legion told me very frankly that Poland would find it easy to achieve *pénétration pacifique* of Lithuania in the economic, cultural, and political spheres; other opinions are more cautious, to be sure. There is no doubt, however, that from now on Poland will make every effort to weld Lithuania firmly to herself sooner or later, at first economically, but then above all politically and militarily also, and to make her—next to western Poland—a second strong point in Polish Baltic Sea policy.

The slogan "Poland's Baltic Sea policy" which is being used a great deal at the present time was given special emphasis recently on the occasion of M. Beck's trip to Rome, when Polish semiofficial comment designated the Baltic Sea area as Poland's main sphere of interest, comparable to Italy's interest in the Mediterranean, while the Danube area was only of secondary importance to both countries. The strong cultivation of Poland's interest in the Baltic Sea has, moreover, become a permanent phenomenon here in political gatherings and demonstrations of the most varied kinds; it finds further expression in the propaganda activity of the very active Polish Maritime and Colonial League and in the money collection made under official auspices for the naval armament fund.

It may appear grotesque that Poland, as is actually the case, wants to build a large fleet, the only base for which is the harbor of Gdynia, which lies within range of German guns; even the development of Hela would hardly improve the situation. In order to explain Polish naval policy one must assume that Poland is pursuing the plan of obtaining another naval base on the Baltic Sea, and if one considers the above remarks in this light the slogan "To Memel!" which was heard in the streets of Warsaw for the first time during the days of the Lithuanian conflict, actually assumes a special significance. The press further supplemented this idea by pointing out that there was of course no intention of exchanging Gdynia and the Corridor, but of obtaining a second access to the sea.

It may be said even now that if the Polish Government carries out its Lithuanian plans—and there is no doubt that this will be done sooner or later—German interests will be engaged at least as regards the Memel area; moreover, the military situation of East Prussia would undergo a basic change as the result of this development. To this extent March 19 assumes far-reaching significance for German-Polish relations as well, and it will be necessary to consider how it will be possible to formulate our policy especially vis-à-vis Lithuania in order to safeguard our interests.

VON MOLTKE

### No. 34

147/78556-58

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 203

BERLIN, March 31, 1938.

Polish Ambassador Lipski called on me today at 12:30 p. m. to communicate the following:

The law published on October 4, 1937, concerning the census to be held on May 15, and the subsequent regulations for its execution, had established a change in previous practice. This change consisted in the fact that, in the first place, the completed census forms, which were formerly intended exclusively for statistical purposes and were moreover kept secret, could in the future be used for other purposes also; frank statement of nationality was thereby made difficult for the individual. Lastly, apart from data on native language, etc., an open avowal of nationality preference was now required. This whole matter was, of course, an internal German affair. Unofficially, however, he would like to call my attention to these changes. He did not care to make any statement as to whether the new procedure might perhaps conflict with the Minorities Declaration of November 5, 1937.

I told him that I was not acquainted with the particulars of the law, but that I would inquire concerning the points mentioned by him.



M. Lipski thereupon asked permission to send me, quite unofficially, a short minute; I agreed. The note is enclosed.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to German-Polish relations in general, Lipski told me that the Agreement of 1934 and the Minorities Declaration of 1937 had established a firm basis for friendly relations between Germany and Poland. In a conversation that Field Marshal Göring had recently had with Foreign Minister Beck, the problem how to establish still closer relations between Germany and Poland had been considered. On this point Foreign Minister Beck had stated that the German declaration of November 5, 1937 concerning Danzig had already greatly contributed to sounder relations. We might consider whether the Agreement of 1934, which was concluded for a period of 10 years, could now be further extended in order to silence the critics who wished to regard the Agreement merely as a temporary, transitional stage in German-Polish relations.

I replied that this question could of course be examined, but that the thought came to me quite spontaneously that extension in advance might not necessarily be interpreted as a strengthening of the Agreement. It might even create the impression that German-Polish relations were not so close and satisfactory, and that extension in advance had become necessary for that reason.

I also told M. Lipski that Germany welcomed Poland's resistance to communism, especially German-Polish cooperation in this field, which had found expression in the Police Agreement. As he was of course aware, Germany was united through the Anti-Comintern Pact with Italy and Japan in a common defense against communism. Our cooperation with these countries had proved to be entirely satisfactory. I should be happy if Germany and Poland, as they had begun to do through the Police Agreement, continued to give full attention to the problem of communism and cooperated more and more closely in defense against it. I considered it advisable, in any case, for us to keep each other informed with respect to this question. I did not extend an invitation for possible Polish accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

M. Lipski replied that Poland also was proceeding vigorously against communism, as was shown by the note recently addressed to Czechoslovakia and communicated to us through the German Ambassador in Warsaw.<sup>2</sup> He, too, was convinced of the advisability of collaboration against communism and desired to keep in touch with me concerning this matter.

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1834/418915-17). The note is an elaboration of Lipski's statement as summarized in this memorandum. It points out that if an individual's nationality is determined by his own statement rather than by objective factors like language and ancestry he is subject to pressure.

<sup>2</sup>The note has not been found.

## No. 35

2040/446128

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, April 1, 1938.

Ambassador Lipski just called on me in order, in compliance with his instructions, to make the following proposals for the economic conferences which we suggested:

1. Beginning of the negotiations on April 7; purpose of the negotiations: a German-Polish supplementary agreement to the German-Polish Trade Treaty<sup>1</sup> in order to include Austrian trade in that treaty.

2. A proposal that the supplementary agreement be concluded for a period of two years;

3. Since the German-Polish Trade Treaty would expire on December 31, 1938 and therefore negotiations would have to be carried on in any case, the supplementary agreement should be fused with the original agreement in such a way that from now on both would run for a period of two years.

The Commercial Counselor of the Polish Embassy would call at the Economic Policy Department very soon in order to discuss further details.

The Ambassador then stated further that the Austrian question had been discussed by Field Marshal Göring and Minister Beck on January 14 (presumably in Berlin) and on February 23 in Warsaw,<sup>2</sup> and that Minister Beck had stated that Poland would not assert any political claims in the *Anschluss* question but in return expected concessions in the economic field and in transit matters. On the famous day of March 11, that is, the evening before the *Anschluss*, the Field Marshal had given M. Lipski confirmation of the content of the above conversation.

Submitted to the Director of the Economic Policy Department.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Signed at Warsaw, Nov. 4, 1935; text published in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1935, pt. II, pp. 767-813.

<sup>2</sup> Records of these conversations have not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

## No. 36

1724/400727-28

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, May 25, 1938.

The Danzig Senator, Staatsrat Schimmel, called on me today to report to the Foreign Ministry on Gauleiter Forster's trip, at the request of the latter. He informed me as follows:

The only political conversation of any importance took place at a luncheon which Minister Beck gave for Gauleiter Forster and Minister Chodacki alone, and at which he (Schimmel) and the other Danzig Senator who was on the trip were not present.

The conversation dealt with Danzig-Polish questions in general, as well as some domestic Danzig questions. The principal points involved were the following:

1) Gauleiter Forster had informed M. Beck that the 1939 elections to the Danzig Volkstag were not to be held as elections in the democratic sense of the word, but that another form, possibly that of a plebiscite on a current question, would be used. In any case, safeguards would be taken to insure that the Polish minority in Danzig was represented in the Volkstag in the same strength as heretofore. Minister Beck showed understanding for the suggested solution.

2) Gauleiter Forster had spoken of the contemplated change in the flag of Danzig, which was to consist of the addition of the swastika to the Danzig flag or the introduction of the swastika flag. M. Beck had referred to the difficulties that might arise internally in Poland through the introduction of such a flag and had advised against introducing it.

3) The conversation had then turned to Poland's economic rights in Danzig, which it was intended to preserve in full. A sore point in this connection was the Jewish question; as was known, Danzig had earlier given Poland written assurances in the Harbor Agreement<sup>1</sup> of free economic activity for Jews. An attempt was being made to circumvent these provisions of the agreement administratively as far as possible. M. Beck had taken a rather noncommittal attitude on this issue and, at any rate, had not expressly approved.

For the rest, Gauleiter Forster and his companions were accorded a friendly reception on their visit. They visited a great number of industrial and agricultural enterprises, including the petroleum district.

As for the origin of the visit, Senator Schimmel said that a remark of Ambassador Lipski to Field Marshal Göring had given rise to it. The Ambassador had complained of the allegedly anti-Polish attitude of the Gauleiter. The Field Marshal had then told Gauleiter Forster it would be best if he were to go to Poland himself some time. Later on, the invitation was extended to Gauleiter Forster through Lipski and the High Commissioner. Although the visit had been unofficial, it nevertheless meant recognition of the position of the Party in Danzig by official Poland.

Gauleiter Forster will report to the Führer on the visit next week and also hopes soon to have the opportunity to discuss the trip with the Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Signed on May 18, 1933.

## No. 37

1724/400729-34

*The Consulate General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

No. IG 621

DANZIG, May 25, 1938.

Received May 27.

Pol. V 4062.

Subject: The High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt.

With reference to my reports of May 2, IG 484; May 11, IG 536; May 19, IG 604.<sup>1</sup>

Upon his return from his trip to Geneva, Paris, and Berlin, Professor Burckhardt received Staatsrat Böttcher on May 21 and informed him of the conversations he had held in those cities and the observations he had made on his journey, as set forth in the enclosed minute.

VON GROLMAN

[Enclosure]

DANZIG, May 23, 1938.

The High Commissioner of the League of Nations, Professor Burckhardt, telephoned me on Saturday and asked me to come to see him.

He reported to me on Geneva:

He had had several long conversations with Halifax. Halifax had made a very good impression upon him. His language was much more incisive than Eden's and he expressed himself very candidly on all matters. Halifax had also expressed himself to the effect that he had learned a great deal from his visit to Berlin. It was his aim to establish good relations with Germany. His Government was not very strong, however, and the opponents of the Government, on the other hand, were very numerous. What was now called liberal in England had nothing whatever to do with the old Liberals—the Whigs—who had probably all become conservative by now. The present liberals were very close to the Third International. The Third International was constantly gaining ground in England, also among the students.

Lord Halifax had termed Danzig and the Corridor an absurdity. Separating a large province from the Reich had probably been the most foolish provision of the Treaty of Versailles. But since it had been done, it was, of course, difficult to alter. He was convinced, however, that such a change would have to come about through friendly negotiations between Germany and Poland. England, that is, the present Government, was quite prepared to play a mediator's role in such negotiations. But, as he had mentioned, the British Government was under heavy fire not only in England but also abroad.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6226/E470310); (1728/401750); (1724/400729-34).

Halifax was also favorably inclined toward Danzig. If, in a new election, the National Socialist Party polled a two-thirds majority, any constitutional amendment would doubtless be approved by the League of Nations. But things must not be made too difficult for him. It would be a considerable embarrassment to him and his Government if the Aryan clause were now introduced in Danzig. (According to a remark the Gauleiter had made to the High Commissioner, the Civil Service Law and a Law for the Protection of the Aryan Race will now be introduced in Danzig.)

The High Commissioner asked whether it was not still possible to influence the leaders to refrain from introducing an Aryan clause. He gave it as his opinion that in case of new elections in Danzig, the National Socialists would undoubtedly obtain the same number of representatives as now, so that aside from them only the two or three Poles would still be left. The Gauleiter—so he said—did not, to be sure, seem to be entirely of this opinion.

Regarding the personality of Lord Halifax, M. Burckhardt added that Halifax was a very strict churchman in the Anglican-Catholic sense, independent of the Pope. Lord Halifax went to church at 7 o'clock every morning even in Geneva and made use of the time to organize his thoughts. He began work promptly at 8 o'clock. He also played golf for 2 hours every day under any circumstances. He needed the one to organize his thoughts and the other to strengthen his body. He was a good rider and one of the best shots in the country. In his capacity as Viceroy of India he had achieved good results.

Burckhardt had told him that there were good deer in the Danzig area. Lord Halifax replied that he would gladly accept an invitation to shoot deer.

The High Commissioner then spoke of his impressions at Geneva. England was departing further and further from her former view of the League of Nations and now really thought of it only as an alliance not *against* but rather *for* something. Avenol's position in Geneva was weakened. England wished to fill Avenol's post once again with an Englishman. The Pole, Rajchman,<sup>2</sup> who had been expatriated by Poland, nevertheless remained in the employ of the Secretariat and was continuing his intrigues. The French Ministers had this time appeared in Geneva with new people. The old officials, even Massigli, had not been in Geneva during the May sessions, since the officials did not share the views of the Ministers. Burckhardt had therefore journeyed to Paris for 2 days and had called on Massigli. France was experiencing severe internal strife. The political rivalry between the different personalities was very strongly accentuated.

<sup>2</sup>Ludwik Rajchman, Director of the Health Section of the League of Nations.

Massigli maintained that Franco was by no means yet to be regarded as the certain victor in the Spanish war. The French General Staff, however, gave him a different picture.

Burckhardt had then visited State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker in Berlin and had had lunch with him in the company of the French Ambassador, François-Poncet.

The High Commissioner then said further that it was evident in Switzerland that underground elements were trying to incite to war. They were experiencing the same things in Switzerland as during the war, that spies were trying to create sentiment against Germany. Thus, in an express train at Lausanne, a lady traveling first class and speaking German in a conspicuous manner had wanted to pay for her order in the dining car with reichsmarks, which was naturally refused. Thereupon this lady had very loudly expressed her displeasure and said it would not be long before the reichsmark was good in Switzerland, too. The other people present had naturally been very much aroused at this incident.

I then mentioned the construction of unarmed warships by Danzig shipyards. M. Burckhardt told me that Lord Halifax had no objections to this. As a formality the Secretariat had been asked to give a legal opinion as to whether the decision on this question could be left to the High Commissioner. Halifax would deal with any difficulties. These could come only from Sanders [*Sandler*].

I replied that we were anxious to get as speedy a clarification of this problem as possible because Poland was already trying to get some advantages in return for her consent. If the High Commissioner obtained the consent of the Committee of Three to the decision, however, we would move to request this decision at once and would then be in a more favorable position with regard to Poland.

The High Commissioner intended to communicate with the Secretariat at once in order that its legal opinion might be expedited.

M. Burckhardt had spoken in Geneva with M. Gwiazdowski<sup>\*</sup> with regard to the visit of the Gauleiter to Poland. Beck had been reproached in Poland with having been too friendly and yielding toward the Gauleiter. But Beck had replied that he had to behave in a well-intentioned way toward the close confidant of the Führer. It was not necessary to conclude from this that the officials of the Government would now have to take a different attitude toward Danzig.

From the conversation with Gwiazdowski, it had further appeared that the attempt had been made to learn as much as possible from the Gauleiter and that Malewski had noted down every one of his

<sup>\*</sup> See document No. 5, footnote 5.

demands. The attitude seemed, however, to be in favor of continuing to deal with the Government and President Greiser, thus being on surer ground, rather than with the Gauleiter, who was of a somewhat unstable nature.

M. Burekhardt said the Gauleiter had told him on Friday that he wished to go to England—in the company of Professor Noë,<sup>4</sup> in fact. It would be a good thing in itself for the Gauleiter to become acquainted with England. Whether an introduction through Professor Noë was advisable or not, however, and what ulterior motives Herr Noë had, he did not know.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

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<sup>4</sup>Ludwig Noë, Professor of the Danzig Technical College, Director General of the International Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd., which operated the Danzig shipyards.

## No. 38

116/66364

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

RM 230

BERLIN, May 31, 1938.

At 8 p. m. today I received Gauleiter Forster. At the start of our conversation I remonstrated with him with regard to his alleged statements that it was almost impossible to obtain an appointment with me. I also objected to his remarks about the project of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle for the reorganization of the German element in Poland.<sup>2</sup>

Gauleiter Forster apologized for both incidents.

I then told Gauleiter Forster that I did not consider participation of the Gauleiter of Danzig in questions of the German minority in Poland advisable, as his position in Danzig would be made unnecessarily more difficult thereby. Moreover, the Führer had put the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in charge of minority questions. Gauleiter

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<sup>1</sup>According to a marginal notation by Erich Kordt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, this memorandum was shown only to Weizsäcker on June 2, and was then returned to the secret file of the Foreign Minister.

<sup>2</sup>The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle informed the Foreign Ministry on May 20 that it planned to unify by order from Berlin all German organizations in Poland, political, economic, cultural, into a single organization. There was opposition to this within the Foreign Ministry itself on the grounds that Berlin's role in this "spontaneous" unification of Germans in Poland could not be kept secret, that the moment was ill chosen for sharpening Polish-German relations, and that Poland might react by destroying German economic organizations in Poland. A Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle "proposal" which made slight concessions to these objections was nevertheless transmitted to the German leaders in Poland through the German Consulates on May 28 (3023/598960-63, 598966-67, 598971-75, 598983-90, 599030-33). The plan was opposed, however, by the leaders of the German minority in Poland, who objected particularly to the single "Führer" designated by Berlin (6367/E474121-22). See also document No. 51.

Forster expressed his agreement, adding that he was happy not to have to occupy himself further with these matters.<sup>8</sup>

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>8</sup> According to a May 30 memorandum (116/66363) by Erich Kordt, written for Weizsäcker only, Forster had himself proposed that "he also be consulted on minority problems in Poland." This memorandum also states that at the Foreign Minister's request he agreed to postpone the questions of a change in the Danzig flag and the introduction of racial laws in Danzig. Kordt's memorandum presumably refers to the same conversation which Ribbentrop records in the above document. Internal evidence suggests that the conversation took place on May 30, and that a clerical error was made in dating the document May 31.

## No. 39

1834/418924-26

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, June 9, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. V 4439.

The Association of Poles in Germany handed the Reich Minister of the Interior a memorandum at the beginning of the month in which it is asserted that a deterioration in the situation of the Polish minority groups in the Reich has taken place since the Minorities Declaration of November 5, 1937. The memorandum protests against discriminatory treatment in the field of public instruction, in the economic and socio-political field, in the application of the Reich Law concerning Editors, the Reich Entail Law, and the Frontier Law, as well as in the cultural and organizational activity of the Polish minority. The Foreign Ministry does not yet have the text of the memorandum. The memorandum is at present being studied by the Ministry of the Interior and is to be the subject of a conference there within the next few days.

The Embassy in Warsaw has received a telegraphic instruction, a copy of which is attached, to make representations to the Polish Foreign Ministry regarding the handling of the complaints by the Polish press, which is exaggerating the affair in a malicious manner.

Pol. V respectfully suggests that at the anticipated reception of the Polish Ambassador, the Reich Foreign Minister likewise express his astonishment at this strange behavior of the Polish press. It is further respectfully suggested that the occasion be taken to repeat our previous proposal to Ambassador Lipski, that minorities' grievances on both sides be taken out of the sphere of diplomatic and journalistic discussion and dealt with by a committee of experts from the two Governments which would meet from time to time.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 23 and 27.



Herewith respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister through the Deputy Director of the Political Department, the Under State Secretary, and the State Secretary.

SCHLIER

[Enclosure]

*Telegram to Warsaw*

Pol. NP 5173.

Please express to the Polish Government our regret that the Polish press and radio almost unanimously and with great exaggeration are supporting the Polish minority's complaints, as to the justification for which conclusive judgment will be possible only after the current investigation. In so doing they are drawing in part menacing conclusions with regard to the development of neighborly relations. Particularly surprising is the attitude of the semi-official Iskra Agency which, among other things, is drawing ugly parallels with the oppression of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia. With the appearance of such press comments, it need occasion no surprise in Warsaw if, for example, the war-mongering Jewish *New York Times* eagerly takes up the theme and, for its part, makes Germany "guilty of the same terrorization of minorities of which she accuses the Czechs."

The German Government is of the opinion that such language in the Polish press is incompatible with the German-Polish agreements and not beneficial to practical work in the sphere of mutual minority interests.

ASCHMANN

No. 40

147/78576

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 13, 1938.

The Polish Ambassador, who visited me today on another matter, also mentioned the petition of the Polish minority in the Reich to the Reich Ministry of the Interior and cited as a special case the girls' school at Ratibor, the completion of which had been prevented by Germany. One could also tell from the Polish press that Poland was gradually becoming nervous about the treatment of the Polish minority.

I answered the Ambassador that I certainly had noticed the Polish press attacks and was somewhat surprised that things which were a matter of domestic policy and, so to speak, still in *stadium nascendi*

[sic] had reached the Polish press. If it was a question of Polish grievances on German soil, I told the Ambassador, I had to say that such minority complaints rested on reciprocity, etc.

On my part, however, I did not really go into the subject deeply, since a general discussion of our minorities' grievances with the Polish Ambassador is to be saved for a somewhat more favorable moment.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 41

1834/418929

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, June 17, 1938.

Pol. V 4719.

To be transmitted to the Head of Political Division V through the Under State Secretary and the State Secretary:

The Foreign Minister requests that during the next 4 weeks instances of grievances relating to the treatment of the German minorities in Poland be assembled and that a new memorandum<sup>1</sup> then be submitted to him which he can use in possible exchanges with the Polish Ambassador.

ERICH KORDT

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<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of May 30, 1938 (6237/E470314-17), had described the deterioration of the German minority's position in Poland since the Minorities Declaration of Nov. 5, 1937.

## No. 42

147/78577-78

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

BERLIN, June 20, 1938.

e. o. Pol. V 4716.

The petition of June 2 from the Association of Poles in Germany to the Reich Ministry of the Interior was recently discussed in a rather large conference in the Ministry of the Interior. The grievances alleged by the Poles were acknowledged to correspond to some extent with the actual situation. It was therefore decided to remedy two grievances (regarding the students' cards and the bookkeeping of the Polish cooperatives). Furthermore, the leaders of the Polish minority in Germany are to be given an opportunity to confer with

the Reich Minister of the Interior. On the other hand, however, it was pointed out that the position of the German minority in Poland offered far greater cause for complaint. In view of this fact and in order further to develop in a positive sense the understanding initiated in the field of minorities questions through the Minorities Declaration of November 5, 1937, it was considered advisable to use the petition as an occasion for repeating to the Polish Government the suggestion previously made to it at the time of the Minorities Declaration but not yet accepted by it: to have representatives of the two Governments examine and settle the complaints of the two minority groups from time to time. Such a procedure would be equivalent to creating an organ for nationality questions similar to that which had already, in the form of governmental committees, proved its value in the economic field. The implementation of this proposal would perhaps be the only effective means of alleviating the difficult position of the German minority in Poland. At the same time, the consideration of the minorities' grievances would thus be removed as a political issue, and this in turn would lead to an improvement in the general relations, upon which the constant grievances of the minorities on both sides had placed a strain.

Before further steps are taken in this direction, a discussion within a smaller circle of the Ministry of the Interior is to take place.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister through the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the State Secretary.

SCHLIEF

No. 43

1834/418930-22

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P III 4 f

WARSAW, June 25, 1938.

Received June 27.

Pol. V 4907.

Subject: Treatment of minorities questions.

The reception of the representatives of the Polish minority by the Reich Minister [of the Interior] yesterday has received close attention here. All newspapers carry the official Berlin report on the matter. The semiofficial *Gazeta Polska* in its editorial, a translation of which I enclose,<sup>1</sup> does not take up the idea of cooperation in the

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (6237/E470818).

field of minorities as expressed in the German communiqué but intimates that minorities questions should be treated solely as a domestic concern of the two States. This is in line with the recent rejection by the press chief, M. Skiwski, of the idea of any "Clearings."<sup>2</sup> (Cf. report of June 20, 1938—P III 4 f).<sup>3</sup> The responsible official of the Ministry of the Interior here, in a conversation with Senator Hasbach, expressed himself more favorably in this respect. He made it plain that the extreme tension which had prevailed in the western Polish provinces in the last few weeks and which had been aggravated by the grievances of the Polish minority in Germany had caused him grave concern and that something had to be done to improve the atmosphere. In the course of this conversation Senator Hasbach suggested initiating official discussions of the minorities questions, with the departmental chiefs concerned in the two Ministries of the Interior to be included. According to Herr Hasbach, this suggestion seems to have been very favorably received.

Even though the attitude of this administrative official, who was perhaps not sufficiently informed of the Polish Foreign Ministry's view, cannot be considered a change in the Polish attitude on the question of the establishment of a minorities commission, it is nevertheless quite noteworthy. In any case, an attempt should be made to exploit the present situation by a new move to start negotiations. Even if this attempt fails, our tactical situation would improve, inasmuch as we could place the responsibility for further developments on the Poles.

As to procedure, it seems to me that two courses are possible. As is perhaps known in Berlin, the German minority intends to draw up a detailed memorandum like that of the Association of Poles. We could wait now until this complaint is presented to the Polish Government, and the question whether we should also support this step in the press, as the Poles did, may remain open for the present. We could also, however, approach the Polish Government directly before the complaint is presented and state that a settlement of the Polish grievances will be possible only if the far greater grievances of which we have been apprised by the German minority are likewise remedied. We might further state that the Polish attitude has led to an aggravation of the situation in the minority areas and is, besides, capable of disturbing the relations between the two countries, while a frank discussion of principles (which need not be embodied in a formal agreement) would lead to practical results and thus ease political relations. In this connection it would also be appropriate to refer to

<sup>2</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6249/E470340-43).

the fruitful work of the governmental committees in German-Polish economic questions.

Personally I would consider the latter course the more expedient.

MOLTKE

No. 44

1834/418933-36

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Poland*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram<sup>2</sup>

No. 132 of June 29

BERLIN, June 29, 1938.

zu Pol. V 4907.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Schliep.<sup>3</sup>

With reference to your report of June 25, P III 4 f.

Here, too, it is considered advisable not to wait for the bill of complaints which is being prepared by the German minority but to take the petition of June 2 from the Association of Poles and the increased tension in the matter of minorities resulting therefrom as occasion for proposing now to the Polish Government negotiations regarding grievances of the respective minorities. Therefore please make the appropriate *démarche* with Foreign Minister Beck as soon as possible, making use of the following arguments:

The petition of the Association of Poles had been carefully examined by the Reich Government, which was prepared to comply with justified requests of the Polish minority. The accommodating attitude of the Reich Government had already been expressed by redressing individual grievances as well as by the reception of representatives of the Polish minority by the Reich Minister of the Interior. In the further treatment of these questions, however, we could not be expected to disregard the situation of the German minority in Poland, which in our opinion gave much greater cause for complaint. Representatives of the Polish minority had admitted to the Reich Minister of the Interior that they had no reason whatever for complaint in the economic field. On the other hand, it must be stated that Germans in Poland, in spite of the economic recovery which was also noticeable there, were being deprived of their economic basis solely because they are Germans.

Particularly disappointing was the negative result of the negotiations by the Embassy regarding the agrarian measures against the German minority, in which the Polish Government adopted the dis-

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 171.

<sup>2</sup> Although drafted and numbered as a telegram, a handwritten note indicates that the communication was actually transmitted by courier on June 29.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Schliep's handwriting: "Reich Ministry of Interior (Ministerialdirektor Vollert) is in agreement insofar as his jurisdiction is concerned."

criminatory standpoint of the Western Association\* that the German share in land ownership had to be adjusted to the percentage of the German population.

The application of the decree concerning frontier zones could not possibly go unchallenged either; under section 2, paragraph 2 of the Polish Minister of the Interior's decree of January 22, 1937, concerning the national boundaries there would soon be evictions of German owners who had been denied permission a year ago to take over landed property they inherited. It was to be feared that the imminent expulsion of such Volksdeutsche from house and home would have the most unfavorable influence upon the already irritated temper of the German frontier population, and would in turn have serious effects on the Polish minority in Germany if the situation were not remedied in time. The German Government, which had felt impelled to issue a decree on German frontier zones only as a result of the tightening of Polish frontier zone regulations, therefore proposed reciprocally exempting the inheritance of land in the frontier zone from the requirement of permits. Such a settlement ought not to create special difficulties for the Polish Government, since in all voivodeships, with the exception of Posen and Pommerellen, direct and collateral heirs could already inherit without permit.

Another source of constant anxiety for the German public was the continued dismissals of German workers in eastern Upper Silesia as well as the economic boycott organized by the Western Association. I leave it to your discretion whether to refer also to the nonperformance of the Polish *quid pro quo* in return for our approval of the Polish Gymnasium in Marienwerder, and to the rigorous measures of the school authorities against German schools in Volhynia, where 5,800 out of 7,500 German children of school age are getting no instruction or only insufficient instruction in the German language.

Please also explain to M. Beck that the tense situation in the western Polish provinces has been further aggravated by the protest of the Association of Poles and its treatment in the Polish press. The German Government is watching with concern this development, which might endanger our otherwise good-neighborly relations, and considers it urgently necessary to counteract it by a frank discussion in order to continue the understanding on the minorities question initiated by the Minorities Declaration. It therefore proposes that the grievances of the minority groups be studied immediately by experts from each side and redressed in so far as possible.

Please report by telegram regarding the reception accorded your *démarche*.

RIBBENTROP

\* A supra-party organization dedicated to the development of Polish political and national influence in the Polish-German frontier areas. See document No. 51.

## No. 45

1730/401830-32

*The Consulate General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

No. IG 808

DANZIG, June 30, 1938.  
Pol. V 5084.

Subject: Visit of Staatsrat Dr. Böttcher in London.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 4259 of June 3.<sup>1</sup>

Staatsrat Dr. Böttcher has put at my disposal a minute of his conversations with officials of the Foreign Office and his reception by Lord Halifax which I have the honor to transmit enclosed.

GROLMAN

[Enclosure]

DANZIG, June 30, 1938.

During my stay in London on the occasion of the Sixteenth International Conference of the Red Cross I had communicated with Mr. Stevenson<sup>2</sup> and Mr. Makins<sup>3</sup> of the British Foreign Office and requested that I also be introduced to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax. On Thursday, June 23, I lunched at the Savoy Hotel with Mr. Stevenson and two other gentlemen from the Foreign Office.

A noteworthy feature of the conversation is that I happened to mention that the people of Danzig naturally still had the ardent desire to return to the German Reich but that we would, of course, adhere to the existing treaties. Mr. Stevenson replied that it had been a wonderful idea for Germany to conclude the 10-year pact with Poland. After those 10 years all unsettled questions would take care of themselves.

At 3:15 p. m. on the same day I was received by Lord Halifax in the Foreign Office. The conversation took place without witnesses and lasted approximately 25 minutes. Lord Halifax was very friendly and very much interested. He mentioned that Danzig had the role of a mediator between Germany and Poland, and I replied that this was true in a certain sense but that Danzig's situation had by no means become easier thereby. I then mentioned that rumors were repeatedly being circulated in foreign newspapers to the effect

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1730/401827). The instruction, in reply to a query from Grolman, stated that the Foreign Ministry would have no objection to a call by Böttcher at the Foreign Office while he was visiting London.

<sup>2</sup>Ralph Clarmont Skrine Stevenson, Acting Counselor in the Foreign Office, Adviser on League of Nations Affairs.

<sup>3</sup>Roger Mellor Makins, Second Secretary in the Foreign Office, Assistant Adviser on League of Nations Affairs.

that Danzig would adopt the German Nuremberg Laws and that laws for the special protection of German nationality, directed against the Jews, would very soon be enacted. This was by no means correct. Danzig had only planned to issue an ordinance concerning the civil service. This ordinance was also to contain the provision that Jews could not be public officials and that henceforth the latter would not be permitted to marry Jewesses. This ordinance would only have confirmed a state of affairs which already existed, for we had not a single Jewish civil servant nor one who had recently married a Jewess. The new ordinance would therefore have been applicable only in the future.

We had learned, however, that this ordinance would cause certain difficulties for him as *rapporteur* for Danzig questions on the Committee of Three and in the Council of the League of Nations. Since he and the High Commissioner were at present obviously making every effort to avoid annoyances for Danzig, and since he was striving to exert a moderating influence in favor of Danzig, we had refrained from issuing the ordinance, in order to meet him halfway. Germany had also sent us a hint to this effect. We had already informed the British Consul General at Danzig, Mr. Shepherd, of this.

Lord Halifax replied that he was extremely pleased with this news and that he was especially grateful for our having proceeded in this manner. He hoped that in the future, too, we would not undertake anything unexpected without previously communicating with him.

Lord Halifax then mentioned the hunting invitation he had received from President Greiser. Unfortunately, he was unable to make a special trip to Danzig for that purpose. But if he should have occasion to be in the vicinity he would be very happy to accept this invitation.

He then told me in detail of his tiger hunts in India and listened attentively to my account of an elephant hunt in the Cameroons. The conversation became so animated that it lasted longer than anticipated and was broken off only when the Ambassador of a foreign power (as far as I remember, the Ambassador of France) was announced.

On the next day, June 24, I had another conversation with Mr. Makins of the Foreign Office, who expressed his satisfaction that no Danzig issue had been discussed in Geneva for a long time. He requested only that if we had the intention of amending our constitution we should first communicate with Lord Halifax.

I replied that so far I knew nothing about any amendments to the constitution but that in such a case we would certainly communicate with Lord Halifax in advance.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER



## No. 46

52/34462

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 40 of July 7

WARSAW, July 7, 1938—9:30 p. m.

Received July 7—11:55 p. m.

Several correspondents of German newspapers have recently received instructions from their offices to write articles on the situation of the German minority. Some of these instructions were transmitted by telephone, and furthermore the reason given was that the articles were desired because of impending negotiations with the Polish Government regarding minorities questions. Since the Poles have in this way certainly learned of the planned press campaign and its purposes, this campaign will fail of its purpose and had now, perhaps, better be abandoned. I should like to state that on a previous occasion also I discovered that the newspaper offices transmitted secret communications and instructions to their representatives here by telephone.

MOLTKE

## No. 47

1884/418937-39

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*BRIEF FOR A CONVERSATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH THE POLISH  
AMBASSADOR ON GERMAN-POLISH MINORITIES QUESTIONS

BERLIN, July 8, 1938.

Pol. V 5316.

The expectation of the German Government that the position of the German minority in Poland would be considerably improved by the German-Polish Minorities Declaration of November 5, 1937 has unfortunately not been fulfilled. On the contrary, since that time the general situation of the German minority in Poland has considerably deteriorated, particularly in the following fields:

a) In the former provinces of Posen and West Prussia the Volksdeutsche have to provide approximately two-thirds of the acreage scheduled for land reform, although their share of the entire area no longer amounts to more than one-third.

The same procedure will be followed in Upper Silesia beginning next year.

b) In a frontier zone of 30 kilometers, which includes all of Upper Silesia, most of former West Prussia, and a considerable part of the former province of Posen, it has been made impossible for Volks-

deutsche to make any transactions in land; in Posen and Pommerellen they cannot even inherit landed property. This practice will result in the elimination of German land ownership in the above-mentioned territory within a generation at the latest.

c) German merchants, artisans, and manufacturers are being deprived of a livelihood by boycotts tolerated by the Polish Government. German workers, particularly in Upper Silesia, are being continually forced out of their jobs in spite of the general improvement in economic conditions. As early as 1937, 80 percent of the German workers and employees in eastern Upper Silesia were out of work and 100 percent of the German youth without apprenticeships.

d) In the cultural field German schools are being closed and German teachers are being transferred from western Poland to the interior of the country; parents who send their children to German schools are subjected to great economic pressure.

All attempts of the Embassy in Warsaw to check this development have been unsuccessful so far. On the other hand, on June 9, 1938, the Association of Poles in Germany filed a complaint with the Reich Minister of the Interior regarding alleged German violations of the Minorities Declaration of November 5, 1937. This complaint attracted world-wide attention and created the impression that Germany was suppressing the Polish minority in the Reich while at the same time asking the greatest consideration for the interests of her minority groups abroad. Some grievances of the Polish Association have meanwhile been redressed. In addition, the Reich Minister of the Interior promised the leaders of the Polish Association at a reception that he would investigate the other complaints.

However, since further concessions to the Polish minority in the Reich, in the opinion of all offices concerned, can be considered only if the Poles at the same time take into consideration the grievances of the German minority in Poland, Ambassador von Moltke was instructed several days ago to use the complaint made by the Association of Poles as the occasion for bringing up this minorities question once more for thorough discussion with the Polish Foreign Minister. Ambassador von Moltke will point out that the continuous complaints from the respective minorities constitute a continuing burden to the good-neighborly relations otherwise existing between us. We propose eliminating this danger, as in the field of economics and press policy, by having a committee of representatives from the two Foreign Ministries and Ministries of the Interior from time to time examine and, if possible, redress the grievances of the minorities on both sides. For example, the complaints on both sides regarding the application of frontier-zone legislation could be settled by abrogating the regulations preventing inheritance in the frontier zones.

The report from the German Ambassador in Warsaw regarding the *démarche* which he was instructed to make with Foreign Minister Beck has not yet been received. Since the Ambassador is referring

in this *démarche* to an express instruction from the Reich Foreign Minister (instruction of June 29, 1938, Pol. V 4907), it may be suggested in the interest of furthering this matter, which is so important for the further development of German-Polish relations, that Herr von Moltke's step be particularly underscored by a corresponding conversation of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Lipski.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister through the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the State Secretary in accordance with instructions.

SCHLIER

No. 48

1834/418940-44

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

P III 2 a

WARSAW, July 9, 1938.

Received July 11.

Pol. V 5352.

Subject: Conversation with Foreign Minister Beck regarding minorities questions. Proposal for a Minorities Commission.

In accordance with the instruction of June 29, I took up the minorities question with M. Beck today. I pointed out particularly that the failure to fulfill the Polish part of the special agreement concerning Marienwerder had greatly impaired the implementation of the Agreement of November 5. The fact that today, after 10 months, the permit for continuing construction in Bromberg had not yet been granted had naturally created the impression in Germany that Poland had no inclination whatever to put into practice the principles of November 5. I further stated that the conversation with M. Kunicki regarding agrarian reforms had definitely confirmed the unequal treatment of the German minority, and finally I submitted with particular emphasis that the complaint of the Polish minority in Germany and the manner in which it had been treated by the Polish and foreign press had done extremely great damage in many respects. The very thing that we had intended to avoid by the Agreement of November 5 had happened: namely, the minorities question had become the subject of political dispute and as a result the atmosphere in Poland and particularly in the minority areas had greatly deteriorated, quite apart from the unfavorable effect it had had for us abroad.

After this I stated that in the further consideration of the Polish minority's complaints we could not disregard the position of the

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 172.

German minority in Poland, and that instead of attacking each other in public, it appeared to us more to the point to undertake a frank discussion of the problem. We therefore proposed that the responsible department heads of the two Ministries of the Interior, assisted by one official of each of the two Foreign Ministries, should meet periodically for conferences in order to examine the various minorities problems in frank discussion without interference by the press, although for the present it would not be intended to reach any signed agreements. By way of example I mentioned that in the interpretation of the respective frontier zone ordinances, agreement might be reached on exempting the transfer of landed property to heirs of the first and second order from the requirement of a permit. Furthermore, both sides could, for example, agree to release a certain number of assembly halls for meetings of the minority. In the matter of schools, too, useful results could surely be achieved by discussions. We were of the opinion that just as the periodic discussions of economic questions and of press affairs had had a favorable result, a similar procedure would also enable progress to be made in the minorities problem. We therefore requested that the Polish Government examine this proposal. We hoped it might lead to a continuation of the understanding initiated by the Minorities Declaration and thereby, at the same time, to an easing of our political relations in one important respect.

M. Beck first stated that he regretted it very much if the agreement concerning Marienwerder had not yet been completely carried out by Poland. He had not been aware of that and would immediately take the steps necessary for the final settlement of this question. He was, moreover, also of the opinion that the manner in which the press handled the minorities questions did more harm than good. At the time when the minorities complaint in Berlin had led to something of a press outbreak here, he had immediately intervened, but he admitted that it had been too late to have any far-reaching effect. He, too, favored frank discussions and believed that this was still the best way to make progress in difficult questions. He was therefore very favorably inclined toward our proposal. Of course, he was not in a position to give me a definitive answer immediately, since the matter exceeded the scope of his Ministry. He would therefore report to the Minister President, who was also Minister of the Interior, as soon as possible; unfortunately this was not feasible next week because of his trip to Riga, but he could promise me even today that he would push our proposal. He intended to take it up with me again in due time.

In spite of my clear statement that the Minorities Declaration had obviously been violated, M. Beck did not take up the question of agrarian reform. I myself believed that I should not elaborate on the matter, for it would presumably have led to an unpleasant discussion, and at the present time it seemed to me wiser not to impair the friendly attitude of the Polish Foreign Minister toward our proposal for a commission.

If the previous negative attitude toward the idea of a minorities commission is apparently beginning to change, it is probably due to the fact that this time we have initiated our action at a particularly propitious moment. The failure of the Poles in the question of the Marienwerder agreement appeared to be very embarrassing to M. Beck. Besides, he himself evidently had the feeling that the press campaign launched in connection with the complaint of the Polish minority was not entirely in conformity with the intentions which led to the Agreement of November 5. The fact that Polish violation of the Minorities Declaration in the question of agrarian reform is clearly established probably also helped to convince M. Beck that a friendly gesture toward us was now necessary in the minorities question. However, it will still be advisable not to raise too high our expectations for a fundamental change in the minorities policy of Poland.

MOLTKE

No. 49

1724/400760-66

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

No. IG 874

DANZIG, July 18, 1938.

Received July 20.

Pol. V 5646.

Subject: Conference with the High Commissioner.

The High Commissioner of the League of Nations, Professor Burckhardt, had invited Vice Consul von Grolman for a conversation with him today in the course of which Dr. Burckhardt touched upon various political questions.

At first the High Commissioner spoke of Gauleiter Forster's trip to England. M. Burckhardt remarked that this trip had attracted an extraordinary amount of attention internationally among the public and in the press, and parallels had been drawn in various quarters with Henlein's visits to London. Not only British but also French official circles were concerning themselves with the matter, as shown by the fact that the French Consul here had come to him

just this morning in considerable excitement and on the basis of telegraphic instructions from the French Foreign Ministry had asked him for information about the Gauleiter's trip. Burckhardt had made some reassuring statements to the French Consul and told him that, as far as he knew, the visit was only of a private nature, even if Gauleiter Forster naturally had also taken the opportunity in England to speak with political personalities.<sup>1</sup>

Then Professor Burckhardt mentioned the Order of the Red Cross recently awarded him by the Senate of the Free City of Danzig. As M. Burckhardt had already explained a few days previously in another connection, this award had led to violent personal attacks on him in the Polish and Swiss press, in which his objectivity as High Commissioner had been seriously questioned. For practical reasons he welcomed the fact that the Polish Government, too, was now planning to bestow a decoration on him, and this would presumably take place at the end of this week. Furthermore, it was not out of the question that he might perhaps receive a similar decoration from England, too. By such decorations the wind would very adroitly be taken out of the sails of the foreign press, which had become so excited about his receiving the Danzig Red Cross decoration. It was best in all respects if as little reference as possible was made to him in public and in the press. Thus the objectivity of his position would not be jeopardized and matters would thus be best served, particularly from the German point of view.

In this connection the High Commissioner of his own accord again mentioned this year's Party rally at Nuremberg (cf. the report of July 14<sup>2</sup>). M. Burckhardt said that he had again spoken to Herr Greiser, the President of the Senate, during the last few days. The latter, to be sure, appreciated the High Commissioner's hesitation about attending this year's Party rally but would regret it very much if M. Burckhardt did not go to Nuremberg; Greiser had told M. Burckhardt that an invitation could easily be sent him and he could then decline it. M. Burckhardt did not, however, consider this suggestion a very fortunate one. He believed that the hesitation which he still felt would meet with understanding on the part of the authorities in Berlin.

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<sup>1</sup> According to a report made by Ambassador Dirksen from London on July 15, 1938 (1730/401835-37), Gauleiter Forster during a week's stay there had talks with the Secretary of State for War, Hore-Belisha, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Robert Vansittart, and Winston Churchill among other leading personalities. Forster told Dirksen that he had been assured by all with whom he had spoken that France and Britain would aid Czechoslovakia if the latter was attacked by Germany. He was also impressed by British preoccupation with the Jewish question.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

As on previous occasions, M. Burckhardt thereupon stressed the fact that in his opinion a quiet development of matters would be best for Danzig. The Party could rule here in Danzig at will without requiring any special legislative measures. Any measures for amending the Constitution were therefore wholly unnecessary, since they would, after all, merely confirm a situation already existing but would involve the danger of bringing questions pertaining to Danzig again very much to the attention of the international public; at the present time at least, this appeared to him to be very undesirable. The many fantastic rumors circulated in the foreign press regarding measures allegedly planned to take place in Danzig last June 20 had been characteristic. A Polish source had just told him that by such false reports these newspapers benefited Germany and Danzig most of all by virtue of the fact that all such reports were continually being disproved by actual developments, since, contrary to all announcements, nothing happened. He deplored the fact that the very excellent Government statement by the President of the Senate, Herr Greiser, at the Volkstag session of June 20 had received hardly any notice in the foreign press. He would have considered it desirable if several days after the Volkstag session the Germans had drawn special attention to the fact that, contrary to all prophecies of international scribblers, June 20 had passed in Danzig without any sensation.

In this connection the High Commissioner also discussed press policy in general, remarking that he would be very much in favor of having the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*,<sup>3</sup> one of the few foreign newspapers appearing in the German language and having a wide circulation abroad, appropriately supplied with information by the Germans from time to time; it should certainly be possible to establish contact in this respect with the above-named newspaper through a clever intermediary.

Turning to the development of the Danzig situation in the near future, the High Commissioner expressed the hope that peace would reign in Danzig at least until the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, the agenda of which so far did not envisage the consideration of any Danzig issue. From time to time there were rumors of the alleged intention of the Gauleiter to combine the two positions of Gauleiter and President of the Senate in his own person. Burckhardt himself would be exceedingly sorry if Senate President Greiser were to leave his post; he had friendly personal relations with Herr Greiser, and he considered him an extraordinarily efficient and capable person who had developed into a statesman of

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "Banned! Discussed with Minister Aschmann. Sch[liep]."

a particularly high order. As far as the Polish view of the Danzig question was concerned, the fact that Danzig had a predominantly German population was now freely admitted in influential Polish circles. But they insisted on upholding Polish rights in Danzig to the utmost. This included the maintenance of the League of Nations guarantee, since circumstances might still arise which would make it appear advisable for Poland to invoke this guarantee in the interest of her rights in Danzig.

The High Commissioner then touched upon German-Polish relations in a general way. In this connection he remarked that France had apparently achieved a great political success recently, in that Poland had allegedly given assurances in the Czechoslovak question that in the future she would pursue her interests in Czechoslovakia jointly with Germany only after consulting the Western Powers, and not do so as energetically as she had at first intended in May of this year. Burckhardt had frequently taken occasion to discuss German-Polish relations with leading Polish personages. Time and again he met with doubts on the part of the Poles of the honesty of German policy toward Poland. The Poles were simply the people with an "eternal mistrust" and progress could be achieved with them only gradually, by means of quiet and objective explanations. Burckhardt considered it his duty, on the basis of his thorough knowledge of German conditions and leading German personages, to influence the Poles toward a policy of German-Polish understanding. He had just recently taken occasion to repeat to influential Polish persons some remarks made to him by Admiral Raeder during Kiel Week concerning the view on the German-Polish question held by the Führer, who was still guided in his policy toward Poland by respect for the manly and statesman-like personality of Marshal Pilsudski. These remarks of his had made a strong impression on the Poles. Within the next few days he also intended to discuss German-Polish relations with Foreign Minister Beck, who was in Danzig at present with his wife and a secretary for a vacation of 8 to 10 days, visiting the Polish diplomatic representative here, Minister Chodacki. He would also use this opportunity to speak to M. Beck about the fact that, according to the information which had come to his attention, the Polish authorities were taking particularly severe measures of the most varied sort especially against the German minority in the northern part of Pommerellen, and that as a result German-Polish relations as a whole were experiencing considerable strain.

Vice Consul von Grolman listened to the High Commissioner's statements on the whole without comment.

JANSON



## No. 50

1834/418045

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

P III 2 a

WARSAW, July 19, 1938.

Received July 20.

Pol. V 5658.

Subject: Proposal for a Minorities Commission.

With reference to my report of July 9—P III 2 a.

The *chef de cabinet* of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Count Lubienski, yesterday requested me to call on him and informed me that M. Beck, who had gone away on a week's leave, had instructed him to transmit to me the reply to Ambassador Moltke's proposal regarding the meeting of a minorities commission. The text of the reply, which Count Lubienski read to me from his notes, was as follows: "The Polish Government does not reject in principle the proposal for contacts between representatives of the Ministries of the Interior of the two countries within the framework of Herr von Moltke's proposal."

As is apparent from the formulation of the reply, the Polish Foreign Ministry is at pains not to show too great eagerness in this matter, probably for tactical reasons. In reply to my question as to what he thought further developments would be, Count Lubienski stated that discussions were probably contemplated some time in the autumn. The Poles already had in mind a suitable person for these discussions; at the present stage, however, he could not as yet give me any more detailed information.

WÜHLISCH

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<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 173.

## No. 51

878/288839-48

*Senior Counselor Schliep to Obergruppenführer Lorenz*<sup>1</sup>BERLIN, August . . . , 1938.<sup>2</sup>

e. o. Pol. I 2188 g.

OBERGRUPPENFÜHRER: The conference relative to matters of German minority policy held in your offices a few days ago led me to examine

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<sup>1</sup> Werner Lorenz, head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.<sup>2</sup> The document is a draft letter prepared for Schliep's signature, with date left open, and was not sent, as the handwritten word "Cessat" [Canceled] on its face indicates. The drafting officer, Mackeben, an official of Political Division V, initialed it on Aug. 25.

once more the especially urgent question of German-Polish minority relations and their changing fortunes so far.

As you know, we are presumably on the eve of discussions with the Polish Government about this matter, which is repeatedly the source of unfavorable influence on German-Polish political relations. Since Poland has accepted in principle our proposal for a discussion of minority questions by two small delegations, it may be expected that the first meeting will be held in the course of the next month at the end of the vacation period.

I believe it would be highly desirable if the next conference at your offices were used to clarify the basic principles of German-Polish minority questions, not only in relation to the German minority in Poland but also in relation to the Polish minority in Germany.

I have taken the liberty of putting on paper a few ideas on this subject—of necessity in sketchy form because of haste—and I have the honor to enclose a copy for you. The memorandum does not go into details but confines itself to setting forth the broad outline. It makes no claim to being complete, of course.

Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

(SCHLIER)

[Enclosure]

#### GERMAN MINORITY POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO POLAND

In order to clarify this question, the most important in the entire German minority policy, it is necessary to obtain a picture of the composition of the German minority in Poland:

The German minority in Poland is composed of three separate parts, each of which has undergone its own development. There are the Germans in the former Prussian part of Poland, those in the former Russian part of Poland (Congress Poland), and those in the former Austrian part of Poland (Galicia). Of the Germans in the former Prussian part of Poland a distinction has to be made between those in Posen-Pommerellen and those in Upper Silesia; their development has followed divergent lines and they differ greatly in their structure and origin. In the case of the Galician Germans a distinction must be made between the area around Bielitz and Teschen and the area of eastern Galicia around Lemberg-Stanislaw. In Congress Poland, too, there are certain differences in development between the Germans in Lodz and the German peasants who settled on the Vistula lowlands. Even after the establishment of the Polish State, relations between the various German minority groups in Poland were relatively little developed, although there was some contact, especially between Posen and the other German groups. From Germany's standpoint there is for a number of reasons a special interest in the Germans in Posen-Pommerellen and Upper Silesia. Since these are

former German nationals who were not separated from Germany until the Treaty of Versailles, relations between these groups and the Reich are naturally very close. On the other hand they are subjected to the greatest Polish pressure.

So far German minority policy with reference to Poland has concerned itself for the most part with the Germans in the former Prussian parts of Poland. It was natural that, because of the special ties existing there as well as because of the moral obligation of the Reich, everything possible was done to help these former German nationals who were exposed to the greatest Polish efforts at extermination. Thus German minority policy with reference to Poland has so far been dominated, on the whole, by the desire to preserve the German element as much as possible in these latter areas. The considerations which motivated us in this course have caused Poland, pursuing contrary aims, to oppose the activities of the Reich in questions pertaining to the German minority in Poland, and to do everything possible in these very areas to further the Polish element while suppressing the Germans. Thus they seek to engineer accomplished facts there, so to speak, with reference to the predominance of the Polish element. In addition, Danzig's relation to Poland caused the latter to develop her own harbor in Gdynia and to route her traffic around Danzig; because of the desire to Polonize the hinterland of the new harbor this in turn brought about increased pressure on the German element.

As a result of the extensive relations between the Reich and the former Prussian areas of Poland and the variety of objectives pursued there, a great number of German agencies took up the problems of the German minority there and in the course of these activities established their own lines of communication and their own network of contact men there. The advantage of this system, namely the intensification of relations between the Reich and the German element there and the maintenance of as active connections as possible, was offset, however, by the disadvantage that the agencies in the Reich which handled these matters maintained only very loose contact with one another and informed one another either very inadequately or not at all about their activities. The various contact men frequently were not acquainted with one another; their reports naturally were bound to differ more or less according to their individual attitudes, and also inevitably resulted in divergent decisions and measures in the Reich. This became especially apparent after political divisions developed among the German minority in Poland, the leaders of which came into ever sharper conflict. All attempts to prevent this development, which is extremely harmful to the existence of the German minority in Poland, by bringing about a unification of the conflicting groups have been unsuccessful so far; furthermore, they could not achieve this objective as long as no uniformity of conception existed in

Germany concerning the importance of the various groups and the aim of the activity in connection with the German minority in Poland. The situation of the German element became especially difficult after the conclusion of the 10-year pact of understanding in 1934, which was unfortunately utilized by Poland primarily for the purpose of liquidating the German question within that period, especially in Posen-Pommerellen and Upper Silesia. The discord within the German minority in Poland and the lapsing on July 14, 1937, of the special protection for the German element in Upper Silesia provided by the Geneva Convention<sup>3</sup> increased the effect of the Polish measures. The quickened and intensified implementation of the agrarian reform and of the Polish frontier-zone law in conjunction with the increased activity of the Polish Western Association, the only point on whose program is the extermination of the German element at the Polish western frontier, undermines increasingly from day to day the economic foundations of the German element there, and today the latter is already only a mere shadow of its former self.

It is especially awkward that political considerations with reference to Poland at present deprive the German Government of the possibility of intervening on behalf of the German minority in Poland, especially the Germans in the former Prussian parts of Poland, as the interests of the Reich and of the German minority in Poland would necessitate. The moral obligations and the promises given by the German Government to the Germans in the former Prussian areas with reference to protection and the opportunity to return to the Reich at any time can at present—for overriding political reasons—be fulfilled only to a very limited extent.

Finally, the measures which have to be taken in the interest of carrying out the Four Year Plan in many ways represent an undesirable deviation from the straight line of Reich policy with reference to the German minority in Poland and will lead to a weakening of that group.

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In view of the general situation briefly sketched above, the creation of an office in the Reich which would in the future deal authoritatively with questions of the German minority in Poland would mean the possibility of achieving uniformity in German minority policy vis-à-vis Poland and of utilizing in the most effective manner the means available to us for the purpose. The first requirement must be to gather together all threads running from Germany to the German minority in Poland. That does not necessarily mean that all connections which have developed in the course of time, some of which are very active, will be eliminated, but that they will be directed toward

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<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 214-215.

a common goal and harmonized with one another in such a way that working at cross purposes will be avoided under all circumstances.

It must be the aim of German minority policy vis-à-vis Poland to support the German minority in Poland in every way in its struggle for economic and cultural existence. Even if the higher interests of the Reich must take precedence over the interests of the German minority in Poland and it is therefore not always possible to avoid temporary disadvantage for this group, nevertheless a strong stand must be taken against the idea frequently expressed recently that the German minority in Poland should be sacrificed to the interests of the Reich. There is no doubt that the preservation of the German element in Poland, quite aside from its right to continued existence, offers advantages to the Reich which we neither can nor wish to give up.

The necessity of maintaining the most active possible relations with the German minority in Poland will result in the future, too, not only in lines of communication running from a central office in the Reich to the leaders of the group, but also in the maintenance and strengthening of relations with separate individuals there. However, an increasing effort must be made to ensure that separate individuals will not interfere with the main policy by their special connections. From a practical standpoint, too, it is not possible in the long run for us to concern ourselves with the detailed problems of the German minority in Poland as though we were directly responsible for them. Such a procedure would in the long run necessarily result in weakening the leadership of the German minority in Poland. Therefore a constantly greater effort should be made in the future to refer to the leaders of the German minority persons who, without the authority of these leaders, are pursuing objectives here, no matter how well-meant they may be, and to limit ourselves insofar as possible to carrying out the German minority policy vis-à-vis Poland only in conjunction with these leaders. A leadership which must constantly expect to have its big objectives interfered with, if not actually opposed, by individual actions can in the long run be but a weak factor in relation to the separate German minority groups and also in relation to the agencies in the Reich.

By the proposed procedure, the office in Germany for handling minority questions will in the long run be relieved of all individual cases, so that it can limit itself to pursuing important objectives and maintaining important principles. The experience which we have had in recent years with other methods in Europe as well as in South America should be a lesson for the future. It is not important to have a big apparatus with many specialists who busy themselves with details, but to have a general staff which should be kept as small as possible and which holds in its hands only the direction of matters but

leaves the details to be worked out by the minority group. In the long run both parties can only gain by this.

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Since the possibilities of the German minority in Poland with reference to the safeguarding of their existence and their cultural needs will depend to a considerable extent on similar possibilities for the Polish minority in Germany, we shall have to decide in the first place what policy the Reich Government intends to adopt toward this group. In this respect, too, it will be necessary to reach a full understanding about the objective dictated by national necessity and the guiding principles which should be followed. Even if certain effects on the attitude of the Polish State toward the German minority in Poland cannot be our prime concern, they must nevertheless be taken into consideration to the extent that they might thwart our efforts to preserve as far as possible the German minority in Poland.

As a matter of principle the Reich Government's policy toward the Polish minority in Germany should avoid all petty measures which have proved to be more annoying than useful and which can serve the other side as a pretext for measures against the German minority in Poland. In this sphere especially a great deal remains to be done.

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The steps which have been taken by the Reich Government vis-à-vis the Polish Government and which aim to bring about understanding in the minorities field and sensible joint application of the prescribed principles will, it is hoped, form the basis for an agreement in this field, which so far has constantly disturbed the political relations between the two countries. Since it is to be expected that an initial conference in this matter will be held shortly, it is especially urgent that a decision be reached as quickly as possible on the main lines to be followed.

## No. 52

F6/0295

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 252

BERLIN, August 26, 1938.

During the state visit<sup>1</sup> Regent Horthy told the Führer informally that Hungary was prepared to advocate in Warsaw that Poland return the Corridor to Germany. The Führer requested the Regent to refrain from taking such a step.

RIBBENTROP

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<sup>1</sup> For the visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent, as well as Minister President Imrédy and Foreign Minister Kánya, see vol. II, documents Nos. 383, 390, 395, and 402.

## No. 53

1828/417108-09

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P III 4 f

WARSAW, September 2, 1938.

Received September 5.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Growth of anti-German sentiment in Poland.

The attitude of the Polish press and other organs of Polish public opinion toward Germany has unmistakably worsened of late. It has never been satisfactory and has always fallen short of the expectations frequently attached by the Germans to the political pact and to the press agreement of 1934. Jewish, Masonic, and Marxist elements, all of the leftist and the nationalist opposition, and, in addition, the widespread clerical influence in a country so decidedly Catholic as Poland, have been constantly at work and have never ceased to promote animosity against the Third Reich for one reason or another. To be sure, newspapers and other organs of public opinion close to the Polish Foreign Ministry have behaved correctly for the most part, and in some questions, especially those related to foreign policy, have often displayed an attitude which can even be regarded as favorable. But not even the so-called Camp of National Unity, that is, the governmental party organization created for the purpose of winning the masses over to the regime in power, refrains from utilizing anti-German slogans in competition with the other political groups, in order to gain popularity.

All these factors continually working to our disadvantage have received an added impulse since the *Anschluss* of Austria. To be sure, the various anti-German factions in Poland were united even before then on one common ground, namely, the apprehension caused by Germany's recovery of strength and the mistrust of her "*Drang nach Osten*"; the added power which Germany gained through the *Anschluss* of Austria, however, and the disconcerting speed with which that action was carried out have further intensified the sense of the "German danger." The uneasiness was further increased by the opening up of the Sudeten-German question. Although there is a certain parallelism between the aims to be achieved in Czechoslovakia and Polish aspirations, a feeling of alarm is created by the fact that Germany, basing her action on the existence of her minority there, is trying to impose political demands on a neighboring state. Naturally, this draws attention to the German minority in Poland, and it must be admitted that members of the German minority do sometimes commit indiscretions that give fresh stimulus to Polish

mistrust. Remarks that sooner or later it would be "Poland's turn, too," that the Führer would soon "have to straighten things out here," etc., have already brought numerous convictions by the courts. The postal supervision, too, recently intensified, appears to have disclosed similar indications of sentiment. Finally, it is alleged that Polish farm workers returning from Germany had reported that anti-Polish propaganda was being spread there which, among other things, spoke of an early recovery of the Corridor. How far this uneasiness goes is shown by the fact that the old charges of a conspiratorial link between Germany and the Ukrainians in Poland are also reviving, and that not only the lately renewed demands of the Ukrainians for autonomy but also other occurrences in the eastern Ukrainian regions that are displeasing to Poland are imputed to the subversive activities of certain German circles. Finally, it has gradually become the everyday stock in trade of the anti-German agitation to hold up Germany quite generally as the disturber of the peace in Europe, on account of her policy toward Czechoslovakia.

The Polish Government is maintaining great reserve with regard to these developments; at any rate, except for articles in the papers close to the Foreign Ministry, in which the German standpoint is given its due at times, there are no indications of any vigorous counter-action. It may be admitted that the Polish authorities are restricted in their ability to exert influence upon the press, but such far-reaching passivity can nevertheless be explained only by reluctance on the part of the Government to make use of its powers to defend the unpopular German claims, whereas it displays far greater vigor in the defense of its own interests. And it seems hardly credible that the Government should not be in a position to prevent, for instance, the recurrent provocative demonstrations in the cities of the western areas staged by the Western Association, which is close to the Government.

To be sure, this passive attitude is partly due to domestic causes. The municipal elections to be held in the fall are looming large and, with the opposition displaying more and more self-confidence, the Government obviously attaches importance to keeping pace with its competitors in nationalist spirit. But the Government cannot be unaware either that by doing so it is gradually creating an atmosphere which is more and more difficult to reconcile with the German-Polish policy of mutual understanding. To be sure, there was never any great affection for Germany expressed here and, especially in critical moments, there has always been a desire not to permit relations to appear too close. Nevertheless, the fact that now, for instance, the "Rota" song of hate can be sung without interference in front of a German Consulate General is something which has not been observed since 1934. It is obvious that Beck's policies are even less popular today than in the past, and that the Foreign Minister himself is forced



to practice restraint. We had a clear indication of the internal stresses existing here in the well-known case of the German gymnasium at Bromberg, where the gentlemen's agreement concluded with Beck was quite obviously sabotaged by the internal administration. And, indeed, there does not seem to be complete unanimity in the Government, particularly with regard to Beck's policy toward Germany. Thus, for instance, only a week ago on the occasion of one of the anti-German demonstrations the prohibition first issued against publishing the resolutions was revoked by the Ministry of the Interior. Vice Premier Kwiatkowski, too, is hardly on our side, especially in the Czechoslovak question, for he is obviously very much interested in utilizing the present tension to get more of the Czech export trade routed via Gdynia. Whether the rumor is true that General Sosnkowski<sup>1</sup> recently made a demand in the name of the Army for a revision of Beck's policy toward Germany may remain an open question for the present. But in any case it appears probable that neither the Minister of War<sup>2</sup> nor Marshal Smigly-Rydz is participating wholeheartedly in Beck's policy. In this connection it is also interesting that even such an old champion of understanding with Germany as Mackiewicz, editor of the Vilna *Słowo*, recently attacked Beck's policy in an almost sensational article, blaming him for neglecting relations with France and England in favor of friendship with Germany, and for his failure to derive any corresponding advantages for Poland from the cooperation with Germany.

After having broached the same subject a few days ago to Acting Vice Minister Arciszewski, I also spoke seriously with M. Beck yesterday of the unfavorable development of public opinion here and the pointedly anti-German manifestations of recent date. M. Beck did not deny that the situation was unsatisfactory; immediately on returning from his vacation he had on his own initiative drawn the attention of the Minister President to this fact and had met with complete agreement. To my remark that we could not understand why at least the repeated demonstrations of the Western Association were not being prevented, M. Beck replied that it was not always expedient to resort solely to prohibitions but was sometimes better to leave a safety valve open. Hence they had restricted themselves to confining the much more extensive plans of the demonstrators within narrow limits. As a reason for the uneasiness prevailing in western Poland, M. Beck pointed out the above-mentioned imprudent attitude of the minority and especially the alarming reports brought home by the returning farm workers. With regard to the charges of an alleged German-Ukrainian conspiracy, M. Beck stated that this suspicion

<sup>1</sup>Gen. Kasimierz Sosnkowski, Inspector of the Polish Army, former Minister of War.

<sup>2</sup>Gen. Tadeusz Kasprzycki.

originated in the favorable treatment accorded the Ukrainian colony in Danzig; it had recently even been able to arrange an art exhibition with propaganda support from Danzig. To this I remarked that something must be wrong with the Polish newspapers if such a harmless occurrence resulted in the accusations and suspicions which were now being raised against Germany almost daily.

In conclusion, M. Beck sought to minimize the significance of the attacks on Germany and assured me that the Government was not letting itself be influenced in any way by the nervous state of public opinion but was holding to its old political course.

Although M. Beck made this statement in a very emphatic way, we should nevertheless not let ourselves be deceived about the fact that feeling here is already unfriendly to us, and that this might well influence the Government's freedom of decision on important questions.

MOLTKE

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[EDITORS' NOTE. Documents dealing with Poland's role during the September crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland have been published in volume II of this series. See especially documents Nos. 501, 508, 540, 553, 588, 593, 606, 621, 625, 629, 639, 642, 644, 652, and 666.]

## No. 54

140/75619-20

### *The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WARSAW, October 1, 1938—2:12 a.m.

No. 75 of September 30

Received October 1—5:50 a.m.

Foreign Minister Beck asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me of the present position of Polish-Czech negotiations; at the same time he expressed the wish that his statements also be transmitted to the Führer and Chancellor.

The note which had been announced in Prague 2 days ago and which according to Czech and French reports was to contain a clear acceptance of Polish demands had not arrived. The Czech Minister, on the other hand, had transmitted a note this afternoon which gave an evasive answer in long-winded formulations, and in effect stated that the entire problem should first be studied by a mixed commission. The Polish Government had no intention of tolerating such delaying tactics; consequently an ultimatum had been issued today demanding that evacuation begin tomorrow at 12 o'clock noon; the city of Teschen would have to be evacuated within 24 hours—as a sort of symbolic action—while other incontestably Polish areas (the Teschen and

Freistadt Districts) would have to be evacuated within 10 days. Poland conceded that a plebiscite should be held by a mixed commission in the disputed areas. A reply was expected by tomorrow at 12 o'clock noon.<sup>1</sup> When I asked whether, in case of rejection, military measures would be taken as early as tomorrow noon, M. Beck replied that this had not yet been decided.

M. Beck continued that he wished to ask the German Government in this connection whether Poland could count on a benevolent attitude on the part of Germany in case of an armed conflict with Czechoslovakia. He stated explicitly that he did not expect any "action" on our part. M. Beck stated further that it was, of course, not very likely that the Soviet Union would do anything against Poland in the event of a Polish-Czech conflict. Nevertheless he would appreciate learning whether Germany would, if the occasion arose, adopt the friendly attitude of a good neighbor. He thought he knew German views in general but he believed it important nevertheless to know our stand in this specific case.

For the rest, M. Beck expressed real gratitude for the loyal treatment accorded Polish interests at the Munich conference, as well as the sincerity of relations during the Czech conflict. The attitude of the Führer and Chancellor was fully appreciated by the Government and the public. I promised M. Beck to transmit his statements at once. I did not have the impression that he believed a rejection of the ultimatum or an armed conflict very likely, so that his two questions probably have only theoretical significance at the moment. They appear to me none the less important on that account, and in consideration of the future development of German-Polish relations I would recommend a reply as promptly as possible.<sup>2</sup>

MOLTKE

<sup>1</sup>The texts of the Czechoslovak note of Sept. 30 and the Polish reply of the same date are printed in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. III (London, 1950), document No. 101.

<sup>2</sup>Marginal notes in Weizsäcker's handwriting:

"By telephone: 1) Pleasure at Poland's understanding for results of Munich. 2) Armed action probably bluff. 3) In the event of armed conflict with Czechoslovakia benevolent attitude is a matter of course. 4) Demarcation line."  
"Hungary?"

## No. 55

147/78615-16

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 256

BERLIN, October 1, 1938.

I spoke with Ciano on the telephone this morning regarding the Polish ultimatum to Czechoslovakia and the report that the French, British, and Italian Ambassadors, invoking the Munich Agreement,

had made strong *démarches* in Warsaw in order to prevent military intervention by Poland. Ciano said he had not ordered the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw to make a *démarche*, but had given him instructions to say, in a conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister, that the Italian Government expected that Poland would not resort to arms merely because of a few days—which was really all that could be involved.

I thereupon explained our view to Ciano and told him that because of the experience we had had with the treatment of the Sudeten Germans, we had great sympathy and understanding for the Polish standpoint. Already, 240,000 Germans had been expelled from the Sudetenland. In the case of the Poles, 200,000 people were involved, who in part had already met with or were faced with a similar fate. We knew of the terrible conditions in the Teschen territory. He, Ciano, would understand if in these circumstances we did not use the same language in Warsaw as Italy.

Thereupon I at once made the following statement to the Polish Ambassador in response to the step taken today by Polish Foreign Minister Beck with our Ambassador in Warsaw:

- 1) We had complete understanding for the Polish viewpoint;
- 2) We hoped that military action would not become necessary; the condition for this, it seemed to us, was that Prague should accommodate itself immediately to the Polish demands and quickly comply with the wishes of the Poles;
- 3) In case of an armed conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia, we would naturally take a benevolent attitude;
- 4) Should the Soviet Union proceed against Poland militarily, which I think is out of the question, however,<sup>1</sup> a completely new situation would arise for Germany in the whole Czechoslovak problem.

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>1</sup> The clause, "we would likewise adopt a benevolent attitude," was deleted from the text at this point by Ribbentrop, and the words "in the whole Czechoslovak problem" were added by him. Ambassador Moltke's report of his parallel conversation with Foreign Minister Beck, however, reveals that he employed the original version of this paragraph in the statement. He told Beck that "in case of Russian intervention we would likewise adopt a benevolent attitude, but in that event an entirely new situation would confront us" (2389/495071-72).

## No. 56

28/17830

### *The Legation in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 534 of October 1

PRAGUE, October 1, 1938—8:00 p.m.

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Attaché Group.

The Polish demands were unconditionally accepted by the Czech Government at 10 o'clock this morning. The first step will be the oc-

cupation of the Teschen territory proper, to begin at noon on October 2. Further occupation is subject to mutual agreement. Military experts of both States met at the Czech-Polish frontier at 5 p. m. today to settle upon proceedings for evacuation and occupation.

For the Foreign Ministry also.

TOUSSAINT<sup>1</sup>  
HENCKE

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<sup>1</sup> Lt. Col. Rudolf Toussaint, Military Attaché.

## No. 57

147/73628

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 3, 1938.

The Polish Ambassador again today expressed to me the thanks of the Polish Government to the participating officials of our Ministry for the assistance rendered in the last few days.

I then told the Ambassador that we would perhaps sometime during the day request him or a representative to come to the Ministry in order to arrive at complete clarity with the Polish Government regarding the demarcation of our plebiscite areas. I added that the Polish Government had already made known to the Czechoslovak Government, by means of a map, its wishes in this respect. So far as I was informed, and subject to reservation, I wished to state that no overlapping of our respective wishes with regard to a plebiscite must take place. With regard to possible electoral alliances between Germany and Poland in their respective areas, I have as yet told the Ambassador nothing.

M. Lipski asked in conclusion that we keep him currently informed of the progress of the work of subcommittee C regarding establishment of the line of demarcation for our troops.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> See vol. IV, ch. 1 for documents dealing with the International Commission for executing the terms of the Munich Agreement.

## No. 58

2185/472216

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 4, 1938.

Field Marshal Göring told me today with regard to the territory south of the southeastern corner of Silesia, that it must by all means

become German. Should a dispute develop about it with the Poles, a deal could be made over Danzig. Otherwise it would be best to pass it to the Czechs.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 59

834/196718

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

URGENT

BERLIN, October 4, 1938.

Dr. Reichert (of the Economic Group for the Iron Industries<sup>1</sup>) pointed out over the telephone that by the Polish occupation of the Teschen area the most valuable part of Witkowitz, near Ostrau-Oderberg, with its coal mines, iron industry (1 million tons), would be much endangered. Witkowitz was, moreover, the location of several important foundries. With the acquisition of Witkowitz, Polish iron production would, according to his estimates, be increased some 50 percent. So far as he knew, Witkowitz had in prewar days been overwhelmingly German.

I informed Dr. Reichert that we were already making efforts to include Witkowitz in the German plebiscite area.

WIEHL

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<sup>1</sup> In the German: Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisenschaffende Industrie.

### No. 60

2134/467162

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 4, 1938.

I told the Polish Ambassador on the telephone today that with respect to the delimitation of the Polish claims in Czechoslovakia vis-à-vis Germany there seemed still to be a certain overlapping of German and Polish interests. I did not wish to express myself more specifically in the matter at the moment. Probably Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would arrive here this afternoon, so he would presumably hear more from us than.

It will be necessary to present the Poles with our objection with regard to Oderberg today. I note on this point that in all talks with the Polish Ambassador thus far, I have expressly barred any delimitation of our sphere of interests. Neither Under State Secretary Woermann nor I have said anything to the Polish Ambassador that was prejudicial to the present peaceful progress of the Czechoslovak transfers of territory to Poland and Germany.

Undoubtedly, however, the Polish Ambassador will, as previously, cite promises by the Führer to him as well as promises by Field Marshal Göring to Minister Beck. On this point Field Marshal Göring told me on the telephone today that for his part he had made no promises of any kind to the Poles.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 61

147/78639-42

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, October 4, 1938.

I am transmitting attached a memorandum of a conversation between Under State Secretary Woermann and the Polish Ambassador on the question of Oderberg. As the memorandum shows, the Polish Ambassador proved thoroughly obdurate on this question. The question is now whether the German Ambassador in Warsaw should be instructed to bring up the matter in Warsaw.

The Foreign Minister requests that the Führer's decision be obtained. Submitted herewith to Counselor Hewel.

BRÜCKLMETER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, October 4, 1938.

I asked the Polish Ambassador to call on me and told him, as instructed, that the inclusion of Oderberg in the Polish zone represented, for us, a new fact. Since we had to discuss the definitive boundary line with Poland anyway, the question of Oderberg could be brought up in that connection.

M. Lipski said that he was very much astonished at this statement. Poland could have had no doubt, from previous conversations, that Germany agreed to the incorporation of Oderberg. The Führer had already agreed to this claim—of which he had been notified and of which maps had been shown him—when he had received Lipski at Obersalzberg in the presence of the Foreign Minister. A conference between Field Marshal Göring and Minister Beck had had the same result. Finally, he had also discussed this matter several times with State Secretary von Weizsäcker with the aforesaid maps at hand, and the latter had also agreed. I replied to the Ambassador that today I could only discuss the conversation between him and Herr von Weizsäcker, about which I had spoken with the State Secretary immediately afterwards and regarding which he had also written a memorandum. According to this, the so-called "black line," which included Oderberg, was expressly designated only as a line east of which Poland would take action in the event of a military solution. M.

Lipski insisted that the conversation had been otherwise, but this I strongly denied.

M. Lipski took down verbatim the formula proposed by me and said that after the course the conversations had taken earlier he hesitated to report this to M. Beck, but at a remark by me he undertook to do so.

The Ambassador then inquired further what we understood by Oderberg. I told him that this was taken to mean all parts of the city east of the Oder, since there was no question west of the Oder. M. Lipski further asked whether the statement referred only to the city of Oderberg or to other, neighboring areas also. I replied that I could tell him nothing in addition to the statement made to him but that its precise wording, which called for discussion with Poland of the definitive boundary line, left open the question of the inclusion of neighboring areas.

In conclusion, I showed the Ambassador informally the nationality figures for Oderberg in 1930 and 1910.

A quarter of an hour after the conversation M. Lipski called from the Polish Embassy and said that he had again carefully studied the formula and, after all that had happened before, was not in a position to transmit it to his Government. I replied that the Ambassador nevertheless had to report to his Government the fact of the conversation that had taken place between us and the statement made therein. M. Lipski insisted that he could not do this. To further objections on my part, he said he would write M. Beck privately about the matter but that he could not report it officially.

WOERMANN

No. 62

147/78638

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

OCTOBER 5, 1938.

Subject: Oderberg.

To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, Dr. Kordt.

I reported on the attached matter<sup>1</sup> to the Führer, who, although I referred to the economic loss that the surrender of Oderberg would mean for Germany, told me that he had no interest in Oderberg whatever. On the map drawn up this morning, Oderberg was no longer included in the German area. Oderberg was in itself a Polish town. He was not going to haggle with the Poles about every single city but would be generous toward those who were modest in their demands. For the Führer the matter is therefore closed.

HEWEL

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum originally covered the papers printed as document No. 61.



## No. 63

147/78646

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 5, 1938.

Dr. Harbich, the champion of the German cause in the Teschen area, called on me today accompanied by Dr. Pfitzner, of Oderberg. He said that he intended to address to the Berlin Ambassadors of France, England, Italy, and Japan, as the signatories of an agreement of 1919 whereby a three-way plebiscite was to be taken in the Teschen area, a petition in which the Ambassadors would be reminded of this obligation. I told him that for the German Government the question of Teschen was to be regarded as settled. We did not wish to make any difficulties for Poland in this area. For that reason we also had no interest in having such a petition addressed to the Ambassadors. Dr. Harbich indicated that in order to vindicate himself before his minority group he thought he would have to take such a step. I raised no objection to this, but said he might in any case leave out the Japanese. Express approval from me would not be forthcoming. His step would not meet with any success whatever. Dr. Harbich said that he would then have to draw the logical conclusions for the Teschen area and intended to exhort the people there to armed resistance against the Poles. I told him most emphatically that he had to desist from that as it would be entirely contrary to our policy.

I informed both men that, in accordance with the Polish-Czech agreement, Oderberg was to be left to Poland. Dr. Harbich and Dr. Pfitzner said that they could not understand this. I tried to explain to them the renunciation of Oderberg in the context of general German policy, but apparently without success.

WOERMANN

## No. 64

1998/441801-5

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P V 47

WARSAW, September [October] 6, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

Received October 12.

Pol. V 7664.

## POLITICAL REPORT

By way of supplement to my previous reports, it seems to me not uninteresting to present again briefly the last stages of the Czechoslo-

<sup>1</sup>The obvious error in the month is corrected in handwriting on the original document.

vak conflict so far as Poland enters into question, and the Polish attitude toward different phases of the crisis.

As I have already reported on a previous occasion, it was evident from the start that Polish foreign policy strove to exploit the German action against Czechoslovakia in order to satisfy Polish aspirations but at the same time not run too great a risk, and to attain the goal by as self-reliant an action as possible, independent of Germany.

The tactics of waiting and shifting dictated by this attitude also had disadvantages, however, and made frequent changes of course necessary. Although at first they had consciously refrained from any demonstrative action, after the Anglo-German meeting at Berchtesgaden they suddenly found themselves faced with the danger that German demands might possibly be met but Poland left empty-handed. In view of this situation Poland now took a more open and active stand. The concentration of troops on the Teschen border was carried out in a demonstrative manner and threats of invasion were heard in public. After the Anglo-German meeting at Godesberg, which seemed to make the possibility of an international conflagration real, a new change in Poland's course took place. M. Beck, I would assume, never lost faith that a world war could be prevented; at the same time, however, in view of the now considerably increased risk, he probably thought he was acting more cautiously by trying to solve the question of Teschen-Silesia by himself even before a decision had been reached on war or peace. A chance of doing so seemed to be offered by Beneš' letter to the President of Poland, which obviously aimed at detaching Poland from the anti-Czech front. The negotiations thereupon started with Prague were conducted with the greatest haste, and it seemed as if it would actually be possible to effect a separate solution by exploiting the Czechs' desperation. But instead of the consent of the Czech Government, of which advance notice had already been given, the news then arrived of the imminent meeting at Munich, which, from the standpoint of Warsaw, was unpleasantly reminiscent of the concept of the Four Power Pact. A completely new situation had thereby arisen for Poland; to be sure, at first they evidently hoped that precisely the failure to settle the Polish claims might provide the occasion for including Poland, too, in the Munich conference. But when such an invitation did not come and the Czech note as well failed to arrive, the nervousness here was unmistakable.

Then, after the decision had been reached at Munich without any participation whatever by Poland, it seemed the more urgent for Warsaw to recall with emphasis the old principle: "Nothing concerning us without us." If the powers had allowed 3 months' time for the settlement of the Polish claims, Poland now wanted to show that she could

by her own efforts bring about a solution in 12 hours, and do so by a separate action demonstrating the independence of Polish policy from the tribunal of the four Powers.

As a result of this striving for an independent position, which was evident during the entire crisis, the words of thanks that M. Beck addressed to Germany for the consideration given to Polish interests at Munich as well as for the "loyal, sincere relations" throughout, sounded less cordial than might perhaps have been expected. The same may be said of the press reactions to Munich. To be sure, there were frequent statements in the Polish Government press to the effect that Germany, like Italy, had taken "an extremely loyal attitude" with respect to Poland and had shown understanding for her importance and for her interests, while the attitude of France and in part also of England was criticized and censured in the same newspapers. Of a collaboration by Poland with Germany or of the fact that Poland had been able to make an effective claim upon Teschen-Silesia only because of the circumstance that Germany had cleared the path for her, there was no mention anywhere even by implication. On the contrary, it was frequently pointed out that the German action would not have been possible if Poland by her neutrality policy had not precluded any military operation on the part of Soviet Russia.

It is still too early to be able to judge what form Polish policy will take hereafter. Nevertheless it may be said even now that the same "independent trend" which was so apparent in the last days of the crisis will probably dominate Poland's policy in the future also. Naturally they also realize in Warsaw that after the collapse of the French system of pacts and the exclusion of Soviet Russia, and as a result of the consequent increase in Germany's power, a new situation has arisen in Europe which confronts Poland as well with new decisions. That this decision may take the form of an alignment with Germany is not to be assumed. Even if the alliance with France has lost considerably in significance, and for the time being also in popularity, the idea of abandoning this alliance will hardly be entertained. It is rather to be assumed—and certain semiofficial press comments have already so indicated—that the crisis in Franco-Polish relations will be weathered. Certainly Germany's strengthened position will in the future be taken fully into consideration and it will be the aim to maintain good relations with Berlin. After the obvious exclusion of Soviet Russia from European affairs, however, the main effort will be directed toward developing the position that Poland has long aspired to hold, namely, that of being the decisive factor in eastern Europe. Even the demand for a common frontier with Hungary in the last analysis pursues the objective of establishing more firmly the

policy which is justified outwardly as a defense against Bolshevism but which actually aims at an expansion of the Polish sphere of influence and has as its goal to bring the eastern states that border upon Russia together into the "neutral European security zone"—a plan which is directed primarily against Soviet Russia but in which fears of German expansion also play a part.

MOLTKE

No. 65

147/78649-50

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 7, 1938.

I asked the Polish Ambassador to call on me today and told him the following:

I was reverting to his recent conversation with Under State Secretary Woermann regarding Oderberg. His, Lipski's, statements in this conversation had been referred to higher authority. I could now inform Lipski that we had understood the position he then took, but we did wish to call attention to the economic and national interests that we especially had at heart in the area concerned. It was a question of the following:

- 1) The Annaberg-Oderberg-Schönbrunn railroad line, as well as the Oderberg station. The settlement of our claims there would also involve filing German property claims;
- 2) a canal that might be built in this territory, where important German economic interests were likewise to be established;
- 3) the establishment of a consulate in Teschen;
- 4) the treatment of the German minority in the territory newly awarded to Poland. We expected that the actual and legal status of these fellow Germans would not deteriorate. I had to point out that M. Kraczkowski<sup>1</sup> was already casting his shadow before him again and that we had serious complaints from there.

I added that my foregoing communication to M. Lipski was made by direction of higher authority and that Ambassador von Moltke would today or tomorrow make a similar but more detailed communication to Minister Beck. It was our desire to have experts in the next few days enter into negotiations on the above-mentioned questions with the Polish Government in Warsaw.

Having said this, I immediately went on to another subject. Nor did Lipski try to revert to the matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. M. Grazynski, Voivode of Silesia, is meant.

## No. 66

1647/391079-80

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

No. 79 of October 8

WARSAW, October 8, 1938.

Received October 10—8:20 a. m.

Since M. Beck is slightly indisposed, I made the *démarche* ordered regarding Oderberg yesterday evening with the Deputy Minister, Count Szembek.

Count Szembek sent me a reply today to the effect that the Polish Government attached the greatest importance to bringing about a friendly understanding with respect to our wishes.

He stated the following regarding the individual points:

a) Railway questions:

1. With regard to the Annaberg-Oderberg railway line we will be granted the same rights as we have had hitherto. (The Poles assume that we also have property rights in the line.)

2. The same applies to the railway station of Oderberg and the roads leading there.

3. For the traffic on the Oderberg-Schönbrunn-Witkowitz line they propose an arrangement whereby our trains will have free transit and we share proportionately the actual cost of maintaining the line. In this way they believe they can better arrive at a settlement which does justice to the interests of both sides than by a transfer of ownership; this they are not willing to grant for this particular line, which is part of an important Polish line of communication.

4. Unlimited passenger and freight transit traffic is to be established on the Annaberg-Oderberg-Schönbrunn line free from passport, customs, and currency formalities. If necessary, the sealing of cars could be considered.

b) The consent desired by us for construction and operation of the Annaberg-Koblau Canal is being granted; we are free to use the method of expropriation, and the transfer of the land will be assured. It is desired, however, that the canal be laid out in consultation with the Polish Government. It is expected furthermore that preferential use of the stretch of the canal passing through Polish territory will be assured in case a connection with the Vistula Canal is established at some time.

c) With regard to the establishment of a consulate in Teschen and a passport office in Oderberg favorable consideration is promised if a request to that effect is made through the usual channels.

d) In recognition of our special interest the minority is promised benevolent treatment in accordance with the principles of the Minorities Declaration as well as maintenance of the *status quo*. Instructions to this effect have already been sent to the administrative authori-

ties. It is agreed that Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche have the unrestricted right to leave with their property interests guaranteed. Reciprocity is requested.

An agreement is to be concluded as soon as possible regarding the railway and canal questions. Whether this is to be in Berlin or here is not yet decided. The Director of the Ministry of Transportation here will get in touch with Director Holtz immediately by telephone in this matter.

An exchange of notes on minorities questions is planned, if possible prior to the occupation of Oderberg.

MOLTKE

### No. 67

1863/423118-21

#### *The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P V 51

WARSAW, October 8, 1938.

Received October 10.

Pol. IV 7181.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

During his brief visit to Warsaw Count Csáky, the *chef de cabinet* of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, had two long conferences with Foreign Minister Beck for the purpose of reaching agreement on Polish-Hungarian cooperation in enforcing Hungary's territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. The question of the Carpatho-Ukraine was evidently in the foreground. It was realized that there were considerable obstacles to progress in this matter, especially since nothing was said at the Munich conference either about Hungary's claims to all of the Carpatho-Ukraine or about the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Carpatho-Ukraine population. Since there is consequently no direct way of attaining the goal, the hope seems to be nourished that through annexation by Hungary of Hungarian-language enclaves in the Carpatho-Ukraine the territory would be blocked off from Slovakia in such a way that the desired solution would thereby be achieved indirectly.

M. Beck, I am reliably informed, again told Count Csáky that for military and political reasons Poland attached the greatest importance to a common frontier with Hungary, and he promised Hungary the moral support of Poland to the fullest extent. It seems that Hungarian expectations were nevertheless not quite fulfilled. Evidently M. Beck showed himself more reserved than Budapest had hoped, as a result of strong opposition from his Rumanian ally; apart from various other considerations Rumania sees the erection of a Polish-

Hungarian protective barrier toward the East as evidence of distrust of Rumania herself and as deprecation of her own position as watchman *vis-à-vis* Russia. At any rate the Rumanian Ambassador here, who has repeatedly called on M. Beck during the last few days, is said to be very much disturbed and even to have raised the question of the continuation of the Polish-Rumanian alliance.

The fact that despite this opposition a vigorous campaign for the annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary has been launched during the last few days in the Polish Government press may be an expression of the moral support which M. Beck promised Count Csáky and which, for the time being at least, must serve as a substitute for more active assistance in the matter. The Polish Government papers and the National Democratic press, which were in agreement this time, stated that the Carpatho-Ukraine had hitherto been a bridgehead for the Soviet Union, serving to disturb the neighboring states through military air bases and Communist propaganda cells; only the establishment of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier through the reincorporation of the Carpatho-Ukraine into Hungary could erect a barrier against this constant threat. If the ethnographically Hungarian southern fringe of the Carpatho-Ukraine, together with the country's only east-west rail connection, came under Hungary—which would happen in any case—the rest of the territory would be left suspended in the air and would not be economically viable. The great majority of the native Carpatho-Ukrainian population was too backward to decide its future national allegiance by a plebiscite. A return of the territory to Hungary was the only tenable solution.

In comparison with the question of the future fate of the Carpatho-Ukraine, that of the future of Slovakia has lately receded, since the possibility of annexing Slovakia to Hungary is no longer seriously entertained. In these circumstances the Poles seem to regard the independence of Slovakia as a relatively desirable solution, since they assume that an independent Slovakia would seek alignment with Poland.

The Italian Ambassador here has told me that so far he has received no instructions regarding Rome's attitude toward the Polish or Hungarian wishes for a common frontier. He expressed the personal opinion that the establishment of a common frontier, however useful it might be for defense against Soviet Russia, also had its great disadvantages. In addition to these anti-Bolshevist objectives, Poland was undoubtedly pursuing the aim of creating her own north-south axis in the Danube region, which sooner or later would necessarily clash with German or Italian interests there.

MOLTKE

## No. 68

1340/353389

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 80 of October 10

WARSAW, October 10, 1938—4:30 p. m.

Received October 10—6:55 p. m.

Pol. V 7615.

Contrary to the statement of the Polish Foreign Ministry which I reported by telephone yesterday and according to which the occupation of Oderberg ahead of schedule took place as a result of Czech provocation, the semiofficial *Gazeta Polska* today describes the circumstances as if the occupation had been necessitated by the formation of German shock troops in Oderberg. It is emphasized, to be sure, that these shock troops, which had tried to get arms in Germany, had not obtained any there.

For the past two days the press has been calling attention to Mährisch-Ostrau in an obvious manner. It is asserted that a feeling of panic prevails there and that the people are looking to Poland. There is also talk of a plebiscite in favor of Poland. All this gives the impression that the Polish Government has not given up hope of somehow obtaining Mährisch-Ostrau, which, together with Witkowitz, is still found on all propaganda maps.

MOLTKE

## No. 69

147/78651

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 12, 1938.

I requested the Polish Ambassador to call on me today in order to tell him the following:

It was well understood that Germany had given Poland a free hand in the Oderberg question. With Mährisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz the situation was different. Whether Mährisch-Ostrau was to remain under Czechoslovakia depended on future developments. If the future of these regions should come up for discussion, we would have to demand a plebiscite under international control.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Telegrams from the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Poland (No. 210) and to the Legation in Czechoslovakia (No. 386) transmitted the substance of Weizsäcker's statement to Lipski with the added information that it was made "in accordance with the Führer's decision." The Prague Legation was asked to refrain from discussing the question with the Czech Government (140/75741).



Lipski replied immediately that he was fully informed of his Government's view, since he had just been in Warsaw. His Government did not covet Mährisch-Ostrau; it confined itself to the plebiscite line, with which we were familiar. They were negotiating today and tomorrow with the Czechs to determine whether a direct settlement with Prague would not be preferable in the plebiscite area proposed by Warsaw; a plebiscite there would then be waived altogether. The new Polish-Czech frontier would thus presumably be shifted somewhat farther to the east.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 70

52/34468

*Memorandum by the Director of the Information and Press  
Department*

BERLIN, October 13, 1938.

Dr. Schmidt reports that following my inquiries the Foreign Minister, after a conference with the Führer, fully upheld the instruction pertaining to the treatment of Polish questions, that is, to release nothing unfavorable to Poland; this also applies to the incidents involving the German minority.

Submitted to the State Secretary.

ASCHMANN

No. 71

1340/353426

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 611 of October 14

PRAGUE, October 14, 1938—7:00 p. m.

Received October 14—9:20 p. m.

Pol. V 7740.

With reference to my telegram No. 601 of October 13.<sup>1</sup>

1) Ministerial Counselor Čermak today informed Secretary of Legation Hofmann that the Polish Minister had unexpectedly told him yesterday afternoon that the Polish Government would drop its demand for a plebiscite in the area described in telegram No. 601 of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1340/353424). Hencke reported he had been told confidentially by the Counselor of the Polish Legation in Prague that Poland had for tactical reasons demanded a plebiscite in the area between Ostravica and the Polish-occupied zone, but would not press the demand.

October 13 only if the Czechoslovak Government would immediately cede to Poland the territory between Ostravica and the zone occupied by Poland, with the southern boundary line running approximately from Vratinov to Datyne. In case Czechoslovakia was not prepared to do so, Poland would extend her demand for a plebiscite to a still larger area. The Czechoslovak Government intends to delay answering until the Foreign Minister returns from Berlin.<sup>3</sup>

2) Professor Krcar [Krčmař]<sup>4</sup> has been appointed chairman of the Czechoslovak delegation on the Polish-Czechoslovak Liquidation Commission. The negotiations will presumably begin tomorrow.

HENCKE

<sup>3</sup> Foreign Minister František Chvalkovsky visited Berlin on Oct. 13-14, 1938.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Jan Krčmař, Professor of Civil Law at Charles University since 1911, served as Czechoslovak Minister of Education in 1926 and again in 1934-36. He was also a member of his country's delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, and later its delegation to the League of Nations.

## No. 72

879/288885

### *The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

WARSAW, October 15, 1938.

Received October 17.

Pol. V 7769.

Subject: Polish complaints regarding Ukrainian propaganda.

In a conversation which I had today with the Deputy Minister, Count Szembek, concerning another matter, he brought up the Ukrainian question, stating that propaganda for an independent Ukraine including Polish territory was being carried on in Germany by certain circles close to the late Kornovalez.<sup>1</sup> The Vienna radio station was particularly active along this line. Representations had already been made in Berlin, but the activity of the Vienna station was continuing nevertheless; it might even be said that activity had increased during the last 2 days.

Count Szembek added that M. Lipski had received instructions to discuss this situation in Berlin, but that he would appreciate it if I, too, would take the opportunity to stress the importance of the matter in Berlin. I have often emphasized in my reports that the Poles are especially sensitive on all questions connected with the Ukraine, and

<sup>1</sup> Col. Evhen Konovalez, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and a veteran of the Ukrainian struggle against the Bolshevik regime in the Russian civil wars, was murdered in Holland in May 1938.

that particularly recently the press has been constantly linking Germany with the independence movement of the Ukrainians here.

I should therefore be grateful if I could be authorized to give Count Szembek a reassuring reply as soon as possible.

MOLTKE

### No. 73

7082/E522577-78

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 17, 1938.

e. o. Pol. V 7934.

Senate President Greiser inquired of me today regarding the appropriate attitude toward the Poles, now that the foreign press had again carried rumors of negotiations between Germany and Poland concerning annexation of Danzig by the Reich. On the other hand, Herr Greiser also referred to the Führer's speech in the Sportpalast.<sup>1</sup> I told Herr Greiser that in my opinion Danzig's interests vis-à-vis Poland should, as previously, be upheld with calm objectivity; any special provocation of the Poles, however, did not seem to me to be indicated at the moment.

President Greiser then mentioned certain laws pertaining to the Jews which were in preparation in Danzig and inquired whether these laws would be opportune from the point of view of foreign policy. As for the matter itself, he remarked that Danzig could get along for another half year or year without these laws. The High Commissioner was not a supporter of these laws. The reaction to the laws in England would probably not be especially favorable; this factor, however, could probably be disregarded. On the other hand, Poland and her Jewish-Polish nationals would undoubtedly be affected most. I told Herr Greiser that there was no need to consider England; the question of Polish reaction, on the other hand, should perhaps be examined further.

In conclusion the Senate President stated that if we, too, did not desire to have these laws enacted in the near future, a hint by the Foreign Minister to Gauleiter Forster might be advisable.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> On Sept. 26. See *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, edited by Norman H. Baynes (London, 1942), vol. II, pp. 1508-27.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "To the Under State Secretary and the Deputy Director of the Political Department, with the request to examine whether this matter should be submitted to the Foreign Minister." See document No. 671.

## No. 74

1340/353434

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 626 of October 17

PRAGUE, October 17, 1938—9:05 p. m.

Received October 18—12:40 a. m.

Pol. V 7796.

With reference to my telegram No. 611 of October 14.

The Foreign Minister told me today that Poland insists on immediate cession of the territory described in telegram No. 611 under 1). The Poles had declared again that in the event of Czech rejection they would demand a plebiscite for a far larger area and under completely new conditions.

The Czech Government was not prepared to cede the territory in question, the population of which is almost 99 percent Czech. In case the Poles persisted in their demand, Prague would demand a plebiscite under international control for the entire area, including that already occupied by Poland.

The Foreign Minister requests that the Reich Government so far as possible exercise a restraining influence on Poland. He emphasized expressly that there was nothing he desired more ardently than to settle Polish and Hungarian frontier questions as soon as possible in order thereby to create the necessary conditions for effecting the guarantee which the Führer gave the Czech Republic.<sup>1</sup> He regarded this guarantee as an historic turning point for his country and its implementation as his most important political task.

HENCKE

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<sup>1</sup> Chvalkovsky is referring here to conversations he had with Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berlin on Oct. 13-14, 1938. See vol. iv, documents Nos. 55 and 61.

## No. 75

147/78853-54

*Memorandum by the State Secretary<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, October 18, 1938.

Instead of visiting the Foreign Minister the Polish Ambassador called on me today by direction of Minister Beck in order to state

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<sup>1</sup> Note at head of document: "Shown to the Foreign Minister. Lipski to be informed through the State Secretary in the forenoon the day after tomorrow. Sp[itz]. Oct. 19."

that Beck would like to "remain in friendly consultation" with us in regard to the Hungarian-Slovak question. Poland's view was, as previously, that Hungary's wishes must by all means be taken into account. The solution had to be such that it achieved a maximum of political stability in the areas in question. Lipski then made a few more remarks on the dilatory tactics of the Czechs and wanted me to give him our view as to the status of and the further procedure in the question of establishing the Hungarian-Slovak boundary.

I told the Ambassador, who had mentioned two Hungarian notes transmitted to Warsaw on Friday and yesterday, that we were maintaining close contact with Budapest. The conversation which the Foreign Minister had had with the former Hungarian Minister President, Darányi, and subsequently with the Czech Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, was basic for us. With full knowledge of the Hungarian wishes, influence had been brought to bear on Prague. Yesterday we had again inquired in Prague about the stand taken by the Czechs. We wished, of course, that the Czechs and the Hungarians would come to an agreement as soon as possible. We did not know at present, however, whether the interrupted negotiations would now be resumed and on what basis; I could therefore say nothing for the time being about further procedure. Intervention by the four Powers had, as was well known, been provided for at Munich, but only if it became necessary after 3 months had elapsed.

Thus I expressed myself to M. Lipski in rather general terms and did not go into any further details; however, I promised the Ambassador at his request that I would keep him informed in future visits. Lipski refrained from hinting à la Comnen-Fabricsius (cf. Budapest telegram No. 213<sup>2</sup>) that notice was being served on the four Great Powers that Poland claimed the right to be consulted; however, his visit could have no other meaning than a request not to be forgotten in the contingency indicated.

For the sake of reciprocity I then asked the Ambassador about the status of the Polish-Czech negotiations. Lipski said that everything was going well. The Poles were handling the Czechs with kid gloves. In reply to a somewhat skeptical remark of mine (cf. Prague telegraphic report No. 626<sup>3</sup>) Lipski said that Poland actually wanted

<sup>2</sup> Weizsäcker's reference is incorrect and should read Bucharest telegram No. 213. The latter is not printed (379/210063). The telegram reported Rumanian Foreign Minister Comnen's request that "in case direct negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary are not resumed and their dispute is submitted to the four Munich Powers for settlement, that then Rumania be given the right to state her views to the four Powers through an 'observer'. . . . He had heard, moreover, that Poland had also expressed such a desire and had received a promise to that effect."

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 74.

nothing more in the Teschen area than she had always demanded, and she had thus far not made any further claims. He believed that everything would continue to go well. Furthermore, Poland had thus far made no demands on Slovakia for frontier adjustments.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 76

1776/406260-65

### *The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

WARSAW, October 19, 1938.

Received October 20.

Pol. V 7889.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Foreign Minister Beck's trip to Rumania.

With reference to my telegraphic report.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Ministry has issued a statement to foreign correspondents here concerning Foreign Minister Beck's surprise departure for Rumania which confirms that the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question will be in the foreground of the political discussion with King Carol. Poland recently has given increasing moral support to the Hungarian claims to this territory. The fact that M. Beck has now decided on personal intervention with his Rumanian ally shows how deeply Polish foreign policy has pledged itself to the attainment of this goal.

In fact, Polish political circles regard the creation of a common frontier with Hungary as one of the vital questions in Poland's foreign policy. Apart from the Polish wishes, previously reported by the Embassy, which aim, through the frontier with Hungary, at attaining a more effective barrier against the threat of Bolshevism and at the same time a strengthening of Poland's position as a Great Power, it appears that two other factors have lately come into play. These make annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary especially urgent from the Polish point of view.

The first one of these is the Ukrainian question. The Ukrainians living in Poland—about 6,500,000 in all—have been enormously strengthened in their striving for independence by the emphasis given the right of self-determination in connection with the Czech crisis. The prospect that an independent Ukrainian state might be created in the Carpatho-Ukraine or at least an autonomous structure set up

<sup>1</sup> Moltke refers to a brief telegram he sent the previous evening conveying the news of Beck's sudden departure for Bucharest (1776/406258).

within the framework of a Czechoslovakia which was no longer able to pursue a policy of oppression, has fanned these hopes even more. Polish Ukrainian circles apparently see therein a sort of "Piedmont" from which the development into a Greater Ukraine might begin, while they regard annexation by Hungary as equivalent to annihilating the Ukrainian nationality in the Carpatho-Ukraine. The revival of the idea of a Greater Ukraine, which is also becoming noticeable in the Ukrainian press in spite of the most rigorous censorship by the Poles, and which has in the last few days led to bloody disorders in Lemberg, must naturally cause the Polish Government serious anxiety and influence its attitude in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. The Polish Government will therefore leave nothing undone to oppose the formation of the new center of crystallization sought by the Ukrainians. It believes it can best achieve this objective if the Carpatho-Ukraine is brought under Hungarian sovereignty, which offers the assurance that even a sham autonomy would not save the Carpatho-Ukraine from denationalization.

If this territory remains under Czechoslovakia, however—and here I come to the second point—it is feared that the Carpatho-Ukrainian region would fall under German influence. This fear has even been expressed in the semiofficial *Gazeta Polska*, which points out with concern in today's editorial that Czechoslovakia is continuing, as heretofore, to surrender to foreign influences. The quick reversal of Czech policy in the direction of alignment with Germany has caused surprise here and made a strong impression. Concern is felt in the face of the possibility that the Czech State might fall completely under German influence and that this influence might extend to the Rumanian frontier, now that the separation of Slovakia, which was confidently expected here, did not occur. The thought that Germany might thereby be placed in a position to intervene directly in the development of the Ukrainian question is all the more difficult for Poland to accept, as the greatest distrust is already felt here concerning a Ukrainian policy by Germany damaging to Polish interests. Moreover, Poland considers that a penetration of German influence into the Carpatho-Ukrainian area endangers her strategic position. While Czechoslovakia had her former frontiers, Poland always tried in every way to eliminate Soviet-Russian influence and prevent the possible transit of Soviet-Russian troops; today she is opposing perhaps even more strongly the formation of a German sphere of influence on her southern frontier.

In the attempt to enforce the Polish wishes, and consequently the Hungarian as well, M. Beck has met with very strong opposition from his Rumanian ally. Above all, it would be contrary to Rumanian in-

terests if by the incorporation of the entire Carpatho-Ukrainian territory Hungary should be enlarged and Rumania completely shut off from contact with Czechoslovakia. The Rumanian opposition to the Polish plans has evidently endangered friendly relations. It is therefore quite understandable that M. Beck is now making an especially strong effort to win Rumania over to the Polish plans. I am reliably informed that he intends to obtain the consent of Rumania by promising her a strip of territory in the eastern Carpatho-Ukraine—probably also settled in part by Rumanians—through which the railway line leading from Kolomea to Rumania by way of the Carpatho-Ukraine now runs. This solution would, among other things, have the strategically important effect that Poland would obtain for a possible mobilization a second, less exposed, railway connection leading directly into Rumanian territory. Whether Rumania will be prepared to participate in partitioning the territory of a member of the Little Entente, and how the entire plan in general is to be implemented, remains to be seen. As to this M. Beck evidently has the intention of proceeding along the line of the right of self-determination, and I hear that he regards quite favorably the prospects for Hungary of a plebiscite in the Carpatho-Ukraine. But perhaps he is also thinking of employing at the proper time the procedure which was used in the Teschen territory and is apparently contemplated for the Zips area, that is, to gamble on exploiting the factor of uncertainty involved in a plebiscite and waiving the plebiscite in exchange for the cession of a smaller territory. Even partition of the Carpatho-Ukraine could satisfy the wishes of Poland.

Moreover, it should also be emphasized that M. Beck's trip to Rumania might have had the additional motive of plainly showing the whole world the great interest Poland has in the settlement of questions of the Danube region and the importance to be attached to her position, which does not tolerate the making of decisions by the four Great Powers in these questions without consulting her.

Germany's attitude in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question is followed here with special interest. During the last few days the nationalist opposition press has repeatedly expressed the view that Germany will assert her influence in order to prevent the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. Germany's attitude is regarded here as especially important, since it is assumed that Germany will play a decisive role in the final settlement. If Poland should not succeed in fulfilling her aspirations and establishing a common frontier with Hungary, Germany will undoubtedly be held chiefly responsible.

MOLTKE



## No. 77

1875/395067-68

*Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate*<sup>1</sup>

DANZIG, October 20, 1938.

The decree for the protection of German blood and German honor is doubtless unconstitutional. According to the Constitution it would have to be passed twice by a two-thirds majority of the Volkstag and have the approval of the League of Nations. It is a fact that the League of Nations has become unimportant and that in practice we could ignore it without its being able to intervene. In the Council of the League of Nations, however, there are representatives of powers which are important for German policy, in particular England and France. The British Foreign Office has often informed us (through the High Commissioner, and also through Lord Halifax to me directly) that if after another Volkstag election in Danzig unconstitutional laws should obtain a two-thirds majority, the League of Nations Council would give its approval in any case. But if this procedure should not be followed, the opposition press, especially England's, would seize upon the matter and the opposition in the British Parliament would make it very difficult for the present Government because of its failure to fulfill the obligations it had assumed. That might even lead to the fall of the British Government. I also told Lord Halifax in London at the time that we felt bound by our treaties and would not change our Constitution without first communicating with him. Grave injury could easily be done also to the position of the High Commissioner, who has frequently rendered great service to us and Germany.

I therefore recommend that as far as possible the constitutional procedure proposed by England be followed in order not to disturb German policy and again stir up the world press against us. In any case, however, the British Foreign Secretary would have to be properly informed by the Foreign Department and possibly by the High Commissioner before the decree was issued.

President Greiser takes the position that the matter should not be hurried.

DR. BÖTTCHER

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<sup>1</sup> This document, which Böttcher had prepared for the Danzig Justice Department, was sent with some other papers to Consul General Janson in Danzig on Oct. 20 (6367/E474108). Janson sent it on to the Foreign Ministry where it was initiated by Schliep on Nov. 7.

## No. 78

1340/358435

*The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in  
Czechoslovakia*

Telegram

No. 402

BERLIN, October 20, 1938—9:15 p. m.  
zu Pol. V 7796 Ang. I.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Schliep.

With reference to your No. 626 of October 17.

At the present moment it is not proposed to comply with the request of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister. Therefore, please avoid discussion of the matter as far as possible.

WOERMANN

## No. 79

1776/408289

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 85 of October 21

WARSAW, October 22, 1938—12:25 a. m.  
Received October 22—3:30 a. m.

From a source close to Foreign Minister Beck I have heard that he returned greatly disappointed from his trip to Rumania. Although King Carol had shown understanding for the Polish viewpoint, Comnen had stubbornly opposed any solution which would deprive Rumania of direct contact with Czechoslovakia. M. Beck had not, however, permitted this to divert him from his plans and was determined to achieve a common frontier with Hungary under any circumstances, if necessary by force.

MOLTKE

## No. 80

147/78655-56

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, October 22, 1938.

The Polish Ambassador called on me today in order to point out once more Poland's interest in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. To be sure, he had already repeatedly explained the Polish position to the Führer, the Foreign Minister, Field Marshal Göring, and the State

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in handwriting: "Original sent to Munich with today's courier. Oct. 22." Ribbentrop was to receive the Polish Ambassador at Berchtesgaden 2 days later; see document No. 81.

Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker. In the Slovak question the Polish Government, too, was of the opinion that Hungary had to make certain concessions. On the other hand it took the view that the cities of Ungvar and Munkács should be given to Hungary. For the rest, it was well known that the Poles favored an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine associated with Hungary. Since all this was well known he was today only requesting that regular contact be maintained with Poland in dealing with Hungarian frontier questions; he had spoken about this with the State Secretary a few days ago.

He then mentioned Beck's visit to Bucharest and gave the version already known, according to which the King had been more favorably disposed toward the Polish point of view than M. Comnen, who was still unable to free himself of the old and outdated conceptions of the Little Entente. M. Comnen had also given completely false versions to various diplomats after the visit. For instance he had asserted, contrary to the truth, that Beck had assured him Poland did not desire a common frontier with Hungary. Furthermore, M. Comnen had told various persons that Germany completely shared the Rumanian point of view; the Polish Government knew very well that this was untrue.<sup>2</sup> I told the Ambassador on this point that we continued to stand for the right of self-determination for the Ukraine, whatever this might imply.

Ambassador Lipski then stated again at some length that the Carpatho-Ukraine with its mixed population, whose cultural level was very low except for the cities, was not suitable material for an independent state. The Carpatho-Ukraine had been the seat of Communist activities against Poland, over which the Polish Government had constantly had differences with Prague. In the event of an association with Prague, which could only be very loose, there would be a complete absence of authority in the country. Association with Hungary was the only right one, for economic reasons as well.

I repeated once more that in all these questions we adhered to the principle of self-determination.

The Ambassador could not as yet give me any information regarding the Warsaw visit of M. Sidor,<sup>3</sup> the Slovak Minister.

WOERMANN

<sup>2</sup> The Rumanian Foreign Minister, Petrescu-Comnen, told the German Minister in Bucharest, Fabricius, that Beck had stated to him that according to telegrams from Lipski, Germany was completely disinterested in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. He, Comnen, had replied that it was his understanding, on the basis of his own diplomatic reports, that the Munich Powers, including Germany, wanted the principle of self-determination applied, which meant that only areas with a Hungarian majority should go to Hungary. Fabricius confirmed that this was still the German position. Comnen said he also told Beck that there were Rumanians in the Carpatho-Ukraine whom he could not see turned over to Hungary, and that if Hungary acquired the territory, Rumania would have to build 100 kilometers of new fortifications on the lengthened frontier (140/75966-67).

<sup>3</sup> Karol Sidor, Deputy of the Slovak People's Party.

## No. 81

147/78675-80

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*<sup>1</sup>CONVERSATION BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER VON RIBBENTROP AND  
AMBASSADOR LIPSKI ON OCTOBER 24, 1938, AT BERCHTESGADEN

For the Reich Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Beck, and Ambassador Lipski only.

At the beginning of the 3-hour conversation the Foreign Minister described the present situation to the Polish Ambassador. He told Lipski in detail of the conversations and events that preceded the crisis and finally led to the peaceful and happy solution welcomed by both Germany and Poland. He mentioned in this connection the weight of German military power and the potential that joint action by Germany and Italy would have represented in case of war. He explained to the Pole precisely the role that Hungary had played during this time, and the wretched policy she had pursued, so that finally, despite the Führer's warning, she had missed the proper moment for action. He mentioned the role of Kánya and the Agreement of Bled<sup>2</sup> during the Horthy visit, and came to the conclusion that one could not blame the Führer for having little appreciation for Hungary's behavior.

L. agreed to all this without reservation, but said that the fault lay with certain individuals, particularly Kánya, but not with the people and also not with Horthy. He now came to the purpose of his visit: Poland was interested in the stabilization of the Danube region. The Carpatho-Ukraine, with its disorders and with 80 percent of its population illiterate, was a focal point for all conceivable political currents—a true Communist center. It had 650,000 inhabitants in all, including 250,000 Hungarians and Jews and 400,000 Ruthenians (to be verified). Poland had already had many a sharp exchange of notes with Prague over this center of unrest. Beck had told him that he was anxious to have something sensible emerge from this crisis. Poland desired that this area be attached to Hungary. Yugoslavia was disinterested and would make no difficulties. On the other hand it was much more difficult with Rumania. Comnen was still living entirely in the way of thinking of the Little Entente. The King himself had more understanding for these questions. Lipski admitted that Beck's trip to Rumania had been a disappointment to Poland.

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 197.

<sup>2</sup> On Aug. 23, Hungary and the states of the Little Entente announced a provisional agreement by which Hungary's "equality of rights as regards armament" was recognized and there was a "mutual renunciation of any recourse to force." See *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. 1, p. 234.

Furthermore, Prague had never done anything for the Carpatho-Ukraine; except for a few airports for Soviet Russian flyers, the Czechs had done nothing there. It was an island for foreign agents.

Moreover, a common Polish-Hungarian border was of great value as a barrier toward the East. The rumors of the formation of a bloc against Germany were nonsense; they had been more than disproved by the attitude of Poland toward Soviet Russia during the crisis. It had been Polish policy to induce the Hungarian Government to exercise moderation in the Slovak question and to take the offensive in the question of the Carpatho-Ukraine. He, Lipski, hoped that a solution such as had been mentioned would not run counter to German interests.

The Foreign Minister told Lipski that these ideas were somewhat new to him and he wished to consider them at leisure. He had understanding for Poland's wishes, to be sure, but he also saw certain difficulties that we had to take into consideration. These lay principally with Rumania, whose wishes we also had to respect. As a result of Hungarian revisionist demands the Hungarian-Rumanian problem was not an easy one.

The Foreign Minister now came to the large general problem because of which he had invited Lipski to Berchtesgaden, and which he wished to broach in strict confidence as between *only Lipski, Beck, and himself*. He asked L. to report to Beck orally on the conversation, since otherwise there was too great danger of its leaking out, especially to the press. L. promised to do this.<sup>8</sup> In introducing the matter the Foreign Minister also extended an invitation to Beck, whom he would like to have visit him in the course of the coming month. Our Polish friends had a standing invitation to visit Germany. L. was pleased to hear this and said he would inform Beck.

The Foreign Minister now explained that he thought it was time to arrive at a general settlement of all possible points of friction between Germany and Poland. This would be a culmination of the work started by Marshal Pilsudski and the Führer. He compared our relations with Italy, where for the sake of a general settlement and out of deep perception the Führer had renounced the South Tyrol, etc., etc. Such an agreement was desirable also with Poland and for Poland, and was in line with the Führer's policy of achieving clarity in our relations with all our neighbors. It was not impossible that a still more definite agreement might be reached with France, too, going beyond the statement of the Führer with respect to the border. Here it was necessary to speak with Poland first of all about Danzig, as one part of a large settlement between the two nations. Danzig

<sup>8</sup> Lipski did in fact make a written report; see Polish White Book, document No. 44.

was German—had always been German and would always remain German. He, the Foreign Minister, conceived of a solution in general as follows:

1. The Free State of Danzig would revert to the German Reich.
2. An extra-territorial *Reichsautobahn* belonging to Germany and likewise an extra-territorial, multiple-track railroad would be laid through the Corridor.
3. Similarly, Poland would receive in the Danzig area an extra-territorial road or *Autobahn*, a railroad, and a free port.
4. Poland would receive a guarantee of a market for her goods in the Danzig area.
5. The two nations would recognize their common boundaries (guarantee) or each other's territories.
6. The German-Polish treaty would be extended 10 to 25 years.
7. Poland would accede to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
8. The two countries would add a consultation clause to their treaty.

Lipski took cognizance of this proposal.\* Although he naturally had to speak with Beck first, he wanted to express himself even now on the problem of Danzig:

It was wrong to view Danzig as a product of Versailles, like the Saar region, for instance. It was necessary to trace the historical and geographical origin of Danzig in order to obtain the proper perspective on the question. Danzig was a problem handed down from the Middle Ages. From time immemorial it had been the city of the mouth of the Vistula, the outlet to the sea for the hinterland on the Vistula, Poland, with her 35,000,000 people. Danzig had risen from comparative insignificance when Poland rose again after the war. Thus the city was for Poland almost a symbol. Poland had always refused to meddle in the internal political problems of Danzig, and had repeatedly demonstrated this when the parties had appealed to Poland for help against the NSDAP. Poland had viewed this as a German domestic concern and had always recognized the German character of Danzig. He, Lipski, therefore considered it possible that by careful study every point of friction could be eliminated. He did not consider an *Anschluss* possible, however, if only—and principally—for reasons of domestic policy. Beck could never prevail upon the people to accept it.

The Foreign Minister said he did not wish to have an answer now. L. should think all these things over and speak with Beck about them as soon as possible. After all, one should not exclude a certain reciprocity in the consideration of these matters. For the Führer final recognition of the Corridor was also not easy from the standpoint of domestic policy. Moreover, it was necessary to take a long-range

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\*The following words originally included in this sentence are stricken through in the copy used: "by and large with pleasure and gratitude."

view of the matter—and Danzig was in the last analysis German and would always remain so.

Lipski promised to discuss all this in greatest detail with Beck. He would go to Warsaw possibly on Thursday and could be back about the beginning of next week. His principal request was for the exchange of ideas on the question of Hungary. Beck asked him to say that Poland agreed to participate in case a Hungarian desire for arbitration by the three countries, Germany, Italy, and Poland, was accepted by the first two countries.

The Foreign Minister pointed out the risk involved in arbitration, and likewise the obligation arising out of the Munich Agreement to include the two other Powers.

During a second short conversation, the Foreign Minister asked Lipski whether Poland was interested in a portion of the Carpatho-Ukraine. L. said that Poland had no interest in gaining territory there, but that it was her sole wish for Hungary to receive the Carpatho-Ukraine in order that peace and stability might be assured there. A decision by the people should be arranged there, and Poland expected that it would result in a decision in favor of Hungary.

The Foreign Minister thereupon stated that Poland would thus evidently like to have the support of Germany in seeing that the Carpatho-Ukraine went to Hungary. At Lipski's affirmative answer, the Foreign Minister promised to think over carefully this complex of questions once more and said that if a general settlement was reached between Germany and Poland then surely a favorable arrangement could be found for this problem, too.

The conversation took place in a very friendly atmosphere.

HEWEL

## No. 82

879/288892-94

*Ambassador Molke to Senior Counselor Schliep*

WARSAW, October 25, 1938.

DEAR HERR SCHLIEP: I have had occasion to report repeatedly on the extraordinary sensitivity of the Poles in all Ukrainian matters, and to point out the great extent to which mistrust of Germany is also attributable to this very thing. You can see from the enclosed memorandum how things appear to politically interested persons. It must certainly be admitted that we frequently give grounds for this mistrust; I should like, for this reason, to bring up again the subject of the Vienna radio, regarding whose broadcasts in the Ukrainian language I wrote you recently. Yesterday the Vienna radio was busy again; it was not possible to determine what it re-

ported, for the broadcast was jammed so loudly that the interference could only have originated from a transmitter located here. After all, one can hardly blame the Poles for taking their own measures, since until now they have not, so far as I know, received any reply to their appeals to us.<sup>1</sup>

It would also interest me to learn how matters really stand. If we are pursuing an ambitious Ukrainian policy, being prepared even to ignore Polish interests, if necessary, one would have to make the best of it. If this is not the case, however, I cannot understand why, on the one hand, all news about the [German] minority is suppressed in the newspapers, although a calm, factual presentation of these matters would not be seriously disturbing to the Poles at all, and at the same time the much more effective instrument of radio propaganda is used to prick the vital nerve of the Polish State at its most sensitive spot.

With best regards and

Heil Hitler!

MOLTKE

[Enclosure]

WARSAW, October 20, 1938.

A Polish landowner from eastern Galicia whom I chanced to meet today told me the following:

The mood in the Ukrainian population was somewhat like that of the Sudeten Germans after the Austrian *Anschluss*. Despite all pacification measures, which resulted in daily arrests, the excitement was still growing. The Poles blame the Germans in particular for this. The radio broadcasts in the Ukrainian language which were now being made from three stations (Vienna, Graz, and Leipzig) were in effect an incitement of the Ukrainian population. It was noteworthy, moreover, that the Ukrainians participating in the radio broadcasts had been instructed by the Ministry of Propaganda that

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<sup>1</sup> Moltke had apparently not yet received an instruction sent him by mail on Oct. 22 which authorized him to tell the Poles in reply to their complaints that "measures have been taken to put a stop to the Ukrainian propaganda," and that "in particular steps have been taken to obtain more rigorous supervision of the activity of the Vienna radio station."

The "measures taken" consisted of a circular letter addressed by the Foreign Ministry on Oct. 22 to the Propaganda Ministry, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Gestapo, the Deputy of the Führer, and the Foreign Affairs Office of the Nazi Party (879/288883-84). It repeated a request made to them on Oct. 12 that "everything be avoided which might give rise to the impression that official German agencies were cooperating with the Jary group or the Ukrainian National Union." The letter enclosed Moltke's report of Oct. 15 (document No. 72) and stated that "the greatest caution was indicated, out of consideration for German-Polish relations, in the treatment of Ukrainian affairs." A supplementary paragraph for the Propaganda Ministry requested an immediate investigation of transmissions by the Vienna radio.



anti-Soviet propaganda could be conducted only on the condition that it be directed against the present so-called Stalin system, but not against the Soviet Union in general. The Poles concluded from this that Germany was still opposing the present regime in the Soviet Union, to be sure, but that she would perhaps be inclined to make a pact with another system in Russia, even if it was likewise a Soviet one.

## No. 83

147/78881-85

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

PI 2 g

WARSAW, October 25, 1938.

Received October 26.

Subject: Conversation with Foreign Minister Beck regarding the Carpatho-Ukraine and the negotiations with Czechoslovakia.

In a conversation I had today with Foreign Minister Beck, the latter gave me a full statement of his stand on the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. I assume that this stand has also been repeatedly stated in detail by Ambassador Lipski, and in consequence I should like to limit myself to a brief summary of the most important reasons that M. Beck advanced for the Polish view:

1. The inclusion of the Carpatho-Ukraine in the Czechoslovak State was an absurdity that had resulted in 1918 from the ignorance of the statesmen, out of consideration for the political aspirations of Beneš and his Russophile tendencies. Now that an attempt was being made to settle the Czechoslovak problem, it would be foolish to perpetuate this condition, which was not justified either geopolitically, ethnographically, or economically.

2. The people living in the Carpatho-Ukraine had never had any points of contact or relations of any sort with the Czechs. They were a primitive mountain people without any well-defined feeling of nationality. For historical and economic reasons the people felt rather more drawn to Hungary, even though it could not be definitely predicted what would result from a plebiscite,—which, moreover, would be very difficult to carry out there.

3. If the plain in the southern part of the country, settled exclusively by Hungarians, was ceded to Hungary, the remainder would be left hanging completely in the air and entirely cut off from the West. The construction of a new railroad in this difficult mountain terrain was such a costly undertaking that it could not be considered.

Besides these three reasons, which made the annexation of the whole territory to Hungary seem necessary as the only sensible solution, M. Beck emphasized particularly the political considerations in favor of this. He considered it possible in this way to arrive at a settlement of Hungaro-Rumanian relations, a problem on which the Polish Government had been working for years, but which was at the same time

of the greatest possible interest for the pacification of Europe. If Hungarian aspirations were satisfied by the annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary, and if her old boundaries to the north were at least partially restored to her, then Budapest would be prepared to come to an understanding with Rumania. He even considered it possible that Hungary might conclude a nonaggression pact with Rumania. When I expressed my amazement at the assumption that Hungary would renounce her aspirations in Transylvania, M. Beck moderated his optimistic predictions somewhat and said that at least a better situation would be created than if the Hungarian claim to the Carpatho-Ukrainian region was disregarded. M. Beck attacked the rumors to the effect that Poland was pursuing aims of power politics by creating a common border with Hungary, and assured me that he was only anxious to bring about the *rapprochement* between Hungary and Rumania that was so important for the pacification of eastern Europe.

M. Beck did not speak about the Ukrainian question, which, according to the report from our Legation in Bucharest,<sup>1</sup> he had underscored in his conversation with the King of Rumania. When I asked him, therefore, if it was feared that the Carpatho-Ukraine could become a hotbed for Ukrainian aspirations, he dismissed this thought with a disdainful gesture and asserted that he had ascertained through personal observation during the war that the Carpatho-Ukrainian people—to call them Ukrainians was really incorrect—did not have the slightest sympathy for the Galician Ukrainians.

M. Beck was in general concerned to represent matters as if Polish interests were hardly involved. He said that Poland believed she was acting only in the interest of Europe in working for a solution here which would be lasting. If after cession of the Hungarian regions the remnant of the Carpatho-Ukraine was left to Czechoslovakia, unrest and intrigue would not cease in this country. The avoidance of such a condition was the only direct interest that Poland had in this question. It was somewhat different from the question of Teschen, for the solution of which Poland would have been prepared to take up arms. When I told him that the view was widespread here that in the last analysis Poland would resort to arms even for the sake of the Carpatho-Ukraine, especially if disorders should break out there, M. Beck replied evasively but without giving a direct denial.

Regarding the Hungarian note of reply to Czechoslovakia,<sup>2</sup> M. Beck observed that it would probably be impossible for Czechoslo-

<sup>1</sup> This report has not been definitely identified, but Bucharest telegram No. 219 of Oct. 21 (1776/406272) states: "In a conversation with King Carol, Beck offered a small part of the Carpatho-Ukraine as compensation. Rumania refused, because public opinion would not understand if Rumania annexed territory of a friend and ally."

<sup>2</sup> See vol. iv, document No. 86.

vakia to submit to the proposed arbitration as far as the Carpatho-Ukraine was concerned. But he assumed that as soon as the southern portions were annexed to Hungary the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, which was apparently very sensible, would itself propose to unite the remaining area with Hungary, too, and that this proposal could be confirmed by a referendum.

On Polish-Czech negotiations regarding the Teschen area, M. Beck stated that Poland wanted only very small adjustments on the border, which were of no significance whatever. He assumed that it would not be difficult to arrive at a settlement. I have learned from the Czech Minister here, who returned from Prague today, that Poland, after giving up the hopeless idea of a plebiscite, was in fact concerned only with straightening the border, and that the Poles now demanded an area with some 7,000 inhabitants. The Czech Government had replied that it agreed to this proposal provided that Poland made no further territorial claims. The Polish reply had not yet been received. The Czech Minister also informed me that no demand had been made so far for the regions of Arva and Javorina. On the contrary, the Poles had stated that they wished to settle this matter directly in friendly negotiation with Slovakia. M. Beck also mentioned in today's conversation that he thought a friendly settlement could easily be reached with the Slovaks in this matter, and that he had already spoken to this effect with the Slovak Deputy, Sidor, who had recently been in Warsaw for a few days.

VON MOLTKE

## No. 84

52/34469

*The Director of the Legal Department to the Embassy in Poland*

Telephone Message

BERLIN, October 26, 1938.

According to the decree of October 6 transmitted with the report of October 18, R I a,<sup>1</sup> Polish passports shall as of October 29 no longer authorize entry into Poland if they do not contain the inspection stamp provided for in section 2, No. 1. This could mean that tens of thousands of Polish Jews living in Reich territory would have to be tolerated permanently in Germany. The German Government cannot view such a development passively. The Jews of Polish nationality in Germany will therefore, as a measure of precaution, be expelled from the Reich immediately on the shortest possible notice. The German Government would be able to refrain from the immediate execution of these expulsions only if the Poles refrained from applying

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6382/E474491-92).

the decree of October 6 to Reich territory, or if the Polish Government makes a binding declaration that the measures taken pursuant to the Polish decree will in no way affect the obligation of the Polish Government to admit holders of Polish passports into Poland immediately, solely on the basis of these passports, even if the latter do not bear the inspection stamp.

Wire report on Polish answer today.

GAUS

## No. 85

2168/470991-92

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, October 27, 1938.  
Kult B. 1142 (g. Rs.).

Subject: Precarious position of the Germans in western Poland.

I take the liberty of reserving for a special report<sup>1</sup> the results of my conversations with the heads of the German agencies in western Poland regarding a better disguise for current liaison with the Volksdeutsche and their organizations.

I received the impression on my trip that the German element is subjected to particularly great danger by being called upon to do military intelligence service. I did not consider it my task, however, to institute exhaustive inquiries on this point. Nevertheless, all other security questions seem to me of secondary importance to this.

I consider the following measures urgent: To determine to what extent the individual Germans or even their organizations are already being recruited for the intelligence service and to what extent they are to be called upon in the further course of developments. The attitude of the Foreign Ministry will have to be formed accordingly.

My personal opinion, from the standpoint of my special field, is as follows: The use of Volksdeutsche in western Poland, or even of organizations or persons who are active in the organizations and are therefore considered their agents, is extremely dangerous to the entire existence of the German element. It exposes the German element to the following dangers:

a. In peace: execution of convicted persons, destruction of the organizations that are the mainstay of the German group;

b. In war: deportation of all Germans into the interior after they have been decimated by executions.

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum, e. o. Kult B 60-05 of Oct. 28 (2669/528037-40), discusses the need for concealing the close relations between the volksdeutsch organizations and German Consulates in Poland and for maintaining the security of communications between these agencies and agencies in Germany.

Should it be impossible to prevail upon the military officials to dispense entirely with the collaboration of Volksdeutsche in western Poland, we should definitely see to it that as little use is made of them as possible; all dilettantes should be excluded from the organization and it should be placed under an experienced intelligence officer who would maintain contact with an agent of the Foreign Ministry—this might be Regierungsrat Krahmer-Möllenberg<sup>2</sup> because of his positions in both the cultural and the economic cover organizations.

In all circumstances, however, the organizations and their organs should stay out of the picture, and the intelligence officers and agents should be strictly forbidden to recruit such persons or accept them when they are offered. If participation by organizations could be proved this would furnish the Poles with a welcome pretext for the destruction of the cultural and economic organizations. The latter, comprising almost 800 associations all over Poland, constitute the economic backbone of the German group, and it must be remembered that their reestablishment would require impossible outlays of money and foreign exchange.<sup>3</sup>

SCHWAGER

<sup>2</sup> Erich Krahmer-Möllenberg, Deputy Head of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore, a Reich corporation set up under the Foreign Ministry for covert financial support to various volksdeutsch groups, and Head of the Deutsche Stiftung, which provided school funds for such groups.

<sup>3</sup> On Nov. 15 Heyden-Rynsch, head of Political Division I M, wrote a memorandum in reference to the above document in which he stated that he had discussed the matter with the Intelligence Department of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. He added: "A new instruction will be issued by the competent department to the appropriate subordinate offices that it is forbidden to recruit for the Intelligence Service in any guise Volksdeutsche who are in the organizations mentioned and who work actively for them. I was expressly assured that the offices that have to do with the German minorities abroad have always observed this principle in the past."

"It was stated in addition that they desired to use as few Volksdeutsche as possible; it would not be possible, however, to dispense with their cooperation altogether" (2168/470995).

## No. 86

147/78688-90

*The General Inspector for German Highways to the Foreign Minister*

No. 1352g

KAISERHOF, WIESBADEN, October 27, 1938.

Subject: *Reichsautobahn* through the Polish Corridor.

MY DEAR FOREIGN MINISTER, PARTY COMRADE VON RIBBENTROP:<sup>1</sup>  
We spoke once several years ago in the Hotel Viktoria in Stuttgart about the Führer's idea of connecting East Prussia with the Reich through a Corridor road (*Reichsautobahn* through the Corridor).

<sup>1</sup> In German: "Sehr geehrter Herr Reichsminister, lieber Parteigenosse von Ribbentrop."

Ambassador Count von Moltke has made several attempts over a period of years toward realization of this plan, but so far without success. Last Sunday the Führer informed me of various aspects of his policy in order that we may adjust our highway construction program accordingly. He mentioned again that if there was to be any guarantee of the Corridor, Germany would have to be granted a traffic corridor for an *Autobahn* and if possible also for a railway. Nothing could more effectively lend force to a guarantee of the Polish Corridor than the elimination, through such a corridor highway, of the economic disadvantage of the Corridor for Germany, namely the interruption of traffic between East Prussia and the Reich. I request that you keep these ideas in mind during the present negotiations. If necessary, I shall be glad to supply any details.

There are two possibilities as to the route to be chosen :

a. The shortest distance is approximately from Bütow (Pomerania) to Elbing (East Prussia) via Praust (Danzig), extending about 40 kilometers through the Polish Corridor and 75 kilometers through Danzig territory (Polish customs area). The Polish military are less favorably inclined toward this route, because, lying near the coast, it can more easily and quickly be placed entirely under German control than a route lying further to the south.

b. The Poles prefer a route between Schlochau (Pomerania) and Marienwerder (East Prussia), running about 85 kilometers through Polish territory.

It is understandable that we wish Danzig not to be too distant from this highway and to be connected by a feeder road.

The traffic at present using the transit route on the basis of the Treaty of Paris involves considerable expenditures of foreign exchange and is greatly hampered by control measures. Automobile traffic over a German highway would not involve any foreign exchange and for that reason would be an advantageous addition to the Reich railway traffic, which requires foreign exchange. The transit traffic is, however, a very profitable business for Poland, since for railway and road traffic Poland annually takes in approximately five times the amount that she spends on servicing rolling stock and road maintenance.

The execution of the construction projects and the regulation of future traffic might conceivably be based on the same principles as those worked out between the Foreign Ministry and me in a plan for a through highway from Breslau to Vienna via Brünn.

If necessary please instruct your staff to remain in touch with me on these questions so that, if the idea can be carried out, questions of its practical implementation may be considered from the outset.

Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

Toot

## No. 87

2003/442356

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

WARSAW, October 27, 1938.

Received October 29.

Pol. IV 7819.

## POLITICAL REPORT

With reference to your telegram No. 225 of October 25.<sup>1</sup>

As I have already stated in report P V 47 of October 14, 1938,<sup>2</sup> Poland is trying to induce Slovakia to break away from the political union in which she has been joined until now. For this purpose use is made of the Slovak Deputy, Sidor, who for a long time apparently has been getting material support from Poland for his political purposes. So far, however, it has not been possible to discover any indication here that the Polish Government may be bent on uniting an independent Slovakia with Poland through a personal union, in violation of the interests of its close ally, Hungary. Rather, the information available here indicates that according to the Polish view Slovakia could very well become an independent state; it would then remain to be seen whether she would seek a future alignment with Hungary or Poland. Moreover, this also seems to be the opinion of the Hungarian Minister here, who regards the rumors mentioned in the telegram referred to above, which he likewise has heard of, merely as Czech attempts to cause trouble. MOLTKE

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (2003/442353-54). The telegram transmitted and requested comment on a report of the Prague Legation that the Slovak Deputy, Sidor, was working as the agent of Polish Foreign Minister Beck to persuade the Slovaks to declare their independence from Prague and then to join Poland in a personal union.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (3122/642035-38).

## No. 88

52/34470-71

*Aide-Mémoire From the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

WARSAW, October 27, 1938.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges the receipt of the *aide-mémoire* of October 26 from the German Embassy in Warsaw<sup>2</sup> and has the honor to communicate the following:

The Polish Government's decree of October 6, 1938, which is mentioned in the *aide-mémoire* of the German Embassy in Warsaw is

<sup>1</sup>The copy used is a translation into German from the original, which has not been found.

<sup>2</sup>Not found. It would presumably have been based, almost verbally, on the telephoned instruction printed as document No. 84.

general in nature and does not provide for special application merely to certain groups of holders of Polish passports residing in any given territory. The main purpose of this decree is to carry out the inspection of the passports of those persons exclusively who, of their own initiative, apply for entry into the Polish Republic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not expect that such applications, and hence the inspection of passports, will assume mass proportions.

The German Government refers to the decree of October 6 and poses for discussion the question of its possible future consequences with respect to Jews who have Polish passports. These Jews, the overwhelming majority of whom have been residing in Germany for a number of years, were, as is well known, the subject of numerous interventions by Polish diplomatic and consular authorities. These interventions aimed at obtaining protection for them from the effects of legislation of the German Reich, legislation which is legally binding on German nationals of Jewish origin. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is forced to state that these interventions were unsuccessful.

Without concealing the fact that the Polish Government does not desire the return to Poland *en masse* of great numbers of holders of Polish passports who have lost their property as a result of regulations of the German Government and have been brought to a condition of complete proletarianization, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses at the same time its readiness to open conversations with Germany for the purpose of clarifying the material situation of such persons and settling the problem as a whole, a problem which, moreover, has no direct connection with the decree of October 6.

## No. 89

52/84472

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 28, 1938.

The Polish Chargé d'Affaires called on me this evening in the matter of the Polish Jews and made exactly the same statements as had already been made to Herr von Scheliha at the Polish Foreign Ministry this afternoon. I told him that Herr von Scheliha had meanwhile been provided with new instructions and was at the moment negotiating in Warsaw. What we were concerned about was that Polish Jews living in Germany should not be deprived of their citizenship by November 15 and that the decree should not apply to them for the time being. It did not matter so much about the form, that is to say, we did not absolutely demand that the decree as such be replaced by a new one. We agreed that we had to await the outcome of the conversations in Warsaw.



From Lubomirski's further statements it appeared that the Polish Government in fact recognizes that it is at present obligated to admit the Jews. This was to be inferred from his statement that the present friction at the border was to be explained by the fact that the Polish officials had not been prepared for their admittance.

Finally the Chargé d'Affaires stressed that there must be a misunderstanding involved. The Polish decree had a single limited purpose only, to check the passports of all Polish Jews abroad. When this single operation had been concluded, the previous condition would be restored. I replied that this did not appear from the text of the decree.

WOERMANN

### No. 90

2134/467170

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 28, 1938.

The Rumanian Chargé d'Affaires today inquired of me concerning the German attitude toward the Slovakian and Carpatho-Ukrainian questions. He wanted to know whether we had really given the Poles a free hand in the Carpatho-Ukraine and requested on behalf of M. Comnen—"as a sign of friendship," as he put it—a promise that we would oppose a common Hungarian-Polish frontier.

I told the Rumanian that I knew nothing about our having given the Poles a free hand. We were not pursuing any policy of our own in Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine. Rather, we desired that the frontiers in these areas be drawn according to the wishes of the local population. When the Chargé d'Affaires asked whether we were willing to act as arbiter, I said that the idea of an arbiter did not originate with us; I did not know what attitude the German Government would take toward it if the problem should actually arise.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 91

1522/373329-32

#### *The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery*

S-V 7 No. 2295/38-509-27

BERLIN, October 29, 1938.

Rk 21309 B.

Subject: Order prohibiting residence of Jews of Polish nationality.

On October 6, 1938, the Polish Government issued and on October 15, 1938, published a decree whereby all passports must bear a control stamp in order to remain valid. Passports which do not bear this

stamp no longer authorize entry into Polish territory. By this decree the Polish Government obviously intended to make it impossible for the numerous Polish Jews living abroad—particularly in Germany—to return to Poland. Practically, this would mean that some 70,000 Polish Jews in Reich territory would have to be tolerated permanently in Germany.<sup>1</sup>

On October 26, 1938, the Foreign Ministry instructed the German Embassy in Warsaw to make representations at once to the Polish Government and demand a binding statement to the effect that the Polish Government would admit holders of Polish passports from Germany into Poland even if the passports did not bear this stamp. The German Government would find itself compelled, as a matter of precaution, to expel all Polish Jews from Reich territory on very short notice.

In execution of this instruction to the German Embassy the alien control authorities were instructed at the instance of the Foreign Ministry to issue immediate orders on a large scale to Jews of Polish nationality prohibiting further residence in Reich territory. October 29, 1938, was set as the final date for leaving Reich territory, because after that date the Polish passport decree will enter into force. On October 28 and 29, 1938, some 15,000 Polish Jews throughout the Reich—particularly male adults—were thereupon taken into custody for deportation and brought in special transports to the Polish border.

Although these Polish Jews were in possession of valid Polish passports and the Polish passport decree is not to take effect until October 30, 1938, the Polish border police authorities—evidently on instructions from Warsaw—refused to receive the Polish Jews when they crossed the border into Poland. Through the massing of thousands of Polish Jews in a few border towns on the German-Polish frontier, some very disagreeable conditions resulted. In the night of October 28-29, 1938, we succeeded in pushing some 12,000 Polish Jews into Poland, partly by way of the frontier stations, partly surreptitiously [*über die grüne Grenze*].

The Polish Government issued instructions this afternoon to expel Reichsdeutsche immediately from Posen and Pommerellen in reprisal. A report on the scope of these measures cannot yet be given, because so far no transports have arrived at the German border. According to German border-police officials, however, these countermeasures of the Polish Government are supposed to be confined to the expulsion of reichsdeutsch Jews.

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Please see that I am kept currently informed. L[ammers], Nov. 1."

The diplomatic negotiations in the meantime conducted by the Foreign Ministry with the Polish Government resulted in agreement by the two Governments not to expel each other's citizens. On the question of the treatment of the Polish Jews, German-Polish negotiations are to take place in Warsaw the beginning of next week. In pursuance of this agreement, the German border-police officials have been instructed to abstain from further removals of Polish Jews to Poland and to free all Polish Jews still in deportation custody by suspending the prohibition of residence issued against them, and permit them to return to their homes.

By order:  
W. K. BEST

### No. 92

52/34473-75

#### *Minute by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 29, 1938.

1. At 3:35 p. m. there was a telephone call from Ministerialdirigent Best of the Gestapo: Conditions on the border had become intolerable. Many thousands of Polish Jews had been standing at the border since yesterday between the German and the Polish barriers. What was to be done now? The Gestapo had not instigated any part of the operation; it was simply carrying out the wishes of the Foreign Ministry. He wanted to be informed immediately whether these Jews were to be brought back, and whether we still insisted that they be put in concentration camps.

I replied first of all to this latter point that putting them in concentration camps had been suggested not by the Foreign Ministry but by the Gestapo (Herr Wetz). We had no interest in that. If these people had to be brought back, they should be taken to their homes. Beyond this, I could not yet give any final answer, since our Chargé d'Affaires was just making a new *démarche* in the matter. I could not make a statement on bringing the Poles back until the position of the Germans who were now being brought to the Polish border by thousands was assured.

[2.] In response to my telephone call at about 4:15 p. m., Counselor of Legation von Scheliha informed me as follows: He had carried out the instruction given him this noon. The Poles, however, had not agreed. They took the following stand:

a) Seven thousand Polish Jews had already crossed the border into Poland. The same number of Germans would be expelled from Poland.

b) Poland was prepared to negotiate to the end that the Polish Consulates in Germany be instructed to grant the control stamp for a

normal movement of returnees. (This means that the Poles will, as before, place no difficulties in the way of the normal repatriation of Jews to Poland, perhaps 100 a month.)

c) Poland would admit the Polish Jews who are now on the border. For purely technical reasons this would take some time.

I instructed Herr von Scheliha to negotiate again on the following basis: Above and beyond our previous promise not to start any further deportations if Polish countermeasures were stopped, we were prepared to take back all the Jews now at the border if the Polish Government at once ceased its action against the Germans.

3. I informed Ministerialdirigent Best of this at 4:45 p. m. According to him, the situation at the border has meanwhile eased since the Poles are continuing to receive the Polish Jews. I told him that until the results of the new step were known we should continue to move the Jews across. Dr. Best informed me on the other hand that Polish officials were turning back many Jews because their passports were not in order. I told him that these should now be moved on at once—to their homes and not to a concentration camp. I further asked him in any case to make the necessary arrangements so that the Germans who might yet be deported were admitted to Germany and provided for here. I further said that if the step in Warsaw failed, nothing remained but to stop the action on our side and bring the Polish Jews home in order that a still greater number of Germans might not be expelled.

4. At 5:30 p. m. State Secretary Stuckart<sup>1</sup> and State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker agreed on the following:

The Germans who arrive at the border will be received. They are for the present to remain in the vicinity of the border. All arrangements will be made for their care. The Poles at the border will remain there until the result of the new *démarche* in Warsaw is known.

WOERMANN

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<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Stuckart of the Ministry of the Interior.

## No. 93

1340/353461

### *The Consul at Pressburg to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 88 of October 31

PRESSBURG, October 31, 1938—4:00 p. m.

Received October 31—6:25 p. m.

Pol. V 8133.

Minister President Tiso has communicated the following with a request that it be transmitted to the German Government:

Through the Polish Consul General here and the Prague Legation, Poland has made territorial demands with reference to the Slovak frontier which go far beyond the small border adjustments originally indicated and have no ethnographical basis whatever. They involve the Čadca-Zwardoń railroad line, about 25 kilometers in length, and the Jaworina area, including several peaks of the High Tatra. In unofficial discussions on the Polish demands Senator Gwizd, who is staying here, did not deny their strategic nature, but he did not answer the question, "Against whom?" The Slovak Government has rejected the demands except for the small frontier adjustments and requests the support of the Reich Government so that the Polish demands may be reduced to reasonable proportions.

Same text to Prague.

DRUFFEL

No. 94

140/76092

*The Legation in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 688 of November 1

PRAGUE, November 1, 1938—6:10 p. m.

Received November 1—7:30 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 685 of October 30.<sup>1</sup>

The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister told me shortly before he left for Vienna that an agreement had been reached between the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments whereby the Czechoslovak Government had in the main complied with the Polish demands except for cession of the industrial area near Hrusow (telegram 685, paragraph 1 a). Yesterday the Slovak Government had given its consent to this settlement. Polish pressure on Czechoslovakia had been extremely strong. The Polish note had spoken of immediate resort to extreme measures in the event that the proposal was rejected. The Czechoslovak Government had had no other choice than to accept the heavy territorial and economic sacrifice demanded, in order to avoid armed conflict.

The detailed demarcation of the frontier is to be left to a delimitation commission, which is to complete the work on the Silesian-Moravian frontier by November 15 and that on the Slovak frontier by December 1.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (140/76070).

Tomorrow I shall try to obtain from the Foreign Ministry expert, who is absent today, further particulars regarding the demarcation of the frontier.

HOFMANN

No. 95

147/78712-13

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 8, 1938.

The Polish Ambassador in calling on me today wished to revive the German-Polish discussion of the treatment of Polish Jews in Germany which, he asserted, had reached an impasse.<sup>1</sup> I told Lipski that so far as I knew the conversations had not been broken off and were not in such a state that the knot would have to be cut today between the two of us. The crucial question, namely, what to do about the persons deported by us to Poland, was about to be solved. To be sure, I too saw no immediate solution as regards the Polish Jews still in Germany, but the members of the German delegation were still studying the problem. What we could definitely not consent to was that a mass of 40 to 50 thousand stateless former Polish Jews should be dropped into our laps as a result of their being deprived of citizenship. Lipski declared that my figures were exaggerated and described the great sacrifice that Poland was allegedly making in admitting those who had now been deported. Lipski asserted that this event was an extremely heavy internal political liability for Poland and also for him personally, as he had at this same time made such extensive efforts to meet our wishes.

I replied to Lipski that the taking over of Polish property—and that is what the Polish Jews were—did not seem to me to be such a considerable sacrifice. Moreover, Lipski should think of the von Rath case. I should not be surprised if this incident led to a very considerable increase in the severity of the German measures against the Polish Jews.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Negotiations to settle the dispute described in documents Nos. 91 and 92 were begun by Polish and German representatives in Berlin on Nov. 2. In a conversation between Lipski and Weizsäcker on Nov. 3 the latter said that the whole episode, which in the interest of German-Polish relations he regretted very much, had come about as a result of the intransigence of Polish domestic authorities, and could have been avoided by a word between himself and Lipski had the Ambassador not been absent from Berlin during the final days of October (52/34479). On the further course of the negotiations see documents Nos. 107 and 127.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 649, footnote 1.

## No. 96

1724/400798

*Minute by an Official of the Information and Press Department*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, November 9, 1938.

e. o. Pol. V 8414.

Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, told an informant who was on a visit in Danzig for a few days that he had noticed a peculiar change in Poland's attitude toward Danzig problems. Whereas the Poles had hitherto endeavored to settle pending questions directly with Danzig itself, their recent tactics consisted in making use of the League of Nations again. Thus, the Polish representative had just requested him to transmit to Geneva a complaint of the Polish Government concerning a reorganization of the banking system by the Senate. M. Burckhardt himself had concluded from this that there was evidently some disharmony between Germany and Poland.

BRAUN STUMM

<sup>1</sup>Note at head of document: "Shown to the Foreign Minister. Sp[itzy]. Nov. 12."

## No. 97

147/78725

*Memorandum of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*<sup>1</sup>

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, November 11, 1938.

Telephone message from Fräulein Blank<sup>2</sup> in Munich.

Reminder from Herr Spitz.

The Foreign Minister requests a short precise memorandum on the status of the negotiations with the Poles in the matter of the expulsion and deportation of the Jews, giving especially the reasons why no more Jews are to be deported. The Foreign Minister desires this information in writing, chiefly in order to be able to prove clearly to the Führer that suspension of the mass deportations was due to the rigorous procedure of the Poles and particularly to the request of domestic German authorities (please indicate which authorities) and that no slackness on the part of the Foreign Ministry is involved, as some people are again foolishly saying, but rather a request from domestic German authorities (the Gestapo itself).

<sup>1</sup>The document is initialed but its author cannot be identified. Brückmeier of the Secretariat referred it to Ministerialdirektor Gaus of the Legal Department. For the further action taken see document No. 98, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup>Ribbentrop's personal secretary.

## No. 98

2528/520219-20

*Memorandum by an official of the State Secretary's Secretariat*

BERLIN, November 11, 1938.

Telephone call from Herr Spitzzy.

Herr Spitzzy complains of the fact that despite a telephone conversation with Counselor Brücklmeier and Counselor Siegfried, he had again received only a *legalistic* dissertation on the reasons why the deportation of the Jews to the Polish border had been discontinued. What he had been *especially* concerned to obtain—and he had asked Counselor Brücklmeier and Counselor Siegfried expressly for it—was, first of all, a recital of the bare facts that had led to a halt in the deportation on the German side, in other words, a memorandum on the brutal Polish countermeasures, such as the mounting of machine guns, the placing of barbed-wire entanglements, the removal from Poland of German nationals—allegedly 7,000 German nationals had already been shipped out—etc., etc. He would furthermore have appreciated emphasis on the fact that it had been the domestic authorities who, because of these brutal Polish countermeasures, had put a stop to further deportation of Polish Jews across the border to Poland. He had been particularly anxious to have these facts emphasized in order from the outset to avoid the impression that the suspension of the operations was attributable solely to the attitude of the Foreign Ministry. Yesterday, after Herr Kordt had informed him of the Polish countermeasures, he had himself informed the Foreign Minister, whereupon the Foreign Minister had given him orders to submit a memorandum on the subject, on the basis of which he could make a report to the Führer and Chancellor today. Herr Spitzzy again emphasized in conclusion that on the basis of legalistic statements alone, he could do nothing; he *urgently* needed an *additional memorandum* containing the bare facts of the brutal Polish countermeasures as well as the orders thereupon given by the German domestic authorities.<sup>1</sup>

REIFEGERSTE

<sup>1</sup> In response to the request contained in document No. 97, two memoranda were transmitted to Munich in the early afternoon of Nov. 11. One, edited by Woermann (147/78714-17), reviewed the events described in document No. 92. The other, prepared by the Legal Department, described the negotiations with the Poles begun on Nov. 2 which had reached an impasse because of the refusal of the Poles to accept any more Jewish deportees (147/78723-24). It was apparently these memoranda which Spitzzy found unsatisfactory. Another memorandum, telephoned to Berchtesgaden at 8:20 p. m., included handwritten additions by Woermann stressing the Polish threats to open fire on the Polish Jews stranded between the frontier posts and to begin mass expulsion of Germans. It also stated that the initiative for the expulsion of the Polish Jews was taken by the Foreign Ministry, not by the domestic authorities, and that this action had achieved its objects, which were to compel the Poles to negotiate and to rid Germany of a large number of Polish Jews (147/78718-22).



## No. 99

2446/514862

*Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department*BERLIN, November 12, 1938.  
zu Kult A 1154 (g).<sup>1</sup>

For strictly confidential information.

Oberführer Behrends of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle informed me as follows:

The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle has handed the Foreign Minister a memorandum<sup>2</sup> on the intolerable situation of the Volksdeutsche in Poland and the necessity of Reich intervention for improving their situation. Obergruppenführer Lorenz reported to the Foreign Minister and the latter promised to report to the Führer in the sense of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle memorandum. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle then appealed to General Haushofer, who met the Führer on the occasion of the christening in the Hess home. General Haushofer spoke at length to the Führer on the intolerable situation of the Germans in Poland, whereupon the Führer is said to have replied that he "did not intend to put up any longer with the conduct of our eastern neighbors toward his fellow Germans."

Submitted to Ministerialdirektor Stieve.

V. TWARDOWSKI

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<sup>1</sup> Kult A 1154 (g) : Not printed (2446/514850-61).

## No. 100

2396/500334-35

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

URGENT

BERLIN, November 12, 1938.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON ACUTE DANGERS  
IN THE CARPATHO-UKRAINIAN QUESTION

From the reports received here it appears that despite the Vienna Award<sup>1</sup> Poland and Hungary are continuing to push actively the question of a common frontier. Whereas since the Vienna Award the Hungarian Government and press have observed restraint regarding the future of the remaining territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine,

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<sup>1</sup> The German and Italian Foreign Ministers arbitrated in a meeting at Vienna on Nov. 2, 1938, the question of Czechoslovak territorial cessions to Hungary which at Munich had been left to direct negotiations between the two Governments. See vol. iv, document No. 99.

both the Polish Government and the Polish press—and this is verified by confidential sources—are fomenting a campaign for the return of this territory to Hungary and hence the establishment of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier; in the last few days this campaign has become increasingly vigorous. According to a report of November 8<sup>2</sup> from our Embassy in Warsaw, M. Beck stated that he did not consider the rump area of the Carpatho-Ukraine, in which there were no cities and no railways, as viable. He therefore assumed that the population would on its own initiative, *and in the very near future*, express a desire for a plebiscite. This view of the Foreign Minister is also reflected in the entire Polish press, which maintains, as heretofore, that in spite of the Vienna decision, which can be regarded only as a partial solution, a common frontier between Hungary and Poland must be established. Although some Polish newspapers emphasize that any initiative in the question of the future form of the Carpatho-Ukraine lies with Budapest alone and that Poland is merely willing to support the Hungarian claims by every means, it appears from a number of confidential reports received here—some of which even speak of Polish troop movements in the region in question—that Poland is making every effort to pave the way for the fulfillment of the Hungarian wishes. It is said that in political circles in Warsaw the opinion is generally held that the establishment of a common frontier with Hungary is at present the most important goal of Polish foreign policy. In addition, it appears from the information available here that Poland is trying in every way to realize her goal (by money, agents, radio broadcasts, inspired resolutions, etc.). From the Carpatho-Ukraine come reports that bands are arousing the population there, blowing up bridges, and resorting to bribery; probably this is being promoted by Hungary. An investigation of these reports has been started.

On the basis of these reports it is not impossible that Poland, in complicity with Hungary, will in the near future bring about a *fait accompli*.

Proposal for the further handling of the question :

1. Immediate exchange of views with the Italian Government. The Italian attitude is at least uncertain, thus far.

2. If possible, a joint German-Italian *démarche* in Budapest, demanding that Hungary respect the Vienna Award in all circumstances and that she suppress any subversive activity.

3. A similar *démarche* with the Polish Government is probably out of the question in the present stage of developments on account of the connection with other pending questions.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2043/446577-80).

4. The question of a German-Italian guarantee to Czechoslovakia should be examined in this connection; however, it will probably not be acute before the frontier is definitively fixed.

5. As a German counteraction against the Polish agitation we shall have to support the remaining Carpatho-Ukrainian territory as promptly as possible, both economically and financially. The preliminary work on this will be started by State Secretary Keppler in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. One of the first measures, moreover, will be the dispatch of a German consul general to the new provincial capital, Chust.

WOERMANN

## No. 101

147/78735-39

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

RM 260

BERLIN, November 19, 1938.

Today at 1 p. m. I received Polish Ambassador Lipski.

M. Lipski told me that he had informed Foreign Minister Beck about the content of our conversation at Berchtesgaden on October 24,<sup>2</sup> and he was now in a position to give me Beck's views on this subject. Then M. Lipski read part of his instructions to me from a sheet of paper.<sup>3</sup>

1. Foreign Minister Beck was of the opinion that in general German-Polish relations had stood the test. During the Czech crisis it had been shown that the German-Polish agreement was founded on a sound basis. Foreign Minister Beck believed that the straightforward Polish policy had been useful for Germany in winning the Sudeten area, and had made an important contribution toward a smooth solution of this question in the German sense. During these critical days the Polish Government had ignored all the siren songs which had been emitted from a certain quarter.

I answered M. Lipski that in my opinion, also, the German-Polish agreement had proved itself to be invulnerable. Through the Führer's action against Czechoslovakia, Poland had had the opportunity of winning the Olsa area and satisfying a number of other frontier wishes. For the rest, I agreed with him that the Polish attitude had also facilitated matters for Germany.

2. Then M. Lipski made a verbose statement to prove the importance and significance for Poland of Danzig's status as a free city.

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 198.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 81.

<sup>3</sup> See Polish White Book, document No. 45, for Beck's instruction to Lipski, and for the Ambassador's report of this conversation, document No. 46.

For centuries Danzig had been a free city, and had always served as Poland's outlet at the mouth of the Vistula, that is, the mouth of a purely Polish river; and therefore Danzig had also had a symbolical significance for Poland. The first partition of Poland at the time of Frederick the Great had begun with the severing of Danzig's natural connection with Poland. One must therefore understand that Poland was particularly sensitive in the Danzig question, for the Polish outlet to the sea was decisive for Poland's future. With the development of shipping and trade Gdynia would not be sufficient for Polish commerce. The customs union between Danzig and Poland was therefore of vital interest for Poland. For domestic political reasons also, Foreign Minister Beck could not agree to a union of Danzig with the Reich. If the Danzig question were opened, German-Polish relations would be profoundly and seriously endangered. (M. Lipski evidently read this formulation word for word from his instructions and then spoke vaguely of the fact that an annexation of Danzig would necessarily lead to a very serious conflict with Germany.) Foreign Minister Beck had now considered how all points of friction which might arise between Germany and Poland because of Danzig could be eliminated once and for all. He had thought that the League of Nations Statute for Danzig might be replaced by a German-Polish treaty in which all questions pertaining to Danzig would be dealt with. As a basis for this treaty Beck thought that one might fully recognize Danzig as a purely German city with all the rights resulting therefrom. On the other hand, however, Poland and the Polish minority should likewise be guaranteed all economic rights; thus Danzig's character as a free city and the customs union with Poland would be maintained. Since the National Socialist seizure of power the position of the Polish Government in the question of Danzig had become constantly more difficult. From month to month, even from day to day, the Polish Government had yielded to Danzig's demands. Poland had done nothing to counter the development of National Socialism in Danzig. However, Marshal Pilsudski had always stated that the treatment of the Danzig question was the measuring rod of German-Polish friendship, and remained decisive for German-Polish relations.

I answered M. Lipski that I regretted the position taken by Foreign Minister Beck. The suggestion for a long-term solution of the German-Polish problem by which Danzig would go to Germany might well result in domestic political difficulties for M. Beck, but on the other hand it should not be forgotten that the Führer would not find it easy either to justify to the German people a guarantee of the Polish

Corridor. I was very much surprised that such a solution as the Führer had in mind could endanger German-Polish relations. My suggestion had been made with the intention of placing German-Polish relations on an absolutely permanent basis and eliminating all imaginable points of friction. I had not had the intention of conducting a petty diplomatic conversation. As Lipski could see from the speeches of the Führer, the latter always treated the German-Polish question from a very lofty point of view. I had recently stated to the international press in his presence that German-Polish relations were one of the mainstays of German foreign policy.

Ambassador Lipski thanked me for these statements and then reverted to the suggestion of a bilateral treaty on Danzig.

I informed him that I did not want to take a final stand on this subject, but that the proposal did not seem to me to be easy to realize.

3. Then I asked M. Lipski how M. Beck stood on the question of an extraterritorial highway and also an extraterritorial double track railroad through the Polish Corridor.

M. Lipski answered that we could not take a detailed or official stand on this question. Purely personally he could say that such a wish on the part of Germany need not fall upon barren ground in Poland, and that possibly there were chances for a solution in this direction.

4. Then I spoke to M. Lipski about the Polish postage stamps which had just been issued, which were meant to be used by Danzig, and which represented Danzig more or less as a Polish city.<sup>4</sup> He could understand that this might injure the feelings of the German population in Danzig.

M. Lipski told me that he was not acquainted with the matter but that he would immediately inquire about it.

Finally I told M. Lipski that it was worth the trouble to give serious consideration to the German proposals on the entire complex of German-Polish relations. We wanted to create something permanent here, and bring about real stability. That could naturally not be done in a day. If M. Beck would think about our suggestions at his leisure, perhaps he would come to regard them in a positive light after all.

RIBBENTROP

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<sup>4</sup> On Nov. 19 Gauleiter Forster of Danzig wrote to Ribbentrop (116/66379-80) that the Poles had done "an insolent thing" which was provocative and injurious to the feelings of Germans in Danzig and the Reich by issuing two new postage stamps, one showing Poles trading in Danzig in the 16th century, and the other recalling the defeat of German knights by King Ladislas Jagiello. He requested that Germany protest to Poland. See also document No. 112.

## No. 102

1724/400804-07

*Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate*<sup>1</sup>

DANZIG, November 21, 1938.

I had the following conversation with High Commissioner Professor Burckhardt, who returned from Warsaw this morning:

He told me that Polish Foreign Minister Beck, who had asked him to come to Warsaw, at first indulged in generalities as always, but then turned to the Danzig problem. He finally said that one must take account of the changed circumstances in Danzig. It would probably be correct to strengthen Danzig's sovereignty. Poland would have to give up representing Danzig in foreign affairs, and perhaps Danzig should maintain foreign representatives of its own in Poland and in Germany. After all, Poland's interest in Danzig was mainly an economic one. She must, however, maintain this economic interest in all circumstances. The High Commissioner had the impression that only a suggestion by Germany was needed in order to initiate a conversation on this subject between Germany and Poland.

Minister Beck had then brought up the subject of the Danzig civil service law. The Polish Government took offense less at the Aryan paragraph than at the provision concerning the oath of allegiance to the Free City of Danzig and the *National Socialist leadership*.

The High Commissioner then visited the British Ambassador in Warsaw and had two conversations with him, one on Saturday evening from 5 to 7 p. m. and the second the next day, at a luncheon to which the Ambassador had invited him.

The British Ambassador had been rather haughty at first, and had spoken out against the alleged atrocities against the Jews in Danzig. The High Commissioner had attempted to minimize the incidents, and had said that nothing had happened to the main synagogue in Danzig, but that it had been a question of lesser damage in the suburbs. The British Ambassador had taken the stand that England could not tolerate the incidents in Danzig, and that the Committee of Three would have to be convened and the High Commissioner relieved of his office. M. Burckhardt had asked him at least not to send a report to London before he had spoken with Minister Beck. He had then told him that if they wished to relieve him of his office this could still be done in January or later. At the present time action by the League

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<sup>1</sup>The document was transmitted to the Foreign Ministry by the Consulate General at Danzig with a covering report summarizing it which is not printed (1724/400802-03). The report added that Burckhardt requested Böttcher to treat his statements, especially those about his Warsaw impressions, as strictly confidential.

of Nations in Danzig would arouse a great deal of attention, and then disturbances might really occur, which it had been possible to avoid heretofore. The British Ambassador had finally let himself be convinced that it was better if he did not recommend a meeting of the Committee of Three before January. One of his men in the Embassy, who was a very good friend of Stevenson,<sup>2</sup> had supported the High Commissioner and his point of view.

The British Ambassador seemed to be of the opinion that German policy was somewhat influenced by personal feelings; this was evident also from the speeches of the Führer. Professor Burckhardt had denied this emphatically.<sup>3</sup>

The High Commissioner will not go to Geneva for the present. He said there was no use in speaking with Avenol about things of which the latter had little understanding. There was a slight possibility that he would go to Geneva in the middle of December, if that was desired. He said that if Danzig was detached from the League of Nations in January in one way or another, the attempt should be made to do this peacefully, and then it would be well if we were represented at Geneva.

I remarked that it almost looked as if Poland would try to give way step by step in Danzig, in the hope that Germany would then be more likely to comply with Poland's wishes in the Carpatho-Ukraine. M. Burckhardt said that Poland was no longer in the very difficult situation of 4 weeks ago, and that she could now again count much more on the support of England and France, particularly since Germany had injured herself politically, at least for the present, through her action against the Jews.

The High Commissioner will go to Berlin Tuesday morning in response to hunting invitations from the Reichsführer-SS and Field Marshal Göring. On the way back he will try to speak with Minister Goebbels.

The High Commissioner also said that he had a great deal on his mind; that at the moment he was very little inclined to take part in the hunt, but accepted the invitation gladly because he hoped to be able to speak personally with the influential men concerned. He is evidently very much agitated, and he said that he was taking a very great responsibility upon himself, especially vis-à-vis the League of Nations.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 45, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Howard Kennard, the British Ambassador in Poland, gave an account of the conversations with Burckhardt in a telegram to Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, which is published in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. III, document No. 319.

## No. 103

2385/499730-84

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P II 7 a

WARSAW, November 22, 1938.

Received November 23.

Pol. V 8745.

POLITICAL REPORT<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Reception by the Polish public of the German reprisal action against the Jews.

The reprisal action carried out in Germany against Jewry has in general received a calm and reserved treatment in the Polish press. Particularly the Government press limited itself essentially to an objective report, in which only the incidents in Danzig received special stress. Only the Socialist papers and the Kraków *Courier* (*Ilustrowany Kurjer Codzienny*), well known as anti-German, exploited the incidents in a sensational way. Particularly objectionable was an editorial in the *IKC*, in which the German procedure was likened to the terrorist methods used by Moscow, and in which it was stated by way of conclusion that no such blot could be found on the pages of Polish history. In the same vein was an atrocity story published by the same paper and also by the Socialist press, to the effect that the Danzig Hitlerjugend had allegedly tried to burn alive a Jewish physician. However, these attacks were not on so large a scale as earlier anti-German propaganda campaigns.

On the other hand, to be sure, if one excepts the radically anti-Semitic Warsaw *ABC*, the German measures have not met with un-

<sup>1</sup> An order (2385/499736) to circulate this report to German Missions for information is marked "canceled" and is replaced by another (2385/499737) which directed that it be sent only to the Propaganda and Interior Ministries, to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, to Göring in his capacity as Commissioner for the Settlement of the Jewish Question, and to the Reichsführer-SS, Himmler. The reason that the report was denied to the Missions was that Referat Deutschland, the division of the Ministry dealing with internal affairs, objected. It did so in the following memorandum (2385/499735):

"Referat Deutschland suggests that those reports that particularly emphasize the negative attitude abroad toward Germany's Jewish policy shall be sent only to internal German agencies, in particular to Minister President Field Marshal Göring as Commissioner for the Settlement of the Jewish Question. Referat Deutschland takes the view that circulation without commentary to German Missions abroad is not desirable, because such reports may provide evidence for a pessimistic interpretation of the effect of Germany's Jewish policy on the Reich's foreign relations. I know of no case in which a German Mission abroad has had to be warned to moderate its outspoken language about the Jewish question. Referat Deutschland therefore sees no disadvantage in deciding not to pass on information which merely reports on the negative effect of the Jewish policy and would thus be conducive to moderate the tone of German Missions abroad on the Jewish question. Hinrichs, Dec. 2, 1938."



reserved approbation even in the anti-Semitic press. *Dziennik Narodowy*, for example, the organ of the National Democrats, recognized that it was historical necessity to remove the Jews from Germany, and urged the Polish Government to energetic action on the Polish Jewish question. But at the same time the paper was careful not to identify itself with the manner of the German action. Still greater exception is taken to the alleged German "excesses" in the conservative Christian papers such as the *Czas*.

There is hardly any doubt that the reserve exercised by the press in general is attributable to instructions by the Government, for which the Jewish question is a particularly ticklish subject just at the present moment. One should not forget in this connection that the existence of 3½ million Polish Jews represents only one of the unsolved Polish minority problems. A radical attack on the Jewish question would therefore involve the danger of serious internal disturbances, at least so long as other minority questions have not been solved. It is the present tension in the Galician Ukraine which, according to trustworthy reports, has caused the Government to table for the time being the laws for Jews which were already prepared by the National Unity camp. As justification of this postponement it is explained that Poland is not in a position to proceed against both the Jews and the Ukrainians at the same time.

Thus, although the Government is not at all interested at the present time in opening the Jewish question at home as a result of the events in Germany, it is endeavoring all the more to include Poland wherever international possibilities for solving the problem are discussed. Among other things, the diplomatic steps taken by Poland during the past weeks in various capitals are indicative of this; they have the purpose of asserting the strong Polish interest in a solution of the Jewish emigration problem. This diplomatic action has been effectively supported by the press. It has been stressed that Poland is extremely interested in an international solution; a certain fear was also expressed that Poland might come off badly. The Government press also adopted a rather unfriendly tone toward the Reich in this connection. For example, it could be read in the *Kurjer Poranny* that by her ruthless solution of the Jewish question Germany had procured an advantage for herself, since as a result England and America were interesting themselves in the emigration of the German Jews, whereas no one spoke of the Polish Jews.

Since on the whole the attitude of the Polish press seems to be strongly influenced by domestic political considerations and by official directives, we will have to realize all the more clearly that it reflects only imperfectly the reaction of Polish public opinion. Obviously the impression of the German events on political circles and also on wide strata of the population, not even excepting supposed

anti-Semites, is much stronger than the press indicates. It cannot be denied that the German reprisal action has caused a considerable shock among these groups generally. The factors responsible for this are on the one hand humanitarian ideas, which are strongly exhibited particularly by Polish Catholics. On the other hand, the instinctive feeling of anxiety which the Poles have always had with regard to their large German neighbor has been newly aroused. One can hear at present even in circles which are not outspokenly anti-German that this has again shown the "unpredictable" nature of the Germans. The implication is that the Germans might tomorrow turn against another opponent the methods which today they are employing against the Jews.

Besides the feeling of uneasiness there is also evident a certain *Schadenfreude*, called forth particularly by the effect of the German events on the Anglo-Saxon countries and the related campaign against German colonial demands. This feeling is also expressed cautiously in the press by the importance given to reports unfavorable to the German colonial claims. Furthermore, the opinion is expressed with a certain undertone of satisfaction that the Germans had injured themselves more than the Jews by their action.

Moreover, it is not to be wondered at that the Jews are cleverly utilizing for their own ends the present attitude of public opinion, and evidently not without success. Indicative of this, among other things, is the fact that the Jewish aid committees which were formed several weeks ago in connection with the expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany, and which were hardly accorded any notice at first, have now received a strong impetus.

MOLTKE

## No. 104

1346/354047-49

### *The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram Letter

No. 94 of November 22

WARSAW, November 22, 1938.

Received November 23—8:50 a. m.

As instructed I have oriented Foreign Minister Beck concerning our note sent to the Hungarian Government, pointing out that the same step was being taken in Budapest by the Italian Government, which also very sharply disapproves of the action intended by Hungary.<sup>1</sup> Both Governments considered any attempt at the present time

<sup>1</sup> See vol. iv, document No. 132 and enclosure.

to change the borders fixed by the Vienna Award as entirely inopportune. Since the Polish Government, at the request of the Hungarians, had supported the solution desired by Hungary, we should be happy if Warsaw would also work in the direction of our efforts, and in particular would exercise its influence accordingly on the Polish press.

M. Beck answered that he could not understand the Hungarians very well. At first they had been so overcautious and timid that they had missed the proper moment for action, and now they were going too far in the opposite direction. To be sure, he could still not really believe that military action was actually intended, but in any case he would do nothing to further such plans. Later in the course of the conversation, which lasted almost an hour, M. Beck, who listened to my statements very calmly and composedly, expressed himself even more definitely against military action, and called it really very inopportune. The reasons for his attitude, however, were less considerations as to the authoritative nature of the award, which we emphasized, than objections of a general nature. He could not yet say exactly what instructions he would send to Budapest, but we could at any rate count on his avoiding anything which would run contrary to our action there. When I asked whether he would also stop the press campaign here, he answered that he would exert his influence on the press, but, considering the outspoken sympathy of Polish public opinion for Hungary, he was not sure whether this would be effective, particularly with the opposition press.

M. Beck then brought up the question whether, in consideration of the "paradoxical" situation which obtained in the Carpatho-Ukraine, there was not a possibility of doing justice in a peaceful manner to the desire of the population to unite with Hungary. I answered that according to our information the situation was not alarming, and that the desires for union were probably essentially a product of Hungarian propaganda.

The Minister remarked that he regretted a continuation of the present situation for general political reasons also. Aside from the necessity of eliminating this source of constant unrest, he considered it desirable to satisfy the Hungarian demands for revision on this point. Then it would be easier to induce Hungary to give up her plans for revision in Transylvania and to reach the understanding with Rumania which was desired in the interest of peace and defense against Soviet Russia.

Finally M. Beck asked whether we had any fundamental objections to the common Polish-Hungarian frontier, and he plainly hinted at the Ukrainian question. I answered that after all it was only too understandable if we refused to overthrow immediately an award which

had just been made and was recognized by all parties. Fundamental objection to the common frontier was not involved in this attitude. In my opinion the Polish fears with regard to alleged Ukrainian plans for the future were also without foundation. The Reich Foreign Minister had told me only yesterday that he did not see why the Ukrainian problem should disturb German-Polish relations. M. Beck seemed to be satisfied with this remark and stated that that was also his opinion.

VON MOLTKE

# No. 105

52/34483

## *The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WARSAW, November 27, 1938—1:45 a. m.

No. 98 of November 26

Received November 27—5:15 a. m.

As far as can be judged at present, the Polish-Soviet agreement<sup>1</sup> seems to have resulted from the economic difficulties in which Poland finds herself in the newly acquired Olsa area. Several factories of this industrial area, which in the past delivered a large part of their production to Soviet Russia, are having a very hard time marketing their goods, so that a revival of the almost dormant Polish-Soviet economic relations may seem to be the only solution.

If this economic basis has been made the point of departure for an agreement with a political character, which seems to be the starting point for a normalization of relations that have been exceedingly bad during recent years, the main reason was probably the fear that Germany, which is constantly growing stronger, would disregard vital Polish interests.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that the agreement was published directly before the Franco-German agreement<sup>3</sup> is evidently meant to bring out the parallel nature of the two actions.

MOLTKE

<sup>1</sup> On Nov. 26, after a series of conversations between Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, agreement was reached on a declaration reaffirming the Nonaggression Pact of 1932, and providing for an increase of trade between the two countries. The text as released by Tass on Nov. 29 is published in *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. I, pp. 311-312.

<sup>2</sup> In a telegram of Nov. 27 Ambassador Schulenburg reported a similar view was held in Moscow diplomatic circles: "... it is thought that Poland wishes to cover herself against difficulties which threaten from the direction of Germany, and that the Soviet Union complied with this desire because she believes she must oppose Germany everywhere. . . ." (52/34484).

<sup>3</sup> See vol. IV, document No. 369.

## No. 106

F14/276

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 264

BERLIN, December 2, 1938.

I received the Polish Ambassador today. He gave the following account of the origin of the Polish-Russian declaration, which he called a Polish-Russian communiqué:

During the Czechoslovak crisis skirmishes had frequently occurred at the Russo-Polish frontier, concerning which, moreover, nothing had appeared in the press. Airplanes had even been shot down. It was now the desire of both countries to restore relations to normal. The declaration was merely intended to reestablish the situation that existed prior to the conflict. Therefore the political part of the declaration contained no more than a confirmation of the existing non-aggression pact, in other words, nothing new politically. Furthermore it expressed the desire of the two Governments for an improvement in trade relations, which had also been disturbed.

I told the Ambassador that after his explanation I could well understand why the declaration had been issued. I had taken it for granted from the very beginning that in issuing this declaration the National Government of Poland did not want to initiate a pro-Bolshevik policy. Nevertheless we had been surprised that Poland had not informed us beforehand; this was not quite in keeping with our friendly relations. The Ambassador tried to explain this by his having been absent from Berlin.

R[IBBENTROP]

## No. 107

2596/525152

*The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery*

S. V. 7 No. 2496/38-509-27

BERLIN, December 2, 1938.

Rk25525B.

Subject: Order prohibiting residence of Jews of Polish nationality.

With reference to your letter of November 5, 1938, Rk. 21309 B.<sup>1</sup>

In the period from October 27 to 29, 1938, a total of some 17,000 Jews of Polish nationality were deported to Poland. As a result of the agreement entered into between the two Governments, the counter-measures contemplated by the Polish Government were never carried

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (6367/E474106). Lammers had replied to the communication of Oct. 29, 1938 (document No. 91), that he wished to be kept informed of the development of the dispute with Poland.

out. The German-Polish negotiations conducted from November 2 to 10, 1938, have not as yet led to any accord. Only on isolated points could agreement be reached. The result of the negotiations appears from the enclosed draft agreement; the proposals on which it has not so far been possible to reach agreement are juxtaposed.<sup>2</sup> In view of the assassination in Paris by the Polish Jew Grynszpan, whose parents had been deported to Poland in the course of the action, negotiations were not continued; they are not regarded as broken off, however, but simply as suspended.

By order:  
HEYDRICH

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2596/525152/1-52/4). Germany had agreed to readmit temporarily Polish Jews expelled between Oct. 26 and 29 to enable them to settle their affairs and liquidate their property in Germany. Poland agreed to take them back thereafter, together with the wives and children who had not been expelled with them. No agreement had been reached for transfer of funds arising from property sold by the Poles in Germany before their departure. Nor was there agreement as to whether or in what numbers Poland would in future admit Polish Jews still remaining in Germany.

## No. 108

1256/338432-35

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A 1841

Moscow, December 3, 1938.

Received December 7.

Pol. V 9058.

Subject: Soviet-Polish relations.

With reference to my telegraphic report.<sup>1</sup>

On September 23, 1938, the Soviet Union threatened Poland with the abrogation of the Soviet-Polish nonaggression pact. Two months later in November 1938 a joint Soviet-Polish communiqué affirmed the existence of the nonaggression pact as the basis for the friendly relations between the two countries. Whereas on September 23, 1938, the Soviet Union utilized the concentration of Polish troops on the Czechoslovak border in order to threaten abrogation of the non-aggression pact in the event of an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Polish troops, she has remained passive vis-à-vis the concentration of Polish troops at the Carpatho-Ukraine frontier. Prior to the meeting at Munich, the Soviet press launched heavy attacks against Poland almost daily, representing her as Germany's satellite. After Munich these press attacks became milder and less frequent, and about 2 weeks ago they ceased altogether.

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<sup>1</sup> The reference is to telegram No. 214 of Nov. 28 which is not printed (1256/338411). It reported that the Soviet press had given an anti-German emphasis to its interpretation of the Soviet-Polish communiqué of Nov. 26.

The content of the Soviet-Polish communiqué on the negotiations between Litvinov and Polish Ambassador Grzybowski, which was published on November 26, does not *per se* carry any significance and acquires importance only in relation to the political developments of the past 2 months and because of the fact of publication itself. The principal point of the communiqué is the revitalizing of the nonaggression pact. By their express confirmation of the nonaggression pact, which was still formally valid, the parties desire to indicate that the provisions of the treaty, which a few months ago were contradicted by the actual relations between the two countries, are now again in harmony with their political interests. The communiqué further states that the two Governments will develop their trade relations, which had fallen to nothing, and will settle a number of disputes, especially border incidents, by mutual agreement. Regarding Polish-Soviet trade relations a separate report is being forwarded simultaneously under D/530 of December 3.<sup>2</sup>

It appears certain that the initiative for the Litvinov-Grzybowski negotiations, which started around November 10, came from the side of Poland, and the Soviet Government seems to have seized the opportunity most eagerly. What are the reasons that induced the Soviet Union to this change in her policy toward Poland despite the conflicts which surely still continue between the two countries? It was doubtless primarily the fear of a steadily growing Germany which prompted the Soviet Union to improve her relations with Poland, which had become more and more hostile in the years since 1934. She believes that Poland, too, has an interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union in order to obtain backing against Germany. The Soviet Union feels isolated since Munich. She found common ground with Poland, both feeling spurned and also disliking the Four Power Pact looming anew on the political horizon. The Soviet Union feels that her mutual assistance pact with France has lost its value in consequence of the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by France and of the Franco-German declaration. Czechoslovakia is viewed here as a German satellite which is to serve as the springboard for the subsequent advance of Germany in the direction of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has lost every interest in Czechoslovakia, since the latter can no longer serve as a barrier to a German attack. The Carpatho-Ukraine under German influence appears a major threat to the Soviet Union as a crystallizing point for a Ukrainian independence movement. On this issue, too, the Soviet Union believes she has the same interest as Poland. Wherever possible the Soviet Union opposes Germany, whom she regards as her chief opponent. By flirting with Poland the Soviet Union hopes to drive a wedge into German-Polish relations. The Soviet press has been trying to give an anti-German

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

angle to the latest negotiations with Poland and to build up their significance in every possible way. By normalizing her relations with Poland the Soviet Union hopes to be able to break Poland loose from the front of the aggressor states, which she imagines to exist. By revitalizing the pact relating to nonaggression and nonparticipation in hostile coalitions, the Soviet Union is seeking insurance against Poland's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The fear of such a development—of a joint German-Polish action against the Soviet Union—has undoubtedly existed here. The Soviet Union believes that by improving her relations with Poland she has countered that threat and has pushed back any future German offensive in the East from the Polish-Soviet to the German-Polish frontier. The Soviet Union is interested in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the East, i. e., in the preservation of Poland and the Baltic States in their present character as buffers and insulators against Germany, and she believes that Poland can be assumed to have the same interest. The Soviet Union is afraid that since Munich the Baltic States have been looking increasingly to Germany for support and in the end will fall completely under German influence. In this respect, Lithuania's changed attitude toward Germany has had a disquieting effect in Moscow. The improvement of Soviet-Polish relations is calculated to counteract the power of attraction exerted by Germany on the Baltic States.

How the Soviet-Polish relationship will develop in the future and whether, in particular, the hopes of the Soviets will be fulfilled cannot be predicted, since this depends to a large extent on the general political development. The immediate effects of the normalization of Polish-Soviet relations will probably be some measure of revival of trade relations and the appointment of a new Soviet Ambassador to Warsaw.

SCHULENBURG

## No. 109

147/78761

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, December 5, 1938.

The Polish Ambassador called on me today and requested by instruction of Foreign Minister Beck that the following be conveyed to the Reich Foreign Minister before his departure:<sup>1</sup>

M. Beck was very grateful for the communication of the content of the Franco-German declaration. The French Government had likewise been in touch with the Polish Government with regard to this declaration. The Polish Government had informed the French Government that it sincerely welcomed the Franco-German *rap-*

<sup>1</sup> The reference is to Ribbentrop's visit to Paris and the signing of the Franco-German declaration there on Dec. 6. See vol. iv, documents Nos. 369, 370, and 372.



*prochement* in the form outlined. At the same time Poland had emphasized that the view which construed good German-Polish relations or the new Franco-German declaration to be unfavorable to Franco-Polish relations must be said to have no basis in fact. Rather, M. Beck looked upon all these relations as positive factors for the stabilization of the peace.

M. Beck wanted him to add confidentially that he had reports indicating that the Soviet Government did not look upon the Franco-German declaration with the same feelings as did Poland.

WOERMANN

## No. 110

2547/523278

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Information and Press Department<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, December 5, 1938.

Pol. V 9102.

The press has been given the following directive:

"The press has been told repeatedly during the past months that we could not take notice of certain matters relating to Polish nationalities policy. That directive meanwhile has been relaxed to the extent of permitting the newspapers in the border areas to report happenings as they occur and to speculate to some extent about their consequences. The press in other parts of the Reich, however, will not proceed along the same line."

ASCHMANN

<sup>1</sup> The copy of the document used was one referred to Schliep, Head of Political Division V. Notations by him indicate that its content was sent as confidential information to the Embassy in Poland, and to the Consulates at Kattowitz, Posen, and Thorn.

## No. 111

140/76171

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry* Telegram

No. 787 of Dec. 12

PRAGUE, December 12, 1938—9:48 p.m.

Received December 13—12:15 a.m.

With reference to my telegram No. 762 of November 28:<sup>1</sup>

1. Minister Masafik, *chef de cabinet* of the Foreign Minister, informed me today confidentially of the following:

Polish politicians were still coming to Czechoslovakia to discuss with political circles here the chance of improving Polish-Czechoslovak

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1340/353496-97). The telegram reported that a mission sent by Polish Foreign Minister Beck was in Prague. Its aim was to repair Polish-Czech relations and to prevent Czech policy from falling completely under German influence.

relations. In addition, officers of the Polish border commission had told Czechoslovak officers on several occasions in the last few days that the establishment of good relations between the two countries and even a new revision of the common border in favor of Czechoslovakia were easily possible if Prague abandoned its current pro-German course. The *chef de cabinet* added that the Polish overtures had been rejected by Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the Government in Prague thought that the Polish overtures were attributable in part to the increasing difficulties which the Czech population in the occupied area—supposedly quite against the wishes of Prague—was making for the Poles by acts of sabotage and the like. M. Masařík mentioned that the Poles, employing substantial manpower, had been building fortifications lately, and not in the newly occupied area, but behind the former Polish-Czech border.

2. The Polish Minister here mentioned to me in conversation that Warsaw had a sincere desire to put Polish-Czechoslovak relations on a good-neighbor basis, quite apart from the Carpatho-Ukrainian question.

HENCKE

## No. 112

147/78776-79

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

### CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND POLISH AMBASSADOR LIPSKI ON DECEMBER 15, 1938

1. Conditions in the Olsa area were discussed. The Minister pointed out to the Polish Ambassador that conditions there were intolerable and that he was constantly getting new reports about the treatment of the German minority. The Führer had been generous in the territorial settlement with Poland. But now he must expect that the Germans would be treated in such a way that they would not feel as though they had fallen from the frying pan into the fire. Lipski showed understanding for the problem and promised to get in touch with Beck directly about it.

2. Ambassador Lipski told the Minister that the controversial stamps which had been issued in Danzig had been withdrawn by his Government as a result of our protest.

3. The Ambassador delivered to the Foreign Minister an invitation by Foreign Minister Beck to come to Poland. The Foreign Minister expressed his agreement in principle with an exchange of visits, especially since Beck had made an official visit to Berlin in 1935, which had not been returned. The Minister told the Ambassador that such visits could take place only if their success was assured in advance by adequate diplomatic conversations. Such a visit had to represent a

kind of conclusion to conversations. Nowadays such visits, in which the people placed such great expectations, could not be made without arriving at actual concrete results. Such a visit therefore had to be in connection with the proposed "general settlement." For this, too, Lipski showed full understanding.

4. The Minister once more mentioned Danzig in this connection. Lipski, however, ignored this question entirely in his reply and even showed a somewhat negative attitude. Mention was also made of the double track railroad and the *Reichsautobahn*, and Lipski indicated that they were willing to discuss these.

5. The Foreign Minister further mentioned that he hoped the Poles would follow a policy based on the tradition of Pilsudski and his breadth of vision. This meant that Poland would take German interests into account and would not resist certain natural phenomena and inevitable developments. Then there would be no further obstacles in the way of a final and stable settlement with Germany and a broad common policy. Germany desired to have a sound Poland as her neighbor. Germany was anti-Russian and if only for that reason welcomed a strong Poland who would defend her interests against Russia. At this point the Minister purposely mentioned the Polish-Russian treaty as not being contrary to this line, to which Lipski agreed.

6. The Minister further mentioned that as part of the general settlement the minorities question, too, would have to be thoroughly discussed.

7. The Polish Ambassador then mentioned the Memel question and informed the Minister that Poland had established contact with Lithuania in connection with certain maritime negotiations. The Minister injected the remark that these probably involved only questions of a purely economic nature, for Memel was entirely German and had always been so. In our opinion it was of course entitled to self-determination. Lipski confirmed that this matter was purely of an economic nature. The Minister then told Lipski that the French Ambassador and the British Chargé d'Affaires had called at the Foreign Ministry a few days ago to make a *démarche* in the Memel question. They were given to understand that the signatory powers of the Memel Statute<sup>1</sup> would be the last to be consulted in this question, since numerous representations by Germany in recent years had been consistently fruitless.

Hew[EL]

<sup>1</sup>The Statute, providing for autonomy of the Memel Territory under Lithuanian sovereignty, was part of a convention concluded between the principal Versailles signatories and Lithuania on May 8, 1924. For a summary of the history of the Memel question at the peace conference and later, see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 237-241.

## No. 113

147/78772-74

*Memorandum by the Ambassador to Poland*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, December 15, 1938.

Foreign Minister Beck asked me to call on him last night after I had sent him a message that I would be in Berlin today. M. Beck first indulged in a lengthy discussion of the great importance of the agreement of January 1934 and stated that he was still willing to continue the policy inaugurated by Pilsudski. The agreement of 1934 had played an especially great role in the extremely critical period which we had just gone through and he must state once more that it had proved its worth. That a certain tension had now arisen in German-Polish relations was therefore absurd. It was probably due to the fact that in recent weeks too much had changed all at one time. Not only had Czechoslovakia taken on a new aspect but a number of other systems and combinations which had formerly played a role had collapsed. He therefore deemed it advisable to examine the new situation jointly, and he had instructed M. Lipski to transmit the suggestion for a personal conversation between the two Foreign Ministers.

M. Lipski, who was in Warsaw yesterday and whom I met on the train, told me that this conversation was planned for Warsaw and said it was hoped that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would return the visit made to Berlin 3 years ago by Foreign Minister Beck as soon as possible.

M. Beck then took up the various problems which required more detailed discussion. First he mentioned Danzig, where new difficulties had recently arisen and where the danger of unpleasant surprises always existed. He hoped very much that undesirable *faits accomplis* would be avoided. An initial conversation on the Danzig problem had already taken place recently (this evidently referred to the Berchtesgaden conference) and sooner or later the discussion would doubtless have to be resumed.

M. Beck further mentioned the Carpatho-Ukrainian question, which had evoked a certain excitement in public opinion. The Polish public feared that Germany intended to pursue an anti-Polish policy operating from the Carpatho-Ukraine, and in Germany it was suspected that Poland desired to erect a barrier against a natural German expansion in the Danube region. The latter suspicion was entirely false and he hoped that the former too was incorrect. But at any rate it would be well to discuss these things sometime. He believed that it

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]".  
See German White Book, document No. 199.

should be possible to find a way which would take into consideration the interests of both countries.

We then discussed Memel, and I took occasion to refer to Polish press comments which seemed to expect important political changes in the Memel Territory following the election.<sup>2</sup> M. Beck merely pointed out that Poland had economic and maritime interests in the Memel Territory and that it could probably be expected that these interests would be taken into consideration in any case.

M. Beck then gave the account that had already been transmitted by M. Lipski of the Polish-Soviet negotiations, which allegedly had become necessary because of the numerous border incidents. When I said that we had been less surprised by the negotiations than by the secrecy with which they had been carried on, M. Beck remarked by way of an excuse that up to the last day he had not known what the outcome of these negotiations would be.

I then pointed out that not only had I noticed a deterioration of the public temper in Poland vis-à-vis Germany but that in Germany as well the attitude toward Poland was at present not friendly. As the most important cause of this I pointed to the treatment of the minorities, especially in the Olsa area, where there had been mass dismissals of workers and where the population had gradually come to view the 20 years under Czech domination as a paradise in comparison with present conditions. M. Beck stated that the Polish Government desired to provide good living conditions for the German minority, that the Minister President had already given very strict instructions to the administrative authorities, and that he, Beck, was ready to intervene personally at any time if he could be informed of concrete incidents.

MOLTKE

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<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 501.

## No. 114

116/66389

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, December 19, 1938.

The Foreign Minister told me today that he had agreed to the following with the High Commissioner in Danzig:

If the High Commissioner sends a communication to the Danzig Senate in which he refers to the recent laws which violate the Constitution (especially those in the field of Aryanization), arrangements will be made to have the Danzig Senate promise subsequent sanctioning of these laws by the Danzig representative assembly which is to be newly elected.

The Foreign Minister requests that an inquiry be made in Danzig by telephone as to whether Gauleiter Forster will come through here within the next few days. The Foreign Minister will then ask Gauleiter Forster to make the necessary arrangements regarding the above matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 115

147/78780-S2

*Ambassador Moltke to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop*<sup>1</sup>

WARSAW, December 20, 1938.

MY DEAR FOREIGN MINISTER: After I had informed M. Beck, immediately after my return from Berlin, of your attitude toward his proposal for a visit, M. Beck of his own accord returned to that subject today. He is likewise of the opinion that an official visit should not be without political content and that consequently it is necessary to make diplomatic preparations for it. He told me today that it was perfectly agreeable to him if the preparations envisaged were taken up for discussion about the middle of January by you and the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. But he wondered whether it would not perhaps be very advisable if he himself had a general discussion with you beforehand. Since he intended to spend the holidays in Monte Carlo, the return trip would offer an opportunity for that. He intended to leave Monte Carlo for Warsaw via Germany around January 5 or 6 and would be prepared either to stop over in Berlin or, in case you should not be there at that time, to meet you in some other place. M. Beck expressly emphasized that he would understand it perfectly if this date were not agreeable to you. He would in no wise regard a rejection of his proposal as evidence of unfriendliness. He merely thought he ought to mention the fact that his trip to the south would offer an opportunity for an unofficial meeting, all the more so since such an opportunity would hardly come again in the near future.

I have the impression that M. Beck, aside from the fact that he naturally attaches a great deal of importance to having a talk with you, my dear Foreign Minister, also has in mind in proposing this unofficial visit the objective of rendering easier your acceptance of the invitation to Warsaw.

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] Führer".

M. Beck requested that a reply be transmitted either through me or by way of the Embassy in Berlin, saying that it would suffice if he were notified by January 1.

With highest esteem,

Heil Hitler!

Very sincerely yours,

MOLTKE

No. 116

1724/400833-35

*Minute by the President of the Danzig Senate*

DANZIG, December 22, 1938.

Pol. V 9660.

On December 17 Minister Chodacki, whom I had not seen since the end of October because of my illness, visited me at my home.

He told me that meanwhile he had had a great many worries and that many single events had occurred, the total result of which was that the important, fundamental question between Danzig and Poland now had to be brought up for discussion. Two weeks ago, to be sure, in a rather lengthy note which he had handed to Vice President Huth, he had already expressed his anxiety regarding the development of Danzig-Polish relations and in addition during several discussions had again pointed out details which repeatedly and more seriously affected Danzig-Polish relations; however, thus far his efforts had brought no reply. He had the impression that quite consciously a psychosis was being created in Danzig, the purpose of which was to convince the population of Danzig that the city would be returned to the German Reich within the foreseeable future. Recently this psychosis was no longer merely to be observed in propaganda whispered from mouth to mouth; it had now reached the point where comments were made on such things in more or less public speeches by more or less prominent leaders of the Party. Of course, all these things were in contradiction to the declarations of the Führer and Chancellor in Berlin, and especially to the declarations of the Senate and to the treaties and agreements. It would be an easy matter to protest against this juridically and on the basis of international law. It would also be an easy matter for the Polish Government to reply to this with measures of a political and economic nature; however, in spite of his great anxiety he had advised his Government against this. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce in Warsaw had for a long time desired to proceed to action, but he and his chief, Minister Beck, were of the opinion that all means of

peaceful settlement should first be exhausted. He really had no faith in Danzig at all any more, and he felt obliged to ask me what was to happen now. As far as his Government was concerned, he could assure me that Warsaw was at all times prepared to discuss further developments and further accommodation in the Danzig question. The prerequisite for all these things was the assurance which had repeatedly been made contractually and in writing that the Polish element and vital Polish rights in Danzig would be respected.

I told him that in surveying the last few weeks one had to distinguish between details and fundamental questions. In my opinion it was neither his nor my job to discuss details, but the settlement of these questions by the specialists involved, along the political lines laid down by the two of us, must at all times be possible. So the only purpose of this conversation today would be to discuss questions of principle. In so doing I desired as always to discuss things with him in an open and above-board manner. For this a knowledge of the subject was necessary not only in terms of the way in which the local scene in Danzig was viewed from Danzig and Warsaw but also from the point of view of those events which, not evident from the outside, are occurring behind the scenes; I had the impression that many a discussion was being carried on between Berlin and Warsaw, of the existence of which, to be sure, I knew something but the details of which were unknown to me up to the present hour. I therefore asked him whether he could tell me anything about his conference with Ambassador Lipski and with Minister Beck; further, whether in the opinion of the Polish Government the Danzig question was a national question for Poland, and whether to Poland a solution of the question in line with the wishes of the Danzig population would mean war.

Minister Chodacki thereupon told me that Poland had two national questions. The first was the Army, and here there was no difference among the Poles, irrespective of what political camp they belonged to. Anyone who attacked the Army attacked Poland, and the anger of every Pole would be directed against him. The second national question was the sea. To the south the boundaries of Poland enjoyed the natural protection of the Carpathians. In the east and in the west there were two ideological walls with fixed boundaries which by treaty could not be altered. To the north was the open sea, toward which Poland and the entire Polish people were striving. And Danzig was included in this part of the Polish national question. Thus Danzig was a Polish national question less as a city than in its role of providing free access to the sea. From this viewpoint and this interpretation, just as in regard to the Army, one would meet with re-



sistance from every Pole, if one desired to cut off this access through any political action whatsoever. From such a viewpoint one could in this sense recognize the German element and National Socialism in Danzig and assent to its internal development in all fields, insofar as these Polish desires and rights were not disturbed.

We then got around to discussing details and Minister Chodacki handed me a number of notes in the Polish language. In all the documents of the last few weeks two questions were for him decisive and of immediate significance: the civil service law and the school question. He told me that as regards the civil service law he had to protest most emphatically but he wanted me to do him the favor of giving him, by the end of the year at the latest, a satisfactory reply which he could take along with him to Warsaw at New Year. His idea in this matter was that a special arrangement be made regarding the customs officials and Polish customs inspectors by means of an amendment to this law. He was just now being subjected to strong pressure from the Polish Ministry of Finance in the matter of the customs officials, and if he did not bring in some sort of pledge by January 1, intervention by the Ministry of Finance in regard to the Danzig customs officials would have to be reckoned with.<sup>1</sup>

Minister Chodacki then called my attention to a large number of individual cases in which he allegedly had received no reply from the Senate and from me.

I asked him to prepare a list of these for me, in order that I might occupy myself with them personally, even if they were not my concern. He promised to have such a list sent to me.

We then discussed the New Year's reception, and he regretted that he would not be in Danzig on that day.

I told him that because of my illness this reception would probably be postponed.

Then, in conclusion, he asked me to receive him again before Christmas, if possible, so that he would receive by then at least a few partial replies.

GREISER

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<sup>1</sup>In his brief covering report transmitting Greiser's minute (1724/400831-32) the Consul General at Danzig stated: "The Senate intends to reply soon in a friendly manner to the numerous Polish notes, in which protests are lodged against the most varied Danzig measures of the last few weeks."

In a letter to Minister Chodacki on Jan. 9, 1939 (1724/400855-59), Greiser stated that all the recent Polish complaints had been studied but that many were found to be based on false information, and asserted that "neither the rights of Poland as such nor those of Poles in Danzig had been seriously endangered." He added: "In Danzig there is the impression that under cover of the assertion that this had in fact happened, Poland frequently made the attempt to extend these rights."

## No. 117

7082/E522604-05

*The Foreign Ministry to the Consulate General at Danzig*

BERLIN, December 23, 1938.

e. o. Pol. V 9491.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Schliep.

The League of Nations Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt, was received by the Foreign Minister on December 17.<sup>1</sup> On that occasion, in view of the January meeting of the League of Nations, he explained the plan, with which you are acquainted, for an exchange of letters with Senate President Greiser<sup>2</sup> concerning the question of the constitutionality of several laws which have recently been proclaimed in Danzig.<sup>3</sup> In his letter Professor Burckhardt intends to point out that there might be some doubt as to whether certain Danzig laws can still be brought into harmony with the Statute of the Free City and to ask the Senate for clarification on that point. Professor Burckhardt visualizes a reply by the Senate President somewhat to the effect that the laws in question were a matter of legal decrees which would doubtless be approved by the Volkstag, in which there were 70 National Socialist deputies; it was intended, moreover, to hold new elections for the Volkstag next spring which may be expected with certainty to result in a two-thirds majority, which would then sanction the legal decrees. A similar exchange of letters could also take place between the League of Nations Commissioner and the Gauleiter.

The Foreign Minister declared his approval of the League Commissioner's plan. Please inform the President of the Senate and the Gauleiter as soon as possible. A personal, oral notification to the Gauleiter, as the Foreign Minister had planned, had to be dispensed with, since the matter is urgent and the Gauleiter is apparently not planning a trip to Berlin any time before New Year.<sup>4</sup>

By order:  
WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> For Burckhardt's own account of this meeting see *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. III, pp. 657-661.

<sup>2</sup> At this point Ribbentrop struck out of the draft the following words: "possibly also with Gauleiter Forster".

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 674 and 675.

<sup>4</sup> The final sentence is a handwritten addition by Weizsäcker to the draft.

## No. 118

1729/401791-92

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

IG 1683 II

DANZIG, December 28, 1938.

Received December 29.

Pol. V 9683.

Subject: The League of Nations High Commissioner.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 9394 of December 21<sup>1</sup> and my report IG 1683 of December 27.<sup>2</sup>

On December 27 I had a conference with Senate President Greiser, in which the question of continuing the post of High Commissioner here was also discussed.<sup>3</sup>

According to the statements of the President of the Senate the situation with regard to this question is as follows:

French Foreign Minister Bonnet is working toward having the League of Nations and the Committee of Three disinterest themselves *de facto* in Danzig, without any change in the present structure of Danzig, that is, in the institution of the High Commissioner, etc.; England goes further and is advocating a complete withdrawal from Danzig by the League of Nations and a liquidation of the post of High Commissioner at the earliest possible date.

Since, as Herr Greiser stated, the Reich shares his view that the institution of High Commissioner, and especially Burckhardt personally, constitutes a strong conciliatory factor—which should not be given up in view of the constantly and inherently delicate Danzig-

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1729/401788-89). The instruction transmitted a report of Dec. 9 from the Consul General at Geneva that "according to usually well-informed sources" Danzig High Commissioner Burckhardt "recently suggested to the Secretary General of the League that he consider whether it would not be better for the League to abolish the office of High Commissioner on its own initiative, in order thus to anticipate the inevitable in Danzig. In Professor Burckhardt's view it could only be a question of time until Danzig, supported by Germany—perhaps also by Poland—would convey to the League the desire of the Danzig Government that the office of High Commissioner be abolished."

<sup>2</sup>The report (1729/401790) read as follows: "Professor Burckhardt told me, what was already known to me from previous talks with him, that immediately upon assumption of his post here and since then whenever he has been in Geneva he has always given it as his view that the gradual abolition of the post of High Commissioner in Danzig was advisable and that political prudence required it. Among his suggestions there had also been the idea that it was of first importance for the League of Nations to free itself as soon as possible from its guarantee of the Danzig constitution. Professor Burckhardt had not recently, however, made an official proposal in this sense."

<sup>3</sup>Marginal note: "Recently the Foreign Minister strongly urged Burckhardt to do nothing precipitately. Nor will Burckhardt do this; however, he has the understandable desire not to be shown the door at the moment we find it convenient. W[eizsäcker], [Dec.] 30."

Polish, and hence German-Polish, relations—he would be gratified for the sake of Danzig if the Reich used its influence to prevent the adoption of the radical solution advocated by the British. Perhaps it would be possible to exert influence in Paris and induce France to support the line that no formal initiative is to be taken in Geneva relative to the High Commissioner and no change made in the *status quo* for the time being. (In September the situation will be clearer.)

In this connection I believe I may refrain from taking any position with respect to the French and the British proposals. I might only point out that in the interest of Danzig and the Reich it would seem to me unwise to forego Professor Burckhardt's activity, which is particularly valuable because of his personality, so long as it remains legally possible for the League of Nations, perhaps at the instigation of Poland, to exert influence in Danzig questions.

JANSON

### No. 119

F3/0080-102

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*<sup>1</sup>

RM 01

MUNICH, January 5, 1939.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR AND THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER, COLONEL BECK,<sup>2</sup> AT BERCHTESGADEN ON JANUARY 5, 1939, IN THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER VON RIBBENTROP, AMBASSADOR VON MOLTKE, AMBASSADOR LIPSKI, AND COUNT LUBIENSKI<sup>3</sup>

By way of introduction, Colonel Beck emphasized the fact that during the September crisis German-Polish relations had stood the test in every way. If in the last few months a certain decline from the high level of the September days had perhaps become noticeable, an attempt should be made by both sides, in the opinion of the Polish Government, to eliminate the causes of some of the difficulties which

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 200.

<sup>2</sup> For Beck's account of this conversation, see Polish White Book, document No. 48.

<sup>3</sup> In a note covering a lengthy series of memoranda submitted to the Foreign Minister on Jan. 2 as background information for the talks with Beck (52/34504), Weizsäcker stated that in his view the following should receive emphasis: "a) Poland must do more for our minority. b) Poland had best reconcile herself now to receiving only minor economic advantages in the event that Memel should shortly become German. c) To get Poland to commit herself in this conversation as regards other points of our eastern policy will probably prove to be premature. Beck should be made to see that we understand the entire weakness of his position and are waiting until he becomes more pliable."

The memorandum submitted by the Political Department and signed by Deputy Director Bismarck (52/34505-07) recommended the following general strat-

had recently arisen. Beck mentioned the Danzig question as one of these difficulties and emphasized that this concerned not only the German and Polish Governments but third parties also, among others, the League of Nations. For example, what was to happen in case the League of Nations should sometime withdraw from its role in Danzig? There were also some other questions in which existing misunderstandings should be eliminated, among others, that of guaranteeing the Czechoslovak border; was this guarantee to be given immediately, or when, if at all, was it proposed to do so?

The Führer replied that for a settlement of all existing difficulties it was first of all necessary to go back to the basic orientation of German-Polish relations. On the part of Germany he could state emphatically that there had not been the slightest change in Germany's relations with Poland as based on the nonaggression declaration of 1934. Germany would under all circumstances be interested in maintaining a strong nationalist Poland, quite irrespective of developments in Russia. Regardless of whether Russia was bolshevist or czarist, or something else, Germany's attitude toward that country would always be one of the greatest caution and for that reason she was decidedly interested in seeing Poland's position preserved. Purely from the military point of view the existence of a strong Polish Army meant a considerable easing of Germany's position; the divisions which Poland stationed at the Russian frontier saved Germany just so much additional military expenditure.

The Führer referred to the aims imputed to Germany by the world press in connection with the Ukraine and declared that Poland did not have the slightest thing to fear from Germany in this respect. Germany had no interests beyond the Carpathians and it was a matter of indifference to her what the countries interested in those areas did there. Similarly, she was not directly interested in the Mediterranean, but would in any case always be found on Italy's side. More-

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egy for the talks: "Before beginning a discussion of individual problems it seems advisable to point out to M. Beck that the German Government may expect the Polish Government to take into account the complete change in the European situation brought about by the recovery of German strength, but especially by the events of 1933. Poland will certainly realize that Germany is today the only power in Europe with which she can align herself. Germany wishes, as heretofore, to collaborate on the basis of the Agreement of Jan. 26, 1934. The German Government has followed with interest the recent efforts of the Polish Government to improve Russo-Polish relations. Germany has no objection to a normalization of Russo-Polish relations; however, we are of the opinion that the Soviet Union is at present neither especially valuable as a friend nor especially to be feared as an enemy. With respect to Franco-Polish relations, too, Poland must surely realize that France's friendship is a platonic one, since the erection of a West German *limes* and since France abruptly abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, a country which was considerably more important for the French system of European alliances." The memorandum added that in view of Beck's previous brusque rejection of German proposals on Danzig it would be better not to discuss this unless Beck did so himself, since the question was "obviously not yet ripe."

over, it was necessary to distinguish between Germany's political spheres of interest and her economic aspirations, which were aimed solely at maintaining extensive commercial relations with all countries that could be considered as economic partners. There were countries, such as the United States, for example, which because of their economic structure were less suitable as partners for Germany, since they themselves produced the industrial products with which alone Germany could pay for her imports of raw materials and food. On the other hand, other countries, including Poland, could import all the industrial products that they needed from Germany and in return sell to her food and raw materials. With these countries Germany wished to expand her commercial relations as far as possible; this applied in particular to economic intercourse with Poland.

The attitude taken by Germany in the Ukrainian question in connection with the Vienna Award—an attitude which had perhaps led to certain misunderstandings in Poland—was explained by the historical development of this problem as it related to the attitude of Hungary during the September crisis. The Führer then gave a long exposition of the individual phases of the Czechoslovak conflict with particular emphasis on the indecisive, hesitant attitude of Hungary. At various conferences, he had urgently advised the Hungarians that if they desired a political solution of their territorial dispute with Czechoslovakia, they should take the initiative themselves as soon as possible; but he had found very little understanding among the Hungarians. The Hungarians had been inhibited by their prewar conceptions of the intentions of England and France and had repeatedly stated that they feared active intervention by the two countries in the conflict and that while a lost war would perhaps not be fatal to Germany, it would definitely mean the end of Hungary. Chamberlain's and Daladier's surprising offer to negotiate had moreover deflected him (the Führer) from the purely political solution of the Czechoslovak question, which would have been tantamount to a liquidation of Czechoslovakia, and, since he had had no active support whatever from Hungary, the only solution that he could justify before the world was the ethnographic in contrast to the political solution, which would have consisted in a settlement to be arranged exclusively between Poland, Hungary, and Germany as the only interested powers, that is, in the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. It was clear that in the future too, such political solutions could never take place unilaterally; rather, all countries interested in Czechoslovakia would participate therein.

Only after the Hungarians considered it safe to intervene had they taken somewhat stronger action. In this connection he had to point out that it had by no means been easy to induce the French and the British at Munich to have the Polish and Hungarian claims against

Czechoslovakia also included in the agreement. Pursuant to the agreement reached on these two special claims at Munich on the basis of a proposal by Mussolini, the Hungarians had then formulated their demands as presented on a map on which the Ukrainian territory was not claimed by Hungary. Germany had only very reluctantly acceded to the request for arbitration and had finally done so only when assurances had been received from both contending parties, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, that the award would be accepted. As stated, this award had been made after both parties had been heard and on the basis of the Hungarian demands. Then, shortly thereafter, the Hungarians had suddenly declared that they now must demand still larger parts of the Ukraine and had thereby placed the arbitral powers in a difficult position. It was naturally impossible so shortly after Vienna to revise the result arrived at there. On the other hand, it was also impossible for Hungary to satisfy her demands by force, since the Czechoslovak Army would doubtless have proved to be the stronger and in a short time would probably have marched into Budapest. In that event Germany would have been placed in an extremely difficult position, for it was clear that she would have had to save Hungary from being conquered by Czechoslovakia, if only for reasons of prestige, in order to prevent world-wide rejoicing at the triumph of a democratic country over an aggressor. Militarily, on the other hand, Germany had been mobilizing for a long time; the class which normally would have been due for discharge had been retained in service several months longer. Other measures of mobilization had been taken in many different fields for some time and it proved necessary to withdraw all those measures after the crisis had been terminated. In November, the class which was in its second year of service and was trained had only just been released, and only a class which was not fully trained, together with some young recruits, was on active service. In this situation even a minor international complication would have made it necessary to recall immediately the class that had just been discharged and to take various costly measures in the economic field. This recall would naturally have been a very heavy psychological burden for German public opinion, but beyond that would have had the result that in France mobilization measures corresponding to various stages of the crisis would automatically have been taken and would in turn have led to similar mobilization measures by Germany (garrisoning of the western fortifications, etc.). For this reason Germany could by no means have permitted an international conflict in November, and in the last analysis this had been one of the decisive reasons for her attitude in the Ukrainian question.

As for the details of German-Polish relations, he wished to repeat once more that since 1934 there had been no change in the German attitude toward Poland. In order to arrive at a definitive settlement

of the questions still pending between the two countries, one ought not to confine oneself to the rather negative agreement of 1934, but should try to bring the individual problems to a definitive settlement by treaty. From the German point of view the remaining problem in direct German-Polish relations, outside of the Memel question, which would be settled in the German sense (it appeared that the Lithuanians intended to cooperate toward a sensible solution), was that of the Corridor and Danzig, which was psychologically very difficult for German sensibilities. In his opinion it was necessary to depart from old patterns here and seek solutions along entirely new lines. Thus, for example, in the case of Danzig there might conceivably be a settlement by which this city would be brought into the German political community again in accordance with the will of its population; naturally the Polish interests, especially in the economic field, would have to be fully protected. This was after all in the interest of Danzig as well, for Danzig could not live economically without Poland, either, and so he, the Führer, was thinking of a formula by which Danzig would come into the German community politically but remain with Poland economically.

Danzig is German, will always remain German, and will sooner or later become part of Germany. He could give the assurance, however, that no *fait accompli* would be engineered in Danzig.

With regard to the Corridor, which, as stated, was a difficult psychological problem for Germany, the Führer pointed out that it was of course completely absurd to want to deprive Poland of her outlet to the sea. If Poland were bottled up in this manner, she might, in view of the tension that would thereby arise, be likened to a loaded revolver whose trigger might be pulled at any minute. Thus, the necessity for Poland to have access to the sea definitely had to be recognized. In the same way, however, having a connection with East Prussia was a necessity for Germany; here too, by using entirely new methods of solution one could perhaps do justice to the interests of both.

If it should be possible on this rational basis to bring about a definitive settlement of the individual problems, which would of course have to do justice to both sides, the time would have come to supplement in a positive sense, in the manner of the agreements with France, the rather negative declaration of 1934 by a German guarantee of Poland's frontiers clearly laid down in a treaty. Poland would then obtain the great advantage of having her frontier with Germany, including the Corridor, secured by treaty. The Führer emphasized again the psychological difficulty of this problem and the fact that only he could bring about such a solution. It was by no means easy for him to guarantee the Corridor in this way, and he would undoubtedly be widely criticized for it, especially by bourgeois circles.



But as a realistic statesman he still believed that such a solution was the best. When Germany had once given such a guarantee, as little would be heard about the Polish Corridor as was being said today about the South Tyrol or Alsace-Lorraine.

Another problem in which Poland and Germany had a common interest was the Jewish question. He, the Führer, was firmly resolved to get the Jews out of Germany. They were still permitted to take part of their property with them; in this way they certainly would take out of Germany more than they had owned at the time when they entered the country. The longer they delayed emigrating, however, the less they would be able to take along.

If the Western Powers had shown more understanding of the German demand for colonies, he, the Führer, would perhaps have made available for the solution of the Jewish problem a territory in Africa which could have been used for the settlement not only of German but also of Polish Jews. Unfortunately, however, the Western Powers had not shown such understanding; Germany nevertheless had to insist on her demand for colonies; she absolutely needed the colonies for feeding her population, and sooner or later she would regain her colonial possessions. Of this, he was firmly convinced. The cost in armaments, both to the Western Powers and to Germany, occasioned by the tension arising from the unresolved colonial question was very considerable, and if the Western Powers should ever later draw up a balance sheet, they would see that their refusal to concede the justified German demands for colonies had cost them billions and that it would have been cheaper for all concerned if the colonial question had been settled at a sensible time in the manner desired by Germany.

Polish Foreign Minister Beck thanked the Führer for his comprehensive exposition of Germany's position and declared that Poland would absolutely adhere to the attitude she had adopted vis-à-vis Germany heretofore. At the time of the September crisis, relations with Soviet Russia had been exceedingly tense. The situation had been more serious than had been apparent to the outside world. The Russians had brought several army corps into position on the Russian-Polish frontier, in some places up to the very border line, and the Poles had taken corresponding countermeasures on an extensive scale, which then had made it possible to act so quickly vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia. Since Russia was, after all, a neighbor of Poland, the Poles had tried to reduce this extraordinary tension to normal proportions again. They were therefore trying, quite naturally, to find an acceptable *modus vivendi* with their Russian neighbors. Poland would, however, never enter into a dependent relationship with Russia and would continue to follow an independent policy, as she had already done in previous years, when the attempt was made to induce Poland to ally herself more closely with Russia through an eastern pact. Po-

land was indeed not so nervous as France with regard to increasing her security and had no use for the so-called "security systems", which had been completely discredited after the September crisis—a fact that signified a turning point in history. But she was quite able to appreciate the German attitude as expressed again in the statement just made by the Führer. She, too, for her part adhered to the old policy toward Germany.

Regarding the Ukraine he recalled an expression of Pilsudski's about the "Balkanization of Central Europe." In the agitators who were active in the present Carpatho-Ukrainian territory Poland recognized old enemies and feared that the Carpatho-Ukraine might some day develop into such a seat of unrest for Poland that the Polish Government would find itself called upon to intervene, and from this further complications might then arise. This was the main reason why Poland had been striving for a common frontier with Hungary. Poland, too, had used her influence with Hungary in the direction indicated by the Führer himself and had advised her to take energetic action. From his trip to Rumania he (Colonel Beck) had brought the Hungarians the assurance that Rumania would not attack them, and the President of Poland had told foreign diplomatic circles that if war came Poland would support Hungary. But in spite of these assurances the Hungarians had unfortunately not taken any initiative. He remarked incidentally that the population of the so-called Carpatho-Ukraine (the Ruthenians) had nothing in common with the population of the Ukraine proper. "Ukraine" was a Polish word and meant "eastern march." For decades the Poles had used it to designate the areas on the Dnieper situated east of their territory.

As for German-Polish relations, he took cognizance of the wishes expressed by the Führer. The Danzig question, however, seemed to him extremely difficult. It was especially necessary to take into account public opinion in Poland. In this connection he was completely ignoring the attitude of the "coffee-house opposition." During his 7-year tenure of office he had not paid the slightest attention to coffee-house opinion, and he was still in office. But he did have to consider the real opinion of the people and here, to be sure, he saw very great difficulties in the way of a solution of the Danzig question. He would, however, like to think the problem over at leisure.

Colonel Beck did not go into the other German-Polish questions brought up by the Führer, but concluded his statements with the renewed affirmation that in her general attitude Poland would, as heretofore, remain true to the line followed since 1934.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT  
*Minister*

## No. 120

F3/0074-79

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

RM 2

BERLIN, January 9, 1939.

CONVERSATION WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER BECK IN MUNICH ON  
JANUARY 6, 1939

In a conversation lasting about an hour and a half, M. Beck immediately reverted to the Danzig problem. He said that Poland too was endeavoring to live in friendly and neighborly relations with Germany and to strengthen these relations. The only problem which might have a disturbing effect in the near future was the Danzig question. Danzig had used the tactics of little *faits accomplis* which had already started to affect Polish rights there. He really saw a certain danger in this. He had not wanted to mention this so bluntly to the Führer yesterday, but in our frank confidential conversation he did not want to conceal that he regarded the situation with some concern.<sup>2</sup> Two possibilities might arise which would require us to take a stand on the problem:

1. The League of Nations might disinterest itself in the Danzig question and withdraw its High Commissioner. Germany and Poland would then have to deal with the question themselves;
2. The above-mentioned tactics of *faits accomplis* would force Poland to take a stand.

The problem was actually a very difficult one and he had already racked his brain to find a solution, thus far without success.

Beck then turned to the question of the Greater Ukraine and said that the Führer's reassurance that we had no interests there had relieved him greatly and all in all he had noted with sincere satisfaction the Führer's clear and firm policy of friendly understanding with Poland.

In conclusion Beck pointed out once more that in the minds of the whole Polish people Danzig represented a touchstone of German-Polish relations and that it would be very difficult to change this in any manner. Marshal Pilsudski had once before expressed the same opinion to a German visitor.

I then developed for M. Beck the following points:

1. As the Führer had already said, Germany had above all else the profound desire for a definitive, comprehensive, and generous consolidation of mutual relations.

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 201.

<sup>2</sup> According to Beck's account of the conversation, he said that "today for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement" (Polish White Book, document No. 49).

2. Three problems seemed significant in that connection :

(a) Direct German-Polish relations. Here I was thinking of the following solution :

Reincorporating Danzig into Germany, at the same time assuring—in the most generous manner—all of Poland's economic interests in that area. Connecting Germany with her province of East Prussia by means of an extraterritorial highway and railroad. As compensation, Germany would guarantee the Corridor and all of Poland's possessions—that is, a final and permanent recognition of the mutual boundaries.

(b) The Czech-Carpatho-Ukrainian question.

Here I repeated that ethnographic boundaries were set in Munich. If anyone should bring up the principle of political boundaries in this connection, of course Germany could not be disinterested. Although Germany's political interests *per se* did not go beyond the Carpathians, nevertheless Germany could not claim to be disinterested in a shift in boundaries even beyond, in Czechoslovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, for she could easily be drawn into a conflict by such events. Wherever a cannon went off in Europe today Germany in principle could not be disinterested. The Vienna Award must be adhered to, and our basic position was that if other wishes somehow emerged here, they must be brought into accord with German interests.

(c) The policy to be followed by Poland and Germany vis-à-vis Russia and in this connection also the question of a Greater Ukraine.

I assured M. Beck that we were interested in the Soviet-Russian Ukraine only to the extent that we inflicted damage on Russia everywhere we could, just as she did on us; therefore we naturally kept up constant relations with the Russian Ukraine. But we had never operated in any way with the Polish Ukrainians; this had always been strictly avoided. The Führer had explained our negative attitude regarding a Greater Ukraine. The evil seemed to me to lie in the fact that naturally anti-Russian agitation in the Ukraine always had certain effects on the Polish minority and the Ukrainians in the Carpatho-Ukraine. In my opinion, however, this could be changed only if Poland and we would work together in every respect in the Ukrainian question. I could imagine that in the course of a general, generous settlement of all problems between Poland and us we might very well be moved to regard the Ukrainian question as covered by a special Polish prerogative and to support Poland in every way in dealing with this question. On the other hand, of course, this presupposed a more and more pronounced anti-Russian attitude on the part of Poland, since otherwise there would be no question of any mutual interest.

In this connection I asked Beck whether he did not want to accede to the Anti-Comintern Pact some day.

Beck explained that this was not possible at the present time, since there were courts in Poland to deal with the Comintern and these

questions had always been kept strictly separate from diplomatic relations with Russia. Poland would do everything to cooperate with us against the Comintern in police matters, but if she entered into a political treaty with Germany to this end, then she would not be able to maintain the peaceful neighborly relations with Russia which were necessary to her security. Nevertheless Beck held out the prospect that Poland's policy might be capable of future development in the direction desired by us.

I asked Beck whether they had given up Marshal Pilsudski's aspirations in this direction, that is, toward the Ukraine; he answered me laughingly that they had even been in Kiev, and that these aspirations were doubtless still alive today.

At the close of the conversation I then complained to M. Beck regarding the treatment of our German minorities, particularly in the Olsa area, and in this connection I referred very emphatically to Grazyński's<sup>3</sup> constant anti-German machinations. M. Beck told me that he had already devoted his serious attention to this question and that he for his part would do everything to guide these matters along a more peaceful course.

I then thanked M. Beck for his invitation to Warsaw and accepted it in principle. A date was not yet fixed. It was agreed that M. Beck and I would once more turn over in our minds the whole problem of a possible treaty between Poland and us. Lipski and Moltke would then carry on the negotiations in the coming weeks, and the visit would still take place this winter in any case.

RIBBENTROP

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\* Voivode of Silesia.

## No. 121

1785/407797-98

### *Circular of the State Secretary<sup>1</sup>*

Telegram

BERLIN, January 10, 1939—8:10 p. m.  
e. o. Pol. V 238.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Schliep.

For information and guidance in your conversations:

The visit of Foreign Minister Beck, which was motivated by a Polish desire to discuss the new situation, took place in a friendly

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<sup>1</sup> The telegram was sent to all Missions in Europe, to Washington and Tokyo, and to the Consulates General at Danzig, Memel, and Geneva.

atmosphere. It was noted on both sides that the agreement of January 1934 had proved its worth and continued to form the basis of German-Polish relations.

More particularly, the question of Danzig was discussed, but did not reach a practical stage. The Führer reassured Beck with respect to the alleged danger of *faits accomplis* being engineered in Danzig, and confirmed Poland's need for access to the sea.<sup>2</sup> The question of Memel was touched upon briefly. The Führer also dissipated Polish misgivings regarding Germany's Ukraine policy. No agreements of any kind were reached. Beck repeated the familiar Polish explanation of the origin of the Polish-Soviet declaration, which had become necessary on account of numerous border incidents.

The Reich Foreign Minister accepted in principle Beck's invitation to Warsaw extended at the end of last year. The date is still open.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>2</sup> Fuller information on this point was given the Consulate General at Danzig in a separate telegram (52/34521). This stated that Hitler, in his conversation with Beck, had again brought up the proposal for return of Danzig and for an extraterritorial road across the Corridor. Beck again termed such a solution unacceptable to Poland, though he promised further study of the proposal. The telegram then added: "Please urge the Senate President to limit the information he gives Burckhardt to the statement that although the Danzig question was discussed it did not in any sense reach a practical stage. In these circumstances Germany, as was discussed earlier with B., attaches importance to preserving the institution of the League of Nations Commissioner."

## No. 122

116/68401

*Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

January 13, 1939.

### THE VISIT OF GAULEITER FORSTER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

It was agreed in this conference that Gauleiter Forster would not undertake any new measures in Danzig until the Foreign Minister's return from Warsaw. The Foreign Minister will then summon Gauleiter Forster to a new conference, when it will be decided whether new measures shall be initiated in Danzig or whether such measures would be rendered superfluous by a general settlement with Poland.

These measures include in the main:

1. Official adoption of the German salute.
2. Adoption of the German flag.
3. Formation of a Death's-head [*Totenkopf*] unit of the SS in Danzig.

HEWEL

## No. 123

1724/400865-67

*The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry*

IMMEDIATE HANDLING!

No. 78

GENEVA, January 20, 1939.

Received January 23.

Pol. V 695.

Subject: The Danzig question at the 104th session of the Council.

With reference to my telegram No. 6 of January 15.<sup>1</sup>

I enclose the French text of the communiqué<sup>2</sup> which the League of Nations Council issued on January 19 on the treatment of the Danzig question, the substance of which has already been transmitted by telegraph.

Regarding the origin of the communiqué, the High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt, told me that the British had readily and energetically supported his views, described in the above-mentioned telegram, regarding the present and future treatment of the Danzig question. The British would be pleased if the next session of the Committee of Three was held in London and the elections and the revision of the Danzig Constitution took place earlier in order thus to prepare the political and legal prerequisites for a peaceful liquidation of the Danzig question by the next session of the League Council. The British assume that Senate President Greiser will appear at this session of the Committee of Three in London, since it involves a fundamental discussion of Danzig.

Evidently the French caused some difficulty at first, and Bonnet even said at a press conference that a committee of lawyers should be assigned at once to investigate the Danzig question. In the course of the negotiations, however, the French went over to the British line.

The main resistance stemmed from Foreign Minister Sandler, who at first was determined to put through a move to have the Council deal with the Danzig question at once; he even threatened withdrawal from the Committee of Three if this was not done. Foreign Min-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (97/108299-300). Krauel reported a conversation with Burckhardt in which the latter stated that, despite the efforts of "leftists" and Swedish Foreign Minister Sandler to make a dramatic issue of Danzig in the current Council meeting, Britain and France would not allow action on Danzig for the present, preferring to wait until constitutional changes had been made legally in Danzig, after which the League could withdraw. Burckhardt had convinced Halifax that this step could be taken at the next meeting of the Committee of Three after new elections in Danzig had provided a legal basis for the constitutional changes.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (1724/400868). The statement issued by the Committee of Three is printed in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. III, p. 614. See also document No. 124, footnote 2.

ister Sandler was thereby acting for the leftist circles in France and England, and he also contributed considerably to the excited press reports about the imminent defeat of the League of Nations in Danzig. In these circumstances the conflict between Burckhardt and Sandler in the Committee of Three had a very personal character, intensified by the fact that the Swedish Consul in Danzig sent a telegram to the Committee of Three in which it was asserted that the High Commissioner had stated publicly that all difficulties originated with Sweden. Professor Burckhardt was very much annoyed at this indiscretion.

Nor was the High Commissioner pleased at the attitude of the Polish representative at this session of the Council; he evidently had instructions to prevent by every means anything that would facilitate the withdrawal from Danzig of the League or the High Commissioner in the foreseeable future. In Professor Burckhardt's opinion the Poles do not want the elections and an amendment of the Constitution to take place in Danzig, because this would create the legal basis and also the psychological prerequisites for removing the League guarantee and the post of High Commissioner. Professor Burckhardt explains these Polish intentions by Poland's belief that by maintenance of the present situation in Danzig she has a means of now and again putting German policy in Danzig in a bad light before England and France and at the same time coming forward as mediator between Germany and those powers. The British showed little sympathy for these Polish aspirations at this session, and both Lord Halifax and Butler<sup>a</sup> were, in Professor Burckhardt's opinion, rather cool toward M. Komarnicki<sup>b</sup>; yet the Polish Minister tried to give me the impression that the British fully shared Poland's conception of the Danzig question.

The attempt of the leftist, pro-League press to exaggerate the Danzig question has already been reported. In this connection it might be interesting to note that the High Commissioner intends to complain to President Motta of Switzerland about the attitude of the Swiss press, especially that of the representatives of the Swiss Telegraph Agency in Geneva, whose reports were entirely in line with Popular Front circles and one of whom, at least, was obviously in the pay of those circles. I encouraged M. Burckhardt in this intention.

KRAUEL

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<sup>a</sup> R. A. Butler, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was serving as *rapporteur* for the Committee of Three.

<sup>b</sup> Tytus Komarnicki, Polish Minister in Switzerland, who also represented Poland at Geneva.



## No. 124

440/221197-200

Danzig High Commissioner Burckhardt to State Secretary von  
Weizsäcker

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL<sup>1</sup>

CREMIR BEI MURTEN,  
Sunday, January 22, 1939.

MY DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: There is no need to say much about the really unpleasant 10 days that I spent in the city of Calvin. The leftists tried in every possible way to force my resignation in order to use this opportunity to stage a big spectacle: Council, etc. Well, we fought the matter through for the time being. Except for the communiqué, as pallid and insipid as it is stupid, and the idiotic chants of the Swiss press, nothing happened.<sup>2</sup> Lord Halifax helped me through thick and thin in spite of Noel Baker<sup>3</sup> and the Major<sup>4</sup> in the background. Last of all, the noble descendants of Gustavus Adolphus attempted another direct coup by producing a telegram from Danzig according to which I had spoken to the Danzigers about the antagonism between Sandler and Halifax. On the same day on which this maneuver was tried, M. Sandler told Goldmann, the President of the Jewish World Congress, that he was very strongly opposed to the British and would prevent my return to Danzig. After the communiqué was issued, Westman<sup>5</sup> told the journalists that they should merely read the last passage carefully; he guaranteed that an end would be put to the matter [*Schluss gemacht werde*]. On the evening of the last day Butler called on me, visibly angered, and told me: "Sandler will have to resign, but it would be better that he do it in Stockholm rather than here; the best solution would then be to settle everything in agreement with the interested powers, in London or Paris, by withdrawing from all internal affairs of Danzig and offering to serve in any mediator's role that might still be neces-

<sup>1</sup> These words were added by Weizsäcker when he had copies of Burckhardt's handwritten letter typed for circulation in the Foreign Ministry (440/221201-03).

<sup>2</sup> The League Council's Committee of Three on Danzig met in Geneva on Jan. 17 and 19, 1939. It decided that certain decrees issued by the Danzig Senate (i. e. the anti-Semitic decrees) violated the Constitution of Danzig which was under League guarantee. It postponed action pending further consideration and in view of negotiations understood to be in progress. The demand had been made and was supported in the Committee by the Swedish delegate that the High Commissioner should resign; instead a statement was issued that he would take "the leave of absence which is due to him." For the League Committee's handling of the Danzig issue at this period see *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. III, ch. IX; records of the two sessions of the Committee of Three are printed as documents Nos. 548 and 556.

<sup>3</sup> Philip J. Noel Baker, British Labor M. P.

<sup>4</sup> Not identified.

<sup>5</sup> Karl Ivan Westman, Swedish Minister to Switzerland and permanent delegate to the League of Nations.

sary. But do the Poles want that?" As far as the guarantee of the Constitution is concerned I myself am not clear about the latter point. At the beginning of December Warsaw was speaking of it; now the rather arrogant Komarnicki spoke very disparagingly about new elections, a new Constitution, and abandonment of control. But they are surely amenable to reason; they must be spoken to in plain words and be reminded that Beck himself always said that he did not wish to disturb "the German life" of the people of Danzig.

At present, then, I am on leave. In order to return to Danzig I must obtain permission from the Committee of Three. A delightful situation. The occasion for my request to the Committee would probably best be furnished if President Greiser wrote me a letter stating that he had various things to discuss with me; Chodacki might do the same, possibly after conferring with Greiser. Paris and London would then "authorize" me; Stockholm would withdraw; the Second and Third International would gnash their teeth; and I could then discuss any further matters in Berlin and Warsaw and find out what the plans are.

The work and various things in the external living conditions in Danzig often did not appeal to me; often I should gladly have left, but now I am frankly in a fighting mood and as far as I am concerned, I should not like to give in to these Marxists. They are going too far; the latest was that I was secretly informed by Geneva circles of this group that it had now been decided to compromise me with the Party in Germany by circulating freely fabricated criticisms allegedly made by me. I had opportunity to tell Herr Gravitz about this, and I hope that he has brought it to the attention of the Reichsführer. They have set to vigorously along those lines. What is needed again is a little victory at last.

It is too bad that all this cannot at present be discussed orally. Naturally, I am always available. We are now going to Crans, Hotel Riódama. Krauel, who was charming as always, can get in touch with me there at any time.

As ever, with respectful and cordial greetings,

Faithfully yours,

BURCKHARDT

No. 125

52/34526

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 66

BERLIN, January 23, 1939.

After the exhaustive discussions with Polish Foreign Minister Beck during the first days of January, any more fruitful discussion of cer-

tain questions with him will hardly be possible. But since Minister Beck likes to conceal his policy from other responsible persons in Warsaw, it will presumably be worth while to feel out their attitude on some of the more important questions.

In the order of their importance the subjects may be listed approximately as follows:

Danzig  
attitude of the Polish press  
German minorities (setting up of a mixed commission)  
the Ukraine  
relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

There would be no interest in a discussion of the Memel question and the problem of the Polish Jews.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 126

F19/086-88

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

RM No. 6

BERLIN, February 1, 1939.

CONVERSATION WITH POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER BECK IN WARSAW  
ON JANUARY 26, 1939

1. Referring to the conversation with him in Munich on January 6,<sup>2</sup> I again brought up with M. Beck the German proposal he knew of (reincorporation of Danzig with a guarantee of Poland's economic interests there and creation of an extraterritorial road and railway connection between the Reich and its province of East Prussia, in return for which Germany would guarantee the German-Polish frontier); I explained once more that it was the Führer's desire to arrive at a comprehensive peaceful settlement of German-Polish relations by a treaty on these lines. M. Beck surely must realize that the German wishes were extremely moderate, for the transfer of very valuable German territory to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles was still felt by every German as a great injustice, which had been possible only at a time of extreme German weakness. If 100 Englishmen or Frenchmen were asked, 99 would concede without hesitation that the reincorporation of Danzig and of at least the Corridor as well was a natural German demand.

<sup>1</sup> See German White Book, document No. 202.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 120.

M. Beck appeared to be impressed by my statements, but again pointed out that the strongest internal political opposition was to be expected, for which reason he could not view the matter optimistically; nevertheless, he intended to give our suggestion further careful consideration.<sup>3</sup>

I arranged with M. Beck that if the League of Nations should withdraw from Danzig before a treaty had been made between us and Poland that would include Danzig as well, we would get in touch with him in order to find a solution to bridge over this situation.

2. I then spoke to M. Beck once more about the policy to be pursued by Poland and Germany toward the Soviet Union and in this connection also spoke about the question of the Greater Ukraine and again proposed German-Polish collaboration in this field.

M. Beck made no secret of the fact that Poland had aspirations directed toward the Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black Sea; but at the same time he called attention to the supposed dangers to Poland that in the Polish view would arise from a treaty with Germany directed against the Soviet Union. With regard to the future of the Soviet Union, moreover, he held the view that the Soviet Union would either disintegrate as a result of internal decay or, in order to avoid this fate, would first gather all its strength and then attack.

I condemned the passivity of M. Beck's attitude and stated that it was more expedient to anticipate the development he had predicted and to take action against the Soviet Union by propaganda. In my opinion no dangers to Poland could arise from an adherence to the anti-Comintern powers; on the contrary, if Poland sat in the same boat as we, she could only gain added security.

M. Beck promised that he would give further careful consideration to this question, too.

I instructed Ambassador Moltke to follow up with M. Beck the questions treated under (1) and (2).

3. I again complained to M. Beck about the treatment of the German minority and arranged with him that the discussions between leading officials of the two Ministries of the Interior, which had been planned for a long time, should be started immediately.

R[IBBENTROP]

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<sup>3</sup> Beck's record of his conversation states that he "categorically rejected" the proposal for an extraterritorial road. (See Polish White Book, document No. 52.)

## No. 127

2596/525152/5-53

*The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery*

S. V. 7 No. 271/39-509-27

BERLIN, February 3, 1939.

Rk 3791 B.

Subject: Order prohibiting residence of Jews of Polish nationality.

With reference to my letter of December 2, 1938 (S. V. 7 No. 2496/38-509-27).

The negotiations between the German and the Polish Governments have led to the agreement of which a copy is enclosed,<sup>1</sup> and the agreement was put into force on January 24, 1939, by an exchange of notes<sup>2</sup> between the Foreign Ministry and the Polish Embassy. The concession made by Germany in permitting the Polish Jews expelled at the end of October to return temporarily to Reich territory in order to wind up their personal and business affairs is compensated by the fact that the Polish Government has pledged itself to receive into Poland the expelled Polish Jews' wives and children under 18 years of age who are still in Reich territory. They are estimated to be some 5,000 to 6,000 in number. Care has been taken to see that all the Polish Jews who are being permitted to return temporarily leave Reich territory definitively with their wives and children at the expiration of the time limit. No agreement could be reached with the Polish Government regarding the treatment of the remaining Polish Jews, some 7,000 to 8,000, still in Germany (the number of Polish Jews in the Reich in 1933 was about 70,000) since the Polish Government refuses to make any commitments with respect to the nonenforcement of the Polish law regarding revocation of citizenship. It must therefore be expected that the rest of the Polish Jews still in Reich territory will shortly become stateless through revocation of citizenship. The attempt will be made through action of the alien control police to get as many of these Polish Jews as possible to leave Reich territory.

By order:

DR. BEST

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (2596/525154-57). Among provisions of the agreement not mentioned in the above letter were that Polish Jews temporarily readmitted to Germany would be allowed to take away personal property and to liquidate other property without hindrance, the proceeds to be transferred through a special foreign exchange account to be set up by the two Governments. Temporary returnees in Germany were not to exceed 1,000 at any one time and the opportunity for such temporary return was to expire July 31, 1939.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (6382/E474493-505).

## No. 128

2446/514893-94

*Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department*PARTICIPATION OF THE VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE IN NEGOTIATIONS  
WITH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT COMMISSION<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, February 8, 1939.

e. o. Kult. A 1306 g.

In the absence of SS-Oberführer Behrends, I had a telephone conversation on February 7 with his deputy, Dr. Luig, on the question of the participation of a representative of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in the forthcoming governmental negotiations with Poland.<sup>2</sup> I told Dr. Luig that the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle had hitherto been a strictly camouflaged agency. If a representative of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle should himself participate in any way in the negotiations with the Poles, the camouflage would inevitably have to be dropped for the future, for the representative of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle would have to be introduced to the Poles in one way or another. It was therefore a question of fundamental importance which required careful consideration, and I requested him to confer once more with SS-Oberführer Behrends and Obergruppenführer Lorenz and inform me of the position taken by these two men.

This morning Dr. Luig called and informed me as follows of the result of his conversation with SS-Oberführer Behrends: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle attached the greatest importance to having a decisive influence on the outcome of the discussions with the Poles. This was also the wish that the Foreign Minister had expressed to Obergruppenführer Lorenz. If the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle had a voice in drawing up the instructions for the German delegation and if it was made certain that before any decisions vis-à-vis the Poles were accepted the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle would be heard, this would in the opinion of Oberführer Behrends be sufficient in case the Foreign Ministry, for its part, should have objections against, or see

<sup>1</sup> The negotiations referred to were those of a joint commission of Polish and German experts on minority questions, as proposed by the Germans in June 1938. See document No. 44. The agenda for the meetings, which were finally held in Berlin between Feb. 27 and Mar. 3, included questions of land tenure, inheritance, schools and churches, equal rights to employment and in the professions, and minority organizations (52/34539-42). See also documents Nos. 132 and 134.

<sup>2</sup> A Führer order of July 2, 1938 (1861/422926) states: "I commission the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle with the centralized control of all Government and Party agencies, and with the centralized utilization of funds at the disposal of all agencies for nationality and border questions (German minorities outside and foreign minorities inside the borders)."

"The approval of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle is to be obtained before important decisions are made or funds in sizable amounts are expended."

difficulties in, having a representative of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle participate personally in the negotiations.

Submitted through Ministerialdirektor Stieve to the State Secretary.<sup>3</sup>

V. T[WARDOWSKI]

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "To Kult. I reported to the Foreign Minister today that internally the rights of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle will be fully respected, but it is not to be brought into direct contact with the Poles. The Foreign Minister agrees. Please take the necessary steps. W[eizsäcker], Feb. 9." An attached sheet (2446/514895) contains an exchange of handwritten notes between Counselor Bergmann of Political Division V and Senior Counselor Lorenz of the Cultural Policy Department indicating that the latter informed the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in accordance with the State Secretary's instruction.

## No. 129

1724/400884

*The State Secretary to the Consulate General at Geneva*

Telegram

No. 27

BERLIN, February 25, 1939—7:35 p. m.  
Pol. V 1706.

For the Consul General.

With reference to your letter of February 21.<sup>1</sup>

If the Council of the League of Nations should decide at its May session to withdraw from its guarantee of Danzig, we cannot do anything to prevent it. Whether in this case an advisory conciliation agency ought to be established in the person of Carl Burckhardt by means of direct German-Polish agreement depends upon factors which are difficult to judge today, 2 months in advance. At the present time we cannot imagine how any German-Polish agreement which would provide treaty-binding formal authority for Burckhardt, and also other concrete regulations, could be made without again prejudicing in an undesirable manner and rendering more difficult a solution of the Danzig question. Therefore we do not wish to encourage Burckhardt to engage in any activity along the lines of the ideas outlined by him, at any rate not at the present stage. Perhaps Burckhardt's imminent conversations in Geneva, especially with Chodacki, will provide some clarification.

Please send a telegraphic report on the course of these developments.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> In a letter to the State Secretary (1724/400878-83), Consul General Krauel had reported a conversation with Burckhardt in which the latter stated that the French and British had not been disturbed by the news that Danzig would refuse to hold new elections in accordance with constitutional requirements. Their main concern was to disengage the League from its guarantee of Danzig, and Burckhardt intended to recommend that they do this and abolish the post of High Commissioner at the May meeting of the League Council. If it was in accordance with German wishes he might continue to serve as an arbitrator under a special Polish-German agreement.

## No. 130

681/252314

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 18 of February 26

WARSAW, February 26, 1939—11:10 p. m.

Received February 27—2:00 a. m.

Pol. V 1734.

In regard to Beck's trip to London, which is now definite and will probably take place at the end of March, I have learned confidentially that the initiative was taken by Beck, who allowed it to be hinted in London that it would be well for him to inform the British Government about the Polish viewpoint on the Danzig question before the meeting of the Committee of Three. His purpose obviously is to delay, if possible, the abrogation of the League of Nations guarantee, and also to win British support for a subsequent settlement.

Furthermore, in making the trip Beck doubtless also intends to improve relations with England, which were troubled at times because of the Polish attitude in the Czechoslovak question; and in general, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Poland desires to get into closer touch with the Western democracies. In this connection, the fear that a conflict might arise with Germany over Danzig certainly plays an important role, as well as the effort in such an eventuality to escape from her present isolated position. In recent weeks the French alliance has also been receiving greater emphasis here than formerly, and it is possible—although nothing definite can be learned on this point as yet—that Beck will also go to Paris after his trip to London, something which he had declined to do in a rather unfriendly manner on the occasion of his Christmas sojourn on the Riviera.

MOLTKE

## No. 131

F14/273-75

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

RM 13

BERLIN, February 28, 1939.

I received the Polish Ambassador today and told him that I regarded the development in Poland with constantly increasing un-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The Führer has been informed. Hew[el]. Mar. 4."  
See German White Book, document No. 152.



easiness because of the local student incidents in Danzig. I called attention to the two demonstrations held in front of the Embassy, when the police had apparently stood by without doing anything, and also pointed out the agitation in a considerable part of the Polish press. The demonstrations were still continuing today all over Poland. I pointed out to the Ambassador that so far I had kept the entire affair completely out of the German press. If this press agitation and the demonstrations in Poland continued, however, the German press would reply and of course he knew enough about the German press to realize that it would then really do a thorough job. He, Lipski, knew the fundamental attitude of the Führer, which was to seek a broad, definitive settlement with Poland; this attitude continued unchanged. This settlement, however, could be rendered very difficult by such deplorable occurrences, and at the very least would be greatly delayed.

Thereupon Lipski explained how the incident had come about. Placards had apparently been put up there reading: "Admission prohibited to Poles and dogs! Poor dogs!" This had offended the student body and had led to the clashes with German students.<sup>2</sup> It seemed to him important for the students in Danzig to arrive at an agreement among themselves through the proposed commission. He knew that one step had already been taken, in that lectures had already been discontinued for the time being in order to calm tempers. He regretted very much the occurrences in Poland, and the demonstrations in front of the Embassy had particularly distressed Colonel Beck, who had immediately gone to Herr von Moltke for that reason. The responsible police officer had been dismissed immediately after the demonstrations. The Government press had taken a very sharp stand against the demonstrations. He would telephone Colonel Beck in Warsaw at once regarding our conversation, so that he might do still more to prevent any further clashes. I told Lipski that I was convinced that Colonel Beck deplored these demonstrations, and I expressed the hope that no further incidents would take place in Poland, since if our press were once given free rein there would naturally not fail to be incidents in the Reich, and this would necessarily lead to a serious disturbance of German-Polish relations.<sup>3</sup>

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>2</sup> Ciano, who was visiting Warsaw at the time of the demonstrations, told Moltke, according to the latter's telegram of Feb. 23 (52/34566-67), that when he expressed his displeasure Beck replied that French provocation had played a part in the incidents. Weizsäcker marked this sentence in the telegram with an exclamation point.

<sup>3</sup> A sentence added in Ribbentrop's handwriting at the foot of this document reads as follows: "I refused to meddle in the local student differences in Danzig."

## No. 132

52/34563-64

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

BERLIN, February 28, 1939.

In the German-Polish minority negotiations which began yesterday afternoon the enclosed working program<sup>1</sup> was initially proposed to the Polish delegation and was accepted by the latter after a discussion of a general nature. Then today point I (questions regarding boundary zones) and point II (agrarian reform questions) were introduced.

In regard to I, the German side proposed that the inheritance of landed property in both boundary zones as well as the legal acquisition of real estate by blood relatives or relatives by marriage up to the second degree be freed in principle from the necessity of official approval. Such a regulation is legally possible in Poland without any change in the boundary zone law. A proposal to this effect was transmitted. With regard to residence in the boundary zones, it was proposed that in the future persons be expelled only for more specifically defined reasons, and that expulsions undertaken after the Minorities Declaration (November 5, 1937) be reexamined on this basis. As regards agrarian reform, actual equality of treatment was demanded for the Volksdeutsche both with respect to their inclusion in the compulsory land redistribution program and in the various stages of its execution.

The Polish delegation showed extremely little willingness to come to any concrete agreements. Its spirit of cooperation was essentially limited to being willing once more to call the attention of subordinate offices to observance of the principles of the Minorities Declaration. In particular the Polish delegation considered unacceptable the mitigation of the boundary zone laws which we sought, since such a regulation would necessitate changes in existing laws. Our wishes regarding the treatment of cases of expulsion from the boundary zone were characterized as irreconcilable with the claims of state sovereignty. The definitive Polish stand on both boundary zone questions is still pending.

The Polish delegation stated that any discussion of agrarian reform questions in the Minorities Commission was inappropriate, since such discussions were already going on between the German Embassy in Warsaw and the Polish Foreign Ministry. After it was pointed out that these Warsaw discussions were merely of a preparatory nature, since the Minorities Commission had not met until just now, it was

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed (52/34565). See document No. 128, footnote 1, for a summary of the agenda.

agreed that the Poles be given a memorandum regarding discrimination against the Volksdeutsche in the field of agrarian reform, and that they then make an official reply.

The negotiations will be continued tomorrow morning with a discussion of the other points on the agenda. The Polish delegation expressed the intention of returning to Warsaw as early as tomorrow evening (March 1, 1939). An attempt will be made to induce the Polish representatives to remain here longer, since a thorough discussion of the entire agenda is impossible in such a short time.

Because of urgency submitted in separate copies to the Deputy Director and Director of the Political Department and to the State Secretary.

SCHLIER

No. 133

1724/400892-93

*The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 21 of February 28

GENEVA, March 1, 1939—5:05 p. m.

Received March 1—6:30 p. m.

Pol. V 1892.

Prior to the first discussion between Burckhardt and Walters<sup>1</sup> which occurred today I gave the High Commissioner the information in telegraphic instruction No. 27 of February 27 [25].

As a result of today's discussions in the League Secretariat the High Commissioner is sending a letter to the Committee of Three, in which he calls attention to his duty to interrupt his vacation and return to his post because of the present situation in Danzig. The Committee of Three will presumably decide, with or without the approval of Sandler, that the High Commissioner should return to Danzig after conferring with the British *rapporteur* of the Council . . . (group garbled) Halifax in London.

The Anglo-French intention now is to bring about at the May meeting of the Council a decision to revoke the League of Nations guarantee of the Danzig Constitution, which no longer fits the actual situation, but nevertheless to retain the authority of the League of Nations to safeguard the Danzig Statute in other respects. The High Commissioner would then remain in Danzig with limited duties. British annoyance with the Poles, who want to prevent the League of Nations from giving up the guarantee of the Constitution and who apparently fomented the present incidents for this purpose, seems

<sup>1</sup> Frank P. Walters, Under Secretary General of the League.

to be genuine. The High Commissioner believes that if the Danzig Government remains calm in the face of Polish provocation the German position in Danzig will be strengthened and compliance by the British and the French with Polish wishes will definitely be prevented.

Professor Burckhardt requested that Field Marshal Göring, Gauleiter Forster, and President Greiser also be informed in strictest confidence about the plans for handling the Danzig question, and that it be announced that he will return to Danzig the middle of March. The High Commissioner intends to await in Geneva the decision of the Committee of Three and then presumably go to London the beginning of next week for a discussion with Halifax; from there he will return to Danzig by way of Berlin. Professor Burckhardt would be grateful if he could be given the opportunity to inform the Foreign Minister personally about the discussions with Halifax and to learn the German attitude regarding further treatment of the Danzig question.

KRAUEL

### No. 134

52/34568-69

#### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

BERLIN, March 3, 1939.

Points III and V of the agenda were discussed in detail on the third and fourth day of negotiations (March 1 and 2) in the German-Polish minorities conversations.

In regard to school questions the principal German demand was the restoration of conditions as of November 5, 1937. The desires of both sides with respect to schools could be discussed after restoration of these conditions. The Poles do not care to engage in any discussion of school questions unless such questions are discussed in their entirety and unless the Polish minority is granted at least a Gymnasium for girls in Ratibor. This school in Ratibor is ostensibly a *conditio sine qua non* for the Poles.

In the field of church affairs we have indicated our interest in the fulfillment of the desire of the Evangelical Church in Posen-Pommerellen to organize and requested further that what we considered a political proceeding against Evangelical pastors of German origin, especially in Upper Silesia and Congress Poland, be stopped. On the question of the organization of the Evangelical Church in Posen-Pommerellen, the Poles remarked that this would soon be regulated by law. Any influencing of the Church authorities in regard to mea-

asures directed against German Evangelical ministers was not within the power of the administration.

Regarding passport questions, it was requested that discrimination against Volksdeutsche in the granting of passports be done away with. The Poles replied that in this particular the Volksdeutsche were not being discriminated against. For fiscal reasons Poland was not in a position to issue passports to the extent desired. It was agreed that the leaders of the national minorities should give both Governments lists of persons having a special interest in passports (leaders of minority organizations, business leaders, representatives of the press, and the like).

Regarding the local frontier traffic, it was demanded that border permits be issued entirely in accordance with the agreement on local border traffic.<sup>1</sup> Such permits should be refused only for reasons referring to the person of the applicant and as provided in the agreement. A request formulated in those terms was handed to the Polish delegation.

The Polish delegation declined to discuss questions regarding the German element in the Olsa area, since such questions were the subject of discussions between the German Embassy in Warsaw and the Polish Foreign Ministry. We answered that the discussions were merely of a preparatory nature and like all the other minorities questions naturally would have to be exhaustively discussed by this body. It is to be hoped that on this basis at least a general discussion will take place.

The discussions as such will be concluded this forenoon. It is intended to summarize the results in a protocol this afternoon.<sup>2</sup> In default of the necessary full powers the Polish delegation refuses to conclude any agreements. The protocol will therefore contain merely a statement of the views of the two sides.

The question whether a joint or separate final communiqué is to be published is still undecided.<sup>3</sup>

Because of urgency submitted in separate copies to the Deputy Director and Director of the Political Department and to the State Secretary.

SCHLIEP

<sup>1</sup> A Polish-German agreement of Dec. 22, 1931, for facilitating local border traffic provided that residents of the border districts (residence to be established after 3 months) might obtain border passes, normally to be valid for 1 year.

<sup>2</sup> The intention to draw up an agreed protocol was not carried out because the Polish delegation declared that, in view of the essentially negative result of the conversations, they saw no value in such a protocol. This explanation is made in a Foreign Ministry memorandum of Mar. 29, 1939, which summarized the talks of Feb. 27 to Mar. 3 (1836/419018-33).

<sup>3</sup> No communiqué was published because the Poles refused to accept a statement in the German draft (1836/419040) that negotiations would be resumed at an early date. The negotiations were in fact not resumed.

## No. 135

1724/400894

*The Foreign Minister to the Consulate General at Geneva*

Telegram

No. 29

BERLIN, March 4, 1939—6:45 p. m.  
zu Pol. V 1892.

With reference to your telegram No. 21 of February 28.

Since together with Danzig we have always taken the standpoint that the League of Nations has no authority to meddle in Danzig's internal affairs, we would welcome abolition of the League of Nations guarantee of the Danzig Constitution. We can never adopt an attitude of approval for the League of Nations legal competence in regard to the international statute, in view of our fundamentally negative attitude toward the institution of the League of Nations. Subject to this reservation, we would not oppose a development in the direction intended by the British and French.

Please inform Burckhardt accordingly and tell him that I am prepared to receive him.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 136

52/84573-74

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 88 of March 4

ROME, March 5, 1939—1:20 a. m.  
Received March 5—4:50 a. m.

Ciano, who upon his return yesterday greeted me with the assurance that he had informed our Ambassador in Warsaw in detail of the content and results of the Warsaw conversations, received me today for a longer discussion of his trip to Poland. His statement coincides with Moltke's telegraphic report (telegraphic instruction No. 76 of March 1).<sup>1</sup> He characterized the position of the Polish Government as lacking in inner firmness, since everyone regards himself as the appointed guardian of the Pilsudski heritage, but there is no one with really new ideas. "Poland is living under the dictatorship of a dead man." Strong counterinfluences are at work against Beck's policy toward the Reich, especially certain arch-Catholic circles and 4 million Jews, but more than anything else there is a mounting fear of the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6381/E474485-87). The Foreign Ministry had transmitted to the Rome Embassy the Moltke telegram referred to in document No. 131, footnote 2.

steadily increasing strength of the large neighbor to the west. He could summarize his opinion of Poland's attitude in case of a conflict by saying—in complete agreement with Moltke, by the way—that it would be just as big a mistake to assume that Poland has been won over to the Axis as it would be too pessimistic to expect Poland to be committed to the opposite side. Poland would delay the decision as long as possible and then "hurry to the aid of the victor."

In regard to individual questions: Ciano mentioned casually that Beck had characterized the Danzig question as a problem which concerned only Poland and the Reich and was therefore to be dealt with only by these two.

In contrast to certain political questions, not a word was said concerning colonial questions.

The anti-German demonstrations had placed him in an embarrassing position. He had, however, been able to observe that the Polish Government had reacted immediately by arresting four ringleaders and discharging certain responsible public officials.

Finally, Ciano asked me to supplement his statements to Moltke on a point which he had forgotten in his conversation with him. In view of the fact that the President of Poland had already on several occasions come to Italy privately to stay at spas, Ciano, with the approval of Mussolini, had extended to him an invitation to come to Rome, which had been accepted in principle. But in consideration of the anti-German demonstrations he had omitted that passage in the final communiqué, in order not to allow false impressions to arise. May or June was being considered for the date of the visit; but he would follow up the idea—on which he could still "put a damper" at any time—only if it suited us. He could imagine that a visit might be useful for further *rapprochement* of Poland to the Axis. I request instructions on this point at your convenience.

MACKENSEN

### No. 137

1818/415153-53

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P III 1 d

WARSAW, March 9, 1939.

Received March 15.

Pol. V 2336.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversation with Minister Beck on German-Polish Relations.

In a conversation which I had with M. Beck yesterday I again referred to the demonstrations in front of the German Embassy, in

which connection I called attention in particular to the obvious partisanship shown by the police for the demonstrators as well as to the fact that a high-ranking Polish officer had described these demonstrations to an informant as completely justified. I told M. Beck that both these facts as well as other observations of a like nature had unfortunately demonstrated from what a narrow base the policy of understanding was being pursued here in Poland. With the exception of himself and possibly a half dozen other persons there was really no one here in Poland who was seriously interested in this matter. Nor was it surprising if the attitude toward Germany was continually getting worse here, for the press did not stop its provocative attacks. Every day hostile articles appeared, and not only in the opposition press but also in the provincial government organs; and only the two semiofficial newspapers published in Warsaw maintained a fairly correct attitude. But even worse was the agitation of the Western Association, which in an exceedingly obvious manner was carrying out a planned program to stir up the people against everything German. It was simply monstrous that there had been a wave of demonstrations all over the country for 3 weeks in August of last year, in protest against the alleged brutality of the Germans—demonstrations actually occasioned by the regrettable accident of a Polish railroad man who fell off the train on the Danzig-Gdynia run and had both legs cut off. The agitation at that time was tolerated by the Government although it knew that the accident blamed on the Germans had been brought about solely by the negligence of the Polish railroad employee himself, without a single German being implicated in the matter. That was the most incredible case of incitation that had ever come to my attention.

M. Beck appeared to be very much embarrassed by these statements and declared once again how much he had deplored the incidents in front of the German Embassy. He admitted that the police had failed to act and declared that the guilty police officer would be brought to trial. For the rest, he thought that one ought not to regard the situation too pessimistically. The policy of understanding was in fact not always easy to carry out, and he was quite aware of the difficulties. He had had to fight hard especially in 1936 for recognition of this policy inaugurated by Pilsudski; since then, however, he had encountered more and more sympathetic understanding of it in political circles. He thought that the main reason for the deterioration of the atmosphere during the last few months could be attributed to the Carpatho-Ukrainian question, since Germany was blamed for the fact that a common Polish-Hungarian boundary was not established. Furthermore, the idea was being fostered among the people



through all possible channels from countries hostile to us that with the problems of Austria and the Sudetenland solved, it was now Poland's turn.

I pointed out that both assertions had been rendered devoid of all foundation by the very plain statements at Berchtesgaden and that it was really high time that something was done to counteract this poisoning of the atmosphere. At any rate we were unable to understand how the press agitation could be tolerated by the Government and how the Western Association could be given a free reign for its anti-German activities.

VON MOLTKE

No. 138

97/108309

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 207 a

BERLIN, March 13, 1939.

Today I discussed at length with Professor Burckhardt (Danzig) his further conduct. B. described his last conversations in Geneva and gave me to understand that he was now going back to Danzig really because of opposition to MM. Sandler, etc. Besides, he did not want to overstay his leave, although we had urged him through Consul General Krauel to remain in the mountains a little longer.

I then corroborated B.'s view that in my opinion we could not count on any Volkstag elections for the time being. On account of the acute Czechoslovak question the Poles gave us the impression of being very nervous. Thus, they would probably also be more difficult in Danzig and be inclined to misuse B. and play him off against us. I would therefore really have preferred in B.'s own interest that he should not expose himself to that at this time.

B. then added in this connection that he knew the introduction of the swastika flag was being considered in Danzig. I did not deny this. It did not, however, appear to disturb B. particularly. So I am not sure whether B. will take my advice and return temporarily to Switzerland.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Burckhardt did return to Geneva and on Mar. 19 Weizsäcker wrote him a letter there (97/108310) in which he stated that he had learned that a third person, a non-German, to whom Burckhardt had given an account of his conversation with Weizsäcker, was passing this on in a false and dramatized form. Weizsäcker requested Burckhardt not to attempt to correct this version as that would only increase its currency.

## No. 139

1340/353524-25

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 26 of March 13

WARSAW, March 13, 1939—4:02 a. m.

Received March 13—6:10 a. m.

Pol. V 2259.

With reference to your telegram No. 35 of March 11.<sup>1</sup>

The following should be considered in evaluating the Polish attitude toward the Czechoslovak question:

1. From all appearances Poland considers the settlement of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question and the establishment of a common Polish-Hungarian boundary of decisive importance. Annexation by Hungary is considered the main alternative to the Polish solution.

2. Beck has for a long time been counting on internal tension within Czechoslovakia to bring about, sooner or later, a situation which would make it possible to carry out the above plan. The discussions here with Gafencu also appear to have been conducted on that basis.

3. Up to now Poland has encouraged the creation of an independent Slovakia in the expectation that this would finally bring about a solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question favorable to Poland. It was probably assumed that because of linguistic, racial, and cultural ties as well as years of furthering . . . (group garbled), an independent Slovakia would align herself with Poland.

4. Poland apparently does not desire to incorporate Slovakia into the Polish State or otherwise to assume military responsibility for her, since it would mean exchanging an otherwise good Carpathian boundary for an essentially poorer military position.

5. Poland is quite obviously averse to an independent Slovakia under German influence, since the danger of military encirclement is still further increased thereby.

In view of the considerations mentioned above, the contradictory reports from Prague and Warsaw referred to in your telegram could be explained. Poland, because of her attitude at the time the boundary was fixed, suffered a considerable loss of the sympathy existing in Slovakia and has to fear that now the independence of Slovakia would only mean alignment with Germany; thus it is quite understandable that the Poles are intriguing against it in Prague while simultaneously maintaining an outwardly friendly attitude in

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1340/353523). The Foreign Ministry telegram requested an explanation of the contradictory reports concerning the Polish attitude toward the internal crisis in Czechoslovakia which were being sent by official German news agency representatives in Prague and Warsaw. DNB reported from Prague that the Czechs were counting on Polish support to help in curbing the Slovaks, probably at the price of giving up the Carpatho-Ukraine. But the DNB report from Warsaw stated that Poland viewed with sympathy the attempt of Slovakia to free herself from Prague.

Warsaw in the event that this development cannot be halted, in order to keep open the possibility of German-Polish cooperation.

MOLTKE

No. 140

1818/415157-58

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P V 18

WARSAW, March 14, 1939.

Pol. V 2338.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: M. Beck in regard to his trip to England.

M. Beck informed me in regard to his trip to London, the initiative for which is known to have come from him, that he had been invited by the British Government, but had requested on his part that the trip be given an unofficial character in order to facilitate in this way the questions of protocol and to gain time for political discussions. Since he was not going to Geneva any more and had no opportunity to meet the British politicians there, he had been very glad to accept the invitation. There were no special problems facing them, but rather a general *tour d'horizon* was to be undertaken in London.

In answer to my question whether his trip was connected with the meeting of the Danzig Committee of Three, he replied that the intention was to have the Committee meet in London, to be sure, but the session would not take place during his stay there. Of course, he intended also to discuss the Danzig question with the British Government. In answer to the question whether he was still of the opinion that an extension of the League of Nations guarantee was desirable, he replied that he did in fact attach importance to such an extension and hoped to obtain it, now that he had been informed from Stockholm that M. Sandler appeared to be revising his previously negative attitude.

M. Beck then finally revealed his real intentions and declared that his goal was to interest the British Government in preventing a vacuum and in maintaining the League of Nations guarantee until Germany and Poland succeeded in arriving at an understanding in regard to substituting a bilateral agreement for the League of Nations guarantee. He had just received a report from M. Lipski and learned from it to his great joy that the Reich Chancellor had lately emphasized, even more strongly than at Berchtesgaden, that the Danzig question under no circumstances should be permitted to lead to a disturbance of German-Polish relations. In view of this attitude on the part of the Reich Chancellor, he hoped to arrive at a solution satisfactory to the interests of both sides.

VON MOLTKE

CHAPTER II  
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE  
SEPTEMBER 21, 1937-MARCH 15, 1939

No. 141

1518/373057-64

*Memorandum by the Press Attaché of the Legation in Switzerland*<sup>1</sup>

CONVERSATION WITH THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER M. DE  
KÁNYA, ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1937, IN GENEVA

1. *State of the Negotiations With the Little Entente.*<sup>2</sup>

M. de Kánya gave the following account:

He had negotiated here, in continuation of the Bucharest discussions, with Antonescu<sup>3</sup> and later with Purich;<sup>4</sup> he had not yet been able to talk with a representative of Czechoslovakia, however, because of the Czech Minister's absence. On the question of the declarations to be made by both sides, he believed he had reached agreement with the representatives of Rumania and Yugoslavia—provided there were no surprises—and there would doubtless be no difficulties with Czechoslovakia. If it were only a matter of these questions, prospects for the negotiations would be excellent. Things would then develop in such a way that the individual countries of the Little Entente would openly declare that they renounced the implementation of the military clauses of the Trianon Treaty, while Hungary would, with reference to the Kellogg Pact, proclaim a general renunciation of war. This "Kellogg declaration" would likewise be made by the Little Entente. Kánya rejected the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty, pointing out that such a treaty would be senseless and also ineffectual in practice, so long as the Little Entente was bound by military conventions aimed directly and exclusively against Hungary. Nor had Antonescu and Purich returned to the question of the nonaggression

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<sup>1</sup> The memorandum was enclosed in a letter to Weizsäcker (1518/373053-56) who as Minister in Switzerland was Hack's former chief. The interview with Kánya occurred during the latter's attendance at the League of Nations Assembly sessions.

<sup>2</sup> For a statement on the background of Hungary's relations with the Little Entente at this period see *Survey of International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1938), vol. I, pp. 415-418.

<sup>3</sup> Victor Antonescu, Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Bozhidar Purich, Yugoslav Minister in France who represented Yugoslavia at the meeting of the Permanent Council of the Little Entente held in Geneva on Sept. 27, 1937.

pact during the Geneva talks, and they appeared satisfied with a "Kellogg declaration." In this connection it should be borne in mind that the Little Entente had even originally wished for *assistance mutuelle* between their countries and Hungary.

The result of the negotiations summarized here remains as before dependent upon concrete concessions by the Little Entente on the minorities question. Only in this case could Hungary be interested in the whole affair. He, Kánya, had discussed with Antonescu and Purich (separately) the concrete and exactly defined Hungarian demands. Certainly some objections had been raised on the part of both these Ministers, but they had not refused unconditionally. It had now been agreed that counterproposals would still be presented here in Geneva. As Kánya had to leave on Thursday evening (September 23, 1937) the negotiations would then be continued through diplomatic channels with each of the three countries of the Little Entente separately. Nevertheless it was quite clear today that a separate agreement with one of these three countries was no longer possible, but that in the end there could be only a general agreement. The prospects of future negotiations on the minorities question could not yet be judged. One had to remember the relatively weak internal position of the Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments, and also the fact that both countries were riding a high horse on account of the German and Italian attempts to win Belgrade and Bucharest. This was particularly true in the case of Yugoslavia. On the other hand Czechoslovakia was much more "pliable." In any case the negotiations would last still longer. In the event that a satisfactory solution was finally reached, the settlement of the minorities question would then be linked up with the general agreement, probably without publication of the details. Kánya would then make a statement in Parliament or to the press saying that the countries of the Little Entente would carry out certain measures in favor of the Hungarian minorities, and the Little Entente would then issue corresponding orders internally. This agreement would then result in a certain easing of relations between Hungary and the Little Entente without altering the main lines of policy. It was not the fault of Hungary that it had been necessary to include Czechoslovakia in this agreement as well, but the fault of Italy and Germany, who had by their policy supported Yugoslavia and Rumania to such an extent that these two countries were no longer sufficiently prepared to make concessions.

In Kánya's opinion no communiqué would be published on the Geneva negotiations, which would in any case only represent one stage. The press could be informed merely that negotiations between the Little Entente and Hungary, principally on questions of equality of

rights and on minorities, were in progress and would be continued. The aim was to ease tension in the Danube Basin in the interests of peace. Naturally any resulting agreement would in no way be aimed against other powers.

Finally Kánya confirmed once more that of course a separate declaration by Hungary of Hungary's sovereign rights in the military sphere was out of the question as long as these negotiations lasted. He had, however, deliberately given a hint of the possibility of such a declaration, in order to exert influence on the Cabinets of the Little Entente, which would see in such a declaration by Hungary a serious loss of prestige.

## 2. *Preceding Stages of the Negotiations.*

The Hungarian Foreign Minister gave the following additional information on these:

At the end of the previous year the Ministers of the Little Entente in Budapest had already sounded him out about a nonaggression treaty. But even at that time he had pointed out that really concrete measures in favor of the Hungarian minorities would be the prerequisite of any other agreement. The Little Entente must make some "serious gesture" in this direction before Hungary could consider any other arrangements. Measures in favor of the Hungarian minorities had then been envisaged on the part of the Little Entente. He had, however, waited in vain for their implementation. At all events nothing of any importance had occurred.

Then in March of this year he had attempted to conclude a separate agreement with Yugoslavia, which the Germans and Italians had always urged him to do. He had made proposals and shown his willingness to go further in this respect than toward the Little Entente in general. These proposals had at first been welcomed very enthusiastically by Stoyadinovich. A few days later, however, Count Ciano had suddenly arrived in Belgrade and concluded the treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia.<sup>5</sup> As a result there was no longer any evidence of willingness on the Yugoslav side to seek a *rapprochement* with Hungary. Certainly Benes' visit to Yugoslavia,<sup>6</sup> which had led to enthusiastic demonstrations, and the criticism which the understanding with Italy had evoked in some quarters in Yugoslavia, had made it difficult for Stoyadinovich to make concessions to Hungary, too.

This being so, Kánya had to admit that, if he wished to ease tension in the Danube Basin and to accomplish anything for the sorely oppressed Hungarian minorities, he would be obliged to negotiate with all the states of the Little Entente and to give up the idea of a

<sup>5</sup> Mar. 25, 1937.

<sup>6</sup> Apr. 25-26, 1937.

separate agreement. These considerations had then led to the talks in Sinaia<sup>7</sup> in August of this year. He was bound to stress once more the fact that it was precisely Italy, who had originally wished for an understanding only with Yugoslavia and Rumania, that was mainly to blame if Czechoslovakia now had to be drawn in as well. The Italian Minister in Bucharest, Sola, had made great efforts to promote the talks in Sinaia, but this had not in itself been necessary, as M. de Bardossy<sup>8</sup> needed no guidance and only those negotiations were continued which had already been commenced with Hungary earlier.

### 3. *Germany, Italy and Hungary.*

Kánya said in a clearly rather bitter and offended tone that while Italy and Germany certainly wished Hungary to take a stand against Czechoslovakia, they had done practically nothing for Hungary. In Berlin and Rome more heed was paid nowadays to Belgrade than to Budapest. He realized, of course, that questions of general policy were involved. Nor had Hungary any mistrust of Germany's and Italy's policy. Nevertheless he felt bound to say frankly that if, contrary to expectations, she were ever abandoned by Germany and Italy, then Hungary would reach a very much more comprehensive agreement with the Little Entente than was perhaps held to be possible today. Kánya then stressed once again that he personally was not counting on that possibility at all, and that the existing good relations were confirmed by the visit of the War Minister and highest-ranking officers of the Hungarian Army to the German maneuvers.

### 4. *Hungary and England.*

By way of impressions of his conversation with Eden, Kánya told me that the British were convinced that the measures taken in the Mediterranean were sufficient to prevent further attacks by "pirates."<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Italy's attitude was by no means regarded as a final refusal. They were, as always, prepared to make far-reaching concessions to Italy. An authoritative Englishman (Eden?) had told him that Germany was, in his opinion, exerting a calming influence on relations between Italy and England. He had been able to sense a certain anxiety and unrest among the British about future developments in Spain. It was not yet regarded as being out of the question that Italy—particularly after a great and decisive victory on land—would still come forward with territorial claims. That could, of course, never be tolerated by England and France. In this connection Kánya

<sup>7</sup>The Permanent Council of the Little Entente met at Sinaia on Aug. 30-31, 1937.

<sup>8</sup>Ladislav de Bardossy, Hungarian Minister in Rumania.

<sup>9</sup>An agreement was signed at Nyon on Sept. 14, 1937, by Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, U. S. S. R., and Yugoslavia to take measures against the operations of "unidentified" submarines in connection with the Spanish Civil War (British White Paper, Cmd. 5563, 1937). See also vol. III, ch. IV, of this series.

remarked further that Mussolini had told him quite definitely that Italy was not so stupid as to pursue territorial aims in Spain.

In Kánya's opinion, England's interest in the Danube Basin (and her understanding of problems there) were not great enough for England to be prepared to undertake dangerous guarantee commitments here. She was, however, anxious for and was supporting all attempts to reach a settlement in that area. There was still a great difference between England's vital interests in France, Holland, and Belgium, and her attitude to the Danube problems. Nevertheless Kánya believed that England would always stand by France if the latter should become involved in a large-scale war.

#### 5. *Austria—Italy—Germany.*

Kánya emphasized that Austria would very much welcome an easing of tension in the Danube Basin by means of a settlement between Hungary and the Little Entente. He himself regarded it, now as always, as an important step forward that Germany and Austria were now getting along well together. He believed that at bottom Italy was still interested in Austria's independence, but that she could no longer show or demonstrate this interest so clearly as formerly because of the tension between her and England. In his conversation with Count Ciano he had got the impression that the latter had been very greatly impressed by his visit to Germany, and that today Germany filled the Italians—even Mussolini—with respect.

#### 6. *Czechoslovakia.*

The Hungarian Foreign Minister described the extremely menaced and precarious position of Czechoslovakia. It should never be forgotten that 52 percent of the people in this country were non-Czechs and that everywhere the minorities lived at the frontiers. Yet this country had actually none but enemies among her neighbors. He had talked to Beck recently and the latter had expressed his views on Czechoslovakia with extreme severity. It was therefore understandable that Prague now felt insecure and would also make concessions to Hungary, though not of a territorial nature. Of course, the Czechs knew very well that even a nonaggression pact could not secure them against Hungary in all eventualities.

#### 7. *Hungary and the Hodža Plan.*<sup>10</sup>

With regard to the report of the Rumanian news agency, Rador, that negotiations on the Danube Basin project (modified Hodža plan?)

<sup>10</sup> "The 'Hodža Plan' of 1936 had aimed at an economic-political organization embracing the six states bordering on the Danube, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and commercial treaties had already been concluded between Czechoslovakia and Austria, and Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Dr. Hodža envisaged the extension of this system to all signatories of the Pact of Rome, as well as to the members of the Balkan and Baltic Ententes." (*Survey of International Affairs, 1938*, vol. 1, pp. 49-50.)



were taking place in Geneva, Kánya stated that he knew nothing whatever of a Hodža plan. Certainly there were various more or less vague ideas described as a Hodža plan, but nothing really definite and concrete. He wished to tell me confidentially that M. Hodža had himself approached Baron Schüller some time before in Vienna and asked him to make some suggestions for his Hodža plan. That was significant.

#### 8. *Hungarian Policy of Revision.*

Kánya stressed that a small country in such a dangerous and difficult position as Hungary could only gradually undertake the revision of treaties, and that demonstrative gestures had no meaning for Hungary. He had now won 75 percent of Hungarian politicians over to this policy.

To the question why Hungary attached primary consideration to the protection of her minorities, Count Csáky later replied that in view of certain expropriation measures, etc., it was now really a question of the very life and existence of the Hungarian minorities. These must first and foremost be secured as far as possible before anything else could be thought of. Moreover, the members of the Hungarian minorities driven from the countries of the Little Entente were infecting public life in Hungary itself; it was therefore important from the point of view of Hungarian domestic policy to procure a remedy for this.

HACK

### No. 142

511/235505-08

#### *The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET  
G 249

BELGRADE, September 28, 1937.

Received October 2.

Pol. IV 4985.

Subject: Date of the official return visit of the Yugoslav Minister President and Foreign Minister to Berlin.

Minister President and Foreign Minister Stoyadinovich told me today that from the end of November on he would be in a position at any time to accept an invitation to pay an official visit to Berlin, thus returning the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister to Belgrade.<sup>1</sup> With this reservation he left the choice of date entirely to us and asked only that we get in touch with him at the proper time with regard to the specific dates which came into question. He believed that it was in the interest of both countries to give the visit the character of an

<sup>1</sup> Neurath visited Belgrade from June 7 to 9, 1937.

official state visit and therefore to dispense with such camouflage as a hunting exhibit, a hunting invitation, etc., a view with which I stated my personal agreement.<sup>2</sup>

The Minister President intends to go to Paris during the first half of October for the purpose of extending the Franco-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship. Perhaps he will also accept a British invitation and visit London afterwards. The visit to London could only be very short, to be sure, since he has to be in Belgrade again by October 18 (convening of the Skupshtina). Stoyadinovich wishes to go to Rome at the beginning of November to return Ciano's visit. He would like to postpone until next spring the return visit which is due in Sofia.

V. HEEREN

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "Yes. v. N[eurath]. Oct. 4."

### No. 143

1895/426815-16

#### *The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 2306 Po 3 Kl.E

BELGRADE, September 29, 1937.

Received October 2.

Pol. IV 5004.

Subject: Hungary-Little Entente.

Regarding the status of the negotiations between Hungary and the states of the Little Entente on the modalities for recognition of Hungary's unrestricted sovereignty in armaments, the Minister President expressed himself to me today as follows:

It now remained only a question of Hungary's wishes in the minorities question. These had to do mainly with Rumania and Czechoslovakia, less with Yugoslavia, where an accommodating attitude toward the Hungarian minority had already been adopted spontaneously. In Czechoslovakia it was the questions of agrarian reform, in Rumania the complicated conditions in Transylvania (the Szeklers, etc.) that made difficulties. There was also the circumstance that Tatarescu had objections to making concessions to the Hungarian minority before the Rumanian elections, since the domestic opposition would exploit this with the slogan, "betrayal of Rumanian nationalism." Some time might still elapse, therefore, before agreement was reached with Hungary. He had stated in Sinaia that Yugoslavia would not conclude a separate agreement with Hungary. Actually he could not afford to do this in view of his other divergences. Nevertheless he believed that the fear on the part of her partners in the Little Entente that Yugoslavia might make a separate settlement with

Hungary had done Hungary good service in the present negotiations, since the inclination of Czechoslovakia and of Rumania to be conciliatory toward Hungary had been greatly strengthened thereby.

V. HEEREN

No. 144

1881/424576-79

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A No. 273 P 1 (Spez.)

BUDAPEST, October 5, 1937.

Received October 9.

Pol. IV 5148.

Subject: Landeskreis Hungary of the NSDAP.

With reference to my report of September 21, A No. 262.<sup>1</sup>

At the dinner given by the Minister President yesterday in honor of Marshal Badoglio, I asked the former whether the Minister of the Interior had, as he had promised me, reported to him my request for revision of the Hungarian stand with regard to non-approval of the conversion of the Ortsgruppe of the NSDAP here into a Landeskreis.<sup>2</sup>

M. de Darányi, whose attention had apparently not been called to the matter recently, referred first of all to the objections to the term "Landeskreis" which I mentioned in my previous reports, a word in very bad repute here since the days of the Hapsburgs. In accordance with the authorization given me by Gauleiter Bohle and the oral communication from Gauamtsleiter Dr. Koderle to the effect that the early conversion of the Landeskreis here into a Landesgruppe was contemplated, and that for this reason we had better avoid approaching the Hungarian Government twice in quick succession in this matter, I informed the Minister President that we were willing to come to an agreement on the basis of a "Landesgruppe." I stated, among other things, that in view of the fact that the organizations of the NSDAP were allowed to function in 40 countries, among them France and Belgium, it was not understood in Germany why particularly Hungary, with whom we enjoy especially friendly relations, was making difficulties in this matter.

The Minister President seemed inclined to grant my request, but then drew the Foreign Minister into the conversation. M. de Kánya stated that the Minister of the Interior had decided that the "Orts-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1881/424573). Erdmannsdorff had reported earlier unsuccessful representations on the same subject.

<sup>2</sup> On Sept. 2 State Secretary Mackensen had explained to Ministerial Counselor de Boor of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior that what was desired was to promote Ortsgruppenleiter Wilhelm Graeb of Budapest to the title of Landeskreisleiter, but that no immediate organizational changes were intended (3435/E016576).

gruppe" would have to remain unchanged. When I said, among other things, using the familiar arguments, that I failed to understand this decision, and inquired as to the motives, M. de Kánya referred to the fact that the Ministry of the Interior here was extremely irritated at the constant Greater Germany propaganda.<sup>3</sup> He mentioned in this connection trips made by Reich Germans for purposes of agitation in the areas occupied by the German minority here, alleged financial support from the Reich for German minority groups, as well as the activity of the Academic Exchange Service in Budapest. The Foreign Minister further asserted that in Germany, despite official declarations, the concepts of *Auslandsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche* were still being confused, as he had noted twice quite recently in the *Kölnische Zeitung*. It also did not exactly help to clarify matters that in Stuttgart, the "City of the *Auslandsdeutsche*," that is, of Reich Germans abroad, there existed the "Auslandsinstitut," which treated very extensively *volksdeutsch* questions. He also said that a speech of Minister Frick in Nuremberg—perhaps he meant the Stuttgart speech<sup>4</sup>—could be applied to *Auslandsdeutsche* as well as to *Volksdeutsche*, and that a statement recently made by an authoritative official in Germany, to the effect that in cultural matters there were no political boundaries, gave cause for strong objections.

Naturally I opposed energetically the statements of the Foreign Minister. Among other things, I demanded that instead of generalizing he produce positive proof for his assertions regarding the alleged Greater Germany propaganda being conducted from certain German offices. I pointed out to him, moreover, that his statements had nothing in the least to do with the question of converting the *Ortsgruppe* here, against whose activities to date not the slightest reproach could be made, into a *Landesgruppe*. The disapproval of this change could therefore not be justified on logical grounds.

M. de Kánya replied that he had mentioned these matters only in order to explain the annoyance of the Ministry of the Interior, and stated that he had often used his moderating influence with the authorities there and with the press. He said we would probably still obtain our wish with respect to the conversion of the *Ortsgruppe*. We should have a little patience, however.

The Minister President, who mentioned that recently he had again been presented with a great deal of material regarding the propaganda

<sup>3</sup> In a report of Sept. 10 (1847/420946-47) Erdmannsdorff called attention to public speeches by Tibor Eckhardt, leader of the Independent Agrarian Party, and by Vice President Kornis of the Chamber of Deputies, both of which made the charge of pan-Germanism. On Sept. 15 Hungarian Minister Sztójay complained to State Secretary Mackensen (3412/E014151-52) of what seemed to him a systematic increase of anti-Hungarian propaganda in the German youth publication *Wille und Macht*.

<sup>4</sup> At the twentieth annual meeting of the *Deutsches Auslandsinstitut* in August.

from Germany in support of the extreme right-wing political groups in Hungary, stated to me in conclusion that he would try to find a satisfactory solution with respect to the conversion of the Ortsgruppe.

V. ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 145

1975/438252-58

*Memorandum by the Minister to Rumania*

BERLIN, October 7, 1937.

Pol. IV 5085.

[I.] The Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Nagy, called on me on October 2 for the purpose of informing me of an instruction he had received from M. de Kánya. It was to the effect that M. de Kánya had had a talk with the German Minister in Budapest, running approximately as follows:

Hungary, in deference to the wish of Germany and Italy, had been trying to bring about a settlement in her relations with Rumania. The negotiations, started in Sinaia, where the Italian Minister, M. Ugo Sola, had rendered valuable mediation services, had been continued in Geneva. Unfortunately these negotiations had produced no results whatsoever. Whereas Yugoslavia evinced a sympathetic attitude toward the solution of the minorities problem, Czechoslovakia had cooled after initially showing good will, and Rumania was completely negative. But until a few days ago, M. de Nagy added parenthetically, they had hoped nevertheless that it would be possible to continue the negotiations in Bucharest, and the Minister, M. de Bardossy, was supposed to hold himself in readiness here after a brief vacation of ten days. However, the last conversations in Geneva had shown that any continuation of negotiations would be futile at the present time, and so M. de Bardossy would remain absent on a prolonged vacation for the present.

M. de Kánya had accordingly requested the German Minister in Budapest, Herr von Erdmannsdorff, to report to his Government so that the German Minister in Bucharest could be instructed to urge the Rumanian Foreign Minister to be more accommodating in the minority question. He, M. de Nagy, wanted me to know this because he had heard that I was to leave on October 4 and that the instructions from Berlin would consequently no longer reach me in time.

I replied in the first place that we would welcome a normalization of relations between Hungary and Rumania, to be sure, and I had for that reason arranged the first talk between M. de Bardossy and M. An-

tonescu at the time, but the settlement of mutual problems was nevertheless a matter between Rumania and Hungary. On this account—and M. de Nagy understood this—I had to observe much greater reserve than my Italian colleague, in order not to injure the Hungarian cause by overzealousness.

Moreover, I told M. de Nagy that I had not heard anything from Berlin as yet about M. de Kánya's wishes. But he might perhaps tell me at this time to what he attributed the opposition of the Rumanian Foreign Minister, and what specific questions he referred to. M. de Nagy said that he did not know the reasons for Antonescu's negative attitude, but M. Antonescu was obviously too weak to carry his point in this matter; specific points relating to the minority problem had not yet been discussed—as a matter of fact, the Rumanians refused altogether to negotiate about the minorities in Hungary.

I then told M. de Nagy that if that was the case it must appear to him, too, that my talking with M. Antonescu could only consist in my asking the Foreign Minister how matters stood with respect to Hungary, so as to get an idea what steps to take next. I could naturally undertake such an informal talk at any time provided I could still arrange to speak to Foreign Minister Antonescu, who would not return from Geneva until the late evening of October 3, before my departure on October 4.

M. de Nagy also stressed that a declaration in general terms on the better treatment of the Hungarian minority would not be satisfactory in M. de Kánya's opinion, but that concrete commitments were needed, such as those contained in the Hungarian proposal with which we were familiar.

II. I managed to see M. Antonescu on Monday, October 4, from 6:45 to 7:30 p. m., to take my leave of him before departing for Berlin. After we had spoken of the forthcoming visit to Bucharest of the President of the Reichsbank—he gave October 28 and the following days as the date to be proposed—I inquired about M. Antonescu's impressions in Geneva and he himself immediately talked about his negotiations with M. de Kánya. *Hungary*, he said, had expressed her intention to proclaim her rearmament. M. de Kánya had stated that this declaration was nothing new, but merely published an existing state of affairs. The Little Entente was prepared to recognize this, but emphasized that the declaration of adherence to the Kellogg Pact which Hungary would issue subsequently was nothing new either, being merely a solemn confirmation of the existing state of affairs. He thought that one declaration balanced the other, and that it was not fair and proper for Hungary to insist also on negotiations about minorities.

I remarked that in that case the talks in Geneva were a step backward from those in Sinaia. There, as I had originally believed, the consensus had been that the Hungarian declaration about rearmament did not call for a counterassurance, but that, in line with the improvement in relations between the neighboring countries, the non-aggression declaration in the sense of the Kellogg Pact would be supplemented by a declaration concerning the better treatment of the minorities.

M. Antonescu shrugged his shoulders, saying it was obvious that in view of public opinion in Rumania at present the Government could issue no declaration whatever about the Hungarian minorities; the German minorities were an entirely different matter, but the Hungarian minority was a much more thorny problem. The present Government would risk the greatest difficulties if it agreed to negotiate about this problem. Everyone had to understand that such a thing was entirely impossible *before* the elections. I asked M. Antonescu whether he saw prospects for a discussion *after* the elections. He replied: "Perhaps, but it is impossible to say anything as yet."

It was quite evident from the conversation that a settlement of this issue is out of the question at this time at any rate.

Since there was no time to do so before my departure, I asked Herr von Pochhammer, who was taking my place, to inform the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires that I had talked with M. Antonescu and become convinced that he would not do anything, at least not *before* the elections, that could advance the negotiations with Hungary.

III. I asked M. Antonescu in the course of our conversation about the rumors that he had negotiated in Geneva about Hodža's *Danube plan*. He admitted this, but added that he had upheld Rumania's viewpoint that Rumania had no interest in the realization of the plan. Rumania had close economic relations with Germany and attached the greatest value to not disturbing them but rather expanding them further. A settlement about the Danube Basin which did not include German participation was disadvantageous to Rumania. That was his own view and that of the present Rumanian Government.

IV. I asked M. Antonescu whether France, perhaps with the support of Czechoslovakia, had revived her old *alliance project*. M. Antonescu replied that France had not done this, but Czechoslovakia had. However, Rumania's line was absolutely clear: no more alliances. Rumania was desirous of developing her friendships, as, for instance, with Germany. But even with Germany she wanted no alliance, but rather an increasingly close friendship. He did not think that M. Krofta was discussing any new subjects in Paris; it was a visit of friendship.

V. M. Antonescu then talked about Rumania's attitude in the voting on the *non-permanent Council seat* in Geneva. Rumania, together with the members of the Little Entente and the Balkan Federation—it had been hard to persuade Czechoslovakia—had voted against Red Spain. Since the position of Rumania and her partners was known, some of the sponsors of Red Spain had taken their revenge and voted against Turkey, whose election was supported by the Little Entente and the Balkan Federation. And so Turkey had been rejected. I asked M. Antonescu whether he thought that the overthrow of İsmet İnönü and Tewfik Aras was attributable to this, since the outcome of the Geneva vote was in the eyes of Gazi Atatürk a bad defeat for Aras. M. Antonescu replied that the Turkish Foreign Minister had indeed been very disappointed but had remained in Geneva to the last. In Geneva, the story had made the rounds that the Gazi had attacked the Minister of Interior on some issue, the nature of which M. Antonescu did not know, and that Minister President İnönü had said in that connection that in the circumstances he might as well leave, too. The Gazi had accepted impulsively, and had sent İsmet İnönü on vacation for the time being, but his resignation would follow. A change was also certain in Tewfik Aras' post; in Geneva, Secretary General Numan Menemencioglu was being mentioned as his successor.

I interjected the question whether the development of Atatürk's policy in the direction of England and against Russia might not possibly have been a contributory cause, to which M. Antonescu replied: I can only give you that version. But, he continued, I can tell you that M. Litvinov seemed to have very little information on these matters, and had nothing to say when Delbos asked him about what had happened in Ankara. All in all, Litvinov was not at all pleased. For, M. Antonescu said, in Nyon we, that is, the countries of the Little Entente, pushed the Russians out of the Mediterranean and confined them again to the Black Sea.

VI. As regards the *state visit in Berlin*,<sup>1</sup> M. Antonescu held that it had been a great demonstration which had not failed to leave an impression. I took advantage of this opportunity to underline the significance of the occasion for world peace. M. Antonescu acknowledged this and remarked that the address of the Führer and Reich Chancellor had met widespread response, whereas the opposition to Mussolini was growing steadily, in both French and English circles. It was intolerable in England's and France's view for Italy to occupy

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<sup>1</sup> The reference is to Mussolini's visit to Germany, Sept. 25-29, 1937. See vol. I, documents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5.



and fortify islands in the Mediterranean. This might some day lead to a conflict.

VII. The *Spanish question per se* was causing no serious concern at the moment. It was believed in Geneva, too, that Franco will eventually, if only very slowly, gain the upper hand and conquer all of Spain. Greater anxiety for international peace was felt because of the *conflict in the Far East*. The interests at stake there were so much greater. Soviet Russia had her hand in it, and although it was impossible to say what her objectives were, this might yet produce conflict material of a serious nature.

VIII. In conclusion M. Antonescu remarked that he could assure me that Rumania was increasingly determined to go along with *Germany*. He even thought that France and England also desired a *rapprochement* with Germany. He had said to me before that the *problem of colonies* could be solved notwithstanding momentary opposition on the part of England. He believed that England was becoming more willing from day to day. However, this disposition would take on more concrete form only after a general settlement, including, for instance, the question of armament limitations.

FABRICIUS

## No. 146

5559/E395748

### *The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 83 of November 5

SOFIA, November 5, 1937—6:20 p. m.

Received November 5—7:00 p. m.

W 361 g.

If, as is believed here, King Boris should soon come to Germany, the period of payment for the German war deliveries will come up for discussion. Bulgaria understandably desires the longest possible period. The matter has not only a financial but also a military-political aspect. It will perhaps be possible to meet the Bulgarian wishes in the form of a camouflaged loan to fund old and future obligations.

The idea is all the more plausible because, as I know, the French have offered to extend loans in order to obtain the business.

The Military Attaché is sending a report to the same effect to the Ministry of War.

RÜMELIN

## No. 147

6669/E506110-11

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 3321

BUCHAREST, November 18, 1937.

IC 4

Received November 20.

W III S. E. 9066.

Subject: Negotiations of the German and Rumanian Inter-Governmental Committees in Bucharest.<sup>1</sup>

I wish to support most emphatically the report of the German Governmental Committee's Chairman, which is being sent by the same courier.<sup>2</sup> The importance of Rumania for our supply of raw materials (foodstuffs and feed as well as petroleum) is very great, and affords favorable prospects for the future, too.

Rumania's economic ties with Germany create at the same time the basis for the interest, which Rumania must feel more and more, in also aligning herself with us politically, and thus moving further away from her former eastern policy, which under Titulescu still inclined toward Soviet Russia.

As I have often reported, the expectation of German assistance in the expansion of the Rumanian economy has been expressed to me repeatedly by the Highest Authority, the Rumanian Minister President and other important persons in Rumanian public life. It is therefore also in line with the policy we have pursued heretofore that the present negotiations, which because of their importance for the entire Rumanian economy are being watched with the greatest attention, should be conducted to a satisfactory agreement.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup> Economic negotiations had begun on Nov. 2, 1937 (6669/E506109).

<sup>2</sup> In the accompanying report of Nov. 18 (not printed, 6669/E506112-23), Wohlthat urged that the Reichsbank and the German Ministries concerned in the economic negotiations be persuaded to make valuable concessions to the Rumanians, in order to continue the systematic build-up of economic relations between the two countries. The projected agreement with Rumania would form the capstone of German economic development in southeastern Europe in 1937. See document No. 154.

## No. 148

33/25858-59

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 22, 1937.

Minister President Darányi utilized yesterday's supper at my home to inform me privately of several points which he intends to bring up

in the conversations with the Reich Foreign Minister and perhaps also with the Führer and Chancellor:

1. During the coming year of St. Stephen, which would be commemorated with great ceremony in Hungary, the Eucharistic Congress would also meet. Hungary laid the greatest importance on Germany's participation. In his opinion as a Protestant, this was prompted primarily by the consideration that here was a very favorable opportunity to combat successfully, through the statements of German Catholics, certain ideas and prejudices in the international Catholic world which were doubtless incorrect; and further, there was also the danger that, if Germany should stay away, others (there is no doubt that he meant the Austrians) would step into the gap to our disadvantage. In a long conversation with the Cardinal Prince Primate, he had become convinced that the Cardinal would furnish every guarantee that the Eucharistic Congress would keep out of politics. Without going into the matter further I answered the Minister President that the question of our participation was already being considered, but that a decision had not yet been made. The arguments which he used had been taken into consideration and we recognized their full importance. Of course, the decision would also be influenced in part by whether a suitable delegation could be selected.<sup>1</sup>

2. Cooperation between the German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia still left much to be desired. I pointed out to the Minister President, as I had also done while in Budapest at all such opportunities, that as things stand now the situation would hardly change until the policy of the Hungarian Government toward its German minorities had led to successes which were clearly evident to the German minorities in the ceded areas.

3. There were still cases to be observed in which Reich Germans, mostly persons appearing as simple tourists, attempted to exert on the German minority an influence detrimental to the interests of the Hungarian state. I merely replied to the Minister President that, as I had always emphasized, general reports of this sort were of little help to us. It would be much more useful, and would moreover conform to the meaning of the declarations which we had exchanged, if the Hungarian Government would in each case present charges of this sort to our Minister together with substantiated evidence.<sup>2</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 149, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> Mackensen discussed the question of the German minority in Hungary and relations between the German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia at greater length on Nov. 24 with Dr. Tibor Pataky, State Secretary for Minorities in the office of the Hungarian Minister President (33/25861-63). He told Pataky that while the intentions of the Minister President might be good, the treatment given the German minority by the lower Hungarian bureaucracy left much to be desired. So long as this situation obtained, Germany could hardly be expected to make the prospect of a return to Hungary look tempting to German minorities in the succession states.

## No. 149

8626/E028036-38

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Presidential Chancellery*

TOP SECRET

zu Pol. I 6353 g. Rs.<sup>1</sup>RECEPTION OF HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT DE DARÁNYI AND  
HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DE KÁNYA BY THE FÜHRER AND  
CHANCELLOR ON NOVEMBER 25, 1937

## Present:

M. de Darányi, Royal Hungarian Minister President,  
M. de Kánya, Royal Hungarian Foreign Minister,  
M. Sztójay, Royal Hungarian Minister in Berlin,  
Freiherr von Neurath, Reich Foreign Minister,  
Dr. Meissner, State Secretary.

After the customary exchange of courtesies the Hungarian Minister President informed the Führer by direction of Regent Horthy that next year the Eucharistic Congress was to be held in Budapest. Although he himself and the Regent were Protestants, nevertheless he was asking the Führer that no obstacles be placed in the way of the journey of German participants to this Congress. The Führer replied that at present it was not yet possible to foresee what the position of the Catholic Church with regard to Germany would be at that time. If next year the Catholic Church were to adopt an attitude of pronounced hostility to Germany our attitude would naturally be determined accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

The conversation then turned to the relations between Austria and Czechoslovakia. The Führer expressed the fear that closer ties were being formed between Vienna and Prague; this created the danger that a barrier might be erected between Germany and Hungary, which would have unpleasant effects for both of these countries. The

<sup>1</sup> Pol. I 6353 g. Rs. is the cover note which transmitted this document to Minister von Erdmannsdorff in Budapest for his "strictly private information." Not printed (3626/E028035).

<sup>2</sup> On Dec. 14 Neurath informed Hitler that the Hungarians were pressing for a decision as to whether German Catholics would be allowed to participate in the Eucharistic Congress and recommended that approval be given (3037/600338-39). On Jan. 8, 1938, Minister Erdmannsdorff reported from Budapest that assurances had been obtained from the organizers of the Eucharistic Congress that no anti-German speeches would be permitted if Germans were present. He added that the Hungarian Government also was doubtless interested in having the Congress refrain from attacks on its friend, the German Reich (3037/600354-55). On Jan. 13 Reich Minister Lammers informed the Foreign Ministry that the Führer did not wish German Catholics to participate and added that the shortage of foreign exchange could be given as the reason (3037/600358-59). Erdmannsdorff reported on Jan. 24 that Minister President Darányi regretted this decision exceedingly and feared that the Congress would now be made the vehicle for attacks not only against Bolshevism but also against the so-called New Paganism (3037/600362-64).

minorities policy followed by Czechoslovakia was absolutely wrong. Darányi and Kánya replied that Schuschnigg had given them reassuring explanations regarding Austria's attitude toward Czechoslovakia.

The conversation next turned to the problem of minorities in general and to that of the large Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia in particular. The Hungarian Ministers reported on the negotiations which they had conducted in Rumania regarding better treatment of the Hungarian minorities in Rumania, but which were unsuccessful. The Little Entente apparently wanted to act on the minorities question only in concert, while Hungary desired to negotiate with each state separately.

The Führer referred to the settlement of the minorities question between Germany and Poland<sup>a</sup> and emphasized that it was particularly important for each country to protect its minorities from denationalization; he recommended that Hungary avoid a diffusion of her policies in various directions, but rather concentrate on one direction; that direction was Czechoslovakia. Kánya replied that that was Hungary's opinion, too. Revisionist speeches and newspaper articles appearing in Hungary ought not to be taken too seriously; the Government knew what it wanted.

Kánya then reported on negotiations with Yugoslav Minister President Stoyadinovich concerning a settlement of the minorities question. Stoyadinovich had been well disposed at first, but later, for reasons of internal policy and perhaps also out of consideration for the other member states of the Little Entente, had not continued that attitude. Hungary was willing to concede to Yugoslavia that Hungarian territorial claims would not be made the object of military action, provided Yugoslavia would accord cultural autonomy to the Hungarian minorities. But he had not made any progress with Stoyadinovich as yet.

The Führer very warmly welcomed this proposal by the Hungarian Government to Yugoslavia; since it was not possible to break up the Little Entente one had to try to weaken its internal cohesion; an agreement such as had been outlined by Kánya appeared the proper means to obtain that end. He, the Führer, declared himself willing to discuss this proposal with Stoyadinovich, who was also coming to Berlin shortly, and to support it.

The Hungarian Ministers declared that they would be only too grateful for this.

At the conclusion of the conversation Kánya again stated emphatically that, contrary to various rumors, Hungary had no intention whatever of achieving her revisionist aims by force of arms and

<sup>a</sup> See document No. 18.

thereby possibly unleashing a European war. He asked the Führer to take cognizance of this.

The Führer replied that he had never given credence to these rumors.

After the conversation, which lasted for an hour, Minister President Darányi introduced the members of his entourage to the Führer. The Führer spoke for a while with State Secretaries Marschall and Pataky and thereafter shook hands with everyone.

MEISSNER

## No. 150

33/25868

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 29, 1937.

The Hungarian Foreign Minister, M. de Kánya, mentioned to me yesterday that he would rather have chosen Rome as the scene for the next meeting of the three Protocol Powers which is scheduled for Budapest. More than ever he considered it essential to have Mussolini within reach during such negotiations, since he had the impression more and more that Ciano, whom he does not like anyway, has the tendency to eliminate the Duce in matters of foreign policy. He considered a growth in Ciano's influence unfortunate.

I replied to M. de Kánya that so far we have found no indication that Mussolini has given Foreign Minister Ciano more freedom of action than before in the field of foreign policy, or that he is perhaps taking less interest in this question.

MACKENSEN

## No. 151

5558/E395749-50

### *Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker to Minister Rümelin*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, November 29, 1937.

Pol. IV 6156.

DEAR HERR RÜMELIN: During the last few days we have received certain reports relating to the trip of King Boris which I should like to communicate to you. We had assumed, as your telegram No. 83 of November 5 also indicated, that on his trip abroad King Boris would probably visit Germany and also Berlin, where he is indeed a very welcome guest. Now, however, after spending some time in London and then in Paris, and also visiting Switzerland, the King has returned directly to Sofia. It is rumored here that in London, and perhaps also in Paris, he negotiated a loan and placed, or at least promised, orders for military armaments—a possibility you already

pointed out in your telegram of November 5. We shall have these rumors followed up separately in Paris and London but would, of course, be very grateful for any further information about these matters which you, too, could give us.

Cordial greetings.

Heil Hitler!

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 152

3412/E014153-35

*Minister Erdmannsdorff to Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker*

CONFIDENTIAL

BUDAPEST, December 1, 1937.<sup>1</sup>

Pol. IV 6436

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: The Regent received me today to accept from me the Führer's letter of thanks for the porcelain service. This was followed by a half-hour talk, and I should like to inform you of several points dealt with which are not suitable for an official report because of their confidential nature.

The Regent said first that he had been very glad about Lord Halifax's visit to Germany.<sup>2</sup> In that connection he expressed at some length his view that it would be a grave mistake to underestimate England's power, which was still enormous despite all of the ominous signs of decadence among part of the British youth.

We then spoke of the Hungarian Ministers' visit to Berlin. The Regent stressed the usefulness of such conversations for eliminating misunderstandings. The Minister President and the Foreign Minister had reported to him, for instance, that Colonel General Göring had asked them about the existence of an alleged Hungarian understanding with Austria and even with Czechoslovakia in the event of a German-Austrian conflict—a report of which Colonel Bodenschatz<sup>3</sup> has also talked to me in Berlin and which I discussed with the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a rumor was, of course, nonsensical. After all, he was still at his post, and he would never permit any such policy. Regardless of his attachment to the beautiful Vienna of prewar days, it was plain to him that Austria had to become German in the end, which would only please him. He had told the Führer as early as a year ago that Germany only needed a little patience in this question. The old generation of Austrians, whose attachment to the Hapsburg dynasty could not be torn from their hearts, would die out, not in 20 or 30 years, but very soon. Only recently a former high Austrian

<sup>1</sup> No date of receipt is indicated but Weizsäcker initialed the document and referred it to the Foreign Minister on Dec. 6.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. I, document No. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Personal adjutant to Göring.

general had complained to him that his three sons were Nazis. This was quite natural, for Austrian youth dreamed of some day becoming governor of German East Africa or something of the sort.

Finally the Regent said that the recall of Otto von Hapsburg to the royal Hungarian throne was out of the question for the following two reasons. For one thing, along with the entirely inexperienced king, his numerous family, about 80 persons including the Parmas, would have to be placed as county governors, etc. In addition, such a solution would fail because of resistance by Germany and the Little Entente.

The day before yesterday the Regent received the Bavarian Minister President. As was also presumably the case when you were in Switzerland, Herr Siebert's visit to Budapest was both officially and personally a very marked success. His formal address, his warm-hearted extemporaneous dinner speeches, and his whole deportment, as well as the personality of his wife, left the best possible impression in German and Hungarian circles here.

I assume I may leave it to you to pass these comments on to the Foreign Minister, who discussed with me in Berlin the conjectures about the above-mentioned alleged Austro-Hungarian understanding, and also to the State Secretary.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 153

1798/409228

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram<sup>1</sup>

No. 343 of December 8

Received December 10, 1937—11:15 a.m.

Pol. IV 6466.

With reference to our No. 338 of December 6.<sup>2</sup>

In regard to the first conversation between Mussolini and Stoyadinovich I have been informed by a reliable source as follows:

Stoyadinovich declared that he did not intend to acquiesce in Delbos' plans;<sup>3</sup> in regard to the question of recognition of Soviet Russia he would continue to stand firm and would likewise not assume any

<sup>1</sup> A note on the document indicates that in the interest of economy it was transmitted by air courier rather than by telegraph. It bears no dispatch date.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3155/673314). Ambassador Hassell reported a conversation with Stoyadinovich in which the latter stated that he planned no negotiations in Rome but was making a courtesy visit only.

<sup>3</sup> French Foreign Minister Delbos visited Warsaw and the Little Entente capitals in the first half of December 1937 and was in Belgrade from Dec. 12 to 14. See vol. I, ch. I, and for the report of the German Minister on the Belgrade visit, document No. 85.



obligation to assist Czechoslovakia. He would continue his efforts for a *rapprochement* with Hungary. The greatest difficulties were still occasioned by Rumania. As far as Austria was concerned, he was not sympathetic to the idea of *Anschluss*; in his opinion the German-Austrian agreement of July 11, 1936, should suffice.

Finally, Stoyadinovich gave assurances that he intended, to begin with, to organize the young people in his party on the Italian model, but for reasons of domestic policy he considered it dangerous to issue public statements to that effect.

PLESSÉN

## No. 154

6689/E506125-33

*Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Minister President General Göring*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, December 13, 1937.

W III S.E. 9908.

Subject: Economic negotiations with Rumania.

On December 9, 1937, agreements were reached in Bucharest between the German and Rumanian Inter-Governmental Committees regarding the implementation of German-Rumanian trade and payments in 1938.<sup>2</sup> The negotiations were necessary because serious difficulties had developed in the balancing of our economic relations, which were mainly due to the following:

Official Rumanian authorities, especially the National Bank, had been increasingly interested since the beginning of 1937 in diverting Rumanian trade from Germany to other countries, in particular countries without foreign exchange control. The reason for this was mainly the fear that Germany's economic ascendancy was becoming too great. To this end, insufficient import and payment authorizations were issued for Rumanian imports from Germany. Since on the other hand, owing to the urgent German requirements, purchases of Rumanian grain had to be very greatly increased, a disparity arose between imports and exports on both sides. The result was that a large balance (about 35 million reichsmarks) developed in the clearing transactions in favor of Rumania. The Rumanian exporter, who had to utilize on the free Rumanian market the export proceeds in reichsmarks paid in through the clearing transactions, was forced because of the small demand to release the reichsmarks to Rumanian importers

<sup>1</sup> The document is on a letterhead of the Chairman of the German Governmental Committee for German-Rumanian Economic Relations, in which capacity Wohlthat reported to Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan. The copy used was transmitted to the Foreign Ministry on Dec. 14 (6689/E506124).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6646/E504581-617).

at a very considerable discount (up to 38 percent). A special drawback was that the exchange rate of the reichsmark in clearing transactions was subject to great fluctuations, so that neither the purchaser nor the seller had a sure basis for his calculations and had to include in them large risk premiums. In this way German imports from Rumania became so expensive that, except for grain, which had to be bought at excessive prices for reasons of domestic supply, Rumanian products—especially petroleum—could be bought only to a limited extent.

In this situation our objective in the negotiations became the following:

1. To reach an agreement on a further increase in reciprocal trade;
2. To ensure a settlement in trade and payments transactions with reduction of the payments balance;
3. To stabilize the rate of exchange on as high a level as possible.

*Re 1:* From the start the Rumanian Governmental Committee supported the view that German-Rumanian trade ought not substantially to exceed the volume reached in 1936. It proposed that German exports be limited to 32.5 million reichsmarks a quarter. Both quota goods (mainly consumption goods) and non-quota goods (particularly capital goods) were to be included within this framework. This would have meant that the export of consumption goods, in which Germany is mainly interested, would have been prejudiced in favor of the capital goods, which at present can be disposed of easily in other markets.

The Rumanian Governmental Committee wished to keep Rumanian exports to Germany within correspondingly restricted limits. The deliveries of other agricultural products (especially hogs, lard, bacon, eggs) were to be increased at the expense of grain exports.

After long, difficult negotiations it was finally possible to establish, in an import and export plan extending to September 30, 1938, a volume of trade amounting to about  $\frac{1}{3}$  more than German-Rumanian trade during the corresponding period of the previous year. The agreement extended to the end of September 1938 particularly in consideration of the Rumanian harvests, which can be more or less foreseen in August–September.

It should be stressed that a fixed quarterly quota of 25 million reichsmarks was agreed upon for German exports of consumption goods (quota goods), and no restrictions were placed upon the export of other German products (non-quota goods). Total German exports to Rumania of at least 150 million reichsmarks can be counted on from January 1 to September 30, 1938.

It was possible to provide sufficient opportunities for importing grain to Germany (150,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 tons of feed grains,

some of which can come from the new harvest and be delivered in the period from October to December 1938). On the other side, it was possible to take account of the Rumanian wishes for deliveries of other agricultural products on a considerable scale. For petroleum and lumber imports, quotas of 37 and 10.8 million reichsmarks respectively have been provided for the period from January 1 to September 30. Should the quota for lumber be entirely filled, then further quotas for lumber should be made available from the other quotas (except grain) which are not filled.

*Re 2:* The import and export plan is set up in such a way, by mutual agreement, that the existing balance in favor of the Rumanian National Bank will be covered within a few months. The balance of payments is to be assured by the regulation of German imports of goods. If, contrary to expectations, the balance should not decrease in the manner intended, or should again increase, German imports are to be correspondingly curtailed.

*Re 3:* The Rumanians agreed with us that the rate of exchange of the reichsmark in clearing transactions should be stabilized, and the existing system of free utilization of the reichsmark on the Rumanian market should be eliminated. However, they wanted a rate of 36 lei to 1 reichsmark for buying, and 37 lei to 1 reichsmark for selling, and this was not acceptable to us for reasons of currency policy (former rate 39.5/40.5). It would also have increased the price of important Rumanian exports to Germany and thus made most of them impossible. The Rumanian National Bank was willing to establish a higher rate of exchange in compliance with German wishes only on condition that the existing balance was secured against a possible devaluation in the exchange rate. Since we had to reject this demand, the negotiations on the rate of exchange became particularly difficult, especially since the Rumanian National Bank could refer to the rate of exchange guarantees which it knew had been given to Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece. Great efforts were necessary before the National Bank, influenced by the Rumanian Government, gave up the guarantee and established a rate of exchange of 38/39. We have accepted the statement of the Rumanian Government to this effect in substance, to be sure, but opposed it formally for reasons of currency policy.

The over-all outcome, which was advantageous for us, could be attained only by complying with Rumanian wishes for higher prices on certain agricultural products of special importance to Rumania. So as to avoid involving other countries, the method chosen for this purpose was to utilize part of the export premiums for wheat exports to Germany, to be defrayed in Rumania, for promoting exports of the other agricultural products which come into question. This arrangement also has the advantage that Rumania was committed to the pay-

ment of these export premiums, which seemed doubtful in the past. The concession made to the Rumanians in the price question, however, does not go nearly so far as what was conceded other Southeastern countries in this field.

Besides these general questions, numerous separate points were settled. In particular, the past unwieldy method of settling for armament transactions, which required of Rumania the delivery of a corresponding equivalent in petroleum or wheat, has been eased by having these transactions included in the agreement, with the assurance of additional deliveries of wheat or petroleum.

It should also be mentioned that it was possible to do away with the past unfavorable customs treatment accorded German motor vehicles in comparison with motor vehicles from countries without foreign exchange control. Adequate import quotas have been secured for the import of motorcycles, which have hardly been admitted at all in Rumania heretofore.

It has also been made clear that payments arising from the utilization of guarantees, which come into question particularly with transactions involving German exports to Rumania, can be made via the Clearing Agreement.

The separate arrangements are contained in a protocol of the negotiations, in the Third Supplementary Agreement to the Clearing Agreement, a confidential protocol supplementing it, and in various letters of the chairmen of the two Governmental Committees.

In summary it should be noted that the negotiations just concluded are capable of bringing about with Rumania, too, a consolidation of the exchange of goods and of clearing transactions. The negotiations were started in spite of the fact that in accordance with the constitution a change of government was imminent in Rumania. The appointment of the present Tatarescu government was not unfavorable to German interests. However, during the election contest there developed strong opposition to the government of the Liberal Party, so that some quarters were doubtful whether the government would dare before the elections to conclude a treaty with Germany of decisive importance for Rumanian economic policy. The content of the treaty, the fact that it was signed during the visit of French Foreign Minister Delbos, and the audience of the undersigned with the King immediately thereafter are proof of the growth of German influence which has taken place in the years since the conclusion of the commercial treaty of 1935. This welcome development is all the more noteworthy in that the Rumanians show themselves to be very sensitive in the question of equal treatment with other countries of Southeastern Europe. This was particularly evident in the negotiations on a rate of exchange guarantee, the granting of prices which make possible the Rumanian

import of certain agricultural products, and in the delivery of certain war matériel. Considering the importance of Rumania to Germany's balance of trade in Southeastern Europe because of the volume and character of her commerce, everything ought to be done to free our relations with this country, which has the greatest possibilities for the future in the Danube area, from the handicap which arises from a feeling of being discriminated against.

If German-Rumanian relations develop within the framework of the present agreements, then we can count on the most favorable conditions obtaining for further economic cooperation when the present treaty period is at an end.

WOHLTHAT

No. 155

381/210552-55

*Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Minister President General Göring*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, December 14, 1937.

REPORT ON THE AUDIENCE WITH KING CAROL AND CONVERSATIONS WITH  
RUMANIAN MINISTERS IN BUCHAREST

I.

King Carol granted me an audience at the conclusion of the negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

Owing to the opposition of the Rumanian National Bank, I did not succeed in obtaining the Rumanian signature before the arrival of French Foreign Minister Delbos. The reception by the King at the conclusion of the negotiations was intended to be a special mark of consideration and gave a certain emphasis to the German position in Rumania. The King took a lively interest in the new treaty. After discussing the import and export plan he asked particularly about Rumania's lumber exports, since he intends to undertake a systematic development of the forest and lumber industry. I explained to the King the three large projects for lumber exploitation which are being worked on at Czernowitz, Busau and Closani. Since it was possible to put through a fixed rate of exchange for the reichsmark in the treaty, there is a better prospect for the lumber projects than in the last few years.

The King then spoke of the problem of "state direction of foreign trade and domestic economy". I explained to the King the differences

<sup>1</sup> The copy used bears the marginal note: "Given to me today by Herr Wohlthat, M[ackensen], Dec. 15."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 154.

between the political methods of incorporating the unemployed into the national labor process in Germany, England and North America. The conversation then turned to the effect of rearmament and the raw material requirements on the foreign trade of Germany and England. The King recognized that large economic projects to raise the standard of living of the people or to attain certain objectives in domestic or foreign policy force the state authority to intervene on the basis of multiple-year plans. The King conceives of his Government as an authoritarian leadership, whereby he consciously pits the permanent institution of the monarchy against the political life of the Rumanian parties. In the case of the Tatarescu government it is actually not a question of a government by the so-called Liberal Party together with friendly party groups, but of a government which carries out the intentions of the King.

At the conclusion of the audience, which went off in a notably friendly manner, the King stressed that he attached great value to economic cooperation with Germany and expressed the wish that the treaty just concluded might lead to a further favorable development, like that begun with the treaties of 1935.<sup>3</sup>

## II.

The following picture of Rumanian economic policy developed from the conversations with Minister President Tatarescu, Minister of Commerce and Industry Bujoiu, Minister Manolescu-Strunga and a number of other influential persons.

After the new government has been formed the Minister President intends to pay very special attention to economic tasks. He invited the undersigned to discuss the completed plans with the Rumanian Ministers in the spring. Tatarescu used the expression "economic community of interests" for the relation between Germany and Rumania. According to the various conversations the following results would be achieved, on condition that the Rumanians work systematically:

1. Introduction of technology in agriculture, standardization and storage of export goods, adoption of new crops, according to the example of Germany in soybean cultivation, such as flax, cotton and rice.
2. Exploitation of raw material resources, expansion of the basic industries of coal and iron, modernization of gold production. Bauxite. Asbestos.
3. Exploration of new petroleum fields, with alteration of the existing laws which discourage foreign capital.

<sup>3</sup> The economic treaties of 1935 between Germany and Rumania are published in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*. Secret portions have been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry (6646/E504636-50).

4. Expansion of national industry (armament plants).
5. Expansion of municipal enterprises (gas, electricity, meat-packing houses, street-cleaning, etc.).
6. Expansion of the transportation system, road-building, river-regulation, expansion of the harbor of Constantza.
7. Legislative measures for increasing foreign credit. Payment of foreign debts, preferential treatment for foreign capital.

### III.

Constantinescu, President of the Rumanian National Bank, is in a somewhat embarrassing situation owing to the visit of Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht having been called off several times; each time he had obtained the consent of the King and the entire Government to receive him. The National Bank and the Rumanian Government attach great importance to discussing their situation as regards monetary and financial policy with President Schacht. Doubtless such a visit would increase the regard for Germany in Rumania, and in particular would help to overcome a certain opposition which the Rumanian National Bank puts in the way of economic cooperation between the two countries.

After the visit of Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht, additional visits by leading German personalities would be possible, and I request the opportunity to discuss this matter in person.

The political importance of such visits has been treated in the reports of the German Minister in Bucharest.

WOHLTHAT

### No. 156

119/118652-55

#### *Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, December 31, 1937.

#### THE GERMAN MINORITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

There are approximately 700,000 Germans in Yugoslavia, about 80 per cent of whom are engaged in agriculture. Up to 1918 the area settled by Germans belonged partly to Austria (Slovenia) and partly to Hungary (Croatia and Slavonia).

#### 1. *The organization of the German element.*

The political organization of the German minority, the German Party, which was founded in 1922, was dissolved in 1929. Since then the Government parties have assigned several seats in both houses

<sup>1</sup> Together with documents Nos. 155 and 159, this memorandum provided background information for the forthcoming conversations with Yugoslav Minister President Stoyadinovich. On Jan. 11 copies of all three documents were sent to Göring (5482/E382168-80).

of Parliament to the minority. At present, among others, Dr. Stefan Kraft is a Deputy and Dr. Grassl is a Senator.

The central German cultural organization in Yugoslavia is the "Swabian-German Cultural Union" [*Schwäbisch-deutscher Kulturbund*] founded in 1920. It has available an organization with wide ramifications in the cultural and particularly the economic fields (a system of agricultural cooperatives). The presiding officer of the national organization is Captain Keks (retired) and the honorary president is Senator Grassl. The guiding spirit is the very energetic and active Dr. Kraft. Another prominent personality is the head of the Evangelical Church in Yugoslavia, Bishop Popp, who is closely associated with the Evangelical Church in the Reich. In recognition of his great services he was given an honorary doctor's degree by the University of Breslau in the fall of 1936.

Besides the Cultural Union there exists an opposition group, the "Renovation Movement" [*Erneuerungsbewegung*], under the leadership of Dr. Awender, a physician. It obtains its support mainly from young people's groups. The Renovation Movement has organized its own cultural and economic organizations, particularly in Slavonia. The Cultural Union and the Renovation Movement are in strong opposition to each other, and the latter is very radical in its methods. Last spring there was a split in the ranks of the Renovation Movement. Dr. Awender and his more intimate associates joined the political party which is under the leadership of former Minister Lyatich and is in sharp opposition to Minister President Stoyadinovich. The other faction of the Renovation Movement is led by Branimir Altgayer. Attempts have been initiated to bring together the more moderate part of the Renovation Movement and the Cultural Union in a working partnership.

The actual leadership of the German minority is in the hands of the Swabian-German Cultural Union, which the Yugoslav Government also considers the representative of the Germans in Yugoslavia and treats as such.

## 2. *The situation of the Germans.*

The treatment of the German minority by the Yugoslav authorities has varied from time to time in the course of the years. In general it may be stated that the treatment in Yugoslavia is better than in Rump-Hungary. At the moment the situation is such that in Slavonia and Croatia the conditions are not too unfavorable, but the part of the German minority residing in Slovenia, which has been strongly organized since the time of the Austrian Empire, has hitherto been suppressed. This is mainly caused by the fact that Yugoslav Minister of the Interior Korošec, as a Catholic clergyman and the impassioned leader of the Slovenian clericals, has always been inclined



to carry on the fight against the Germans in Slovenia. Since Korošec has been Minister, the Germans, particularly in Slovenia but also in South Slavonia, have been subjected to the greatest variety of chicaneries and oppressive measures. Today there is not a single German school left for the minority in Slovenia—not a single German kindergarten, not to mention a German secondary school. The miserable remnants of the once flourishing German school system are several so-called minority parallel classes in the state elementary schools, in which the children are taught by Slovenian teachers who are for the most part anti-German. The pupils are forbidden to use the German language; this prohibition is even extended to the family. In 1920 there were still fifty-four German teachers in the Gottscheerland district; today there are only six left. The German teachers were transferred for no reason at all to purely Slovenian villages and replaced by teachers who did not understand a word of German and were leaders of the Slovenian Sokol associations. It is practically impossible for Germans to acquire land within 50 kilometers of the border, even if they are reserve officers in the Yugoslav Army.

3. *Wishes and demands of the German element vis-à-vis the Yugoslav Government.*

The demands of the German element for the most part aim at a definite settlement with regard to the position of the Swabian-German Cultural Union and an organized German school system with appropriately trained teachers. The individual points, particularly as regards Slovenia, are as follows:

- a. Permission for the unhampered formation of societies and co-operative organizations;
- b. Establishment of German classes in schools taught by teachers of German origin;
- c. Cessation of the general chicaneries practiced against members of the German minority;
- d. Moderation in the tone of the provocative articles against Germany and German ideas appearing in the newspaper *Slovenec*;
- e. Abolition of the rule forbidding members of the German minority to own property within 50 kilometers of the border.

In this connection it could be pointed out in conversations with the Yugoslav delegation accompanying Stoyadinovich on his visit to Berlin that in contrast with the poor treatment which is being accorded part of the German minority in Yugoslavia, no difficulties have been placed in the way of the cultural pursuits of the 25,000 persons (Slovenes) of Yugoslav origin living in Germany (the Ruhr area). If an attempt should be made by the Yugoslavs to bring up the treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Carinthia, it might be advisable for us not to go into this question, it being the affair of the

Austrian Government, but to limit the conversation to the Yugoslavs in the Ruhr area, since they are particularly well treated and are a better object of comparison.

## No. 157

1945/435402-03

*Memorandum by an Official of the Presidential Chancellery*

BERLIN, January 1, 1938.

zu Pol. IV 3.<sup>1</sup>

(To be telephoned immediately to Captain Wiedemann, at the Berghof, near Berchtesgaden.)

On January 1, 1938, Octavian Goga, the new Rumanian Minister President,<sup>2</sup> addressed the following telegraphic declaration to the Führer and Chancellor from Bucharest:

"After having been entrusted by King Carol II, my exalted ruler, with the formation of a new Government, I would like to express to Your Excellency, upon my assumption of office as the first counselor of the Crown, my unshakeable determination to maintain good and cordial relations with Germany, for from the outset it is my considered view that a complete return to normalcy would be in the best interests of both countries. This desire, which is founded upon mutual feelings of friendship, can be all the more easily fulfilled as I had the honor to hear Your Excellency's personal and just conception of the natural relations between the two countries and of the vital rights of Rumania, whose present boundaries are incontrovertibly justified by the principle of nationality."

Since it appears inadvisable for the Führer and Chancellor to make a direct reply to this telegram because of the one-sided interpretation of a conversation in the second sentence and the reference to the disputed question of boundaries, the Foreign Minister recommends the following form of reply:

The German Minister in Bucharest should receive the text of the telegram in cipher as promptly as possible, with instructions immediately and by special direction of the Führer and Chancellor to call personally on the Rumanian Minister President and convey to him the sincere gratitude of the German Chancellor for his declaration of friendship.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pol. IV 3: Not printed (6636/E504507). The reference is to the Goga telegram which is quoted in full in the document printed here.

<sup>2</sup> Octavian Goga, leader of the National Christian Party, became Minister President on Dec. 29, 1937, succeeding George Tatarescu who had headed a cabinet of the National Liberal Party since January 1934.

<sup>3</sup> The instructions to Bucharest were sent, as recommended (6636/E504508-09). On Jan. 3 Fabricius wired to Berlin (1945/435406): "Assignment carried out. Minister President very pleased. Stating that Germany might well be satisfied with his Government, he asked that all support for the Iron Guard be withheld, so that one party of the Right would not be supported against another party of the Right in Rumania."

Publication of the contents of the telegram will not take place in the German press. But consideration might be given to a brief notice in the press, somewhat as follows:

On the occasion of assuming office as head of the newly formed Rumanian Government, Minister President Goga addressed to the Führer and Chancellor a telegraphic declaration of friendship, in reply to which the Führer, through the German Minister in Bucharest, transmitted to the Minister President an expression of his sincere gratitude ~~and the assurance of his equally friendly sentiments.~~<sup>1</sup>

KIEWITZ

<sup>1</sup>These words were struck out on the original.

## No. 158

119/118648-47, 118656-57

### *Memorandum of Political Division IV*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, January 3, 1938.

zu Pol. IV 1675.<sup>2</sup>

#### YUGOSLAVIA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

##### 1. *The internal political situation in Yugoslavia.*

The Stoyadinovich Government, which has been in office since May 1935, has to contend with strong opposition. This consists of the so-called Leftist opposition of ~~groups around former Minister President Yevtich~~<sup>3</sup> and General Zivkovich,<sup>4</sup> as well as the Croatian Peasant Party led by Dr. Maček. These two groups joined forces recently<sup>5</sup> in order to combat Stoyadinovich. This in turn injured Dr. Maček with his own followers, however, since most of the Croatians want nothing to do with pacts with any Serbian groups whatsoever. On the other hand, owing to the position which the Government was forced to take because the Serbian Leftist opposition supported the Croatian desire for autonomy, it has received renewed support among the Serbs and the wind has been taken out of the sails of the Rightist opposition.

The position of the Stoyadinovich Government seemed particularly endangered in the late summer of 1937, when it submitted to the Parliament for ratification the Concordat concluded by Yevtich. Led by the Orthodox Church, which felt slighted, a considerable number of Serbs rose in opposition against the Concordat and against Stoyadinovich; there were even bloody clashes. Although Parlia-

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum is unsigned. See document No. 156, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Pol. IV 1675: Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Bogulyub Yevtich, predecessor to Stoyadinovich as Minister President.

<sup>4</sup> These words were struck out on the original.

<sup>5</sup> In October 1937.

ment finally accepted the Concordat, Stoyadinovich refrained for the time being from submitting it to the Senate, and the situation gradually calmed down.

The Croatian question, too, could not be brought any closer to a solution by Stoyadinovich, in spite of his obviously good intentions. The Croats are maintaining their demands: first, abolition of the Constitution, and then general free elections for a National Assembly. In this way the Croats hope to achieve extensive autonomy. A group of Croatian extremists, especially those living in foreign countries, is still keeping up the fight for an independent Croatian state.

## 2. *The situation of Yugoslavia in foreign policy.*

Since assuming the offices of Minister President and Foreign Minister, Stoyadinovich has given evidence of an endeavor to free Yugoslavia from the previously dominating influence of France and to pursue his own political plans. Of course, Stoyadinovich cannot and does not wish to abandon the friendship with France, especially since this is deeply rooted in extensive circles of the Yugoslav people. Thus last October he renewed the Treaty of Friendship with France which was signed in 1927. This should not be interpreted as a strengthening of the ties with Paris, however. From the very beginning Yugoslavia has successfully resisted the repeated urging of France and Czechoslovakia to conclude a treaty of alliance and to develop the Little Entente into a general mutual assistance system.

The independence and the new interpretation of Yugoslav foreign policy have become apparent in particular:

by the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria in January 1937 without the assistance of any Great Power, by means of which Yugoslav foreign policy has freed itself from the continuous tensions in the Balkans and a real pacification has been introduced there;

and, further, by the conclusion with Italy in March 1937 of the pact for mutual recognition of boundaries and for consultation, by which Yugoslavia has been relieved of the Italian danger, which was felt constantly in every aspect of policy before that time.

By his independent foreign policy Stoyadinovich is continuing to pursue the aim of keeping his country out of the game played by the Great Powers and of protecting it from being drawn into a possible conflict between other powers. Yugoslavia does not want to be in the position some day of having to choose between Italy and France or between England and Italy. Thus, she likewise maintains good relations with England—which are further promoted by

the fact that the two royal houses are related—but here, too, she avoids any commitments to England at the expense of Italy.

Within the Little Entente Yugoslavia is the country that has conducted her relations with Hungary in the most acceptable fashion, and is consequently the least interested in maintaining the Little Entente, even though she does not wish to withdraw from the alliance. Her membership in the Balkan Pact of 1934 now has in effect merely formal significance, in view of the Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria.

Yugoslavia under Stoyadinovich has exceedingly friendly relations with Germany, which not only are based on the highly developed exchange of goods but also have an ideological foundation. The settlement between Yugoslavia and Italy, which was emphasized and strengthened by Stoyadinovich's visit to Rome and Milan in December 1937, is also advantageous for our own relations with Yugoslavia. The fact that Yugoslavia has not recognized Soviet Russia in the past, and obviously does not intend to do so, likewise has this effect.

### No. 159

2321/485696-99

#### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, January 7, 1938.

W III S. E. 136.

#### GERMAN-YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC RELATIONS: BRIEF FOR TALKS WITH THE YUGOSLAV MINISTER PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER STOYADINOVICH

In the efforts made by the German Government since 1933 to develop systematically economic and thereby also political relations with the countries of Southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia plays a special part. Yugoslavia is the first country of the Little Entente with which, as of May 1, 1934, comprehensive economic arrangements covering trade and foreign exchange were concluded. At the same time, in a secret agreement, preferences were granted to Yugoslavia for export to Germany of a large number of Yugoslav agricultural products.

As a result of these agreements, which were meanwhile supplemented and extended at the regular sessions of the German and Yugoslav governmental committee for the regulation of German-Yugoslav economic relations, it was possible approximately to treble the volume

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 156, footnote 1.

of trade between the two countries from 1934 to date. Since last year, for the first time since the founding of the Yugoslav State, Germany has occupied first place in the foreign trade of this country in regard to exports as well as imports—a place which Italy had always held previously. The last negotiations with Yugoslavia, concluded in September 1937, which were entirely satisfactory in their results, give one reason to expect that these favorable developments will continue in 1938 as well, particularly since the economies of the two countries supplement each other naturally. Yugoslavia is becoming an increasingly important supplier of agricultural products for Germany, particularly as regards grain, livestock, and animal products, as well as of industrial raw materials such as bauxite, copper, lumber, skins, and hides. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's importance as a market for German products is constantly increasing, especially with regard to machinery, products of the iron industry, chemical and pharmaceutical products, as well as coal and coke.

The importance of this extension of German-Yugoslav economic relations for the Yugoslav economy is thoroughly appreciated by all leading Yugoslav officials, especially Minister President Stoyadinovich himself, who, as a former businessman and Minister of Finance, is particularly interested in economic questions. The Yugoslavs know that the rise in the standard of living of the agricultural population is attributable principally to increasing sales of agricultural products to Germany at good prices. Minister President Stoyadinovich himself knows in particular that Yugoslavia's large-scale industrialization program, which he inaugurated, can be accomplished only with the aid of the German economy and, above all, with the aid of German engineers. He clearly expressed this conviction when recently dedicating—as an important stage in this industrialization program—the first part of the new Yugoslav rolling mill at Senitz, which will be the largest rolling mill in Southeastern Europe and which was built and finished on schedule by Krupp. The realization of this growing economic tie between Yugoslavia and Germany has had a part in facilitating and expediting Yugoslavia's withdrawal—in preparation for a number of years—from the anti-German political combinations in the Danube region. To be sure, it is not expedient to discuss with M. Stoyadinovich these connections between economic interdependence and political development, because in Yugoslavia also, just as in other countries of the Southeast, the fear is already being voiced that Yugoslavia could, through economic collaboration, become too dependent on Germany politically. It would seem advisable nevertheless, to find occasion for a friendly remark to M. Stoyadinovich to the effect that we, too, are entirely satisfied with the development of German-Yugoslav economic relations in the past few years; that we are fully

cognizant of the cooperation of the Yugoslav Government and particularly of the Minister President personally in this development, and realize its value.

CLODIUS

No. 160

1218/382437-38

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, January 11, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. IV 354.

In the course of a general conversation today, in which the imminent visit of the Yugoslavs was also mentioned in passing, the Hungarian Minister recalled the Führer's conversation with M. de Darányi and M. de Kánya on November 25, 1937, which he discussed recently with Minister of State Meissner insofar as it had to do with Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. M. Sztójay was very enthusiastic about the way in which the Führer had expressed himself at that time on the question of Hungary-Yugoslavia. According to his account, the conversation progressed as represented in the minutes of Minister of State Meissner,<sup>1</sup> but, as far as M. Sztójay remembers, it was more precise in one essential point. Not only had the Führer declared himself willing to speak with the Yugoslav Minister President, when the latter comes to Berlin, about the Hungarian suggestion, according to which Hungary would concede to Yugoslavia that territorial claims would not be made the object of military action if Yugoslavia would for her part grant the Hungarian minorities cultural autonomy; he had gone further and declared that he would exert his influence with the Yugoslavs for the fulfillment of this project. M. de Kánya had interrupted at this point with the remark that such a guarantee on our part would be excellent, whereupon the Führer had replied, "Guarantor, yes, that was the word which he had been looking for." In other words, he was willing to take over a guarantee<sup>2</sup> for such an agreement. The Hungarian Minister emphasized very strongly how exceptionally important it would be for Hungary if during the coming visit of the Yugoslavs the Führer would recall his earlier words.

I replied to M. Sztójay that, unlike him, I had not been a witness to the conversation, but that the Führer's statements, as conveyed to us by Herr Meissner, had not had quite such a positive purport on the point of a guarantee as he thought he heard. M. Sztójay insisted, however, on his account of the course of the conversation.

MACKENSEN

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 149.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "A 'guarantee' that the agreement will be concluded, or that it will be honored? Surely both are not possible."

## No. 161

1218/332439-40

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, January 12, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. IV 355.

During a telephone conversation today, the Hungarian Minister asked whether I had in the meantime been able to find out just how we had recorded the part of the conversation of November 25, 1937, between the Führer and Darányi concerning Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. I replied that my investigations have shown that the words "guarantor" or "guarantee" were not included in the minutes taken by Minister of State Meissner, who was present at the conversation. M. Sztójay replied that he, and above all M. de Kánya himself, definitely remembered this expression, the context, and the manner in which it was used; he emphasized once more what great importance the Hungarian Government attached to recalling to the Führer the course of the conversation and this expression. His conversation on the same theme with Minister of State Meissner, of which he spoke yesterday, had taken place shortly before Christmas, without mention of the word "guarantor," however. Minister of State Meissner had declared on his own initiative at that time that he would remind the Führer of the earlier conversation with the Hungarians before Stoyadinovich's visit.

Sztójay added that he would be very grateful if the Reich Foreign Minister would receive him before the visit of the Yugoslav Minister President in order to talk over this matter. I did not give him a definite reply to this request, but only promised to pass it on.<sup>1</sup>

In the further course of the conversation I pointed out to the Minister that I had the impression that the Hungarians now wish to commit us legally to an expression such as "guarantor" or "guarantee" which may have been dropped during the conversation. That was an impossible way to begin, because even if the word was used in this connection it naturally could never have been meant in that sense, since such a statement would presuppose the most careful investigation of the data from all sides and this could not have been the case in an expression which was even taken over from the interlocutor.

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum of Jan. 14 (2134/467223) Mackensen recorded that he had again seen the Hungarian Minister to inform him that Foreign Minister Neurath would not have time to see him before the arrival of the Yugoslav Minister President. On the question at issue Neurath was convinced that the Meissner record of the conversation was correct, and that Hitler had only promised "to discuss and support" in his conversation with Stoyadinovich the Hungarian proposals to Yugoslavia.



M. Sztójay protested energetically against this assumption, stressing only how important it was that the Führer now express emphatically the strong German interest in a Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement as outlined in the conversation at that time.<sup>2</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup> On Jan. 14 Weizsäcker saw Sztójay and wrote a minute stating that the latter now "translated" the term "guarantor" to mean that Germany should serve only as an "honest broker" or "godfather" to a Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement (1213/332441).

## No. 162

2181/471705-06

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 37

BERLIN, January 15, 1938.

My conversation with Minister President Stoyadinovich today lasted approximately an hour. We discussed the European situation in general, with particular reference to any changes since my visit to Belgrade. In this connection it was stated that Yugoslav-Italian relations have further improved, and that Yugoslavia's relations with Bulgaria have also remained good. With regard to the new Rumanian Government,<sup>1</sup> M. Stoyadinovich also expressed himself somewhat cautiously concerning the stability of the Goga government and expressed the same opinion as Beck yesterday<sup>2</sup> that nothing definite could be predicted before the elections in April or May. Naturally the Belgrade Government's relations with Goga were better than with his predecessors, and the turn of events, which had been surprising also for Belgrade, was welcomed there.

M. Stoyadinovich went on to speak about his impressions in England, declaring that he had found that Chamberlain earnestly desired an understanding with us. He believes that they are even prepared to grant our wishes relating to colonies, if in return they receive assurances that we will not disturb Europe for 10 or 15 years. We then discussed the problem of maintaining peaceful relations, and I pointed out the difficulties involved in any such absolute promise on our part, since for example this would amount to giving the Czechs, the Lithuanians, and possibly also the Poles *carte blanche* in simply disregarding all our grievances pertaining to the treatment of the German minorities in these areas.

M. Stoyadinovich also stated that if a Rightist government is maintained in Rumania, he intends to cultivate closer relations with Ru-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 157, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 28 and 29.

mania and Poland, in order to be able to offer his people at least some sort of substitute in case the Little Entente should disintegrate completely. Regarding Czech policy, Stoyadinovich expressed himself very unfavorably, just as he did last summer.

As regards the Austro-German question, I told him that this was for us in as unsatisfactory a condition as ever. There was not sufficient time this morning for a more detailed discussion of this question or of the relations of Hungary with Yugoslavia.

FREIHERR VON NEURATH

## No. 163

906/293848-64

### *Memorandum by the Minister to Yugoslavia<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, January 17, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. I [60] g.

Drafting Officer: Minister von Heeren.

CONVERSATION HELD DURING THE RECEPTION OF YUGOSLAV MINISTER PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER, DR. STOYADINOVICH, BY THE FÜHRER AND CHANCELLOR ON JANUARY 17, 1938

At the reception, in which Minister President General Göring also participated, there were present: the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Freiherr von Neurath, the Yugoslav Minister in Berlin, and the German Minister to Belgrade.

The Yugoslav Minister President opened the conversation by presenting to the Führer the most cordial greetings of his Royal Highness, Prince Regent Paul of Yugoslavia. The Prince Regent still recalled with the greatest satisfaction the conversations that he had had with the Führer at Berchtesgaden.<sup>2</sup>

The Führer expressed his thanks for the greetings from the Prince Regent and asked that his compliments likewise be paid to the Prince Regent. He then asked whether Dr. Stoyadinovich desired to make any special problem the subject of the conversation.

Dr. Stoyadinovich replied in the negative, adding that he would be grateful if he could learn more concerning the general political aims and plans of the Führer. Yugoslav policy with respect to Germany could be summed up to the effect that Yugoslavia would never

<sup>1</sup> A covering minute by Weizsäcker (906/293848) states that the Führer wished to see the memorandum before it received wider distribution or was handed to the Yugoslavs as had been agreed. Political Division IV was requested to suggest passages that should be stricken before the document was given to the Yugoslavs. No copy of the version finally given them has been found. One revision is indicated in footnote 4, however.

<sup>2</sup> Prince Paul visited Germany in August 1936.

under any circumstances enter into a pact against Germany or into any kind of an anti-German coalition. The Germans and Serbs had not been enemies in the World War, but only opponents. His policy was aimed at ensuring that Yugoslavia and Germany would not be opponents again in the future.

The Führer concurred fully in this. Germany had slipped into the antagonisms of the World War without knowing how it came about. The Hapsburgs had had Germany in tow at that time. In reality there had been no differences at all between Germany and the Balkans. The war had come like a mad fatality but some good had finally come of it after all; for it had freed Germany from her dependence on the Hapsburgs and prepared the rebirth of Germany. War experience in Siberia had changed the attitude of the German soldier and filled him with respect for the heroism of the Serbian people. Germany had only economic interests in the Balkans; she had political interests only insofar as she was interested in the political consolidation of the Balkans for economic reasons.

In this connection, the Führer stressed the fact that he still regarded a slow bolshevization of Europe as the greatest danger at present. His views on this question were often not understood abroad and were considered exaggerated. But it was necessary to keep in mind Germany's position. It would then be understood that Germany had a direct and vital interest in a strong order of national states in Europe. Germany could not be indifferent to internal conditions in present-day France and possible developments in other countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, and others. Germany was dependent on the closest economic cooperation with all these states. She could not console herself with the fact that Bolshevism, in case it seized these countries, would destroy itself in 10 or 20 years, for by that time Germany would have starved to death. Besides, Germany was not in a position, as was England, for example, to fall back on an empire if Europe were bolshevized. It might be interesting to live surrounded by plague-infected people, but it was also very dangerous. The British should bear in mind that a bolshevization of densely populated Central and Western Europe would necessarily have quite other consequences than that of Russia, where one townsman is fed by nine peasants.

The Führer then referred to the state of constant crisis in the world economic situation, which was a continual source of danger. In Germany, for this reason, we were following the principle of producing with all our might. It was not pleasant to tell a nation that it had to work, but this was the only salvation. We had not raised wages in Germany, but had made it possible for the worker to put in overtime and thus increase his earnings. France would also have to learn to

work once more. For some day there would be nothing left in the pot from which she was still able time and again to produce gold and credit.

Besides this general European crisis, which could be traced back to the bolshevist ideology, there were, the Führer continued, also some smaller focal points of crisis. The most dangerous of these had been Poland. Thanks to the great statesman Pilsudski, he, the Führer, had succeeded in arriving at an understanding with Poland. It was clear to him that Poland needed an outlet to the sea. The Corridor was certainly a bitter pill for Germany to swallow, but it had to be accepted. On the Danzig question, too, he had reached a direct agreement with Poland, and without assistance from the League of Nations. He was glad that there was a sensible League of Nations Commissioner<sup>a</sup> residing in Danzig today who did not consider it his task to create new difficulties, but rather to encourage German-Polish co-operation in questions relating to Danzig.

Another danger spot was Czechoslovakia. She still seemed to misunderstand her situation entirely. She simply was not a unified national state, but a state with several nationalities. It was impossible to denationalize 3 million Germans who, moreover, were living at the German border. He still hoped, however, for a return to reason in Prague. He knew, of course, that Moscow was trying to use Czechoslovakia to a certain extent as its aircraft carrier.

The Führer then spoke of the possibility of attempts to bring about a restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria. He was and would remain an absolutely determined foe of the Hapsburgs. A Hapsburg in Vienna would throw the whole of Central Europe into confusion. If this dynasty should move into Vienna, political intrigues would begin at once. It was ridiculous to think that an emperor in Vienna would confine himself to present-day Austria. The Legitimists' provocations, which even now aimed at splitting off southern from northern Germany, were preposterous. He would crush with lightning speed any attempt to bring the Hapsburgs back to Vienna and nobody, not even France, would be able to stop him.

As far as Yugoslavia was concerned, Germany was, in her own interest, in favor of a strong Yugoslavia. He, the Führer, had been worried at the moment when King Alexander had been murdered. Yugoslavia had weathered this test of its viability, however, thanks to the fact that a member of the Karageorgevich dynasty had been able to take the reins of government firmly in his hands until the young King attained his majority.

Germany's friendship with Italy, the Führer continued, did not in any way conflict with her friendship with Yugoslavia. He considered

<sup>a</sup> Carl J. Burckhardt; see ch. I.

Italy an element contributing toward order in Europe. It was a false policy to wish to throttle such a country in its development. Germany had no alliance with Italy. He knew that Mussolini was pursuing Italian policy just as he himself was pursuing only German policy. If Germany and Italy were cooperating now it was in the interest of both.

As far as Hungary was concerned, he had told the Hungarians quite plainly that he did not wish to lecture them on their political aims, but Germany would not support anything that was not in the German interest. And Germany was interested in a strong Yugoslavia. Hungary had always been somewhat inclined to pursue what he called schoolboy politics, particularly earlier when she had not yet rearmed and was therefore very weak. Today, with Hungary's growing strength, her political aims, too, seemed to be growing more sensible and realistic. Perhaps we had certain common interests with Hungary in the direction of Czechoslovakia, but none whatsoever as far as Rumania and Yugoslavia were concerned. He had the impression that about 80 percent of Hungary's present demands were directed at Czechoslovakia, 16 percent at Rumania, and perhaps only 4 percent at Yugoslavia. In the past Hungary had still been thinking of revisions of the Hungarian-Yugoslav border. For this he had no sympathy. It made no real difference whether only a few or many square kilometers were desired. He could understand that the other party would start shooting in either case. Italy, too, had become more sensible with regard to Yugoslavia, and had come to see that a strong Yugoslav neighbor was better, after all, than a Greater Hungary extending to the Adriatic.

A Yugoslav-Hungarian *rapprochement* seemed to him, the Führer, entirely possible. It could be greatly facilitated by a suitable treatment of the Hungarian minority. Should Yugoslavia be interested in coming to a clear understanding with Hungary and in developing such an understanding into something in the nature of a treaty, and should a guarantor be needed in this connection, Germany would be prepared to take over this role of guarantor. He had in mind an absolutely binding guarantee, which would also apply militarily in case Hungary should violate the Yugoslav border.\* Minister President Göring had told the Hungarians quite plainly that in this case they must expect squadrons of German bombers over Budapest. He asked the Minister President to consider this offer. He did not require

\*A revised page (293855) was inserted in the original memorandum at this point. In the new version this sentence reads: "He had in mind an absolutely binding guarantee, which would also provide for the application of military measures by the guarantor in case the agreements were violated by one of the contracting parties. The next sentence beginning 'Minister President Göring' was omitted entirely from the revised version."

a reply today, and would also not take it amiss if there should be no reply.

For Germany, the Adriatic was not a political objective; on the contrary, the drive toward the Adriatic had been for Germany the cause of the splitting apart of the German nation. The North was the decisive region for Germany. Our possibilities lay on the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. We had to concentrate on one direction and that was the North. In the Balkans we wanted nothing more than an open door for our economy.

The Führer then spoke about Geneva and the anxiety that the League of Nations policy was causing him. This was schoolboy politics on a large scale. It led to the danger of embroiling the whole world in each individual conflict. It tended to arouse false hopes in the small nations and thus plunge them into disaster. This had been the case in Abyssinia, as it was now in China. The help that China was receiving from the Western democracies was nothing but newspaper help. There was talk of 50 divisions that Chiang Kai-shek would organize by next spring, and of roads 5,000 kilometers long that he would build. He, the Führer, thought he knew a thing or two about organizing divisions and building roads. By employing all her resources, Germany had organized 44 divisions in 5 years' time and was satisfied if she could build 1,000 kilometers of roads a year. This showed how entirely ridiculous were these claims, which were intended to goad China into continuing the war. Japan did not fear the intervention of third powers. She had as yet made no use at all of her first-rate fleet, and felt capable of repelling any intervention at sea. What objection was there, anyway, to Japanese influence in China? If Japan were not there, China would soon fall prey to Bolshevism. We were reproached for damaging the interests of the white race by this attitude. Who started this first was a matter he did not wish to go into. It was not our affair today to defend the white race and thereby sacrifice our own interests.

The British were a brave people, but they did not like to fight themselves. They preferred to fight to the last Frenchman, as in the World War, or, as recently, to the last Abyssinian, and now to the last Chinese.

Another danger inherent in the League of Nations today was the tendency to represent certain interests of individual Great Powers as world interests. Germany would not enter the League of Nations again, for we had no desire to fight for foreign interests.

The Führer here stressed the fact that he had always favored Anglo-German understanding, and that he had always been ready to negotiate with England in every conflict of interests that arose.

There was the question of colonies. Germany needed colonies mainly in order to compensate for her deficiencies in fats and lumber

But Germany was asking only for her former German colonies, that is, the colonies of which she had been deprived unjustly. He had never by so much as a word made claim to the property of others and would never do the British the favor of demanding Portuguese or other colonies which had not formerly belonged to Germany. If England wished instead to cede other territories out of her rich abundance of colonies, it would be possible to discuss the matter.

The Yugoslav Minister President remarked in this connection that British Prime Minister Chamberlain had told him he was prepared to satisfy Germany's colonial desires if Germany would give certain guarantees of a general political nature.

The Führer answered that he knew the British spoke in this way, but they were obviously unable to make up their minds to act. As far as the guarantees contemplated by England were concerned, it was impossible for Germany to stop her rearmament. Her three previous offers in the field of armaments had all been rejected. His next logical step after this rejection had necessarily been to harness all Germany's resources for rearmament. This had now been started and, like mobilization, could no longer be stopped. A limitation on the size of the air force was also impossible today. The safety of Germany forbade it. If Czechoslovakia cooperated militarily with Moscow we had to protect ourselves. A limitation of armaments had been possible so far only on one point, by means of the naval agreement with England.<sup>5</sup>

Nor could the economic mobilization of Germany now be reversed. The Four Year Plan could now no longer be scrapped. We had not started all this to amuse ourselves but because we had been forced into it. At first people had laughed at our synthetic materials. Now they were afraid because they saw how successful we were.

The Führer finally came to the subject of Spain. Germany saw in the Spanish war only the danger of Bolshevism. She had no territorial interests in Spain.

The Führer then summed up Germany's political situation with respect to her neighbors and the other European states by saying that, among all her neighbors, she had reached the best and most important understanding with Poland. He had also been happy that the effects of the war were disappearing in several other countries, above all in Yugoslavia. He was therefore observing Yugoslav policy in particular with great sympathy and with the hope that it would assure an independent and sound Yugoslavia. We did not desire any alliances with Yugoslavia, just as we had no alliances with Italy. He had all his cards on the table, and spoke in exactly the same way to Hungary and Austria also. He hoped that the Minister President would re-

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<sup>5</sup> Of June 18, 1935.

peat his visit some time at a pleasanter season of the year. He would then see that we were no longer suffering from unemployment here in Germany, but, on the contrary, from a shortage of labor.

At this point Minister President General Göring again broached the subject of Austria. Yugoslavia could rely upon it that, if Austria should at some time join with Germany and Germany should thus become a neighbor of Yugoslavia, Germany would never make territorial demands on Yugoslavia.

The Führer agreed fully. German policy would in the future never again be made in Vienna, but only in Berlin. It would be soberly realistic and always only German. The interests that united Germany and Yugoslavia would constantly become stronger. This would result from their economic interdependence in itself. Germany's political aims did not extend beyond Austria. A Hapsburg in Vienna, or Austria's entry into anti-German coalitions, would be intolerable for Germany. Anything of the sort would result in constant latent tensions with the continual danger of war. But whatever happened, the present Yugoslav border would remain as inviolate as the present border at the Brenner. Moreover, he knew that the German minority in Yugoslavia was entirely loyal to the Yugoslav State and he could only say again that he considered a good minorities policy Yugoslavia's best protection. Germany would never again go to war for a chimera. The German people were soldierly, but not militaristic. They loved nothing more than peace and order. In this the German people were like the British.

The Yugoslav Minister President thanked the Führer for the clear picture of German policy that the Führer had given him. The German attitude on the Hungarian and Austrian problems was a source of satisfaction to him. Germany had given economic aid to the old Serbia in former times. In the World War, the Serbian people had become acquainted with the heroism of the German soldier. During the occupation, it had been the German troops and officers who had protected the Serbian people against the arbitrary actions of others. Since the war nothing had separated Yugoslavia from Germany so much as the French spectacles. Yugoslavia had now removed these spectacles.

The Austrian question was for Yugoslavia a purely domestic German question. Yugoslavia would never fight because a people wished to be united. On the Hapsburg question Yugoslavia was absolutely in accord with Germany and was prepared, if necessary, to march with her.

As far as Hungary was concerned, the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia was today already fairly well satisfied. He would continue to endeavor to meet their wishes. What he did with respect to Hungary he had to do within the framework of the Little Entente. He had



opposed any extension of the Little Entente into a general mutual assistance pact, but the Hungarian question was the core of the alliance of the Little Entente. He believed that the Hungarians also understood this attitude of his.

He could assure the Führer, moreover, that all of Yugoslavia relied on the word of the Führer. He expressed his thanks for all the friendliness that he had been shown here. The death of King Alexander had been a severe trial for Yugoslavia. Fortunately, the Prince Regent had been able to step into the breach and it was owing to him that Yugoslavia had been able to survive this test without collapsing.

His trip to Germany had also been made for the purpose of learning something. It was his intention to imitate some of the things that he saw here. He was particularly anxious to win over the youth of his country, just as the Führer had done. He wished to see to it that the youth of Yugoslavia felt themselves to be exclusively Yugoslavs.

The Führer ended the conversation by pointing out that just as Yugoslavia, in her relations with Germany, had now removed the French spectacles, Germany, too, in her relations with Yugoslavia, was now no longer using the Viennese spectacles. He saw in Yugoslavia an increasingly prosperous country and it was evident to him that domestic opposition to the Minister President in many cases consisted of the same foes that he, the Führer, had also had to fight in Germany. He therefore thoroughly understood the difficulties that faced the Minister President. Germany's testing time had been the World War, Yugoslavia's the death of King Alexander. Both tests had been surmounted.

### No. 164

1494/870012-13

#### *The Chief of the Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Minister*

MOST URGENT

Rk. 797 B

BERLIN, January 18, 1938.

Pol. I 184 g (IV).

Subject: Iron Guard/Rumania.

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: According to information I have received, the Iron Guard has been assisted by sources in Germany. It has been reported to M. Goga, the present Minister President, that 17,000 kg. of printed matter was shipped to the German school at Bucharest under an invoice of the Foreign Ministry. According to statements of the present Government it is only this assistance which explains the enormous propaganda activities of the Iron Guard which, besides having printed material in abundance, also appeared everywhere with an astonishing display of hired passenger cars and trucks.

Since there is no doubt as to the anti-monarchical attitude of the Iron Guard, it is important to find its German sources.

The Führer and Chancellor is informed of this matter and is awaiting my report. I request you, therefore, to conduct a careful inquiry into the matter and also to establish whether and from what German agency the Iron Guard has received financial subsidies.

Please have the result of your inquiry forwarded to me as soon as possible.<sup>1</sup>

Heil Hitler!

Very truly yours,

DR. LAMMERS

<sup>1</sup> Neurath replied on Jan. 31 (1494/370013-16) that he had investigated the shipping records of the Foreign Ministry for several preceding months and found that nothing like the volume of shipments alleged had been dispatched by his Ministry, and that of material shipped none had been for the Iron Guard or was objectionable on other grounds. He thought it very unlikely that some other agency had been misusing the labels and the shipping documents of the Foreign Ministry.

No. 165

3568/E023651-54

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, January 22, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. IV 427 I.

For your confidential information.

The visit of the Yugoslav Minister President to Berlin went off satisfactorily in every respect. No treaty agreements were contemplated and none were concluded. During the many confidential talks the Yugoslav Minister President declared that Yugoslavia would never under any circumstances enter into an anti-German pact or an anti-German coalition. We on our part pointed out that we were not seeking any alliance or similar ties with Yugoslavia. In the Balkans we were pursuing only economic interests, for whose realization confidential and friendly relations with a strong and independent Yugoslavia offered the best guarantee. The Yugoslav Minister President spoke with satisfaction of the further development of Yugoslavia's relations with Italy and Bulgaria, with some reservations regarding the stability of the Goga government (which in itself he welcomed), and with strong disapproval, on the other hand, of Czechoslovak policy. As on the occasion of the Hungarian visit, we laid great stress on a Yugoslav-Hungarian *rapprochement*. The Yugoslav

<sup>1</sup> Addressees were the Embassies in Turkey, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Poland, and the Legations in Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece.

Minister President pointed to his continued efforts to meet the wishes of the Hungarian minority but emphasized the necessity of taking into consideration the Little Entente. The Austrian question, declared the Yugoslav Minister President, was a purely internal German question. In the Hapsburg question he assured us that he was in complete agreement with our uncompromising attitude and would fully conform to German policy. Contrary to press reports, nothing was said regarding a possible adherence by Yugoslavia to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The agreement reached with regard to influencing the press of both sides is known to you through the DNB report of January 18.

The total impression is that the Minister President continues to strive earnestly and vigorously to keep Yugoslav policy free of all influences not in harmony with the interests of his own country. Without breaking the tie with France, he intends at all events to avoid being drawn into any possible conflicts. Nor will he for the time being break away from the Little Entente; but he is avoiding everything that might lead to its consolidation. He regards its progressive disintegration as not impossible and intends in such an event to lean on Rumania, if a Rightist government remains in power, as well as on Poland, in order to seek in such a coalition a substitute for the Little Entente. In keeping with the successes of his foreign policy thus far and with his own disposition, he tends to take an optimistic view of developments in Southeastern Europe. The forceful personality of the Minister President, moreover, left a very favorable impression here.

In conversations please stress the general success of the visit in the sense of the final communiqué;<sup>2</sup> point out that no agreements were concluded, but avoid giving details.

#### Supplement for Budapest:

I received and informed the Hungarian Minister after the departure of Stoyadinovich. An instruction on Hungarian-Yugoslav relations will follow by pouch.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Published in *Documents on International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1942), vol. I, pp. 294-295.

<sup>3</sup>Not printed (3626/E028042-44). The instruction, Pol. I 60g. Rs. of Jan. 24, reviewed discussions held earlier concerning Germany's role in connection with a Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier agreement, quoting Hitler's statement to the Hungarians as recorded in document No. 149, and summarizing the representations of the Hungarian Minister in documents Nos. 160 and 161, which construed Hitler's statement as an offer to "guarantee" a Yugoslav-Hungarian agreement. The instruction then quoted Hitler's statement to Stoyadinovich on this subject, not as recorded in document No. 163, where the term "guarantee" is also employed, but as Neurath recorded it in a separate and shorter memorandum of the conversation (906/293845-47). This latter version attributes to Hitler the somewhat more cautious statement that Germany would "give security [eine Bürgschaft übernehmen] on terms to be defined later for any agreement the two States might make."

Supplement for Rome:

Attolico has been informed in broad outline of the conversations with Stoyadinovich.

NEURATH

No. 166

8767/E040716-17

*Counselor Clodius to Minister Rümelin*

BERLIN, January 24, 1938.

MY DEAR MINISTER: Excellency Schnee,<sup>1</sup> your corps brother of student days, came to see me and asked me to get in touch with you once more regarding the trip planned by the World Economic Society [*Weltwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft*]. Because of your stand we have taken a negative attitude heretofore. But I believe we should perhaps give our approval to the trip after all; it seems to me quite well prepared, and if Excellency Schnee himself is leading it I do not believe that there will be any foolish or tactless incidents.

Herr von Lupin, the manager of the Export Cartel for War Matériel, will leave for Sofia tomorrow to discuss war matériel deliveries with the Bulgarian authorities. It is a question of the large transaction which the party with whom you are on friendly terms has had in preparation for a long time through M. Draganov<sup>2</sup> and with regard to which you have sent several telegrams. Here the economic agencies concerned are of the opinion that the transaction cannot be carried out on the suggested scale of 100 million reichsmarks and on such unusually long credit terms as 10 to 12 years, as the Bulgarians desire. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry has taken the stand that a solution must at least be found which takes account of our political friendship with Bulgaria and the fact that economically Bulgaria has oriented herself completely toward Germany. Consideration for the party with whom you are on friendly terms also plays its part, of course. Accordingly I told Herr von Lupin today, the last day before his departure, that he was to negotiate in such a way that the Bulgarians would be fully satisfied. If he succeeded in achieving this with a smaller order of about 25 millions, we would be in accord, of course. We shall not be able to go higher than 50 in any case, for the German productive capacity, the transfer possibilities, and the possibilities of raising leva in Bulgaria would not permit that. The Bulgarians themselves will understand this, however. Naturally Herr

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Heinrich Schnee, President of the German organization, World Economic Society.

<sup>2</sup> Farvan Draganov, Bulgarian Minister in Vienna until the *Anschluss*, and in Berlin from Apr. 22, 1938.

von Lupin cannot conclude anything definite, but must report here. In view of the importance of this matter we would be very grateful if you would look after him and advise him on personalities and political matters.

With many cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Sincerely yours,

CLODIUS

No. 167

5538/E395768-70

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy  
Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, February 1, 1938.

URGENT

W 108 g.

The executive director of the Export Cartel for War Matériel, Herr von Lupin, has been in Sofia during the last few days in order to discuss with the Bulgarian Government the possible framework for the implementation of the war-matériel orders which the Bulgarian Minister in Vienna, Draganov, previously discussed with Minister President Göring, at the personal initiative of the King of Bulgaria.

The King of Bulgaria had sent word to Minister President Göring that the Bulgarian Government desired to put into execution a large armament program amounting to 100 million reichsmarks as soon as possible, with payment to be made over a period of about 10 to 15 years. The German agencies interested in the economic aspect of the transaction, as well as Colonel General Göring himself, maintain that a transaction of this scope is out of the question for economic and financial reasons.

I told Herr von Lupin before he left that the Foreign Ministry would not go so far as to demand, for political reasons, that the internal ministries and industry go through with any transaction that would be very disadvantageous from an economic and financial point of view. On the other hand, in view of our existing friendly political relations with Bulgaria, we considered it important that the negotiations should be conducted in such a manner that the Bulgarians would not be seriously annoyed. We also would have to give some consideration to the fact that the Bulgarians for years have on an ever-increasing scale been adapting their economy to Germany. (Germany's share of Bulgarian foreign trade runs to about 60 percent.)

From the report now made by Herr von Lupin<sup>1</sup> it appears that the Bulgarian Government is not disposed to adapt the transaction to the actual facts of Germany's credit policy, foreign exchange policy,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (5538/E395771-75).

and armament production potential, but rather, under the impression that Minister President General Göring had expressed himself very favorably to M. Draganov, will yet attempt to obtain the approval of the German Government for an armament order in the amount of 38 million reichsmarks that would be filled immediately but would be paid for only in the years 1940 to 1952. This order is to comprise the real core of the program, that is, the delivery of heavy weapons. But additional orders would also be placed during the next few years for technical material and accessories in the amount of 50 million reichsmarks, for which shorter terms of payment would be agreed upon in each case. In the Bulgarian view, however, the indispensable condition for the implementation of the whole program is our consent to the 38-million-reichsmark transaction with a credit for 15 years and payments beginning only after 3 years, that is, long after all the matériel has been delivered.

If the Bulgarians should insist on these extreme demands, it will be difficult to reach any compromise solution that is reasonably satisfactory to them, although that would in itself be desirable for political considerations. I told Herr von Lupin that in view of the special importance, political as well as otherwise, of how we handle this project, which is crucial for Bulgaria's entire armament program, I believed that it was necessary on all accounts to conduct the negotiations in such a way that the Bulgarians would not get the impression that we were leaving them in the lurch.

Herr von Lupin will within the next few days, perhaps as soon as tomorrow, report personally to Minister President Göring and request his decision on the further course of action. If he receives no other communication from me in the meantime, he will present the position of the Foreign Ministry as set forth above.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the Director of the Economic Policy Department and the State Secretary.

CLODIUS

### No. 168

5558/E395781

*State Secretary Körner of the Four Year Plan to the Bulgarian Minister in Austria, Draganov*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, February 8, 1938.

W 123 g.

Your Excellency will have heard by now of the negotiations by Freiherr von Lupin in Sofia. In these negotiations, as you will also

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<sup>1</sup> The cover note (5558/E395780) on the copy of the letter sent to the Foreign Ministry for information states that it was delivered through the German Legation in Vienna.

have been informed, far-reaching differences of opinion have developed regarding the scope of the transactions and the terms of payment. These differences were intensively discussed between the two parties, but have not as yet been eliminated. We hope, however, that it will be possible for the representatives of your country to give due weight to the important considerations which Freiherr von Lupin had to bring up on instructions of the Field Marshal, so that agreement on the scope and the terms of delivery and payment, desired by both sides, may yet be reached. In this hope I extend to Your Excellency my sincere greetings.

Faithfully yours,

KÖRNER

No. 169

1988/440976-79

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 428-I A 5

BUCHAREST, February 10, 1938.

Received February 12.

Pol. IV 893.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: M. Antonescu, Minister of War.

The Polish Minister, M. Arciszewski, gave me an account of a conversation he had two days ago with General Antonescu, the Minister of War. His call on M. Antonescu was for the purpose of inducing him to exercise his influence upon Codreanu<sup>1</sup> in favor of benevolent neutrality by the Iron Guard toward the Goga government in the election campaign so that Goga would not be overthrown by a Rightist party. As a matter of fact, the position of the Cabinet had become so difficult, owing to external and internal enmities, that it had slight prospect of carrying the elections if in addition it had to face the hostility of Codreanu, who was incensed over the sanguinary incidents at the first election meetings. Antonescu seems to have acted successfully on this suggestion, as I have reported elsewhere.

On this occasion M. Arciszewski also discussed with the Minister of War the question of deployment in the East, against Russia. Before his departure M. Ostrovski, the Soviet Russian Minister, had coined the phrase, "With the pro-German Goga government Germany is standing at the Dniester." Rumania would have to understand that Germany was only out to obtain possession of the Rumanian oil fields. Russia would know how to resist that. That, said the Polish

<sup>1</sup> Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, leader of the Iron Guard.

Minister to M. Antonescu, showed Rumania from what quarter danger threatened. In reply Minister of War Antonescu told M. Arciszewski that he did not consider that danger as too great. At the moment another danger appeared much more serious to him, and that was the recent events in Germany. He had news from Paris according to which the changes in the command of the German military forces indicated a greater striking power for the German Army, but also a more active policy aimed at *Anschluss* [of Austria] and the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The Polish Minister contradicted the Minister of War. He could only tell him that rumors concerning changes in the Reich Army had been current for some time and at any rate had already been the topic of the day in Berlin when his Foreign Minister, M. Beck, had visited Herr von Neurath. But M. Beck had imparted to him his impressions of Berlin, which carried the conviction that Adolf Hitler wanted no war and would solve neither the Austrian nor the Czech problem by force of arms. Poland at least could see no danger at all from the German quarter. M. Arciszewski asked M. Antonescu whether Rumania would think of hastening to the aid of Czechoslovakia if German troops were nevertheless to invade. M. Antonescu had replied that he was not thinking of that; Rumania was involved by treaty only in an action against Hungary. But it was France's attitude in such a contingency that worried him. France would without fail come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia and then there would be a conflict into which the whole world would be drawn. Rumania would then find herself threatened by Russia, and that was what worried him most. He would therefore work with all his vigor to strengthen the Army and to see to it that it is adequately equipped.

M. Arciszewski found confirmation in this conversation of how strongly Minister of War Antonescu was influenced by the French Army. The same applied to M. Paul Theodorescu, his Under State Secretary. Both had been educated in France and spoke excellent French. M. Antonescu served for a long time in London as Military Attaché and is a man of broad vision. On the other hand, he has no ties to Germany whatever. Since he is a man of determination who has his task of building up the striking power of the Rumanian Army seriously at heart, we will have to try to develop further the contact which I have recently established with him. I would therefore like in this connection to suggest again the early assignment of a Military Attaché to Bucharest, to serve exclusively at this post.<sup>2</sup>

I informed Minister President Goga and a senior court official, the latter for the information of the King, regarding the import for

<sup>2</sup> Lt. Col. Rudolf Toussaint was assigned to both Rumania and Czechoslovakia.



foreign policy of the changes in the Reich which took place on February 4.<sup>3</sup> I shall [seek] an opportunity to talk this over with General Antonescu, too.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup> On this date Ribbentrop replaced Neurath as Foreign Minister simultaneously with changes in the principal military posts. Field Marshal von Blomberg was removed as War Minister and Hitler himself became Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces with a staff headed by General Keitel. General von Fritsch was replaced by General von Brauchitsch as Commander in Chief of the Army.

# No. 170

3409/E014052

## *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV*

BERLIN, February 11, 1938.  
Pol. IV 878.

As directed, I telephoned Herr von Marchtaler<sup>1</sup> in Berchtesgaden today and told him the following regarding the events in Rumania:<sup>2</sup>

As far as it is possible from the news available here to form an impression of the reasons for the Cabinet change in Rumania, it could be assumed that on the one hand economic and financial reasons were involved; on the other hand, however, foreign influences from France and England, and perhaps also America, on the score of the Jewish question<sup>3</sup> probably also played a role. Because of the recent incident in Bucharest involving the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, one could also imagine that the Rumanians were somewhat concerned about Russia, especially as the Russians had dispatched a sharp note to Rumania in the matter.<sup>4</sup> With regard to the question whether any essential change in the course of foreign policy was to be expected at the moment, it was important that, as in the past, developments in Rumania were still in the hands of the King, and possibly even more so. For that reason, as far as could be predicted at this time, an immediate shift in the course of foreign policy was not likely.

<sup>1</sup> Of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

<sup>2</sup> King Carol had dismissed the Cabinet of Octavian Goga on Feb. 10 to form a provisional government of national concentration.

<sup>3</sup> Goga's National Christian Party was strongly anti-Semitic; France and Britain had protested that its measures violated the minorities treaties. See document No. 179.

<sup>4</sup> The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania, Theodor C. Butenko, disappeared on Feb. 6. A Russian note to Rumania charged that the Goga government did not conduct an adequate investigation. An article in *Pravda* stated that Butenko had been the victim of Rumanian fascists having the support of foreign powers, and attacked Goga as a German agent. When Butenko some days later appeared in Rome as a political refugee, the Soviet press alleged that this Butenko was a "White-Guardist" impostor. The German Embassy in Moscow reported to the Foreign Ministry on Feb. 28 that the photograph in its files accompanying Butenko's visa application was identical with the one published in Rome. (1650/392011).

I also informed Herr von Marchtaler about the reports just printed in the *B. Z. am Mittag* regarding the proclamation of martial law and the placing of executive functions in the hands of the military, and called attention to the fact that according to these reports the former Liberal Minister President Tatarescu has taken over the functions of Foreign Minister.

HEINBURG

### No. 171

3409/E014053

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, February 11, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. IV 896.

Not being able to reach the State Secretary, Herr von Marchtaler telephoned me today from Berchtesgaden, as Herr von Ribbentrop wanted an opinion on the reorganization of the Rumanian Cabinet. Just before that, Minister Comnen had called on me to tell me the following, with all the signs of emotion of which he is capable: He had been recalled to Bucharest, obviously because they wanted to saddle him with the Foreign Ministry. He hoped that he would be able to get out of taking that ministerial post. But if he had to take it, it would be with no other aim in mind than to demonstrate even more forcefully than in the past his proven friendship for Germany. M. Comnen said regarding the reorganization of the Cabinet itself only that he missed the name of Bratianu in the new list, and if he should be forced to take the ministerial post he would do everything to obtain Bratianu's support.

I transmitted these statements of Comnen to Herr von Marchtaler and added that a sudden change of direction in Rumania on foreign affairs was probably not to be feared. But I would direct Herr Heinburg to forward more detailed information.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 172

2134/467226

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, February 14, 1938.

For the reasons mentioned in the attached paper<sup>1</sup> Herr von Ribbentrop considers it a very good idea to take the wind out of the

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (2134/467224-25). The Hungarian Minister suggested to Mackensen on Feb. 11 that to forestall the impression that Germany's refusal to participate in the Eucharistic Congress was directed against Hungary, an early announcement should be made of Germany's intention to participate in the August celebration of the 900-year jubilee of St. Stephen which was a national festival. See documents Nos. 148 and 149.

sails of the Jewish-liberal press in the question of the German refusal to participate in the Eucharistic Congress, by having a suitable German delegation take part in the celebration in honor of the 900-year jubilee of St. Stephen, the first Hungarian king, and by announcing this participation as soon as possible, in any event before the beginning of the Eucharistic Congress.

It is a prerequisite that the celebration in which we are to take part is actually a purely Hungarian national one, and not a church celebration.

The Foreign Minister also deems it more appropriate, since we should not press ourselves upon the Hungarians in this matter, that we await a Hungarian invitation. He intends to submit the question to the Führer and Reich Chancellor for his decision.

When the decision has been taken the conversation with Minister Sztójay can be continued.<sup>2</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notes: "The Foreign Minister requests that he be informed of the composition of the German delegation. E. K[ordt], Feb. 16." "The Foreign Minister has spoken with the Führer, who concurs. E. K[ordt], Feb. 17."

No. 173

3626/E028058-61

*The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Hungary*

PERSONAL

BERLIN, February 28, 1938.

Received March 3.

Pol. I 127 g. Rs.

With reference to instruction Pol. I 60 g. Rs. II of January 24.<sup>1</sup>

In the enclosure I am sending you a copy of an extract from the memorandum of the State Secretary and Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry regarding his journey to Budapest from February [January] 23 to 27; the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery has forwarded the memorandum to the Foreign Ministry for further action on the political issues with which it deals.

The conversation related therein, which was initiated by Count Csáky, is obviously connected with the Berlin conversations referred to in the preceding instruction, but is at variance with them insofar as Count Csáky's proposal aims at a unilateral German military guarantee of the present Hungarian-Yugoslav boundary. To prevent any misunderstanding it appears advisable to take up this matter,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3626/E028042-44). See document No. 165, footnote 3, for a summary of the instruction.

which was discussed by the Foreign Minister's *chef de cabinet*, with the Hungarian Foreign Minister in person.

I therefore request you to call M. de Kánya's attention orally to the content of the relevant part of the memorandum when the opportunity arises, and to ask him what he wishes to communicate to us regarding that question and whether he wishes to indicate more precisely what was meant by the proposal. If in his statement—to which, by the way, you should adopt a purely noncommittal attitude—M. de Kánya should mention a military guarantee, it would be well for you to observe that, as far as you knew, a military guarantee had not been mentioned heretofore and that on this point more detailed explanations were required to enable us to judge the implications of his proposal.

I should be obliged for a report on the outcome of the interview.

By order:  
WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, February 3, 1938.

MEMORANDUM ON MY TRIP TO BUDAPEST, FROM JANUARY 23 TO 27, 1938<sup>1</sup>

f) *Count Csáky*—*chef de cabinet* of the Royal Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Csáky, who very often drew me into political conversations, quite obviously had definite instructions from Kánya. Csáky developed the following picture of the situation:

Both Germany and Hungary had legitimate territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. The same was true of Poland. If Germany should march into Czechoslovakia, Hungary would not be able to do the same unless she had absolute assurance that Yugoslavia would not in turn attack Hungary. In his opinion, however, a simultaneous attack by Hungary would mean a very considerable and necessary assistance to Germany.

The Hungarian Government therefore proposed that Germany give a military guarantee of the *present* Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier. If such a German guarantee was given, Hungary was prepared for her

<sup>1</sup> Bohle transmitted the full memorandum to Erdmannsdorff on Feb. 12 (3626/E028045-57). His account of his conversations with Hungarian leaders, except for the talk with Csáky, adds nothing to the Hungarian-German exchanges contained in the documents printed above in this chapter. He does quote Horthy as saying that he hated the French and "would go through thick and thin with Germany." The covering letter to Erdmannsdorff states that Minister Sztójay had "expressly confirmed" the Csáky proposal to him, Bohle, and inquired from State Secretary Mackensen whether it had been transmitted to the Führer, which it had.

part to relinquish *forever* the territory which Yugoslavia had obtained from Hungary.

I asked the Count whether this proposal was meant seriously. He affirmed this very emphatically, adding that the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia was rather scattered and not too important; moreover, Hungary did not have any prospect whatever of recovering this territory for decades to come and was therefore prepared on grounds of *Realpolitik* to relinquish any claim to it.

Repeating my view that a *modus vivendi* with Yugoslavia was of extreme importance for Hungary, I promised the Count that I would discuss this proposal in Berlin.

Csáky emphasized that the Regent's impending visit to Poland, on which he would be accompanied by M. de Kánya and himself, was of great importance also with respect to Czechoslovakia.

Everything said by Csáky betrayed again and again his extreme concern that Yugoslavia, by reason of her ties with the Little Entente, might attack Hungary in case of Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia.

He likewise emphasized the unreliability of Stoyadinovich, who was likely to become something of a megalomaniac on account of the many honors bestowed on him. It had been noticed with great astonishment in Hungary that at the dinner given by Foreign Minister von Neurath, Stoyadinovich had proposed his toast in the Yugoslav language. Apart from the discourtesy—Stoyadinovich is known to speak German well—Stoyadinovich seemed to wish to create the impression that Yugoslavia was a Great Power.

With reference to Austria, Csáky told me that Hungary had no objections whatever to Austria's incorporation into the German Reich, especially since she was convinced that there was no intention of a subsequent annexation of Hungary as well.

I told him that the Führer was opposed in principle to subjugating foreign peoples, so that Hungary really need not be concerned on that account.

Csáky stated in conclusion that the Hungarians would rather have as their neighbor a strong and friendly German Reich than a weak and unreliable Austria.

### III

Through all conversations rang the recurrent expression of Hungary's desire for maintaining and strengthening her traditional good relations with the Reich. The Hungarians repeatedly stated that my visit, following immediately upon the visit of Stoyadinovich to Berlin, had greatly contributed toward dispelling the rumors that Germany intended to pursue a separate policy with Yugoslavia, and lately also with Rumania, at the expense of Hungary.

## No. 174

PB/0028-27

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 4, 1938.

The Yugoslav Minister, Cincar-Markovich, called on me at noon today. He told me that he was going to Belgrade in the next few days and was therefore glad to have the opportunity still to speak with the new Reich Foreign Minister, since he wished to make as complete a report as possible to Prince Regent Paul and Minister President Stoyadinovich.

He then spoke to me about the Austrian question, and I briefly explained our position, adding that we were seeking a peaceful outcome. However, in case foreign powers intervened in this internal German affair, we were armed in the west, and all those circles that were thinking of intervention would do well to realize clearly that Germany would know how to defend herself with all her might.

M. Cincar-Markovich stated that Yugoslavia attached special importance to good relations with the German Reich. So far as the Austrian question was concerned, the Yugoslav Government took the position that it was an internal German affair.<sup>1</sup>

M. Cincar-Markovich then brought up the subject of the Anglo-Italian negotiations. I told him that we would welcome an easing of the relations between England and Italy. Such a development would naturally be of interest to Yugoslavia also.

RIBBENTROP

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<sup>1</sup> In a dispatch of Feb. 22 (504/234915-19) Minister Heeren reported from Belgrade that the Prince Regent and Stoyadinovich, the only authoritative voices in Yugoslav foreign policy, would prefer a stable, independent Austria. Since a stable Austria seemed unlikely they were willing to accept a "German solution" as the only permanent guarantee against Hapsburg and Italian machinations in Austria. In Slovenia and Croatia, however, clerical influence led to a decisively negative attitude toward *Anschluss*.

## No. 175

5558/E395783-85

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy  
Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, March 4, 1938.

W 178 g.

For some time now negotiations have been conducted with the Bulgarian Government about a large war matériel order. Originally the Bulgarian Government desired to place an order in the amount of

100 million RM in Germany, with a credit for 15-16 years. Since the King of Bulgaria is especially interested in these negotiations, some considerable time ago he instructed his former adjutant and personal confidant Draganov, the then Bulgarian Minister in Vienna and future Minister in Berlin, to conduct the negotiations in the name of the King directly with Field Marshal Göring, through State Secretary Körner.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the failure to date to bring the negotiations to a conclusion by this procedure, the King has now sent the former Minister of Finance, Riaskov, and M. Draganov together to Berlin with instructions to enter into official negotiations with the German Government on this transaction and at the same time to convey to the Field Marshal the personal request of the King that the deal be moved along.

The discussions which I have had during the last few days with the two Bulgarians, attended also by the Ministries concerned, and which were continued yesterday in a conference at the office of State Secretary Körner, have so far had the following result:

The order will for the time being be limited to 30 million RM. Payment and amortization are to begin in 1942. In 1939, 1940, and 1941 only 6-percent interest will be paid. The payment of one-fourth of the total amount, that is, about 7.5 million RM, will be made by supplementary shipments of lead from the Bulgarian lead mines which are to be reopened with German assistance. No agreement has been reached as yet about the period of payment after 1942. The Bulgarians are asking for 8 years, while we have so far said that 5 years is the maximum. At yesterday's conference, State Secretary Körner proposed a five-year payment period as the final German offer, with the proviso that if the economic and financial situation of Bulgaria should deteriorate and preclude payment, an extension of the period to 8 years would be granted. The Bulgarians said that this proposal was unacceptable and asked, in view of the special instructions from their King, to be allowed to put the matter before the Field Marshal. State Secretary Körner promised them that they would be received by the Field Marshal within the next few days. The Bulgarians attach so much value to a conversation with the Field Marshal because, on the strength of M. Draganov's conversation with him during an earlier visit to Berlin, they feel justified in believing that he will make an exception for Bulgaria and approve such a long period of payment.

<sup>1</sup> According to a memorandum by Lupin on his visit to Sofia, dated Feb. 1 (5558/E395771-75), Bulgaria initiated the negotiations in September 1937 by a letter from the War Minister, General Lukov, to Göring. Draganov forwarded the letter in an exchange of correspondence with Göring.

Throughout the negotiations the Foreign Ministry has consistently taken the position that while an attempt must be made, through limiting as much as possible the scale of the deliveries and the period of payment, to arrive at an arrangement that will be economically not too unfavorable for Germany, a complete breakdown of the negotiations must be avoided in view of the close political and economic ties of many years' standing between Bulgaria and Germany.<sup>2</sup>

CLODIUS

<sup>2</sup> No document has been found recording an interview of the Bulgarians with Göring. The terms finally agreed are included in the Secret Protocol signed on Mar. 12 (document No. 181). On Mar. 10 State Secretary Mackensen addressed a letter (5558/E395786-88) to Finance Minister Schwerin von Krosigk stating that the Bulgarians stood fast on their demand for an 8-year credit, as qualified in the final protocol. Although these terms exceeded those Germany had insisted upon for similar contracts with other states it "would be politically indefensible to allow the negotiations to collapse." He requested Krosigk's agreement, adding that Göring and Schacht had already consented. In a letter of Mar. 21 (5558/E395802-04) Krosigk confirmed the approval he had given earlier by telephone, but said that he consented reluctantly and only out of consideration for the political argument. He objected also to the fact that his Ministry had not been kept sufficiently informed of the negotiations; in future he would not be disposed to agree if such a protocol was presented to him only after it had reached its final form.

## No. 176

1895/426864-66

### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A. No. 50 P 35

BUDAPEST, March 7, 1938.

Received March 14.

Pol. IV 1611.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Relations between Hungary and the Little Entente.

Foreign Minister de Kánya told me on inquiry that at his direction the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest had spoken to the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Tatarescu, some three weeks ago about the possibility of resuming the negotiations which had come to a standstill first because of the Rumanian elections and later because of the government crisis in Bucharest. The object of the negotiations, as was previously reported, was the conclusion of an agreement between the states of the Little Entente and Hungary, whereby the former, in return for an assurance of nonaggression on the part of Hungary in the sense of the Kellogg Pact, would recognize the latter's equality of military rights and give positive assurances regarding an improvement in the position of the Hungarian minority.

After Tatarescu had first agreed in principle, difficulties had soon arisen on the minorities question. A week ago the Rumanian Minister here had stated to him that his Government was prepared to pick



up the thread of the negotiations broken off months ago. M. de Kánya had replied that he himself had already made a beginning by the previously mentioned conversation of Minister de Bardossy. He had told Minister Bosny in addition that the Hungarian Government—as reported elsewhere—had no intention at the present time of making a unilateral declaration of its equality of military rights, but that it could not wait forever for the conclusion of an agreement to that effect.

As he had done previously, the Foreign Minister told me that on the question of the contemplated agreement Hungary could probably come to an understanding very quickly with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, whereas the Rumanians, on the other hand, were still causing difficulties. Their attitude, therefore, still blocked progress on the protocol, since the states of the Little Entente wished to conclude it only as a bloc.

In his important speech in Győr (Raab) on March 5, Minister President de Darányi stated that almost a year had passed without any progress having been made—except for some wishes expressed in general terms—in the Hungarian Government's proposed settlement of relations with the states of the Little Entente, although Hungary's willingness to reach an understanding had remained unchanged throughout the entire period. This willingness still existed today, provided no one abused the political patience of the Hungarian Government. On this occasion, too, he considered it necessary to emphasize that the *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of better relations with the neighbors of Hungary was a guarantee of protection for the Hungarian minorities through legislative measures. Without a satisfactory settlement of the fate of the minorities, normal relations between Hungary and the states of the Little Entente could not be established.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 177

8626/E028065-68

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

BUDAPEST, March 7, 1938.

G. No. 5

Subject: German guarantee of Hungarian-Yugoslav agreements.

With reference to instruction Pol. I 127 g. Rs. of February 28.

I called on the Foreign Minister and spoke with him in the sense of the instruction referred to above.

It was brought out that, in Foreign Minister de Kánya's opinion, Count Csáky's remarks to State Secretary Bohle differed from Kánya's statements in Berlin only in that Csáky, because of the negative results for Hungary of the conversation between the Führer and the Yugoslav Minister President, proposed that Germany undertake a unilateral military guarantee of the present Hungarian-Yugoslav boundary, thus enabling Hungary to take parallel action in the event of a German-Czechoslovak conflict without having to fear a Yugoslav invasion. Count Csáky had afterwards informed him, Kánya, of this conversation. However, the suggestion was to be considered as a personal opinion advanced by Count Csáky and not an official suggestion of the Hungarian Government.

M. de Kánya, who had Count Csáky attend this phase of his conversation with me, assured me that in his Berlin conversations both with Field Marshal Göring and with the Führer he had offered final renunciation by Hungary of the territory ceded to Yugoslavia in the peace treaty, that is, recognition of the present boundary, in return for a Yugoslav neutrality pledge to Hungary, and that he had suggested a German guarantee for such an agreement. The Führer had responded to this proposal very willingly, and had promised to pass it on to Stoyadinovich. Perhaps he had first spoken to the latter in January only in general terms of these matters (see instruction Pol. I 60 g. Rs. of January 24, 1938),<sup>1</sup> but had refrained from submitting to Stoyadinovich the Hungarian proposal in all its implications after, as Foreign Minister Freiherr von Neurath had told Minister Sztójay, it became evident that Stoyadinovich was not willing to free himself from his commitments to the other states of the Little Entente concerning Hungary. The Führer had acted very properly in doing so, as everything which is told Stoyadinovich becomes known to Paris and Prague within 48 hours. He, Kánya, had assumed that calculated risk despite the dangers thereby incurred by Hungary.

Besides, about 3 weeks ago he himself had read a communication which the Yugoslav Minister President had sent to Paris after his Berlin visit, according to which Yugoslavia felt obliged to attach great value to good economic relations with Germany and Italy, but in case of an armed conflict she still intended, as in the past, to march at the side of France.

He would tell Count Ciano, who had recently again sent word to him recommending concessions to Yugoslavia, in plain terms that he had gone to the farthest possible limit in his offer made in Berlin, which apparently was not yet known to the Italian Foreign Minister, and had

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3626/E028042-44). See document No. 165, footnote 3, for a summary of the instruction.

thereby offered proof of Hungary's sincere readiness to arrive at an understanding with Yugoslavia.

The Hungarian Government could do nothing more in this matter at present, and had to leave it to us whether and when we deemed it the proper moment for informing Stoyadinovich of Hungary's far-reaching offer, if this had not been done already.

V. ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 178

F18/381-383

*Minister Erdmannsdorff to Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker*<sup>1</sup>

BUDAPEST, March 7, 1938.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should like to add to my official report<sup>2</sup> in reply to your secret instruction of February 28<sup>3</sup> that the misunderstanding regarding the scope of the Hungarian offer to Yugoslavia probably arose from the fact that Herr M[eissner]'s memorandum of the conversation between the Führer and the Hungarian Ministers<sup>4</sup>—transmitted to me by the instruction of December 1, 1937, Pol. I 6353 g. Rs.<sup>5</sup>—states only the following with reference to the statement of M. de Kánya: "Hungary was willing to concede to Yugoslavia that Hungarian territorial claims would not be made the object of military action, provided Yugoslavia would accord cultural autonomy to the Hungarian minorities."

As appears from my enclosed report,<sup>6</sup> however, it was not Count Csáky who, in a statement to State Secretary Bohle, first went much further, but M. de Kánya in Berlin, when he offered a definitive recognition of the present Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier in return for a Yugoslav neutrality pledge to Hungary, which naturally would have relevance chiefly in the event of a conflict between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. I was able to ascertain definitely that M. de Kánya made no mention to the Führer of "cultural autonomy for the Hun-

<sup>1</sup> The copy of this document available contains a notation by Erich Kordt dated Apr. 29 that the original was in the possession of the Foreign Minister for use in a discussion with the Führer. (See document No. 191, footnote 1.) It is apparently this original, which contains additional marginal comments, that was used for the publication *Documents secrets du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne: Hongrie* (Paris, 1946), document No. 8, a French translation of German Foreign Ministry documents issued in Russian by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R. The publication is referred to hereinafter as Soviet publication, *Documents secrets*.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 177.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 173.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 149.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 149, footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 177.

garian minority", contrary to the statement in the memorandum; at the most Kánya discussed in this connection the conversations with all the states of the Little Entente—which, as you know, have been going on for a long time—regarding a renewed declaration by Hungary in the sense of the Kellogg Pact, in return for the recognition of Hungarian military sovereignty and positive promises by the Little Entente to accord better treatment to the Hungarian minority.

If the memorandum of the conversation between the Führer and Stoyadinovich (secret instruction of Jan. 24, Pol. I 60 g. Rs.<sup>7</sup>) is complete or is reproduced in full by the instruction, the Führer said to Stoyadinovich only: "A Yugoslav-Hungarian *rapprochement* seems possible and would be greatly furthered by benevolent treatment of the Hungarian minority. Germany will gladly support any attempt to improve relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary, and under certain circumstances would give security on terms to be defined later for any agreement the two states might make."

Thereafter the Führer had—quite deliberately, M. de Kánya assumes—refrained from communicating to Stoyadinovich the offer of the Hungarian Foreign Minister regarding the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier.

Kánya told me that on February 15, after the diplomatic dinner, the Führer had honored Minister Sztójay with a very friendly conversation and, in connection with a discussion of the possibility of a visit to Germany by the Regent, made a remark to the effect that he hoped soon to be able to do something important for Hungary. Whether this meant intervention with Stoyadinovich or something else, the Hungarians did not know.<sup>8</sup>

I should like to take the opportunity in this letter to report to you that the concern over the alleged danger of Pan-Germanism, especially in connection with events in Austria, is surprisingly widespread in very extensive circles in Hungary, even in those which are well disposed toward us, and is a general topic of conversation. On the other hand, the Führer's statements aimed at Czechoslovakia in his Reichstag speech have met with strong approval here.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 165, footnote 3.

<sup>8</sup> A note by Erich Kordt (F18/379-380) dated Mar. 25 states that the Foreign Minister took this up with the Führer, who denied knowledge of such a remark and thought a reference by him to imminent developments in Austria might have been misinterpreted. "In any case he does not at the moment intend any sort of diplomatic action involving Hungary." The note is printed in Soviet publication, *Documents secrets*, No. 10.

## No. 179

1988/441023-83

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, March 9, 1938.  
zu Pol. IV 1007, 1012, 1085, 1116,  
1226, 1238, 1241.<sup>2</sup>

The events in Rumania connected with the advent and the fall of the Goga government received international attention in an unusual degree. The events in Rumania are also of considerable significance to us, both because of Goga's attitude in domestic affairs, which owed much to National Socialism, and also because of the diplomatic position of the country, particularly as a neighbor of Soviet Russia.

According to such reports as we have, especially from our Legation in Bucharest, developments appear to have been as follows:

The Goga government first of all attempted by a series of anti-Semitic measures to secure predominance in the most vital areas of public life for the real Rumanians ~~over the Jews~~<sup>3</sup> with the slogan "Rumania for the Rumanians." These measures, however, remained on the surface and did not touch the core of the problem. But they did arouse the Jews all over the world and led to a complaint to the League of Nations by various Jewish organizations, particularly the executive committee of the Jewish World Congress. Their main effect, however, was to cause the Jews in Rumania proper to abstain from business transactions and thereby to bring the economy largely to a standstill. Goga ~~who by nature is apparently not a very strong leader~~ could not overcome the ensuing difficulties. ~~On top of this he was surrounded by business manipulators of the most objectionable type whom he failed to curb with sufficient determination, and his followers in the provinces in many instances attacked not only the Jews but also other opponents, from whom they extorted money; these followers, like his intimate friends in the Government itself, attempted to enrich themselves by illicit means.~~

His domestic opponents, especially the Liberals and the National Peasant Party, also conducted a vigorous campaign against Goga.

<sup>1</sup> The addressees were the Embassies in France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union, Turkey, and the United States, and the Legations in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. Although dated Mar. 9 the dispatch was sent out to the respective Missions by diplomatic pouch on various dates, the latest being Mar. 16. A copy was also sent to the Reich War Ministry, Foreign Intelligence Department.

<sup>2</sup> The documents referred to are reports of the Embassy in Bucharest on the fall of the Goga government and the political reorganization which followed. None is printed: Pol. IV 1007 (1988/440980-87), Pol. IV 1012 (1988/440988-97), Pol. IV 1085 (1988/440998-1002), Pol. IV 1116 (1988/441007-10), Pol. IV 1226 (1988/441017-20), Pol. IV 1238 (1988/441021-22), Pol. IV 1241 (6837/E504513).

<sup>3</sup> This and subsequent canceled passages were included in the first draft but were eliminated from the final draft.

Particularly former Minister Tatarescu, who for 4 years had held office to the satisfaction of the King, succeeded in regaining his influence with the monarch. In view of all this it was of little or no consequence that Codreanu and his Iron Guard refrained from opposing Goga and even withdrew from the campaign that had developed around the parliamentary elections which had been called.

The position of the Goga government was made still more difficult, if not crucially so, by the intervention of France and England. In a sometimes spirited conversation lasting for several hours the French Minister protested against Goga's measures against the Jews and, referring to an instruction in writing from his Government, demanded a binding declaration on the further policy contemplated by the Rumanian Government with regard to the Jewish minority, which was under the protection of the minorities treaty of 1919. Should Rumania not be willing—the French Minister declared, according to Goga's own account—to comply with her obligations under the minorities treaty, France in turn would consider herself no longer bound by her obligations either regarding the guarantee of Rumania's boundaries or regarding armament credits and assistance in building up the army.

In much milder form the British Minister thereafter also took up the Jewish question and asked Goga whether Rumania was prepared to suspend any coercive measures against the Jewish population until this matter had been given further consideration at Geneva. Goga said yes to this question, as he states himself, and only reserved to himself the re-examination of the citizenship papers of Jews who had immigrated since the war.

Finally, at the most inopportune moment, there came the dispute with the Soviet Government over the disappearance of Butenko, the Soviet Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Bucharest, and put another burden upon the Goga government.<sup>4</sup>

In this situation King Carol was obliged to recognize that Goga was hardly the right man to master all these difficulties. Our Minister was frankly told by the King that Goga was in no way fit for his task. The internal and not the external difficulties had become too much for Goga, the King stated expressly, though hardly accurately. Reports of disturbances had been coming in from all over the country and even if some rumors had exaggerated the danger, there had been reason to fear revolutionary unrest. Under these circumstances he quickly had had to decide to break with the party system, to which

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 170, footnote 4.

Goga still adhered in the hope of obtaining an endorsement of his policy by the population of the country in the coming elections and of carrying at least 40 percent of the total ballots by election compacts with several parties, the German and Hungarian minorities among them. From this question, indeed a fundamental one, an open difference of opinion with the King resulted. The King was particularly indignant that Goga had had an interview with Codreanu, which had led to a partial understanding. But the King had in any case already contemplated a change of government, by which a number of former minister presidents would join the Cabinet, with Goga to remain as Minister President. Since Goga declined this, as he believed he could carry out his anti-Semitic policy only upon the broad basis of a plebiscite by means of the parliamentary elections, and the King, on the other hand, insisted upon his proposal, Goga's resignation resulted.

That the latter, after having received no more than 9 percent of the vote in the December elections, necessarily felt the need of gaining for himself a solid following among the people is evident. But obviously the King feared such great unrest in the country as a result of the electoral campaign that he preferred to forego the elections and sacrifice Goga. When Goga told our Minister, "Israel has won out," the statement was not without foundation in view of the events described, but the consequences of Goga's fight for anti-Semitism were not the sole reason for his downfall. Rumania needed a political reformation anyway, and Goga was not strong enough for the part of the reformer. Although his government had been welcomed by us for ideological reasons, it is not as though German policy had suffered a defeat as a result of his resignation; the position of his government was from the outset not considered by us as very strong, and the press therefore received word to exercise a great deal of caution. As far as Goga is concerned we found in him, as an admirer of the present German form of government, a far-reaching understanding for the new Germany but more intimate ties with Rumania were not sought by us and are therefore not lost to us; beyond that the short duration of his government prevented a serious diplomatic exchange of views with him.

Its personnel and the first measures taken by the new Cabinet are in accordance with the King's aim of having a nonpartisan government. That the Cabinet is placed under the leadership of the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church<sup>5</sup> emphasizes the Christian character

<sup>5</sup> The Patriarch of Rumania, Dr. Miron Cristea, served as Minister President of the provisional cabinet which King Carol appointed after he dismissed the Goga cabinet on Feb. 10, 1938.

of the new Government, but in a certain sense also, the continuation of Goga's anti-Semitic policy; for the Patriarch, too, is imbued with similar ideas. The domestic truce which the King wishes to achieve is to be enforced with the help of martial law—which had already been extended over the whole country under Goga's government—in such a manner that all political agitation, all meetings, all demonstrations, and the circulating and printing of political manifestos are prohibited. These measures are primarily directed against the Iron Guard. The Patriarch has absolved all persons from "unlawful oaths." The formation of cells or units is forbidden. Marching in groups of military formation is prohibited. Contraventions will be prosecuted in the courts. Most remarkable is the provision under which the judges whose duty it is to enforce this regulation are to be called to account if by intention or neglect they arrive at acquittals in such cases.

Shielded by these measures, the new Government promptly proceeded to draft a new constitution which was submitted to a referendum a few days after its publication. It was passed by an allegedly overwhelming majority. Its main outlines are described in the enclosed dispatch of February 21, 1938, from the Legation in Bucharest.<sup>6</sup> The chief characteristic of this new basic law is the broadening of the King's powers, whereby the two Chambers are retained but deprived of their influence. So the Ministers are hereafter responsible to the King alone, who also has the right, when the Chambers are not in session, to issue decrees having the force of law.

The King's moves as set forth here could be called a *coup d'état*. That the referendum had really sanctioned the new constitution cannot be asserted in view of the short notice given and the practical impossibility of enlightening and instructing the people with regard to the decreed constitution. Rumania therefore is now under a barely veiled royal dictatorship. Whether the country will accept this in the long run only the future will show.

With regard to foreign policy it is of interest to us that the King had declared his unchanged intention to draw closer to Germany slowly and systematically, and that M. Tatarescu, the provisional Foreign Minister, has likewise made statements to that effect. Significant is the provision in article 91 of the constitution under which no foreign armed troops may be admitted into the service of the Rumanian State and may neither enter nor pass through Rumanian territory unless authorized to do so by a law. This is especially important in view of Soviet Russia's repeatedly disclosed desire to secure for her-

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<sup>6</sup> Not printed (1988/441017-20).



self the right of passage through Rumania to Czechoslovakia. Article 91, it appears, is designed to block such attempts. But it cannot be overlooked that Tatarescu has stressed in a press statement that in its relations with the Soviet Union the Rumanian Government will "unceasingly pursue the development of good-neighborly and cordial relations."

Even though in Rumania the movement which ideologically appears most closely to approach our own *Weltanschauung*, namely the Iron Guard, is being most vigorously fought, we nevertheless have no cause for uneasiness over the turn of events. It is to be hoped, on the contrary, that in his foreign policy King Carol will persist in his repeatedly expressed desire to come into a closer relationship with Germany. In general, the action he took bears remarkable testimony as to his personal will power and his capacity for independent decisions.

By order:  
Director of the Political Department <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A note on this corrected draft states that the final version was signed by Weizsäcker.

## No. 130

2134/467227

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 11, 1938.

The Hungarian Minister, who called on me yesterday for another reason, recapitulated on this occasion the contents of his first official conversation with the new Reich Foreign Minister <sup>1</sup> and expressed his gratitude that he had been given an opportunity to inform the Foreign Minister in great detail of all questions affecting German-Hungarian relations. He had also taken the opportunity to call the Foreign Minister's attention to the fact that there were certain special ties between us and Hungary inasmuch as we had promised Hungary, in case we should ever conclude a non-aggression pact with Czechoslovakia, to inform the Hungarian Government thereof sufficiently in advance (the Minister mentioned 24 hours), and that we had further promised Hungary that we would conclude a mutual assistance pact with her in case of such a non-aggression pact with Czechoslovakia.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>1</sup> For the memorandum on the Ribbentrop-Sztójay conversation see vol. II, enclosure to document No. 65.

## No. 181

6640/E504531-33

*Secret Protocol Between Germany and Bulgaria of March 12, 1938*

The German Government and the Royal Bulgarian Government have agreed as follows:

The German Government has agreed that the Bulgarian authorities shall place with German firms orders for the delivery of war matériel, with the exception of airplanes, to the amount of 80 million reichsmarks; the following conditions shall obtain:

1. Delivery of the war matériel shall take place as soon as practicable, at the latest, however, within 2 years. The Bulgarian authorities will come to an agreement with the suppliers regarding the delivery date of certain special deliveries the production of which requires more time.

2. The Bulgarian Government desires that the invoicing be done in reichsmarks. The German Government will communicate this wish to the supplying firms, but states that the settlement of this question must be reserved for the negotiations between the competent Bulgarian authorities and the firms concerned.

3. Payment for the war matériel ordered will be made from 1942 on over a period of 5 years. Interest is to be at the rate of 6 percent. During the years 1939, 1940, and 1941, only the interest which has accrued from the date of delivery shall be paid in semi-annual installments. From 1942 on, repayment of the principal shall take place in ten equal semi-annual installments, the first installment in the middle of 1942, with 6 percent interest. Separate treasury bills shall be issued for the interest.

The German Government states that in the event the Bulgarian Government, taking account of the financial situation of the Bulgarian State, proposes before January 1, 1942, that the treasury bills for the principal be redeemed at only  $\frac{5}{8}$  of their face value when due, the German suppliers shall agree. The remaining  $\frac{3}{8}$  shall be issued in six equal semi-monthly installments, plus 6 percent deferred interest, with maturities of 1947, 1948, and 1949, so that in case of a proposal of the kind mentioned, the ultimate plan of payment would take such form as if payment of principal and interest had been provided in advance for an 8-year period from 1942.

4. Arrangements for the remittance of the purchase price and interest will be reserved for special negotiations between the designated Bulgarian and German authorities.

5. The negotiations regarding the conclusion of the individual sales contracts shall be conducted by the designated Bulgarian authorities with the German supplying firms through the agency of the Export Cartel for War Matériel.

6. In order to guarantee the payment of a suitable portion of the deliveries of war matériel by additional deliveries of raw material, the Bulgarian Government will make possible the conclusion of the

contract between the Granitoid Corporation, as owner of the Pirin Lead and Zinc Mines Corporation, and the German group, for the present consisting of the firms of Otto Wolff and Felten & Guillaume Carlswerk A. G., in accordance with the agreement arrived at in the course of the negotiations on this matter and on the basis of the terms laid down in the correspondence of February 22 and March 4, 1938, between Ministerialdirigent Dr. Landwehr and the Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, M. Bojilov.

The Bulgarian Government agrees that the above-mentioned deliveries of raw material shall be expedited as much as possible over a period of 5 years, at a value of approximately 1½ million reichsmarks per year, and paid through a clearing arrangement.

This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signing. It shall be treated as secret by both Governments.

Done in duplicate at Berlin on March 12, 1938.

CARL CLODIUS

M. RIASCOFF

P. DRAGANOFF

## No. 182

6638/E504517

### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

BUDAPEST, March 16, 1938—9: 27 p. m.

SECRET

Received March 17—12: 10 a. m.

No. 31 of March 16

Pol. IV 1946.

For the State Secretary.

After he had offered his congratulations on the reunion with Austria, Deputy von Mecser, President of the Chamber of Agriculture, said in confidence that the late Minister President Gömbös had informed him after his Berlin visit to the Führer and Chancellor that the Führer had remarked, in the course of a conversation regarding the possible later *Anschluss* of Austria, that he would in this case return to Hungary the territory detached from it by the Treaty of Trianon and annexed to Austria. Mecser added that such a gesture, even if it was extended only to districts of the severed territory inhabited exclusively by Hungarians, would make a tremendously deep impression in Hungary and assure Hungarian adherence to the policy of the Reich for all time. Hungary would also value such a decision as the first breach in the Trianon Treaty, which it was likewise in our interest to annul after we had disposed of those of Versailles and St. Germain.

There is no doubt that such a gesture would meet with tremendous response in Hungary. The Radical Rightist leader, Sallo, expressed a similar expectation in a speech on Sunday.

I should be grateful for telegraphic instructions for guidance in my conversations.<sup>1</sup>

ERDMANNSDORFF

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<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 193 and 195. A similar private approach was made by the Hungarian Baron Malcoimes to the Dienststelle Ribbentrop on Mar. 14. Asserting that he acted with the approval of the Hungarian authorities, he said that his mission was to discover "whether there was the possibility of diplomatic exchanges concerning a frontier revision in the Burgenland." He was told: "In view of the good relations between the Hungarian and German Governments, it was felt that, if the Hungarian Government desired a frontier revision in the Burgenland, it might let the German Government know of this through the regular diplomatic channels." Weizsäcker noted in the margin that he had told Raumer of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop that Germany had no desire to be approached by Hungary on this matter. The Führer was not considering any such gifts at the present time (3412/E014163-67). On Mar. 18 Weizsäcker informed Chargé d'Affaires Woermann in London, who had reported a similar proposal made by Lord Newton in a letter to the *Times*, that the Hungarians had not taken up the matter officially (3412/E014160). On Mar. 19 Minister Erdmannsdorff was asked by telephone to see to it that Lord Newton's letter was kept out of the Hungarian press (3412/E014159).

## No. 183

2134/467229

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.

During his visit today the Hungarian Minister turned the conversation to the enclosed German press notices,<sup>1</sup> from which it appeared that the German Government had given the governments of the countries with which it had obtained common boundaries through the reincorporation of Austria specific assurances regarding the inviolability of these boundaries. Hungary alone, who for the first time in her history had become an immediate neighbor of Germany, had so far not received any such assurance. Without being instructed by his Government, he wanted to mention this, remarking at the same time that such a declaration, which might be given either through Herr von Erdmannsdorff in Budapest or to himself here, would most effectively aid the Hungarian Government in its efforts to turn the wheel as far to the right as possible and to persevere on its course in the struggle against the abuses of the freedom of the press and against Jewry. He called such a declaration on our part the surest means of assisting his Government in its struggle against the opposition.

I answered the Minister that while I knew of the assurances to Switzerland and Italy, I knew nothing of a formal pledge to Yugo-

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<sup>1</sup> Not reprinted (6635/E504503).

slavia after Austria's reincorporation; I did know of certain pledges given the Yugoslavs at an earlier time in the event of Austria's reincorporation into Germany. However that might be, I was very willing to submit his suggestion to a decision by the Foreign Minister, as from my experience in Budapest I had to agree with him that such a declaration would have a very fortunate effect.<sup>2</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup>Minister Erdmannsdorff delivered the desired declaration in Budapest on Mar. 19 (3412/E014159).

## No. 184

509/235385-69

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. IV 1803.

The Yugoslav Minister called on me by appointment today to communicate to me officially the instructions of his Government which he had already brought to my attention unofficially at last night's dinner at the Belgian Legation. These instructions were to advise the Government of the Reich that on March 12 on the occasion of the German entry into Austria Minister President Stoyadinovich had ordered the appropriate Yugoslav Ministers to instruct the Yugoslav officials concerned on the Yugoslav-Austrian frontier to make contact with any representatives of the German administration or the German armed forces on the spot, and to cooperate with them in the spirit of friendliness which linked Yugoslavia with the Reich. The Minister handed me the memorandum annexed hereto relating to these instructions.<sup>1</sup> I thanked him for his communication and added that this friendly gesture on the part of M. Stoyadinovich did not come as a surprise to us, in view of his gratifying attitude toward the question of the reunion of Austria with the Reich. We did, however, attach a high value to it as a renewed proof of his friendly disposition. I was convinced that cooperation would be undertaken in the same spirit by any of our civil or military authorities who came in contact with Yugoslav frontier officials.

The Minister then inquired about the reaction which the events in Austria would produce upon the continuation of the Anglo-German conversations.<sup>2</sup> In view of England's interest in Central European developments these reactions were assuredly very considerable. I

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (509/235370). The substance is found in the preceding sentence.

<sup>2</sup>Halifax had visited Germany in November 1937, and discussions had been continued in meetings between Hitler and Ambassador Henderson on Mar. 3, 1938, and between Halifax and Ribbentrop on Mar. 10. See vol. I, ch. I.

answered that no doubt at the present moment, when, partly under the influence of false reports coming from the press and from other sources in England, the myth of a German ultimatum and of other acts of violence still misled some minds, the atmosphere between England and ourselves had certainly not improved. Taking a long view, however, I could very well believe that the effect of present developments in Austria might change even in England into something diametrically opposite. For in fact—and this the British would increasingly recognize—the Führer had by his far-sighted decision solved at a single stroke and in the only sound way possible the problem which had weighed most heavily on Central Europe—and England, too, would sooner or later see that a substantial easing of relations had thus been brought about in this area. The same was true of Czechoslovakia; in connection with the developments in Austria, Czechoslovakia had during the last few days received from us renewed assurances<sup>3</sup> which, as I heard from M. Mastny himself, had fully satisfied the leading personalities in Prague. Accordingly Czechoslovakia too had actually acquired a more secure position through the developments of the last few days than she had had previously since, but for the events in Austria, we should have had no occasion for these declarations. The declarations naturally rested upon the assumption, as I added in response to an objection on the Minister's part, that Czechoslovakia would finally come to realize that in the long run it was an indispensable condition of normal relations with the Reich that she should cease once and for all from treating three and a half million Sudeten Germans like bootblacks. The future alone could show whether certain signs that the realization of the complete failure of the policy hitherto pursued was gradually dawning upon the leading men in Prague should really be taken to signify an intention to adopt a fundamentally new line in the minorities question. It was worthy of note how enthusiastically M. Cincar-Markovich concurred in my criticism of the policy hitherto followed by the Czechs in the minorities question.

To a question of the Minister about the present state of the Anglo-Italian conversations I replied that we had no further details on the subject either, but that they could hardly have passed the initial stage. I did not contradict the Yugoslav Minister's view that the questions to be cleared up between England and Italy were of such far-reaching importance that an early settlement of all the issues involved could hardly be expected.

The Minister then remarked upon the great strength manifested during the last few days by the Rome-Berlin Axis. In this connection he referred to the Führer's clear statement regarding the in-

<sup>3</sup> See vol. II, document No. 74 (enclosure) and document No. 85.

violability of the Brenner frontier, on which occasion Alsace-Lorraine had also been mentioned again. Without having any instructions on the subject, but simply—as he put it—by way of a personal suggestion, he put forward a proposal in this connection, to the effect that the Führer and Chancellor when he spoke in Graz, as the Minister professed to have gathered from the press he intended to, might put in a few words relating to the new German-Yugoslav frontier. It was known in Belgrade, partly from clear statements made by Field Marshal Göring at an earlier date, that we regarded this frontier, too, as inviolable. A public pronouncement of our attitude in this matter would, however, be of extraordinarily great importance for Minister President Stoyadinovich and for the position of the present Yugoslav Government in its relations with the Opposition. I expressed no opinion upon this suggestion, but merely remarked that I would inform the Foreign Minister of it.

Finally the Minister alluded briefly to the future status of the diplomatic representatives remaining in Vienna. I told him that in this respect Hungary had already taken the lead with an excellent and commendable example, and had informed us that she would shortly convert her Vienna Legation into a Consulate General. For us the question of recognition played a very subordinate role, as the reunion of Austria with the Reich had been finally and definitively completed as of March 13. The Minister indicated that—in his personal opinion—his Government would surely have no objection to following Hungary's example. In this connection he touched briefly upon the question of the commercial relations between the former State of Austria and third countries. I told him that we were studying this question at the moment, and that the idea had come up, with regard to any questions in this field that we had to decide in agreement with third states of utilizing wherever possible the existing governmental committees formed in consequence of our own agreements with such third states. M. Cincar-Markovich considered that a very good idea.

MACKENSEN

## No. 185

969/302604

### *The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 19 of March 17

BELGRADE, March 17, 1938—8:40 p. m.

Received March 18—12:10 a. m.

The Minister President, who was fully occupied during the last few days with the debate on the budget, congratulated me very heartily

today on the return of the German Ostmark to the Reich. The speed and discipline of the operation merited the greatest admiration. The triumphal reception of the Führer in Austria had demonstrated to the whole world the unnatural character of the former regime. Yugoslavia welcomed a friendly Germany as her neighbor. He hoped that we had been satisfied with the attitude of the Yugoslav press. The overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav population took as favorable an attitude toward the *Anschluss* as he did himself. Only in Slovenia was a certain anxiety apparent, first on account of the fate of the Slovene minority in Carinthia, and then because of an alleged German drive in the direction of the Adriatic. He knew these fears were groundless. The opposition at home, however, was trying, by spreading rumors regarding arrests of members of the Slovene minority and the like, to create unrest and thus make difficulties for the Government.<sup>1</sup> I thanked Stoyadinovich for his congratulations and expressed appreciation for the correct attitude of the Yugoslav press. I was convinced that we would do everything to prevent any encroachment upon the rights of the Slovene minority in Carinthia.

The Minister President also emphasized that Korošec<sup>2</sup> was fully in agreement with his attitude on the Austrian question. There was no difference of opinion in the Cabinet in this respect.

HEEREN

<sup>1</sup> On Mar. 19 Heeren transmitted a report submitted to him by the former Austrian Consul General in Ljubljana of anti-German demonstrations there. Stoyadinovich attributed these to Communist youth groups and the agitation in Slovenia generally to machinations of his opponents (6975/E520984-91).

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Anton Korošec, Minister of the Interior, and prior to the banning of provincial parties by the constitution of 1931, leader of the Slovene Clerical Party.

## No. 186

1945/435443

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 69 of March 19

BUCHAREST, March 19, 1938—5:00 p. m.

Received March 19—9:15 p. m.

Pol. IV 1831.

The King asked me during yesterday's audience about an assertion allegedly made by Codreanu that the German Legation had forwarded his congratulations to the Führer and Chancellor by tele-



graph to Berlin. I replied that this was not the case. Codreanu had not asked me to forward his congratulations by telegraph, but had merely transmitted to me the copy of a telegram he had allegedly sent. I had forwarded this copy to the Foreign Ministry as a dispatch, just as I had reported other congratulatory messages.

The King said that this procedure was entirely correct; if, however, the Legation lent itself to forwarding by wire telegrams that had not been passed by his censorship, it would indeed be a *very serious matter*.

The King brought up the question whether the German Government might not be prepared to disavow Codreanu and the Iron Guard by an appropriate declaration. I replied that this would not be possible, if only because we would be blamed for interfering in Rumanian domestic affairs. The German Government took the position that it would conduct political transactions with no one but the King and his Government. The King declared himself satisfied and requested me to transmit to Berlin his wish that we adhere to this line of conduct also in the future.

Regarding the rest of the conversation I will report by dispatch.<sup>1</sup>

FABRICIUS

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1988/441037-48). The King told Fabricius that he had long regarded the *Anschluss* as inevitable and therefore had welcomed it, but he feared that the manner and timing of its coming would lead to complications with England and France. He also warned against any direct pressure on Czechoslovakia. He repeated an earlier statement that he desired closer relations with Germany but thought they must develop slowly.

## No. 187

3046/600795-97

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 22, 1938.

The Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires called on me today to inform me at the direction of the Hungarian Government that as stated in the attached *note verbale* the Hungarian Government had now given its consent to the establishment of a Landesgruppe of the NSDAP in Hungary. He was happy to be able to make this announcement to me since, indeed, it went even further than the wish expressed by State Secretary Bohle, who had urged the recognition only of a Landeskreis, but not of a Landesgruppe. I replied to M. de Ghyczy that I was not able to share this view altogether. It had corresponded to

the organizational development of the Party first to set up a Landeskreis in Hungary, where there was only one Ortsgruppe with a few supporting points. And our request to the Hungarian Government had been directed toward that end. M. de Ghyczy interrupted me with the statement that on the basis of instructions which he had received yesterday by telephone he could supplement the content of the *note verbale* to the effect that the Hungarian Government also agreed to the designation Landeskreis in Hungary. I told him that I received this information with great satisfaction because this, at least, showed clearly that Hungary was not thinking of giving us a less favorable position in the matter of freedom of movement for the Party than did other countries with which we had less friendly relations. On the question of a Landeskreis or a Landesgruppe I did not wish to anticipate the decision of Gauleiter Bohle, but after conversations with him I did not believe I was mistaken in saying that in any case he had thought of setting up a Landesgruppe in Hungary in the near future. Now that the basic question had been settled by Hungary in accordance with our desires, he would perhaps of his own accord give up the intermediate stage of a Landeskreis and at once create a Landesgruppe. The decision in that matter, however, rested entirely with him.<sup>1</sup>

M. de Ghyczy also emphasized, finally, that the original reluctance of the Hungarian Government to consent to a Landeskreis was due mainly to a historical memory which was very painful to Hungary. In the Bach era the old historical Hungarian Komitate were changed by Vienna into Kreise, with a Kreisleiter at the head. This memory was still retained by far too many people for the word "Landeskreis" not to arouse hostility, especially since there had in the beginning often been talk of a "Landeskreis Hungary", and not of a "Landeskreis of the NSDAP in Hungary."

MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

59/biz.

BERLIN, March 19, 1938.

#### NOTE VERBALE

The Royal Hungarian Legation has the honor respectfully to inform the Foreign Ministry, in accordance with instructions, that the Royal Hungarian Minister of the Interior has given his approval that the

<sup>1</sup> Bohle addressed a letter to the Legation in Hungary on Mar. 23 in which he stated that the Auslandsorganisation had taken steps to set up a Landeskreis, but out of consideration for Hungarian sensitivity care must be exercised to refer to it always as the Landeskreis "in" Hungary (3046/600793-94).

German National Socialist Party group in Hungary bear the following official name: "Landesgruppe of the NSDAP in Hungary."

The Royal Hungarian Government granted this permission particularly in the light of the Budapest speech of the State Secretary, Gauleiter E. W. Bohle, which is regarded by the Hungarian Government as a serious and frank statement of position on the question of Germans abroad.

## No. 188

1847/421038-40

### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A. No. 64, P 3-Kánya

BUDAPEST, March 24, 1938.

Received March 28.

Pol. IV 2110.

Subject: Parliamentary Statement by the Hungarian Foreign Minister.

Foreign Minister de Kánya in his statements yesterday before the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Upper House<sup>1</sup>—dealing mainly with the question of the reunion of Austria with the German Reich—pointed out, among other things, that the Allied Powers had previously forced independence on Austria, but that those powers had not seen to it that Austria also had at her disposal the necessary means of maintaining her independence. This prohibition of *Anschluss* was incompatible with Wilson's points and with the principle of nationality, and had therefore caused profound bitterness in the German Reich, so that it might have been foreseen that Germany would try to free herself from this restriction. Now the place of Austria had been taken by the German Reich, which stood in a relation of closest friendship with Hungary; there could not for a moment be any doubt regarding the stand which Hungary should adopt toward Germany. For this reason Hungary had also expressed to the German Government her congratulations and the confident hope that the present friendly relations would remain unaltered in the future.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister added:

"Chancellor Hitler conveyed his warm thanks to the Regent of Hungary for this attitude; the Reich Government did the

<sup>1</sup>Extracts from the address are published in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 264-266.

<sup>2</sup>This statement was made by the Hungarian Minister in Berlin to Mackensen on Mar. 15 (718/263968). He had added that Hungary would at once transform her Legation in Vienna into a Consulate General.

same to the Hungarian Government. The events of the recent past have clearly shown that we took the right course when we made the cultivation of friendship with Germany one of our main objects, and—so far as it depends on us—there will be no change in this policy in the future.”

M. de Kánya stated further that recently numerous alarmist rumors and terrifying reports had been circulated in Hungary without any basis whatsoever. He pointed out that the German Government had left no doubt that it regarded the existing German-Hungarian frontier as being as inviolable as the German frontiers with Yugoslavia, Italy, and Switzerland.<sup>5</sup>

In the further course of his statements the Foreign Minister spoke of the relations of Hungary with other powers and emphasized the good relations between Hungary and Italy. These continued unchanged, although the Rome three-power group no longer existed, as a result of the withdrawal of Austria. The spirit of the Rome Protocols would, however, retain its full validity in Hungarian-Italian relations in the future.

With reference to Poland, the Foreign Minister remarked, among other things, that Hungary welcomed with the greatest satisfaction Poland's interest in the Danube Basin; he entertained the hope that peaceful Polish-Hungarian cooperation would continue to develop favorably in the future.

With reference to the states of the Little Entente, the Foreign Minister emphasized his willingness to moderate or normalize Hungary's relations with them. The negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente, which had come to a standstill last September, had recently been resumed in Bucharest. On the part of Hungary there was no lack of good will to conclude these negotiations successfully.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister also pointed out that Hungary would develop her national defense to the limit of her capacity.

The statements of the Foreign Minister were received with loud acclaim by the two Foreign Affairs Committees.

ERDMANNSDORFF

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<sup>5</sup> On Mar. 19 Erdmannsdorff reported (969/302624) that Kánya requested that he be allowed to make a public statement that Germany had pledged the inviolability of the Hungarian frontier, since an uneasy opinion in Hungary pointed to the fact that “even Czechoslovakia” had received such a pledge. Ribbentrop replied in a telegram of Mar. 21 (vol. II, document 99) that there was no objection to the public statement by Kánya, but that the Czechs had received no such pledge. Assurances given them by Göring were *ad hoc* only, that is, applicable to the period during which German troops were moving into Austria. On Göring's statements see vol. II, document No. 74.

## No. 189

8410/EO14075-76

*State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Fabricius*BERLIN, April . . ., 1938.<sup>1</sup>  
zu Pol. IV 2272.<sup>2</sup>

Drafting Officer: Counselor Busse.

DEAR HERR FABRICIUS: We have read with interest your reports of March 19<sup>3</sup> and 27<sup>2</sup> on your talks with King Carol and with M. Goga. I should like to make the following comments:

We agree with you that it cannot be your task to take a stand on Rumanian domestic issues vis-à-vis prominent Rumanian personalities or give them advice. The view expressed in your reports, to the effect that reserve is quite essential in these matters, is shared here.

As regards relations between Germany and Rumania, it is not our intention to advance matters by special proposals or measures on our part. We shall treat German-Rumanian relations with solicitude, taking care that Rumania is not induced by any coolness in our relations to contract other and undesirable ties.

For the rest, we intend to let the actual development of commercial relations between the two countries work for us. In the political field, however, we shall not for the time being seek any closer relations with Rumania, the more so as, according to your own account, too, the domestic situation in Rumania is apparently very obscure at this time.

Under these circumstances we cannot give you any new viewpoints for your further conversations with King Carol, for which reason your visit to Berlin on this account does not seem necessary.

(formal close)

St[ate] S[ecretary]

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<sup>1</sup>The letter is a draft initialed by the drafting officer and later marked "canceled" [cassat]. It carries the further notation: "Has been discussed with Herr Fabricius. File. He[inburg], Apr. 30."

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (1988/441046-48). Fabricius had reported on Mar. 27 that Goga had told him he did not believe the new non-party regime inaugurated by King Carol in February could survive, as it lacked support. The King would be obliged to return to party government and it would be best if he himself sponsored a party of national concentration. Fabricius said that he saw the situation in somewhat the same light. Goga then asked whether Fabricius intended to advise the King in this sense, but Fabricius replied that he would not so long as the King did not raise the question with him, as he did not wish to be accused of meddling in Rumania's internal affairs.

<sup>3</sup>Not printed (1988/441037-43). See document No. 186, footnote 1.

## No. 190

2134/487243-46

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, April 11, 1938.

The Hungarian Minister today handed me as a private note the attached memorandum, part A of which refers to Hungarian-Yugoslav relations, and part B to German-Hungarian general staff discussions. The note owes its origin, the Minister told me, to a conversation in which the Foreign Minister of his own accord addressed the Minister on the subject touched upon in the memorandum.

I shall present the original of the memorandum to the Foreign Minister personally.

Herewith, with a request for return of the document to the Deputy Director of the Political Department and Pol. IVa.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

## A.

We would recognize the Trianon border with Yugoslavia as final if Belgrade gave us the guarantee that in case Hungary should enter into a conflict with one of her neighbors Yugoslavia would remain completely disinterested.

## Advantages:

1. Final accord with Yugoslavia. This has been long and repeatedly stressed as desirable by Germany also.
2. Loosening or disintegration of the Little Entente, which is, to be sure, formally directed against Hungary, but which is undoubtedly also to be regarded as the instrument or the ally of France in the Danube region and also as against Germany.
3. In case of a war with Czechoslovakia, simultaneous, that is, immediate action on the part of Hungary would be made possible, without her having to wait for a possible statement of disinterestedness from Yugoslavia. It is of course a question whether this expected statement might not be *very* long deferred.

By a simultaneous move:

a. The whole of Czechoslovakia could be seized *at once*, making it questionable whether the Czech Army could even completely mobilize.

On the other hand a shifting of forces from northern Hungary to the western border would be prevented.

b. A landing by Russian air forces in northern Hungary would be made impossible from the *very* first moment.

c. A clear situation would result, which would be advantageous from the standpoint of both foreign and domestic policy.

### B.

There is much talk all over Europe to the effect that important events are brewing in Czechoslovakia.

Hungary's absolutely *peaceful policy* is well known, and she is relying upon the Czech question being settled by peaceful means.

In view of the general nervousness and tension in Czechoslovakia, however, it does not seem impossible that, contrary to all expectations, there might be an explosion there. In that case military intervention might become necessary. And it is thought that necessity might compel cooperation.

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Why would conversations or a certain exchange of ideas be advantageous?

1. The advantages mentioned in section A under point 3 are attainable only if a possible cooperation is discussed in advance at least in general outline.

2. Zones, objectives and missions could be outlined in advance; plans could be made accordingly, and misunderstandings could be excluded from the start. The latter would be of particular significance.

### No. 191

F11/0059

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]<sup>1</sup>

zu Pol. I 60 g. Rs.

Attached: An excerpt from the memorandum of the conversations held during the reception of Yugoslav Minister President and Foreign Minister Stoyadinovich by the Führer and Chancellor on January 17, 1938.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Internal evidence, together with the fact that Ribbentrop discussed the problem of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations with Hitler in the latter part of April (see document No. 178, footnote 1), indicates that this memorandum was prepared shortly after the Hungarian proposal of Apr. 11 recorded in the preceding document. It is probable that, before taking up the Hungarian proposal with Hitler, Ribbentrop called for this full record of what had passed between Hitler and Stoyadinovich in January on the subject of a Hungarian-Yugoslav settlement.

<sup>2</sup> The attached excerpt is not printed (F11/0060-61). It consisted of the two paragraphs of Hitler's statement in document No. 163 beginning "As far as Hungary . . ." and ending ". . . no reply." Also included was one paragraph of Stoyadinovich's reply beginning "As far as Hungary . . ." and ending ". . . attitude of his."

The memorandum shows that discussion also took place with regard to *nonviolation of the Hungarian-Yugoslav border*. It was not brought out with complete precision, however, to what extent Hungary is now prepared to renounce a revision of the present Hungarian-Yugoslav border, that is, to give final recognition to this boundary if Yugoslavia should guarantee complete neutrality in case Hungary became militarily involved in other directions.

If it meets with approval, Minister von Heeren could find occasion to refer orally in Belgrade to the Hungarian proposal and state precisely the Hungarian view. It would be desirable, however, if Minister von Heeren on this occasion did not again raise the question of a German guarantee, which was broached in the Berlin conversations.\*

WEIZSÄCKER

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\* Marginal note: "Heeren to feel out situation further. R[ibbentrop]." Ribbentrop's own oral instruction to Heeren is recorded in document No. 198.

## No. 192

3626/E028074-75

### *The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary*

SECRET

BERLIN, April 11, 1938.

Received April 14.

Pol. IM 1228 g.

As you may know, official Hungarian circles have repeatedly made references in the Reich War Ministry and in the Foreign Ministry to the German-Hungarian general staff discussions promised last fall by Field Marshal von Blomberg regarding a common attitude in the case of a war with Czechoslovakia.<sup>1</sup> In the course of the last few months both the Hungarian Minister and the Hungarian Military Attaché here have brought up this matter in the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry, respectively.

As General Keitel reported at a conversation in the Foreign Ministry at the end of last week, the director of the Hungarian counter-espionage service, who was here on one of his routine quarterly visits recently, also turned to General Keitel with the question as to when the promised conversations were to take place. General Keitel replied that he would be glad to go to Budapest some time for this purpose, but that he would not be able to get away until the end of May and was also not yet in a position today to say what date either then or in the course of the summer would suit him for the contemplated visit.

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<sup>1</sup> See vol. II, documents Nos. 65, 66, and 114.



It seems to me best for you not to bring up the subject of your own accord. Should you be approached, please refer to General Keitel's position mentioned above.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 193

3412/E014168-69

*State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Erdmannsdorff*

URGENT

BERLIN, April 13, 1938.

Pol. IV 2733.

DEAR HERR VON ERDMANNSDORFF: Herr Werkmeister<sup>1</sup> has brought to my attention the fact that no reply has been made to the inquiry by the Hungarian Deputy M[ecser], which you forwarded to us,<sup>2</sup> suggesting that it would be viewed in Hungary as a very valuable gesture if certain parts of the Burgenland which are inhabited preponderantly by Hungarians, were spontaneously returned to Hungary.

Without looking into the previous correspondence—I do not have it at hand at the present moment, either—I had assumed that your instructions to talk with M. Kánya on the stability of the present boundaries would also be an answer to the suggestion by M. To keep the record straight, however, I would nevertheless like to state here once again that the Führer is firm in his view that our present boundary with Hungary is definitive. Consequently there is no room for a gesture such as that referred to above.

Objectively, however, the following should be added: According to the ethnic map there exist no suitable areas which could be returned to Hungary, inasmuch as certain Hungarian localities form enclaves scattered in the Burgenland, and are not situated at the border. Another factor is that, looking at the question from the ethnic viewpoint, there are substantial areas southwest of the Neusiedler Lake which are purely German. These areas, as you must know better than I, were incorporated previously into Hungary as the result of a plebiscite, under circumstances that are viewed by experts as very dubious. However that may be, any comparison of persons of Hungarian blood in the Burgenland and of ethnic Germans on the other side of the border would come out very much to Hungary's disadvantage. This is a computation that certain Hungarian circles, which suggest that Germany make such a magnanimous gesture, ought to make for themselves in order to cure themselves of ideas which, as I

<sup>1</sup> Counselor of the Legation in Hungary.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 182.

said before, according to the official view here are completely out of the question.

I am committing the foregoing to paper since Herr Werkmeister thought that you would welcome a letter rather than an oral communication.

Sincere regards and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 194

1895/426867-89

#### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A No. 96 P 32

BUDAPEST, April 21, 1938.

Received April 25.

Pol. IV 2831.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Hungarian negotiations with the Little Entente.

In reply to my inquiry concerning the present status of Hungary's negotiations with the individual states of the Little Entente, the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry told me that the Hungarian Minister to Bucharest had arrived here yesterday to report on the course of the negotiations with Rumania and to obtain further instructions.

The latest suggestion to the Hungarians had been that they waive the provisions of articles 51 and 239 of the Trianon Treaty, whereby Czechoslovakia is forbidden to fortify the bridgehead at Pressburg and mixed courts of arbitration are provided for in certain cases. The Hungarian Government had rejected this unreasonable demand, although Czechoslovakia had long since violated the prohibition against fortifying the bridgehead of Pressburg.

The prospective agreement was encountering difficulties, among other things for the following reasons:

The concession made by the Little Entente with respect to Hungary's sovereign right to rearm would perhaps still have created an impression here a year ago but was now of no practical value.

It was difficult to arrive at anything more than a theoretical agreement with Rumania on the minorities question, because after the military took over the administration chaotic conditions prevailed there in part and the various military commanders issued conflicting orders in administrative questions or else construed such orders from higher authorities differently. The desire of the Little Entente to reach parallel agreements with Hungary created an especially harassing problem, because the rights of the Hungarian minorities in the individual countries were by no means the same. Thus, for example,

an agreement that from the Hungarian viewpoint was to be considered a gain with respect to the previous condition in Rumania, would, with respect to Czechoslovakia, seem rather ridiculous in the eyes of the Hungarian minority there, since much more far-reaching demands were already being made there, such as the demand for autonomy. Furthermore, the Hungarian Government had to think of the consequences of the reciprocity to be granted by it with reference to the minorities of the three countries in question living here. This was less important for the barely 20,000 Rumanians than for the much greater number of Slovaks who did not live in compact settlements here.

The Yugoslavs had declared their readiness to conclude with Hungary any agreement which Czechoslovakia and Rumania were prepared to conclude. Thus far nothing had been achieved in the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia despite the efforts of influential German authorities during the past year; however, the atmosphere had improved considerably.

The Hungarian Government would have much preferred to conclude the prospective agreement only with Yugoslavia and perhaps also with Rumania. "Our Yugoslav friends" were to blame, however, for the fact that the Hungarian Government had to include Czechoslovakia, too, among the treaty partners. Perhaps Minister President Stoyadinovich was forced to take such an attitude in view of the sentiment prevailing in the Army and in large groups of the population.

The Hungarians cherished the hope that after he had in this way demonstrated his loyalty toward the other countries of the Little Entente he would be in a better position to execute a policy vis-à-vis Hungary which implied a settlement of the difficult and—with respect to certain eventualities—significant questions regarding which I reported in secret communication No. 5 of March 7.

ERDMANNSDORFF

No. 195

2412/E014174-78

*Minister Erdmannsdorff to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

BUDAPEST, April 21, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

Pol. IV 2961.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: Many thanks for your lines of the 13th,<sup>2</sup> brought me by Werkmeister, regarding the definitive status of

<sup>1</sup> No date of receipt is indicated on the document but Weizsäcker initialed it on Apr. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 193.

the present German-Hungarian border; I found them very valuable.

It will interest you, in this connection, that the head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry here, Baron Bessenyey, whom you know, told me yesterday that in this country, perhaps reminiscent of its former ties with the Orient, really fantastic stories were again current. Thus "patriotic" circles were accusing the Government of taking a passive attitude while the Reich Government had expected Hungarian troops to march into the predominantly Hungarian area of Burgenland and would actually have welcomed such an entry. For this reason Germany had waited a few days and only when the Hungarian forces did not appear had she ordered the German troops to march in up to the old Austro-Hungarian frontier! Minister of Culture Hóman told me on Easter Sunday that M. de Kánya had been much incensed at this silly twaddle which was nevertheless given credence in certain circles.

Baron Bessenyey added that the statement was also being used against the Government that the Führer would not place the part of Burgenland in question at the disposal of the present Government but would do so for a National Socialist Hungarian Government.

It will perhaps interest you in this connection, that the Führer, as a reliable informant told me, is supposed to have said to Reich Governor Seyss-Inquart in Graz that he much preferred the present Hungarian Government to a National Socialist Government. He was probably thinking of the present lack of leadership in the right-radical movements here, which are very much at odds with each other. As seen from here also we have every reason to be interested in the continuance of the Darányi government if only for lack of an equally valuable, to say nothing of a better, substitute from the standpoint of our interests.

I have, moreover, not been approached by anyone in the Government concerning the gesture mentioned by you and suggested in many Hungarian quarters with regard to returning certain portions of Burgenland to Hungary. Baron Bessenyey told me when he mentioned this gossip that the Government had never indulged in such illusions.

At the moment the eyes of all here are gazing spellbound at Czechoslovakia, hoping as a present from us to get former Upper Hungary in a possible partitioning. I reported a week ago the fact that they are actually beginning to work here toward collaboration among the various minorities in Czechoslovakia and on pro-Hungarian propaganda among the Slovaks.

Regarding the difficulties in the way of an identical treaty with the individual states of the Little Entente—as demanded of Hungary by the other side—I would call your attention to my political report (A No. 96) of the 21st, which is leaving by the same courier. They

are prepared here to conclude such an agreement, though very unwillingly, even with Czechoslovakia, in view of the wishes of Stoyadinovich in this matter, in the hope that the Yugoslav Minister President, after this proof of his solidarity with respect to the other partners of the Little Entente, might perhaps accede the more readily to the proposal of a special agreement between Hungary and Yugoslavia (definitive recognition of the present Hungarian-Yugoslav border by Hungary in return for a promise of neutrality from Yugoslavia), which had already been mentioned by the Hungarian Ministers in Berlin and favorably received by us.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

ERDMANNSDORFF

### No. 196

1945/435456

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 214

BERLIN, April 22, 1938.

Pol. IV 2817.

After the presentation of credentials, the Führer and Chancellor declared to Rumanian Minister Djuvara that Germany considered her boundaries with Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary as final, and further, that she had no territorial aspirations whatsoever in the Balkans. Germany was pursuing only economic aims in the Balkans and she wished, moreover, to attain a position of trust with the Balkan countries. Furthermore, Germany was disinterested in the territorial problems between the Balkan countries.

The Rumanian Minister acknowledged this statement with thanks and mentioned that he was happy to have the statements confirmed which the Führer had made to Bratianu a few years ago.

RIBBENTROP

### No. 197

F14/055

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 215

BERLIN, April 25, 1938.

The Rumanian Minister called on me today at 1:30 p.m. to pay his first visit. I explained to the Rumanian Minister that, as the Führer had told him already, our ties with Rumania were chiefly formed by economic interests. After the *Anschluss* of Austria, Germany hoped to intensify the trade with Rumania even further. Besides, we were joined with Rumania in the common defense against Bolshevism. German-Rumanian relations therefore could not fail to be excellent.

The Rumanian Minister concurred in my remarks and declared

that he conceived it to be his mission to strengthen German-Rumanian relations still further.

RIBBENTROP

# No. 198

F14/054

## *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 216

BERLIN, April 26, 1938.

I received Minister von Heeren at 7 p. m. today and informed him of the following:

1. During casual conversation with Minister President Stoyadinovich he should ask whether the Yugoslav Minister President knew the full contents of the Hungarian offer (renunciation of claims of revision against Yugoslavia in exchange for a nonaggression treaty, applicable also in the event of a conflict with Czechoslovakia).<sup>1</sup>

2. To an inquiry by the Yugoslav Minister President as to whether we would be interested, during the coming meeting of the Little Entente, in having him work toward a direct understanding with Germany regarding the Sudeten German question, the reply was to be that we were very much interested in having the Czechoslovak Government come to an understanding directly with the German minority concerning the Sudeten German question.

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum of Apr. 29 (348/201619-20) Woermann recorded that the Hungarian Minister told him that this reminder to Stoyadinovich had been promised him by Ribbentrop. The Hungarian requested in the name of his Government that this be discussed with Italy in case the Czech problem was taken up during Hitler's visit to Rome. The Woermann memorandum is found in Soviet publication, *Documents secrets*, No. 16.

# No. 199

1895/426870

## *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 98 of May 6

BUCHAREST, May 6, 1938—8:05 p. m.

Received May 7—1:15 a. m.

Pol. IV 3128.

While Czechoslovakia tried at the Council meeting in Sinaia<sup>1</sup> to emphasize the importance of the Little Entente as a "factor with which Germany had to reckon," Stoyadinovich took the stand that Germany absolutely desired peace and that the Sudeten German question was an internal matter, which he advised the Czechoslovak Government to settle, but which could not form the subject of negotiations of the

<sup>1</sup> The Permanent Council of the Little Entente held a regular session at Sinaia in Rumania on May 4-5, 1938. The communiqué is published in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 281-282.

present Council meeting. Rumania adopted the same viewpoint, since it is also desired here to treat minority problems as internal questions.

Meanwhile, the Council nevertheless supported the view that member states should continue the negotiations with Hungary with the aim of establishing a "regime of understanding and confidence in the Danube Basin." Stoyadinovich expressed himself very skeptically to me on the possibility of an understanding, "since Hungary obviously wanted to wait and see what happened to Henlein". He also had doubts of Rumania's willingness. The Italian Minister is making a noticeably strong effort to bring about negotiations between the Hungarian Minister and Stoyadinovich, as well as Krofta. The conversations, which were only after-dinner affairs, had no tangible results.

England has again taken steps in Bucharest, Prague, and Belgrade to recommend agreement in the Hungarian minorities question. The question of a new location for the International Danube Commission has occupied the Council session. It is reported that Budapest is being proposed.

A written report on the session, the results of which are in general negative, will follow.

FABRICIUS

## No. 200

1895/426879-80

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

No. 1468

I A 34

BUCHAREST, May 6, 1938.

Received May 9.

Pol. IV 3179.

Subject: Little Entente military discussions.

At the same time that the Council of the Little Entente met in Sinaia, conversations took place in Bucharest between the chiefs of the operations divisions of the Yugoslav, Rumanian, and Czechoslovak armies, at which the new situation created by the reunion of Austria with the Reich was discussed.

The Italian and Bulgarian Military Attachés told me independently of one another that prior to this the above-mentioned operations divisions had worked out plans covering the following possibilities, in the event of an attack by Hungary on one or more of the three Entente countries concerned:

1. If Italy and Germany remained neutral with respect to the Little Entente;
2. If Italy alone remained neutral;
3. If Bulgaria also attacked.

The operations anticipated that Yugoslavia would in any case withdraw one army corps from the Italian border and, in violation of neutrality, send it through Austria.

As a result of the new situation, Yugoslavia had stated that she by no means desired to be drawn into a conflict with Germany and therefore refused entirely to dispatch an army corps, the more so since she did not wish to leave the Italian border exposed; this, in the opinion of the Italian Military Attaché, was a subterfuge. Yugoslavia simply wanted to have no further part in adventures of this kind.

The negotiations are allegedly continuing. Negotiations are also taking place concerning the purchase of aviation gasoline by the Yugoslav army administration.

I shall turn this matter over for further handling to the Military Attaché, Colonel Toussaint, who is expected here on May 8.

FABRICIUS

## No. 201

5555/E395135-37

### *Memorandum of the Ministry of Economics*<sup>1</sup>

I Min. Ö1 [123 g]

BERLIN, May 11, 1938.

[W 685 g.]

To: Ministerialdirigent Dr. Schlotterer in the Ministry.

Subject: Urgency of the sale of war matériel to Rumania for the procurement of aviation gasoline.

After consultation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the expert in the Austrian Ministry of Trade, I should like to sum up once more the ideas proposed on April 28, 1938, and request that you ask for a decision by the Field Marshal.

#### 1. *The situation with regard to obtaining aviation gasoline.*

The total requirements for the year 1938-39 are:

current consumption	270,000 tons
stockpiling	50,000 tons
	<hr/> 320,000 tons

This quantity has been established by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces after careful calculations. It represents only the most essential requirements. An additional quantity needed for Austria is not included.

<sup>1</sup>The memorandum was forwarded to the Foreign Ministry on May 11 for information. The file numbers printed in brackets were taken from the forwarding note (5555/E395134).



The following possibilities were envisaged for procurement:

80,000 tons	Leuna aviation gasoline	} German production
30,000 tons	Aviation benzol	
130,000 tons	Allocation of foreign exchange	13 million RM
80,000 tons	Rumania-clearing	10.4 million RM
320,000 tons		

The allocation of foreign exchange has lately been subjected to substantial restrictions. We must expect a loss of about 35,000 tons on this account. This loss can be borne only if the current peacetime allocation to the Air Force and stocking of mobilization supplies, which are already cut in the extreme, are further reduced. Since such a step is hardly to be anticipated, the gap of 3.5 million reichsmarks in foreign exchange must be closed by equivalent additional allocations. Appropriate recommendations are being made by this office irrespective of the foregoing account of the situation.

This general survey clearly indicates the immense significance of purchases from Rumania for the procurement of aviation gasoline.

## 2. *Procurement from Rumania through clearing.*

Two methods are available for the payment of petroleum purchases from Rumania—the regular clearing, and supplementary transactions which in the main consist of war matériel.

Certain restrictive factors operating at present tend to impair the clearing procedure's capacity for supplying aviation gasoline. According to the agreements of the governmental committees, the petroleum purchases are supposed to total 50 million reichsmarks. But it must be anticipated even now that the equivalent of only 40 million reichsmarks at the most will be obtained through clearing.

The Rumanian clearing, however, has gained particular importance for our petroleum economy since Austria joined the Reich. The important political objective of keeping the refineries in Austria going at full capacity can be achieved in economic terms only if we obtain imports from Rumania. It may be assumed that we shall have to import the equivalent of at least 15 million reichsmarks. It is a moot question whether in the negotiations of the governmental committees, which are due to start at the end of May, the Rumanians will be willing to expand the clearing by that amount, the more so because petroleum deliveries from Rumania to Austria were suspended a year ago. It must therefore be expected that the petroleum quota, already cut by 10 million reichsmarks, will be further decreased, because essential Austrian requirements will have to be supplied from it.

In consequence it is to be feared that the supply possibilities for the Reich proper will be decreased to 25 million reichsmarks.

Since the aviation gasoline deliveries will probably have to maintain an appropriate ratio to the total deliveries, we must anticipate that the procurement of aviation gasoline will decrease by at least 5 million reichsmarks.

3. *Supplementary transactions with war matériel.*

Our conferences with the Export Cartel for War Matériel indicate that no substantial amounts will fall due from war matériel transactions within the next few months.

The aviation gasoline supply situation, however, requires the conclusion of contracts for immediate liquidation on a scale that would yield additional funds amounting to at least 5 million reichsmarks, due within the next few months.

The Export Cartel for War Matériel has submitted in a letter on May 10, 1938,<sup>2</sup> a list of suitable transactions. These items given in the list are viewed by the Export Cartel for War Matériel as especially promising as regards the possibility of immediate settlement:

140 37-mm antiaircraft guns  
30 Heinkel 112 aircraft

It would be necessary that these items be promptly released by the Reich Air Ministry.

In view of the tight procurement situation, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces considers it necessary that the Air Ministry agree to a release that would meet the need for disposable funds.

I accordingly request that you obtain a decision by the Field Marshal.<sup>3</sup>

ROSENCRANTZ

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<sup>2</sup>Not printed (5555/E395096-98).

<sup>3</sup>A letter of July 1 from State Secretary Neumann of the Four Year Plan to State Secretary Milch in the Air Ministry, a copy of which was sent to the Foreign Ministry (5555/E395144-46), states that Göring had approved the sale of additional war matériel in the amount of about 18 million reichsmarks to Rumania, Iran, and Lithuania. The letter states that this was being done to acquire foreign exchange to import aluminum, the Führer's orders to increase the tempo of defense measures having resulted in a shortage of 1,700 tons per month. It is evident, however, from document No. 212, that a part of the proceeds was applied to the import of additional oil from Rumania.

No. 202

2134/466962-68

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 13, 1938.

The new Bulgarian Minister<sup>1</sup> made his first call on me today. His political comments were less noteworthy than his reference to

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<sup>1</sup>Parvan Draganov; see document No. 175.

the fact that it was being bruited about in anti-German quarters in the Balkans, and particularly in Bulgaria, that we desired, by virtue of the weight we had acquired by the reincorporation of Austria, to make the Balkans a German economic colony. He mentioned, among other things, the alleged intention to found a "purchasing office" in Sofia, which would divert business from the Bulgarian dealers and the Bulgarian business world and would be eyed very much askance. He asked me to give special consideration to this matter in order to avoid harmful political repercussions.

In this connection the Bulgarian Minister mentioned that in economic matters, too, a clear distinction should always be made between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In spite of the recent good relations between Sofia and Belgrade, this was necessary for psychological reasons.

With a certain emphasis, but without mentioning names, the Minister spoke of the attempt of alleged Reich Germans in Sofia to force their way into Bulgarian domestic politics by the encouragement of certain Bulgarian elements of National Socialist hue. It was a question of small, ambitious people, but they were nevertheless capable of doing serious harm to the feeling toward us in Bulgaria.

I asked the Minister to give me names, if this was at all possible. We would use all our influence to proceed against such interference in Bulgarian domestic politics. Nothing was further from our intentions than such interference.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 203

1988/441055-53

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

No. 112 of May 17

BUCHAREST, May 17, 1938—10:20 p. m.

Received May 18—1:00 a. m.

Pol. IV 3378.

An indictment was presented today against Codreanu

(1) for unlawful possession of secret documents of the security agencies, articles 191 and 192 of the Penal Code of Carol II.

<sup>1</sup> The document is printed here as deciphered and circulated in the Foreign Ministry, but this version differs in some particulars from the final draft in the files of the Legation in Bucharest (7887/E570893-895).

(2) for offenses against the internal security of the state, article 209, paragraph 4.

(3) for rebellion, article 210.

Codreanu is accused of having formed, and organized as a paramilitary body, a secret organization for the overthrow of the existing social order, and of having for this purpose accepted foreign funds and entered into relations abroad.

The indictment, which is published in the newspapers, declares that the evidence was found in Codreanu's home. Passages which state that the accused entered into relations with foreign organizations for the purpose of bringing about a revolution, and requested support and instructions from them, are so censored that Germany is not mentioned, though plainly meant. It is also stated that these documents,<sup>2</sup> originating in 1935, were forwarded by the same route as a telegram which was sent by the accused to a foreign power.

The latter point refers to the familiar allegation that the German Legation despatched a telegram from Codreanu to the Führer on the occasion of the reincorporation of Austria. Inasmuch as I have denied this assertion to the King himself as well as to the Minister of the Court and the Minister of the Interior, it is all the more astonishing since the Minister of the Interior invited me to call on him before publication of the indictment and made the following statement:

The records of Codreanu had vanished and the material found was scanty. The prosecutor therefore insisted on using a document which was the Rumanian draft of a letter that the accused had addressed to the Führer and Chancellor at the beginning of 1935, in which he announced that he wished to carry out a revolution in Rumania on the National Socialist pattern and was looking to Germany for backing. In the letter, concerning which it is not known whether it was forwarded through the German Legation as indicated by a notation on it, Codreanu requests assistance and instructions from Germany and proposes a political and economic alliance with Germany.<sup>3</sup>

The Minister of the Interior emphasized that he did not know whether the letter had reached its destination and had been answered. He did not suppose the latter was the case and he did not intend to ask me whether we had forwarded it. But he wanted us to know that, in recognition of the fact that we had been taking pains to observe the strictest reserve toward the Iron Guard, the Rumanian Govern-

<sup>2</sup> The Bucharest text reads: "this document".

<sup>3</sup> On May 27 Fabricius reported (1988/441076-85) that at Codreanu's trial, during a secret session of the court, the Iron Guard leader denied that he had written such a letter. He also denied that he had maintained relations with the Nazi Party in Germany or received financial support from there.

ment wished to avoid anything that might in any way involve Germany in these proceedings; a special watch would be kept over the press in this regard.

In all circles this affair is the topic of the day and attempts are made to discover our attitude. I am maintaining the utmost reserve, although the Iron Guard is attempting to induce the Italian Minister and me to intervene. Numerous other members of the Legion were arrested in the following days <sup>4</sup> and given prison sentences.

Nae Jonescu <sup>5</sup> has also been arrested.

FABRICIUS

<sup>4</sup> The Bucharest text reads: "in recent days".

<sup>5</sup> Deputy to Iron Guard leader Codreanu.

## No. 204

1938/441060-61

*Minister Fabricius to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

SECRET

BUCHAREST, May 20, 1938.  
Pol. IV 3457.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: The trial of Codreanu, which will presumably be followed by similar trials of other "Iron Guard" leaders, is quite embarrassing to us, on the one hand because of the document that was found on Codreanu and was supposed to establish connections with the Führer, and on the other hand, because precisely those members of the "Iron Guard" are being prosecuted who are ideologically closest to us in Rumania. It is difficult for a German envoy to have to watch all this calmly from the sidelines, but I think the Foreign Ministry will approve my restraint. Interference not only would hurt our interests for a long time to come, but also would be of no advantage at all to the Guard at the present time.

In my opinion, the King is making a big mistake in proceeding so drastically, but it is not our business to keep him from doing so. Nevertheless, one might perhaps intimate to him the dangers that might result for him from the attempt to destroy this element, which in the last analysis aspires to ideals that are in the interest of the state. Bolshevism and association with Soviet Russia were prevented in the days of Titulescu <sup>1</sup> particularly through the propaganda spread among the population by the "Iron Guard." Should this element dis-

<sup>1</sup> Nicholas Titulescu was removed as Foreign Minister on Aug. 29, 1936, in a cabinet reorganization occasioned by growing opposition to his alleged pro-Russian and pro-League policies. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, pp. 522-524.

appear or become the embittered foe of the King and the Government, then a situation could well arise that would become quite complicated and would help neither us nor European civilization.

I thought, therefore, that it would be desirable if the Foreign Minister impressed these things on Prince Frederick of Hohenzollern, to whom at my suggestion he intended sometime anyway to extend an invitation. The Prince has great influence with his nephew. Perhaps he can now approach him and induce him not to carry on the fight to the bitter end.

Queen Mother Marie, who is at present staying at the "Weisser Hirsch" near Dresden, has no influence with Carol; otherwise I would advise speaking with her also.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

FABRICIUS

## No. 205

1988/441057

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 117 of May 22

BUCHAREST, May 22, 1938—9: 55 p. m.

Received May 23—1: 30 a. m.

Pol. IV 3465.

Foreign Minister Comnen, who spoke to me about the Iron Guard, emphasized that in the documents discovered, numerous contacts of the Iron Guard with German Party agencies had been disclosed. The Rumanian Government wished if possible to make use of them in the pending trial. To my objection that they probably were rather old documents and that they could have no significance other than that of correspondence customary with politicians, he replied that they did contain more. Even today letters sometimes arrived and he asked me to use my influence to put a stop to this. He did not indicate any specific Party agency.<sup>1</sup> The King regarded any such contacts with the Iron Guard as directed against himself.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup> On May 25 a letter on this subject was drafted in Political Division IV but was subsequently marked "Canceled" [*Cessat*] (1988/441058-59). Addressees listed on the draft were the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the Nazi Party, the Auslandsorganisation, the Reich Youth Leadership, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and the Propaganda Ministry. The letter requested information on any contacts established with the Iron Guard, and stated that it was "absolutely necessary that these relations be broken off at once."

## No. 206

3403/E013611-12

*The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

A 313

SOFIA, May 31, 1938.

Pol. IV 3965.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Bulgaria's foreign policy.

It was interesting for me to return from leave precisely during the days in which the German-Czech conflict<sup>1</sup> had attained a certain climax—at least in the press.

On this occasion, too, Bulgaria's attitude can be considered entirely friendly toward us, if one overlooks a few pointed remarks which an unimportant Monday paper has been making against us.

Aside from the fact that the Bulgarian dislikes the Czech, in spite of their Slavic kinship, and is wont to call him the "Jew" of the Slavic family of nations, Germany's political ascendancy has awakened in Bulgaria such strong sympathies, admiration, and—not lastly—Bulgarian hopes, that other sentiments are thereby completely relegated to the background even among the skeptics—for we have no real enemies any more.

As I reported earlier, even during the first 24 hours after the Austrian *Anschluss*, when international complications seemed entirely possible, we had a press here such as I had not previously experienced during my term of office.

There is no doubt therefore that the Bulgarians are at least indifferent to Czechoslovakia and her national crises, especially since, as the King has confirmed to me on occasion, Beneš hates Bulgaria as much as he does us. Although today everything is in our favor here, also politically—a situation to which Germany's cooperation in the question of armament deliveries, especially, has been a contributing factor—there still remains one factor which I have emphasized in all my reports: Bulgaria is greatly impressed by our strength, much less so by Italy's; she places great political trust in us, but little in Italy (the kinship between the King and the House of Savoy does not change this situation). Therefore it is a principle of present-day Bulgarian foreign policy never to be committed to Italy's cause if England is on the other side. That should be kept in mind.

I should like to utilize this opportunity for a brief remark on Bulgaria's position with regard to the Balkan Entente. From occasional reports from other missions I have the impression that they count

<sup>1</sup> The reference is to the German-Czech crisis of May 1938. See vol. II, ch. III.

on the possibility of Bulgaria's joining the Balkan Entente. I have so far been unable to call on the Minister President since my return because of a minor foot injury; I do not believe, however, that the recent discussion with the Turks in Sofia has changed anything in the previous Bulgarian stand on this question.

Either Bulgaria accedes, and thereby accepts the *status quo* in the Balkans and renounces any territorial aspirations in the future, or they waive recognition of the *status quo* on her part; what good is Bulgaria's accession then even from the standpoint of the Balkan Entente?<sup>2</sup>

I believe it is best for us if Bulgaria faces the future with as few commitments as possible; this also applies in case of war. Even now we can probably be certain of Bulgaria's friendly neutrality in such an eventuality, but perhaps we shall desire more than that in case of war—Rumanian oil, for example.

RÜMELIN

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<sup>2</sup> In a letter to Senior Counselor Schliep on June 20 (1895/426381) Ambassador Schulenburg in Moscow commented on Rümelin's report, which had been sent to his mission for information. The Bulgarian Minister in Moscow had told him, he wrote, that Foreign Minister Litvinov had urged Bulgaria's adherence to the Balkan Entente. The Bulgarian said he replied that his country could not see the least advantage in such a step.

## No. 207

1938/441062-63

*State Secretary Weizsäcker to Minister Fabricius*

SECRET

BY TODAY'S COURIER

BERLIN, June 7, 1938.

zu Pol. IV 3465.<sup>1</sup>

Drafting Officer: Counselor Busse.

DEAR HERR FABRICIUS: In reply to your letter of May 20 I should like to tell you that we not only approve your reserve toward the Iron Guard and the trial of Codreanu, now concluded,<sup>2</sup> but indeed deem it essential in the light of our foreign policy. ~~We never intended, nor do we now intend, to maintain any kind of relations with the Iron Guard as a means of gaining influence on developments in Rumania.~~<sup>3</sup> You will have perceived that our press has also not exhibited any marked sympathy for Codreanu and his Iron Guard. The similarity of ideologies gives us no occasion to drop this reserve and interfere in the domestic affairs of Rumania.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 205.

<sup>2</sup> Codreanu had been sentenced on May 27 to 10 years in prison.

<sup>3</sup> This sentence appeared in Busse's draft but was stricken from the letter as sent.



It would be distinctly an act of interference even if we caused it to be intimated to the King that his actions against the Iron Guard might involve dangers for him. On this account I would rather not make use of the Prince of Hohenzollern along the lines proposed by you. Besides, we have the impression—confirmed by your reports—that in Rumania it is not only the Iron Guard that forms a dam against Bolshevism and rejects any tie with Soviet Russia; rather, it appears to us that other circles<sup>1</sup> as well have a similar attitude.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

(State Secretary)

<sup>1</sup>Marginal note in Busse's handwriting: "Note: the former Old Liberals, the King, Comnen, the former National Christian Party, etc."

## No. 208

3410/E014077

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 145 of June 9, 1938

BERLIN, June 9, 1938—8:30 p. m.  
zu Pol. IV 3727.<sup>1</sup>

Drafting Officer: Counselor Busse.

With reference to your report No. 1703 of May 27.<sup>1</sup>

It is suggested that when occasion offers, you point out once more to the proper Rumanian authorities that we maintained no relations of any kind with Codreanu and that testimony presented at the trial had failed to produce evidence to this effect. We consider any assertions to the contrary sheer figments of the imagination.

Please do not make any formal *démarche*, however.

Further comment in the Konradi affair is reserved.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1938/441076-85). This was a report on Codreanu's trial in which, according to Fabricius, the prosecution failed to establish that Codreanu had communicated secretly with Hitler in 1935.

<sup>2</sup>In his report of May 27 Fabricius referred to statements attributed to the King that Konradi, who was General Secretary of the German-Rumanian Chamber of Commerce and Landesgruppenleiter of the Nazi Party, and also functioned as Commercial Attaché for the Legation, was the channel for the financial support Codreanu was alleged to have received from Germany. Fabricius wrote that he had spoken with Konradi before the latter's departure on a long leave in Germany, and added, "There is, of course, no truth in any of this." He was combating the rumors about Konradi vigorously, but doubted that Konradi could be maintained in his position since as an official of the Chamber of Commerce he was subject to Rumanian law.

Referring to the last sentence of the above telegram is a marginal note: "Note (after conversation with Pers. H.—Senior Counselor Rohde). There is a possibility that the Konradi case will be settled without the participation of the Foreign Ministry. Submit again on Aug. 15, 1938. B[usse], July 1." See document No. 254.

## No. 209

223/150255

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 10, 1938.

Today I called the attention of the Hungarian Minister to the fact that the well-known Hungarian map representing the dismemberment of the country through the Trianon Treaty also claims Burgenland for Hungary. I added that I was not interested in how the Austrians had formerly reconciled themselves to this propaganda. But since Austria was now a part of the German Reich the situation was altered. I did not make any definite demand on the Minister, but I recommend that after a time Herr von Erdmannsdorff make a similar statement in Budapest and that, if no action is taken, he warn them at intervals.

Submitted with the relevant papers<sup>1</sup> to the Under State Secretary.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Not found.

## No. 210

442/221370-72

*Minister Rümelin to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

CONFIDENTIAL

SOFIA, June 22, 1938.

A 363

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: With reference to my telegram No. 57,<sup>1</sup> I should like to report a few more things worthy of note from my conversation with the King. I choose the method of a private letter because of the confidential nature of the information.

To begin with, King Boris told me about his conversation with the new Italian Minister, Marquis Talamo, at the time of the presentation of his credentials, which took place in the presence of the Minister President. The Italian Minister actually asked the King to adhere more closely to the "Axis policy." The King replied that Bulgaria wished to conduct her foreign policy without any fixed political commitments, and that such an independent policy was precisely in the interest of the "Axis," rightly understood. Moreover, he told the Minister that it was always dangerous, if one had just come to a country, to observe things from the very first from a single aspect, before one had become acquainted with the country and the people.

Nevertheless, the Minister brought up the same subject to the Minister President a few days later and told him that Bulgaria was not

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3420/E015914).

sufficiently accommodating toward Italy. Kiosseivanov thereupon replied that Bulgaria had just recently helped Italy out with grain, in spite of her own shortage—and so forth!

The King did not speak about any South Slav agitation, but did mention the agitation of the Serb Military League in Serbia and in the neighboring countries. There was every reason for supporting Stoyadinovich, who deserved confidence, whose independent policy supported the Italian-Yugoslav Agreement, and who acted as a "brake" on the Czechs—something which his opponents, Zhivkovich and Yevtich<sup>2</sup> at any rate would not do. The other reports of the Minister to Rome, the King said, were incorrect and designed to echo the words of Mussolini, whom the Ministers feared. The King, for personal reasons also, regretted that the new Italian Minister seemed to repeat his predecessors' mistakes. As characteristic of the level of Italian diplomats, the King told me—visibly disgusted—that former Minister Sappupo at his departure had confided to him that his successor's wife was the mistress of Count Ciano!

The reports the King gave concerning the intervention of the Czechs in Bulgarian domestic policy were interesting to me. I told him that, with his approval, I would relay them to Berlin. As I have reported separately, the opposition in the Sobranje left the Chamber while the annulment of Communistic mandates was being discussed.<sup>3</sup> King Boris stated he was convinced that the Czech Minister here, Maxa—whose machinations in other respects are also known—was behind this exodus. Maxa was a very dangerous fellow, who had something like 40 million *leva* (equivalent of 3 million marks) at his disposal; *he was taking care of the distribution of bribes and political subventions for the Soviets also since the disappearance of the Russian Minister, Ras-kolnikov*. In this connection it may be remarked that the money transactions of the Soviet Embassy here with the banks were constantly under surveillance of the secret police.

It is therefore altogether possible, for this reason too, that the Soviets made use of the Czech Minister to pay out subsidies. It would also be advisable to keep a watchful eye on the Czech diplomats elsewhere.

In reply to a remark by me the King expressed himself regarding the leaders of the Czech policy of provocation, the representatives of which he sees in the group surrounding Beneš and Krofta, who—in contrast to Hodža—were quite capable of flirting with the idea of staking

<sup>2</sup> Leaders of the Rightist opposition to the Stoyadinovich government as organized in the Yugoslav National Party. General Petar Zhivkovich was formerly Minister of War; Bogulyub Yevtich preceded Stoyadinovich as Minister President.

<sup>3</sup> The first parliamentary elections since the *coup d'état* of 1934 were held in Bulgaria in March 1938. Soon after the Sobranje convened a resolution was introduced to disqualify half of the members of the opposition on the ground that they belonged to proscribed parties or had been elected by Soviet propaganda.

everything on one card and provoking us in order to achieve a greater Czech nation when Germany had been overpowered by a coalition. In this connection the policy of Moscow was to stir things up in Prague wherever it could.

In regard to the visit of Stoyadinovich in the fall, the King went on to say that the time was agreeable to him, because of the unpleasant debates in the Sobranye during the present summer session.

The King expressed warm and cordial sentiments regarding the Führer and Field Marshal Göring.

With cordial greetings,

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

RÜMELIN

### No. 211

3403/E013614-15

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, July 14, 1938.

Pol. IV 4783.

The Italian Ambassador informed me today of an inquiry that had reached Rome from Sofia with reference to the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly. An agreement had been reached between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente to the effect that the latter conceded to the Bulgarians the annulment of the military disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly, while, on the other hand, Bulgaria agreed to waive the demilitarization provisions of the same treaty in regard to Thrace.<sup>1</sup> As a signatory of the Treaty of Neuilly, Italy had also now been asked for her consent. The Italian reply was as follows: The formal approval of the Italian Government was probably not necessary. The Italian Government, however, raised no objections to the contemplated agreement, even if it might look as though the intention was in this way to initiate a *rapprochement* between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente.

The Ambassador added some remarks, inspired by mistrust concerning the renewed activity of the Turks, also in relation to Bulgaria.

<sup>1</sup> Reporting on these negotiations from Belgrade on July 26 (3403/E013619), Heeren said he had learned in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that a Turkish initiative was responsible for the talks between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente.

The agreement, which also incorporated the language of the Kellogg Pact providing for renunciation of any resort to force in the relations of the signatory states, was signed at Salonika on July 31, 1938, by Minister President Kiosseivanov representing Bulgaria and Minister President Metaxas of Greece representing all the states of the Balkan Entente. The text is published in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 287-288.

Then, when the conversation turned to the Franco-Turkish Treaty,<sup>2</sup> this mistrust became even more clearly apparent. The Greco-Turkish Treaty,<sup>3</sup> too, Attolico judged unfavorably. He saw England's hand behind all the Turkish activity. England was busily engaged in securing bases in the eastern Mediterranean in case there should be a war.

VON WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup>On July 4, 1933, Turkey and France initialed a new Treaty of Friendship in which each promised to enter into no diplomatic combination directed against the other, and to give no assistance to an aggressor against the other. This followed by one day an agreement by which Turkish participation was admitted by France in the control of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, an arrangement which led in the following year to the latter's detachment from France's Syrian mandate and cession to Turkey. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1933*, vol. 1, pp. 479-492.

<sup>3</sup>Greece and Turkey concluded on Apr. 27, 1933, a treaty supplementary to their Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 1930 and their Entente Cordiale of 1933. The new treaty engaged each party to oppose any attempt by an aggressor to use the territory of either for an attack on the other. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*, vol. 1, pp. 286-287.

## No. 212

5555/E395149-50

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

No. 2428

I F 7

BUCHAREST, July 15, 1938.

Received July 20.

W 688 g.

Subject: Transactions of Rheinmetall with Reschitza [*Resita*] concerning antiaircraft guns and machine tools for the armaments industry.

With reference to your cipher letter W 587 g.<sup>1</sup>

At an audience which I had with the King in another connection on July 6, I mentioned that Field Marshal Göring, animated by the desire to further relations with Rumania, has despite the obvious difficulties, ordered the release of 24 37-mm. antiaircraft guns from German military stocks within the framework of the transactions of Rheinmetall with Reschitza. I said the Field Marshal had, however, voiced the express desire in this connection that at least one-half of the petroleum for supplementary export to Germany be released this year, that is, before the payments fall due.<sup>2</sup> On account of the known opposition by the present Minister of Economics, Mititza Constantinescu, I asked the King to exert his influence in that direction.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (5555/E395130-31).

<sup>2</sup>For an account of Germany's urgent need for additional oil imports at this period see document No. 201.

King Carol replied that he was pleased to learn of the assent of the Field Marshal and Minister President. Although he could not make me any positive promise regarding the petroleum because he was reluctant to interfere with his Ministers, he would actively support our proposal. He asked me to convey to Minister President Göring his warmest thanks and his regards. The Minister President, he said, had on repeated occasions used his influence in behalf of the economic relations with Rumania; the King was extremely grateful to him for this, and would like to ask him to continue to do so in the future. He placed particular value on the machine tools for the Reschitza works, and especially the possibility of early delivery.

I replied to the King that I would convey his thanks and wishes.

M. Malaxa, with whom I talked afterward in order to get information on the particulars of the additional deliveries the King had spoken about, is going to send the Legation a list of the machines which they are especially interested in having delivered soon.

It is my belief that prompt and satisfactory deliveries in the armaments field are the best means for combatting the fanciful designs of the British for erecting an economic bulwark against German expansion in the southeastern area. If we are able to satisfy Rumania on this subject, which holds the center of her interest at the present, she will see no necessity for embarking on complex economic combinations with England, which cannot but lead to a relationship of dependency. The credit offers by the British, as I have reliably learned, have made no further progress as yet.

FABRICIUS

## No. 213

2129/464651

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

ROME, July 22, 1938—7:30 p. m.

SECRET

No. 195 of July 22

Ciano, on whom I called today to obtain information about the visit of the Hungarian Ministers, told me the communiqué contained all the essentials. Basically there was nothing to add to it. Nothing had been signed or agreed upon. He only wanted to say that he had detected great suspicion toward Yugoslavia on the part of the Hungarians and especially of Kánya, and also "jealousy" of the relations of Yugoslavia with Italy and Germany. The Hungarians had indicated here that they would not proceed militarily against Czechoslovakia of their own accord, but would probably do so in case of armed conflict between Czechoslovakia and Germany. The attitude

Yugoslavia might take was a matter of concern to them (cf. telegraphic report 192 of July 18).<sup>1</sup> Ciano added that he had tried to exercise a calming influence.

PLESSEN

<sup>1</sup> Vol. II, document No. 296.

## No. 214

2129/464653-55

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

[Telegram]

SECRET

BUDAPEST, July 28, 1938.

No. 70 of July 27

Pol. I 628 g. Rs.

With reference to our report A 193 of July 26,<sup>1</sup> and to your instruction Pol. I 600 g. Rs. of July 21.<sup>1</sup>

Immediately after his return 2 days ago, Minister President Imrédy asked me to call on him today. In the course of the conversation he pointed out that the main reason for his trip to Rome had been the desire to establish personal relations with Mussolini, and that after Ciano had visited Budapest twice he had considered it a polite gesture to make the trip with the Foreign Minister. He had gained the firm impression from his conversation with Mussolini that the Rome-Berlin Axis was the foundation of Italian policy and that Mussolini, within the framework of this policy, had a very great interest in a politically and economically strong Hungary. Since according to his impressions Hungary could absolutely depend on the friendship of Mussolini, the visit had thus been extremely satisfactory for him.

Since the Minister President, ordinarily very sparing of words, intended to say more, evidently for my personal information, I took the initiative, pointing out how often Yugoslavia had been mentioned in connection with the visit, and asked whether any guiding principles had been established in the Hungarian-Italian conversation with regard to the future role of Yugoslavia in relation to Hungary and Italy. Imrédy tried to avoid giving a clear answer, but admitted that Mussolini had strongly emphasized his interest in good Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. The Minister President added that he also earnestly desired an improvement in Hungarian-Yugoslav relations, but he did not quite see how to achieve this in the near future. At the same time he remarked in passing that he had also gained the impression that for some time Germany had no longer been so interested as in the past in closer Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. I replied that

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

I had no reason whatever to suppose that we would not still greatly welcome a Hungarian-Yugoslav settlement.

To induce Imrédy to say more I informed him about the story making the rounds here that an improvement of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations had been suggested to him in Rome particularly because the Italians wished the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Rome Protocols, and that furthermore Yugoslavia was allegedly willing to conclude a pact of friendship with Hungary as with Bulgaria, if Hungary would commit herself to refrain from military action against Czechoslovakia. Imrédy did not deny in so many words that inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Rome Protocols had been discussed, but he stressed that he did not think much would come of it, so that I obtained the impression that they did talk of such a combination in Rome. On the other hand, the Minister President declared flatly that he had never heard that Yugoslavia was willing to conclude a pact of friendship with Hungary under any conditions whatsoever.

After these statements I told the Minister President that the outcome of the Rome visit which he had sketched did not seem to me to be exactly of great importance, and I would be surprised if during his visit to Rome he had not asked Mussolini pointblank what the Italian Government intended to do in case of a Czech attack upon Hungary or in case Hungary should feel impelled to take military action against Czechoslovakia, and this should result in Yugoslav measures against Hungary. Imrédy remarked in the first place that the Foreign Minister would inform me about details, but he admitted indirectly that this question had been touched on; evidently there had not been any unequivocal answer by the Italians, however. Imrédy said in effect that action by Hungary against Czechoslovakia could be considered only in agreement with Germany. In this case Italy, if only on the basis of Axis policy, would be constrained to decide on the Italian stand together with Germany. Considering the good German-Yugoslav and Italian-Yugoslav relations it could be considered as certain that Yugoslavia would not take military action against Hungary.

I remarked on this point that I had heretofore always heard the opinion on the Hungarian side that Yugoslavia would attack Hungary in any case if the latter should proceed against Czechoslovakia, but from his words I thought I could assume a change in the Hungarian stand. Imrédy replied that he had perhaps not expressed himself clearly. He did not by any means want to say that the ideas he had repeated represented the Hungarian stand; rather he had "heard" such opinions during his visit to Rome. He willingly admitted that there was something to them from the standpoint of political logic.



## No. 215

1550/376813-16

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A No. 198

BUDAPEST, July 29, 1938.

Received July 30.

Pol. IV 5051.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Foreign Minister de Kánya on his impressions at Rome.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to my telegram No. 70 of July 27.

Foreign Minister de Kánya received me today in order to give me some information on his conversations at Rome. To begin with, he stated that in Rome he had become convinced of the "perfect functioning" of German-Italian cooperation. He had gained the impression that Count Ciano was not merely a 100 percent but a 500 percent (!) supporter of Axis policy and that the present foundation of German-Italian cooperation was firmer than ever. He was also able to observe anew that the Italian policy toward Hungary, too, was that of a really sincere and loyal friendship. He and the Minister President were therefore highly satisfied and deeply impressed with the result of their trip.

To my question how policy toward Yugoslavia had been discussed between him and the Italian statesmen, M. de Kánya replied that the Italians seemed to be convinced that they could tie Yugoslavia more closely to the policy of the Axis, and that they had therefore also showed strong interest in far-reaching normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. On the other hand, it was idle talk if here and there the opinion was expressed that the creation of a special Rome-Belgrade-Budapest group had been discussed in Rome. This idea was not discussed in any form. The version he had heard here, namely that Yugoslavia was prepared to conclude a treaty of friendship with Hungary, was also incorrect in his opinion. He thought it out of the question that Stoyadinovich had ever considered such an idea. Stoyadinovich had once casually said, "Wait and see,"<sup>2</sup> and he, Kánya, was convinced that it was to be understood to mean that Stoyadinovich did not by any means intend to commit himself for the future, but wanted to leave all possibilities open.

M. de Kánya then emphasized that he, too, desired nothing more fervently than a normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations.

<sup>1</sup>For other reports on the visit of the Hungarian statesmen in Rome July 18-20, see vol. I, document No. 795; vol. II, document No. 296; and Soviet publication, *Documents secrets*, No. 21. The communiqué on the meetings is published in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, p. 279.

<sup>2</sup>In English in the original.

But it should not be assumed that this could be carried out from one day to the next. He reminded me of the fact that it was only 3 or 4 years ago that a deeply rooted hatred of Yugoslavia had possessed every Hungarian. Even if the feelings of the Hungarians toward Yugoslavia had since changed to a great extent, one should nevertheless not expect that so few years sufficed to change those former feelings to feelings of friendship. Nevertheless he himself was working incessantly on the improvement of mutual relations. He then stated confidentially that the conversations conducted between the Hungarian Minister in Belgrade and M. Stoyadinovich had already reached the stage where Yugoslavia was prepared to recognize Hungary's complete sovereignty in military matters and where Hungary on her part was prepared to issue a declaration in the sense of the Kellogg Pact to which Yugoslavia would reply with a corresponding declaration. As to the third point of the negotiations, the question of minorities, they had, to be sure, made no real progress as yet. Several weeks ago Stoyadinovich had transmitted to him a draft of a declaration to which he had replied with a counterdeclaration; since that time, however, he had received no further communication from Stoyadinovich. Summarizing, he stated that both sides agreed in principle on the drafting of a protocol which is to comprise the three points mentioned.

Since the Foreign Minister remarked during the further course of the conversation that the Minister President had informed him of the conversation he had had with me, I asked him what could possibly have led M. Imrédy to the assumption that we now seemed to have less interest than previously in a settlement of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. The Foreign Minister replied that he supposed the Minister President was informed that some weeks ago M. Stoyadinovich had taken strong steps against certain attempts by Reich Germans to agitate among the German minority in Yugoslavia and that he had even had Reich Germans expelled and members of the minority arrested. It was well known that Stoyadinovich had personally given strictest instructions to the *Banús* against any Reich German agitation among the German minority. The Minister President had presumably had the impression that in the face of these measures we had shown a certain reserve toward Yugoslavia.

To my question whether in the Rome conversations the possibility of war with Czechoslovakia, and Italian intentions in such a case, had also been discussed, M. de Kánya replied that for obvious reasons he would rather not answer this question, but that he could assure me that Hungary had a loyal friend in Italy, upon whom she could depend under all circumstances. He then again emphasized that he was convinced of the *loyalty* of this friend. From this strong emphasis on Italian loyalty I believe I may conclude that the Italians

have made certain promises to the Hungarian statesmen, though perhaps not in binding form.

Finally M. de Kánya stated of his own accord that the Italians had not brought up in Rome the question of possible Hungarian adherence to the Anti-Comintern Agreement nor the possibility of a Hungarian withdrawal from the League of Nations.

In conclusion I asked the Foreign Minister whether the presence of the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff at Venice had any connection with the Rome visit; M. de Kánya expressly denied this. He added that General Rátz's call on the Chief of the Italian General Staff had been planned for a long time and that no special significance should be attributed to it. Whether this is actually in conformity with the facts, I am unable to judge.

WERKMEISTER

### No. 216

1895/426887-88

#### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A No. 222

BUDAPEST, August 9, 1938.

Received August 11.

Pol. IV 5334.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Hungary's relations with the Little Entente.

Foreign Minister de Kánya and Minister Count Csáky, the *chef de cabinet*, today answered my question concerning the status of Hungary's negotiations with the countries of the Little Entente with the following explanation:

A counterproposal intended for Rumanian Foreign Minister Comnen, the spokesman of the Little Entente, had been drawn up in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry a few days ago. It stated that the Hungarian Government was willing to accept Comnen's latest proposal with certain modifications after the Rumanian Government had given proof of its good will in the minorities question by publication of the nationalities statute, which constituted a good step forward, even though the manner of its implementation remained to be seen.

The main difficulty continued to be that the Hungarian Government was not willing to conclude the same agreement with the Czechs as with the Yugoslavs and the Rumanians. It therefore wished to propose that an agreement with Yugoslavia and Rumania be initialed at once, recognizing Hungary's military equality and containing a mutual declaration in the sense of the Kellogg Pact and promises for

the minorities, but that it not be made public until after "the Czech situation has been clarified." In that case a communiqué concerning the fact that such an agreement was reached would be published. The alternative Hungarian proposal is to the effect that they would be ready to reach a simultaneous agreement with the Czechs only if the latter would make concessions to Hungary greater than those of Rumania and Yugoslavia without any compensation on Hungary's part. Hungary would ask of them the fulfillment of practically all the demands made by the Sudeten Germans except for the admission of National Socialist propaganda.

On the Hungarian side they are rather skeptical concerning the outcome of the negotiations.<sup>1</sup> To be sure, M. Comnen, whose position with the King is alleged to be no longer so secure, seemed in urgent need of a success in his foreign policy. Since he was annoyed by the fact that Stoyadinovich presented as his own personal achievement the agreement recently concluded between the powers of the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria, M. Comnen was anxious to submit to the conference of the Little Entente meeting in Bled at the end of August an acceptable proposal for an agreement with Hungary.

ERDMANNSDORFF

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<sup>1</sup> In an interview on Aug. 17 the Hungarian Minister told Ribbentrop that there were signs that the difficulties in the way of a declaration by the Little Entente on behalf of the Hungarian minorities would be removed and that an agreement was in sight. Ribbentrop replied that "the present moment seemed ill-chosen for negotiations with the Little Entente, to which of course Czechoslovakia also belonged." This policy might be right if all Hungary wanted was a weak declaration in favor of her minorities, not if she was pursuing revisionist aims (F6/0289-88).

## No. 217

2228/475688-90

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, August 10, 1938.

Today I asked the Bulgarian Minister to come to see me in connection with another matter, and on this occasion broached the subject of Bulgaria's loan from France. I told the Minister that it was, of course, far from our thoughts to ask for a monopoly position in Bulgaria. Naturally Bulgaria could develop her trade with other countries to the best of her ability and borrow money where she liked, especially in view of the fact that the Bulgarian Government in this case had approached us first and had not entered into negotiations with France until, instead of RM 100,000,000 and then RM 60,000,000, we had made available only 30 million reichsmarks.

Nevertheless it had surprised us that Bulgaria concluded a credit agreement of this sort with a French banking group just *at this moment*. The fact that England and France were systematically trying to curb Germany's trade with the countries of Southeastern Europe was known in Bulgaria as well as in Germany, and Bulgaria could imagine that we had not expected that the Bulgarian Government, especially, would enter into their game. Although it was far from our thoughts to believe that the Bulgarian Government had intended a political gesture by accepting this credit at the present moment, it was undeniable that the conclusion of this credit agreement would be represented in other countries as a victory for the anti-German policy in the Southeast.

Moreover, the matter also had a purely economic side which necessarily interested us. We are, as is well known, by far the best buyer of Bulgarian goods, and Bulgaria frequently has difficulty in buying a corresponding amount of German goods. If Bulgaria now purchased in France railway equipment and armament, in other words products with which Germany traditionally supplied Bulgaria, the possibility for establishing a balance of trade between Germany and Bulgaria would be made even more difficult. Moreover, it was not clear to me how Bulgaria, who had no foreign exchange available, was planning to repay the loan to France, who was not prepared to accept goods in payment.

M. Draganov said that when the conclusion of the agreement became known he had at once had the impression that the news would be received somewhat unfavorably here. For this reason he had telephoned the King a few days ago before the latter left Bulgaria. Among other things he had told the King that he was afraid the loan agreement would be regarded here as having some connection with the Salonika Protocol.<sup>1</sup> The King had answered that all such conjectures were incorrect. The negotiations with France had been pending for a considerable time, and it was pure coincidence that they were concluded precisely now, shortly after the Salonika meeting.

I am under the impression that M. Draganov appreciates our attitude. I assume that he will ask his Government for further information and will request authority to explain to the German Government the origin of the credit agreement and the attitude of the Bulgarian Government.

It is of interest that M. Draganov mentioned in the course of our conversation that the agreement with France was modeled after the agreement of March 12, 1938, with Germany.<sup>2</sup>

CLODIUS

<sup>1</sup> The agreement of July 31 between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente. See document No. 211, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 181.

## No. 218

5555/E395155

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 2815

BUCHAREST, August 16, 1938.

I C 4

Received August 18.

W 789 g.

Subject: Additional petroleum.

With reference to my telegram No. 155 of August 15.<sup>1</sup>

I am enclosing a copy of the letter No. 54905 of August 13 from the Rumanian Ministry of Economics,<sup>2</sup> authorizing the additional export of petroleum or grain in return for the delivery of antiaircraft guns by the Rheinmetall concern to the Resita concern, in the amount of RM 8,600,000.

At the request of the Legation 60 percent of this will for the time being be given in petroleum; RM 1,720,000 with down payment by the end of 1938 and the same in the first quarter of 1939, the latter exports representing an advance on the payments of Resita falling due later. Exports for the equivalent of the remaining 40 percent will be released to coincide with the subsequent due dates of payments of Resita. The governmental committees will at that time decide what commodities should then be taken.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (5555/E395151). The telegram is a brief summary of the information in this report.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (5555/E395156).

## No. 219

1895/426892-94

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 2896

BUCHAREST, August 18, 1938.

I A 10

Received August 20.

Pol. IV 5541.

Subject: Hungarian negotiations with the Little Entente States.

The negotiations taking place with Italian assistance between the Hungarian Minister, M. de Bardossy, and Rumanian Foreign Minister, Comnen, concerning an arrangement between Hungary and the members of the Little Entente have of late made remarkable progress.

As is known, the following matters are involved:

1. A statement by the states of the Little Entente concerning Hungary's freedom from military restrictions;

2. Hungary's nonaggression declaration in the sense of the Kellogg Pact;

3. A statement concerning the treatment of minorities on both sides.

There has been agreement concerning the first two points for some time, but the one concerning the minorities was controversial. One formula is to be agreed upon between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and another between Hungary and Rumania and between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Rumanian Minister Bossy has now told Foreign Minister de Kánya, in Budapest a few days ago—the negotiations between Comnen and Bardossy had to be broken off here and transferred to Budapest because Bardossy was taken seriously ill—that Rumania and Yugoslavia accept the formula desired by Hungary. This provides that the measures "necessary" for eliminating the hindrances imposed on the minorities will be taken, whereas the text which had been proposed by Rumania and Yugoslavia envisaged only "administrative" measures.

As for the formula to be agreed upon between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Hungary is demanding a version going beyond that intended for Rumania and Yugoslavia. It mentions "constitutional, legislative, and administrative measures" and demands addition of the clause, "in order to permit the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia the free development of their political, cultural, and economic life." While the Czechs accepted the first part of the statement they reject the additional clause.

The matter is now to be discussed further at Bled, and according to the papers here the Italian and Hungarian Ministers from Belgrade will be present. My informant further tells me on this subject that the Little Entente states will presumably issue a statement at Bled which promises an early settlement of the differences; on the other hand, well-informed circles are convinced that Hungary is purposely drawing out the negotiations in order to see how the Czech-Sudeten-German problem is settled.<sup>1</sup>

M. Comnen has of late repeatedly expressed to me his satisfaction concerning the progress of his discussions with M. de Bardossy, without, however, disclosing any particulars.

FABRICIUS

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<sup>1</sup> On Aug. 18 Erdmannsdorff telegraphed from Budapest (1895/426889-90) that Kánya had informed him that he was proposing a postponement of the negotiations since it was clear that Rumania and Yugoslavia would not make an agreement without the participation of Czechoslovakia. Comnen had told Kánya that he could not abandon the Czechs in their present threatened situation, and stressed Hungary's common interest with the Little Entente in view of the growing German danger. Kánya had replied that there was no such danger for Hungary.

## No. 220

1895/426891

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 76 of August 19

BUDAPEST, August 19, 1938—11:20 a. m.

Received August 19—1:20 p. m.

Pol. IV 5520.

With reference to my telegram 75 of August 18.<sup>1</sup>

The Rumanian Minister, who, since the illness of the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest, has been carrying on negotiations for the Rumanian Foreign Minister—the latter was appointed the spokesman of the Little Entente at the Sinaia Conference—told me after his conversation with the Hungarian Foreign Minister yesterday that no agreement was reached at the present time because the Hungarians refused reciprocity for the far-reaching concessions which the Czechs were willing to make over and above the Rumanian and Yugoslav declaration.

The Little Entente would now discuss at Bled the possibilities of some other solution.

ERDMANNSDORFF

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1895/426889-90). See document No. 219, footnote 1.

## No. 221

1895/426899-900

*Circular of the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, August 26, 1938—9:40 p. m.

e. o. Pol. IV 5641.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Busse.

For your information:

The communiqué published on the conference of the Little Entente in Bled,<sup>2</sup> according to which an agreement, not yet published, has been concluded between Hungary and the members of the Entente with respect to recognition of Hungary's equal military rights and renunciation of the use of armed force as between Hungary and the Entente countries, hence also Czechoslovakia, occasioned initial surprise here in view of Hungary's attitude hitherto. [for any sort of

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<sup>1</sup> Addressees were the principal Missions in Europe, the Missions in Tokyo and Washington, and all Missions in Southeastern Europe.

<sup>2</sup> The text is published in *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. I, p. 284. See also vol. II of this series, documents Nos. 383 and 390.



agreement with Czechoslovakia on the part of Hungary, especially at this moment, which means a lessening of tension for Czechoslovakia in any direction, must be undesirable for us.<sup>3</sup>] We have not concealed this from our Hungarian visitors.<sup>4</sup> In reply the Hungarian Foreign Minister pointed out that nothing definite had been decided in Bled; the coming into force of the agreements had been made conditional upon the satisfactory settlement of the question of the Hungarian minorities in the three Entente states. But the Hungarian demands upon Czechoslovakia in that respect were so great that Czechoslovakia would not comply with them. Hence it was not to be expected that the agreement would come into force.

Nevertheless, Hungary's renunciation of the use of force against Czechoslovakia, even if presented merely as a goal of further negotiations, appears undesirable to us, especially at the present moment. The German press has therefore been directed to withhold any comments of its own on the Bled conversations. You will please likewise speak only with reserve on the outcome of Bled, but without criticizing Hungary.

VON WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>3</sup> The sentence in brackets was found in the draft but was stricken from the final text of the telegram.

<sup>4</sup> Regent Horthy, Minister President Imrédy and Foreign Minister Kánya visited Germany Aug. 23-26. See vol. II, documents Nos. 367, 383, 390, 392, 395, and 402.

## No. 222

2134/466964-65

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, August 31, 1938.

In the course of his visit today, the Bulgarian Minister first made some remarks to me on the Agreement of Salonika, the contents of which he described as reassuring to Germany also.

The Minister then went on to talk of the new French credit to Bulgaria. The fact that the credit was negotiated simultaneously with the agreement of Salonika, he said, was purely accidental. The French credit must not be confused with a political loan. It came from private sources. To what extent it would materialize was an open question. Moreover, the Minister added, a British group was also interested in granting a credit to Bulgaria. He was telling this in order to spare us surprises. The utilization of the French and possibly the British credits would depend, however, on Bulgarian payment possibilities which, with reference to France and England, were known to be limited. Approximately one-fifth of the French

credit would probably be used for military supplies, the rest for rail-road construction, etc. The French credit did not, however, rule out German participation in the deliveries in question. The bids would be solicited publicly. Whether or not the French State had secretly sponsored the extension of the credit was not entirely clear. It should be noted that France had not in any way connected the credit with increases in merchandise quotas.

I told the Minister that the latter consideration in particular, as well as the fact that France was not by nature a buyer of Bulgarian goods on a large scale, suggested the idea of political intentions on the part of the French Government. As everybody knew, the French were shrewd calculators in political and financial matters. If France, therefore, officially or privately made financial sacrifices, then political intentions had to be suspected.

The Minister did not deny this, but emphasized that Bulgaria had made no commitments of any kind and would not sell her political friendship with Germany for the mess of pottage represented by this loan.

In conclusion I promised the Minister to transmit his communications to the proper authorities.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 223

1895/426820-22

### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A No. 244

BUDAPEST, September 1, 1938.

Received September 2.

Pol. IV 5792.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Hungary's agreement with the Little Entente.

While the text of the communiqué on the preliminary agreements reached at Bled between Hungary and the states of the Little Entente might create the impression that "an agreement banning any use of armed force" had already been concluded between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Foreign Minister de Kánya had stated in the Minister President's well-known interview in the *Völkischer Beobachter*<sup>1</sup> that the entire agreement could enter into force only after complete accord had been reached also with reference to the

<sup>1</sup> Minister President Imrédy gave an interview to the press in Berlin on Aug. 26, 1938, during the visit of the Hungarian Ministers to Germany. His statement was published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of Aug. 27; extracts are printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. 1, pp. 274-275.

minorities declaration to be made by Czechoslovakia; moreover, Hungary's conduct would of course depend on the manner in which the obligations assumed in this minorities declaration were carried out. Minister President de Imrédy added that an agreement was reached with Yugoslavia and Rumania and that a declaration including the minorities provisions had also been formulated. But it had not yet been possible to put these two agreements into force because Rumania and Yugoslavia wished to await the Czech stand. So far, however, the Prague Government, on which the Hungarian Government for well-known reasons had to make considerably greater demands with reference to the treatment of the Hungarian minority there, had not yet given its consent to the Bled plan, for which reason it had not yet been possible to conclude any final agreement.

The Minister President and the Foreign Minister further made statements in Berlin for the Hungarian press. After very friendly words about the impressions gained in Germany they also discussed the Bled agreement. M. de Kánya emphasized that the Salonika agreement had nothing in common with the Bled agreement and that there was no connection between the two events, especially since the Hungarian negotiations with the Little Entente were of a much earlier date. Moreover, at Salonika they had merely recognized Bulgaria's military equality, but the minorities question had not been mentioned with one single word. During the entire time the Hungarian Government had taken the stand that military equality should not be subject to bargaining, since it had to be accepted as the natural right of any independent state.

In the qualified Bled agreement Rumania and Yugoslavia stated—although the declaration would not contain the word “minorities”—that their Governments would do everything possible to eliminate the difficulties which had so far prevented normalization of their relations with Hungary. The texts had been fully discussed by Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania and fixed in all particulars. *De facto* recognition of military equality was irrevocably assured, although the agreement did not yet have legal force. *Vis-à-vis* Czechoslovakia, Hungary had made much more far-reaching demands with reference to the declaration to be made in the interest of the Hungarian minorities, demands which Czechoslovakia had so far declared unacceptable. Nevertheless, M. de Kánya stated with all emphasis, Hungary would insist on her demands *vis-à-vis* Czechoslovakia under all circumstances. *Thus it followed that the nonaggression declaration depended on the reaching of an agreement concerning the declaration in the matter of minorities*; in general the full diplomatic instrument would enter into force only after the minorities declaration had been made by each state separately in the manner agreed upon or to be agreed upon.

Italian Foreign Minister Ciano sent the following telegram to Foreign Minister de Kánya on the occasion of the recognition of Hungarian military sovereignty at Bled:

"The Fascist Government, which has always proclaimed Hungarian equality, has with sincere satisfaction taken cognizance of the agreement recognizing Hungary's military sovereignty and opening the way to new and fruitful agreements. Please accept the assurance of my deep satisfaction and most cordial greetings of friendship."

Foreign Minister de Kánya's telegraphic reply reads as follows:

"I wish to express my sincere thanks for the cordial congratulations which you sent me on the occasion of the formal recognition of our military sovereignty. I take the liberty of expressing my sincere thanks to the Italian Government, which has always supported with all its might the realization of this, the inalienable right of every free people. Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration."

ERDMANNSDORFF

## No. 224

1895/426923-25

*An Official of the Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A No. 255

BUDAPEST, September 6, 1938.

Received September 10.

Pol. IV 5992.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Minister President de Imrédy on the result of the Bled negotiations.

With reference to reports A No. 244 of September 1 and A No. 254 of September 6.<sup>1</sup>

In his speech at Kaposvár,<sup>2</sup> Minister President de Imrédy again expressed himself at considerable length concerning the Bled results. He explained that the primary aim of the negotiations carried on with the states of the Little Entente for over a year had been to improve the conditions of the Hungarians living in the Succession States or at least to create the prerequisites for such improvement. The settlement of the fate of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia (Imrédy spoke only of the "neighboring state to the north") had now assumed a special actuality. Today the whole world realized that this neighboring state was not a national state but a multi-national

<sup>1</sup> Latter not printed (6639/E504521-26). A separate report was made on other aspects of the Imrédy speech, particularly land reform and a new military service law.

<sup>2</sup> On Sept. 4. Extracts are published in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 275-277.

state since the other nationalities exceeded the number of Czechs living there. Thus it followed that the legal position and the way of life of the nationalities living in Czechoslovakia required a special arrangement.

At Bled Hungary had primarily taken the stand that equality in armament matters was an inalienable right to which every state was entitled. Certain countries (the Little Entente), however, had not agreed with this obvious view. He therefore saw the "achievement" of the Bled negotiations in the fact that, according to the communiqué issued in Bled on the progress of the conference, the view that equality in armament matters was the inalienable right of every state had achieved recognition even in the circles of the Little Entente.

The Minister President further stated that in the course of the negotiations at Bled the three states of the Little Entente had expressed their readiness to issue a statement with reference to the diplomatic recognition of Hungary's equality in armament matters; parallel to this statement the three states as well as Hungary would repeat the clause contained in the Kellogg Pact to the effect that they would not resort to force against one another. The Hungarians, however, had made the signing of the latter statement dependent on declarations which were of great importance to the Hungarians living in the Succession States and which expressed the willingness to eliminate the disturbing conditions still existing (in the minorities field). However, no agreement had been reached on this score. For this reason the communiqué issued on the course of the Bled conference merely stated that if an accord was reached concerning a declaration satisfactory to Hungary, an understanding might also be achieved with reference to the whole range of questions under negotiation.

The Minister President further added that it was superfluous to emphasize that such agreements would have reality and be of value for the peaceful co-existence of the countries of the Danube basin only as long as the condition of the Hungarians living in the Succession States corresponded to the spirit which Hungary considered a prerequisite for making the above-mentioned declaration.

The above statements indicate that the Minister President, like the Hungarian Foreign Minister, has taken the stand that *de facto* recognition of military equality for Hungary has been assured irrevocably by the Bled negotiations even though the agreement has legally not yet entered into force. No press comments to the contrary have so far been published here from countries of the Little Entente.

The Minister President closed his remarks with the statement that Hungarian foreign policy would never disregard national interests and national dignity. The Hungarian stand at Bled had met with full understanding on the part of the countries friendly to Hungary. Count Ciano had congratulated the Foreign Minister by tele-

gram on the success achieved; a corresponding echo had been heard in the German papers as well as in the Polish press.

WERKMEISTER

No. 225

1213/332457

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 98 of September 24 BUDAPEST, September 24, 1938—9:40 p. m.

Received September 25—12:45 a. m.

Pol. IV 6451.

The Deputy Foreign Minister told me the following: Upon the advice of allied powers the Czech Minister stated that the mobilization which had taken place was not directed against Hungary.<sup>1</sup> Baron Apor, however, pointed out that the Czechs had stationed troops at the Czech frontier and paralyzed all railroad, telegraph, and telephone communications. The Czech Minister requested that he himself and the Legation personnel be removed to Italy via Yugoslavia if need be. The Hungarian Government let it be known in Belgrade that it already regarded the Bled Agreement as binding with reference to Yugoslavia, a statement which Stoyadinovich received with great satisfaction. At his suggestion the same statement was made in Bucharest. The Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister promised immediate transmission to the King.

ERDMANNSDORFF

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<sup>1</sup> Czechoslovakia ordered general mobilization on the evening of Sept. 23. Numerous other documents on Hungary's relations with the Little Entente and her role during the final phases of the Czech-German crisis are printed in vol. II, chs. VI and VII.

No. 226

8774/E041081-82

*The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

SOFIA, September 26, 1938.

A 535

With reference to your W 824 g of September 6, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

Whether German interests in Bulgaria are seriously prejudiced by the Franco-Bulgarian credit agreement for 375 million French francs

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3774/E041081-82). The Foreign Ministry had transmitted the following query from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces: "Is the recent credit agreement with French banks to be regarded as seriously detrimental to German interests, particularly with respect to the trade in military equipment?"

concluded in the summer of 1938 depends—particularly with respect to the trade in military equipment—mainly on whether Germany is prepared to supply Bulgaria with further substantial quantities of war matériel at reasonable prices and with acceptable delivery terms. An official inquiry to this effect from Bulgaria to the German Government may be expected possibly in October of this year.

There can be no doubt about the fact that the present Bulgarian Government has the desire to retain Germany as her principal supplier of war matériel. General Russev, the Chief of the Bulgarian Arms Office, who decides such questions together with the War Minister, repeatedly made this plain to the Military Attaché even after acceptance of the French loan. As recently as September 22, 1938, the War Minister told the Military Attaché: "We shall order very little in France."

Since General Russev enjoys the King's fullest confidence—according to a statement made by the latter to the Military Attaché on July 13, 1938—as far as we can judge here, it is certain that no serious injury to German interests need be feared.

If, however, the anticipated new German-Bulgarian negotiations develop unfavorably for Bulgaria, we must expect that the pro-German leaders will of necessity have to yield to the pressure of pro-French and pro-British circles, and that substantial quantities of war matériel will be ordered in other countries. Bulgaria could not in that event do otherwise, since she is firmly determined to bring her armament up to the planned level.

The German Legation is familiar with the documents setting forth Bulgaria's financial capacity, which were examined by a particularly trustworthy person. They indicate that Germany could without hesitation and on terms similar to those in the previous case grant a further credit of approximately 45 million reichsmarks—i. e., in addition to the credit of 80 million reichsmarks granted in the summer of 1938.

RÜMELIN

## No. 227

1945/435502-03

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

BUCHAREST, September 29, 1938—8:55 p. m.

Received September 29—10:55 p. m.

No. 198 of September 27 [*sic*]

Pol. IV 6767.

Today Court Marshal Flondor called on me, on instructions from Master of the Court Urdareanu,<sup>1</sup> to inform me of King Carol's desire

<sup>1</sup> Minister of the Royal Household and Chamberlain to the King.

to establish closer relations with Germany than hitherto. I replied that this would please me very much and that the King had already spoken to me previously of such an intention; but except for closer economic relations, which were a natural development, I had so far unfortunately not noticed any sign, beyond friendly words, that such a *rapprochement* was being made a reality. I would, however, be very glad to discuss this with M. Urdareanu, too.

The Court Marshal welcomed this and said that an invitation to an intimate meeting at his residence would be forthcoming.

He emphasized that the fear of a Russian invasion was very great and asked whether I could tell him "privately" what Germany was thinking with regard to such a contingency, and in particular whether German assistance might be rendered. I replied that in view of the attitude of the Rumanian Government to date, we had not yet given any thought to this question. It was Poland, above all, who was likely to be prepared to lend assistance against the Russians. But the Führer and Field Marshal Göring had always spoken of Rumania as a bulwark against Soviet Russia and I knew that the Foreign Minister thought the same. That we would be glad to strengthen this bulwark was certain; but there was nothing I could say about the "how."

In my opinion this *démarche* represents a preliminary feeler put out by the King to determine whether and to what extent we are prepared to assist Rumania against Soviet Russia. King Carol is becoming increasingly aware that assistance from France is becoming more and more remote and that good relations with Germany might also protect him against Hungarian revisionist claims. But he does not believe he can take a decisive step toward closer relations with Germany until we protect Rumania against Soviet Russia. He would not dare to join the Anti-Comintern Pact as yet, because he would be disinclined to disturb his relations with France and especially with England by too abrupt a *rapprochement* with Germany.

In concluding the conversation the Court Marshal mentioned the treatment of Germany in the Rumanian press and emphasized that the latter's attitude hitherto did not have the approval of the Government and did not reflect its views on Germany. However, measures had been taken to modify the attitude taken by the press up to now. I replied that I considered this an essential point in any *rapprochement*.<sup>2</sup>

FABRICIUS

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "Submitted to the State Secretary and Under State Secretary. The Foreign Minister wishes that this matter be followed up and that he be kept currently informed. Brücklmeier. Berlin, October 5, 1938."



## No. 228

1945/435507-10

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

URGENT  
No. 3380  
I A 4

BUCHAREST, September 30, 1938.  
Received October 1.  
Pol. IV 6859.

Subject: German-Rumanian relations.

With reference to my telegram No. 198 of September 28 [*sic*].<sup>1</sup>

How strongly the wish for a *rapprochement* of Rumania with Germany is being voiced among those close to the King, who mostly reflect his own views, is evident from the fact that tomorrow I am to meet one of the most trusted attendants of the King, Chief Master of the Hunt Mocsonyi, at the residence of M. Savu, Minister of Finance in the Goga Cabinet, at a luncheon in an intimate circle. M. Savu indicated the purpose of the meeting as mentioned. But elsewhere, too, there seems to be a growing conviction in many quarters that Rumania must find her place at the side of Germany. In this connection it is worth noting the formula that Rumania, in order to survive in her present form, must maintain relations with Germany at least as good as those maintained with Germany by Hungary. In authoritative circles the declarations made by the Führer and Chancellor to M. George Bratianu and the article of Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the *Völkischer Beobachter* are once more being brought up, and the fact that Germany has no interest in a modification of boundaries in Southeastern Europe is believed to constitute a reassurance that Hungary's revisionist demands for Rumanian territory are not being supported.<sup>2</sup>

The *rapprochement* with Germany, for which a desire had already been voiced prior to yesterday's conference at Munich, will now be rendered all the easier for Rumania and her King, since it is assumed that the Reich has entered into friendlier relations with England and France. I have previously pointed out, on my visit to Berlin, that good relations with France and especially with England would make it much easier for the King of Rumania to bring about the friendship with Germany he has always desired.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 227.

<sup>2</sup> In an interview which Hitler gave Bratianu in Berlin on Nov. 16, 1938 (1938/433589-94) he told the Rumanian leader that Hungarian revisionism need not be taken too seriously, that it mainly served domestic political purposes, and that the real danger to Rumania and the peace of Europe was Bolshevism. "If, however, Rumania became an outpost of European order, there would be no state more interested in its preservation than Germany. I am prepared to say this in Budapest, as I have already said it to Horthy." He referred Bratianu to Rosenberg's article on this subject. The article, published on Nov. 15, 1938, stated that Hungarian revisionist demands were of no concern to Germany.

There still remains Rumania's fear of Soviet Russia. Remarks which the King is said to have made to his aides, but which cannot possibly be confirmed, are being circulated; he is supposed to have said that he would rather see the Germans as enemies than the Russians as friends in his country. But the overture made to me by M. Flondor, his Court Marshal (cf. the telegram referred to above), shows again that the King is aware of the Soviet Russian danger and is hoping for support from us if threatened by the Russians because of his *rapprochement* with Germany.

In what, then, could such aid consist? A guarantee of her boundaries by Germany is probably out of the question, for we would hardly let our troops shed their blood on the Dniester, and such a guarantee would naturally not be interpreted by Hungary and Bulgaria as exactly a friendly act. But we can—and that fits into our present program—aid Rumania to a considerable extent in her re-armament, possibly to an extent far greater than hitherto, by furnishing her planes and antiaircraft artillery, and by supplies and equipment for her armament industry. Substantial credit facilities to that end might perhaps also be given consideration. We might also promise military assistance to the King personally, particularly the dispatch of air squadrons—camouflaged, if necessary—in the event of an invasion by Soviet Russia.

Besides, the moment seems now to have arrived for aiding Rumania to find a market for her crops by carrying out the project of the Reich Grain Agency [*Reichsgetreidestelle*] to purchase 400,000 to 500,000 tons of wheat. Since the Anglo-Rumanian negotiations on the purchase of wheat have led to no practical result—the treaty in question has remained a scrap of paper—we would thereby afford *great* relief to the Rumanian economy and, as I would like to put it, render it a “friendly service.” Thereby Germany would again become Rumania's debtor and Rumania would have a new incentive for placing orders with us. The transaction involving enlargement and operation of the aircraft plant in Kronstadt by the Junkers firm, which I discussed at Nuremberg with State Secretary von Weizsäcker and State Secretary Körner, could be combined with these orders, and a quantity of petroleum could also undoubtedly be obtained.

In brief, there are so many favorable possibilities that I should like to suggest that everything possible be done now in order, at long last, to take a step in the direction of mutual *rapprochement*.

FABRICIUS

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[EDITORS' NOTE. On October 3, 1938, Hungary presented a note to Czechoslovakia demanding that negotiations concerning cession of

territory and other Hungarian demands should begin on October 6. The Hungarian claims on Czechoslovakia were ultimately arbitrated by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers at Vienna on November 2. Documents concerning these developments are published in volume IV (chapter I) of this series.]

## No. 229

2162/470191-92

*The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

No. 117 of October 4

BELGRADE, October 4, 1938—8:30 p. m.

Received October 5—12:20 a. m.

The Minister President, whom I thanked today for the cordial hospitality that Yugoslavia had shown to Reich Minister Funk,<sup>2</sup> brought up the subject of the general political situation and particularly the impending Hungarian-Czech showdown.

Stoyadinovich expressed to me his constant and boundless admiration<sup>3</sup> for the policy of the Führer, who had succeeded by peaceful means in the space of half a year in enlarging the Reich by nearly 10 million inhabitants. He rejoiced at this German success all the more since the political developments of the past weeks represented a distinct justification of his foreign trade policy<sup>4</sup> and thus a strengthening of his position at home. A very favorable atmosphere had now been created for the coming elections.

From the lengthy conversation on the Hungarian problem which followed I obtained the following impression of the views entertained here:

Yugoslavia showed full understanding from the beginning for Germany's claims to the Sudeten-German territory and did not consider Yugoslavia's interests threatened thereby. It is another matter as far as Hungary's claims to Czechoslovak territory are concerned. So far as they are limited to cession of Magyar border regions, and thus remain within the framework of the German demands, Yugoslavia would reconcile herself to them. An extension of Hungarian claims to non-Magyar territories of Czechoslovakia would, however, for obvious reasons cause great uneasiness here, even if for the time

<sup>1</sup>The document is printed here as deciphered and circulated in the Foreign Ministry, but this version differs in some particulars from the final draft in the files of the Legation in Belgrade (7887/E570903-904).

<sup>2</sup>The Minister of Economics arrived in Belgrade on Sept. 30 for a visit of several days before proceeding to Turkey and Bulgaria. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1938*, vol. I, pp. 50-51.

<sup>3</sup>The Belgrade text reads: "S. then expressed to me his boundless admiration".

<sup>4</sup>The Belgrade text reads simply: "foreign policy".

being the demands were confined only to the holding of a plebiscite. The *démarche* applies<sup>5</sup> first of all to Hungarian claims to Slovak territory, somewhat less to the Carpatho-Ukraine. Thus Hungary's claims which are regarded here as a menace to Yugoslavia are those which cannot be justified on racial grounds, but at best on historical grounds.

It would, moreover, do much to calm Yugoslavia if Hungary's Bled Agreement with Yugoslavia and Rumania were now formally put into effect and published, and if Hungary would then in a unilateral declaration recognize the definitive natural Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier.<sup>6</sup>

HEEREN

<sup>5</sup> The Belgrade text reads: "This applies".

<sup>6</sup> The Belgrade text reads: "The definitive nature of the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier".

## No. 230

383/210846

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 203 of October 6

BUCHAREST, October 6, 1938—7:40 p. m.

Received October 6—11:30 p. m.

Foreign Minister Comnen urgently requested me to call on him and informed me that Rumania was seriously worried because Hungary not only had aspirations to obtain areas in Czechoslovakia inhabited by Hungarians but also wanted to incorporate Slovaks and Ruthenians. A Slovak delegate had called on the Rumanian Minister in Prague and complained that Hungary was inciting agitation to this effect among the Slovaks. The Slovaks, who would be fully satisfied with autonomy within Czechoslovakia, had requested Rumanian aid in the form of the symbolic occupation of a few localities, if necessary. Even if such occupation was completely out of the question, Rumania was nevertheless *very much* interested in not being completely cut off from Czechoslovakia; as a matter of fact a proposal was under consideration to exchange certain Hungarian settlers for Slovaks in order to be able to preserve for Czechoslovakia the only Czech-Rumanian rail connection. Comnen asked me whether I knew the German Government's stand in this matter.

I told the Foreign Minister that we fully supported the Hungarian wishes as far as they applied to the return of Hungarian minorities from Czechoslovakia, but that I knew nothing of support for Hungarian plans of further scope. Whether or not the Slovaks and Ruthenians were granted the right of self-determination was not Germany's affair; as far as I knew no agreement on this point had

been made at Munich. I was not informed as to whether the German Government would wish at all to make to the Rumanian Government the statement requested by Comnen in this matter, but I would not fail to inform my Government of the Rumanian Government's concern.<sup>1</sup> As for the direct rail connection and the resettlement, I did not believe that we could bring this question up for discussion at all; it did not concern us. Comnen further remarked that he had made similar approaches to the representatives of the other Great Powers and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia took the same stand as Rumania.

In conclusion Comnen called attention to the DNB telegram according to which Rumania agreed to the incorporation of Slovaks into Hungary. This report was false.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup> On Oct. 8 Weizsäcker recorded in a memorandum (2134/487168-69) that the Rumanian Minister in Berlin had been instructed to appeal for German support against Hungarian territorial acquisitions in Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine. Weizsäcker replied provisionally that he assumed the principle of self-determination would apply in those areas.

## No. 231

1945/435511-14

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 3440

I A 4

BUCHAREST, October 7, 1938.

Received October 10.

Pol. IV 7199.

Subject: German-Rumanian relations.

With reference to my report No. 3380 of September 30.

In the course of the conversation which I had with M. Mocsonyi, the Chief Master of the Hunt, concerning German-Rumanian relations he underscored that the King was very desirous of an early development of these relations. He asked me how I envisaged this. I replied that in the main it was probably up to the Rumanians to make practical proposals. However, I could tell him even now that the necessary condition for this was first of all a better press which did not carry on incendiary Jewish propaganda but demonstrated a desire to cultivate German-Rumanian relations and to understand the New Germany. I was thinking further of visits to Germany by leading Rumanian statesmen and, in that case, return visits by Germans to Rumania. After all, every statesman here was in rather close contact with the statesmen of France, England, and to some extent also of Italy, while the same could not be said of the relations of Rumanian statesmen with the leading men in Germany. At the same time I

was able to state, however, that the few persons who had gone to Germany from here and established contact had returned from there full of enthusiasm; I needed only to mention Labor Minister Ralea who, as a sworn democrat, had at first certainly regarded German achievements critically. M. Mocsonyi admitted this and told me that the King had already expressed regret that of those invited to the Party Rally only former Finance Minister Gigurtu had been able to accept. It was certain, however, that the King would greatly welcome such visits. We discussed the continuation of visits by artists, scientists, etc., and finally spoke about the development of economic relations. With the assistance of former Finance Minister Savu, who was a member of Goga's cabinet and in whose home the conversation took place, I pointed out how wrong it was for Rumanian economic policy to try again and again to assume every other orientation except that toward Germany. Thus the orientation of this policy toward England had resulted in a drop in the price of wheat and Rumania had nevertheless been left with this year's enormous wheat crop on her hands. Only a controlled economy like the German could buy the expensive wheat, since it was easier for Germany, who had trade relations with Rumania, to overcome the price problem than for a British firm which might perhaps purchase a single shipment of wheat with the aid of a government subsidy. For such a firm had to think of the sales possibility and simply could not ignore the world market situation. M. Mocsonyi realized this and said that he would speak once more with King Carol in this vein. I told him especially of our willingness to give assistance to Rumania in the field of armament industry and of Rumanian armament in general.

I have learned confidentially that the Council of Ministers held a meeting 4 days ago with the King presiding and discussed the expansion of economic relations with Germany. The King, to be sure, expressed the opinion that our wishes had already been complied with to a great extent. Following a report by M. Malaxa, who had been asked to attend the Council of Ministers, he stated, however, that considerably more must be done in this direction. In particular M. Malaxa has been authorized to communicate with the Junkers firm about the expansion of the I. A. R., the airplane factory at Kronstadt. I shall revert to this in another connection.

Further, Foreign Minister Comnen told me that he had reported to the King on the question of developing German-Rumanian relations. The King had very strongly advocated a change in the present Rumanian foreign policy. I did not reply to Comnen's statement, since this information appeared strange to me, coming from a man who had stated only a few weeks earlier in Geneva: "We feel closer to France than ever before." M. Comnen then continued, emphasizing

that the King did not approve of the method employed by the present Minister of Economics, M. Constantinescu, who had not shown sufficient understanding for German wishes, and would instruct him to place no further obstacles in the way of expanding economic relations with Germany.

We must utilize this situation, even though a certain restraint is advisable lest any excessive zeal on our part in the pursuit of our objectives be misinterpreted.

FABRICIUS

## No. 232

2479/517667-68

### *The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 2696 Po 2

BELGRADE, October 7, 1938.

Received October 10.

Pol. IV 7202.

Subject: Effect of the development and outcome of the Czech national crisis on the attitude of the Yugoslav population toward Germany.

The Yugoslav population today is dominated entirely by the impression of the preponderance of power of the Berlin-Rome Axis over the so-called Western democracies, which has become apparent in the past few weeks in a really dramatic fashion. All circles realize that in the future there can be no other policy for Yugoslavia, as a neighbor of the two Great Powers of this Axis, than one which carefully avoids any conflict with these Powers. This feeling of definite inferiority in power—especially with regard to Germany—which is now becoming generally prevalent manifests itself for the moment, understandably, in a certain panicky fear of these powerful neighbors, and further increases the sympathy—strengthened in the course of the German-Czech conflict—for the Czech “sister nation” which has been delivered up to the mercy of the German colossus.

Thus it would be wrong to ignore the fact that at the present time there has been a reversal in the attitude of the Yugoslav population toward Germany. If this makes itself felt at all in Government policy, it will only be to the small extent to which public opinion must be taken into account. Nevertheless, it will take some time to regain the ground which has been lost. The sooner there is the conviction here that Germany will not misuse her position of power either against the Czech people or especially against the Yugoslav people, the sooner can this reversal in the attitude of the Yugoslav people be overcome.

HEEREN

## No. 233

2129/464612-15

*The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

II D 4 (S. A.)

ATHENS, October 8, 1938.

Pol. IV 7307.

## POLITICAL REPORT

The Greek attitude during the Sudeten conflict.

The attitude Greece will take in the event of a conflict between the Great Powers is already mapped out. As Minister President Metaxas explained to me during an exhaustive conversation after my return from Nuremberg, the Government will try to remain neutral as long as possible. However, it would be no more possible for Greece to remain neutral now than it was during the World War. On the contrary, while in the great war the Entente did not succeed until 1916 [*sic*] in forcing Greece to enter the war on the side of our opponents, the Metaxas Cabinet, as well as the Greek people, realized in the recent crisis that in a new war Greece would be forced to take sides much sooner. Even the policy of an *entente* with Turkey, assiduously pursued in recent years by the Metaxas Government in the interest of coordinating the foreign policies of the states bordering on the eastern Mediterranean, must prejudice the attitude of the Greek Government, which is certainly not anti-German in its outlook. Any taking of sides would, however, have meant the fall of the authoritarian regime. A declaration for Germany on the part of the Government—though highly improbable—would presumably have been balked by the King and would have led to revolution. But even if the Metaxas Government, obedient to political pressure from without and within, had taken sides with England, the Venizelists would nevertheless soon have taken over the reins of government. In conversation with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Mavroudis, the latter indeed frankly admitted to me that the intransigent Venizelist groups had practically desired a military clash.

In this difficult situation the Government kept its composure even in the critical days. Plans for mobilization of the Greek Army had been made, to be sure, but were to be carried out only if Bulgaria mobilized. This restraint was to be explained by the desire that Bulgaria remain neutral, which also found expression in the strange request that Germany influence King Boris accordingly (see telegram No. 73 of September 24).<sup>2</sup> Shortly before the peak of the crisis, the Navy had held maneuvers in the waters of Corfu and Argostoli, but on September 28 was already on the way back. The Minister of

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6641/E504549).



the Navy expressly assured me that he had not "seen" a single foreign naval vessel in Greek waters during this maneuver, in which he participated in the retinue of the King. This does not, however, take cognizance of the fact that some British naval vessels, as I was told in various quarters, were lying at anchor at the western entrance to the Canal of Corinth and at Navarino. I shall make a separate report on further military measures by the Greek Government and on the question whether Greece has in recent weeks made any commitments of a military nature with England.

If the attitude of the Government in the main confirmed the expectations of the sober observer, the attitude of the Greek public in the recent crisis is plainly disappointing. The group that molds public opinion in Greece did not even wait until it became a political necessity to take sides, but openly announced its sympathies for the Western powers even before the decision. The pro-German attitude displayed by many during good times has not in the past weeks stood up under the test.

It was particularly regrettable that the Greek newspapers, above all the *Messenger d'Athènes*, which appears in the French language and is subsidized by the Government, gave much more space to news from London and Paris than from Berlin, and in many cases, through their headlines, pictured the political situation in a light that by no means did justice to the facts. This situation was not sufficiently made up for by occasional newspaper editorials which were so objective as to be meaningless. I expressed to the proper authorities our astonishment at this attitude of the press, with the result that the Chief of the Press in the Press Ministry went to great lengths to try to justify it. It became evident that the censorship had tried to moderate the tendency which was finding expression in the press by forbidding the newspapers, to a large extent, to print anti-German statements such as Churchill's, for instance. Unfortunately I cannot ignore the further argument, i. e., that the transmission of news from Germany to the *Agence d'Athènes* had encountered technical difficulties precisely at the time of the crisis. I shall make a separate report on this point as well as on the necessity for bringing the Greek newspapers into closer contact with Germany. The apologies of the Press Ministry cannot eradicate the general impression that the Greek press has in general not done justice to the German viewpoint.

The attitude of the people, at least in the capital, corresponded in the main to that of the newspapers. This is not strange insofar as the predominantly Venizelist group is concerned; it considers the Third Reich a power seeking to interfere with its undisturbed enjoyment of wealth acquired by inheritance or through somewhat elastic mercantile practices. Even the broad masses of the population in the large

cities, however, which are in general sympathetic to Germany and the Third Reich, in the recent crisis showed little understanding for the German view.

The workers and the middle class at first had no sympathy at all for Czechoslovakia and may even have regarded the return of Sudeten Germany to the Reich as a justified demand. But this friendly attitude underwent a radical change the moment that realization of the German demands brought within the realm of possibility the involvement of Greece in an armed conflict.

Immediately after publication of the results of the Munich conference, a further change in sentiment became noticeable. Aside from the fact that our fair-weather friends now suddenly reappeared, an attitude developed, especially in the circles of the intelligentsia, that might be termed "*esprit de corps* of the small countries" vis-à-vis the Great Powers.

The Greek Government is not subject to such sentimentalities. In a conversation with me State Secretary Mavroudis openly admitted the impotence to which the League of Nations, where Greece today occupies a Council seat, is consigned. The Metaxas Government sees its salvation rather in a collaboration of the European Great Powers and from this standpoint welcomed with sincere joy and satisfaction the happy solution of the European crisis through the Munich Agreement.

PRINZ ZU ERBACH

## No. 234

2448/515160-64

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 3584

BUCHAREST, October 15, 1938.

V 4

Received October 18.

W III 7870.

Subject: German-Rumanian economic relations.

As early as his return from Geneva, about September 10, Minister of Economics Mititza Constantinescu told his bank directors in the National Bank that he now recognized clearly that the economic relations which he had intended to establish with England could not be realized as planned; rather, Rumanian economic policy would now have to be completely oriented toward Germany. Former Minister President Tatarescu spoke in the same vein.

If these two men still hoped that England would buy 400,000 tons of wheat and Lord Lloyd<sup>1</sup> would come here with a package of big offers

<sup>1</sup> George Ambrose Lloyd, 1st Baron Lloyd of Dolobran, High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, 1925-29.

and possibly aid in the form of credit such as he had brought to Turkey, they have now become convinced that the free economy of England, unlike Germany's controlled economy, is quite unable to buy the wheat, and that on the other hand, although Lord Lloyd came here with a friendly aspect and declared that he was prepared to study the possibilities for British investments, he brought with him nothing whatever of a positive nature. Lord Lloyd, who was the guest for several days of Princess Martha Bibescu in Posada (Carpathia), where I also met him at a private luncheon, had only a short conversation with Minister of Economics M. Constantinescu and left again after a celebration at the Anglo-Rumanian Cultural Institute and the usual dinners. I have heard from Rumanian friends who were his special attendants during his stay in Bucharest that he actually achieved nothing. His 4-day stay here was described as "an information trip."

And so Mititza Constantinescu is now left for the time being with the wheat on his hands and must find some way of getting rid of the enormous stocks. He has had to increase the export premium to 13,000 lei, and it will hardly be possible to maintain the present prices.

When I spoke to the Minister of Economics last spring, I pointed out to him the danger of his economic policy. I should like to refer to my reports dealing therewith. At that time Germany still needed a great deal of wheat. I had emphasized that if Rumania did not make the desired quotas available to Germany in time, Germany would have to look to other countries supplying raw materials, and if her own harvest of bread grains should turn out to be good—which could not be foreseen at that time—she would have to get along more or less without the Rumanian wheat. I could not regard the experiment with England as very promising.

At the end of August, when the situation that I had indicated to Constantinescu began to become clearly evident, I discussed the question in detail with Foreign Minister Comnen. At that time we were already in the midst of the Sudeten German crisis and had a strong interest in becoming indebted to Rumania in order to bind her to us more strongly once more. In agreement with the President of the Reich Grain Agency, Herr Dassler, I then called the Foreign Minister's attention to the possibility that was still open to us of buying Rumanian wheat in considerable quantities in order to help Rumania out of her difficulty. I had said, however, that it was out of the question for us to make an offer so long as M. Mititza Constantinescu continued his British policy; we did not wish to disturb it, but would wait until this game was played out. Any purchase of grain in Rumania that Germany might make resulted not from our need of

wheat, but simply from a desire to help our good customer Rumania. The Foreign Minister found these statements very worthy of consideration and reported them to the King.

As the Foreign Ministry knows from my other reports, I had at that time advised caution in German offers to make purchases in Rumania, because purchases at that time could only have tended to encourage the British transaction.

After my return from the Party Rally in Nuremberg where I had taken the opportunity to talk about the question with State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker and Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, as well as with State Secretary Körner, in connection with the proposed large Rumanian orders in the field of the armaments industry (Malaxa), I broached the question here again. In so doing I emphasized that naturally not only wheat but also additional petroleum would come under consideration in return for our huge deliveries. I spoke about this only incidentally with M. Comnen, but at great length with the former Minister of Economics, our friend Manolescu-Strunga, without making any positive offers or naming any figures.

Today M. Comnen returned to the matter at the request of Mititza Constantinescu, and told me that the Government was prepared to let us have very large quantities of wheat. (Manolescu-Strunga, I am told, had a serious controversy with M. Constantinescu regarding the latter's economic policy, in which he reproached him for not having followed the German line sufficiently.) I replied to M. Comnen somewhat evasively, because I do not know whether the relations developing with Czechia have created a new situation for the Reich in the question of grain imports.

It seems to me, however, that it is still in our interest to make rather extensive purchases of wheat and petroleum here, because through the German debt to Rumania arising therefrom we shall force the Rumanians to place more orders than ever in Germany—which they seriously intend to do, as I have reported in another connection. I regard the present moment as especially appropriate and believe that favorable prospects are opening up for the forthcoming negotiations of the governmental committees, which, as you know, are to begin on October 26 in Bucharest.

Since Foreign Minister Comnen asked me to get in touch with the Minister of Economics, I shall do so in order to find out what his intentions are. I should like to request provisional telegraphic instructions as soon as possible, stating whether there is any possibility of meeting the Rumanian wishes.

FABRICIUS

## No. 235

1945/435515

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 251

BERLIN, October 17, 1938—10:30 p. m.  
zu Pol. IV 6859,<sup>1</sup> 7199.<sup>2</sup>

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Heinburg.

With reference to your report No. 3440 of October 7.

We are prepared to take an accommodating attitude toward the Rumanian wish for an early development of German-Rumanian relations. Since, however, the Rumanian wishes relate not only to expansion of economic relations, which we should welcome, but also to political questions, it is for the Rumanians to tell us how they conceive the development of relations desired by them. Therefore please indicate this in further discussions as you have already done to Mocsonyi. We have received strictly confidential information that the Rumanian Government is also striving for a *rapprochement* with Italy.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 228.<sup>2</sup> Document No. 231.

## No. 236

2104/455859

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 215 of October 19

BUCHAREST, October 19, 1938—2:40 p. m.  
Received October 19—4:30 p. m.

With reference to my report No. 3534 of October 15.

In yesterday's conversation with Minister of Economics Constantinescu I found a fundamental change in his attitude toward Germany. To be sure, he stated that he intended to continue with his plan of intensifying economic relations with England, and remarked that on October 1 Rumania had for the first time been unable to pay the British coupon, owing to the lack of foreign exchange; this had now led to the arrangement for the purchase of Rumanian wheat by Eng-

land. On the other hand, however, he is no longer putting any difficulties in our way with regard to the expansion of our economic relations. He will be grateful if we purchase large amounts of wheat and he also intends to give us petroleum if Germany declares that she is willing to collaborate on a large scale in Rumanian rearmament.

I promised the latter in principle; we had already shown this through the delivery of antiaircraft guns and through the opening of the Malaxa negotiations by Junkers.

I took leave of the Minister of Economics with the remark that in this atmosphere the forthcoming negotiations of the governmental committees could be expected to proceed favorably, and he promised to help toward that end.

FABRICIUS

### No. 237

1945/435529

#### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

##### Telegram

No. 220 of October 22

BUCHAREST, October 22, 1938—7:15 p. m.

Received October 23—2:00 a. m.

Pol. IV 7616.

Foreign Minister Comnen asked me to call on him and informed me, with the request for *strictly confidential treatment for the time being*, that in connection with his visit to London, planned for November 15 to 18, King Carol intended to visit Prince Frederick of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen at his castle. The King wished on this occasion to meet leading German personalities. Further particulars would be given me after the King's return from maneuvers.

In reply to my question whether this suggestion had any connection with my recent conversation with Mocsonyi, the Foreign Minister said he assumed that it had. The King wished to orient his policy toward Germany. I replied that the Reich Government would doubtless welcome this. It was for Rumania to tell us how she conceived of this political *rapprochement* (cf. telegraphic instruction No. 251 of October 17).

The Foreign Minister said that his reason for requesting confidential treatment was to avoid a press campaign which might possibly result.

FABRICIUS

## No. 238

1945/435530

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 260

BERLIN, October 27, 1938—9:15 p. m.  
zu Pol. IV 7616.<sup>1</sup>

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Heinburg.

With reference to your telegram No. 220.<sup>1</sup>If you should be approached again on the question of King Carol's trip to Germany, please say that his visit would be welcome.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 237.<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "This morning a telephone message was received from Rome stating that the Foreign Minister approves the telegram. (Communication from Attaché Bruns.) The Legation in Bucharest has been informed by telephone that it may make use of the instruction. He[inburg], Oct. 29."

Ribbentrop was in Rome at this date. See vol. IV, document No. 400.

## No. 239

1945/435547-50

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

VERY URGENT

BUCHAREST, October 28, 1938.

No. 3697

Received October 29.

I A 4

Pol. IV 7824.

Subject: George Bratianu.

The political personality, George Bratianu, who is known in Berlin, is going to Germany on Sunday, October 30, or Monday, October 31, with his friend, Ata Constantinescu. M. Bratianu indicated to me that the purpose of his visit, which has been approved by King Carol, was as follows:

1. He wished to ascertain whether in spite of the change in the political situation in Central Europe the attitude of German foreign policy on the question of Hungary and the frontiers in the Southeast has remained the same as it was explained to him sometime ago, by the Führer and Chancellor.<sup>1</sup>

When I replied that there had been no change in the view of authoritative circles on this question, he answered that he believed this was true, but his political friends were extremely anxious to obtain confirmation once more, since sources inimical to us were constantly asserting the contrary.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 228, footnote 2.

2. As a friend of Germany he wished to call attention again to the importance of maintaining the corridor separating Poland and Hungary, which guaranteed a more secure connection between Germany and Rumania via Czechoslovakia than if Poland and Hungary had a common frontier and thus the possibility of cutting us off. He was going with the approval of Rumanian Foreign Minister Comnen, who had already told me about the plan for George Bratianu's trip some days ago.

M. Bratianu expressed a desire to speak to Field Marshal Göring again and to meet Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, whom he does not yet know personally. He also wished to be introduced to State Secretary von Weizsäcker. He will be accompanied by his political friend Ata Constantinescu. M. Bratianu will stay at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin and may also be reached at any time through the Rumanian Legation.

George Bratianu is of the opinion, which by the way he has always held, that Rumanian foreign policy must be oriented more strongly toward Germany. As a result of this attitude he was at one time strongly inclined toward Codreanu and the Iron Guard, but states that he turned away from the latter when he noticed that all the dissatisfied elements of Rumania were gathered there. He had come to recognize that the policy of the Guard—probably against the desire of its leader—would inevitably lead to disaster. For that reason he had turned to the Liberal Party—more specifically, the wing led by his uncle, Dinu Bratianu, although the latter had not wanted to hear anything of a pro-German policy. This wing had broken completely with Tatarescu, since Tatarescu was held responsible for the confiscation of the party's property. As a result of the events of the last few weeks and under his (George's) influence, Dinu Bratianu had now come to realize that his previous attitude of "everything with France" had been wrong. It was the bitter disillusionment over the fact that France had got Czechoslovakia into a difficult position and then left her in the lurch. "The same might happen to Rumania," the old friend of France had said, "whereas, after all, before the war Rumania had obtained everything from Germany and had fared well in so doing; this would now have to be the case again."

This change in Dinu Bratianu signifies a great deal; it frees the King from the opposition in the main camp, which hitherto favored France exclusively.

At the same time the old Peasant party leader, Maniu, has also reversed his position. In a memorandum which he submitted to the King jointly with Dinu Bratianu he, too, demanded an alignment with Berlin. This memorandum points out to the King that he has so far



been unable to guide domestic policy. It states that in a country such as Germany, in which there is a dictatorship, there is, after all, a bond between the people and the Government, that, in fact, the Government is supported by the unified will of the entire people, whereas the authoritarian regime in Rumania is alien to the people. Attention is therefore directed to the necessity of getting the backing of the people again.

Maniu was now supporting this standpoint very vigorously and had therefore dropped all his former objections to National Socialism as "anti-democratic," and was now advocating collaboration with Germany.

I believe that it will be advisable to receive George Bratianu again as was done previously.

FABRICIUS

## No. 240

2183/471946

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 3, 1938.

Pol. IV 7990.

Ap[ro]pos of the territorial changes in Czechoslovakia the Bulgarian Minister today recounted to me the well-known Bulgarian aspirations in the Dobruja, vis-à-vis Greece and also vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. I interrupted to ask what had now been discussed in Nish,<sup>1</sup> whereupon the Minister said that in view of his present domestic situation Stoyadinovich was probably not in a position to make territorial concessions of even a trivial nature to Bulgaria. With respect to Serbia, moreover, Bulgaria was, with very slight exceptions, intent only upon receiving adequate protection for her minorities.

The Minister then went on to discuss the question when the hour would probably strike for Bulgarian revisionist claims. When I remarked that I thought the season for war was over at the moment, he replied that Bulgaria was not pressing and fully understood the Great Powers' need for peace. Despite the contagious effects of the Czechoslovak incident, she did not intend to force her revisionist claims and was discussing them only with her friends, not her enemies. As was to be expected, he mentioned the Rumanians first among the latter.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> The Bulgarian and Yugoslav Minister Presidents met there on Oct. 31. The communiqué issued by Kiosselvanov and Stoyadinovich on their meeting is published in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, p. 297.

## No. 241

2134/466966

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 3, 1938.

The Bulgarian Minister spoke to me today about the new Bulgarian credit wishes, with which we are familiar. He asked for the support of the Foreign Ministry, since matters of armament were involved in which we, too, could take a certain political interest.

I told the Minister that we did not possess unlimited wealth either and had to take care that our credits were repaid. Loans such as the most recent French one which Sofia had accepted would probably make repayment to us difficult. In any case, the Minister should submit substantiating data if he wished to take up actual negotiations regarding the loan.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 242

1945/435552

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 4, 1938.

Pol. IV 8268.

George Bratianu called on me today for a long political conversation. He was chiefly interested in what attitude Hungary would now take toward Rumania after the success on her northern frontier and what support she would receive from Germany and Italy if the occasion for it should arise. I replied to M. Bratianu that Germany would not encourage Hungary in any revisionism by force vis-à-vis Rumania. Bratianu then described to what extent the Rumanian frontiers failed to represent the most favorable to which Rumania could legitimately aspire. Rather, with regard to minorities conditions Rumania was in a state of equilibrium with her neighbors. Therefore any foreign revisionism could at the most be satisfied through an exchange of populations.

After briefly touching on the future treatment of the Jews in Rumania, the Rumanian press policy, the anti-Russian attitude of the Government and especially of the King, Bratianu then asked that an audience be arranged for him with the Foreign Minister. Naturally he would also like to be received by the Führer again, as in 1936. He reinforced this request with the remark that his trip was being made with the knowledge of the King, who for his part also hoped to be in Germany in the not-too-distant future.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 243

169/82472/2-73

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania*Draft Telegram<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, November 5, 1938.

[zu] Pol. I g 2536, 2560.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 225 and 228.<sup>2</sup>

Please inform the Court Minister that the Führer and Chancellor will be happy to receive King Carol on the occasion of his visit to Germany. The exact date of this reception and preparations for receptions by other leading personalities can be arranged only after we have the King's exact itinerary. Therefore please transmit this to us immediately.

With regard to the ambassador question, I wish to remark for your information that we do not intend to consider this question for the time being, both because of political considerations and because of the effects that such a measure would doubtless produce among other powers.<sup>3</sup> However, in order to avoid ill feeling before the King's visit, please do not discuss the ambassador question again unless you are approached on it. If the Rumanians should revert to it, you are to state that on account of the reaction in other countries the problem raises a whole series of questions which would first have to be carefully examined, and for that reason the time is not yet ripe for a decision on the problem.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> This draft telegram was not sent. Presumably the invitation to King Carol to visit Hitler was conveyed by other means. For the record of their interview see document No. 254.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (33/25545 and 33/25546). The first telegram reported soundings made by King Carol through Prince Frederick of Hohenzollern as to whether Carol could see Göring and Hitler when he visited the Prince in Germany, and as to whether Germany would consider raising her Legation in Bucharest to an Embassy. In the second telegram Fabricius reported that the latter proposal had been made officially to him. The Court Minister, Urdareanu, had said that if the step could be taken before the King went to London on Nov. 12, it "would document the new line of Rumanian policy."

<sup>3</sup> The words "for example Yugoslavia" were stricken from the draft at this point.

## No. 244

438/220999-1001

*Minister Erdmannsdorff to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

BUDAPEST, November 7, 1938.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: Enclosed I send you for your information copies of two letters from former Minister President de

Darányi to the Führer and to the Foreign Minister.<sup>1</sup> I have sent the originals with a report to the Foreign Ministry with the request that they be forwarded.

M. de Darányi told me that he had first shown Minister President de Imrédy the letter to the Führer. In it he mentions that the Hungarian people and the Government were in agreement in desiring to develop more concretely the friendly relations between Germany and Hungary within the framework of Axis policy. This would be accomplished by the realization of the ideas which had developed on the occasion of his visit in Munich. With this he alluded to the fact that—as is known to you—when he was received by the Führer, he promised the early withdrawal of Hungary from the League of Nations, adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact and a documentary commitment to a close union between Hungarian foreign policy and that of the Berlin-Rome Axis. At the time the Führer had himself advised deferring these things until an understanding should be reached between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Upon my return from Vienna I reminded Count Csáky of the matter, in accordance with verbal instructions from the Foreign Minister. I do not doubt that these promises will be put into effect within the next few weeks.

For the time being, at any rate, the legislative work which has become necessary incident to the return of Upper Hungary must first be completed. It is expected that Imrédy will thereafter pursue an authoritarian course with a rather large reduction of the sphere of parliamentary action. Darányi told me that M. de Kánya's further retention was, of course, out of the question after the strong criticism which the Führer had leveled against him in this connection in Munich. As successor to Kánya, who would, however, probably not leave until January, the Minister in Bucharest, Bardossy, and Count Csáky were being considered. The latter had the best chances. Other changes in the Cabinet have also been under consideration. The names mentioned to me as ministerial candidates will be of little interest to you. They mean a further rejuvenation of the Cabinet and presumably a stronger leaning to the right.

With cordial regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

ERDMANNSDORFF

[Enclosure]

BUDAPEST, November 3, 1938.

MY DEAR FÜHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR, EXCELLENCY: The arbitration in the Hungarian-Czechoslovak controversy has been an-

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure for the letter to Hitler; the letter to Ribbentrop, which expressed gratitude for his personal role in helping to achieve the return of Hungarian territory, is not printed (438/221002).

nounced. From the very beginning the Hungarian people as well as myself, a son of this sorely tried people, have been filled with complete confidence that you, my dear Führer and Reich Chancellor, would support our just cause. We have not deceived ourselves!

May I ask your Excellency to accept our deeply felt gratitude for the fact that you had the goodness to show us at Munich the road, so clearly and distinctly recognized by you, which the Hungarian Government would have to follow to solve this whole problem, and on which road your Excellency came to our aid.

We are fully aware that without your action we would have received none of the territory of which we were robbed at Trianon, and of which a considerable part has now been returned to us.

I am, moreover, firmly convinced that the realization of the ideas which emerged on the occasion of my visit in Munich will contribute to the establishment of still closer friendly relations between Germany and Hungary within the framework of Axis policy. The people and Government are united in this desire.

Assuring your Excellency also personally of our profound and great gratitude, I am in sincere admiration,

Faithfully yours,

DR. KÁLMÁN DE DARÁNYI

## No. 245

1224/333618

*The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 130 of November 11 BELGRADE, November 11, 1938—7:45 p. m.

Received November 11—11:20 p. m.

Pol. IV 8293.

Stoyadinovich informs me that the Prince Regent returned from his hunting trip to Rumania under the impression that the desire there for political *rapprochement* with Germany is growing perceptibly. King Carol seemed to realize more and more the importance of good relations with the Axis, particularly since Rumania at the moment feels rather isolated and menaced by Hungary. The King's trip to England was less in the hope of finding support there than for reasons of personal prestige, since the English Court had thus far ignored King Carol in disapproval of his family relations.

Stoyadinovich also remarked that the visit of the Prince Regent to Rumania had had no political motives but had been requested by King Carol in order to create in the public mind the impression of Yugoslav-Rumanian solidarity. He, Stoyadinovich, considered Rumania's situation unstable, however, and therefore believed that

it was better for Yugoslavia to keep aloof and to regulate her relations with Hungary separately. He believed that the prospects for this had recently become quite good.

HEEREN

## No. 246

2104/455857

### *The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

BUCHAREST, November 11, 1938—10: 15 p. m.

No. 238 of November 11

Received November 12—1: 45 a. m.

Delegation's No. 5

The Rumanians are not prepared to go far enough in meeting our demands on the most important points under negotiation, namely, the question of the exchange rate and the fixing of the amount of feed grain to be delivered in relation to the total volume of trade. In the matter of the rate of exchange the delegation is holding out for a rate of 44/43, but regards 43/42 as acceptable. The Rumanians have so far been unwilling to go higher than 41/40. With respect to feed grains (maize and barley) the Rumanians are willing to deliver only 300,000 tons instead of the 575,000 tons requested. Acceptance of this proposal would interrupt the favorable trend in commercial intercourse which has been developing up to now. Since the Rumanian Government was informed even before the negotiations began that I had to go to Rome on the evening of November 14, I intend to interrupt the negotiations on November 14 if by then the Rumanian Government has made satisfactory declarations. In this event the negotiations would be continued during my absence by the delegation, and I would return on November 19 for their conclusion. The delegation is of the unanimous opinion that further negotiations are advisable only if satisfactory declarations are first received, especially since the Rumanians, even under strong pressure and in spite of the fact that they know of my impending departure, have hitherto been unwilling to go beyond the unfavorable offers mentioned above. I assume that King Carol's visit to London will result in nothing new in the economic field and that the visit of the King to Germany may, on the other hand, create a more favorable atmosphere. Moreover, it is to be hoped that an interruption in the negotiations will shake the position of Minister of Economics Constantinescu, to whom the negative attitude is largely to be attributed. With regard to the treaty situation: the 2-month provisional arrange-

ment concluded at the end of September might possibly be extended for a short period at the end of November.

CLODIUS  
FABRICIUS

### No. 247

2104/455856

#### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, November 13, 1938—11:10 p. m.

No. 245 of November 13

Received November 13—11:55 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 238.<sup>1</sup>

After the cited telegram was sent, the delegation and I continued to make vigorous efforts somehow still to come to a satisfactory conclusion of the economic negotiations. We finally had to take our differences to the King.

The King first made a satisfactory promise in the question of fodder (50,000 carloads of maize and barley); but on the exchange rate, he declared that it was quite impossible to go beyond the last offer of 41. Since Clodius and I persisted, there was another long conversation today between the King, the Minister of Economics, and me at the railway station when the King left. Referring to the break in the negotiations, I stated that we could not accept the Rumanian proposal. King Carol thereupon spoke again at length with the Minister of Economics, called me over and asked me, at his personal request, to wire to Berlin to accept 41½ as the final offer. In spite of my renewed protest the King insisted and asked that a settlement on this basis be made possible, since a rupture particularly at the present moment was especially undesirable for political reasons. Clodius requests instructions by Monday noon since he cannot postpone his departure for Rome on Monday evening.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 246.

### No. 248

2104/455858

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

November 14, [1938.]

Received by Moraht<sup>1</sup> from the Ministry of Economics, telephoned at 2 a. m. to Oberregierungsrat Reinhard, Bucharest.

<sup>1</sup> In charge of Southeastern Europe matters in the Economic Policy Department.

We agree to the last Rumanian offer of 41½ as average rate of exchange, that is, 41 for purchases and 42 for sales, if necessary even to 41½ as maximum rate; however,

- a. in case of possible currency revisions there are to be immediate negotiations to set a new rate;
- b. if possible the new rate of exchange is to become effective at once (in one or two weeks at the latest).

W[IEHL]

### No. 249

1945/435555-56

*The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Legation in  
Rumania*

BERLIN, November 14, 1938.

By Courier

Sent November 15.

zu Pol. IV 7824, 8267, 8268, 8269.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to your report No. 3697-I A 4 of October 28.

For your confidential information. M. George Bratianu was in Berlin from November 2 to November 12 as a guest of Minister Djuvara. He was received first by State Secretary von Weizsäcker and then by Field Marshal Göring. A memorandum by the State Secretary is enclosed for your information.<sup>2</sup>

The other interviews requested by M. Bratianu did not take place, because the Führer as well as Ministers von Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Funk, and Freiherr von Neurath were occupied by other duties this week and were absent from Berlin, and M. Bratianu had to leave in order to be able to report on his impressions here to King Carol before the latter's departure for London.<sup>3</sup>

As already indicated in the cited report, M. Bratianu's object was to ascertain whether German foreign policy with regard to Hungarian revisionism still adhered to the view formerly stated to him. With reference to this, M. Bratianu stated in a conversation with a member of the Foreign Ministry<sup>4</sup> toward the end of his stay here that the

<sup>1</sup> Pol. IV 7824: document No. 239; Pol. IV 8267: not printed (1945/435551); Pol. IV 8268: document No. 242; Pol. IV 8269: the memorandum summarized in footnote 4 below.

<sup>2</sup> Printed separately as document No. 242.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Heinburg's handwriting: "On November 10 Counselor of Legation Brabetianu of the Rumanian Legation reported by telephone, by direction of G. Bratianu, that the latter would have to leave on the morning of November 12 and unfortunately had to give up the other interviews that he had requested. All the requests still pending were thereupon withdrawn."

<sup>4</sup> The conversation was with Counselor Busse of Political Division IV; his memorandum (1945/435553-54) is not printed. Busse wrote that Bratianu "seemed entirely satisfied"; he had said that it was particularly from his conversation with Göring that he had derived "the certainty" that Germany's attitude toward Hungarian revisionist demands was unchanged.



above-mentioned conversations had given him the certainty that Germany had not changed her position on the Hungarian revisionist demands.

By order:  
B[ISMARCK]

No. 250

5558/E395880-82

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, November 15, 1938.

zu W 1090 g.<sup>1</sup>

THE ARMAMENT CREDIT TO BULGARIA

Last March we granted Bulgaria an armament credit of 30 million reichsmarks. Shortly thereafter, Bulgaria received from French banks a credit of 375 million francs (equal to 25 million reichsmarks), chiefly for railroad equipment, but utilization of this credit appears to have met with difficulties because of price questions. Rumors that King Boris vainly tried to obtain an English credit of about 5 million pounds sterling during his visit to London last September have not been confirmed.

The Bulgarian Government would now like to have the German armaments credit increased by another 45 million reichsmarks. The Bulgarian Minister has proposed this to the Foreign Ministry, and the Bulgarian Minister of War has also approached our Military Attaché in Sofia on the subject. The Bulgarians state that Minister Funk and Field Marshal Göring expressed to King Boris their favorable attitude toward this request, but inquiries have shown that neither gave any definite promise. Minister Funk has told Minister Clodius that he was not opposed to the increase in the credit desired by the Bulgarians, but that he regarded this as essentially a political question to be decided by the Reich Foreign Minister, with whom he would discuss the matter at the next convenient opportunity.

Evaluation of the Bulgarian request:

The desired additional war matériel could be supplied to Bulgaria notwithstanding our own armament requirements. The bulk being ammunition, we could perhaps even profit by getting rid of older ammunition stocks. The deliveries would be effected between 1939 and 1941, and payments made in annual instalments of about 10 million reichsmarks between 1942 and 1949. The ability to pay of the

<sup>1</sup> W 1090 g is a communication from the Reichsgruppe Industrie forwarding a report from its representative in Bulgaria, and requesting the Foreign Ministry's views on the proposed arms credit. Not printed (5558/E395888-73).

Bulgarian state, which has so far been punctual in meeting its foreign obligations, is regarded as adequate for these annual instalments, but the payments cannot be in foreign exchange and must be made in commodities. Since our purchases in Bulgaria of products equivalent to foreign exchange (mainly agricultural products) are already on such a scale as to preclude any substantial increase, this credit would be liquidated chiefly by the output of a lead mine which is now in the process of being opened in Bulgaria by a German syndicate and is supposed to come into production in 1942. The prospective output of this mine, however, has not yet been fully ascertained.

Our position for the discussion with Minister Funk:

The increased credit would be in accord with our desire for further improvement of Germany's economic position in the Balkans. It would probably deter the Bulgarians from further attempts to obtain credits from the Western countries. Germany is no doubt also politically interested in completing Bulgaria's rearmament with German arms and excluding other countries from participating in it. To this extent, the increased credit requested by the Bulgarians would be desirable on grounds of foreign policy, but this desirability does not go so far as to make us disregard on that account any possible objections from the standpoint of our own armament needs or the soundness of Bulgaria's credit. The decision on such objections must be left to the proper departments (War Ministry and Ministry of Economics).

To be submitted through the Under State Secretary to the Foreign Minister, with the request for permission—irrespective of the conference planned by the Minister of Economics with the Foreign Minister—to pursue the matter in the direction outlined.

WIEHL

## No. 251

2883/565313

### *The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 106 of November 20

SOFIA, November 20, 1938—4:40 p. m.

Received November 20—6:10 p. m.

Pol. IV 8545.

With reference to my telegram No. 104 of November 18.<sup>1</sup>

Although it was Sunday, Minister President Kiosseivanov summoned me and informed me, by order of the King also, that reports

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2883/565312). Rümelin reported that the Bulgarian press was lately, in the wake of events in Central Europe, much occupied with Bulgarian revisionist claims, and that political circles were discussing Germany's probable attitude toward the Bulgarian aspirations.

had come in from two sources, one of them being London, that King Carol would speak to the Führer and Chancellor in Munich and request him to guarantee the existing territory of Rumania, especially the Dobruja. The King, who had not, moreover, believed the report to be accurate, had telephoned him and asked him in any case to inform me at once.

The peace treaties had robbed Bulgaria of the Dobruja, and he did not need to tell me how dear this territory was to the heart of every Bulgarian.

In the conversation, which was, moreover, very pleasant and cordial, I had the feeling that the Minister President is less concerned with the above-mentioned rumors than with bringing the Bulgarian claims to the Dobruja for the first time to the attention of the Führer and the Reich Government.

RÜMELIN

No. 252

F14/256-254

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 262

BERLIN, November 21, 1938.

Hungarian Minister Sztójay called on me today and in our conversation I again gave him to understand how surprised we were at the Hungarian move.<sup>1</sup> If the Hungarian Government had shown so much energy in the fall, matters relating to Czechoslovakia might have developed quite differently. Today the situation was essentially different. After all, the Hungarians were confronted by 10 to 12 divisions; it was impossible to predict what would develop out of a military move. Germany, however, did not permit anyone to predetermine her course of action.

We were especially concerned about the manner in which this action had been staged via Rome. Mussolini shared our feelings completely.

The Minister then asked whether we nevertheless could not disinterest ourselves in the problem. I replied that the answer had already been given in advance through the note delivered in Budapest.

I could only add that we again warned against an action whose end we could not foresee and in which we would not support the Hungarians.

When the Minister then asked whether we would adopt a different point of view at some other time, I replied that at present we could

<sup>1</sup> Hungary had initiated a move to effect seizure of the Carpatho-Ukraine by force on Nov. 20, and had represented to Berlin that Italy approved. For documents on this episode see vol. IV, documents Nos. 118, 122, 127-134, and 139.

not take any position. It seemed to me that if one desired to achieve a common objective it was important to understand how to observe moderation, and that the basis of a good partnership between Germany and Hungary, which I had always desired, was agreement in a spirit of mutual trust on a common policy. Hungary should not be surprised if events had not exactly strengthened this trust on the German side.

The Hungarian Minister then handed me the attached memorandum, with the remark that this memorandum probably best showed Hungary's good will.<sup>2</sup>

RIBBENTROP

[Enclosure]

ROYAL HUNGARIAN LEGATION

BERLIN, November 21, 1938.

MEMORANDUM

The basic principle of Hungarian foreign policy since the formation of the Berlin-Rome Axis has always been association with this Axis, and in the implementation of the Vienna Award this association is assuming an even more complete form.

On the basis of this consideration the Hungarian Government deems it necessary for the purpose of strengthening its relations with the German Reich to enter into negotiations with the Reich Government in both the political and the economic fields.

As far as political questions are concerned, the Hungarian Government has in mind first of all the common fight against Bolshevism. Hungary was perhaps the first state which never deviated from its course in the fight against Communism and which was never open to any sort of settlement or compromise with Bolshevism.

The anti-Bolshevist attitude of the Axis Powers has always found understanding and approval among us, and if the Axis Powers consider it important, we should be prepared to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In the economic field there are new possibilities, and Hungary, who has carried on a considerable part of her foreign trade with the Axis

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<sup>2</sup> Earlier the same day, before he realized he would be able to see Ribbentrop, Sztójay had handed his memorandum to Woermann. The latter recorded (73/51678) that Sztójay told him he had been under instructions for some days, that is, before the Carpatho-Ukraine question had entered its present acute phase, to speak to the Foreign Minister about a closer connection of Hungary with the Berlin-Rome Axis; indeed his Government had been considering this step for a long time but had set it aside because of the crisis during the summer. Woermann replied that it was an interesting proposal but would be still better if Hungary had offered to leave the League of Nations. Sztójay said that, should the proposed negotiations take place, the Germans could once again present this request.

Powers in the past, too, would be prepared not only to cultivate economic relations still further, but to intensify and give them greater stability and develop them practically in a mutually complementary way.

We believe that in this manner we should come closer to the goal of consolidating our relations with the Axis Powers and thereby creating a situation which would be well adapted to serve the interests of the Axis Powers as well as those of Hungary.

### No. 253

2446/514863-64

#### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department*

BERLIN, November 23, 1938.  
e. o. Kult. A 1170 (g).

At the session of November 22 in the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, presided over by Oberführer Behrends, to which the Foreign Ministry (Cultural and Political Departments), the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, the Ministry of the Interior, and Herr Karl Haushofer were invited, the question of the attitude which the Volksdeutsche should take toward Hungarian revisionist aspirations was discussed.

1. The Volksdeutsche in Transylvania are to maintain their previous loyal attitude toward Rumania in the forthcoming communal elections and not enter into any electoral alliance with the Hungarian minority. If confronted with Hungarian wishes to that effect, they are to point to the unfavorable position of the German minority in Hungary.

2. There are reports that the Hungarian Government will now permit the *Deutsche Kameradschaft* in Hungary to have an organization. So far the Hungarian Government has also permitted the German school system in the recovered territory to continue. The German minority in Hungary is to acknowledge every concession with gratitude, with the reservation, however, that on the basis of previous experiences they first wish to await further developments. The press of the German minority and the press in the Reich are to adopt this tone.

3. The question whether the German Government is to intervene regularly with the Hungarian Government in minority questions through diplomatic channels was answered in the negative. These matters are, as hitherto, to be discussed with the Hungarian Government on special occasions and as opportunity offers.

In the foregoing discussions it was assumed that there will be no press support in Germany of the Hungarian revisionist propaganda.

Oberführer Behrends requested that the Foreign Minister's approval of the outcome of the discussion be obtained.<sup>1</sup>

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request for further action.

TWARDOWSKI

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Yes. Ribbentrop."

## No. 254

88/25556-81

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

CONVERSATION OF THE FÜHRER WITH THE KING OF RUMANIA IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER, BERCHTESGADEN, NOVEMBER 24, 1938<sup>1</sup>

The King of Rumania first asked the Führer how he viewed the European situation. The Führer replied that with the solution of the Sudeten question the Central European crisis had ended. With the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland Germany had found her ethnographic frontiers, and there was now no obstacle in the way of establishing sensible, neighborly relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. If Czechoslovakia was sensible and accepted the new realities, that is, if she did not lend herself in the future to any sort of anti-German strategic plans on the part of others, it was quite possible to have lasting peace. Through the recently concluded treaty on the motor highway from Berlin to Vienna via Zwittau-Brünn<sup>2</sup> the question of Austria's communications with Silesia was also solved, and thereby another important source of friction between Germany and Czechoslovakia was eliminated. Some time would naturally have to elapse before Czechoslovakia recovered from the situation into which M. Beneš had brought her. But then he, the Führer, hoped for sensible, neighborly relations. However, if Czechoslovakia should revert to the course of M. Beneš, her destruction would be inevitable.

With regard to the general European situation the Führer was of the opinion that we were at present in a phase in which peace was apparently desired on all sides, but everyone believed that peace could be guaranteed only through maximum rearmament. Throughout the

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<sup>1</sup> According to a telegram of Nov. 20 from the German Embassy in France (33/25552) King Carol requested that strictest secrecy be maintained concerning his meeting with the Führer, since he had informed the French that he was making only a private visit to Germany.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. iv, document No. 123.

world the reply to Munich had been rearmament. Although Germany viewed this with sovereign calm, she was likewise arming correspondingly. Today Germany had not only the strongest army but also the strongest air force in the world, and she would see to it that this remained so.

The King of Rumania emphasized that Rumania desired good relations with all powers, but desired especially to maintain and consolidate the good relations with the German Reich that existed today. Rumania's objectives were:

1. Good commercial relations with Central Europe, especially with Germany;
2. A secure line of communications with Central Europe. This problem was absolutely vital for Rumania, since the line through Hungary could never be regarded as secure for Rumania;
3. It was important for Rumania to know what attitude Germany took toward Hungarian revisionist desires vis-à-vis Rumania; and
4. He was at present especially interested in the German attitude on the Carpatho-Ukrainian question.

The Führer replied as follows:

*Re 1.* He, too, only desired to carry on as much trade as possible and to do profitable business with the entire Southeast, hence also with Rumania. Germany could supply Rumania with most of the things she needed, while we could use Rumanian grain and raw materials.

*Re 2.* As for a line of communication with Central Europe, that is, the construction of a highway to Germany through Czechoslovakia, one would naturally have to be basically clear here regarding what purposes this highway was to serve. In the first place Czechia could not possibly construct such a highway; it could be constructed only with German help, for this project required billions—a sum which at first would not yield any returns. Its profitableness and amortization could be assured only by increased commercial traffic. Before such a big project was considered, one would naturally have to be clear, for example, as to the attitude of Rumania toward Russia. For strategically such a line naturally involved danger for Germany in the event of Russian aggression.

The King of Rumania interposed here that Rumania was anti-Russian, but because the vast Russian state was her neighbor, could not say so openly. Rumania would, however, never permit the passage of Russian troops. It had often been asserted that Rumania had promised the Russians that she would do so, but this was not true.

*Re 3.* As for the Hungarian revisionist ideas, he, the Führer, had for years constantly been telling the Hungarians very plainly that in such desires one had to be moderate.

When the King of Rumania asked specifically what attitude the Führer would take in the event of a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict, the Führer replied that such a conflict did not affect Germany directly and that consequently there was no occasion for Germany to take any stand in such a conflict.

*Re 4.* Nor was Germany directly interested in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. Lately all sorts of false ideas had sprung up to the effect that Germany opposed a common Polish-Hungarian frontier through the annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary. With regard to this, he wished to state that it was of no consequence to Germany. He had, to be sure, opposed the Hungarian tendencies toward an occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine just at this time, by telling the Hungarians that one could not first request an arbitral decision by the Axis Powers and then simply ignore it. Both Italy and Germany were of the opinion that the Vienna signatures had to be respected.

The Führer again repeated that Germany's aspirations in Central Europe had been satisfied by the establishment of her ethnographic frontiers. It was a different matter, of course, if as a result of some development or other strategic problems should be raised by one or another power, and if in the course of these developments dislocations of political power should occur. Then, of course, a new situation might arise for Germany, too. The Germany of today had become cautious as a result of experiences in the past, and she was not following any illusions whatever in foreign policy; rather, her aim now that she had brought the German race together within Germany was to consolidate in every way, to develop the Reich, and to smooth out the difficulties in foreign policy which still existed here and there; thus, for example, he would insist that the Memel Germans now receive their just due through the observance of the Memel Statute. He would also strive to attain increasingly better relations with the Poles as well, and therefore had proposed that an *Autobahn* and a German railway line be constructed through the Corridor for communication with East Prussia. Moreover, Germany would carry on trade on all sides and work for new prosperity.

In the further course of the conversation the King of Rumania showed particular interest in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. He emphasized repeatedly the necessity of a line of communication with Central Europe not dependent on Hungary. Rumania was for that reason opposed to the annexation of the Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary; on the other hand, he naturally understood Poland's anxiety about an independent Carpatho-Ukraine, and in the whole question he was in a somewhat difficult position on account of his alliance with Poland.

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#### Addendum by the Foreign Minister:

As he told me before the conversation, the Führer expressly left open, vis-à-vis the Rumanian King, the question of our future attitude in the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem. Although we have now restrained Hungary from occupation, the Führer is of the opinion, which I share in every respect, that we should not commit ourselves



vis-à-vis the Rumanians against occupation of this territory by Hungary. The basic idea of our policy toward Hungary and Rumania at present should be to keep both these irons in the fire and to shape matters in the German interest according to the way the situation develops.

The Führer also mentioned during the conversation that basically our attitude toward the Carpatho-Ukraine would also be determined by the manner in which Prague in future developed its relations with Germany.

When in the further course of the conversation the King of Rumania mentioned his feeling that we had after all constantly supported Hungary, I replied that this was naturally only too understandable in view of the former policy of the Little Entente as a sort of ally of France. The King vigorously denied that the Little Entente had ever been an ally of France in any sense; rather, it had always been his aim to limit the Little Entente to its real purpose, the prevention of Hungarian revisionism. To this I replied that we had often definitely had the opposite impression—even very recently, when during the days of the Czech crisis the Bucharest representative of the *Agence Havas* suddenly became one of the chief anti-German war-mongers. The King replied that it was not yet known who had disseminated those rumors. He evaded any further discussion of the question.

During the conversation the French situation was also touched upon briefly. The Führer expressed a certain anxiety about internal developments in France. The King of Rumania replied that ultimately France would always take hold of herself again. The Führer pointed to the example of Spain. His help to Franco at the time had after all had the effect of enabling Spain to hold out against Bolshevism and gradually to gain the upper hand. If this had not happened, Spain as well as France would doubtless have become a prey to Bolshevism. This again could have created a very serious situation in Europe.

When the King of Rumania asked whether the Führer believed that henceforth Russia intended to push ahead the world revolution also by military means, the Führer replied that he did not consider this impossible. I pointed out that in Moscow they had completely reorganized the propaganda of the Comintern during the last few weeks, which proved that they were continuing to work consistently for world revolution.

At the end of the conversation the King of Rumania also mentioned that some forces in Rumania were striving to disturb the good relations between Germany and Rumania. The one chiefly responsible for this was Landesgruppenleiter Conradi [*Konradi*],<sup>3</sup> who was col-

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 208, footnote 2.

laborating with all the elements that were undesirable to the King. He urgently requested the Führer to recall Conradi. This was desirable in the interest of improving German-Rumanian relations. The Führer thereupon ordered that I summon Conradi to Berlin immediately.

The conversation lasted approximately an hour and a half and was friendly in tone.

After luncheon the King of Rumania asked what the situation was with respect to the establishment of an embassy in Bucharest. I answered this question in a dilatory fashion, saying that this would set a precedent since other powers as well might demand the establishment of an embassy, and I pointed out especially that England and France had opposed it. The King pointed out that the French Council of Ministers had given its consent. I suggested to the Führer that I study the question again in Berlin and then make a proposal.

R[IBBENTROP]

## No. 255

73/51682

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 311 of November 26

ROME, November 26, 1938—11:10 p. m.

Received November 27—5:15 a. m.

With reference to your coded mail instruction, Pol. IV No. 2781 g of November 23,<sup>1</sup> received here yesterday evening.

This evening I was able to discuss the Hungarian initiative with Ciano and ascertained the following:

So far the Hungarian Minister here has only announced that there would be a formal step. This happened for the first time when Ciano had to ask him to call a few days ago in order to tell him plainly his opinion of the Hungarian intentions with respect to the Carpatho-Ukraine. To Ciano's remark that the Hungarian procedure was hardly to be considered a friendly gesture toward the Axis Powers, the Minister had replied that such an attitude in no way did justice to . . . (group missing); on the contrary, very shortly he would submit to him positive proposals from his Government for the purpose of

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (376/209003-05). The instruction forwarded the Hungarian memorandum printed as an enclosure to document No. 252. It requested the Embassy in Italy to ascertain whether Hungary had presented the identical text in Rome or a different one phrased to take account of the Rome Protocols. The Italians were to be asked to agree with Germany on a reply, the details to be discussed between Ribbentrop and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin.

expanding these relations. When the Minister had called again yesterday on regular business, he had again brought up the subject with the remark that he would undertake a formal step as soon as a government had been formed in Hungary. Ciano told me he had pointed out to the Minister that however interesting the idea of adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact appeared to be, Hungary should at long last leave Geneva, where she had nothing to seek and nothing to gain. I told Ciano that we had also pointed out to the Hungarian Minister in Berlin that withdrawal from the League of Nations was desirable.

Ciano promised that in no case would a reply be made to the expected Hungarian *démarche* without a previous understanding with us. It was immaterial to him whether further discussion was conducted here or in Berlin; if, as I had told him, the Foreign Minister desired that the discussion be continued in Berlin, he was naturally prepared to agree.

At Ciano's request I let him have a carbon copy of the memorandum accompanying the above instruction.

MACKENSEN

## No. 256

2525/520132-33

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, November 30, 1938.

When the Hungarian Government declares that it is prepared "to intensify and give economic relations with Germany greater stability and develop them practically in a mutually complementary way",<sup>1</sup> it is presumably thinking of two things:

a. Measures to adapt production and purchasing capacity on both sides more than previously to the needs of the other country. The Hungarian side is in the first place to increase, or if possible begin, the production of agricultural products needed by Germany (cotton, hemp, flax, wool, soybeans, alfalfa). Furthermore, it is intended that Hungary expand no further her already considerably developed industrialization and that she abandon industries in those branches in which a native Hungarian industry would hardly be viable, for example automobiles, in order to increase the demand for German industrial products. On the German side special measures in this respect would hardly be necessary, since Germany can absorb all Hungarian agricultural products and it is not necessary to adapt the German finished-goods industry especially to Hungarian needs.

<sup>1</sup> The quotation is from the Hungarian memorandum printed as an enclosure to document No. 252.

6. The conclusion of long-term treaties on the exchange of certain goods in certain amounts and if possible also at prices fixed in advance, especially the exchange of Hungarian grain for German timber from the Ostmark.

Germany, too, sees in such measures and agreements a suitable means of strengthening economic relations. In practice the main question will be whether Hungary is able to increase her agricultural production as required and is willing to curtail her industrialization as required. To judge from unofficial discussions, also with the Hungarian Ministers concerned, we may count on sincere willingness on the part of the Hungarians.

More extensive commercial agreements will hardly come into consideration at present. Germany has already been granting secret preferences for years to agricultural imports from Hungary, as a result of which the German share in the total Hungarian imports and exports has been increased to about 45 percent. An agreement on open preferences would be blocked by the opposition of third most-favored nations. Agreements on an economic unification of the two national territories would go too far for the Hungarian Government and would hardly meet with the approval of Italy. Without the abolition of import and export permits and foreign-exchange control between Germany and Hungary, a customs union, which in itself would not require the consent of third most-favored nations, would not signify any really effective unification of the economic territories. Abolition of the said restrictions would, however, require the extension of the German foreign-exchange regulations to Hungary and ultimately a currency union, which would be tantamount to a far-reaching surrender of independence by Hungary.

WIEHL

No. 257

2104/455847-52

*Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl*

PERSONAL  
W VI/64

BERLIN, December 1, 1938.

DEAR HERR WIEHL: I enclose for your confidential information the minute which I made of the conversation between the Field Marshal and the King of Rumania, with the request that you inform those in your Ministry to whom the contents are of interest. I should like to ask, however, that the memorandum not be circulated.

With best regards and Heil Hitler,

Yours,

H. WOHLTHAT

[Enclosure]

W VI/63

BERLIN, November 30, 1938.

MINUTE ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FIELD MARSHAL AND KING CAROL OF RUMANIA ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1938, FROM 2:30 TO 4 P. M. IN LEIPZIG (ATTENDED BY MINISTERIALDIREKTOR WOHLTHAT)

### 1. *European Policy*

The King began the conversation by asking about the German attitude toward a Ukrainian state which would make itself independent of the Bolshevik regime in Moscow.

The Field Marshal answered that we would support a Ukrainian liberation movement in every way.

The King mentioned that the Poles had spoken to him about the Ukrainian question.<sup>1</sup> He would have to clarify for himself what a large Ukrainian state on his eastern frontier would mean. The King declared that he was concerned to retain his present borders with Soviet Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. He had objected to a common Hungarian-Polish frontier in the Carpatho-Ukraine since he had to have a second railroad connection with Germany via the Carpatho-Ukraine and Czechoslovakia besides the one via Poland. The development of the Danube shipping route as the third major route between Germany and Rumania could also be blocked by Hungary in the coalition of Poland, Hungary, and Italy. He did not desire to acquire new land with Ruthenians or other nationalities. He did not care who guaranteed Czechoslovakia, whether the four European Great Powers or Germany alone. He was of the opinion that Czechoslovakia's borders must be guaranteed, and that agreements must be made between Germany and Czechoslovakia giving the latter country the possibility of existence. He remarked with regard to the Polish policy that he had had to make an alliance with Poland, which, however, was directed exclusively against the East. But the Poles sometimes made impossible political proposals.

### 2. *German Minorities in Rumania*

The Field Marshal emphasized that German relations with Rumania were strongly influenced by the treatment of the German minorities. In this respect the Greater German Reich was particularly sensitive.

The King said that he would re-examine the present minorities policy and that he had the intention of taking regional conditions more into account than had been done in the past. He had assigned Under State Secretary Brandsch to this task.

When the Field Marshal inquired about the complaints regarding the recognition of German doctors, the King answered that he

<sup>1</sup> See ch. I, documents Nos. 76, 79, 80.

had ordered a general examination of all academic degrees and diplomas possessed by doctors in Rumania, no matter what their origin. In this way he intended to combat malpractice under cover of diplomas from small universities which did not possess a recognized medical faculty.

The King asserted that he intended, within the framework of the law, to give the German minority groups who were good Rumanian citizens the same rights and living opportunities as the Rumanians.

The King complained about the activity in Bucharest of Herr Conradi [*Konradi*] who had constantly sought connections with his opponents. These elements were not good citizens and he had to set himself against them.

When the Field Marshal asked about the leader of the Iron Guard, Codreanu, the King said that Codreanu was not in a mine any longer but was living under guard in a small city. Formerly he had tried to let Codreanu participate in politics. But that had been impossible, since he did not have a superior intellect, but had built up his movement on the basis of a primitive and in part mystical influence upon the masses. The King could not understand where these and other extreme circles had obtained their funds; it was also very difficult for him to differentiate between what was Party and what was Government in Germany.

The Field Marshal answered that it was not easy for the leading personalities in German public life to be informed on everything which went on. He asked the King to bring any complaints directly to him.

### 3. German-Rumanian Economic Relations

The King said that he was willing to support systematic cooperation for the development of economic relations. The Field Marshal mentioned particularly Rumanian oil fields and the exploitation of Rumanian ore deposits. The King designated Constantinescu, President of the National Bank and Minister of Industry, besides the Ministers of Agriculture, Transportation, Aviation, and Armament, to conduct such negotiations. He had entrusted the big industrialist Malaxa with the development of the armament industry. The King especially stressed his interest in machine tools for a factory for the production of 2-cm. antiaircraft guns. He was very much interested in shortening by 2 months the present term of delivery, which was supposed to be 6 months. The King also mentioned the Junkers airplane and airplane engine factory near Kronstadt and the light metals plant in Remele. An attempt should be made to set up plans for 5 and 10 years in addition to the trade and clearing agreement now in force between the two Governments. The Field Marshal and the King agreed on promoting the development of economic relations to an increased extent.

The King asked me in parting whom the Germans would send to Bucharest for such negotiations. I answered that the Field Marshal would have to name such a person. The King expressed his desire that the Field Marshal might name me, and said he hoped to be able to welcome me in Bucharest in the near future.

After I had reported to the Field Marshal these remarks by the King he gave me such an assignment orally.<sup>2</sup>

WOHLTHAT

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note in Wiehl's handwriting: "According to a statement made by Herr Wohlthat by telephone, a written directive by the Field Marshal is to be sent to the various ministries on this subject."

### No. 258

73/51684

*The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

No. 429

BERLIN, December 1, 1938—[2:02 p. m.<sup>1</sup>]

[Received December 1—4:00 p. m.]

zu Pol. IV 2804 g.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 311.<sup>3</sup>

For your information. On November 28 the Foreign Minister informed Attolico that he had notified the Hungarians that in principle he personally had a positive attitude toward Hungary's suggestion that she adhere to the Anti-Comintern Agreement; at the same time, however, he would ask the Hungarians whether they were now thinking of withdrawing from the League of Nations. The Foreign Minister requested Attolico to inform Ciano to this effect and add that in his opinion Germany and Italy should give the Hungarian Government an affirmative answer to its step on the same day, if possible.<sup>4</sup> In addition, he would also inform the Japanese Government in advance about the Hungarian step and his attitude toward it. After a reply was received from Tokyo, he would inform him about the outcome. The subject has been taken up with the Japanese Embassy here.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Times of dispatch and receipt have been taken from the Embassy copy of the telegram (2129/464935). The latter also has the following: "Strictly secret! To be deciphered by Chief of Mission personally."

<sup>2</sup> Pol. IV 2804 g has not been definitely identified, but it probably was the memorandum of an Attolico-Ribbentrop conversation of Nov. 28 on which the telegram printed here appears to have been based. The memorandum is printed in vol. IV, document No. 408.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 255.

<sup>4</sup> Attolico informed the Foreign Ministry on Dec. 3 (2129/464939) that Ciano accepted these arrangements. He had informed Attolico in a letter that "he was in full accord with the Foreign Minister as to the policy to be followed toward Hungary."

## No. 259

73/51685

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, December 2, 1938.

As instructed, I told the Hungarian Minister today regarding the desire to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Agreement expressed by the Hungarian Government, that in principle the Foreign Minister had a positive attitude toward the idea. He had already been in touch with the Italian and Japanese Governments, which naturally must be heard first. I also told the Hungarian Minister that the Foreign Minister asked him to inquire of his Government whether it did not consider that the time had now come to leave the League of Nations. M. Sztójay recalled that this subject had been discussed repeatedly between Germany and Hungary and between Italy and Hungary. He would pass the inquiry on to Budapest. Naturally it would doubtless take some time before a decision was reached.

M. Sztójay related that he had been received by the Regent and that the latter continued to regard friendship with Germany as the first point in Hungarian foreign policy. He hoped that certain misunderstandings of recent date could now be considered overcome.

The Minister assumed that a new Foreign Minister would be appointed very soon; Count Csáky and Minister Bardossy remained the candidates.

WOERMANN

## No. 260

169/82482

*The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 266 of December 4

BUCHAREST, December 4, 1938—5:30 p. m.

Received December 4—8:00 p. m.

In the absence of the Chargé d'Affaires, who has gone to Constantza for the elections, Foreign Minister Comnen asked me to call on him today, Sunday, and informed me that the attitude of the German press, especially the *Angriff*, the *Nachtausgabe*, and the *Berliner Tageblatt*, toward the action against the Iron Guard<sup>1</sup> had occasioned the greatest dismay in Rumania. He referred to expressions such as mass murder, disintegration of the country, and victory of Jewry. Major repercussions in the Government and the population were to be ex-

<sup>1</sup> On Nov. 30 Codreanu and 13 members of the Iron Guard were shot by their police escort when they allegedly attempted escape while being transported from one prison to another. In his telegram reporting the incident (169/82482) Fabricius recommended cautious treatment in the German press.



pected as a result of this interference in Rumania's internal affairs, especially since this was regarded as confirmation of the suspicion that we were supporting the Iron Guard. He added that the position of leading persons who had urged cooperation with Germany, as well as his own position, was made extremely difficult by the attitude and the tone adopted by our press. The Foreign Minister asked immediate transmittal of his desire that the press be bridled. I promised to transmit it, after pointing out that it was false to conclude that we had supported the Iron Guard because we sympathized at the tragic death.

KLUGKIST

## No. 261

169/82484

*The Director of the Press and Information Department to the  
Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 311

BERLIN, December 5, 1938.

zu P 10979.<sup>1</sup>

The attitude of the German press corresponds to the agitation aroused here by the murder. Under these circumstances it seems impossible to prevent further articles in the press.<sup>2</sup>

ASCHMANN

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> On Dec. 8 Woermann recorded (169/82488) that the Rumanian Minister had requested that at least the person of the King not be made an object of the press attacks. The Propaganda Ministry issued instructions to this effect.

On Dec. 5 Wiehl telegraphed Clodius (2104/455845) that he should conclude the economic negotiations in Bucharest as soon as possible since it was not desired that they be upset by a further demonstration of German displeasure which was planned. This was to be the return to Rumania of certain orders and decorations which had been given to German leaders. A memorandum of the Protocol Department dated Dec. 27 (2435/514582) states that the Rumanian Minister accepted this action on behalf of his Government, declaring only that he hoped this "embarrassing" matter might now be regarded as closed.

## No. 262

3039/600507-09

*The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry*

II GA 1

ATHENS, December 6, 1938.

Pol. IV 9164.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The international position.

A certain unrest has recently been noticeable here because of the international position of Greece. It was manifest also in my conver-

sation of today with Minister President Metaxas. Anxiety over Bulgaria's claim to an outlet to the Aegean Sea seemed allayed temporarily at least as a result of the Salonika Pact of July 31, and even in the first weeks after the September crisis there was no sign of danger reappearing from this direction. Meanwhile, however, the attainment of the German and a portion of the Hungarian desires had its repercussion in Bulgaria to the extent that the opposition there undertook demonstrations over the fact that Bulgaria was the only one of the countries defeated in the World War that had not regained any lost territory. It is not clear whether Greece has allowed herself to be disturbed by these voices alone, or whether the desire to help Bulgaria to obtain an outlet to the Aegean Sea was expressed also in other quarters. Even at the time of the Salonika Pact, England was mentioned in circles here as the driving force behind the scene, although this could of course not be substantiated. Now the same story was heard again. England is supposed to be guided in this by the desire to eliminate the tension in the Balkans through a solution of the Aegean question in the Bulgarian sense, thereby hoping to be able to use the Balkan states *en bloc* for her cause, if necessary, since in the absence of dividing issues they could more easily be welded together. On the other hand, of course, the granting of Bulgaria's wish would be a one-sided solution of the problem and the tension would not be eliminated, but only shifted. There is still nothing positive to be reported about a British move which would in this case have to take the form of pressure upon Greece, and possibly upon Turkey. In his statement of November 26 published in the *Messenger d'Athènes* of November 27, Metaxas does not speak of the direction from which a diplomatic attack upon the borders of his country had come. Even today the Minister President did not mention England in this connection. He merely dropped the remark that he (Metaxas) could only hope that third powers, if they wanted to exert influence upon Bulgaria, would do so with a view to pacification. State Secretary Mavroudis told me expressly that the occasion for the statement of the Minister President was none other than the action of the Bulgarian Opposition and the anxiety caused in the population by this and by the activity of the Greek Opposition. Even if the connections remain as unclear as heretofore, the fact is nevertheless significant that Greece—relatively speaking, Bulgaria's weakest neighbor—feels herself insecure and menaced, despite the Balkan Entente and despite the Pact of Salonika, as soon as Bulgaria receives any boost, even a merely moral one. Metaxas even went so far as to tell me very emphatically that an attack by Bulgaria upon one of the Balkan Entente powers would mean a *casus belli* for Greece. This

is a step backward as compared with the situation created by the Pact of Salonika.

So much the more important is the question of Greek relations with Turkey. The death of Atatürk brought up the question whether Turkey would possibly adopt a new course and in so doing show less consideration for her Greek friend. It seems that at the beginning the Greek Government was troubled about this. But Metaxas returned from Ankara morally fortified. It appears that he received assurances from İsmet İnönü that Turkey would give positive assistance, at least with regard to the Bulgarian claims. This has been confirmed to me by the Turkish Legation. Metaxas today described the situation to me in the following words: "The Turko-Greek friendship is indissoluble." He then assured me that Greece would, if need be, go to the limit; in other words, fight for Thrace.

It remains to be seen whether the Turko-Greek friendship and the Metaxas regime would survive this last test.

PRINZ ZU ERBACH

No. 263

2883/565314-15

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa*

BERLIN, December 8, 1938.

e. o. Pol. IV 9131.

The Bulgarian Minister here, who called upon me today in another matter, asked me about the course of the conversations that King Carol of Rumania had had with the Führer and with Field Marshal Göring. I answered the Minister in accordance with the general directives for discussion of this subject which were issued at the time. He indicated that he would perhaps inquire again later on in order to learn something more detailed about the substance of the conversations, because this was naturally of great interest to his Government.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister then went on to speak also of the situation in Rumania, but said nothing new with regard to an appraisal of the situation.

Finally the Minister also went into the revisionist aspirations vis-à-vis Rumania with respect to Southern Dobruja, which are now of paramount interest to Bulgaria, and stressed the hope of the Bulgarian people that this problem might be solved in the early

<sup>1</sup>In a memorandum of Dec. 9 (2883/565316) Woermann wrote that the Bulgarian Minister had renewed his query. Woermann informed him briefly without going into details.

future in favor of Bulgaria.<sup>2</sup> He remarked in this connection that Germany would surely have no objection to such a settlement. On the question of a territorial outlet for Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea, the Minister stated that the area in question had formerly been inhabited by Bulgarians, but that these had migrated to Bulgaria after the region became a part of Greece and the Greeks coming over from Asia Minor settled there. In Bulgarian opinion, however, this region was to be regarded as age-old Bulgarian territory even if only a few Bulgarians were living there now. If this question should at some time be resolved in Bulgaria's favor, it would also be to the interest of Germany, who would thereby also receive an outlet to the Aegean Sea.

Regarding the questions still pending between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia with reference to the frontier populations, the Minister said that it was hoped that a satisfactory solution could be reached if the friendly relations existing between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were further strengthened.

HEINBURG

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<sup>2</sup> In his talk with Woermann the Minister "put the concrete question whether Germany was favorably inclined toward the Bulgarian viewpoint." Woermann replied "evasively" stating that although Germany had "understanding" for the Bulgarian desires, a solution "particularly if it took place by means of force, could not be regarded as an isolated problem."

## No. 264

2104/455839-43

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, December 13, 1938.

#### POLITICAL IMPRESSIONS DURING MY STAY IN BUCHAREST AND THE OUTCOME OF THE GERMAN-RUMANIAN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS

I. The events of the year 1938 have led to a profound change in political attitudes in Rumania. The conviction that it is necessary to cooperate with Germany to a certain extent has won general acceptance. This change is to be attributed to the collapse of France's political prestige, the growth of Germany's power in 1938, the realization that only Germany can provide effective protection against Russia, Rumania's most dangerous enemy, and finally also to the consideration that Rumania is economically dependent on Germany to an ever-increasing degree. (In consequence of the treaty signed on

December 10,<sup>1</sup> Germany will probably account for approximately 45 percent of Rumania's foreign trade during the coming year.)

During my stay in Bucharest I had opportunity to speak with some members of the Government, several leaders of the two former large political parties (National Peasant Party and Liberals), some high military officers, and a number of leading persons from business and financial circles. I found that all of them unanimously expressed the above views. Even pronounced opponents of Germany, who formerly never concealed their opposition in their conversations with me, now speak quite another language. There is no doubt that in most cases this change is due not to sympathy for Germany but solely to realistic political considerations, often even to fear of Germany. The intention of reaching an understanding with Germany should not be taken less seriously because of these motives, however. That the Iron Guard particularly welcomes every increase in German influence in Rumania may be taken for granted.

At the beginning of November I found the King's position very much stronger. The skillful propaganda during his trip abroad contributed toward further increasing his prestige. Even the old political opponents of the King, as, for instance, the leaders of the National Peasant Party, commented relatively favorably on the accomplishments of the King's authoritarian Government in spite of all their emphasis on their fundamental opposition in domestic policy.

The murder of Codreanu and his followers has changed the situation considerably. Condemnation of this murder is equally strong in almost all circles of the population. I encountered no Rumanian politician who even attempted to defend this murder to me. Even members of the Government and persons close to the Government have tried only hesitantly with very weak arguments to motivate and explain the murder as a political necessity. The embitterment in the Iron Guard is tremendous. Even active ministerial officials who are close to the Iron Guard or are members of it have expressed their abhorrence to me in the sharpest manner.

In spite of this universal condemnation of the deed I do not believe that overt political results are to be expected in the near future. Unless the King should fall victim to assassination, he will probably be strong enough to maintain his power by means of the loyal part of the Army and the security apparatus of the state under the leadership of the ruthless Minister of the Interior, Armand Calinescu. In

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7182/E527329-88). The "treaty" referred to actually consisted of fourteen separate documents in the form of protocols, agreements, and letter exchanges, most of them modifying previously existing German-Rumanian economic agreements.

spite of its numerous followers in the country and although the majority of the young people are in sympathy, the Iron Guard is too poorly organized to be able to go beyond isolated actions and strike a decisive blow, especially since all of its remaining leaders are under arrest. Professor Nae Jonsescu, the leader of the movement after the death of Codreanu, is in the Kronstadt prison hospital. His friends fear for his life.

Although direct effects on the public position of the King are hardly to be expected under these circumstances, I am nevertheless convinced that the murder of Codreanu has shaken his moral position in the country to such an extent that he will recover from it only very slowly, if at all.

II. With Rumania's present attitude toward Germany as described above, I found conditions very favorable in Bucharest for the economic negotiations. The negotiations were made difficult by the fact that Constantinescu, Minister of Economics and President of the Bank of Issue, who exercises a kind of economic dictatorship, opposed an extension of trade with Germany, in contrast to public opinion in general, because his political sympathies go in other directions and because he would like to guide Rumanian foreign trade toward the countries with unrestricted foreign exchange. The treaty which emerged after lengthy negotiations, however, takes account of all important German interests in spite of M. Constantinescu's opposition. Our trade with Rumania in both directions will amount to about 250 million reichsmarks (10 billion lei) and will thus be greater than that in the preceding year also from an absolute standpoint, even when Austria and the Sudetenland are included. Since Rumanian foreign trade in its entirety has decreased considerably, our share has increased a great deal, namely from around 28 percent for the old Reich last year to presumably around 45 percent for Greater Germany in the coming year. We shall be able to obtain oil products for about 60 to 65 million reichsmarks, which corresponds approximately to our needs. Furthermore, Rumania has obligated herself to deliver 500,000 tons of feed grains of which we are in urgent need. The exchange rate has been increased from 38/39 lei to 40.5/41.5 lei per reichsmark; this is important for us in terms of general currency policy and because of a cheapening of the imports from Rumania.

The most important German concession consists in our willingness to take 400,000 tons of wheat which we do not absolutely need at the present moment; this delivery is an important economic gain to Rumania because of her wheat surplus of about one million tons.

It is interesting that the political tension manifesting itself between Germany and Rumania after the murder of Codreanu rather helped

than hindered the negotiations, because the Rumanian Government was evidently much concerned about running into differences with Germany in the economic field, too.

CLODIUS

# No. 265

1550/376822

## *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 202 of December 20

BUDAPEST, December 20, 1938—12:15 p. m.

Received December 20—3:20 p. m.

Pol. IV 9430.

In diplomatic circles the fact that the Italian Foreign Minister is accompanied by several high officials, including Ambassador Buti and Minister Count Vitetti as well as eight newspapermen, gives rise to numerous conjectures on the political significance of this hunting visit.<sup>1</sup>

Ciano told me the following about his topics of conversation here:

1. He had told the Hungarian Foreign Minister that the only real members of the Anti-Comintern Pact were the three Great Powers, who were militarily strong. He could, however, discuss the form of Hungary's welcome adherence during his coming visit with the German Foreign Minister.

2. Adherence was of no use without withdrawal from the League, and this Count Csáky had promised for May—which Ciano . . . (group missing) to treat confidentially. At that time he would make impossible demands for Hungarian minorities and use their rejection to motivate the withdrawal.

3. Ciano had told Hungary clearly that action against the Carpatho-Ukraine no longer came into consideration.

4. Ciano had the impression that Hungarian-Yugoslav relations had considerably improved and that Hungary was more willing to make concessions since Kánya's resignation. During a hunting visit in January he would use his influence on Stoyadinovich in the same direction.

5. Hungary had described relations with Rumania as bad. He had told them that revision was not feasible without war, and therefore for the time at least it did not come into consideration.

6. In the question of a possible guarantee of the new Czechoslovak borders Italy would follow the German lead.

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>1</sup> Ciano was in Hungary Dec. 19 to 23 on a hunting visit at the invitation of the Regent. In a longer report (1550/376823-25) devoted mostly to the social and public events of the visit Erdmannsdorff wrote that Ciano was "received by the Hungarian public with great enthusiasm," and the press had been "more cordial than courtesy required." He added: "It must be recognized that the Hungarian Government took every precaution to eliminate even the slightest note of anti-German sentiment from the demonstrations for the Italian statesman."

## No. 266

73/51696

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 205 of December 22 BUDAPEST, December 22, 1938—6:15 p. m.  
Received December 22—9:35 p. m.

The Foreign Minister told me that he had stressed to the Italian Foreign Minister the desire of the Hungarian Government for the closest cooperation with *both* Axis Powers, and that his statements to Ciano would become effective only after he had obtained Germany's consent during the Berlin visit.

Withdrawal from the League of Nations was planned for the next meeting of the Council in May. This step could be taken only after the closest collaboration with the Axis Powers, strengthened by pending domestic reform legislation, had been documented by a declaration of solidarity with the aims of the Anti-Comintern Powers in a form still to be agreed upon.

He had asked Ciano to find out during his visit in Belgrade whether the Yugoslav Government desired an honest understanding with Hungary. If so, then Ciano could repeat that the Hungarians were willing to guarantee the present Hungarian-Yugoslav border and could suggest direct diplomatic negotiations on this point between Budapest and Belgrade. A prerequisite for this was a Yugoslav declaration in favor of the Hungarian minority and especially renunciation by Yugoslavia of the same border guarantee vis-à-vis Rumania. Stoyadinovich's weakened position as a result of the elections is causing concern here.

The Italian Foreign Minister then made statements to the Hungarians concerning Italian claims on France, which I assume are known in Berlin.

ERDMANNSDORFF

## No. 267

73/51698-700

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, December 28, 1938.  
[e. o. Pol. IV 3076 g.]<sup>1</sup>

Today the Italian Chargé d'Affaires made the following statement on instructions of Count Ciano: On the basis of a conversation with

<sup>1</sup>The Foreign Ministry file number is taken from a copy of the document which was sent to the Embassy in Rome for "strictly confidential information" (2129/464943-46).



the Japanese Ambassador in Rome Count Ciano was informing us of the following:

1. The Italian Government agreed that Manchukuo should adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact in accordance with article 2 of this pact.

2. The Italian Government agreed that Hungary should adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact. (In the instruction sent Magistrati no mention was made of article 2 in regard to this point.)

3. If Germany and Japan agree, the procedure for adherence by Hungary and Manchukuo could take place in accordance with the suggestion by the Reich Foreign Minister; that is, an invitation would be tendered to Hungary and Manchukuo via the diplomatic representatives of the three signatory powers in Budapest and in Hsinking.

Count Magistrati added that the Italian Government was greatly interested in having the invitation to Hungary extended during the first 10 days of January 1939. For reasons of a general political nature, which did not directly involve Hungary, it was desirable for Hungary to declare publicly by January 10 her desire to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact; everything else could then be done after January 10.

Magistrati did not mention expressly that this haste and the date mentioned by him were connected with the pending British visit to Rome.<sup>2</sup> This may be taken for granted, however.

In the further course of the conversation Magistrati defined as follows the invitation to Hungary which he mentioned: evidently his Government desired no other public manifestation than a spontaneous declaration by Budapest—in response to the German, Italian, and Japanese encouragement—that Hungary wished to adhere to the pact. The invitation provided for in article 2 of the pact would then be made officially later.

Without committing myself definitely I told Count Magistrati that I thought our ideas and intentions were essentially the same as those of the Italians. Since the Italian Government seemed to be in something of a hurry, however, I did want to point out that the proposed step involved the first case of the original signatories of the pact inviting other countries to join. Thus a precedent was being created here which necessitated careful consideration. The Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian Government agreed, as far as I knew, that the original signatories should have a somewhat higher position than those who came later. No formula for this existed as yet, as far as I knew. Magistrati, who had no instructions on this point, admitted

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax visited Rome Jan. 11 to 14, 1939. See vol. iv, documents Nos. 430 and 435; also *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. III (London, 1950), ch. VIII.

that this formula should be well considered, in order to preserve the prerogatives of the original signatories without, however, weakening the attractiveness of the pact by making those joining later too obviously inferior. Magistrati also agreed that the Hungarians would have to be told at the time of the first invitation just what form Hungary's adherence was intended to take.

Magistrati had nothing new to offer concerning the time Hungary was intending to withdraw from the League of Nations.

In closing Magistrati mentioned that the Italian Embassy in Tokyo had received the same instruction.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 268

73/51701-02

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, December 30, 1938.

[e. o. Pol. IV 3077 g.]<sup>1</sup>

Today I asked the Italian Chargé d'Affaires to call on me again in the matter of the adherence of Hungary and Manchukuo to the Anti-Comintern Pact. I told Magistrati that after obtaining instructions from the Foreign Minister I could now inform him as follows:

1. We agreed to an invitation to Hungary and Manchukuo.
2. We concurred in the Italian proposal that Hungary should issue a spontaneous declaration during the first 10 days of the New Year to the effect that she wished to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
3. We proposed that in this spontaneous declaration a certain reference nevertheless be made to prior exchanges of views, a community of purpose between Hungarian policy and that of the Axis, etc.
4. We were of the opinion that an identical procedure should be followed simultaneously in Hsinking by way of consideration for Japan.
5. We were now in agreement that Hungary (and also Manchukuo) would have to be told at the time of the first invitation what form of adherence was intended for Hungary (and Manchukuo). Germany's deliberations concerning the form of this adherence had not yet been quite completed. Magistrati had not yet received instruction from Rome in this matter either.
6. We were agreed that after Hungary and Manchukuo had expressed the desire to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact, the three original signatories should not delay in issuing the official invitation.

<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Ministry file number is taken from a copy of the document which was sent to the Embassy in Rome for "strictly confidential information" (2129/464947-48).

7. I asked Count Magistrati immediately to propose in Rome that the Italians and we request of Budapest without delay a specific promise to both of us—not for publication—to the effect that Hungary will withdraw from the League of Nations in May.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 269

73/51706

### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2 of January 4

BUDAPEST, January 4, 1939—6:00 p. m.

Received January 4—9:05 p. m.

With reference to telegraphic instruction No. 1.<sup>1</sup>

I first called on the Italian Minister, who yesterday made the *démarche* announced in the telegraphic instruction, and then on the Foreign Minister.

Csáky repeated to me in unequivocal language the promise made to the Italian Government that Hungary would withdraw from the League of Nations in May, which was made contingent at the time only upon the readiness of the powers concerned to permit Hungary to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

To the Italian Minister as well as to me he expressed the wish that there be an interval of at least some days between the adherence of Hungary and that of Manchukuo to the Anti-Comintern Pact in order to avoid unnecessarily giving the opposition occasion for criticism.

The Foreign Minister told the Italian Minister that the Parliamentary debate on January 12, that is, while the British Ministers were still in Rome, would afford him the opportunity to issue the Anti-Comintern declaration.

The Foreign Minister told me that the Japanese Minister had suggested to him at the end of December that Hungary adhere to the Pact. He was now awaiting the invitation from Germany and Japan.<sup>2</sup>

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (73/51703-04). The instruction directed that Hungary be asked, before the *démarche* concerning adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact was delivered, to make the same commitment to Germany as she had made earlier to Italy, that is, that she would quit the League of Nations by the following May.

<sup>2</sup> On Jan. 12, just prior to visiting Berlin, Csáky made a public statement that Hungary would join the Anti-Comintern if invited. The invitation was extended by the Ministers of Germany, Italy, and Japan on Jan. 13. On Jan. 18 an invitation was extended to Manchukuo. The protocol for Hungary's adherence (2871/564700-01) was signed in Budapest on Feb. 24, that for Manchukuo (2871/564705-06) in Hsinking on the same date. The texts of the protocols are published in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VII, pt. 1 (Berlin, 1941), pp. 40-42.

## No. 270

2883/565320

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 20

BERLIN, January 7, 1939.  
Pol. IV 190.

The Italian Ambassador informed me today that according to certain reports from Budapest the Bulgarian Government had sounded out the Hungarian Government as to whether the Bulgarian aspirations to Dobruja and the Hungarian ones to Transylvania could not be brought into line with each other and a certain relation established between them. Budapest had politely declined.

I told the Ambassador that the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin had once put a cautious inquiry to me as to whether we would come out definitely on one side or the other in the event of a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict. I had kept the Bulgarian in the dark as to our position and only pointed to the present internal weakness of Rumania.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum of his conversation with the Bulgarian Minister, dated Dec. 14, 1938, is not printed (2883/565318). He told the Bulgarian that Germany "had no political commitments either to Rumania against third states, or to third states against Rumania." See also document No. 263.

On Feb. 2 Attolico told Weizsäcker he had noted a tendency, of which he did not approve, for Bulgaria to offer closer association with the Axis in return for support of Bulgarian revisionist aims. Weizsäcker said Germany's attitude on Bulgarian revisionism would depend on whether it was aimed against Greece or against Rumania and whether it was peaceful or violent. In his own view, "it was not the business of Balkan states to provoke crises in which Germany and Italy would then subsequently be forced to take sides" (2883/565324).

## No. 271

73/51714

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 7 of January 11

BUDAPEST, January 11, 1939—2:20 p. m.

Received January 11—5:30 p. m.

The Foreign Minister told me that the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow had received a note signed by Litvinov to the following effect:

The Soviet Government had heard that Hungary wished to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact. This was a political instrument principally in the hands of the Japanese, who had hostile intentions toward the Soviet Union. It was incomprehensible that Hungary should

wish to adhere to the Pact, since no differences existed between the Soviet Union and Hungary. If Hungary joined, the Soviet Government would draw from this serious and immediate conclusions, and asked for an immediate reply as to whether the Hungarian Government really harbored such intentions.

The Hungarian Government replied yesterday that:

[1.] The Anti-Comintern Pact was a defensive measure, without offensive intentions against the Soviet Union.

2. The Soviet Government had heretofore not identified itself with the Comintern, but, on the contrary, had condemned [*verurteilt*] its activities. It was hard to explain, therefore, why it was now suddenly defending the Comintern.

3. Litvinov surely knew that only those who were invited could adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Hungarian Government had not yet been invited by the three powers.

Hungary rejected from the outset any attempt by the Soviet Government to influence her decision in any way and to threaten her.

ERDMANNSDORFF

## No. 272

33/25786-97

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, COUNT CSÁKY, JANUARY 16, 1939, 5 TO 6 P. M.

Present: The Führer, Count Csáky, the Reich Foreign Minister, the Hungarian Minister, Minister von Erdmannsdorff.

Count Csáky conveys the greetings of the Regent, who sends word to the Führer that so long as he is at the head of affairs in Hungary, Germany can rely on Hungary as on the most sincere friend. This message is the main purpose of his trip. The Führer expresses his thanks and continues:

Over the relations between Germany and Hungary lay a shadow, unfortunately, which for a Great Power like Germany was hard to endure. He did not know of any wrongs which Germany had inflicted on Hungary, but, on the contrary, was of the opinion that Germany had made possible for Hungary her first revision.<sup>1</sup> This had cost Germany an untold commitment of manpower and millions in money, and had involved great risk. So when he read that "thanks to the meanness of Germany, Hungary's just claims had been prejudiced," this was not only incomprehensible to him, but—what was much more important—it aroused in the German people a deep bit-

<sup>1</sup> i. e., in the Vienna Award of Nov. 2, 1938. See vol. iv, document No. 99.

terness and the feeling that it was experiencing great ingratitude. In Germany, with her disciplined press, this was not expressed so plainly, but it was not possible to prevent the German people from learning what was being disseminated in Hungary at present in pamphlets, in the press, and in the speeches of leading politicians. This injury could not quickly be repaired. He had often wondered whether he should not place the facts in their true light before the whole world, which, of course, would probably be very embarrassing for the Hungarian Government.

The Führer recapitulated the development of the Hungarian situation before the decisions of September. He had always regarded Kánya as an enemy of Germany. At the moment that he was speaking with Horthy about German-Hungarian cooperation during the latter's visit, Kánya did not hesitate to resurrect the Little Entente once more in Bled—and that, indeed, against Germany. Therefore he had had Imrédy and Sztójay come to him at the crucial moments and implored them in their own interest to lay the Hungarian demands before the world. Then, when matters had gone so far, Poland bestirred herself, while Hungary, except for a few insignificant acts, had slept. Germany had no thought of sacrificing herself for friends who would leave her in the lurch at the critical moment. Germany learned her lesson in the World War in this respect and had not forgotten it.

If Hungary had at that time followed the right course, and if she had in her press presented the situation for Germany, not from the ethnographic, but from the territorial point of view, the whole matter would have been treated on a territorial basis and he, the Führer, would not then have had to engage in discussions with Chamberlain. In a total solution, which he would have preferred, it would have been a matter of indifference to him what happened east of the Carpathians. But Hungary had considered the ethnographic principle as decisive for Germany and subsequently claimed the territorial principle for herself. Count Bethlen's attitude was outrageous, and he was itching to open the eyes of the Hungarian people publicly to what really occurred.

The Hungarians had submitted a map to the Reich Foreign Minister and asked him to negotiate for them. He had not pressed himself on them; it had even been very distasteful to him. But he had negotiated with the Czechs, and 95 to 98 percent of the Hungarian demands had been met. Hungary had then accepted. After all, one had to negotiate unless one wanted to resort to military measures. What military intervention meant at this time was something that those could judge who bore responsibility for it, and not just any street politician. He would be prepared at any time to show the Hungarian

people how loyal he had been toward them. Those statements which asserted that we were against the common Polish-Hungarian boundary were "idiotic." It was disloyal of Hungary to oppose the award, in which the ethnographic principle had been decisive, after she had accepted it. There was talk now in Hungary of the great, thousand-year-old kingdom of Stephen. Over against such demands, however, he would put through those of the Greater German Reich. If the Hungarians had cooperated at the right time, he could have laughed in Chamberlain's face. He would be happy if these mistaken utterances in the Hungarian press would cease; otherwise he might correct them some day.

Count Csáky answered that he was convinced that the great mass of the Hungarian people cherished a deep friendship for Germany. He admitted that during the crisis the Hungarian people were weighed down by heavy cares; for militarily Hungary was extremely weak. Czechoslovakia had placed her strongest troops on the Hungarian border in the belief that the Germans would march through Hungary. If the Hungarians had attacked, they would have been overrun by the Czechs. The Führer called this interpretation ridiculous. Forty-two German divisions had stood ready along the Czech border, which, in conjunction with the immense air power which was mobilized, would have destroyed Czechoslovakia within eight days. At that time the whole question had only been whether to solve the problem ethnographically or territorially. For the latter, the matter would have had to be represented as a general Central European conflagration. But after it had once been settled ethnographically, and England and France had toyed with the idea of a guarantee, it was not possible to open up the whole problem again. What had Hungary been trying to do in December? Czechoslovakia was far superior militarily and would have been able to occupy Budapest in a few days. Then Germany would have had to intervene. On the part of the Hungarians the whole thing had been extremely imprudent—from a military point of view, also. The award had been made in congruity with an ethnographic solution. The Führer had asked Mussolini to look after the interests of Hungary and Poland at Munich, which he did. However, if Hungary had determined to act at the proper time, the decisions would have been quite different. In a talk with Poncet, it had likewise become clear to him that the Western powers would have had to take a quite different position in the event of a reopening of the problem in December.

Count Csáky said that in reality the German position would be accepted 100 percent. In Hungary they knew they could do nothing without Germany. Hungary alone could never have coped mili-

tarily with her opponents. The September decisions had produced a profound revolution in thought. Hungary, which had always lived under the pressure of the Little Entente, now felt free and relieved. This was a historical turning point for Hungary.

The Führer: it was now necessary to look into the future. Great successes would be possible of attainment only through the closest harmony of action. Each one had his own interests. Germany was too wise and too generous not to wish to give each his share. Since his desire to get the Germans back had been fulfilled, he had not been able to wage war. Mussolini would have backed him up fanatically in his struggle if it had come to that. But he agreed with Mussolini that they could now use a few years of peace in order to build up and develop many things. The motto for the future must be: "close ranks." For Germany there were regions in which she was completely disinterested.

Amazing things had been achieved. "Do you think," he asked, "that I myself would have thought it possible half a year ago that Czechoslovakia would be served up to me, so to speak, by her friends? I did not believe that England and France would go to war, but I was convinced that Czechoslovakia would have to be destroyed by a war. The way in which everything happened is historically unique. We can offer each other heartfelt congratulations."

If they were to depart from the ethnographic line and change over to territorial principles, this could only be done jointly. One had to strive toward a politico-territorial solution, and Poland and Hungary would have to participate. An ingenious solution must be sought for, one planned precisely as to timing and requiring the smallest risk (he had come to realize, moreover, that between October and March nothing could really be done in Europe in a military way). The Führer speaks of military measures and the difficulties and possibilities connected with them and comes to the conclusion that everything has to be prepared to the smallest detail so that it can come off like lightning. For, if political actions take a long time, there is great danger of intervention and of innumerable possibilities for introducing difficulties, such as the Western democracies would offer in abundance.

Csáky: "We are finally settled in the Danube Basin; the West will no longer dare to venture in."

The Führer: He saw everything as peaceful, and auguring success—on the condition, however, of perfect team play. It would be necessary to work together like a football team, Poland, Hungary, Germany, as efficiently as possible, without crises and like lightning.

Csáky: The future belongs to the Central European powers.



The Führer agrees and expresses his belief that in the future it would be possible to solve such problems without bloodshed at all; the fortifications in the West would keep the Western powers from any military intervention.

Csáky: Hungary needed peace. She had far-reaching changes to carry through. Her economic life had undergone great convulsions. The incorporation of the newly acquired territory was no trifling matter. A new agrarian law, a defense law, an income tax law, and also a "furious" rearmament were on the program. He was trying to win the goodwill of Yugoslavia and also of Rumania. He knew the Rumanian Foreign Minister well and hoped thereby to make progress.

The Führer is of the opinion that Yugoslavia and Rumania would not take any action against Hungary if Germany stood behind her. The danger lay in the West. There were our enemies: the Western way of thinking and the Jewish tendencies. There they know that as long as Germany stands Bolshevism cannot spread, and they know that where Bolshevism appears Germany will intervene. But a neighbor should be regarded not primarily as an enemy, but as an economic partner.

Csáky: "Every Great Power has a right to have order."

The Führer: "When I speak of Germany, I naturally mean Italy also, and when I speak of myself I also mean Mussolini. The whole world feels this."

Csáky says that he does not believe we would be attacked.

The Führer: If Hungary would associate herself more closely with the Axis, this would mean a strength of 135 millions. If the important country of Japan were added, it would be a matter of 245 million people. The 135 millions were joined territorially and were the strongest military power in the world, quite apart from the spiritual forces.

The Führer then asks Csáky about his position with regard to the League of Nations.

Csáky replies that he is firmly resolved to withdraw in May.

The Führer makes lengthy observations on the League of Nations. Among other things, he points out that every nation which belonged to it was supporting an institution which could turn against it. Furthermore, he observes that there are certain discussions which are dangerous for us; for example, those on disarmament. In the League of Nations votes were always equal. Since most of those countries were dependent on England, he would always face a majority. The League of Nations would always brand him as the black sheep. The League was a gigantic propaganda institution for the rearmament of

the democracies. As the League of Nations was created to hold Germany down, so the Little Entente was created to hold Hungary down. Every nation that withdrew would be giving it a kick. The other nations would follow all the more quickly. The weaker the League of Nations, the more the financial factor would enter into consideration for the small countries.

Csáky mentions that he knew from reliable sources that the Oslo powers would probably follow Hungary very quickly in withdrawing. They preferred to remain neutral.

The Führer is of the opinion that the League of Nations would turn against us in every situation; therefore the task was to render it unimportant. The problem of revision would be affected only adversely by the League of Nations. The League would take up revision in connection with section 1 [*sic*]<sup>2</sup> and make it impossible. The League of Nations was sabotaging a sensible order in Europe. The Führer mentions once more the need for intelligent, sensible, and close collaboration.

Csáky mentions another point on which Hungary had learned to think differently since Munich. The romantic idea of an expansion in all directions had disappeared. They were content to recover their own racial community. Any foreign people within one's own borders was felt as weakening. The Führer confirms this and mentions that in Germany all the Czechs were exempt from military service. We want no foreign elements in our army. The nationality controlling the state not only has the honor of guiding a nation, but also has to assume duties on behalf of this nation.

In this connection, the Jewish problem is also broached. Csáky asks if this problem could not be solved internationally. Rumania had approached him with a view to a common solution. The Führer tells about the plan to solve this problem for Germany by means of a financial scheme. He was sure of only one thing, the Jews would have to disappear from Germany to the last man. The Führer also mentions the answer which Mussolini gave the American Ambassador in reply to the latter's question regarding the Jewish problem.<sup>3</sup> For him the Jewish problem did not exist for Germany alone; Germany would support every nation which takes up this fight.

In conclusion, the Führer asks Count Csáky to convey his greetings to the Regent and his congratulations for what was achieved in the year 1938.

HEWEL

<sup>2</sup> Presumably article 19 of the Covenant.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. iv, document No. 424.

## No. 273

33/25798-805

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

RM 4

BERLIN, January 16, 1939.

## CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COUNT CSÁKY ON JANUARY 16, 1939, IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

After Count Csáky had been greeted briefly by the Reich Foreign Minister, Count Csáky declared in a lengthy statement that the main purpose of his visit was to create a better atmosphere between Germany and Hungary—an atmosphere based on mutual trust and common interests in the Danube Basin. The ultimate goal of his policy was to create such close German-Hungarian relations that no treaties would be necessary any longer. Hungary was at present very much occupied with the reincorporation of the newly acquired territories. For that reason she had great need of peace, and this applied to all her frontiers.

Hungary was at present drawing closer to Germany in the ideological field too, and he was striving to promote this movement in every way. For this reason Hungary had joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Hungarian Government intended, furthermore, to withdraw from the League of Nations in May. He, Count Csáky, had learned that if Hungary withdrew from the League of Nations, the Oslo states would soon follow. The Norwegian delegate to the League of Nations had expressed himself to this effect to the Hungarian Consul General in Geneva.

As further proof of his desire for close association with Germany he was encouraging a closer economic *rapprochement*. In this connection he was thinking of a 10-year treaty whose specific provisions the experts could undoubtedly agree on quickly. Its basic idea was a planning of the two economies.

Finally, Count Csáky brought up a complaint against the German press and the German radio. The German press and radio were capable of troubling German-Hungarian relations. He earnestly requested the mediation of the Reich Foreign Minister in this matter.

The Reich Foreign Minister emphasized at the beginning of his statements that it was necessary in the present conversation to present the point of view of both sides quite frankly. He did not wish to go into detail about things of the past. However, he was obliged to set forth briefly once more the reasons which had contributed to a certain

<sup>1</sup>The draft of the memorandum (F3/0059-68) was signed by Brücklmeier of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, and approved by Ribbentrop with minor changes.

disturbance in German-Hungarian relations. The Reich Foreign Minister then gave a brief survey of the events preceding the Munich and Vienna conferences. In this connection he mentioned the disappointment which Bled and the dilatory behavior of Hungary in the September crisis had produced among us. All of these things had given rise to a feeling among us that Hungary expected us to adopt a Hungarian, not a German, policy. But, as the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized, these were things of the past, and he was quite willing to turn over a new leaf in the book of German-Hungarian relations. The chief prerequisite for this was that in the future we should proceed in the closest political cooperation. It could by no means be a matter of indifference to Germany if shooting should start anywhere in Europe today. At present, however, we wanted tranquility for a great variety of reasons, and therefore we had to oppose any isolated Carpatho-Ukrainian action. He welcomed the fact that Hungary had joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and intimated that presently other powers would also follow. The Berlin-Rome Axis was decisive in Europe today, and the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Triangle was decisive in the world. Russia was weak and powerless. Germany did not desire any conflict at present. However, if she were attacked, she had at her disposal the best armies in the world. Everything dynamic today came from the Axis Powers, and that would be reflected in the future. Like the Italians, we still had legitimate wants. We were quite willing to realize these by negotiation, and we would realize them without any doubt. In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister mentioned the German colonies, which we want to get back in their entirety.

In the further course of the conversation, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that Germany and Hungary have no conflicting interests. Our aspirations in the Southeast were satisfied after the incorporation of the Ostmark. We desired only economic collaboration and therefore welcomed the proposal of Count Csáky for a systematic planning of the trade of the two economies. For this purpose he would instruct Ministerialdirektor Wiehl to get in touch with M. Sztójay at once.

The Reich Foreign Minister likewise welcomed the contemplated withdrawal of Hungary from the League of Nations, which was a dead instrument. In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister pointed out that in Hungary there were still wide circles that were not yet prepared to accept realities. These circles were quite capable of disturbing German-Hungarian relations.

Count Csáky replied that he could give us solemn assurance that the Regent would never tolerate a government in office which was inimical to Germany or even aloof to Germany. The Regent had already demonstrated this through action in the past, and he had in his hands all

the means of power to guarantee it for the future also. And if the Regent, who was already very advanced in years, should pass from the scene, provision had already been made for the succession.

Count Csáky now took up the matter of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. In this connection he stated that the decisive role was being played by Stoyadinovich personally. Count Ciano had told him on the occasion of his last visit that the domestic position of Stoyadinovich was firmly established. But Count Csáky doubted whether the position of Stoyadinovich domestically was strong enough for him to be able openly to conclude a treaty with Hungary. His goal was to conclude a treaty with Yugoslavia similar to the one which Yugoslavia recently concluded with Bulgaria, on which occasion Hungary would recognize the present boundary. He had asked Ciano not to undertake any direct mediation between him and Stoyadinovich for the present but to confine himself to cautious soundings. Before making a final decision on his position with reference to Yugoslavia he would get in touch with Berlin, which he would constantly keep informed about subsequent developments.

The Hungarian Foreign Minister next mentioned Hungarian relations with Rumania. He emphasized that he did not believe in the future stability of Rumania. The King of Rumania was today being vigorously attacked not only by the left but also by the right, and for that reason it was necessary to take precautions in due time in case unexpected things should happen there. His idea was not, as hitherto, to demand a union of the former Hungarian territories with Hungary, but to create a separate new Transylvanian state in which the German, Hungarian, and Rumanian elements would rule side by side with equal rights. A union with Hungary would not enter into the question, for the elements opposing this idea were too large for Hungary to be able to assimilate.

At the conclusion of the conversation, the Reich Foreign Minister brought up the position of the German minorities and emphasized how important a careful treatment of the German element in Hungary was for good German-Hungarian relations.

Count Csáky replied that he would be quite ready to meet German wishes in every respect. However, Hungary had considerable difficulty with the school problem in particular, as the German population again and again for purely economic reasons expressed the wish to learn Hungarian in the schools. He suggested that Germany should send someone to Hungary unobtrusively and unannounced, in order that he might convince himself of the truth of this assertion. For the rest, the efforts of his Government had now been successful in setting up German minority schools among the confessional schools, too. Finally, a knowledge of the German language was required in Hungary even of the lower officials.

Finally Count Csáky asked what German plans for the future were, for if Hungary associated herself so closely with Germany she was naturally very much interested in these plans, especially in connection with the problems of rearmament.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that we were interested in as strong a Hungary as possible, and that today everyone had to be as strongly armed as possible—and as quickly as possible.

In regard to Germany's relations with Czechoslovakia, the Czech Foreign Minister would shortly come here to Berlin. What was to be discussed at this meeting had not as yet been determined. He intended for the time being just to await internal developments in Czechoslovakia and let the problem come to a head there. There was no sense in making agreements with an unconsolidated Czechoslovakia. He promised Count Csáky to keep him informed regarding the progress of the conversations with Chvalkovsky.<sup>2</sup>

As regards Poland there was the prospect of possibly arriving at a broader settlement. He had discussed the Ukrainian question with Beck recently<sup>3</sup> and had emphasized then that we judged this problem from the standpoint of our anti-Soviet position, but that we were not pursuing any other plans in the Ukraine.

Count Csáky stated that Beck had expressed himself in a very satisfactory manner regarding his last meeting with the Reich Foreign Minister. With regard to Czechoslovakia, however, he asked that we act in such a way as to calm the Czechs. If the Czechs should again fire on Hungarian territory with artillery, Hungary would be forced to fire back and would then perhaps not be able to refrain from advancing. The Reich Foreign Minister then warned Count Csáky again and emphasized that Germany could not look on with indifference if shooting should start in Europe today. He warned strongly against any unilateral action by Hungary. He asked Count Csáky to influence the Hungarian terrorists to stop making trouble along the new border. Germany could never permit a unilateral solution of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak boundary problem. He would, however, also urge Chvalkovsky to see that peace was maintained in his territory.

On taking leave, Count Csáky related that, just before he had announced that Hungary was prepared to join the Anti-Comintern Pact, the American Minister had told him that a world war would undoubtedly come this year, for America "is fed up with Germany." For this reason America was using the Jewish question as propaganda from Canada to the tip of South America.

<sup>2</sup> Chvalkovsky had talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin on Jan. 21. See vol. IV, documents Nos. 158 and 159.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 120.

The Reich Foreign Minister merely replied that such threats seemed ridiculous to us, and that he was convinced, moreover, that the decent people in America would prevail and the Jewish question would harm Roosevelt rather than us.<sup>4</sup>

## RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup> A circular information telegram (73/51743-45) summarizing the results of the talks with Csáky was sent to German Missions on Jan. 20. It stated: "The forthright discussion with Csáky of the differences of recent months and their causes had the effect of clearing the atmosphere. The Hungarian Government is now familiar with the German view of the policy to be pursued by Hungary, so that it now only depends on the attitude of Hungary whether the still closer friendship with Germany and Italy which she desires will be realized."

## No. 274

2471/517604-06

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry*

A 10

SOFIA, January 17, 1939.

Pol. IV 578.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Bulgaria's domestic and international situation.

A retrospective glance at the year 1938 shows surprisingly little dynamic quality in Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy in our otherwise so lively times.

The Kiosseivanov Cabinet has paid dearly for its few timid attempts to bring itself to adopt a more positive attitude on the question of revision: for the Salonika Agreement it paid by agreeing to the refortification of the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier zone, a concession which, even though reciprocal, would nevertheless represent an advantage to Turkey as the probable defender in case of war; and for the attempt to consolidate the Friendship Pact with Yugoslavia by means of border revisions it paid with a loss of prestige at home. For, according to all reports, the Kiosseivanov-Stoyadinovich negotiations on the question of this border settlement have bogged down. Public opinion here has been all the more alienated by the fact that, while the Bulgarian Minister President has already been in Yugoslavia twice, M. Stoyadinovich has not yet made his frequently announced return visit to Sofia. The new trade agreement with Greece, which contains no tangible trade advantages, might in this connection be evaluated as an empty gesture, the same as occasional protestations of friendship toward Turkey. Finally, as far as the newspaper campaign in favor of Bulgarian revisionist aims in southern Dobruja is concerned—it flared up some time ago but has meanwhile subsided again—even this revisionist drive increasingly creates the impression that it should be considered more as a gesture for internal rather than

foreign consumption. How much such a gesture was needed is shown by the growing unrest and ferment above all within the ranks of Bulgarian youth, who gave vent to their feelings in the stormy public demonstrations of the Sofia Students' League and who were found worthy of being beaten down and kept down with the policeman's club and martial law. Even if the fatal shots fired at the Chief of the General Staff and his escort<sup>1</sup> were really, as the Government claims, acts of private vengeance, public opinion nevertheless interprets them as warnings to a regime that seeks to prevent the political rejuvenation of the country by police methods. In the heart of the great patriot Lukov—the friend and long-time collaborator of the dead Chief of the General Staff—this shooting, however, as well as the manner in which difficulties are being made for him in his efforts to proclaim a truly nationalistic program in the country, will only strengthen the determination to become the rejuvenator of his country. If only for the reason that this strong personality is the man who is deemed capable of one day leading Bulgaria out of the stagnation of her domestic and foreign situation, it is not necessary to become too concerned over the fate of the present bureaucratic regime. With growing anxiety, however, the friends of the King are wondering when this clever—we hope not too clever—prince will finally consider that the time has come to reverse the present course by deciding, while he can still do so voluntarily, to appoint a personality stronger than the constantly ailing, easy-going Minister President, who because of these traits and his regime of favoritism is slowly but surely growing to be the best-hated and most derided man in Bulgaria. I recently had access to an anonymous memorandum addressed to King Boris, the whole style and substance of which is evidence that politically minded, patriotic persons are behind it. It contained a sharply critical and warning tone which raised automatically the question: How long can a dynasty that has so recently taken root in the country and is encumbered with the odium of a defeat which has not yet been expunged, afford to try the patience of those who are the best elements of its people? This doubt troubles even those who know the merits of King Boris and of his policy of watchful waiting, which has heretofore been so wise, and who know, moreover, that besides him Bulgaria has no one who would be as capable as he of conducting particularly Bulgarian foreign policy. In view of such considerations it can only be hoped that the King, who in the past has so frequently and with so much good fortune mastered last-minute strategy, will finally still choose the right, though late, moment to change course.

Until this moment comes, we Germans will have no cause to abandon our present reserve with regard to Bulgarian revisionist desires.

<sup>1</sup> Major General Peev and his adjutant, Major Stoyanov, were shot to death outside the Ministry of War on Oct. 10, 1938. The investigation established that the assassin had no accomplices and was mentally unstable.



Independently of this attitude toward the present Bulgarian regime, we shall always, however, have to keep in mind not only Bulgaria's significance as an economic supply area for Germany, but also her military potential. From this standpoint it would be a mistake to disappoint above all the hopes of the military men here in further German assistance in the country's rearmament. While I am fully appreciative of the urgency of Germany's domestic armament program, I nevertheless venture to warn against underestimating our military interests here, as we may already be doing psychologically by making the Bulgarians promises that we are unable to keep.

v. Bülow

### No. 275

1945/485574-76

#### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 270

BUCHAREST, January 19, 1939.

I A 3

Received January 23.

Pol. IV 436.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Attitude of the Rumanian King toward the events of November 30, 1938.

With reference to report No. 203 of January 16.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him today and gave me the following statement:

Authoritative circles had at the time made statements implying a connection between the Rumanian King's trip to Germany and the measures of November 30. Since he, Gafencu, was of the opinion that German-Rumanian relations were today still being adversely affected by these statements, he had reported this fact to the King. The King had replied that during his visit to Germany he had not been aware of the gravity of the situation in Rumania. It had therefore been impossible for him, in his talks with the Führer and Field Marshal Göring, to discuss measures against the leaders of the Iron Guard that might perhaps become necessary in the near future. Only after his return to Rumania had the gravity of the situation become quite clear to him. The Government had believed that it was confronted with the alternatives either of taking the most rigorous measures or of being swept away itself. Thus he, the King, had realized the intolerable conditions in Rumania only upon his return, and had thereupon made his decision.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (8643/E504558-60). The report is an account of an interview with Comnen in which the latter gave assurances concerning the events of Nov. 30, 1938, similar to those attributed to Gafencu in the report printed here.

The Foreign Minister added that the King had first wanted to instruct him to communicate this information through his Berlin Legation. He, Gafencu, had preferred, however, to make these statements to me himself, as Foreign Minister. It was his personal opinion that the Führer and Chancellor continued to be strongly prejudiced against Rumania as a result of the events of November 30, which were viewed in a "tragic connection" with the royal visit. He wished, at any rate, to contribute to a clarification of the situation. The King's declaration seemed to him beyond all cavil. He himself, Gafencu, although a member of the National Peasant Party and not of the Government faction, had offered his services for the salvation of the country. The impression that he had recently received on visiting the Danube Delta was that there was also a strong consciousness of the gravity of the situation among the people and a readiness to come to the aid of the Fatherland. Just as it was wrong to impute to the Führer and Chancellor himself co-responsibility for the events of November 30, as was done in some irresponsible quarters, it was likewise entirely erroneous to assert that France, England, or even Russia had had a hand in the affair. The French also had known absolutely nothing about these measures.

I had the impression that the statements of the Foreign Minister, who spoke with particular emphasis and obviously with the intention of convincing me of the gravity and sincerity of his words, have some connection with the statements that M. Comnen made to me shortly before his departure for Rome. But while M. Petrescu-Comnen expressed his views to me more as a personal opinion, M. Gafencu was expressly ordered by the King to make this official communication to the Reich Government through me.

STELZER

## No. 276

1546/375983-65

### *The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 9 of January 23

BELGRADE, January 23, 1939—10:40 p. m.

Received January 24—3:30 a. m.

Pol. IV 484.

Stoyadinovich informed me as follows regarding the conversations with Ciano:<sup>1</sup>

I. Great Power Policy. In the course of the conversations, Ciano had repeatedly spoken about the Axis with the greatest warmth, and had used many arguments to prove its value. The Axis was the solid

<sup>1</sup> Ciano visited Yugoslavia from Jan. 19 to 22. See also vol. iv, documents Nos. 440, 441, and 443.

foundation on which Italian policy rested. It was to be expected that Japan, also, would draw closer to the Axis. These three Great Powers would then dominate the world.

Regarding France, Ciano had expressed himself in a rather unfriendly and pessimistic way. France's significance as a political power would inevitably decline, since her annual birth deficit was tantamount to a lost battle.

Ciano described as generally satisfactory the result of the conversations with the British statesmen, but he did not seem to have been greatly impressed.

Of Russia, Ciano had spoken only casually and very disparagingly. He obviously no longer considered her an important factor of power today.

II. The Anti-Comintern Pact. Ciano had suggested, allegedly in agreement with Berlin, that Yugoslavia also adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Stoyadinovich had replied that Yugoslav policy really went even further than the Anti-Comintern Pact, since diplomatic relations had never even been established with Soviet Russia. In principle, therefore, he had no objection to joining, if he were invited. Before deciding to join, however, he considered an exchange of views with the partners in the Balkan Entente, particularly Rumania, advisable. For this the Bucharest conference in the middle of February would furnish an opportunity.<sup>2</sup>

III. The League of Nations. Ciano had also suggested that Yugoslavia withdraw from the League of Nations. Stoyadinovich had replied that during his tenure of office he had never been in Geneva; this showed sufficiently his lack of interest in the League. On the other hand, Yugoslavia had never had any serious conflict with the League of Nations. He therefore desired to effect the separation from the League of Nations gradually and unostentatiously. For this purpose he planned first to recall the permanent Yugoslav delegation in about May of this year. This was, of course, complicated by the circumstance that Yugoslavia was at present the representative of the Little Entente in the Council.

IV. Southeastern Europe. It had been Ciano's principal endeavor to promote a *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and Hungary. Ciano had first proposed the conclusion of a pact of friendship between the two countries, but had shown appreciation for the fact that ties with Rumania and dynastic considerations restricted Yugoslavia's freedom of action. They finally left it that Stoyadinovich would take every opportunity to show his friendliness toward Hungary and the Hungarian minority, and that, on the other hand, Ciano should use his influence with Hungary in a similar direction. Stoyadinovich

<sup>2</sup> Representatives of the Balkan Entente met at Bucharest Feb. 20-22.

was of the opinion that an improvement in the atmosphere in this way would be of more practical use than a written commitment.

With regard to Rumania, Ciano had only expressed the hope that Gafencu would pursue a sensible policy.

Surprisingly enough, Ciano had shown himself very disinterested in Bulgaria. He had asked when Bulgaria would unite with Yugoslavia; Italy would have no objection to this. Stoyadinovich had replied that this was not a goal of Yugoslav foreign policy at present. It had to mature slowly and would perhaps come about by itself some day.

V. Italo-Yugoslav Relations. Ciano had openly expressed the desire that Yugoslavia collaborate closely with the Axis but had made no demand of any kind for closer ties with Italy alone. For Italy, according to Ciano, the Axis was the foundation of European policy, just as the Pact of Friendship with Yugoslavia was the basis of policy in Southeastern Europe.

For the rest, they had agreed to promote cultural and economic relations as much as possible. In particular, a credit of half a billion lire for the financing of Yugoslav Government orders was shortly to be the subject of negotiations.

In summary Stoyadinovich had stressed the exceedingly open and cordial character of the conversations throughout. He had again received the most favorable impression of Ciano's personality. He had been convinced from statements made by Ciano that Italy honestly desired a strong Yugoslavia, in which it saw the leading power and custodian of peace in the Balkans.

HEEREN

## No. 277

1213/332477-78

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, January 27, 1939.

Pol. IV 555.

The Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires called on me today and informed me as follows in connection with the last communications he had made<sup>1</sup> regarding the relations of Hungary with Yugoslavia and Rumania:

Stoyadinovich had told the Hungarian Minister in Belgrade that he was inclined to favor a further development of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. In view of the Rumanian alliance, however, he could only conclude an agreement with Hungary if Rumania also participated or at least gave her consent. Stoyadinovich, who would meet with the Rumanian Foreign Minister in the middle of February,

<sup>1</sup> Woermann and the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires had exchanged information on Jan. 25 about the Ciano-Stoyadinovich talks (1213/332475).

would then discuss the matter with him. If he did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the Rumanians, Stoyadinovich considered it most expedient to advance *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and Hungary by reciprocal declarations.

The Hungarian Minister to Belgrade was thereupon instructed to inform Stoyadinovich that the Hungarian Government wished to pursue a policy of broad understanding with Rumania but was by no means inclined to conclude the same agreement with Rumania as with Yugoslavia. In relation to Rumania, the Bled declaration constituted the maximum. With Yugoslavia, however, Hungary was prepared, under certain circumstances, to conclude even a long-term nonaggression pact. As regards the unilateral declarations suggested by Stoyadinovich if the treaty should fail to come about, the former Hungarian Foreign Minister had already made such a declaration but it had brought no response from Belgrade.

M. de Ghyczy added that the impression existed in Budapest that Stoyadinovich wished to pursue a Yugoslav-Rumanian-Hungarian bloc policy. The Hungarian Government was opposed to such a bloc policy. As was well known, it refused to participate in any bloc policy in which Germany and Italy were not included. The Hungarian Government would regret it, however, if Stoyadinovich should not continue with the policy of *rapprochement* in consideration of Rumania and under her influence. It was now necessary to wait and see how the conversation between the Foreign Ministers of Yugoslavia and Rumania turned out.

WOERMANN

## No. 278

3062/611797

### *Minute by the State Secretary*

[St. S. No. 79]<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, January 29, 1939.

For the Foreign Minister.

The substance of the communication which the Hungarian Minister wished urgently to make to the Reich Foreign Minister today by direction of Count Csáky, was briefly as follows:

1. In order to elucidate the new phase in the relations between Hungary and Germany which had begun under Count Csáky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister would greatly welcome it if the Führer, in his speech on January 30—insofar as it is concerned with foreign policy in detail—would as last year name Hungary first among the smaller powers; that is, place her before Yugoslavia, etc.<sup>2</sup>

2. Count Csáky is therefore anxious in this connection to apprise us of the fact that he has rejected mediation in Hungarian-Rumanian

<sup>1</sup> The number was added later in handwriting on a carbon copy of the original (485/231677).

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "The Führer has promised this. Hew[el], Jan. 30."

relations on the part of Yugoslavia, since he does not wish to have anything to do with a Yugoslav-Hungarian-Rumanian bloc, and if mediation should be necessary he desired to avail himself solely of the Berlin-Rome Axis.

3. The later Germany guarantees the present Czechoslovak borders, the more agreeable for Hungary.

4. The continued dwelling on the so-called Crown of St. Stephen idea in the press is not desired by the Hungarian Government.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 279

1945/435579-83

*Under State Secretary Woermann to Minister Fabricius*

BERLIN, January 31, 1939.

zu Pol. IV 523.<sup>1</sup>

DEAR HERR FABRICIUS: We should have liked to see you here once more before your return to Rumania. In view of the plan you had made for the last days of your vacation and your desire to be in Bucharest on January 30, we refrained, however, from asking you to come here. I should therefore like to tell you by letter a few things that we could otherwise have discussed orally.

Through various channels we have received definite news to the effect that the Rumanians are trying to achieve better relations with us. In the first place, Counselor of Legation Stelzer made several reports on statements by the Rumanian Foreign Minister and other personages that indicated such a desire on the part of the Rumanians. I do not need to go into detail since you will have read these reports after your return. We have also heard from a strictly confidential source that Constantinescu, who was with G. Bratianu in Berlin shortly before the King's trip to England, came to Berlin again a few days ago and—independently of the Foreign Ministry, by the way—is trying to get in touch with the person who, as you know, spoke with the King at considerable length regarding a large-scale economic project on the occasion of the King's visit to Germany. As the same source reveals, efforts are also being made in this connection to include Stoyadinovich, who of his own accord on the occasion of Count Ciano's visit to Belgrade already expressed the intention of discussing various questions of foreign policy with Foreign Minister Gafencu in the near future.

Finally, Count Ciano has informed us that the Hungarian Foreign Minister gained the impression on his visit to Berlin that we had appeared disinterested in Hungarian-Rumanian relations. Count Ciano asked at the same time that we inform him of our attitude on

<sup>1</sup> Pol. IV 523 (Bucharest Legation Telegram No. 14 of Jan. 24): Not printed (1945/435577-78).

Hungarian-Rumanian relations and on Rumania herself so that the attitude of the Axis Powers on this question might be consistent and he could instruct the Italian representatives accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

To this we replied: During the Csáky visit Hungarian-Rumanian relations had been treated as in an unsettled state. Any settlement possibly contemplated by Hungary had not been explained clearly enough for us to be able to take any action on our part. Moreover, we were also interested in gradually bringing Rumania into closer alignment with the Axis Powers, but it seemed advisable to us first to await developments in the uncertain internal situation of Rumania.

This is our general line at the moment. It is also in accordance with the instructions that the Foreign Minister gave you previously.

We have read with interest the political reports that Counselor of Legation Stelzer made as Chargé d'Affaires. He obviously tried, on the basis of statements that had reached his ears—statements of influential persons—to convey to us the mood prevailing in Bucharest. But in the conversations which he reported in telegram No. 14 of January 24 he possibly ventured a little too far in the question of the reorganization of the Government, particularly since these conversations took place shortly before your return. This is not meant as a reproach, but it would probably be to his own interest if you would suggest to him in a friendly way that whenever he is Chargé d'Affaires in the future he should make reports and receive instructions rather than express his own opinion on political matters in this way.

What we have heard about the change apparently planned in the top personnel of the Rumanian Legation here is incompatible with the above-mentioned efforts of the Rumanians at *rapprochement*. From the instructions you have, you will see what is involved. Perhaps the fact of your return to Bucharest will suffice to prompt the Rumanians to set about clarifying this question.

We should be obliged for an early statement of your first impressions.

WOERMANN

<sup>2</sup> For the exchange with Ciano referred to here, see vol. IV, documents Nos. 441 and 443.

## No. 280

1945/435586-87

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 25 of February 1

BUCHAREST, February 2, 1939—8:00 a. m.

Received February 2—12:45 p. m.

Pol. IV 651.

Immediately upon my arrival and before his departure for Belgrade, Foreign Minister Gafencu requested me to call on him and reiterated

the assurance he had given the Chargé d'Affaires, that the King and the Rumanian Government sincerely wanted to work with Germany. I explained to him, as I had done to his predecessor Comnen last December, why the events at the end of November, shortly after the King's visit to the Berghof, had necessarily aroused deep resentment in Germany. He did not seem to close his mind to our reasoning, but denied the influence of Jewish circles. During the King's absence the Iron Guard had resumed the fight through acts of terrorism; the state had reacted to that. In the struggle against the old parliamentarians such as Maniu of the National Peasant Party and Dinu Bratianu of the Liberals, on the one hand, and the Iron Guard on the other, the Government had remained victorious. Unfortunately, blood was shed, but not until the Iron Guard had started it.

Gafencu believes that the Government will remain stable and that it should be possible to build up the Rumanian National Front as the main support of the state. It was a well-known fact that this development was intended to follow lines similar to National Socialism and Fascism. When I asked whether Jews or baptized Jews would be accepted, the Foreign Minister replied that this was out of the question. The course was anti-Semitic. When I remarked that prominent Jews such as Ausnit, Sapiro, Kaufmann, and especially Mme. Lupescu were still in evidence, he denied Mme. Lupescu's *political* influence; with respect to other Jews he would speak to the King about withdrawing further from their influence.

Gafencu asked that we let bygones be bygones, especially since the Rumanian press, at his suggestion, had shown a correct attitude toward Germany throughout, and he inquired whether we had any suggestions for improving relations. I replied that confidence had been shaken; but if Rumania followed a clear-cut policy against international Jewry, eliminated the Jews from the press altogether, and finally ceased to foster intrigues against persons such as Konradi and Schickert, we would regard this as a step toward a *rapprochement*. In any event, however, the initiative would now have to come from Rumania alone and bring positive results.

I then discussed the Schickert affair at great length in the sense of instruction P. 664 of January 21.<sup>1</sup> He promised me to receive Schickert. More positive cooperation was expected of him in the interest of an understanding.

In conclusion Gafencu told me that Minister Djuvara was to be sent to Athens as Ambassador and that the King intended to appoint Radu

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<sup>1</sup> On Dec. 12, 1938, the Rumanian Government informed the German Legation that Dr. Schickert, the DNB representative in Rumania, was no longer desired in the country because of the nature of his reports. The instruction included a copy of a letter from the DNB requesting that the Legation in Bucharest should clear the matter up with the Rumanian Government and should emphasize that the accusations against Schickert were unfounded and had therefore to be refuted (6644/E504564-85).



Crutescu (see report No. 188 [137] of January 13<sup>2</sup>) as Minister to Berlin. Gafencu requested that I find out whether Crutescu was acceptable, so that there would be no gap between his predecessor's departure and his appointment.

Please communicate with me by telegram on this point. Crutescu has been warmly recommended to me by George Bratianu; my own impression of him is also favorable.

FABRICIUS

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed (1945/435572). Gafencu told the German Chargé d'Affaires that he planned this appointment as the first in a series of measures to improve relations with Germany. He would also like to visit Berlin before he paid any other visits abroad.

### No. 281

1945/435605-08

*Minister Fabricius to Under State Secretary Woermann*

BUCHAREST, February 3, 1939.

Pol. IV 1058.

DEAR HERR WOERMANN: My sincere thanks for your kind letter of January 31. I, too, was very sorry that I was not able to visit Berlin again before returning to Bucharest. But I also felt that I had been out of touch with the latest events here too long to be able in a very brief period to handle the matters which are pending. And my return was very urgently awaited here.

M. Gafencu almost embraced me and said that my return was a great relief to him. The good Rumanians had believed there would be something like a temporary break in relations, and they were strongly encouraged in this belief by the French and the British here, or at least by the British Minister.

The Poles, too, would not have minded if our relations with Rumania had deteriorated. They consider Rumania the country in Southeastern Europe in which they could most easily sell their products. And the oil here tempts them as much as it does us. Since successful commercial relations in the East are always dependent on a generally favorable atmosphere, they hoped that our dissatisfaction over the Codreanu affair would be perpetuated.

I have instructed Stelzer, who is bringing you this letter, along the lines of your communication. He would like to correct the impression that his telegram gave; he had warned against the appointment of Calinescu as Minister President only in an extremely guarded and "personal" manner. And I cannot imagine anything else—otherwise the Rumanians would not simply have accepted it without further ado.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

FABRICIUS

## No. 282

169/82493-94

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa*

BERLIN, February 3, 1939.

e. o. Pol. IV 665.

During his visit today M. George Bratianu<sup>1</sup> informed me of the following:

He had arrived here early the day before yesterday and was received by Field Marshal Göring at noon the same day. This reception had been prepared by his friend Constantinescu. Tomorrow evening he would start his return trip to Bucharest, and he was sorry that owing to the short time at his disposal he would have to forego further visits, much as he would like to have requested an audience with the Reich Foreign Minister.

He had come to Berlin in grave concern, fearing that he would find general dissatisfaction with Rumania here. From his conversation with the Field Marshal, however, he had gained the impression that the dissatisfaction which had arisen here owing to the well-known occurrences was not directed against Rumania in general. He therefore believed—and he had also said so—that it was now time to do something to improve German-Rumanian relations, and that this could best be done in the economic field. During his conversation with the Field Marshal and in another with Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat he had promised to ascertain in Bucharest as soon as possible whether the Rumanians were willing to enter into economic negotiations on a sufficiently large scale as to make it possible to undertake such negotiations with some prospect of success. If, as he hoped, there was a basis for successful negotiations, it would be well in his opinion if Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat would come to Bucharest as soon as possible. He would then see to it that immediately after his arrival Herr Wohlthat would have a conversation with the King and thereafter get in touch with the Ministers concerned. He would immediately inform the Field Marshal and Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat of the result of his inquiries in Bucharest.

M. Bratianu then spoke of the King's visit with the Führer and the occurrences which had taken place immediately after the King's

<sup>1</sup> Fabricius telegraphed from Bucharest on Jan. 31 (2524/520128) that Bratianu was coming to Berlin to ask the German Government to continue and to develop further its cooperation with Rumania. He was making the visit, he told Fabricius, with the approval of the King and the Foreign Minister. Although he had not joined the new National Front in Rumania he lent himself to this diplomatic effort because he believed that Rumania's future depended entirely on her relations with Germany.

return to Rumania. He said it seemed to him that we were not completely informed about the incidents. The King had not been informed while he was in Germany of what had gone on in Rumania during his absence, especially the fact that the Iron Guard had committed acts of terror. On his return a report had been made to him, evidently in a manner which had impressed him extremely, so that the shootings in question had then come about.

M. Bratianu then spoke briefly of the recent reorganization of the Rumanian Cabinet. He is of the opinion that it will be possible to work well on German-Rumanian economic questions with the Ministers now handling economic matters.

HEINBURG

### No. 283

167/132803-04

#### *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 10 of February 3

Moscow, February 3, 1939—9:46 p. m.

[Received February 3—11:30 p. m.]

Pol. IV 260 g.]

With reference to instruction Pol. IV 60 g. 144 g. of January 19.<sup>1</sup>

The Hungarian Minister informed me today that recently, after his return from leave, he called on Litvinov, discussed with him Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, especially with reference to the Soviet note handed to the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires previously, and declared that the Hungarian Government did not consider its adherence a step against the Soviet Union or the Soviet Government, but against World Communism, which Hungary had always fought. Litvinov could not be turned from the opinion that the Anti-Comintern Pact was more than an ideological pact, that it was directed against the Soviet Union, and that it was accompanied by military agreements. Litvinov asserted that he had proof of this.

Yesterday Litvinov sent for the Hungarian Minister and made the statements contained in today's Tass communiqué (cf. the report of the DNB correspondent).<sup>2</sup> Litvinov emphasized that the Soviet Union

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (167/132850). The instruction forwarded without comment the text of the telegram from Budapest printed as document No. 271.

<sup>2</sup> As published in the *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung* of Feb. 3 the communiqué read: "On February 1 Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov informed the Hungarian Minister in Moscow, M. Jungerth-Arnothy, that the Soviet Government had decided to withdraw its Legation from Budapest and expected that the Hungarian Legation in Moscow would also be closed."

did not desire a break in relations, but believed that it was more in accord with the situation to maintain relations through third states.

The Hungarian Minister asked Litvinov whether the Soviet Union would act in the same manner toward all countries which associated themselves with the Anti-Comintern Pact or with any combination conforming to their interests but not approved by the Soviet Union. Litvinov replied that under the same circumstances the Soviet Union would probably react in the same manner in the future, too.<sup>3</sup>

SCHULENBURG

<sup>1</sup> On Feb. 7 the Hungarian Minister in Berlin suggested to Weizsäcker that, to prevent other states which might adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact from being intimidated by the Russian move, a strong counter-action such as the departure of the German and Italian Ambassadors on lengthy leave of absence from Moscow was desirable. Weizsäcker asked whether Sztójay had also considered the Japanese. In this case the Hungarians would be recommending the departure of the very Ambassador they had selected to represent their interests in Russia (485/231680-81).

In a memorandum of Feb. 17 (73/51781) Weizsäcker wrote that the Hungarian Minister had returned to the subject once more. Weizsäcker told him that much as Germany would welcome a gesture of solidarity by the Anti-Comintern powers, the German Ambassador in Moscow was involved in economic negotiations and could not be withdrawn.

## No. 284

2104/455833

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 32 of February 6

BUCHAREST, February 6, 1939—8:25 p. m.

Received February 6—9:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 26 of February 1.<sup>1</sup>

Air Attaché Colonel Gerstenberg<sup>2</sup> today attended the Arado demonstration before the Air Minister and 200 air force officers. The demonstration aroused general enthusiasm. The Air Minister, who had extensive conversations with the Air Attaché yesterday, declared that

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2261/478823).

<sup>2</sup> Gerstenberg served as Air Attaché to both Rumania and Poland. On Feb. 3 he wrote a lengthy report (5555/E395196-202) giving his observations on his return to Rumania after an absence of three months. He had been received at once by the King, the Air Minister, and the Chief of the General Staff. They had all betrayed great anxiety to resume and develop good relations with Germany. He attributed this in part to the displeasure shown by Germany over the Iron Guard shootings. While he was skeptical as to the extent of popular support enjoyed by the new National Front regime, he thought that, in the absence of an organized opposition, the "lesser evil" would be to cooperate with it. By taking advantage of the regime's desire for closer economic relations Germany would in effect lend it support, but the only alternative was internal chaos and foreign meddling.

it had been decided to develop the Rumanian air force with German technical assistance. An order amounting to from 13 to 50 million marks is to be forthcoming soon.

It might be practicable to tie in the financing with the contemplated economic program, the discussion of which absolutely necessitates an early visit here by Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat. The Air Minister again asked that Wohlthat pay this visit and Foreign Minister Gafencu also spoke to me about it.<sup>3</sup>

FABRICIUS

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "To the Economic Policy Department for a decision on the advisability of Wohlthat's trip. R[ibbentrop]."

No. 285

F19/078-74

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RM No. 10

BERLIN, February 7, 1939.

[Pol. IV 848.]<sup>1</sup>

NOTES ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER  
AND YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER CINCAR-MARKOVICH

In the course of his farewell visit, Cincar-Markovich said that the Government crisis in Yugoslavia had broken out unexpectedly and entirely for reasons of domestic policy, and that foreign policy was in no way affected by it.<sup>2</sup> He (Cincar-Markovich) would try to strengthen still further relations between Germany and Yugoslavia and to examine the question of Yugoslavia's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

The Foreign Minister gave the new Yugoslav Foreign Minister a survey of Germany's general policy in Southeastern Europe and had the impression that Cincar-Markovich was sincerely trying further to adjust Yugoslavia's foreign policy to the Axis. When Cincar-Markovich asked about a settlement of relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister replied that Germany would welcome a settlement between the two countries.

Cincar-Markovich stated further that Prince Regent Paul had been and would remain the guarantor of a continued policy of Yugoslav friendship with Germany and Italy.

Cincar-Markovich knows nothing regarding the intentions of Stoyadinovich; he thinks, however, that the latter does not view

<sup>1</sup> The file number is taken from another copy of the document (509/235387-89).

<sup>2</sup> A new cabinet headed by Dragisha Cvetkovich, in which the Yugoslav Minister in Berlin became Foreign Minister, was formed on Feb. 4. Stoyadinovich had been obliged to resign when his cabinet broke up over the issue of Croatian autonomy.

internal developments in Yugoslavia optimistically and is quietly biding his time until he can again step in.

Submitted herewith to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT  
*Minister*

## No. 286

2480/517682

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 36 of February 7

BUCHAREST, February 7, 1939—7:30 p. m.

Received February 7—11:30 p. m.

Pol. IV 790.

Gafencu, who had sent for me to give me his impressions of his Belgrade visit, told me that he, together with Prince Regent Paul and Stoyadinovich, had noted the absolute identity of both countries' policies toward Germany. He had especially emphasized this in his statements to the press, which Stoyadinovich personally no longer had any need to do.

The cabinet crisis in Belgrade had come unexpectedly after his departure; but it would, as he had since ascertained, bring no change in foreign policy.

There was also agreement between Yugoslavia and Rumania regarding policy toward Hungary. Since Ciano had strongly pressed in Belgrade for an improvement in relations with Hungary, Yugoslavia was inclined to do something, but definitely not without parallel action between Rumania and Hungary. He had in mind a proposal to Hungary that the Bled Declarations which had only been initialed be signed; he would guarantee good treatment for the Hungarian minorities. But he would make this proposal to Hungary only if Germany, too, approved of this solution.

I replied that M. Gafencu was familiar with our position on these questions from repeated statements by the Führer and Chancellor and that nothing had changed. However, he insisted on a reply from Berlin as soon as possible since he wanted to do nothing without consulting us. He also mentioned that he wished to pay an early visit to Berlin. I did not respond to this.

Please wire instructions.

FABRICIUS

## No. 287

1895/428932

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

No. 23 of February 8, 1939      BERLIN, February 8, 1939—10:10 p. m.  
e. o. Pol. IV 831.

With reference to your No. 36 of February 7.

You will tell the Rumanian Foreign Minister that for us the Little Entente has ceased to exist.<sup>1</sup> The proposal that we give our consent to a Rumanian step in Hungary aimed to effect the signing of the Bled Declaration between the Little Entente and Hungary is certainly not without its humorous aspect. You are, no doubt, familiar with the arguments to be presented to the Rumanian Foreign Minister against this manner of settlement with Hungary.

RIBBENTROP

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<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously Ribbentrop ordered that an instruction be sent to all Missions that the expression "Little Entente" was no longer to be used in reports and conversations (1895/428933-34).

## No. 288

6570/E398809

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, February 9, 1939.

The Krupp firm requests a 100 percent Reich guarantee for an arms transaction with the Yugoslav Government. To be delivered are 100 million reichsmarks' worth of antiaircraft guns, computers, sound locators, searchlights, prime movers, cross-country vehicles. Terms: Delivery on credit, repayment in 10 years, not in foreign exchange, but by settlement through the usual clearing, that is, only partly against raw materials of equivalent foreign exchange value. The prices would have to be reduced by means of Reich subsidies. The agencies involved are only prepared to give a Reich guarantee of 85 percent on credit extended for 6 years, and that only if a political interest is demonstrated.

Previous German arms deliveries to Yugoslavia have always been blocked by the opposition of military officials there and have been disposed of principally to Czechoslovakia. Stoyadinovich recently overcame this opposition by the removal of two generals. The transaction contemplated represents Germany's first chance to participate in the arming of Yugoslavia. Consul General Neuhausen, Field Marshal Göring's agent in Yugoslavia, is strongly in favor of closing

the deal, but advised postponing the decision for a short time in view of the recent change in the Yugoslav Government. He will probably come here from Belgrade in the next few days with more recent news about the situation there.

Military Attaché Faber du Faur shares the attitude of Consul General Neuhausen.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.<sup>1</sup>

WIEHL

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The Italian credit offer runs to about 60 million reichsmarks (500 million lire) for state orders, not exclusively arms deliveries. W[iehl]. Feb. 9."

## No. 289

1895/426935-36

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 500

BUCHAREST, February 10, 1939.

I A 4

Received February 13.

Pol. IV 922.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversation with Foreign Minister Gafencu.

With reference to telegraphic instruction No. 23 of February 8.

I conveyed a reply along the lines of the telegraphic instruction referred to above to Foreign Minister Gafencu.

He rejoined that he had, to be sure, discussed with M. Stoyadinovich, who was still Minister President, the possibility of keeping alive the fiction of the Little Entente. But if Germany held the view that the Little Entente had ceased to exist, he was completely in agreement and accepted that view as his own. With regard to the Bled Declaration it meant a great deal to him to know that Berlin shared the views I had communicated to him at the time of our first conversation. He had mentioned the ratification of the Bled Declaration only because Count Ciano had demanded from Yugoslavia a conciliatory attitude toward Hungary and since Yugoslavia would and could do nothing in that direction without Rumania, he had suggested the final signature of the declarations which had been initialed at the time. Thereby it would have been possible to avoid new negotiations. Since he had gathered from my remarks, however, that this manner of settlement with Hungary was not agreeable to Germany he would do nothing for the time being but wait until Hungary approached him again. He would in any case see to it that the Hungarian minority received better treatment.



M. Gafencu then turned to the question of the Carpatho-Ukraine. He said the Poles claimed constantly that Germany was modifying her attitude, or at least was no longer so intransigent as in the past. I retorted that, as far as I knew, the German attitude had not undergone any change. Only time could tell, of course, whether the state as set up there at the present time would be viable in the long run. M. Gafencu said that Rumania had revised her previous opinion, for after the direct connection to Prague and Germany via Czechoslovakia was cut, her interest in preserving that impassable strip of land known as the Carpatho-Ukraine was no longer so great. He was telling us this for our information, as Germany and Rumania had been collaborating closely in this question from the very beginning; at the same time, however, he was asking us to let him know in case we should ever contemplate a change of regime in that territory, so that Rumania might then act in conformity with us and prepare public opinion in the country well in advance.

FABRICIUS

No. 290

5570/E398808

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, February 11, 1939.

zu W 290 g.<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Armament transaction with Yugoslavia.

Consul General Neuhausen has returned from Belgrade and reports as follows:

The attitude of the new Yugoslav Government toward Germany and Italy is such that the armament transaction may be safely concluded with it, too. An Italian credit of 500 million lire has, it is true, been offered by Ciano, but it has not yet been accepted since considerable difference of opinion exists regarding specific terms. The Italians wish also in part to supply arms under the credit; a contract for 2 cm. guns has already been concluded.

Besides the Krupp transaction of some 100 million reichsmarks reported earlier, German deliveries are also said to include large airplane shipments for another 100 million reichsmarks, negotiations on which are likewise already in progress. The total amount therefore is 200 million reichsmarks. Field Marshal Göring, Minister Funk,<sup>2</sup> and State Secretary Brinkmann<sup>2</sup> have agreed to the transaction. Financial terms are to be further improved.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 307.

<sup>2</sup> Of the Reich and Prussian Ministry of Economics.

Neuhausen explained that failure to inform the Foreign Ministry promptly was due to the fact that it had been assumed that the Ministry would be informed through the reports of the Military and Air Attachés. I intend to write to the Minister about this.<sup>3</sup>

The next session of the Guarantee Committee in the Ministry of Finance regarding the transaction will take place the afternoon of Monday, February 13. It is proposed that the representative of the Foreign Ministry take the following stand: the transaction is desirable for political reasons, but political interest does not go so far as to justify an economic loss.

Submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister with the request for approval of the instruction.<sup>4</sup> An earlier memorandum is attached.<sup>5</sup>

W[IEHL]

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "Telegraph Heeren." See document No. 296, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "1. Restrict to 100 million. 2. Better relations. R[ibbentrop]."

<sup>5</sup> Presumably the memorandum printed as document No. 288 is meant.

## No. 291

569/235392-93

### *The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 23 of February 11

BELGRADE, February 11, 1939—8:00 p. m.

Received February 11—9:35 p. m.

Pol. IV 882.

Minister President and Minister of the Interior Cvetkovich, who had asked me to see him today, began by protesting vigorously his personal sympathies for Germany. Even as Mayor of Nish, he had always favored German industry in the letting of municipal contracts. On last year's information trip to Germany he became a sincere admirer of NSDAP achievements in the social and economic fields. This could be confirmed by the Germans with whom he came in contact during the trip. He was glad, as Minister President, to be able to work for the further strengthening of Yugoslav-German relations. The line of Yugoslav foreign policy with respect to Germany naturally remained unchanged. This was guaranteed not only by the appointment of the Minister to Berlin as Foreign Minister but, above all, by the fact that the Prince Regent alone was and would remain authoritative in this matter.

I thanked Cvetkovich for his statement, adding that I had never for one moment feared a change of course in Yugoslav foreign policy toward us. This seemed to me—apart from all other things—also

guaranteed at present by the fact that the correctness of the present course had only recently been strikingly demonstrated. The only thing that still troubled me was the divergence continuing to exist between our political friendship and the spirit in which the German element was even now frequently being treated in Yugoslavia and particularly in Slovenia. The new Germany regarded decent treatment of the Germans on the other side of the border as the indispensable prerequisite for lasting friendship. This had to be realized in Slovenia, too.

Cvetkovich agreed with me at once and promised to see to it, in his capacity as Minister of the Interior, that we had no cause for complaint. He asked me always to send complaints of this kind directly to him for redress. People considered him dependent upon Korošec. This was not the case. What he thought proper was what would be done in Slovenia.

It was to be plainly inferred from the content and form of the conversation that the Yugoslav Minister President is extremely anxious to dissipate any possible German mistrust for him personally and is even ready to make sacrifices to this end. The further development of the situation of the Germans in Slovenia will best show how far he is prepared to go.

HEEREN

No. 292

1975/439314-15

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa*

BERLIN, February 13, 1939.  
e. o. Pol. IV 942.

The Hungarian Minister called today and handed me the attached memorandum. He made the following comment:

He had already spoken about the subject dealt with in the memorandum in his conversation with the State Secretary on the evening of February 11. By agreement with the State Secretary he had summarized in the memorandum the statements he made at that time. According to reports received by the Hungarian Government, Rumanian Foreign Minister Gafencu had the idea of forming a Rumanian-Hungarian-Yugoslav bloc. These reports had not been confirmed. In any event, however, the Hungarian Government maintained that its participation in such a bloc was out of the question. He wished to stress that again on this occasion. For the rest, he believed he could assume that the way the Hungarian Government intended to treat any Rumanian invitation to joint negotiations would

conform to the German viewpoint. He would be grateful if he could anticipate a statement by us on this subject in due time.

I told the Minister that I would inform the State Secretary of his statements after his return.

HEINBURG

[Enclosure]

ROYAL HUNGARIAN LEGATION

BERLIN, February 10, 1939.

# MEMORANDUM

As a sequel to his negotiations in Belgrade Foreign Minister Gafencu of Rumania is said to be working toward the creation of a tripartite agreement with Hungary and Yugoslavia on the basis of the Bled conference.

Actually Hungary considers the Bled agreement as being in effect (we have rearmcd), but, on the other hand, as outdated.

While Count Csáky would be willing to negotiate with both countries, he would do so

1. bilaterally only
2. under no circumstances on the basis of the Bled agreement, but only on an entirely new basis, and
3. at a very slow pace, because the internal political situation had now become uncertain not only in Rumania but even in Yugoslavia.

An invitation to joint negotiations is expected shortly.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On a copy of the Hungarian memorandum (1975/438316) apparently prepared for circulation in the Foreign Ministry there is a marginal note: "Agreed. R[ibbentrop]."

In a memorandum of Feb. 17 (1975/438317) Weizsäcker recorded that he had given the Hungarian Minister provisional approval of the three points outlined by Csáky. In a handwritten note added on Feb. 20 he stated that he had confirmed this to the Minister after consulting with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop.

No. 293

2104/455829-30

*The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 42 of February 14 BUCHAREST, February 14, 1939—10:45 p. m.

Received February 15—3:00 a. m.

W III 1209.

Promptly upon his arrival Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat was received by the King, who made reference to his conversation with Field

Marshal Göring in Leipzig. The possibilities of close economic co-operation were discussed at great length. The King declared himself as favoring an extensive reliance on Germany for Rumanian economic development. It developed that the outlines of an economic program had been prepared by Foreign Minister Gafencu, Economics Minister Bujoiu, Minister of Armaments Slavescu and Finance Minister Constantinescu, with the King presiding.

In Wohlthat's further conversation with the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Economics the intention to undertake long-range collaboration with Germany was again confirmed: "Germany generally shall regain the position of economic predominance in Rumania which she had before 1914." In view of such Rumanian willingness the following economic program should be drawn up in an "agreement for the promotion of economic relations between the two countries":

I. For the purpose of promoting and securing German imports from Rumania

1. the authorities and commercial organizations on both sides shall establish regular contacts for adapting Rumanian production to German requirements, especially in the agricultural field;

2. investments and capital participation shall be undertaken to develop a German-Rumanian petroleum industry;

3. Rumanian mineral resources shall be explored and exploited in common;

4. a timber management plan shall be drawn up and Germany shall participate in the exploitation of forests (elimination of Jews from the lumber business).

## II. Rumania is prepared

1. to expand Rumanian industry and cooperate with German industry while respecting German export interests;

2. to expand and standardize Rumanian armament, especially of the air force, with German aid;

3. to develop her armament industry along German lines;

4. to cooperate in matters of communication, especially in the construction of roads and waterways (group garbled).

Germany would be reimbursed from export proceeds.

If this goal is attainable, Germany will indeed achieve predominance in Rumania. Since the Government commission is aware of this fact and therefore considers the attainment of this goal in the interest of the country, such a favorable opportunity of tying this country to us should, in our opinion, be exploited. By such a close economic association between the two countries Rumania will be more and more removed from the influence of the Western powers and the Soviets, and thereby from the Jews, and the general atmosphere between us will be improved.

I request prompt consideration and instruction as to whether Wohlthat may prepare and sign an agreement on the basis given.

WOHLTHAT  
FABRICIUS

No. 294

2104/455826-27

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy  
Department*

BERLIN, February 15, 1939.

I should like to make a few personal remarks regarding telegram No. 42<sup>1</sup> just received from Bucharest:

I think it advisable to accept the Rumanian proposals for concluding an agreement about comprehensive economic cooperation with Germany. While it would be wrong to deceive ourselves about the fact that in the case of some of the items contemplated for this agreement it will be more a question of fine words than of actual accomplishments, it would nevertheless be inadvisable to pass up the opportunity offered by the Rumanians. Slavescu and Bujoiu, and to a certain extent Foreign Minister Gafencu, too, can be regarded as friends of economic cooperation with Germany. There is reason to fear that such a favorable personal constellation, which is markedly different from the situation in December 1938, is not likely soon to return.

The following may be said concerning the separate points of the telegram:

*Re I, 1:* The planting of soybeans had good results, but is terribly expensive for us, because the prices continue to be far above world market quotations. In any further experiments of this sort it should be kept in mind that they cannot be abandoned without loss of prestige once they have been started on a large scale. The cost must therefore be calculated in advance on a long-term basis.

*Re I, 2:* Capital investments in the petroleum industry, especially in the initial period, cannot be financed from the deliveries which then would be comparatively small. Transfers of capital are unavoidable, but the clearing transaction will be difficult. Whether one of the existing Rumanian concerns can profitably be taken over is doubtful.

*Re I, 3:* Prospecting of mineral resources is certainly of great interest in view of probably existing ore deposits of all sorts.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 293.

*Re I, 4:* The plan for timber management will not bring great results, since we are buying the maximum possible even now. Nevertheless, the elimination of the Jewish lumber trade is of interest.

*Re II, 1:* This is more a figure of speech; in practice we are now delivering industrial installations wherever opportunity offers and as far as we are able to deliver them. The situation will remain the same in the future.

*Re II, 2:* Of great interest and importance, since the state of the clearing balance urgently demands increased German exports to Rumania.

*Re II, 3:* A certain reserve is indicated here. We should deliver no more than the Rumanians would otherwise buy in other countries.

*Re II, 4:* Rather difficult, as the costs are chiefly in lei and the expenditures for purchasing machinery represent a relatively small fraction thereof. Of course, it would nevertheless be of interest to develop deliveries on contract for road-building machinery.

The statement that through this agreement Germany would gain economic predominance in Rumania is not quite correct insofar as she has had that predominance for some years already. On the basis of the latest agreements of December 10, 1938, Germany now accounts for nearly 50 percent of Rumanian foreign trade. No very marked increase in this figure can reasonably be expected even under a special program of expansion. Besides, as already stated above, in view of the nature of our Rumanian partner in the negotiations, we shall probably have but fine words and theoretical statements on many of the questions. Nevertheless, a certain new impulse can be expected and the political considerations mentioned in the beginning speak also in favor of our accepting the Rumanian proposals.

CLODIUS

## No. 295

2435/514581

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 43 of February 15      BUCHAREST, February 15, 1939—3:15 p. m.

Received February 15—5:40 p. m.

Lord Sempill's<sup>1</sup> recent visit to Rumania was made to continue negotiations which Lord Lloyd had begun last summer and which aimed at intensifying England's economic activity in Rumania. Sempill was accompanied by Greek advisers and received by the King and various

<sup>1</sup> William Francis Forbes-Sempill, 19th Baron Sempill, visited Bucharest on Feb. 12, 1939, as the representative of a private British business group.

Ministers. The undertaking is inspired by the Jew Max Ausnit, who is trying to launch triangular transactions between England, France, and Rumania (rearmament in connection with a loan). Lately Ausnit has been proposing (group garbled) corporation which would take over his capital investment in Rumanian heavy industry; in this manner he is supposedly intending at the same time to smuggle out of the country the capital he has invested in Rumania. Ambassador Tatarescu has been supporting Ausnit's proposals ever since last summer.

Foreign Minister Gafencu, with whom I spoke of this, has sent for Tatarescu to tell him that the Rumanian Government did not wish this matter to be carried further for the time being, since it was intended to complete the present trade negotiations with Germany.

FABRICIUS

## No. 296

2321/483704

### *The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 27 of February 17

BELGRADE, February 17, 1939—7:20 p. m.

Received February 17—11:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 25 of February 16.<sup>1</sup>

Upon returning from leave I learned that Simovich, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Prince Regent had recently expressed to Air Attaché von Schoenebeck a desire for extensive deliveries of armaments on credit, i. e., for 200 bombers, 100 fighters (both including ground equipment), 70 150-mm howitzers and 120 antiaircraft guns; they had also requested that the credit of about 200 million reichsmarks necessary for this purpose be negotiated with the appropriate authorities in Berlin through Consul General Neuhausen, the agent for the Four-Year Plan in Yugoslavia.

Since I assumed that the report by the Air Attaché in my absence had also reached the Foreign Ministry as a matter of course,<sup>2</sup> and that

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (5570/E398775-76). In a telegram addressed to Minister Heeren personally, the State Secretary said that the Foreign Minister wished a report as to why the Foreign Ministry had not been informed of Consul General Neuhausen's negotiations for an arms transaction with Yugoslavia.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note in handwriting: "Air Attaché Belgrade reported to the Reich Air Ministry regarding his audience with the Prince Regent and the arming of the Yugoslav Air Force. The Foreign Ministry did not receive a carbon copy of the report. (See Pol. I M 501g of Feb. 2, 1939, covering report of the Belgrade Legation.)"

"On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry did receive the copy of a report on the visit with Simovich (report of February 15, 1939)."



the latter was participating in Neuhausen's negotiations in Berlin, I did not consider it necessary for me to report on the matter unless I had proposals to make with regard to political exploitation of the armaments transaction. There was, however, in my opinion, no question of this in view of our export interests and the instability of the situation here after the fall of Stoyadinovich.

The Yugoslavs have never discussed the matter with me.

HEEREN

## No. 297

2104/455823

### *The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 49 of February 17

BUCHAREST, February 17, 1939—8:00 p. m.

Received February 17—11:00 p. m.

For Wiehl.

With reference to your telegram No. 31 of February 16.<sup>1</sup>

Wohlthat's further conversations with Minister of Economics Bujoiu, Minister of Armaments Stavescu, Minister of Finance Constantinescu and . . . (group garbled) confirm the unanimous stand of the Rumanian Government in favor of orienting the Rumanian economy toward Germany. The prospects for the plans reported seem more and more favorable; their materialization depends on cooperation with the Rumanian authorities whose leaders are conducting the negotiations alone and are prepared to promote the plans wholeheartedly.

A "business organization" is not planned; rather, only the offices designated by the Governments on both sides are to be brought into contact with each other, for the purpose, among other things, of obtaining the official material and securing Government support.

A possible fall of the Government or a change in the regime would in all probability return to power circles less favorably inclined toward us, who would like to work with the democracies. This would severely injure our economic interests.

WOHLTHAT  
FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (2104/455825). The instruction approved the plans mentioned in document No. 293 for the oil, mineral, and lumber industries and for armaments, but indicated that pending further instruction a reserved attitude was to be taken concerning general economic coordination.

## No. 298

2104/455821-22

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the  
Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

BERLIN, February 18, 1939.  
zu W III 1260.<sup>1</sup>

For Wohlthat.

With reference to your No. 49.<sup>2</sup>

1. We approve in principle the Rumanian proposals and the preparation of corresponding agreements. In general, please conduct the negotiations in such a manner that, without political commitments, the greatest possible economic advantages are drawn from the present situation; you should, however, avoid a final formulation and delay signature pending a decision from here after your return to report.<sup>3</sup>

2. Binding compacts assuring us as soon as possible of larger supplies of petroleum, lumber, and ores remain the prime consideration. The proposal of more comprehensive agreements for orienting the Rumanian economy toward Germany no doubt offers great advantages, too—although these would not take effect until later—and should be given favorable consideration. Its sincerity would have to be doubted, however, unless the Rumanians made sufficient concessions with reference to the foregoing compacts. Another touchstone for the sincerity of the proposal would be the willingness of the other party to tackle promptly and carry out energetically the task of adapting Rumanian agricultural and industrial production to German requirements; at the moment our chief interest in the matter lies in increased soybean production. We, too, consider it advisable for this adaptation to be handled by the Government agencies of both countries which are competent in the various fields, if necessary drawing on interested business groups as in the case of the Forestry and Timber Committee.

3. In matters of communications first consideration ought not to be given to *Autobahns* but to the providing of better transport facilities for agricultural products. With respect to waterways I refer to the negotiations on the International Danube Commission, with which the Legation is familiar, where the Rumanian Government has hith-

<sup>1</sup> W III 1260 was probably the file number assigned the Bucharest telegram to which this is a reply.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 297.

<sup>3</sup> Wohlthat reported to a session of the inter-ministerial Trade Policy Committee in Berlin on Feb. 24. It was decided that the proposed agreement with Rumania would be submitted to all the interested agencies for study (2104/455816-18).

erto displayed a reserved attitude toward our intentions. However, it does not seem advisable to raise this question in your negotiations.

WIEHL

## No. 299

166/82495-86

### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 54 of February 21

BUCHAREST, February 21, 1939—9: 05 p. m.

Received February 22—12: 20 a. m.

Foreign Minister Markovich informed me as follows regarding his conversations here:

1. He had refused to accede to the Rumanian desire for premature extension of the Balkan Pact, since there was no reason for renewing it a year before its expiration.

2. He had stated clearly that the Little Entente no longer existed. Rumania's relations with Yugoslavia were regulated by the Treaty of 1921, in which Yugoslavia had just as much interest as Rumania. The kinship between the two dynasties also played a part in this.

3. Regarding Rumania's relations with Germany, he had had a long and frank discussion with the King. He could state that the latter was determined to collaborate closely with Germany in the economic field. This necessarily tended, as Markovich remarked . . . (group garbled) to improve the political atmosphere, as was known also to have been the case earlier with regard to relations between Yugoslavia and Germany. He had, in general, held up to the King and Gafencu the example of Yugoslav-German relations as a worthy model, and he thought he had won Rumania completely over to this idea. I remarked that I had always recommended this course to the King; but our faith in the sincerity of Rumanian policy had been deeply shaken. Rumania had to demonstrate by "good works" that she sincerely wanted to go our way and avoid mistakes that might raise doubt as to her sincerity. Markovich assured me that after his talk with the King he was convinced that the Rumanian Government had this intention.

4. He had likewise spoken with Rumania (not with the other Balkan partners) regarding Hungary. Germany was, as he knew from Berlin, disinterested. Since it was impossible for Rumania at present to negotiate regarding the cession of territory and this question had in no way been prepared, further developments were to be quietly awaited.

5. So far as Bulgaria was concerned, the Greeks, much more so than the Rumanians, had appeared especially disturbed over the revisionist

ideas of the Bulgarians. Nothing would happen in this direction, however.

6. The Balkan states had decided to recognize the Franco Government at once. Rumania was willing to do this but for humanitarian reasons had to wait until 250 Spaniards who had taken refuge in the Rumanian Legation in Madrid could be freed.

7. Aside from recognition of Franco, the Balkan Conference therefore would produce no results.

8. Publication of the "program" of the conference in the French press and *Moment* is attributed to the indiscretion of the French Minister following a conversation with Gafencu.

FABRICIUS

No. 300

2196/473627-28

*State Secretary Weissäcker to Minister Heeren*

BERLIN, February 22, 1939.

Sent February 27.

DEAR HEEREN: By order of the Foreign Minister I again revert to your telegram No. 27 of the 17th. We have tried to find out in the Ministry whether a carbon copy of the report from the Air Attaché on the question of deliveries of armaments which is mentioned by you as having arrived in Berlin might have come through here without receiving special notice. Such is not the case, however; so we actually first learned of the whole matter in the roundabout way already known to you.<sup>1</sup> The transaction itself, however, and the political possibilities that may be implicit in it, as well as the principle that we, as the Foreign Ministry, are the proper office, have prompted the Foreign Minister to request me to convey to you again by this means how very anxious he is to assure his prerogatives in the field of trade policy also. I am carrying out these instructions, but I am certain, just as is the Foreign Minister, that you share this view of his from the outset and without further argument. On my own initiative I add only that Herr von Ribbentrop is at present engaged in a lively struggle over his jurisdiction on all sides—a struggle which is imposed upon him by the fact that in past years the Ministry was much too easy-going about its prerogatives and which in the interest of a tight,

<sup>1</sup> In his telegram to Heeren on Feb. 16, cited in document No. 296, footnote 1, Weissäcker explained that Ribbentrop knew nothing of the negotiations until they were mentioned to him by Göring whose representative had conducted them.

unified conduct of foreign policy absolutely must be fought out to a satisfactory conclusion.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

As ever yours,

WEIZSÄCKER

P. S. Pessimistic comments on the internal cohesion of Yugoslavia are at present reaching Berlin through various channels. Especially on the part of the Croats there seems to be a certain inclination to commit us in their favor in some way or other. I do not need to assure you that wherever I hear of such things, I always say, "Hands off." I should be interested to receive observations of a similar kind that you may have made.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 301

54/36360-61

*The Foreign Ministry to the High Command of the Armed Forces*

February 23, 1939.

The Foreign Ministry has learned that in the conversations on an armaments credit which are now in progress with Bulgaria, a political statement was made to the Bulgarian Minister here by an officer of the High Command of the Armed Forces, allegedly Brigadier General Thomas.<sup>1</sup> This statement was to the effect that an increase in the armaments credit to Bulgaria could not be considered unless Bulgaria declared her readiness to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact as proof of her unequivocal political orientation in conformity with ours. It is further reported that the Bulgarian Minister, who was amazed at this statement, is about to report to his Government in Sofia to this effect.

I find myself compelled to request the Bulgarian Minister to see me at once in order to inform him that if he should have obtained any such impression of our political intentions with respect to Bulgaria, it is based on error. If, therefore, the statements of General Thomas were accurately repeated to me, it is essential to identify them correctly as being his private ideas.

Since I have to see the Bulgarian Minister shortly, I should be grateful if I could first receive an official reply from the High Command of the Armed Forces, indicating whether such statements were actually made to the Bulgarian Minister and in what form.

By order:

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Wiehl had obtained this information from informed quarters in the Four Year Plan Ministry and in the Armed Forces, and had reported it to Ribbentrop in a memorandum of Feb. 21, 1938 (54/36362).

## No. 302

54/36358

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 165

BERLIN, February 24, 1939.

As a result of my letter of February 23 to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Brigadier General Thomas called on me yesterday afternoon by order of General Keitel in the matter of the credit to Bulgaria. He confirmed to me that, acting under instructions from Field Marshal Göring, he had made the statement in question to the Bulgarian Minister to the effect that we had a right to expect Bulgaria to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact if she received the credit. General Thomas realizes fully that he would have done better to obtain authorization for such a statement in advance from the Foreign Ministry. Obviously, however, he had not wished to act contrary to the instructions of the Field Marshal.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 303

54/36359

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 166

BERLIN, February 24, 1939.

I asked the Bulgarian Minister to see me today and told him the following in the matter of the credit to Bulgaria and Bulgaria's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact:

It had come to my attention that the credit agreement had been discussed between him, the Bulgarian Minister, and internal authorities of the Reich, and that the political effects of the credit were also brought up. I would like the Minister to inform me what he had to say in the matter.

The Minister thereupon gave me an account of what had happened as we know it, and stated, above all, that his conversation with Brigadier General Thomas had its origin in the latter's request to call upon him. Brigadier General Thomas had not, to be sure, declared that the credit was directly dependent upon Bulgaria's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Minister then gave a number of reasons as to why Bulgaria was not at present in a position to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

I made it clear to the Minister that political discussions with officials outside the Foreign Ministry were inadmissible for him and that for commercial agreements also the Foreign Ministry had primary responsibility. I added that we had a right to expect that in the event an increased German credit were granted, Bulgaria would not adopt a political line at variance with ours. I did not wish, however, to establish a nexus between the increased credit and Bulgarian adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact. I did not allow myself to be drawn into a discussion of the economic aspect of the credit negotiations.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 304

8039/600536

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 62 of February 27

BUCHAREST, February 27, 1939—7:00 p. m.

Received February 27—8:00 p. m.

Pol. IV 1275.

With reference to instruction Pol. IV 1040 of January 19.<sup>1</sup>

Foreign Minister Gafencu told me Sunday evening of his own accord that he and Markovich had agreed at the Balkan Conference that

1. The Little Entente no longer existed;
2. The Balkan Entente should in no circumstances become an instrument which was in any manner directed against Germany.

Quite the contrary, the Balkan Entente must realize that Germany's "*Drang nach dem Osten*" was a natural phenomenon which would increase in strength to the extent that colonial questions were left unsolved. The Balkans must meet this impetus, however, by cooperating closely with Germany, especially in the economic field. That was the view of the Rumanian Government, and Markovich, Metaxas, and Saracoglu had concurred in it.

The Russian proposal for a Black Sea pact had never been mentioned, and neither Rumania nor Turkey had any intention of discussing such a pact.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (8039/600520-21). The instruction, actually dated Feb. 19, forwarded a report from the Minister in Bulgaria. He had heard that Balkan Entente circles intended to attempt to have the four states take joint diplomatic action in future, and to include Bulgaria if possible.

## No. 305

2134/467385

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 189

BERLIN, February 27, 1939.

By direction of Count Csáky, M. Hardy, the Hungarian Military Attaché—who has just returned from Budapest and whom I happen to know personally—informed me privately today as follows:

Count Csáky asked that his recent inquiry regarding the possibility of a Hungarian march into the Carpatho-Ukraine<sup>1</sup> not be taken as political aggressiveness. The reasons for Hungary's wish to include the Carpatho-Ukrainian district under her administration were predominantly of an economic nature.

The Military Attaché then continued that Csáky was in a somewhat difficult situation domestically owing to the lack of tangible assistance by Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo on the occasion of the recent rebuff of Budapest by Moscow. The Military Attaché also expressed some doubt as to Csáky's success in carrying out the withdrawal of Hungary from the League of Nations, promised for May, in face of these trends in the internal political situation.

I did not comment on the last remark but will ask the Hungarian Minister about it at the first opportunity.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> See vol. iv, documents Nos. 165 and 167.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 313.

## No. 306

2104/455809-15

*Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl*

BERLIN, February 27, 1939.

Enclosed I am submitting for your information a copy of my report on the conversations of February 13 to 22, 1939, with the Rumanian Government in Bucharest.

WOHLTHAT

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, February 27, 1939.

Submitted to Minister President Field Marshal Göring  
for his information

**REPORT ON THE CONVERSATIONS OF FEBRUARY 13 TO 22, 1939, WITH THE  
RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT IN BUCHAREST**

The reason for the journey was the wish expressed several times by the King and the Rumanian Ministers that the conversations



which the King had with the Field Marshal at the end of November 1938 in Leipzig be continued.

The mission assigned by the Field Marshal was to tie the Rumanian economy closer to Germany, whereby an attempt was to be made to improve and secure the deliveries of Rumanian petroleum products to Germany by participation in the oil industry.

The reception by the King and the Ministers was in keeping with the realization that Greater Germany is indisputably the first Power in Central Europe. The King had given instructions that the conversations were to be conducted only by the Ministers in person. On the basis of identical instructions from the King, all the Ministers endeavored to bring about close economic cooperation with Germany and willingly showed secret material from their Ministries concerning data and projects. Compared with my negotiations in Bucharest in the spring of 1935, at which time the French influence was still dominant, the reception by the King during the audience on the day of my arrival and on the occasion of the gala concert in honor of the Balkan Conference showed a definite turn in favor of Germany.

The result of the conversations may be summarized as follows: Rumania is prepared to sign an "agreement for the promotion of economic relations between the German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania." This agreement would be in addition to the Trade Agreement of 1935 and the Agreement on Trade and Payments of 1935-37, and would form the basis for large-scale, carefully planned cooperation over a long period of time.

The cooperation of the authorities on both sides is to cover the following in particular:

1. Adaptation of Rumanian agricultural production to German needs
  - a. Increased cultivation of fodder with protein content (barley, maize, alfalfa, oil seed)  
Long-term contracts, using German seeds
  - b. Increased cultivation of oleaginous plants (soybeans, linseed, rapeseed, sunflowers)
  - c. Promotion of hog and sheep raising
  - d. Development of fiber plants (cotton, hemp, flax)
  - e. Exploitation of fishing resources
2. Adoption of long-term projects for the Rumanian lumber and forest industry, with consideration for German needs
3. Prospecting and utilization of mineral resources
  - a. Manganese, copper, and chromium ores
  - b. Lampblack produced from methane
  - c. Byproducts of gold mining
  - d. Aluminum production
  - e. Chemical industry based on petroleum, gas, and coal
  - f. Investigation of whether helium production is possible (proposal by Economics Minister Bujoiu)

4. Development of a German-Rumanian oil industry  
 Capital participation in the only great national Rumanian enterprise in contrast to British, American, French, and minor Italian participation in the greater part of the Rumanian industry.  
 Use of the refining process with a capacity of 400,000 tons according to German needs, especially as regards gasoline.  
 German importation of oil products from Rumania:
 

1937	435,000 tons
1938	628,000 tons
5. Agreements on the development of Rumanian industry  
 Limitation to the basic industries so as to secure to Germany her exports of consumer goods.  
 Agreement on supplementing industrial production on both sides.
6. Establishment of export industries in free zones on the Danube for delivery to third markets (Near East; favorable situation for transportation by freighter to the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal)
7. Delivery of war matériel and army equipment  
 Standardization of the air corps by purchase of German airplanes; completion of an airplane factory. It may be expected that orders totaling 10 billion lei will be placed in Germany in the course of the next few years. This would mean that the weapons and armaments of Rumania will correspond to German standards.
8. Communication and transportation systems  
 Building of roads. A canal between Cernavoda and Constanta to shorten the sea route via the Danube estuary by 300 kilometers (British circles are also interested in this project).  
 Construction of hydraulic power stations for electrification of railroads and industrial areas.
9. Establishment of enterprises under public ownership such as municipal power, gas, and water works, and slaughter and refrigeration plants
10. Financing by cooperation between German and Rumanian banks  
 Influence to be exerted by the Deutsche Bank on the Banque de Credit (pool agreement with Rumanian group with which the royal houses in Bucharest, Belgrade, and Athens are also connected).

Orienting the Rumanian economy toward Germany by joint planning over a number of years will secure Germany the dominant position in Southeastern Europe.

If the treaty with Rumania is concluded, treaties with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey, adapted to the special conditions in each case, could be anticipated. It is less important to us to tie Greece to us, since she is decidedly a Mediterranean power.

The proposed agreement with Rumania will mean a decisive step forward in the development of German economic policy in Southeastern Europe; production within our European sphere of influence will be increased with the participation of German capital. Because of long-term commitments, the unsettling policy which has been followed in the past by the individual national banks must be changed in our favor. The participation of Southeastern Europe in German foreign trade increased from approximately 9 percent in 1933 to about 15 percent in 1938, and it will probably be possible to achieve a further increase to about 25 percent in a number of years.

The proposed policy will secure us a predominant influence with specifically German methods without our having to revert to the old type of trade policy with unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and the gold standard. The stabilizing of exchange rates between the reichsmark and the national currencies involved opens new possibilities for the international prestige of the reichsmark. The financing of the harvests and the production of Southeastern Europe by directing foreign capital, especially from the London market, via Berlin would open further possibilities for expanding the German transit trade. The raising of the living standard in Southeastern Europe would come about in direct relation to Greater Germany. The German position in the conflict with the economic interests of the British Empire and North America would be strengthened. The political development of the national states in Southeastern Europe will follow the German pattern to an increasing extent, while the influence of the Western European democracies and the Soviet Union would be eliminated.

The conclusion of the agreement with Rumania and the realization of the anticipated cooperation will be greatly influenced by the political atmosphere prevailing between the two countries. I should like to refer in this connection to my oral report on the King's remarks and Foreign Minister Gafencu's intention to pay a visit to Berlin in connection with his journey to Warsaw, before getting in touch with London and Paris. During the negotiations now being conducted with Germany, Minister Gafencu rejected feelers from London, Paris, and Moscow in order to give expression to the earnest desire of the Rumanian Government to reach an understanding with Germany first of all. Other members of the Rumanian Government as well are prepared to create the atmosphere of mutual confidence necessary to carry out the plans by visiting and conferring with the corresponding German Ministers.

WOHLTHAT

5570/E398784-86

*The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Yugoslavia*

SECRET

BERLIN, February 27, 1939.

W 290 g.

Consul General Neuhausen will have informed the Legation regarding the conversations that took place during his recent visit to Berlin concerning the contemplated arms transaction with the Yugoslav Government. For your further information, I send you herewith a memorandum regarding a discussion in the Ministry of Economics on February 13, 1939,<sup>1</sup> from which you will note the economic terms contemplated for the transaction, and I also add the following:

The Foreign Minister has agreed to the transaction itself, but, for the time being, only to the extent of some 100 million reichsmarks. He considers that to sign for the whole amount of 200 million reichsmarks desired by the Yugoslav Government would be defensible only if, in addition to the transaction's being desirable on the whole from the economic standpoint (which is the case in the opinion of the Ministry of Economics presented on page three of the enclosure), its specific terms can also be called advantageous; but this can be judged only from the subsequent course of the negotiations. The Foreign Minister intends, moreover, to make political capital out of the transaction and, before concluding it, to await the further attitude of the Yugoslav Government toward the invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.

This position taken by the Foreign Minister was made known to Consul General Neuhausen when he was here and it was added that nothing final must be arranged with respect to the arms transaction unless the further decision of the Foreign Minister was first obtained. Herr Neuhausen promised to see that this was done.

I ask the Legation for its part also to make sure that this is done. Since formally a transaction between private German firms and the Yugoslav Government is involved, it will not be necessary, unless special circumstances make it so, for the Legation to participate directly in the negotiations. But it must at any rate so far identify itself with the matter that it will appear to the Yugoslav Government as the agency to which the latter should turn whenever there are any

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (5570/E398787-93). Representatives of several interested ministries participated as well as representatives of the Krupp firm, who were on hand to press their case for a 100 percent Reich guarantee of the transaction. Representatives of the Ministry of Economics argued for it on the ground that increased imports of minerals and oil from Yugoslavia could be obtained in payment.

communications or requests which it wants to make known to the German Government.

Finally, for your information I enclose copies of two memoranda by Ministerialdirektor Gaus and Senior Counselor Bisse,<sup>2</sup> from which you will see that a short general communication regarding our contemplated deliveries of military supplies to Yugoslavia was sent to the Italian Ambassador here. A reply was received to the effect that the Italian Government would be pleased if we did not precisely at this moment appear as competitors of Italy; you will see, however, that in the opinion of Consul General Neuhausen there can be no question of such competition, since Italy does not enter into consideration for the deliveries concerned here. Under these circumstances we saw no reason for sending another communication to the Italians or even refraining from the further prosecution of the transaction. I ask, however, that you follow and, if necessary, report on further efforts of the Italians to obtain Yugoslav armament orders.

By order:

WIEHL

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed (5570/E398804-07).

## No. 308

2162/470200

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, February 27, 1939.

At the luncheon for the Air Attachés, I spoke with Lieutenant Colonel von Schoenebeck, Air Attaché at Belgrade, regarding the contemplated arms transaction with Yugoslavia. He told me that Field Marshal Göring intended to go on a vacation trip to Italy at the beginning of March and upon his return trip, about the beginning of April, to meet somewhere with Prince Regent Paul of Yugoslavia. He intended at that time to resume the conversations which he had previously had with the Prince Regent regarding a political *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and Germany. In view of this, the Field Marshal considered it advisable until then to conduct the negotiations on the arms transaction in a dilatory manner. Therefore, he, Schoenebeck, would not return directly to Belgrade, as he had intended, but first go on leave for about two or three weeks.

Herr von Schoenebeck was informed that it is the intention to link the arms transaction with Yugoslavia's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact. He considered it more useful, from his standpoint, to work

not so much for adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact but rather for military ties with Yugoslavia, for example the dispatching of German instructors for the Yugoslav air force which was to be built up by us, a voice in the selection of the future military airports of Yugoslavia, the right to use them in certain cases, perhaps conferences of the General Staff as well, etc. He considered such arrangements possible since the Yugoslav air force was completely oriented toward Germany and even the formerly pro-French attitude of the Yugoslav Army was beginning to change in Germany's favor.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WIEHL

### No. 309

2104/455807

#### *The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 66 of March 3

BUCHAREST, March 3, 1939—7:45 p. m.

Received March 3—10:30 p. m.

According to reliable reports a great economic offensive by England may be expected here, directed by Lord Sempill. England is interested, among other things, in exploiting the Rumanian forests.

I should appreciate telegraphic instructions as to whether continuation of the Wohlthat conversations may be expected soon,<sup>1</sup> since in that case there is a good chance that I can persuade the Rumanian Government to apply dilatory tactics to the British proposals.

Ambassador Tatarescu has received oral instructions here not to pursue any of the plans further, since they evidently do not serve the interest of the country but rather private Jewish interests.

FABRICIUS

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Herr Wiehl: Herr Wohlthat told me that he would rather not leave for Bucharest without the question of Gafencu's visit to Berlin having been settled, and therefore would postpone the date of his departure until Tuesday evening. W[eizsäcker], March 4."

Wohlthat actually departed on Wednesday, Mar. 8, without having received final instructions from the Foreign Minister. According to a report written after his return (169/82535-45) he did so on the basis of an understanding with the State Secretary. The report further stated that it was fortunate that he arrived when he did, since, with the increasing pressure being brought by France and Britain against the treaty, members of the cabinet favorable to cooperation with Germany stood in danger of being ousted if the negotiations were further prolonged. The treaty was signed on Mar. 23. For further documents on this episode see vol. vi.

## No. 310

1209/332220-22

*The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 572 Po 5 Ju

BELGRADE, March 7, 1939.

Pol. IV 1611.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The new direction of domestic policy in Yugoslavia and its effect on our further treatment of the Croatian question.

Until the fall of the Stoyadinovich government, I supported in my reports the view that the Croatian demands might, indeed, be entirely justifiable on moral grounds, but their fulfillment seemed hardly possible without detriment to the functioning of the Yugoslav State. Whoever, therefore, like us, desired a strong Yugoslavia would have to realize that only an authoritarian regime based on Serbian supremacy, such as the Stoyadinovich regime was trying to achieve, offered the necessary guarantee for it. It would therefore not be in the German interest to support Croatian ambitions that were opposed to such a regime.

Meanwhile the Prince Regent has withdrawn his confidence from M. Stoyadinovich and thus removed the only personality who is capable at present of carrying on a strong authoritarian regime. He decided to do this precisely in order to propitiate those circles in the country which, under the leadership of the Croats, were in fundamental opposition to the authoritarian methods of the Stoyadinovich government. The change of government quite evidently means, therefore, the conscious abandonment of authoritarian government in favor of a policy whose goal is to resolve internal differences by "democratic" methods through compromise. A policy that hopes to win the goodwill of Croatian federalism and Serbian circles of the Left would inevitably be pursued at the cost of weakening the authority of the state; the Prince Regent can have no illusions on this score. In the face of anxiety over a further deterioration in the internal situation, however, he actually seems to have regarded this as the lesser evil.

The shift in Yugoslav internal policy away from authoritarian government has created a situation which makes it seem to me expedient to revise our attitude on the Croatian question. The fear that by siding with the Croats we should endanger the authoritarian regime which we welcome in Yugoslavia has become meaningless. On the other hand, the friendship of the Croats has grown in value by reason of the fact that the change of course which has taken place

will increasingly strengthen the influence of the Croats in the government. The further fact that, besides the Croats, the Serbian Leftist opposition aligned with them will receive new impetus and greater influence as a result of the change of course makes it all the more to our interest to offset this influence in circles already ideologically hostile to us by winning the friendship of the Croats.

There is no doubt that the conditions for attempting to strengthen German-Croatian friendship are entirely favorable. The close ties between the Croats and the world of German culture and the geopolitical danger threatening them from Italy, which will always make it seem to them necessary to align themselves with Germany, create a very good basis for this. All the moral support that we are able to give them in their battle for equality in the state will, under these circumstances, bear abundant fruit. The new situation which has arisen through the fall of the Stoyadinovich government restores our freedom of action fully to exploit all these favorable conditions for winning the friendship of the Croats.

I would therefore recommend that the restraint thus far exercised by our press in its attitude toward the Croatian problem be gradually relaxed and that our basic position as to the right of self-determination of nations now be given stronger expression in the treatment of this question also.

HEEREN

### No. 311

1209/332223-24

*Minister Heeren to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

BELGRADE, March 7, 1939.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: Enclosed is a copy of a short report which is being sent simultaneously from which you will note my view on the question of our future attitude toward the Croats. So far as the cohesion of the Yugoslav State is concerned, it has, in my opinion, certainly not been improved by the swing to the Left in domestic policy. But there are no acute dangers. The Croats again have every reason to believe that time is in their favor and they are therefore disposed to wait; but the present Government will endeavor to conduct the negotiations for a settlement in as dilatory a manner as possible, if only to avoid sawing off the limb on which it is sitting. In view of the methods of negotiation that are customary here, a decision might well be put off until next year, or perhaps even the year after next. Whether or not the whole thing will finally end in a reversion to Serbian military dictatorship or in a federal state, as



desired by the Croats, can naturally not yet be foreseen. In any case, the cohesion of the Yugoslav State will then have to undergo a severe test.

With best regards.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

HEEREN

No. 312

472/228721-23

*Minister Rümelin to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

CONFIDENTIAL

SOFIA, March 8, 1939.

A 113

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: With reference to my telegram No. 17 of March 4<sup>1</sup> regarding Kiosseivanov's intended trip to Berlin, I should like to give you a few statements in writing to supplement my telegraphic report.

About 10 days ago, the Minister President summoned me and told me he had been informed that he was being accused in Berlin of a policy that was not sufficiently pro-German. He attributed these rumors to intrigue, and he was confirmed in this view by the fact that the Italian Ambassador in Berlin had related there, on the strength of information from his Sofia colleague, Marquis Talamo, that he—Kiosseivanov—possibly wished to conclude an alliance (!) with the Soviet Union, a statement that was, of course, nonsense. (I must mention here that Talamo actually circulated this story—which is, of course, false—for he also related it to one of my colleagues during my last absence from Sofia.)

Kiosseivanov then declared further that I myself knew that Bulgaria would be on our side in case of war, but she could not, in view of her exposed position, come out in the open prematurely. He personally would rather tender his resignation to the King than be suspected of pursuing an unfriendly policy toward Germany, etc., etc.

In conclusion, Kiosseivanov asked me to protect him and above all his country against such insinuations.

I listened quietly to K. and told him that since he had called the conversation with me a friendly and personal one, I, too, wished to speak quite frankly, provided he approved. He asked me to do so. I thereupon told him that I was convinced of his loyal and friendly intentions and those of the Bulgarian Government. As far as the necessary caution in Bulgaria's foreign policy was concerned, I had always taken this viewpoint into account in the long years of my

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

activity; I had never pressed him nor his predecessors for untimely political commitments and was not doing so today. The fact of the matter was, however, that there were people in Germany who had the feeling that Bulgaria wanted all sorts of economic considerations from Germany, particularly with reference to the military side of the economy, just as Bulgarian public opinion took it for granted that we would give political support to Bulgaria's revisionist desires. Certainly, relations between Bulgaria and Germany were cordial, and no one was more pleased about this than I, whose early years here had been so very difficult. Nor had Germany forgotten the old days of the alliance. Nevertheless I wished to suggest that he see whether it was not possible to give Bulgarian foreign policy a definitely pro-German slant; this was a shrewd rather than a rash move when someone wished to obtain something from another party. I knew, indeed, that the conduct of Bulgarian foreign policy was not an easy matter, but relations with Germany could not be defined by the old verse alone:

"I love you true, oh maiden fair,  
But greet me not 'neath the lindens"

I asked somewhat ironically whether Kiosseivanov perhaps wished to make a "Switzerland" of Bulgaria. That could be done. Bulgaria would forthwith receive a guarantee of her present borders from her neighbors as well as from the Great Powers.

But then it would be all over with "revisions." Kiosseivanov, who rejected the idea of a "Switzerland" in shocked amusement, said that he would think over my views and also discuss them with the King.

A few days later he summoned me again and informed me—N. B., without my having now or recently broached the question of a trip—of his intention shortly to return Neurath's visit.<sup>2</sup> The date will depend on the adjournment of the ever "refractory" Sobranye. I told Kiosseivanov that, in my personal opinion, his travel plans were good in themselves, the more so since his Yugoslav and Hungarian colleagues had long since returned the visit. I wanted to advise him personally, however, to concentrate in that case on the visit to Berlin and not to combine it with a "precautionary visit" to Paris and London, since then the effect of the Berlin trip would be spoiled.

Kiosseivanov told me at once he would go only to Berlin and back.

The conversation closed with the statement that the King wished to talk over all the political questions with me and would ask me to come to see him.

As you know, King Boris returned only in the last few days after a 54-day absence and I have not yet seen him. I shall report after our meeting.

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<sup>2</sup> Neurath visited Sofia June 9-10, 1937.

Meanwhile this is a preliminary report, which I would ask you also to communicate to the Foreign Minister.<sup>3</sup>

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

RÜMELIN

<sup>3</sup> On Mar. 11 Weizsäcker referred the letter to the Foreign Minister in whose secretariat it remained until Apr. 1, when it was referred back to Weizsäcker with the request that he discuss it with the Foreign Minister. On the cover note (472/228724) conveying this latter request there is the following marginal note: "Under State Secretary: I should like to answer Herr Rümelin as follows: The schedules of the leading personalities here make it unlikely that any dates can be set at this time. I assume that your concluding sentence also implies the possibility of a delay. The Foreign Minister is informed. W[eizsäcker], Apr. 4." The letter requested was dispatched on Apr. 11 (472/228725-26). It noted that Rümelin had not referred to the matter since his letter of Mar. 8, and informed him that it was not desired that he should press a Berlin visit on Kiosseivanov since the latter's position was thought to be insecure anyway. Kiosseivanov did ultimately come to Berlin, on July 5. See vol. vi.

## No. 313

2134/467386

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 202

BERLIN, March 10, 1939.

Referring to my conversation on February 27 with the Hungarian Military Attaché (St. S. No. 189), I told the Hungarian Minister that I could not accept Count Csáky's hesitation regarding the withdrawal of Hungary from the League of Nations which was promised for May, since this was after all an agreement between Hungary on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other.

The Minister tried to interpret Csáky's remarks to the effect that Csáky had spoken of difficulties in this connection, but did not intend to withdraw his promise.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Hungary withdrew from the League on Apr. 11, 1939.

## No. 314

5558/E395940-41

### *The Minister of Economics to the Foreign Ministry*

V Ld. 140 g II

BERLIN, March 15, 1939.

Received March 15.

W 381 g.

Attention of Minister Clodius.

With reference to the inter-ministerial conference of March 14, 1939, regarding the question of an additional war matériel credit to Bulgaria, I wish to repeat the following:

1. The outcome of yesterday's conference indicates that it is absolutely essential and urgent on grounds of economic policy to grant an

additional war matériel credit to Bulgaria. Our entire economic relations with Bulgaria have developed for some time in such a way that Bulgaria has not only become a source of valuable and important products in the agricultural field but, following our suggestions, is successfully using every means to supply us with increasing quantities of industrial raw materials as well. A country that, like Bulgaria, is closely bound up with Germany by economic ties in so many ways, is fully entitled to demand that it also receive the assistance in the field of armaments which has become customary and necessary all over the world in connection with deliveries of that kind.

2. We have given constant and close attention to Bulgaria's internal economic and budgetary affairs. In the light of these observations and from the development of the economy of that country it can be assumed with certainty that they will be able to raise the funds for liquidating the credit on schedule. For years we have known Bulgaria's financial affairs to be managed with remarkable care and prudence, and the country has been painstakingly scrupulous during that time in meeting her obligations to us.

3. The transfer of these payments will always be assured as long as Germany is willing to absorb Bulgarian products. A nation of eighty million people will and must be prepared to do so at all times, especially if it constantly advocates the view vis-à-vis other nations that a country can fulfill its obligations only if the creditor is prepared to accept payment in the products and services of the debtor country.

I assume on the basis of the joint discussion of the representatives of the two Ministries that the political necessity and significance of the credit will likewise be duly brought to the attention of the Ministry of Finance.

Kindly send me a copy of the reply given to the Minister of Finance.

By order:

DR. LANDWEHR

No. 315

5558/E395942-44

*The Foreign Minister to the Finance Ministry*

March 15, 1939.

W 381 g.

With reference to the telephone conversation with Ministerialdirigent Dr. Nasse on March 14, I have the honor to confirm once more that the Foreign Ministry deems it absolutely essential, for political considerations; to comply with the desire for delivery of additional war matériel repeatedly advanced in urgent form by the highest Bulgarian authorities during the last year. The Bulgarian Government, as your Ministry knows, requested the German Government as early as 1937 to authorize the sale of war matériel in the amount of 100 million reichsmarks on a credit basis. Since a single transaction in this amount was in excess of Germany's production capacity, an initial

agreement with the Bulgarian Government was concluded on March 12, 1938, for the delivery of war matériel in the amount of 30 million reichsmarks. The Bulgarian Government, however, never left the slightest doubt that it was indispensable to the fulfillment of Bulgaria's military and national tasks that it obtain additional war matériel deliveries at the earliest possible time. A year having now passed since conclusion of the first agreement, I consider it essential to meet Bulgaria's wishes by agreeing to the delivery of at least another installment. This installment ought to run to about 20 to 22 million reichsmarks. The terms for this order, I believe, should be the same as those stipulated in the agreement of March 12, 1938.

The Ministry of Economics, too, emphatically approves the conclusion of this transaction; I refer you in this connection to the letter of the above Ministry, dated today, a copy of which is enclosed.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Ministry, in the light of the reports from the German Legation in Sofia and reliable information from other sources, shares the view of the Reich Ministry of Economics that payment by Bulgaria can be regarded as assured both as regards her budget and the transfer. The Armed Forces High Command also approves of an agreement of this kind.

I further add that State Secretary Körner, on behalf of Field Marshal Göring, has likewise declared his agreement to making the shipment in question to the amount, for the time being, of 20 to 22 million reichsmarks, provided that the Bulgarian Government commits itself to giving Germany an appropriate share in the exports of desired raw materials from Bulgaria. Steps will be taken at the forthcoming negotiations to obtain such assurances. According to the preliminary talks with the representatives of the Bulgarian Government it can be expected that there will be no difficulties in arriving at a suitable agreement with the Bulgarian Government, which will take due account of German interests.

Since this matter is particularly urgent in view of the political situation, I would appreciate notification of the concurrence of your Ministry as soon as possible.

By order:  
WIEHL

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 314.

CHAPTER III  
THE BALTIC STATES AND THE MEMEL QUESTION  
OCTOBER 7, 1937-MARCH 23, 1939

No. 316

1850/421248-50

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, October 7, 1937.  
e. o. Pol. VI 1863.

BRIEF FOR LATVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MUNTERS' VISIT TO THE STATE  
SECRETARY ARRANGED FOR OCTOBER 8

The Latvian Foreign Minister, M. Munters, 39 years old, is of German descent, married to a Russian woman, clever, very ambitious, and not without influence within the Latvian Government. As he has shown on several occasions, his orientation is definitely anti-Balt, and heretofore he has shown no understanding for the needs of the German minority in Latvia. He is a decided supporter of the League of Nations and its ideology.

During the course of this year he was received by the Reich Foreign Minister on January 28 and May 31. At the time of the latter visit the news of the bombing of the *Deutschland* had just arrived here.<sup>1</sup> The visit with the Reich Foreign Minister had a favorable effect, for after his return to Latvia M. Munters stated in the Latvian press that people in Germany were very indignant and excited about the incident to be sure, but that the attitude of the Government had shown the desire not to increase the gravity of the situation.

German-Latvian relations are hampered by the attitude of the Latvian Government toward the German minority, even though in recent months Latvia has not undertaken new measures of direct oppression. As in the past, the complaint can still be made that whenever an opportunity arises (Latvian national celebrations, etc.) members of the Latvian Government express themselves in a derogatory way about the historic role of the Germans in Latvia in past centuries and at the end of the World War. In recent years both the Foreign Ministry and the Legation in Riga have had to make representations in connection with such incidents. As for the last few months, it

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<sup>1</sup> On May 29, 1937, the German pocket battleship *Deutschland* had been bombed by Spanish Republican airplanes while lying in the roadstead of Iviza. See vol. III, document No. 267, *et seq.*

might be mentioned that the President of Latvia, Ulmanis, on the occasion of laying the cornerstone of a school in Libau at the end of June 1937, referred to the events in Latvia during the spring of 1919<sup>2</sup> and openly expressed his dislike of the German minority.

On the occasion of the Stuttgart Convention of Auslandsdeutsche in September 1937, the Latvian newspaper *Brihva Seme* discussed in a very unfavorable manner the role of National Socialists abroad, as is evident from the appended report from the Legation in Riga,<sup>3</sup> and this was done, the Legation assumes, not without the influence of Ulmanis and Munters.

On the subject of German-Latvian relations it should also be remarked that at the end of this month negotiations will begin in Riga on an extension of the trade agreement.

Since in conversations Munters has often shown interest for our relations with Lithuania, particularly with regard to the Memel question, I might suggest that it be pointed out to him that the expropriation of Memel-German and reichsdeutsch real property in and around the city of Memel, which, contrary to the Memel Statute, was done without any participation by the Memel Directorate,<sup>4</sup> has led to considerable difficulties of late in our relations with Lithuania. Latvia's relations with her ally Estonia are at the moment rather upset, first because of difficulties in the field of commercial policy, and also because a prominent Estonian historical scholar was banished from Latvia.<sup>5</sup>

Herewith respectfully submitted to the State Secretary through the Deputy Director of the Political Department and through Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker.

GRUNDHERR

<sup>2</sup> In April 1919, with the consent of the Allied Powers, the Germans had undertaken to drive the Soviet forces from the territory of the new Republic of Latvia which the Soviets had overrun in January 1919. The Germans succeeded in conquering the coastal cities of Riga and Libau but suffered reverses in the interior of the country and were ultimately recalled by the Allied Powers.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (1850/421244-47).

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 319.

<sup>5</sup> In September 1937 the Latvian Government deprived Dr. Loozits, a student of folklore of the University of Dorpat, of his permit to stay in Latvia, alleging that he had published untrue reports on the "hard-pressed position" of the Livonian minority. The Estonian Minister to Latvia protested against this measure.

## No. 317

115/117772-74

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 8, 1937.

The Latvian Foreign Minister, who visited me today for nearly an hour, first reported on the latest events at Geneva and added lengthy

reflections regarding the increasingly favorable course taken by the League of Nations, which had definitely benefited from its experiences and therefore had been much more cautious in the Far Eastern conflict, for instance.<sup>1</sup> It was very regrettable indeed that we took such a completely negative attitude toward this organization, whereas the United States, for example, except in the political field, had come to cooperate more and more with the Geneva organization. I replied that our attitude regarding this matter was, after all, sufficiently known to him, that it had not changed at all, and would not change in the foreseeable future either. Besides, it might also be doubted whether the present treatment of the Sino-Japanese conflict by the League of Nations could be called so particularly fortunate.

During the further course of the conversation M. Munters broached the question of Spain and emphasized especially the question of volunteers, to the solution of which we and the Italians could contribute most.<sup>2</sup> I pointed out that in our opinion it was chiefly the business of Franco and of the Valencia Government to take a stand with regard to this matter, which, after all, had first been brought up by us, but unfortunately without success. Moreover, the fact could not be overlooked that a large part of the Red volunteers had acquired Spanish citizenship and that, because of this fact alone, a withdrawal of the volunteers on a basis of parity must fail. M. Munters replied that this was really a question of minor importance, which could easily be solved. I stressed, on the contrary that in my opinion this was not only not a question of minor importance but rather a really fundamental one which, at any rate, would have to be quite seriously considered.

The rest of the conversation concerned German-Latvian relations, which M. Munters of his own accord said were fortunately satisfactory and friendly—a statement which I did not contradict. However, I pointed out the dangers of the minorities issue which constantly threatened our relations, and in particular referred to the attitude of certain newspapers of the Latvian press, whose activities also had an unfavorable effect upon these relations. In this connection I particularly mentioned the attacks which had appeared in the Latvian press on the occasion of the Stuttgart Congress of the Auslandsorganisation.<sup>3</sup> M. Munters admitted this and stated that because of his presence in Geneva he had been unable to attend to these matters. A remark regarding the Auslandsorganisation—whose activities did not seem to be at all clear to him either—induced me to give him a

<sup>1</sup> On Oct. 6, 1937, the League of Nations Assembly, having heard the report of its committee on the Sino-Japanese conflict, declared that Japan had violated the Nine Power Treaty and called for a conference of its signatories. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1939), p. 701.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. III of this series, especially chs. III to VI.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 816.



somewhat more detailed explanation. He listened attentively to the statements, but said that, after all, theory and practice occasionally differed somewhat. I countered this remark with the request that he address himself in full confidence to our Minister whenever, for the reason mentioned by him, he had any real complaints regarding a Reichsdeutscher. He would then realize that with us theory and practice were identical in this case. We would not be willing, however, to discuss general and unfounded assertions.

Concerning the impending economic negotiations the Minister expressed himself very optimistically.

MACKENSEN

### No. 318

115/117439-40

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 15, 1937.

I received the Lithuanian Minister<sup>1</sup> today at his request. M. Šaulys motivated his request with the necessity of presenting himself to me once again after a lengthy absence. He inquired about the status of the various political questions of a general nature, such as the Non-Intervention Committee, the conflict in the Far East, Spain, etc., and otherwise only discussed the impressions he had gained on his journey. When he was on the point of leaving after a half hour's visit I asked him in some surprise whether he did not have anything to say to me on the subject nearest at hand, that is, German-Lithuanian relations. He replied that he had just returned and therefore was not sufficiently informed on pending questions. Thereupon I described to him in all detail the expropriation measures<sup>2</sup> in the Memel Territory<sup>3</sup> which, moreover, he doubtless knew well enough, and pointed out to him that these events were calculated to set German-Lithuanian relations, in which a certain *détente* had become noticeable in recent months, back to their lowest level. M. Šaulys took refuge behind political necessity, which had forced the Lithuanian Government to take the expropriation measures, and attempted to prove that the Lithuanian action was unobjectionable even from a legal point of view, without being able, however, to present sound

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Jurgis Šaulys, Lithuanian Minister in Berlin, 1931-39.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 319.

<sup>3</sup> Germany renounced sovereignty over the Memel Territory in the Treaty of Versailles. The status of the Territory was not settled until May 8, 1924, when a convention was signed between Lithuania, which seized the Territory in February 1923, and the Principal Allied Powers. By the terms of the Memel Convention the Territory was given autonomy under Lithuanian sovereignty. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), vol. XIII, pp. 237-241; also *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (London, 1925), pp. 256-261.

arguments in refutation of my opposing statements. He had made the remark that the whole affair had been treated in the German press in a rather unfortunate manner, since "unnecessary invective," as he put it, had been substituted for objective criticism. To this I replied by pointing out that actually a rather forceful intervention on our part had been necessary in view of the great indignation which the attitude of the Lithuanian Government had aroused among our public. Moreover, I could only urge him to treat this matter in all seriousness, since it might very well have a most unfavorable effect upon German-Lithuanian relations. I wished to stress once more that our legal position was entirely sound; moreover, the Lithuanian Government had not even made the attempt to seek an amicable settlement with the Memel Directorate.<sup>4</sup>

The Minister did not make a single allusion to the suggestion which Consul Wolf had put before Herr von Grundherr, to the effect that the last prisoners from the Memel trial<sup>5</sup> should be released in exchange for the Lithuanian prisoners, with the additional commitment on our part to prevent Herr Neumann's return to the Memel Territory.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>4</sup> Under the Memel Statute, which was annexed to the Convention of 1924, the Directorate exercised executive power in the autonomous Territory. Its members were appointed by a President of the Directorate who was himself appointed by a Governor representing the Lithuanian Government. The Directorate was required to enjoy the confidence of the Landtag, the legislative body elected by universal suffrage.

<sup>5</sup> The Memel treason trial grew out of attempts of the Lithuanian Government to suppress National Socialist organizations in the Territory. On Mar. 26, 1935, the defendants, including the Nazi leaders Dr. Ernst Neumann and Pastor von Sass, were sentenced to various prison terms. The trial continued to be an issue in German-Lithuanian relations and German demands for release of the prisoners were frequently put forward. For the trial and its background see *Survey of International Affairs, 1935*, vol. 1, pp. 246-265.

## No. 319

2465/515773-780

### *The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A 28

MEMEL, January 9, 1938.

Received January 14.

Pol. VI 64.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Annual report for the end of 1937 (months of September to December).

With reference to my report of September 7, 1937, A 680.<sup>1</sup>

If, at the beginning of 1937, various signs already indicated that the Memel policy of Lithuania, which in 1936 had temporarily shifted

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2465/515758-72).

the emphasis of its pressure to the economy of the Memel Territory, would become active again in the purely political domain, developments during and at the end of the year 1937 have strengthened this impression. The method of exerting preponderantly economic influence, to be sure, had offered Lithuania the advantage of throwing a heavy veil over the fact that its policy was in contradiction to the Memel Statute; at the same time, however, it entailed the disadvantage that the tempo of this kind of Lithuanization could only be relatively slow and therefore was not quite suitable to the impatient demands of radical Lithuanian circles. Thus—obviously under the pressure of these circles—the veto policy of the Governor, with which you are familiar from the Consulate General's reports as early as the first half of the year 1937, gradually began to assume such a form that a definite political objective—namely, the desire to influence the legislation of the Memel Landtag—again began to appear. This tendency became even clearer as a result of the Lithuanian expropriation law of September 6, 1937, which—passed in the absence of Lithuanian Foreign Minister Lozoraitis, a reputedly cautious man, and of the Lithuanian Governor of Memel, Kubilius, likewise personally restrained—decreed the expropriation of some 440 ha. of almost exclusively Memel-German landed property in the immediate environs of Memel, thereby encroaching upon essential and statutory functions of the Memel Directorate.

Against this action of the Lithuanian Government the Baldszus Directorate and the Landtag of the Memel Territory, as well as the Reich Government, took a firm stand, in which the representations of the Reich Government were based not only on the general political aspect of a matter concerning German-Lithuanian relations, but also especially on a direct violation of reichsdeutsch interests, since the expropriation also affected two reichsdeutsch landowners. The juridical standpoint of Memel and the Reich rested upon the fact that, in accordance with the clear wording of the provisions of article 5, paragraphs 9 and 32 of the Memel Statute, expropriations can be carried out *materially* only under certain premises, in this case not taken into consideration by the Lithuanian Government, and *formally* only by the Directorate. The Lithuanian standpoint was based on the fact that the expropriation was decreed expressly for purposes of the army, of communications, customs, and ports and that these matters were within the competence of the central government and therefore could not be affected by any provisions of the Statute. Although the two signatory powers, England and France, which were likewise gradually drawn into the discussion of this legal question, showed a certain sympathy for the Lithuanian standpoint, the Lithuanian Government preferred first to make an attempt to induce the expropriated

landowners by way of private negotiations to sell their property voluntarily. At the same time, since the Lithuanians probably hoped at first to achieve their aim in this manner, the Memel Directorate and the German Government were told that the law would not be carried out in practice. This statement ignored one important factor, in that section 2 of the law already contained a restriction on disposal of the expropriated properties by the owners in question—i. e., a part of the practical execution.

Meanwhile this state of affairs has been basically changed, because the Lithuanian attempts to acquire the properties privately miscarried, with only a few insignificant exceptions, in the face of the loyal attitude of the Memel owners. Consequently the Lithuanian Government is now again faced with the dilemma whether it should drop the entire plan or reopen the legal question of expropriation. That the latter will be the case is indicated by the phrase used in a demonstrative manner by Foreign Minister Lozoraitis at the Tautininkai<sup>2</sup> Congress of January 5 of this year, to the effect that the expropriation law was in conformity with both the Memel Statute and Lithuania's foreign obligations. On the other hand the above-mentioned statements to the Directorate and the German Government, as well as the further circumstance that during the interval since the passage of the law nothing has been done, speak against the enforcement of the law. For, from the practical point of view, the futile Lithuanian attempts at private purchase, which dragged on from September to December 1937, i. e. for four months, actually signify not only a loss of time but even a loss of ground. For even assuming that the Lithuanians now actually do apply the law, its enforcement in all its details would assuredly require many months, so that the effects of this action would undoubtedly affect public opinion in the forthcoming Landtag elections in the fall of 1938.

When the German press, in its polemics against the expropriation law, raised some question as to whether this action of the Lithuanian Government did not render doubtful the value of the German-Lithuanian trade and friendship agreement concluded in August 1936, this was understandable from the point of view of press tactics, but the question itself must be answered in the negative. In the first place it should be observed that, even in the strictly political sphere, one of the most important things hoped for by Germany as a result of the conclusion of this agreement, namely the settlement of the Neumann-Sass trial, is nearing realization. Of the 89 persons originally convicted in this trial, by far the larger part was pardoned during the

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<sup>2</sup> Nationalist Union. This was the government party which had had a political monopoly since Feb. 6, 1936, when all other political parties in Lithuania were dissolved.

year 1937. At present there are still in prison only 11 of the persons convicted, six of whom belong to the so-called Jesuttis group. According to various unofficial assurances from various Lithuanian officials, it is to be expected that on February 16, 1938, on the occasion of the observance of the 20th anniversary of Lithuanian independence, the rest of the prisoners—except for this Jesuttis group—will be released, among them Dr. Neumann, the well-known National Socialist leader of the Memel Territory. To be sure, in this connection one must take into consideration that the Lithuanian Government is interested in a speedy settlement of this affair also in view of the coming elections.

But in the strictly economic sphere as well, considerable progress has been made in 1937 through full use of the said German-Lithuanian trade agreement. I would like to refer to the detailed description contained in my previous report concerning the structure of this agreement (exchange of goods by clearing system) and its general favorable effect on the economic situation in the Memel Territory. For the last period of 1937 the following might be added: Since—after the lifting of the border blockade—a brisk demand for German manufactures exists in both Lithuania and the Memel Territory, a considerable excess of German deliveries of goods over Lithuanian-Memel exports to Germany has developed. The German Governmental commission for German-Lithuanian economic negotiations having succeeded already in June 1937 in substantially expanding the limits of the mutual exchange of goods, which were originally fixed at 30 million lits, this excess has now provided a new basis for working toward a further raising of the maximum figure of payments, the result of which would, on the one hand, be an increasing dependence of Lithuania on the German market and, on the other hand, a marked strengthening of the economy of the Memel Territory. That the German demands themselves have gradually acquired greater weight in the deliberations of the economic delegates on both sides is also evident from the fact that in the latest conversations of the Government committees, which meet periodically, it was possible to effect a considerable upward revision of the export volume precisely in the branches of the economy in which was reserved the right to direct exportation from the Memel Territory to Germany.

On the whole, the results achieved in the economic field—and especially in regard to their political effect on the intrinsic power of resistance of the Memel Germans—are of such significance that at present, if we strike a total balance of all the progress and setbacks to be registered since the agreement of 1936 (see also the previous report) including even the most recent Lithuanian acts of expropriation, there can be no doubt as to the positive value of the German-Lithuanian treaty relationship for German interests in the Memel

Territory. Moreover, in regard to the action of expropriation, as already mentioned above, as well as in regard to any other political attacks which may be prepared by Lithuania for the near future, one should take into consideration the fact that even a momentary Lithuanian advance would rather certainly be balanced by a corresponding setback at the coming Landtag elections and need not, viewed in the present context and at long range, necessarily mean a disadvantage for German-Memel Territory interests.

The Legation in Kaunas is receiving a copy of this report.

SAUCKEN

No. 320

1578/381966

*The Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior*

BERLIN, March 12, 1938.

Pol. VI 329.

With reference to your letter V W II/9138 of February 14.<sup>1</sup>

Since there is a pressing political interest in supporting the German minority in Estonia and Latvia in every way, it is urged that the Baltic Aid Society's<sup>2</sup> request for permission to collect funds as it did last year be approved.

By all means, however, care must be taken this time, too, that the collection does not in any way become known to the public. In particular, the Latvian Legation in Berlin must not hear of it, since a collection undertaken by the Baltic Aid Society can be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of Latvia and this would only lead to measures against those who are to be helped by the collection.

For this reason it is necessary that the group of persons who are asked to contribute be selected in such a way that the secrecy of the campaign will be assured.<sup>3</sup>

By order:

DOERTENBACH

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1578/381960-65).

<sup>2</sup> In German, *Die Baltenhilfe*. In a letter from the Chief of the Berlin Police of Feb. 2, a copy of which was attached to the letter of the Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Ministry of Feb. 14, it was explained that the "Baltic Aid Society" had no members, was not an organization at all but a cover name for the fund-collecting activities of a Dr. Friedrich Worms, a German born in Latvia who was editor of the *Baltischer Beobachter*. He solicited by mail a limited circle of some 2000 Germans, and turned over the funds "for the most part" to the *Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland*, which in turn distributed them to agents in the Baltic states. Worms began this activity in 1934 to assist members of the German minority in Latvia and Estonia who were in financial need as a result of their political activities.

<sup>3</sup> On Apr. 28, 1938, the Ministry of the Interior replied by transmitting a copy of a letter it sent to the Baltic Aid Society (1578/381967-68). The letter authorized the solicitation of up to 2000 persons who might be assumed to have an interest in the matter, mostly persons from the Baltic states living in Germany, and who might be relied upon to keep the solicitation strictly confidential.

## No. 321

F2/0435

*The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 13 of March 14

KAUNAS, March 15, 1938—1:45 a. m.

Received March 15—4:40 a. m.

Secretary General Urbšys, acting for the Foreign Minister, who was suddenly called to a cabinet meeting, asked me to call on him this evening at 9:45 p. m. in order to give me the following information, since it would be of interest to the German Government: On March 11 a new border incident had occurred at the Polish-Lithuanian line of demarcation, in the course of which a Polish soldier had been shot by a Lithuanian frontier guard on Lithuanian territory 17 meters from the line of demarcation. A written report follows about the details of the border incident.<sup>1</sup> Urbšys also stated that the Estonian Minister in Warsaw, without being asked by the Lithuanian Government, had taken this matter up with the Polish Foreign Ministry and had found out that in connection with this incident the Polish Government expects proposals from the Lithuanian Government for resumption of diplomatic relations,<sup>2</sup> in order to prevent similar occurrences in the future. When the Estonian Minister asked what would happen if Lithuania did not answer or answered in the negative, he was only told that the Polish Government would then wait 24 or at the most 36 hours. The Lithuanian Government was very much disturbed by this, particularly since in recent days numerous meetings had been held in Poland, mainly in Vilna, in which slogans had been proclaimed such as "we want to go to Memel" or "there has to be a stop to Lithuanian provocation."<sup>3</sup> Also Senator Fudakowski had sharply attacked Lithuania in Warsaw. When I asked what Lithuania was going to do, Urbšys could not give me any precise answer, but said that Lithuania was willing to have the incident settled by arbitration. For the rest I limited myself to taking note of the information.

Same text to Memel.

ZECHLIN

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2061/448259-63). A Schliep memorandum of Mar. 15 records a telephone message from the Minister in Lithuania received at 5:30 a. m. of the same day (241/153020-21). Zechlin reported on the further development of the border incident and also about Lithuanian attempts to negotiate with Poland through Estonia. He then expressed concern that the anti-Lithuanian attitude of the German press might encourage a Polish action against Lithuania and suggested that Germany, through diplomatic steps in Warsaw and Kaunas, should work towards a settlement of this conflict.

<sup>2</sup> There had been no diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania since Poland's seizure of Vilna in 1920.

<sup>3</sup> In a telegram dispatched from Warsaw on Mar. 15 (F2/0438), Ambassador Moltke also reported great political agitation there and rumors of troop concentrations on both sides of the Polish-Lithuanian border.

## No. 322

241/158025-28

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 16, 1938.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today on the instruction of his Government, to inform us with regard to the Lithuanian-Polish border incident of the 11th of this month. He traced the exact course of events, stressing the fact that the Polish soldier who later died was, at the moment at which the fatal shot struck him, on Lithuanian soil, approximately 17 meters from the line of demarcation, a fact which was not disputed by the Poles, for that matter. The Minister described all the details of the incident, including the conduct of the Polish border patrol detachment during the 48 hours following the act, emphasizing particularly the fact that the Polish boundary commissioner had refused to send a representative to the post-mortem examination of the corpse. At first it had been believed in Kaunas that this border incident, like so many others, could be quickly settled locally. The reports from Warsaw, however, hardly left any doubt that the Poles—as could be clearly inferred from a series of organized meetings—would like to exploit the incident politically. On the basis of these indications, the Lithuanian Government had decided to make two proposals through its Minister in Reval to the Polish Minister for transmittal to his Government:

- 1) Establishment of a commission to investigate the incident.
- 2) Initiation of direct negotiations with a view to finding ways and means of preventing a recurrence of such incidents in the future.

The Polish Government had thus far not replied to these proposals.

From reports by the Estonian Minister in Warsaw it had become apparent, however, that the Poles were considering bringing up specific demands in the form of an ultimatum. Upon his inquiry as to the subject of these demands, the Minister had been told that they concerned a resumption of diplomatic relations—i. e., in M. Šaulys' opinion, recognition of Vilna as belonging to Poland. The Poles are said to have stated that a reply was expected within 24 or, at the latest, 36 hours. The Estonian Minister had received no reply from the Poles to his question as to what Poland intended to do when the time limit had elapsed. The Lithuanian Government considered the situation to be serious, as it had the impression that public opinion in Poland was being artificially whipped up, for the purpose—they thought—of utilizing the international situation which had arisen from the reunion of Austria with the Reich in order to obtain compensation elsewhere, so to speak, for the increase in the power of the German Reich.



The Minister also mentioned that he had spoken to Ambassador Lipski about the situation yesterday evening at a social gathering but had learned nothing of importance. In this connection I pointed out to the Minister that as far as I knew the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, had only last night returned to Warsaw.

M. Šaulys made no request in connection with his exposition other than that his statements be noted.

MACKENSEN

## No. 323

F2/0441-40

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, March 16, 1938.

Colonel Scheller and Commander Frisius called on me today to discuss the political and military aspect of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. The two officers had been kept currently informed by the Foreign Ministry of the reports from our Embassy in Warsaw and our Legation in Kaunas. From Abwehr reports received early today by the War Ministry, it is apparent that no unusual troop movements by either Poland or Lithuania have so far been observed.

We realized that in the case of an armed conflict between Poland and Lithuania the question of the Memel Territory might immediately become acute for us, since Poland would presumably not refrain from sending warships to Memel. Colonel Scheller pointed out that at the present moment there were no German naval forces in East Prussian harbors; the nearest destroyers were at Swinemünde. He therefore asked me whether it would not be expedient for us to send one or two destroyers to Pillau, thus bringing them to the immediate vicinity of Memel. If an open conflict should break out between Poland and Lithuania and Poland actually sent a warship to Memel, it would be desirable for the protection of our claims to the Memel Territory to have a German warship appear off Memel simultaneously.

Colonel Scheller further brought up the question as to whether it would not be advisable, by way of anticipating all eventualities, to put certain troop units in East Prussia to some degree in a state of readiness now, in order to be able to move into the Memel Territory in case a conflict should break out.

I told both men that this afternoon I would submit to higher authorities the questions they had raised and I arranged with Colonel Scheller that he would call Ministerialdirektor von Weizsäcker or me by telephone this afternoon for a decision.

BISMARCK

## No. 324

241/158023

*The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

REVAL, March 16, 1938—6: 50 p. m.

No. 24 of March 16

Received March 16—8: 30 p. m.

With reference to your No. 24 of March 15.<sup>1</sup>

Vice Minister Opik, with whom I spoke about the matter, since the Foreign Minister himself could not be reached, confirmed the conversation of the Estonian Minister with the Political Director of the Polish Foreign Ministry as reported by the Legation at Kaunas. He remarked that the same statements had been made at the Warsaw Foreign Ministry to the Latvian Minister also. The Estonian Minister had only called there in order to inform himself about the situation, and the statements by the Political Director had followed. Estonia did not intend to mediate. She was keeping entirely neutral with regard to the conflict. However, the Lithuanian Minister here, who had called in order to learn the views of the Estonians, had informally been advised that Lithuania ought to accede to the Polish demands.

When I asked what he thought Poland would do, the Vice Minister answered that in his opinion, which coincided with that of the Estonian Minister in Warsaw, Poland would take military steps against Lithuania if she (group missing?) submit and finally take up diplomatic relations. In any case this was the intention of Polish Government circles, although evidently no final decision had been made up to that time. To be sure, no Polish troop concentration had been observed yet at the Lithuanian line of demarcation. At the moment the Poles had only about two divisions there. There also seemed to be no Lithuanian troop concentrations. On the other hand, troop movements had been observed lately at Soviet Russia's western border. He considered the situation serious, but was inclined to assume that in the final analysis Lithuania would give in, since the only power from which she could expect military support, namely Soviet Russia, was hardly inclined to become involved in a war now.

FROHWEIN

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed (6706/E506152). The Foreign Ministry had transmitted the text of the telegram from the Legation at Kaunas printed as document No. 321, together with a request for an immediate report on any information available to the Legation in Estonia concerning Poland's attitude in her dispute with Lithuania.

## No. 325

F2/0449

*Note by the Foreign Minister for the Führer*

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.

Yesterday evening Ambassador Moltke saw Szembek, since Beck could not be reached. Szembek told him that no direct conversations were in progress between Poland and Lithuania, but that everything was being handled via Riga. At the moment the situation was such that Lithuania wished to limit the whole affair merely to a settlement of the border incident. Poland is not satisfied with this, but wants diplomatic relations to be resumed.

Moltke could find out nothing for the time being about demands in the nature of an ultimatum; he will see Beck in the course of the morning. I shall then report again.

R[IBBENTROP]

## No. 326

F2/0450

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.

Ambassador von Moltke just telephoned (11:55 a. m.) with the information that he will see Foreign Minister Beck at 6 p. m. this evening.

In the meantime a Polish communiqué had been issued, the text of which was approximately as follows:

"The Polish Government will take appropriate steps in connection with the Polish-Lithuanian border incident provoked by the Lithuanian Government. At the next session of the Senate, Polish Foreign Minister Beck will treat the whole complex of Polish-Lithuanian relations."

Herr von Moltke added that this report did not sound very alarming, to be sure, but it had not been stated what the appropriate steps of the Polish Government would be. The time when the Senate would meet was not yet known. The nationalist opposition went farther in its demands than the Government. The Government camp was preparing an announcement for today, according to which the rights of fellow Poles living in Lithuania were to be protected. Marshal Rydz-Smigly had received a delegation whom he had told that it was his task to see that Poland emerged from every situation with increased prestige.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting at head of document: "[For] Führer".

The demands of the nationalist opposition evidently include a government in Kaunas acceptable to Poland, cooperation between the General Staffs, and a naval base in Memel or Palanga.<sup>2</sup> Such military aspects had heretofore been expressed only by the opposition.

Herr von Moltke added that the Minister of War had not taken part in the session of the Cabinet, but Marshal Rydz-Smigly had done so, as was his custom.\*

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup> In the original, Polangen, the German name for a small town on Lithuania's Baltic coast just north of the border of the Memel Territory.

\* Ambassador von Moltke's message was hard to hear over the telephone and very difficult to take down. [Footnote in the original.]

## No. 327

F11/0479

### *Minute by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.

Herr von Moltke just telephoned as follows: According to a special edition just issued of a small newspaper not connected with the Government, a note had been sent to the Lithuanian Government at 11 a.m. containing the following points:

1. Immediate resumption of diplomatic and consular relations.
2. Restoration of railroad and mail communications.
3. Conclusion of a minority treaty.
4. Conclusion of a trade and customs agreement.
5. Deletion of the article of the Lithuanian Constitution which calls Vilna the capital of Lithuania.
6. Full satisfaction for the border incident. In case of default the most severe consequences are threatened, including military action.

The newspaper did not mention any deadline.

At the close of the telephone conversation Herr von Moltke said that he had just heard that the special edition in which the above-mentioned report had appeared, had been confiscated by the Government.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> The document bears Ribbentrop's initial and the word "yes" in his handwriting written after each of numbered points 1, 2, and 3; the word "customs" in point 4, and all of point 5 have been stricken out by the same pen.

## No. 328

F11/0461

### *Minute by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, March 17, 1938.

This afternoon the Foreign Minister received the Lithuanian Minister. M. Šaulys pointed out to the Foreign Minister the alarming

features of Polish conduct and depicted the difficulty for Lithuania of yielding to Polish pressure for a definite renunciation of the Vilna area. Earlier suggestions for the resumption of diplomatic relations with a mutual reservation as to the definitive settlement of the Vilna problem had been rejected at that time by the Poles.

The Foreign Minister characterized the conversation as an exchange of information, but, through an incidental question, obtained from M. Šaulys the statement that, although Vilna was lost to Lithuania, the loss could hardly be acknowledged, especially not without guarantees for the cultural life of the Lithuanian inhabitants of the Vilna area.

Without giving direct counsel, the Foreign Minister urged upon the Lithuanian Minister a realistic policy in the present situation, especially as Lithuania could expect no aid from Russia.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 329

F2/0448-47

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

March 17, 1938.

1) Germany's interest lies in the maintenance of the *status quo* between Poland and Lithuania, because:

a) Germany, after the annexation of Austria, now has an interest in a peaceful international situation;

b) Germany has no interest in the annexation of Lithuania by Poland, since thereby Lithuania would cease to be an object of compensation for restitution of the Corridor to Germany.

2) In case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict, I consider the occupation of the Memel Territory necessary within the first few hours. Appropriate preparations for this have been made.<sup>1</sup>

3) To effect an amicable settlement I propose that:

a) Poland be informed in proper form, but clearly, that Germany, as Poland's nearest neighbor, must expect to be advised by Poland of any measures that may be adopted by that Government;

b) Influence be exerted upon the Lithuanian Government to accede to the Polish request for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania. Thereby Poland's occupation of the Vilna area would be definitively recognized by Lithuania, and it

<sup>1</sup> Hitler issued a directive to the German armed forces on Mar. 18 to prepare plans for the occupation of the Memel Territory. This was confirmed in a further directive of Oct. 21, 1938, which stated that war between Poland and Lithuania could make the occupation necessary and that the plans should be drafted to permit of very rapid execution. See *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1949), vol. xxxiv, document No. 136-C, pp. 477-481.

would be difficult for Poland to contrive another reason for intervention and for occupation of further territory.

4) In case of conflict, proper notice of the occupation of the Memel Territory by our troops would have to be given to Poland.

R[IBBENTROP]

### No. 330

F11/0468-71

#### *The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

VERY URGENT

WARSAW, March 17, 1938.

No. 17 of March 17

Received March 18—3:40 a. m.

In the course of my conversation this evening with Foreign Minister Beck I conveyed to him the desire of the Reich Foreign Minister to obtain more detailed information about the intentions of the Polish Government with reference to the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. M. Beck replied that the matter was serious. To begin with, it had been brought out in the course of the investigation that the incident itself was of a more serious nature than had at first been assumed. It had been proved that it was a matter of two agents who belonged to a secret anti-Polish organization and who had obviously been sent across the border for subversive purposes. They crossed the border under the protection of a military unit, the Polish frontier guard being a victim of its fire. From the confession of the agent who had been captured, it was discovered that the project was connected with the illegal activities in Poland which had been brought to light in the well-known Stachys case (cf. report of November 30, 1937, P. V 34/11).<sup>1</sup> In judging the incident it was moreover necessary to take into consideration the fact that the Lithuanian Government had repeatedly broken faith in regard to the Polish efforts toward normalization of diplomatic relations. The two discussions which he had had with Lositis [*sic*] two years ago and a year and a half ago, respectively, turned out to be fruitless in spite of a seemingly accommodating attitude. He could tell me in the strictest confidence that new conversations with the Lithuanian Government had taken place

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (2061/448245-48). Konstantin Stachys, the leader of the Lithuanian minority in Vilna, had been accused originally of Irredentist agitation, but was sentenced finally to a year in prison for currency exchange offenses.

during January and February, in which it had been decided to open negotiations on normalization. The name of the negotiator, the day and the hour of the meeting, even the text of the full powers had already been agreed upon. In the end, however, the negotiator had not put in his appearance at the time designated, and the Lithuanian Government had merely let it be known that it had changed its mind, without giving any more detailed reasons. This incident conveyed a warning, and they were therefore determined to proceed more energetically now.

In the note which would be presented this evening—through what channel was still undecided—they were going to use forceful language; but the demands were to be moderate, in order not to injure the prestige of Lithuania.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately he could not give me any details; but he attached great importance to making the statement that the extra edition of the *Nowaja Prawda* which appeared this afternoon—and on which I reported by telephone today<sup>3</sup>—was absolutely incorrect.

To my question as to what would happen in case of an unsatisfactory reply to the note, M. Beck answered that things would then be very serious. From the rest of his not very precise remarks I gathered that there might then even be a question of military action. Beck stressed explicitly, however, that in case the matter should assume a more serious character he would communicate with the German Government; and he repeated this assurance a second time in the further course of the conversation, remarking that he understood our taking an interest in the developments in the neighboring state of Lithuania and had no intention of confronting us with surprises.<sup>4</sup> In answer to my further question as to whether the note was couched in the form of an ultimatum, Beck replied in the affirmative, and stated upon further inquiry that the time limit was set at 48 (forty-eight) hours.

In concluding, Beck repeated that the political demands were moderate and that he had every reason to believe that Lithuania would accept them.

MOLTKE

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<sup>2</sup> The note was transmitted by the Polish Minister at Tallinn (Reval) to the Lithuanian Minister there. It demanded that Lithuania agree within 48 hours to the opening of normal diplomatic relations. For the text see *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. I, pp. 302-303.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 327.

<sup>4</sup> There is in the files an unsigned note (241/158064), initialed and filed by Weizsäcker on Apr. 8, which apparently contains the substance of the reply made to Beck on this point. It reads: "Communication to M. Beck: Thanks for the promise of Mar. 17. We hoped that this promise applied also to the future as Germany was naturally interested in all developments in Lithuania affecting our military situation."

## No. 331

F11/0472

*The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry.*

Telegram

URGENT

KAUNAS, March 18, 1938—4:00 a. m.

No. 18 of March 17

Received March 18—4:05 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 17.<sup>1</sup>

Upon presentation of the Polish reply, Urbšys informed me that, even before receipt of the Polish reply, the Lithuanian Government had made the proposal, through the intermediary of the Polish Ambassador in Paris, that each party should designate one diplomatic representative to carry on negotiations with respect to the settlement of relations between the two countries.

Urbšys further asked for information, if possible, on the views of the German Government and for friendly advice in regard to the Polish note.

ZECHLIN

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (F11/0465-67). The telegram transmitted the text of the Polish ultimatum. See document No. 330, footnote 2.

## No. 332

F14/016-14

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 176

BERLIN, March 18, 1938.

Lithuanian Minister Šaulys called on me at 1 p. m. today.

Referring to the request by the Secretary General of the Lithuanian Foreign Office in Kaunas for friendly advice from the German Government, I informed him that in the opinion of the Reich Government Poland's note was very moderate and that we could only advise unconditional acceptance of the Polish proposal. This was also the opinion of the Führer, with whom I had discussed the matter.

According to my personal opinion it would in any case be preferable for Lithuania to sanction a state of affairs which was really unalterable. The consequences of a refusal were at any rate unforeseeable.

Minister Šaulys informed me that the Lithuanian Government had decided to resume diplomatic relations with Poland. The Lithuanian Government would, however, be grateful if the Reich Government could persuade the Polish Government to reserve the manner and form of establishing diplomatic relations for further Polish-Lithuanian conversations, since otherwise the Polish-Lithuanian relations would from the outset be impaired by the Polish note which amounted to an ultimatum.



I rejected the proposal to mediate in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict and told Minister Šaulys that Germany saw no reason for doing so. It would probably be best if the Lithuanian representative in Reval would stress the Lithuanian views during the exchange of notes with Poland. The Polish Government would perhaps find it possible to meet Lithuanian wishes half-way regarding the publication of the manner and form of the resumption. However, I had no information on that either.

In this connection I told the Lithuanian Minister that if Polish-Lithuanian relations were cleared up, an improvement in German-Lithuanian relations would also seem desirable to me. In this connection I referred to the six Germans who were still in Lithuanian prisons as a result of the Neumann-Sass trial, as well as to our other complaints regarding the Memel Territory. I added that the desire for an adjustment of German-Lithuanian relations, of course, had nothing to do with the Polish action. However, since this was the Lithuanian Minister's first call on me I wished to take advantage of the opportunity to bring up these matters also.

The Lithuanian Minister replied that he would submit the suggestion to his Government to have the six imprisoned Germans released and handed over to Germany, if Germany was prepared to release the two arrested Lithuanians. He would be grateful, moreover, for an *aide-mémoire* regarding our grievances concerning the Memel Territory, and he promised to use his influence in favor of remedial action.

RIBBENTROP

### No. 333

F11/0474

#### *The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces to the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 18, 1938.

MY DEAR MINISTER: The black line on the accompanying sketch<sup>1</sup> indicates our military proposal for a possible line of demarcation vis-à-vis the Poles. I should like to point out, however, that this idea cannot be employed without involving considerable *military* consequences with regard to the strength of forces to be assigned,

<sup>1</sup> The map (F11/0475) is not reproduced. It was apparently prepared for the contingency of a Polish attack on Lithuania, in which case military measures would be taken by Germany, as suggested by Ribbentrop in document No. 329. The demarcation line provides for occupation of considerably more than the Memel Territory itself, however. The line follows the course of the Nemunas (Nemen) River from the East Prussian frontier eastward to the junction with the Dubysa River; it then follows the latter northward to a point roughly due east of the northernmost projection of the Memel Territory; it then turns west and reaches the Baltic coast at the frontier of Memel and Lithuania.

mobilization, etc. Therefore I request that before such a line of demarcation is established the decision of the Führer be obtained once more and I be consulted in connection with it.

Heil Hitler!

Respectfully yours,

KETTEL

No. 334

147/78552-53

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 178

BERLIN, March 18, 1938.

Polish Ambassador Lipski called on me today at 5 p. m. and informed me of the present state of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. His account coincided by and large with the information given by Ambassador von Moltke in his telegraphic report.<sup>1</sup>

I told the Polish Ambassador that I had recommended to the Lithuanian Minister unconditional acceptance of the Polish note, which seemed moderate to me. The Lithuanian Minister had requested my mediation so that the appearance of an ultimatum might be removed from the Polish note. I had refused such mediation.<sup>2</sup>

I told the Polish Ambassador as my personal opinion that Lithuania was only concerned with outwardly saving face.

The Polish Ambassador replied that the Polish Government would assuredly be conciliatory as to form, and that he intended also to communicate with Warsaw to this effect.

I further remarked to the Polish Ambassador that I had taken note of his statement to Field Marshal Göring that Poland would keep us posted on further developments. We attached decided importance to being notified in advance if the Polish Government intended to take any action.

The Polish Ambassador agreed to give me further information if he heard anything new; if necessary, even during the night.

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 330.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 332.

No. 335

241/158045-47

*Memorandum by an Official of the Cultural Policy Department*

URGENT

BERLIN, March 18, 1938.

e. o. Kult A 791 g.

The present tension between Poland and Lithuania and the rumors set afloat about annexation make urgent the examination of the ques-

tion as to whether, in case of the occupation of Lithuania by the Poles, the German Government could facilitate the reincorporation of the Memel Territory by offering its aid in the development of a substitute port. As far as known, this question has never been discussed hitherto.

Aside from the present Polish-Lithuanian tension, the question might also be examined from the viewpoint of the possibility that a situation might arise in which we could confront Lithuania with the demand for reincorporation.

At present the port of Memel is Lithuania's only seaport. The demand for the reincorporation of the volksdeutsch Memel Territory would presumably be more sympathetically received by international public opinion if we pointed out in good time that there was a possibility of constructing another port in the old Lithuanian territory and that, if occasion arose, we were prepared to make this feasible by the concession of a connecting canal for the river traffic on the Memel.

We might consider whether it would be possible to construct on the Lithuanian coast, to the north of the Memel Territory, somewhere near Palanga, a new artificial seaport with a railway connection reaching the interior of Lithuania and with a canal for river traffic to the Memel or to the Kurisches Haff. The nature of the soil (alluvial soil and sand) should present no very great difficulties.

If the shortest route were chosen, the connecting canal would pass through Memel territory—hence, in case of its reincorporation, through German territory. This would be no great drawback compared with the present situation. Even now, in case of war, the waterway to the port of Memel would be under our control and not available, as the south bank of the Memel River is Reich territory. To reach the Memel River the canal could also be built entirely on old Lithuanian territory. It would then be that much longer and more expensive.

Respectfully submitted herewith to Pol. VI (Senior Counselor Grundherr) for appropriate examination.

LORENZ

Note:

Already discussed orally with Senior Counselor Grundherr (Pol. VI).

Because of the need for haste, a copy has been sent to:

Director of the Political Department  
State Secretary's Secretariat  
Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

## No. 336

F11/0476-78

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, March 18, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 551.

## THE SITUATION IN THE MEMEL TERRITORY

The political conditions in the Memel Territory and the conduct of the Lithuanian authorities with regard to the German population there and to the agencies of the autonomous administration do not yet accord in any way with the provisions of the Memel Statute.

The following are the main grievances:

1) Since 1926 the Lithuanian Government has maintained a state of martial law, by virtue of which a "military commander" in the Memel Territory has been ruthlessly repressing the freedom of the press and of assembly guaranteed by the Statute. Censorship frequently bans the publication of speeches by German deputies in the Memel Territory Landtag in which encroachments by the Lithuanian authorities are criticized. German associations and societies in the Memel Territory, even those of such a completely unpolitical and purely economic nature as rural loan associations, are forbidden to hold their statutory general meetings.

2) The Lithuanian political police, whose activity in the Memel Territory has no legal basis under the Memel Statute, maintains an extensive system of police spies, and, by means of arrests and fines and many petty vexations, such as prohibition to reside in a certain place, the obligation to report daily at police stations, etc., takes action against inhabitants of the Memel Territory who are active for the German cause in the economic and cultural fields. An especially striking case: A member of the Memel Directorate, in office for over two years with the consent of the Lithuanian Governor, is still under police supervision, to which he was subjected more than four years ago, and must report weekly to the political police.

3) Officials under the Lithuanian Governor and the military commander in Memel compel the tradesmen and businessmen who are of German origin to use the Lithuanian language exclusively on the sign-boards of their business premises—although according to the Statute the German and Lithuanian languages enjoy equal privileges—and threaten them with the withholding of import licenses for German wares.

4) Following the big Neumann-Sass trial in 1935, six Memel residents who were charged with the murder of the Lithuanian agent Jesuttis are still in Lithuanian prisons. The Lithuanian Government, which was urged by our Minister in Kaunas to pardon these prisoners also, refused to do so at the beginning of February. Circles closely

connected with the Lithuanian Government obviously attach great importance to having two Lithuanians pardoned who were sentenced to long prison terms in Germany on political grounds. The Lithuanian Government knows that we stand ready to pardon these men when the last of the Memel people sentenced in the big Kaunas trial will have been pardoned. It is therefore unnecessary to exert any special pressure on the Lithuanian Government at present for the pardon of these Memel men. This is also the opinion of influential leaders of the German element in Memel.

5) With reference to the question of the non-application of the Lithuanian expropriation law in the Memel Territory, the Lithuanian Government has not yet replied to our proposals made in December of last year.<sup>1</sup>

6) The Lithuanian Governor of the Memel Territory in many cases cripples the legislative activity of the Memel Landtag by vetoing numerous laws passed in accordance with the Statute on grounds not in conformity with the provisions of the Memel Statute. For nearly a year the efforts of a committee of the Landtag, in which a Lithuanian delegate also participated, to reach an agreement through negotiation have been frustrated by continual postponement of the discussions by the Lithuanian Governor.

GRUNDHERR

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 319.

## No. 337

F11/0437

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, March 19, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. VI 570.

Ambassador von Moltke, whom I notified by telephone of the unconditional acceptance of the Polish wishes by the Lithuanian Government,<sup>1</sup> told me that Szembek had given him the same information five minutes earlier; exchange of the notes on the resumption of diplomatic relations had already taken place in Reval. Foreign Minister Beck attached importance to having us immediately informed of this, in which connection he had emphasized that the attitude of the Reich Foreign Minister in this conflict was most gratefully acknowledged by him.

GRUNDHERR

<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Ministry was informed by a telephone call from Minister Zechlin at Kaunas at 11:05 a. m. that Lithuania had accepted the Polish ultimatum unconditionally (F11/0436).

## No. 338

2129/484264-65

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

No. A 454

Moscow, March 21, 1938.

Pol. I 730 g (VI).

Subject: Polish-Lithuanian conflict.

With reference to my telegram No. 85<sup>1</sup> of March 19 and report No. A 427 of March 18.<sup>2</sup>

I had a conversation with the Lithuanian Minister here, Baltrušaitis, regarding the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, in order to learn from him further details as to the attitude of the Soviet Government. The Minister, who usually is a very calm person, gave me the impression of being rather excited. He told me that during the last few days he had been in constant contact with Foreign Commissar Litvinov, who had called him even late at night. Litvinov had shown a very great interest in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. He had asked for the most precise information on all points, had also approached the Polish Ambassador here and requested clear information from him as to the intentions of the Polish Government. The Polish Ambassador had assured Litvinov that Poland demanded nothing but resumption of diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania. Litvinov had said to him, Baltrušaitis, that he could see no objections to the Polish demands, but that in case the conflict should develop further a dangerous situation would arise. That had to be prevented. The Minister added that it was understandable that Lithuania could not have refused the Polish desire for resumption of diplomatic relations. However, the form in which the Polish demand had been presented was objectionable. Moreover, his words indicated that he did not seem to believe the intentions of the Polish Government are entirely limited to the realization of its demand for resumption of diplomatic relations. He seemed to fear that something else was behind the Polish action.

When I asked him whether Litvinov had made any concrete promises, he shrugged his shoulders in a resigned manner. My next question, whether he believed that the Soviet Union would come to the assistance of Lithuania in a military conflict with Poland, he also answered with a resigned gesture. He emphasized only the great interest which Litvinov had expressed to him.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (241/158056). The telegram reported that Litvinov had told the Polish Ambassador in Moscow that if the issue between Lithuania and Poland was only that of restoring diplomatic relations the Soviet Union would not intervene. The head of the Baltic Department in the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had told a Finnish diplomat that the Soviet Union would not intervene if Poland attacked Lithuania.

<sup>2</sup> Printed in vol. II, document No. 96.

The Polish Embassy assured me that the present action had been intended only to enforce resumption of diplomatic relations with Lithuania. Poland had no intentions beyond that. To be sure, military measures would not have been excluded if Lithuania had not complied with the Polish wish. The idea of annexing Lithuania was rejected, however, with a reference to Pilsudski's testament. To what extent this is true, only the future can tell.

As to the attitude of the Soviet Government, it seems to consist in not committing itself and retaining its freedom of action. It may be expected that Litvinov will try above all to prevent, through diplomatic means, a fresh outbreak and possible spreading of the conflict.

VON TIPPELSKIRCH

### No. 339

2129/464266-68

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A 460

Moscow, March 21, 1938.

Pol. I 731 g (VI).

Subject: Polish-Lithuanian Conflict.

With reference to my report of March 21—No. A 454.

The Military Attaché, Major General Köstring, has placed at my disposal the enclosed memorandum of a conversation which he had with Skucas, the Lithuanian Military Attaché here, on March 18. The memorandum gives an idea of the feeling which prevailed in Lithuanian military circles during the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. Of special interest is the remark by the Lithuanian Military Attaché that it was now regrettable that Lithuania had not accepted the repeated offers of the Soviet Union to cooperate in foreign policy and military matters. From this remark it appears to be definitely established that the military convention between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, so often affirmed, actually does not exist.

VON TIPPELSKIRCH

[Enclosure]

Moscow, March 18, 1938.

When we happened to meet today, the Lithuanian Military Attaché, Skucas, engaged me in a conversation on the subject of the Polish ultimatum to Lithuania.

He said that Litvinov had had conversations with the Polish Ambassador on the evening of March 17 and at 3 p. m. on March 18. The Polish ultimatum, which expired on the evening of March 19, contained only one point: establishment of diplomatic relations. Skucas believes that the other points mentioned in the press had been

eliminated as a result of pressure on Poland by Litvinov. Litvinov is said to have told the Polish Ambassador that action against Lithuania would seriously endanger peace in the East. Skucas was not yet informed regarding the second conversation.

I referred to the statement Litvinov gave representatives of the press on March 17<sup>1</sup>—from which it appears that the Soviet Union would take action only if other States did the same. Even if this information applied only to Czechoslovakia, the whole attitude showed nevertheless that the Soviet Union felt too weak militarily to take serious steps. Skucas pointed out that the situation here was different. The Soviet Union could not tolerate Poland's becoming too strong on the Baltic Sea through the possession of Memel. Although the Soviet Army might be weak at present as regards leadership, in spite of its young officers it nevertheless had great importance and weight where Poland was concerned, because of its great masses of men and matériel. Let the politicians decide whatever they liked, he, like other officers, would rather perish than let Lithuania be swallowed up by Poland.

Poland knew that she could not in the long run keep the Corridor, which after all was a vital necessity for Germany. Anticipating this, perhaps she had given it up already, compensating herself with Lithuania. One man—your Führer—could speak the decisive word and restrain Poland. It was regrettable now—looking back—that Lithuania had not accepted the repeated offers of the Soviet Union to cooperate in foreign policy and military matters.

I pointed out to Skucas that not until March 22 was Beck going to state in the Sejm what measures had been decided upon in regard to Lithuania. I was only a soldier and not familiar with what was involved, so I could give him no information. But I could not imagine that Poland would exchange the rich Corridor for the poor land of Lithuania, any more than I could suppose that we, in spite of the differences which would always exist between us regarding the Memel Territory, would take any part in Polish-Lithuanian conflicts. Besides, we had enough on our hands at present with the incorporation of Austria.

KÖSTRING

<sup>1</sup> See vol. II, document No. 92.

## No. 340

1890/426044-46

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, March 23, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 617.

The attitude of the Lithuanian authorities in the Memel Territory shows very clearly the tendency to eliminate the German character of



the great majority of the Memel population in all fields of public and private life and to assimilate forcibly the Memel population of German origin to the inhabitants of the rest of the Lithuanian territory. The Lithuanian authorities are thus violating the spirit and the letter of the Statute of the Memel Territory, which, as stated in the preamble, was promulgated to "safeguard the traditional rights and culture of its inhabitants." The *economic* pressure by the Lithuanian authorities on the Memel Germans has become especially strong during the last few years. Its goal is to make the Territory Lithuanian.

In the attached document a series of particularly flagrant and symptomatic Lithuanian measures are listed which, as the Lithuanian Government has been informed repeatedly by Germany, in the opinion of the Reich Government violate the Statute of the Memel Territory, and the repeal of which must be considered a condition for improving and normalizing German-Lithuanian relations.<sup>1</sup>

GRUNDHERR

<sup>1</sup> According to a memorandum by Erich Kordt dated Mar. 18 (F11/0448) the Foreign Minister requested the list of grievances. A further memorandum by Kordt on Mar. 21 (115/117451) states that Ribbentrop requested the list be handed to the Lithuanian Minister when it was ready. See document No. 341.

(Enclosure)

#### GERMAN GRIEVANCES REGARDING LITHUANIAN ACTIONS IN THE MEMEL TERRITORY

1) Maintenance of martial law since 1926. Restriction of freedom of organization, assembly, and press; arrests; obligation to register; restrictions as to residence, and similar measures in regard to Memel Germans. Maintenance of Lithuanian executive agencies in areas under the jurisdiction of the autonomous administration (military commander, political police).

2) Paralyzation to a large degree of the legislative function of the autonomous authorities as a result of the vetoes by the Governor of the Memel Territory, contrary to the provisions of the Memel Statute, of numerous laws passed by the Memel Landtag.

3) Taking away the right to be elected to office from a large number of members of former Memel German parties.

4) Non-recognition of passports issued by the Directorate of the Memel Territory, the holders of which are designated, in accordance with the Statute, as "citizens of the Memel Territory."

5) Interference by the Governor's officials with the Directorate's inspection of schools.

6) Exclusive use of the Lithuanian language and Lithuanian place names by the Lithuanian post-office, railroad, and customs admin-

istration. Compulsion to use the Lithuanian language in correspondence with Lithuanian authorities.

7) Lithuanian Expropriation Law of September 6, 1937.

8) Pressure on Memel enterprises for the stated purpose of inducing them to use the Lithuanian language exclusively as well as to dismiss workers of German origin and employ workers of Lithuanian nationality.

9) Discrimination against German firms in the Memel Territory in the granting of export licenses.

10) Obstruction to a large degree of the activities of Reich German insurance companies in the Memel Territory.

11) Obstruction of the development of the Memel credit system by placing Government commissioners in the credit institutions, for instance, and by other measures; paralyzation of the "Credit Union of Memel Landowners" and the "Agraria Credit Company."

### No. 341

115/117447-48

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, March 25, 1938.

[e. o. Pol. VI 655.]<sup>1</sup>

I just received the Lithuanian Minister and, in order to define precisely our attitude regarding the release of the six Germans from Lithuanian imprisonment, I told him the following:

We had to insist that the prisoners should not be taken over by Germany after their release but should be able to return to the Memel Territory. The Minister thought that the difficulty in regard to these six remaining prisoners was that they were to be considered criminal and not political prisoners. Without further inquiry he, the Minister, was not able to give any information now concerning the possibility of a release.

I answered that I was not asking for such immediate information from him at present. That the release on the above conditions would be valuable for our mutual relations was self-evident, however. Furthermore, in cases of release of German prisoners, we had so far usually been able to make a suitable response.

The Minister concluded this subject with the remark that fundamentally his Government wished to clear up the difficulties still remaining between Lithuania and Germany.

Taking up this remark I gave the Minister the list of German grievances regarding Lithuanian actions in the Memel Territory

<sup>1</sup> File number taken from another copy of the document (1890/426047-48).

(enclosure to Pol. VI 617).<sup>2</sup> I did not discuss the individual complaints with the Minister. Herr Šaulys also made the usual reservation that he could not speak to us officially about the internal affairs of the Memel Territory, but that, as before, he was naturally willing to do so privately. He would perhaps come back again for a discussion of the details, since he would probably go to Kaunas for a conference in the first half of April.

I stated that I was ready for such a conversation at a later date, in the presence of Herr von Grundherr. I said to the Minister that a juridical discussion regarding our right to talk with him about our interests in the Memel Territory was superfluous. The special relationship between the Memel Territory and Germany was after all a fact, and the treatment of the Memel population by Lithuania was decisive for German-Lithuanian relations. I had no objections to the statement by the Minister that the Memel Territory should not constitute a point of friction but a connecting link in our relations.

On the whole, the Minister seemed to me, more so this time than before, to feel the need for good relations with Germany and to consider this moment favorable for a settlement of issues between us.

WEIZSÄCKER<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 340.

<sup>3</sup> Copies of the Weizsäcker memorandum and of the document handed to the Lithuanian Minister were sent to principal Missions in Europe during the first week in April. The covering instruction (4488/E007546) requested that "as opportunity offers in conversations the statement be made that the conditions in the Memel Territory were still by no means satisfactory, rather that we still had numerous serious complaints concerning the Lithuanian attitude."

## No. 342

2069/449585-87

*The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

P V 34

WARSAW, April 9, 1938.

Received April 20.

Pol. VI 833.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversation with Foreign Minister Beck on the Lithuanian question.<sup>1</sup>

In a conversation today with Foreign Minister Beck I brought up the Lithuanian question, in accordance with the instructions I received in Berlin. I began with a reference to the *démarche* by Minister

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "The report is important; it should be sent to our more important Missions for information."

Šaulys during the Polish-Lithuanian conflict,<sup>2</sup> which prompted M. Beck to express his thanks once more for the attitude which the Reich Foreign Minister had taken in the matter. Ambassador Lipski, he continued, had reported on this in detail, and this report had been read in Warsaw with great satisfaction. I remarked that in the final analysis Berlin had been somewhat relieved that M. Beck had been able to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict after all. Berlin had also been grateful for the promise he had given me on March 17 that in case the conflict became more critical he would consult with the German Government so that there would be no surprises.<sup>3</sup> We hoped—and I was authorized to say this—that this promise was also valid for the future, for Germany was interested in all developments that took place in Lithuania, especially in those which might change our military situation.

M. Beck answered briefly with "quite right" and the remark that no conflict of interests need arise; he had already told me this during our conversation on March 17. Furthermore, events had taken exactly the course he had predicted to me. He hoped that we had not misinterpreted his not informing me in detail about the note at the time; this had been done in order to give Lithuania precedence. I answered that knowledge of the details was less important for us since, in recognition of the fact that we were interested in developments in Lithuania, he had promised to consult with the German Government in case of an emergency.

This ended the conversation on this subject. The promise for the future did not, perhaps, sound very definite. I believed, however, that I should not press this point any further, because in this case the other side doubtless would have come forward with questions which we, too, would not wish to raise at the present moment. I have the impression that M. Beck understood very well what we were interested in, that is, to make it clear that we had interests in Lithuania and that these interests could be affected by events other than a military invasion.

M. Beck then discussed several other matters relating to the conflict, without saying anything essentially new. The only remark of interest was that it had also been possible on the occasion of the Lithuanian crisis to expose certain intrigues by other countries. When I asked whether he meant Russia, he answered that it was mainly a question of Russia but also of another country. There is certainly no doubt that he meant France.

MOLTKE

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 332.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 330.

## No. 343

1890/426063-68

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, May 9, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 929.

For the first time in several years the Lithuanian Minister, M. Šaulys, at a social meeting expressed the wish that he might have a candid and thorough talk with me about German-Lithuanian relations. This one-hour discussion took place on May 7 in my office in the Foreign Ministry. This time M. Šaulys was very subdued. He was more tractable and conciliatory than is his custom, so the discussion was altogether pleasant.

He began the conversation by saying that it would be of great value to his Government to obtain full clarity as to the aims of German foreign policy with respect to Lithuania. He was uncertain as to these aims, for one would have to conclude from the contents of many pamphlets published in Germany and many voices in the press, as well as many speeches at public meetings during the last few years, that these aims were not without danger to Lithuania. In that connection it should be taken into consideration that Memel was the only port at the disposal of Lithuania. I replied that the aims of official German foreign policy could of course not be judged from pamphlets and speeches at gatherings during the time of the struggle<sup>1</sup> and the time of the Kaunas verdict.<sup>2</sup> Rather, the speeches by the Führer and Reich Chancellor and statements by official German authorities were decisive. Furthermore, I had repeatedly expressed myself quite clearly to his Counselor of Legation, the last time just a few days ago. We desired good relations with Lithuania by all means; the only condition was strict observance of the Memel Statute, not only in the letter but in the spirit as well, although this had been entirely lacking so far. M. Šaulys replied that he agreed with us that the Statute must be observed faithfully. He had repeatedly tried to exert his influence in Kaunas to this end. He was of the opinion, for instance, that bilingualism in the Memel Territory would have to be carried out in practice, but naturally applying also to the Lithuanians so that they could use Lithuanian in their contacts with the autonomous authorities. I mentioned as being even more important in this connection the termination of the state of martial law and the withdrawal of the political police, as well as the discontinuation of the veto policy of the Governor. A state of martial law and real

<sup>1</sup>i. e., during the Nazi Party's struggle for power.

<sup>2</sup>The reference is to the Memel treason trial of 1935. See document No. 318, footnote 5.

autonomy were like fire and water. M. Šaulys thought that changes in that respect were imminent; but Lithuania would have to exercise a certain control over the Memel Territory—whereupon I answered him that 5 regiments—which was the number, as far as I knew—after all should be sufficient for this small country. M. Šaulys then said that, to be quite frank, *confidence* in Germany on the part of Lithuania was still lacking. I answered that in view of the experiences of recent years this was understandably also the case on the German side. M. Šaulys mentioned that during the days of crisis he had received many threatening letters from Germany, to which I answered that he could see from that how greatly agitated the German population had been at the hard lot of their brothers in the Memel Territory.

At this point M. Šaulys for the first time touched upon the question of a German-Lithuanian nonaggression pact of which, he said, the Führer and Reich Chancellor had spoken, too. During the ensuing part of the conversation he briefly touched upon the same question twice more; each time I observed a strictly noncommittal attitude. (Excerpts from the speeches of the Führer and Reich Chancellor dealing with this question are attached.)\* Confidence, I continued, had to grow slowly on both sides. Actions would in this case be the most convincing, and I wished to acknowledge that in the question of prisoners, which was now apparently settled in principle, Lithuania had taken an important step, although it might have had a more favorable effect on the sentiment in the Memel Territory and in Germany if this problem had been settled more promptly. M. Šaulys felt that the question of prisoners had been very difficult for the Lithuanian Government; he himself had always advocated a conciliatory attitude in Kaunas. But the main credit should go to President Smetona.<sup>4</sup> He then mentioned the names of four Lithuanians in Germany who were still serving terms in prison for political offenses.

The Minister then said that in order to make practical progress Germany should, if possible, have Minister Zechlin present our wishes in Kaunas. He himself was not well informed as to the details. However, Herr Zechlin should speak not only with M. Lozoraitis, since the latter would otherwise be overburdened and the task would be too

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\* Not printed (1890/426069-73). In his speech of May 21, 1935, Hitler stated that Germany was willing to conclude nonaggression pacts with all her neighbors except Lithuania. No pact with the latter was possible so long as she continued to violate in Memel the most elementary human rights. On Mar. 7, 1936, however, Hitler declared that in view of some improvement shown in Lithuanian policy in Memel this exception could be withdrawn. Germany was "prepared on condition that the autonomy guaranteed the Memel Territory was effectively developed to sign such a nonaggression pact with Lithuania also."

<sup>4</sup> Antanas Smetona, President of Lithuania from 1926 until the Russian occupation of the country in 1940.

difficult for him, but also with Minister President Mironas<sup>6</sup> and President Smetona. Lithuania would prefer to receive the German wishes and then to act on its own initiative—no real negotiation, in other words.

On the present occasion, he might be permitted to express a few wishes himself: first, that the German press write in a more friendly manner about Lithuania. I answered that not every German press statement should be taken as an official statement by the German Government; furthermore, as I could ascertain, our press had carried only very little about Lithuania during the last few months. Moreover, I regretted having to state that the basic tendency of the Lithuanian press—which was of much more consequence than individual voices of the press—was most unfavorable to Germany; for in connection with all important political events it generally printed only the English or French positions. On individual cases, too, we constantly had serious complaints. Thus, I wished to mention merely the speech made by a lieutenant apparently on active duty, on occasion of a collection for the Lithuanian armament fund, who had made a real "Hun speech" with the vilest insults. M. Šaulys regretted this.

Then the Minister expressed the wish that we accord better treatment to the Lithuanian "minority" in East Prussia, which enjoyed very little liberty. I replied, in the first place, that one could not and why one could not in our opinion speak of a Lithuanian "minority" in East Prussia, but that I could well imagine that the treatment of the Memel Germans might have caused such strong and justified agitation in East Prussia that one incident or another against Lithuanians might have occurred in East Prussia in the last few years. Moreover, I should be glad to communicate with the East Prussian authorities in this matter when the occasion presented itself.

The Lithuanian Minister then mentioned the 70-year-old German Reich national of Lithuanian descent, Vidunas, of Tilsit, who enjoyed the highest reputation in Lithuania as a poet and outstanding personality and who was being held because of serious foreign-exchange violations. I emphasized that M. Vidunas had been warned once before because of his conduct, and that it was a matter of several instances and rather large sums, so that several years of imprisonment were in store for him. How accommodating we had been in this case, however, was shown by the following: because of his poor health he had some time ago been admitted to a hospital, where his sister could even prepare his special diet for him, and we were also willing to permit him to go home, under police surveillance, of course. It would

<sup>6</sup> As a result of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, the cabinet of Juozas Tubelis had resigned and a new government had been formed on Mar. 25 headed by Vladas Mironas, chief chaplain of the army.

be difficult to quash the case, but it did not need to be hurried, and Vidunas' age and state of health could be taken into consideration in this connection. Here M. Šaulys asked "privately" whether it would not be a practical solution to deprive Vidunas of his Reich citizenship and expel him. I did not take any further position on this but indicated with a gesture that in this matter we should be willing to listen to reason. (Meanwhile, on my initiative, Vidunas has already been permitted to go home.)

Then the Lithuanian Minister mentioned the broadcasts of the Königsberg radio and said that the Lithuanian Government could hardly tolerate this station's broadcasting of election propaganda—as before the last Memel elections—and interfering with the internal affairs of the Memel Territory. I replied that under martial law there were in the Memel Territory none of the rights established in the Statute for a regular preparation for elections, no freedom of assembly and no freedom of the press, not even permission to put up election posters. Not even Landtag speeches could be printed in the press today. If full freedom to prepare for and hold elections was granted the Memel population, as provided for in the Statute, I should think that even the Königsberg radio would no longer have any reason to transmit such broadcasts, with which, by the way, I was not familiar. But, speaking quite generally, I felt impelled to say in this connection that the position of the Memel population, which after all enjoyed the protection of an internationally guaranteed autonomy, was much more unfavorable than the position of the Sudeten Germans, who so far had no autonomy statute. The situation in the Memel Territory was unfortunately still such that only a complete reversal of the Lithuanian Memel policy could provide any relief. Small individual concessions were of no use here; Kaunas had to make *fundamental* decisions. Only such decisions would have the effect desired also by Lithuania in the Memel Territory.

In this connection M. Šaulys remarked that the Memel population formerly of Lithuanian origin (!) had become German in the course of centuries. There was no intention of taking this characteristic away from them, to which I replied that we should be happy if the Lithuanian Government proved this by its acts. The confidence of which he had spoken would then also gradually increase.

On taking leave the Minister emphasized that he had, of course, spoken "privately." The following day Mme. Šaulys invited me to lunch, which I accepted this time.

In brief, my impression is as follows:

Considering political developments in the Southeast (Austria and Czechoslovakia) and the outcome of the Polish-Lithuanian crisis, the Lithuanian Government is seriously concerned over the future of



the Memel Territory. It is therefore, also in view of Polish intentions in regard to Lithuania, more willing than before to discuss Memel questions with us and to meet our wishes in order thereby to improve its relations with us. To what extent, however, it is seriously determined to take our wishes into consideration in practice, the future alone will tell. Some skepticism in regard to this would certainly be justified considering the experiences of the last few years; in this matter the Lithuanian Government will probably not take any step beyond what it considers absolutely necessary and unavoidable, so that very much will depend on the emphasis with which we present our wishes or demands.

VON GRUNDHERR

### No. 344

1850/421274-75

#### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, May 13, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. VI 960.

Drafting Officer: Secretary of Legation Doertenbach.

#### BRIEF FOR THE IMPENDING VISIT OF LATVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MUNTERS

The serious admonitions which have repeatedly been made to M. Munters during the last few years—most recently on his visit to Berlin at the beginning of February<sup>1</sup>—with regard to the legislation against minorities and the many individual measures of the Latvian authorities against the Germans in Latvia, have unfortunately been unavailing. A few days ago the Latvian Government by enacting the long heralded law on the creation of a State Cultural Council continued its series of laws directed against the German element. This law puts all persons engaged in literary, artistic, and scholarly activities into two chambers, the members of which are appointed for three years by the appropriate ministries. Cultural activity is reserved exclusively for persons and associations authorized by these chambers to engage therein. The Latvian President, explaining this law in a radio address, emphasized as a guiding principle for the activity of these new bodies that in Latvia there could be only one culture, the Latvian.

It will be advisable to point out to M. Munters once more with all seriousness that action against the German associations, educa-

<sup>1</sup> The Latvian Foreign Minister passing through Berlin on his return from Geneva had been received by the State Secretary on Feb. 2, 1938. On this occasion Mackensen had strongly objected to certain recent laws which in his opinion severely restricted the economic activities of the German minority in Latvia (115/117775-77).

tional institutions, etc., in Latvia, which obviously is to be prepared by the new law, and a continuation of the repressive measures against German influence in the Latvian economy would surely result here in a serious aggravation of the ill feeling already prevailing; in the end this could even give rise to our taking serious steps.

In examining the question as to what means we have of exerting pressure in order to make Latvia change her present attitude, consideration may be given to the possibility of transferring our Minister in Riga and having the post filled only by a Chargé d'Affaires for a time; this would undoubtedly be a heavy blow to the strongly developed vanity of the Latvians. Economic reprisals seem inopportune and not very effective. There is also the possibility of a press and radio campaign. So far we have desisted from this because it did not seem very practical to encumber the propaganda campaigns against Lithuania, which become necessary time and again on account of the situation in the Memel Territory, with an essentially similar propaganda activity against another country of the Baltic Entente.

That in individual cases it is possible by strong pressure to make the Latvian Government give in, is shown by the case of Fahle, the German national whose deportation was obviously revoked as the result of a conversation of State Secretary Mackensen with the Latvian Minister here.

A memorandum on the grievances which have come up since the last visit of M. Munters on account of the elimination of the German element in the economic field will be submitted separately by the Economic Policy Department.<sup>2</sup>

VON GRUNDHERR

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<sup>2</sup>Not printed (6706/E506168-70).

## No. 345

1850/421276-78

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, May 18, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. VI 1007.

After visiting State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker,<sup>1</sup> the Latvian Foreign Minister, M. Munters, called on me, as is his wont when

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<sup>1</sup>On May 18. The memorandum of the conversation is not printed (6635/E504502/1-2). Weizsäcker recorded that he made representations to Munters concerning suppression of Germans in Latvia on the basis of the memoranda which had been supplied him. See document No. 344.

he passes through Berlin. After several remarks from him about Geneva I turned the conversation to the Polish-Lithuanian crisis. Thus I had an opportunity of showing him how isolated Lithuania had been during the crisis, and how she had received no really effective help either from Russia or the League of Nations, or from England or France; I stated that, the situation being what it was, we had been quite neutral during the crisis. I was pleased, I continued, that the Lithuanian Government now seemed finally to have realized that the most important thing for Lithuania was to have at least correct, but, if at all possible, even good relations with her great German neighbor, since orientation toward Scandinavia was after all out of the question for the Baltic countries, politically speaking. M. Munters agreed entirely, particularly with this last idea, and said that the Scandinavian countries themselves had interests which were somewhat at variance and sometimes even antagonistic.

Then I brought the conversation around to German-Latvian relations, for which the same was true. About the new Culture Chamber law I made observations which were analogous to those made in the memorandum by Pol. VI for the State Secretary.<sup>2</sup> I then continued that during the repeated visits of M. Munters in recent years I had always taken the opportunity of pointing out the serious effects which the treatment of the German minority in Latvia, and even of German citizens, by the Latvian Government had on German-Latvian relations. We were interested in good German-Latvian relations. However, I could not conceal the fact that it was in practice becoming more and more difficult for us to maintain these. As I could see from numerous letters and oral statements by Reichsdeutsche, very great irritation existed among a great many Germans because of the actions of the Latvian Government. Moreover, I had to stress the fact that this irritation was not called forth by the German press (M. Munters admitted this, particularly as regards recent months; the German press had published relatively little, aside from an article entitled "Latvian Economic Bolshevism" about which he wished to speak with the economic expert, Herr Schnurre);<sup>3</sup> rather, these were impressions which travelers from Latvia brought with them, Reichsdeutsche coming from Latvia, relatives of such persons, etc. If the feeling continued to spread at this rate, it might have practical consequences some day. M. Munters really seemed very much impressed by my

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 344.

<sup>3</sup> Senior Counselor Karl Schnurre of the Economic Policy Department.

statements. First he replied that after all the situation of Reichsdeutsche was satisfactory, as an authoritative representative of the Party (the Landeskreisleiter of the Auslandsorganisation in Riga) had told him only two months ago. I replied to M. Munters that such a statement made to him by the Landeskreisleiter could surely refer only to some individual case.\* (Unfortunately yesterday I did not yet know about the appended report from an informant which tells in detail of police chicanery.)<sup>5</sup> Then M. Munters sought to break a lance for M. Auškaps,<sup>6</sup> whose anti-German statements had supposedly been brought about only by very strong attacks in the German press on the "eastern want of culture" [*östliche Unkultur*] in Latvia. A proof of the fact that Latvia was not at all oriented toward the East was that so many Latvian students came to Germany. All the laws which had been passed had been intended to help stabilize and unify the power of the Government. Certainly Germans had been affected, but so had Latvians. Nevertheless, M. Munters advanced his arguments rather hesitantly this time. I did not go into the matter further, but only stated once more that the numerous measures hitherto taken by the Latvian Government—Herr Schnurre would talk to him about the economic matters—had created among the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in Latvia (and thus automatically also among all those numerous sections of the German people having connections with the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche in Latvia—and these were very numerous) a state of mind which might some day be reflected in action; I did not need to describe further how fast relations could then progressively deteriorate. In any case we would follow with the greatest interest future development, particularly the situation of Reichsdeutsche in Latvia and the effects of the Cultural Chamber law.

I had the impression that this time M. Munters left in a particularly thoughtful mood.

GRUNDHERR

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\* When Grundherr sent a copy of the memorandum of this conversation with Munters to the Legation in Riga on May 20, 1938, he stated that he would inquire whether the Landeskreisleiter actually had made such a remark to the Latvian Foreign Minister (1850/421280). On May 31, 1938, Grundherr informed the Legation that according to the Landeskreisleiter, Munters had never been told that the condition of the Reichsdeutsche in Latvia was satisfactory (1850/421283); this was to be pointed out to the Latvian Foreign Minister by the Legation.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (1850/421279).

<sup>6</sup> Latvian Minister of Education.

## No. 346

F6/0265-64

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 240

BERLIN, June 25 [24], 1938.<sup>1</sup>

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Lozoraitis, who had requested an appointment, was received by me at noon today, Minister Šaulys also being present.<sup>2</sup>

I expressed to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister my gratification at the release of the Memel prisoners. Next I said to the Foreign Minister that compliance in all respects with the Memel Statute through the termination of martial law, the early recall of the military commander, the withdrawal of the Lithuanian political police,<sup>3</sup> etc., was necessary for effective conciliation in the Memel Territory.

M. Lozoraitis told me that the Lithuanian Government intended to end the state of martial law in all Lithuania, whereby special measures would be abolished.<sup>4</sup> As to the withdrawal of the Lithuanian political police from the Memel Territory, this was a difficult problem, since without a special enforcement agency<sup>5</sup> the maintenance of public order could not be guaranteed. M. Lozoraitis then inquired cautiously as to whether Germany was not prepared to conclude a non-aggression pact with Lithuania. In general, he said, German policy had drawn a great distinction between problems in the East and in the West. But, as the example of Poland showed, Germany had also concluded a bilateral nonaggression treaty with that State.

I replied to M. Lozoraitis that our mistrust in the East arose from the fact that Bolshevik Russia was there. Our attitude toward the eastern States depended upon their attitude toward Bolshevik Russia. Poland had given evidence of her anti-Bolshevist attitude, while

<sup>1</sup> Presumably a copying error. An unprinted memorandum (4488/E097562) dealing with arrangements for the visit, as well as document No. 347, gives the date as June 24.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of June 21 (4488/E097560) records a request by the Lithuanian Minister that Lozoraitis, who was coming to Berlin on private business, should be received by Ribbentrop and Weizsäcker. A memorandum by Grundherr of June 23 (115/117459-60) dealing with this impending visit of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister states that since the Polish-Lithuanian crisis of March, Lithuania had manifested a desire to improve relations with Germany and had even taken measures in that direction such as the quashing of various cases against Memel Germans and the release of the last of the defendants in the Neumann-Sass trial.

<sup>3</sup> There is a previous draft of this memorandum (115/117457-58) with corrections in Ribbentrop's hand. At this point he struck out the phrase, "as well as the ending of the veto policy of the Lithuanian governor in Memel."

<sup>4</sup> Ribbentrop inserted the phrase "whereby . . ." and struck out the sentence: "The Lithuanian Government would also concede that its military commander should be withdrawn."

<sup>5</sup> The previous draft read "without these police."

Czechoslovakia, for example, was allied with Russia. Lithuania also had always seemed to me to be a friend of the Soviet Union.

M. Lozoraitis said that they attached importance to good relations with Russia,<sup>1</sup> but that the Lithuanian Government had always taken the strongest measures internally against Communism.

I replied to M. Lozoraitis that I could only welcome this attitude. I disposed of his further hints about the possibility of a German-Lithuanian nonaggression treaty by a reference to the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Memel Territory, in which a fundamental change first had to take place.

RIBBENTROP

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<sup>1</sup>Originally the sentence read: "M. Lozoraitis contradicted this assertion vigorously."

No. 347

1930/432907-09

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, June 24, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 1328.

After their visit with the Reich Foreign Minister and State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister called on me, accompanied by the Lithuanian Minister. The gentlemen stayed about an hour. After a few introductory words the Lithuanian Foreign Minister expressed the wish to be allowed to talk to me in somewhat greater detail about the Memel problem. He began to speak of the latest incident and stressed especially that on the first visit of the ship the incitement had come from the passengers, which caused him deep concern.<sup>1</sup> I pointed out to him, just as State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker had previously done, that the particulars of the incidents appeared less important to me than the fact which had come to light through them, that the population of Memel was not in that peaceful state of mind which would be to the interest of Lithuania and the Memel Territory as well as of Germany. The causes thereof lay, in our opinion, precisely in the fact that the population of Memel had not been permitted to carry on their affairs with sufficient freedom, a freedom which was guaranteed under the Memel Statute. Thus, all the societies and their activities (sports, singing, etc.) were as good as dead. M. Lozoraitis tried to deny this. I referred to the very numerous conversations I had had with the members of the Lithuanian Legation

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<sup>1</sup>On the occasion of the visit of the German liner *Preussen* to Memel on June 21, 1938, clashes had occurred between Germans and dockworkers of Lithuanian nationality.

in the course of recent years. The conversation then turned to the activities of the military commander and the Lithuanian political police in the Memel Territory.

In the course of the conversation M. Lozoraitis especially stressed the need for an authoritarian government under present conditions. I pointed out to him that this contradicted the principles of the Memel Statute. In the further course of the conversation, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister maintained the viewpoint that the Lithuanian interpretation of the Memel Statute had been internationally recognized (Hague decision) and that all rights not expressly reserved to the autonomy of Memel could be claimed by the Lithuanian Government. I pointed out to M. Lozoraitis that the Hague decision cited by him had also contained several findings which conformed with the German interpretation of the concept of autonomy, but I avoided going more deeply into the legal aspect; instead I drew the attention of M. Lozoraitis to the practical political consequences for Lithuania which, in my opinion, followed from the proximity of Germany—a view with which M. Lozoraitis thoroughly agreed. In this connection he emphasized how the Lithuanian Government was striving gradually to alleviate matters in the Memel Territory; for reasons of Lithuanian security, however, this could only take place step by step. M. Lozoraitis made it apparent how concerned he felt over possible influence by us on the Memel population. I replied that it was absurd to believe that we had at any time or in any way stirred up the population of Memel, which, in the March crisis for example, had behaved very loyally. On the other hand, it stood to reason that we could not be disinterested in the fate of the people of Memel and in the rights internationally guaranteed to them. It was also natural that all troubles of the Memel population should find a response in Germany. The very fact, however, that we had repeatedly taken up these problems frankly with the Lithuanian Government proved how much we had at heart a true pacification of the situation there. The better the treatment of the Memel population, the better it could serve—as was to some extent the case in the economic field, for example—as one more important bridge for the relations between Germany and Lithuania and thereby such relations could be developed in a more friendly spirit. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister heartily concurred in these ideas. I described at somewhat greater length the peculiar character of the Memel population, which was very calm and patient but of the utmost tenacity.

My total impression from the conversation, which was carried on by both sides frankly but without acrimony, was that M. Lozoraitis seems anxious for the best possible relations between Germany and Lithuania, but that he obviously would find it difficult to get up the

courage for far-reaching decisions in the sense of applying milder administrative methods in the Memel Territory. The Lithuanian mistrust of the Memel population and of the ultimate aims of our policy with reference to the Memel Territory was a constant undertone that could be perceived throughout the conversation.

GRUNDHERR

### No. 348

1932/433438-40

#### *The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

REVAL, July 5, 1938.

No. A 162

Pol. I 1571 g.

Subject: Political relations between Estonia and Germany.

After a dinner at the Legation, which was given on the occasion of the visit to Reval of Naval Air Squadron 1/106 from Norderney, I had an opportunity to discuss German-Estonian military relations confidentially with the Estonian Chief of Staff, Major General Reek. The General expressed himself very frankly during the conversation. He stated that Estonia was firmly resolved to oppose by military force any attempt to march Soviet troops through the country.<sup>1</sup> In such an event she would fight to the limit, because it was well known here that an occupation of the country as a supply base for Soviet Russian troops was tantamount to a loss of Estonian independence, since the Russians would then never leave the country. Regarding the military prospects of such a defense against Soviet Russian troops, the General stated that in case of a conflict in the East, a total of 200,000 men would after all be such a great factor for the Soviet Army that Russia would think twice before detaching these military forces which would be necessary to defeat neutral Estonia. Estonia would be able to defend herself for some time; then to be sure, she hoped to receive support from Germany. When I sounded out the General as to what kind of support he had in mind, he stated that the question of matériel especially was of decisive importance to Estonia; she needed "not men, but machines."

In order to induce the General to elucidate his ideas still further, I stated that in my opinion, in case of a war between the Soviet Union and Germany, it was extremely unlikely that Poland could remain

<sup>1</sup> On June 20, 1938, the German Minister in Estonia reported a conversation he had with the Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter (1597/384658-62). On this occasion, Selter had told him that a conference of Foreign Ministers of the Baltic states (June 10-12) had agreed to oppose passage of foreign troops through their countries if this should be requested on the basis of article 16 of the League Covenant. Even so, Latvia and Lithuania had hesitated to follow the Estonian suggestion to issue a declaration disavowing article 16.



neutral and the war be fought to a decision on two narrow strips of territory: Rumania-Czechoslovakia and Latvia-Lithuania. If, however, Poland and Lithuania became involved in the war, communication by land between Germany and Estonia was out of the question—at any rate as long as operations had not taken a decisive turn in favor of Germany. General Reek replied that he likewise thought it would be impossible for Poland to remain neutral in the above-mentioned eventuality. Poland would join on one side or the other, and it was a question of the greatest importance which side she would choose. But at any rate it was certain that the German support for Estonia which he had in mind could be given only via the Baltic Sea. Concerning this I remarked that in that case Estonia had, after all, a real interest in the control of Baltic Sea communications by the German fleet, particularly in preventing the Russian fleet from interfering with this line of communication. General Reek confirmed this and then stated that Estonia could also contribute something in this connection. For instance, the Gulf of Finland could quite easily be mined against Soviet Russian warships without attracting attention, and there were also other possibilities. For this reason Estonia was very anxious to improve and expand her military installation on the coast; she especially needed heavy coast artillery.

It did not seem advisable in this conversation to go more deeply into military matters, particularly since the German views on this question are not known to me. I therefore brought the conversation back to the political aspect of the matter by stating that we were highly gratified with the clear and unequivocal refusal to permit the passage of Soviet troops, coupled with the determination to prevent it, if need be, by military force. However, this attitude on the part of Estonia would carry even more weight if it was not only paralleled by that of Finland—General Reek vigorously confirmed that this was the case—but if Latvia also took the same attitude. Unfortunately, however, we had been unable to discern the same clarity and determination regarding Latvian intentions as we had regarding Estonia. If not only Estonia and Finland but also Latvia were determined to take the same unified stand in case of a conflict in the East, the importance of this could not be underestimated, particularly as regards the question of control of the Baltic Sea and its communication, whereas alignment of Latvia with the Soviet Union would also make the situation considerably worse for Estonia. General Reek agreed with this, stating that Latvia's position was also making the Estonians apprehensive, and they were therefore trying continually to bring the Latvians into line with Estonia.

The rest of the conversation was devoted to determining from which direction Estonia felt menaced. General Reek left no doubt about the fact that he feared such a threat only from the Soviet Union and

not from Germany, since German expansion, after all, would be directed more and more toward the fertile southeastern regions settled mostly by Germans and not toward the remote and barren regions on the Gulf of Finland.

In the opinion of Military Attaché Colonel Rössing,<sup>2</sup> who also attended the dinner, the statements of the Estonian Chief of Staff on military policy coincide with what has been said and intimated to him also by Estonian military circles on various occasions.

FROHWEIN

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<sup>2</sup> German Military and Air Attaché in Finland, assigned also to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

### No. 349

8726/E087220

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, July 23, 1938.

Pol. VI 1538.

The German leader in Memel, Dr. Neumann, who was released a few months ago from the Lithuanian penitentiary after four years of imprisonment, will go to Berlin after a visit to the Breslau athletic festival on July 28 and 29, as it has proved desirable to talk over with him a few questions on the position of the German community in the Memel Territory—questions which have arisen from the recent incidents in the port of Memel and from the approaching elections for the Memel Landtag.

It is intended to indicate to Dr. Neumann, by way of supplementing the instructions he has already received through the Consulate General in Memel, the pressing need for the Memel Germans to enter the coming elections with closed ranks behind a single ticket. He is also to be induced to impose a stricter and more unequivocal discipline than before on the young hotheads in the Memel Territory who hope to be able to force a quick and violent solution of the Memel problem through street riots, revolts, and attempts at assassination. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle will participate in the conversations with Dr. Neumann.

It would be desirable, if it could be arranged, that Dr. Neumann, who displayed model conduct during his trial and his imprisonment, and in whose leadership all the hopes of the Memel Germans are united, could be received for a short time by the Foreign Minister.<sup>1</sup>

WOERMANN

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal notes by Ribbentrop indicate that he approved the suggestions made in the memorandum. A note by Erich Kordt on another copy of this memorandum (115/118043) states that Ribbentrop would receive Neumann on July 29.

## No. 350

1930/482922-23

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*BERLIN, August 4, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. VI 1679.

I requested the Lithuanian Minister to call on me today and, in accordance with instructions, discussed with him conditions in the Memel Territory. I called attention to the promises which the Lithuanian Foreign Minister had made on June 24 to the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary,<sup>1</sup> and remarked that only one of the eleven points which had been communicated to the Minister in March by Herr von Weizsäcker<sup>2</sup> could be considered as settled. Going into detail, I first referred to the promise about the termination of the state of martial law. M. Šaulys, speaking quite generally, said, to begin with, that the delay in these matters was partly explained by the fact that M. Lozoraitis had only returned to Kaunas a comparatively short while ago. He, the Minister, had just been there himself and had discussed matters with the authorities concerned. Memel affairs were less the concern of the Foreign Minister than of the Minister President. According to the Lithuanian interpretation, the state of martial law, inasmuch as it was in force for all Lithuania, could not be terminated for the Memel Territory alone; rather, it was planned to terminate it for all Lithuania. The Parliament, which would meet again in the first half of September, had to act on the measures to be taken in this connection. I expressed the hope that the state of martial law in the Memel Territory would not be replaced by other measures which in practice would lead to the same result.

I then especially requested that the crippling of sports associations and the like by the interference of the military commander should be ended forthwith, independently of the termination of the state of martial law. Furthermore, I especially repeated the wish that the forfeiture of eligibility for office in the case of a great number of members of former Memel-German parties be revoked. The Minister, for his own part, expressed his agreement with our request on the question of interference with the activity of clubs; on the other hand, he felt that the question of eligibility for office was far more complicated and could not be settled simply by administrative action, inasmuch as this was a matter which also concerned the judiciary.

The Minister, expressing the wish that everything possible be done by Germany also in behalf of pacification, promised to inform the

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 346.<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 340 and 341.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister of our wishes immediately. I expressly drew his attention to the urgency of the matter.

I did not go into the question of the persons arrested in connection with the incidents of June 2 [21]<sup>3</sup> and 28, as, according to telegram No. 57 from Memel,<sup>4</sup> an agreement seems to be near.

WOERMANN

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 347, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (6708/E506164).

## No. 351

116/66575-78

### *Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, August 31, 1938.

The undersigned was several times urgently requested by Estonian Foreign Minister Selter to pay a visit to Reval. The invitation was extended by the Estonian Minister. After consultation with the Foreign Ministry I went there on the assumption that in view of the unusual situation certain proposals would perhaps be made by the Estonians. I had two lengthy conversations with the Foreign Minister, one on August 29 in the presence of Finance Minister Leo Sepp, who is a friend of mine, and the Chief of the Press Section; the other, on August 30, privately. The real reason for the invitation was the request to assist in publishing a book in the Reich on the President of Estonia, Paets,<sup>2</sup> in the same manner as the one recently published on the President of Finland, and to write a foreword or some other contribution. I promised to use my influence in behalf of this publication, especially since the Estonians are quite clearly striving to consolidate firmly their good relations with the Reich. I would be grateful to the Foreign Minister if he would lend his moral support to this publication.<sup>3</sup>

During the private conversation we discussed the attitude of Estonia in case of serious complications. Selter stated that the Estonian aim was strict neutrality. Of course, Estonia would refuse the Russians passage through her territory and would defend herself to the utmost. She also would not participate in any military sanctions by the League of Nations, and as to article 16, she was just preparing

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<sup>1</sup> The memorandum was apparently prepared for Ribbentrop personally. Its author, Dr. Karl Megerle, a brother-in-law of Göring, frequently wrote articles on foreign policy for the German press, in which capacity he was closely associated with the Dienststelle Ribbentrop and the Propaganda Ministry. He played a considerable role in the political and propaganda preparation for the annexation of Austria; see vol. I, ch. II.

<sup>2</sup> Konstantin Paets, elected President in April 1931 and reelected in April 1938.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]".

a public declaration to that effect. This declaration, however, was not to be made until October, and then not in Geneva but in the Estonian Parliament. I asked why Estonia did not want to join in the expected Geneva declaration of the Oslo States,<sup>4</sup> pointing out that in case the situation should unexpectedly become critical, Soviet Russia, or France or England, could use Estonia's membership in the League of Nations as a pretext to force her into some action on the other side. In my opinion it would be a stronger guarantee for Estonia if she issued a declaration of absolute neutrality as soon as possible in order to thwart at the outset any possible attempts at pressure. These representations seem to have had their effect on Selter, because this morning (August 31) on my departure by plane from Reval, he notified me confidentially through his press chief Tattar that he had once more presented the problem to his fellow Ministers and that they had agreed to take appropriate action already within the next few days. Therefore, if Selter sticks to his decision, Germany may in the very near future expect a statement by Estonia to that effect, which Latvia cannot evade either. I had no further opportunity to inform the German Legation in Reval of this result.

For the rest, Selter stressed the fact that even in case of a conflict Estonia depended upon maintaining her trade with all countries, particularly with England; at any rate she would have to be supplied with cotton, rubber, wool, wheat, etc., and hoped that at least the route via Finland and Sweden would remain open for Estonia even if—as he supposed—the Soviet Russians should first of all advance by sea as far as Ösel [*Saaremaa*] and the Åland Islands and hence block off the most important part of the Finnish and Estonian coasts. To my question whether and from whom Estonia would seek aid, if she were attacked by Russia or were forced to permit the transit of troops, the Foreign Minister replied that he surely would obtain support immediately from his ally, Latvia, and would, moreover, request it from the "enemies of Russia". He does not believe that the Russians would advance by land. The Estonian fear of the Russians seems real, because they regard Russia not only as a military but also as a Communist menace and because they consider the Russians capable, should a given situation arise, of decimating the 1.2 million Estonians to the point of physical annihilation. Reval is convinced that Poland would also put up a determined defense against any Russian attempt to march through her territory. Soviet Russia would not be interested in a short war; to her everything depended upon a long protracted war of attrition; it was immaterial to her who the victor would be, if only she had the opportunity to establish Bolshevism in one of the great nations. The relations between Estonia and Germany had recently

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 443.

been very good; he hoped and was determined to improve them further. Any possible German preventive measures, however, would cause great uneasiness in Estonia.

As to Lithuania, he had recently told the Lithuanians that for Estonia—unlike Lithuania—it was not a matter of possibly losing a small strip of frontier territory such as Memel, but in the event of a Russian advance Estonia's very existence was at stake. If proper German support is extended, I consider it possible that the leadership in the Baltic Entente will quickly pass to Estonia. Since Estonia simultaneously maintains excellent relations with Finland, she can also act as a valuable connection with the Oslo group.

The Estonian Foreign Minister conveyed his most respectful regards to the Reich Foreign Minister and indicated that he would be extremely happy if he were given the opportunity to call on the Reich Foreign Minister at the beginning of October, when he intended to stay a few days in Berlin on his return from Switzerland. Since Selter is a very active, ambitious, and aspiring man, I should recommend such a reception, without prejudice to the attitude which the German Legation might assume in the matter.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately the short time available did not permit my reception—suggested by Selter himself—by the President and by the "strong man" of Estonia, General Laidoner.<sup>6</sup> This will surely take place on the next visit.

DR. KARL MEGERLE

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]". The Estonian Foreign Minister returning from Geneva passed through Berlin at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis but in view of the political situation decided not to stay. This explanation was given to Woermann by the Estonian Minister on Oct. 3, 1938 (116/66579).

<sup>6</sup> General Johan Laidoner, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Estonia.

## No. 352

1930/432925-28

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, September 21, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 1970.

I. a) At 2 o'clock on Saturday afternoon<sup>1</sup> the Lithuanian Chargé, Counselor of Legation Karecka, called on me, obviously under instruction from his Government. In his somewhat clumsy manner he asked the not very skillfully phrased question whether what the Führer had said in regard to Czechoslovakia also applied to Lithuania. In my reply I referred to the many conversations which I had had with him and Minister Šaulys on the Memel question, in which

<sup>1</sup> Sept. 17.

I had repeatedly stated that it stood to reason that we could never be disinterested in the welfare of the people of Memel and—even though a non-signatory power of the Memel Convention—claimed in particular the right to press for the observance of the internationally guaranteed Memel Statute in accordance with the German interpretation. Strict observance of this Memel Statute was the condition for good German-Lithuanian relations. I could note with satisfaction that, because of the influence of Minister President Mironas, in particular, a tendency toward the repeal of decrees contrary to the Statute had recently become evident. Unfortunately, however, there still remained the military commander, the Lithuanian police, the veto policy of the Governor, the petty harassments and penalties imposed by the military commander, restrictions on societies and their activities, and the forfeiture of the right to vote and to be elected to office in the cases of thousands of members of former nationalist parties. It was regrettable that the abrogation of these measures had been constantly postponed. (Meantime, within the last few days, the right to vote has been granted by an amendment of the election law to those previously excluded.) On the other hand I could concede that the problem of the prisoners had been settled.

b) M. Karecka then referred to the passage in the Führer's speech, which he himself had heard in Nuremberg, that Germany "has on all sides frontiers where peace is completely secure [*vollständig befriedigte Grenzen*] and is determined—and has proclaimed this—to accept these frontiers henceforth as unalterable and final." To this I replied, without going into the question more deeply, that, if I remembered correctly, I had read that the Führer had said "on many sides," but M. Karecka insisted that he himself had heard "all."<sup>2</sup> I again repeated that good relations with Lithuania, which we made every effort to obtain, were only possible through strict observance of the Statute. I was willing to recognize that the Lithuanian Government had done a great deal to remove the worst infractions of the Statute. However, the decisive fact was that there was still a fairly long way to go before the population of Memel obtained all the rights granted them under the Statute. It was certainly to the interest of Lithuania as well if greater speed were made in this direction than hitherto.

By the first question under 1 a), M. Karecka had obviously meant to ask whether we were also claiming for the Memel Germans the right of self-determination and hence perhaps a plebiscite. As he did not formulate this question in more exact terms, I was not forced to answer him.

<sup>2</sup> As published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of Sept. 13, 1938, and reprinted in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1939), vol. vi, pt. i, p. 297, the expression used was "on many sides."

In conclusion, M. Karecka stressed that for some time he had had no more complaints to make about the attitude of the German press toward Lithuania. There were only a few Memel pamphlets still in circulation. I replied to M. Karecka that, unfortunately, during the last few weeks our Minister in Kaunas had several times been forced to complain about articles directed against Germany, at times even "atrocious stories," and in the semi-official Government newspaper at that.

II. In this connection it is interesting that twice in the last few days a Lithuanian newspaperman, Gustainis, whom I knew from earlier days, called on me. In recent months he has written several articles in which, to a large extent, he took into account German views on German-Lithuanian relations, and, in general, he sincerely tries to improve the atmosphere in German-Lithuanian relations. He has good connections with President Smetona, Minister President Mironas, and the Lithuanian Foreign Minister. M. Gustainis was very candid and said quite openly that he saw the time coming when the people of Memel would demand the right of self-determination for themselves. What should Lithuania do then? It would perhaps be better to approach Germany beforehand and talk this question over very confidentially but very frankly. In his personal opinion, Lithuania could not hazard its whole existence for the retention of the Memel Territory. There was always the menacing possibility that the German element of Memel would demand this self-determination and a plebiscite. After all, Lithuania would obtain no help from other powers. It would perhaps be better to take the initiative and come to an agreement with the German Government in advance. Lithuania, to be sure, absolutely needed the Memel port for its export trade. I maintained as noncommittal an attitude as possible, did not dispute the existence of the situation he had outlined, and gently hinted that it was always possible to come to terms on an economic outlet to the sea. I stressed the fact that it was he, not I, who had broached this whole subject, but acknowledged the justice of his remark that a really prudent and farsighted policy must duly sacrifice what is untenable and take preventive action. I also agreed with his remark that no obstacles stood in the way of close cooperation between Germany and Lithuania in foreign policy except, of course, that Lithuania must not introduce any anti-Polish nuance. This, however, required a rather sharp turn of Lithuanian foreign policy, which, according to all our observations in recent years, relied heavily on Paris-Prague-Moscow. Finally, I stressed that the Lithuanian Legation here had to me always strongly maintained the view that Lithuania would rather fight to the utmost for her existence than return the Memel Territory.



M. Gustainis is going to Kaunas in the next few days and intends to put in an appearance again here after some little time. Judging from the experience I have had with him hitherto, he is discreet and reliable.

GRUNDHERR

## No. 353

1930/432930-31

*The State Secretary to the Consulate General in Memel*

Telegram

No. 57<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, September 28, 1938—4:30 p. m.  
zu Pol. VI 1998.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 75 of September 24.<sup>3</sup> For the clarification of possible misunderstanding on the part of Memel Germans, attention is drawn to the fact that the development of the Czechoslovak crisis does not, of course, alter in any way the well-known stand of the Reich Government: vigorous political and moral support of the Memel Territory's demands for autonomy. At present this applies especially to our demands for termination of the state of martial law and of the restrictions on suffrage, and for the holding of unfettered Landtag elections. Moreover, the fundamental principles contained in the Führer's speech in Nuremberg on September 12, 1938, are authoritative for the treatment of Memel problems also.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> This was sent to Kaunas as telegram No. 84.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (1930/432929). Consul General Saucken reported that he had reassured the Lithuanian Governor in Memel, who had expressed concern at the similarity of the Memel problem to that of the Sudetenland.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Woermann's handwriting: "Agreed upon with Volks-deutsche Mittelstelle."

## No. 354

115/117790-92

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 29, 1938.

On his return trip from Geneva, Latvian Foreign Minister Munters, accompanied by the Latvian Minister, called on me today in the absence of the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary.

During the conversation the principal questions of interest to the two countries were discussed. As to the question of article 16, M. Munters stated that all states were now in agreement that military sanctions could never be set in motion automatically, and then he reported on the negotiations in Geneva regarding the question of economic sanctions. The result was that Poland, the Baltic countries,

and the Oslo Powers had now definitely stated, although with slight variations in their formulations, that even economic sanctions could not be set in motion automatically.<sup>1</sup>

During the further course of the conversation I told the Foreign Minister that we would take it for granted that Latvia would consider not only passage of Soviet Russian troops but also flights over Latvian territory as a violation of her neutrality. M. Munters declared that the Baltic states and Poland were in agreement that they would oppose by military force any entry by foreign troops. He was not quite certain in regard to the question of flights over their territories; however, the question had not yet been sufficiently discussed in Latvia. I told the Minister I could not leave any doubt in his mind that, if flights over Latvian territory were tolerated, we should consider it as contrary to neutrality. Since M. Munters was somewhat undecided regarding this question, it would be advisable to push this matter again through our Legation in Riga on some other occasion. In this connection M. Munters then said that in order to be able to advocate a strong neutrality policy in Latvia it would be very useful if Germany could issue a declaration sometime to the effect that she would not violate Latvian territory. I told him this was, of course, not our intention. The issuance of formal declarations was a different matter, concerning which I could not express myself at the moment. M. Munters repeated that it would contribute very much to the pacification of the East and North, if Germany made a declaration similar to the one made to Belgium.<sup>2</sup>

As to the economic relations, we agreed that trade is being carried on smoothly. M. Munters called attention to a promise given him in the summer that a representative of the Foreign Ministry would come to Riga in order to arrange an exchange of notes regarding the inclusion of Austria in the German-Latvian Clearing Agreement. It concerned only transactions which had been made prior to the reunion of Germany and Austria, and in connection with which the Austrian firms refused to include the goods in the clearing arrangement. M. Munters requested that these conversations, which the Legation in Riga could also be authorized to conduct, be held as soon as possible; the German-Danish exchange of notes could serve as a model.

I mentioned the German complaints to the effect that representatives of German firms had been allowed to represent only a limited number of German concerns. I did not know whether the purpose of this provision had been to get part of the trade from German into Latvian

<sup>1</sup> At the 1938 Assembly of the League, only 10 member States came out in favor of automatic sanctions, while 26 of them supported the principle of optional sanctions.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 474.

hands; at any rate this seemed to be the result of the provision. M. Munters denied this and stated that an arrangement among the German representatives was entirely possible. I said that I did not want to elaborate on the question and that the conversations regarding the matter would have to be left to the German Legation in Riga.

In discussing cultural relations I mentioned that the whole catalogue of German complaints still stood. We had been gratified to learn that recently Minister of Education Außkaps had for once spoken a friendly word for German culture; we hoped that this would now be followed by deeds as well. M. Munters, as usual, made a general declaration of good will.

I then answered a few questions from M. Munters regarding the course of the Czechoslovak crisis during the last few days.

Finally I asked the Foreign Minister whether he had received any reports regarding troop movements in the Soviet Union near the Latvian border. M. Munters replied in the negative. I told him that neither had we received any such reports.

M. Munters asked me to convey his regards to the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

## No. 355

1980/432945

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 5, 1938.

Pol. VI 2102.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today. After a short conversation about the Czechoslovak question, he asked about the significance of the Führer's statement in his Sportpalast speech according to which Germany no longer had any territorial claims.<sup>1</sup> I said that the address spoke for itself, and it was not necessary to interpret it. In the course of the conversation the Minister came back to this point once more and said that the Führer had made a similar statement on March 7, 1936,<sup>2</sup> although at that time the Austrian and

<sup>1</sup> In his speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin on Sept. 26, at the height of the Sudeten crisis, Hitler declared that "when this problem is solved there is for Germany no further territorial problem in Europe." An English text of the speech is printed in *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, edited by Norman H. Baynes (London, 1942), vol. II, pp. 1508-1527, the German in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VI, pt. I, pp. 333-346.

<sup>2</sup> In his Reichstag speech of Mar. 7, 1936, on the occasion of the reoccupation of the Rhineland by Germany, Hitler said: "I have removed the problem of eternal frontier revisions from the atmosphere of public discussion in Germany. . . . In Europe we have no territorial claims to put forward." An English text of the speech is printed in Baynes, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 1271-1302, the German in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. IV, pp. 101-123.

Czechoslovak questions had not yet been settled. He also mentioned *Mein Kampf*. I insisted that an interpretation of the Führer's speech was out of the question.

I then told the Minister that our wishes with regard to the conditions in the Memel Territory were still awaiting fulfillment. M. Šaulys said that promulgation of the law concerning the termination of the state of martial law, which would apply to all of Lithuania, was imminent. With the lifting of the state of martial law, most of the grievances would disappear of themselves. I answered that it seemed to me urgent to settle these questions.

WOERMANN

## No. 356

2334/486644-47

### *The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

No. A 264

REVAL, October 7, 1938.

Received October 12.

Kult. A 1116 g. Rs.

Subject: Attitude of the German element in case of a European war.

Baron Wrangell, the President of the German Cultural Administration [*Kulturverwaltung*] here, called on me a short time ago in order to make the following statements to me, after, as he said, having spoken with other leading persons of the German community:

"During the Czechoslovak crisis it became obvious that the attitude of the German youth here, and precisely of its best and most active part, could become a great danger for the entire German minority in case of war. To a large extent the conviction prevailed among the young people that it was their task, in a war in which Germany became involved, to place themselves openly and unhesitatingly at Germany's side, not only with words but also with deeds, and without taking account of the neutrality which the republic of Estonia might declare. Certainly in case of a war it would be very hard in any event to practice neutrality in Estonia, if only because of the fact that at present large parts of the Estonian people have been stirred up against everything German. Now if the German youth, in their enthusiasm for Germany, let themselves be carried away to actions which are incompatible with the neutrality of the country, reactions of a violent nature on the part of the Estonians are almost inevitable, which in certain circumstances might most seriously endanger the fate of the German minority."

I should like to make the following comment on this matter: Some time ago I mentioned incidentally at the Foreign Ministry that views are largely prevalent among the German youth here which, to be sure,

are greatly to the credit of those who hold them on account of the idealistic ardor with which they wish to serve the entire German people; however, if the young people do not have the proper leadership this can be a hindrance rather than a help, and in the final analysis it does not correspond to the guiding principles which have been laid down by the Führer lately, particularly in his great speeches during the Czechoslovak crisis. Many of the young Baltic Germans here believe—and, as I hear, this is supposed to an even greater extent to be the case in Latvia, too—that it is simply a matter of time, perhaps only of two years, until the German Reich also incorporates the Baltic countries, thus making the Germans the masters once more in Estonia and Latvia. It is only too natural that such convictions and hopes put the young people concerned into a frame of mind which impels them to dismiss as cowardly faint-heartedness any reminder of political realities at the present time; reference to the fact that the faith of the Austrians and the Sudeten Germans in their liberation was fulfilled naturally plays a great part. In the development of the ideology described there seem to be certain influences exerted by young people in Germany on those here, influences which are very difficult to identify exactly.

Baron Wrangell pointed out to me the contradiction inherent in the fact that Germany, in case of a conflict, desired a neutral Estonia—since an Estonia openly fighting for Germany would naturally be overrun immediately by the Soviet Russians and could be of no use whatsoever; on the other hand, however, the young Germans in their enthusiasm for Germany would not respect Estonia's neutral stand, and thus threatened to cause serious conflicts between the two nationalities at a time when close cooperation between the Estonians and the minority was doubly necessary for us politically. He was of the opinion that these circles among the German youth, all of whom belonged to or were close to the [National Socialist] Movement, were hardly accessible to influence by any governmental authorities whatsoever in the sense of cooperation with the neutral attitude which we desire of Estonia; for all of them believed that the governmental authorities were prevented by diplomatic and political considerations of the moment from revealing their true aims. He suggested instead that perhaps an explanatory statement outlining the task of the German minority in Estonia might be made by a leading personality of the National Socialist Party and could then be deposited at the Legation in the form of a confidential letter, possibly signed by the director of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and this could be shown there to the leaders of the German youth.

I am passing on this suggestion with my approval and should further like to suggest that these guiding principles, the main aspects

of which, in my opinion, derive directly from the Führer's recent speech in the Sportpalast,<sup>1</sup> also be communicated in Germany to the leaders of German youth and of German students as well as any other Party organizations which keep up connections with the German youth here by means of trips abroad or other methods.

FROHWEIN<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 355, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Ministry sent this dispatch to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle on Nov. 3, with the request to exert influence upon the German community in Estonia as recommended in the dispatch and to restrain it from actions detrimental to the political purposes of the Reich; if this was done, the Foreign Ministry considered it unnecessary to deposit at the Legation a written statement containing guiding principles for the activity of the German community (2334/486650). On Dec. 1, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle expressed its full agreement and promised to influence the German minority accordingly (2446/514865). This was communicated to the Legation in Tallinn on Dec. 9 (2446/514866-67).

## No. 357

1930/433146-47

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, October 14, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 2142.

I had a telephone conversation yesterday with Minister Zechlin in Kaunas, not so much for the purpose of giving him information as in the hope that the conversation would be intercepted and thus brought to the notice of the Lithuanian Government.

1. With regard to the question of Krannich, the German citizen who was shot in Memel, I pointed out the disproportion between the smuggling of a few bottles of vermouth and the shooting of a person, especially since the Lithuanian border policeman had determined the identity of the German sailor and had already taken the smuggled goods away from him. I went into detail on what a dangerous role the Lithuanian border police were playing in the Memel Territory (cf. also report A. 527 of October 12 from the Consul General at Memel).<sup>1</sup> Then I also pointed to the unquestionable jurisdiction of the judicial organs in the Memel Territory and to the possibility of German demands for compensation.

2. I then expressed myself very sharply on the veto policy of the Governor (cf. report A. 532 of October 10 from the Consul General at Memel).<sup>2</sup> I asked whether the Governor had slept through the

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6707/E506156-60). The report transmitted copies of vetoes issued on Oct. 6 by the Lithuanian Governor Kubilius against legislation of the Memel Landtag revising Memel commercial regulations. The Governor stated that the legislation violated the Memel Statute and the Lithuanian Constitution.

developments of the last two months, whether he was living on the moon and never read newspapers or listened to the radio. The continuation of such a veto policy was completely unacceptable to the German Government. It was high time that it be ended. In the present case our legal department had established the complete illegality of the veto after an exhaustive juridical examination.

3. It was very regrettable that the passage "no more territorial demands in Europe" in the Führer's speech, was being misused in a Jesuitical fashion by the Lithuanians for malicious election propaganda. The Führer's speech was too good for that. If this were repeated, the German press would take such a sharp stand that the Lithuanians would soon want to forget these newspaper articles. I also felt obliged to remind the Lithuanian gentlemen of that other passage in the Führer's Nuremberg speech stating that the Führer would never tolerate bad treatment of the German minorities at Germany's frontiers.

4. I then inquired about the abolition of the state of martial law and emphasized that this question would now finally have to be cleared up satisfactorily. The old state of affairs or something similar must not continue to exist under new formulas. Herr Zechlin advised me that telegrams would be sent in this matter; the question was to come before the Seimas on October 15.

5. Finally I emphasized that developments in Czechoslovakia were most gratifying insofar as it seemed by all appearances that Czechoslovakia now intended to execute a 180 degree change of course in her foreign policy—that is, she intended to draw the logical conclusions from the events of the last few months and orient herself largely toward Berlin instead of toward Paris-Moscow-Geneva, as hitherto. Thus there was hope that very good cooperation with Czechoslovakia might come about. It was gratifying that after the departure of Beneš the new Czech leaders seemed to be politically far-sighted and courageous enough to adjust themselves radically to a changed situation.

GRUNDHERR

## No. 358

1850/421303-04

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, October 26, 1938.

Pol. VI 2238.

The Estonian Military Attaché, Colonel Jakobsen, who is particularly friendly to us and who was in Estonia and Latvia during the critical days of September, spoke very openly with me yesterday at

a social function about certain observations he made in Estonia and Latvia. During those days, he said, Estonia had been practically swamped with British and French agents. He himself had had an encounter on the train with a very arrogant British agent. He had regretted, and had said so to Admiral Canaris, that during those days there had been no German agents in Estonia to counteract and counterbalance this.

In Latvia he had found such Russophile sentiment in the population and also in military circles that he had come to believe that if the Russians had marched into Latvia they would actually have been received in a cordial manner. I countered by asking Colonel Jakobsen what the Estonian Government said to this, since it had had a military alliance with Latvia for many years and for its part regarded this alliance as directed against Russia. M. Jakobsen expressly assured me that the Estonian Government did indeed regard this alliance only from that standpoint; they were aware in Reval, however, that Latvia had an entirely different attitude, and that in certain circumstances they simply could not count on Latvia.

These statements by the Estonian Military Attaché confirm entirely the reports sent by our Ministers in Reval and Riga. I for my part indicated to M. Jakobsen how very much we welcomed the clear and unambiguous military policy of the admirable General Laidoner, as well as the attitude of the Estonian Government during the days of the crisis; on the other hand, the attitude of the Estonian press and in part also of public opinion in Estonia during the days of the September crisis were unfortunately much less favorable toward us.

VON GRUNDHERR

### No. 359

115/117467-73

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 31, 1938.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today and after a few introductory remarks spoke at some length about German-Lithuanian relations. M. Šaulys began with the recent conference in Kaunas of Lithuania's diplomatic representatives in Europe, at which the guiding principles of Lithuania's future policy had been laid down. After the collapse of the League of Nations policy and the collective idea—which the Lithuanian Foreign Minister took into account both at Geneva and in a subsequent speech by declaring, as the other Baltic states had done, that article 16 was optional—the main aim of Lithuanian policy was now to establish as friendly relations as possible with the two big neighbors, Germany and Poland. For the realiza-



tion of this aim the Lithuanian Government had decided to settle the 11 points handed to the Minister last March, which contain the German complaints regarding the conduct of Lithuania in the Memel Territory.<sup>1</sup> M. Šaulys then went through points 1-11 separately and in this connection stated as follows:

*Re 1:* On November 1 the state of martial law which has been in force in the Memel Territory since 1926 will be abolished; the other complaints contained in point 1 would thereby also be eliminated. Although M. Šaulys wanted to pass on to point 2 immediately after this statement, I went through the individual questions with him and was obliged to note that, as expected, the Lithuanian Government has not yet decided to grant our demand for removal of the political police. In the course of the conversation there developed a very lively discussion on this point. M. Šaulys pointed out repeatedly that the Memel Statute did not contain any provisions which were contrary to the existence of the political police. The police force of the Territory had as its sole task the prevention of crimes and other transgressions, whereas it was the task of the political police to safeguard the security of the state. Every state had the right to maintain such organs, and he believed that their removal would lead to extraordinary difficulties. I contradicted M. Šaulys very emphatically and maintained the view that the police force of the Territory was certainly able to safeguard the security of the state, quite apart from the fact that in addition the Lithuanian Government had at its disposal the Lithuanian Army and the frontier and customs police. For that reason I could only advise him urgently that, if the Lithuanian Government really wished to grant the Memel Territory full autonomy and at the same time normalize relations with Germany, he should use his influence in Kaunas in favor of compliance with this particular German complaint. When in the course of the conversation I repeatedly pressed M. Šaulys on this question, he stated finally that it would probably be best if Minister Zechlin for his part would also bring the matter up for discussion some time in Kaunas.

*Re 2:* The Governor of the Memel Territory has been instructed to begin negotiations with the Directorate immediately on the question of the vetoing of laws passed by the Memel Landtag; the intention is subsequently to put the vetoed laws into effect.

*Re 3:* The question of denying the right to be elected to office had already been settled in a positive sense. I was able to accept this view.

*Re 4:* The Governor had received instructions to settle immediately the question of the non-recognition of the passports issued by the Memel Directorate.

*Re 5:* The Governor had stated that as a result of negotiations with the Directorate there were no longer any differences of opinion on this question.

*Re 6:* The language question as well as the question of the Lithuanian place names given by the Lithuanian authorities had already been settled in accordance with our view.

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure to document No. 340.

*Re 7:* Upon re-examination of the expropriation law it had been ascertained that the land intended for the airfield was too close to the city. This land was therefore no longer involved. There remained only certain sections along the harbor, but the desire likewise existed to bring about an amicable settlement with regard to them. The expropriation law would then be amended correspondingly.

*Re 8:* This complaint had also been complied with, in that it was intended not to exert any such influence in the future.

*Re 9:* Recently no new complaints whatever had been made with reference to this grievance. The former complaints were being settled.

*Re 10:* This question still had to be studied and was subject to regulation by law.

*Re 11:* The negotiations for the settlement of this complaint were already under way between the Memel bank in question and the Finance Ministry. In spite of the difference existing in regard to the amount of capital, the merger would be approved.

When I declared, after these statements by the Lithuanian Minister, that we should certainly receive with gratification the intention of the Lithuanian Government to eliminate all the complaints but questioned him once more with regard to the political police, M. Šaulys stated that on this and other questions he was instructed to make a proposal to the effect that all controversial questions which might arise between Germany and Lithuania with reference to the Memel Territory be settled by negotiation. When Germany still belonged to the League of Nations, the two countries had likewise first conferred on controversial questions; if no agreement was reached, the League of Nations had been appealed to and, as the last instance, the Hague Court of International Justice. After Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations this system had been discontinued and the Lithuanians therefore proposed that a mutual agreement be reached according to which all controversial questions would be made the subject of friendly discussion. It seemed possible to him, in case agreement could not be reached, to employ the signatory powers as the first instance and some sort of arbitration procedure as the second instance. It was really very desirable to deal with complaints in this manner without always causing tension between the two neighboring countries. I replied to M. Šaulys that I could not take a stand on this proposal offhand, but that in principle we had no inclination whatsoever to enter into negotiations with Lithuania on the complaints regarding nonobservance of the Autonomy Statute in the Memel Territory. We maintained the view that if the Autonomy Statute were observed in every way by Lithuania the complaints would automatically disappear.

Thereupon the Lithuanian Minister repeated the statements he had made at the beginning regarding the wish of the Lithuanian Govern-

ment to establish the best relations with Germany and then stated that the German Government would make this aim considerably easier for his Government if it would issue a declaration recognizing Lithuania's integrity. I answered M. Šaulys that for the time being I could only reply with my own view that before this subject was discussed at all, the further attitude of the Lithuanian Government toward the Memel Territory, and in particular the fulfillment of the promises made to me today, had to be awaited.

The Lithuanian Minister then made a further proposal. He pointed to the impending elections in the Memel Territory and to the election propaganda by the German press and radio which was already beginning. His proposal was to the effect that the Lithuanian Government should commit itself not to exert influence of any kind on the elections by press and radio, and that the German Government likewise should issue a declaration; in a similar fashion a press agreement had already been concluded between the two countries. I replied to M. Šaulys that for the time being I could not commit myself on this proposal either, and that in any case, before we went into a study of this question, the Lithuanian Government had to keep the promises made, and in such a way that the Memel population would be left in no doubt that the Lithuanians were prepared to grant full autonomy.

Finally, M. Šaulys stated that the Lithuanian Foreign Minister would be very gratified if he were given an opportunity in the near future to come to Berlin for a conference with the Reich Foreign Minister on all these questions. M. Šaulys also requested that he himself might be received in the near future by the Foreign Minister. Furthermore, he would be very grateful if I would inform him as soon as possible of the reception given his proposals.

BISMARCK<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>A memorandum of Nov. 1 by Grundherr commenting on this conversation (1930/432975-77) states that Germany would wait and see whether Lithuania really meant to comply with the German complaints, particularly in such questions as the withdrawal of the political police from Memel. The Lithuanian Minister's suggestion that controversial issues might be settled with the assistance of the signatories of the Memel Convention is called "an astonishing misunderstanding of the present German position."

## No. 360

315/191484-87

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, November 2, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. VI 2301.

On October 29, 1938, the Estonian Minister, M. Tofer, called on me; I had asked him to do so in order to discuss with him certain questions

concerning German-Baltic relations. As always the conversation was a very friendly one, all the more since M. Tofer is a sincere admirer of the Führer and of National Socialism. Moreover, from his several years' residence in Moscow he is well acquainted with Russian conditions.

I expressed to M. Tofer my satisfaction and pleasure at the way in which German-Estonian relations had developed in recent years, and I remarked on how gratifying it was, in particular, that Estonia had succeeded in bringing Latvia and Lithuania to the point of now declaring their desire for a strict neutrality policy and denouncing the obligatory character of article 16. M. Tofer said that when the Baltic Entente<sup>1</sup> was concluded he had still been in Moscow; at that time the Russian Government had welcomed the formation of the Baltic Entente, very evidently proceeding from the assumption that Russian influence in Kaunas and Riga would result in bringing Estonian foreign policy around to a pro-Russian orientation also. The fact that lately the Russian press had been attacking the Baltic Entente showed clearly how annoyed Russia was because matters had developed in the opposite direction and Estonia's views had prevailed in Riga and Kaunas. Estonian foreign policy, of course, was merely in line with developments in the European situation, which had constantly moved farther away from the League of Nations at Geneva, collective security, and article 16, and doubtless would continue on this course.

In reply to a remark by me, M. Tofer assured me that Estonia's relations with Finland were now quite good. I told him that we, too, could only welcome this. M. Tofer found a few words of lively criticism of M. Holsti's policy, saying that he still clung to the League of Nations idea and its one-sided orientation toward Paris and London. When I informed him of the appointment of Toivola, an outsider and intimate of M. Holsti, as Secretary General in the Foreign Ministry in Helsinki, M. Tofer shook his head violently; he knows M. Toivola well from former days and has a bad opinion of him. M. Tofer expressed the hope, however, that M. Holsti represented only a momentary flaw in the general trend of Finnish foreign policy.

Then I informed M. Tofer in considerable detail concerning Latvia's attitude (Government, press, public opinion) during the Czechoslovak crisis. I pointed out to him in particular that, from all in-

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<sup>1</sup> On Sept. 12, 1934, the three Baltic Republics signed a 10-year Treaty of Understanding and Collaboration, providing for periodic conferences of their foreign ministers and for concerting their foreign policies on questions of common interest to them. Article 3 of the Treaty, however, recognized the existence of special problems with regard to which a common policy might not be possible. This apparently was intended to relieve Estonia and Latvia of any responsibility to support Lithuania on the Memel and Vilna issues. For the text of the Treaty see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1934, pp. 188-190.

formation which we had received, if the Russians had marched into Latvia, there would have been no question of any sort of serious resistance by the Latvians, considering the views held by high Latvian military persons, and that among the Latvian population, too, the feeling against both Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche had been very strong during the critical days. I went on to say that the Estonian Foreign Minister had emphasized in his great speech of October 18 the significance of the Estonian-Latvian alliance. I knew that the Estonians considered this alliance as directed against a Russian attack; Latvia, however, evidently regarded it from another point of view, even though the Riga Government itself had acted in a more or less correct manner during the days of the crisis—outwardly, at any rate. This provided a certain problem which gave us cause for thought, for surely there could be no doubt as to what our attitude would have been if Latvia had permitted Russian troops to march through that country. I also mentioned that Foreign Minister Munter, during a talk with Under State Secretary Woermann, had not expressed a clear attitude with regard to preventing foreign planes from flying over Latvia.<sup>2</sup>

Passing on to Lithuania, I said that according to the declarations given us just recently by the Lithuanian Government they were evidently finally beginning to realize in Kaunas—particularly Minister President Mironas—that good relations between Lithuania and Germany were possible only if a very fundamental change of course in their Memel policy were brought about, reflected in a practical and distinct observance of the Memel Statute, which in our estimation has been 80 percent violated. The state of martial law which has now obtained in the Memel Territory for the last twelve years, and which has made the Memel Statute illusory, would now probably be lifted soon, according to the latest reports. That could be the beginning of a *détente* in the Memel Territory. On the other hand, it was only natural that the Memellanders would certainly not forget so easily the experiences and sufferings of the last 15 years; therefore it would be difficult to overcome the atmosphere of bitterness and mistrust vis-à-vis Lithuania. M. Tofer admitted that we had a right to demand full observance of the Statute. However, he expressed himself as optimistic with regard to further developments. I added that our relations with Lithuania were naturally also dependent upon the course of Lithuanian foreign policy. In recent years Lithuania had oriented herself rather one-sidedly toward Paris, London, Prague, Geneva, and sometimes toward Moscow. But if she really followed a policy of genuine neutrality in the future, we would naturally welcome this very much.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 354.

Finally, I did not fail to mention that the attitude of the Estonian press and the Estonian population with regard to Germany and the Germans in Estonia had not been quite in conformity with the clear attitude of the Estonian Government itself. M. Tofer admitted this and said that on this score there were several things which had to be improved, even in the interest of the Estonian Government itself.

At the end he expressed the hope that Estonian policy would prevail more and more in the Baltic countries. This line corresponded to the tendencies of high European policy and was represented by such determined, energetic and intelligent persons as Paets, Laidoner, and the new Foreign Minister, Selter; for the latter, M. Tofer had words of particular praise.

VON GRUNDHERR

### No. 361

2465/515716-20

*The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A 639

MEMEL, November 5, 1938.

Received November 7.

Pol. VI 2353.

Subject: Celebration of the termination of the state of martial law in the Memel Territory.

The termination of the state of martial law in the Memel Territory was announced over the radio on the night of October 29; the news spread like wildfire to the most remote places and was received by the population with almost unbelievable enthusiasm. In a matter of days thereafter the German greeting was being used almost everywhere, while young people marched in groups through the streets singing German songs. Very soon flags started to appear all over the city of Memel and in the villages in the Territory, first here and there and then more and more frequently, and it soon became apparent that the available bunting and the workers to make the flags could not satisfy the demand by far. From the very beginning, however, the joy of the Memel population had a special note: their gratitude was not directed toward the Lithuanian State which had finally seen fit to terminate the state of martial law, but toward the German Reich which had caused it to do so.

Immediately after the news became known, there arose among the population the spontaneous wish to give expression to the general rejoicing in a demonstration. In a way this was an elemental urge demanding expression; after all, for more than 12 years all community life in the Memel Territory had been forcibly repressed. It was there-

fore arranged with Dr. Neumann, as the National Socialist leader of the Memel Territory, to celebrate the restoration of civil liberties with torchlight processions in the city of Memel and the larger villages.

The villages of Prökuls and Heydekrug led in the celebrations. As early as the night of October 31 huge demonstrations of joy took place with very great participation of the population from the villages themselves and from the surrounding country. The demonstrations were excellently organized and took place without any incidents. See the detailed report of the *Memeler Dampfboots*, which is enclosed (Enclosure 1<sup>1</sup>).

The climax of the celebrations was the torchlight procession through the city of Memel scheduled for the evening of November 1 (immediately after the session of the Landtag) and the subsequent demonstration at Memel's athletic field. Not a single incident occurred, although the torchlight procession comprised close to 6,000 participants from all the athletic clubs, guilds, rifle clubs, and youth organizations, who marched in closed ranks, and in spite of the fact that as many as 25,000 persons crowded the athletic field. The organization was exemplary. Behind an improvised band and a group of standard bearers there followed, as the first in the procession, Dr. Neumann and his associates of the Kaunas trial, then the members of the Land Directorate and the Memel-German delegates to the Landtag; then followed Mayor Brindlinger with members of the municipal council and administration, and finally all of the other formations. The procession through the gaily decorated streets was constantly greeted with cries of *Heil* and chanted slogans (mostly "one People, one Reich, one Führer"). At the athletic field Dr. Neumann made a speech which really carried away the audience and still was politically well considered. The main ideas in the speech were the following:

"We do not belong to the German Reich, to be sure, but more than ever before we feel closely bound to the German people and its culture. We will not depart one hair's breadth from the limits of the law, for justice can only be won through justice. We will oppose by all available means any irresponsible elements which might try to utilize this development to create unrest."

The demonstration ended with everyone's singing the song "*Nur der Freiheit gehört unser Leben*" [Our lives are dedicated wholly to liberty], and all the ranks of the torchlight procession marched past Dr. Neumann. The return march was also performed in closed ranks and with exemplary discipline. A complete account, given by the *Memeler Dampfboots*, is annexed as Enclosure 2. It is especially

<sup>1</sup> This and other enclosed newspaper reports accompanying the dispatch are not reprinted.

noteworthy that the *Baltischer Beobachter*, which is pro-Lithuanian, unreservedly praised the discipline of the participants in the torchlight procession, indeed not only in Memel itself but also in Prökuls and Heydekrug (Enclosures 4 and 5). The members of the police service provided by the various formations themselves, supported by the Memel police force, not only took care that the procession was entirely separated from the spectators, but also saw to it that shouts of "We want to return to the Reich" from the spectators were immediately suppressed. Thus all the misgivings regarding the demonstration which the Lithuanian governor, Kubilius, had expressed several days beforehand to President Baldiszus<sup>2</sup> proved unwarranted.

Another extremely enthusiastic demonstration took place in Pogegen on November 2. The details are fully described in the report of the *Memeler Dampfboots* (see Enclosure 3). Here, too, thousands of Memel Germans gathered from the Pogegen district and the surrounding country. This demonstration, however, went far beyond the limits which they had tried to observe in Memel. Kreisleiter Rademacher's speech also exceeded by far the bounds which the leader, Dr. Neumann, had set himself in his own speech. Likewise, the continuous chants of "We want to return to the Reich" were not curbed in any way, not even for the sake of appearances. It is evident from confidential remarks by the local National Socialist leaders that they do not approve of the statements by Herr Rademacher, which could hardly have been more extreme. On the other hand there is not the slightest doubt that the latter's speech in particular met with the greatest response on the part of the population.

My considered opinion of all these demonstrations is that such an elemental force found expression in them that it would have been not only impossible practically but also inadvisable politically to restrict them to any large degree. The Pogegen district might be an exception to this, but it should be taken into account that special standards must be applied to the peasant population there, since it is situated in the immediate vicinity of the German border. On the other hand, the morale of the Memel Germans has been raised to such an extent by these demonstrations that, if no unexpected setbacks occur, a favorable result in the Landtag election seems fairly certain. One dangerous factor should not be concealed, however: the feeling of the people has reached a point where the slightest provocation on the part of the Lithuanians might be sufficient to lead to serious incidents.

The Legation in Kaunas will receive a copy of this report.

.SAUCKEN

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<sup>2</sup> Of the Memel Directorate.



## No. 362

2470/517496-97

*Minister Zechlin to Senior Counselor Grundherr*

KAUNAS, November 22, 1938.

Received November 24.

Pol. VI 2516.

DEAR HERR VON GRUNDHERR: Urbšys, [the Secretary General in the Foreign Ministry,<sup>1</sup>] whom I met by chance on Sunday, told me of his idea of going to Berlin himself as soon as possible in order, as he expressed it, "to clear the table between Germany and Lithuania." He wished to discuss all pending questions, partly in order to dispose of them definitively, partly in order to see what Lithuania still could or must do. He seemed especially concerned about the problem as to what might take the place of the national security law in case Lithuania repealed it. He was obviously thinking of reaching an agreement with us beforehand on some new bill, at least with regard to its principal features.

He gave as the reason for his idea that time was pressing and furthermore that the change in Ministers in Berlin to a certain extent immobilized the Lithuanian Legation there.<sup>2</sup>

In his statements there were two things worthy of note:

1. He made no mention whatever of the question of a German "contribution," but spoke only of the settlement of all questions. Perhaps this is already one of the effects of your conversation with Karecka on November 15 (Pol. VI 2430).<sup>3</sup>

2. He emphasized that questions of protocol played no role whatsoever; he wished especially to speak with you, and to call on Prince Bismarck or Herr Woermann only if this should be necessary or desirable. This represents a certain evolution; for, as I wrote you on November 15,<sup>4</sup> heretofore the Lithuanians have had in mind chiefly the idea and the hope that as the result of a visit by Šaulys with the Reich Foreign Minister they would obtain greater clarity and would

<sup>1</sup>The words in brackets were inserted by Grundherr when he circulated this letter to the Director and Deputy Director of the Political Department. An additional marginal note reads as follows: "The Lithuanians are getting more and more nervous and pliable. Gr[un]dh[er]r, Nov. 24."

<sup>2</sup>Šaulys was to be replaced as Minister by Kazys Skirpa, previously Lithuanian Minister to Poland and at one time Military Attaché at the Legation in Berlin. Skirpa was accredited on Feb. 28, 1939.

<sup>3</sup>Not printed (1930/433043-45). On that occasion, Grundherr had told Karecka, the Lithuanian Counselor of Legation, that further improvement of German-Lithuanian relations was feasible only after the cardinal German grievances had been remedied and the strictest observance of the Memel Statute in spirit as well as in letter had been shown by actions.

<sup>4</sup>Not found.

make certain general statements of policy. Perhaps this idea has not been given up, but since they are not making any progress by this method, they now obviously intend, as Urbšys himself said, to begin "from below."

Obviously I could not reject the idea, but naturally I did not welcome it enthusiastically either, emphasizing especially that he should make very good preparations for such a visit to Berlin. At the close of the conversation he said that he still had to speak with Lozoraitis about the matter and would then inform me further. So far I have not received this information. However, with the unrest and nervousness prevailing here we must expect surprising moves at any time.

With best wishes and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

ZECHLIN

[P. S.] Many thanks for your friendly letter of the 21st,<sup>\*</sup> which I have just received, and the interesting information contained therein. Yours in haste. Z[ECHLIN].

<sup>\*</sup> Not found.

### No. 363

2470/517498

*The Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Lithuania*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, November 24, 1938—7:30 p. m.

No. 110

zu Pol. VI 2516.

With reference to the letter of November 22 to Grundherr.<sup>1</sup>

A trip by Urbšys to Berlin for discussions on questions concerning the fulfillment of the terms of the Memel Statute is not desired. In case Urbšys reverts to his plan for the trip, please base our negative attitude on the unsettled situation in the Memel Territory, making use of our list of complaints, most of which are still essentially unfulfilled; but avoid any commitment as to our readiness to negotiate later.<sup>2</sup>

BISMARCK

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 362.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly, on Nov. 10 Grundherr had advised a representative sent by the Memel-German leader Dr. Neumann to evade until after the December elections any talks between the Lithuanian Government and the Memel Germans. For this purpose, the Lithuanians should be told, in reply to the informal overtures they had made, that complete fulfillment of the Memel Statute was a prerequisite to any further development of Lithuanian-Memel relations (2465/515724-26).

## No. 364

115/118045-49

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, November 25, 1938.

## THE MEMEL QUESTION

*I. The course of events since September 1938*

Growing insecurity of the Lithuanian Government and recognition of Lithuania's isolation in foreign policy, especially under the impact of the collapse of the Beneš policy.

Strengthening of our diplomatic pressure on the Lithuanian Government for the fulfillment of our demands that the Memel Statute be observed, especially abolition of the state of martial law and withdrawal of the Lithuanian political police; accompanied by sharp statements by the Memel Landtag.

Result: Abolition of the state of martial law in the Memel Territory on November 1. Fulfillment of some of our other demands.

Since November 1 an emphatic profession of their German nationality by the people of Memel through numerous mass demonstrations, parades, torch-light processions, display of previously prohibited Memel flags. Unmistakable and enthusiastic demonstrations of the desire of the German community of Memel for early reincorporation into the Reich. Cries of "One Reich, one people, one Führer; we want to go home to the Reich."

The building up of previously prohibited political and cultural organizations in the German community of Memel under the leadership of Dr. Neumann—in accordance with the guiding principles issued by the Foreign Ministry and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle acting in close collaboration—as a preparation for the elections for the Memel Landtag, to be held on December 11. Restoration of political rights to former Memel prisoners. Isolated attacks by Lithuanians on Memel Germans. The Jews are fleeing the Memel Territory. The Lithuanian authorities are insecure and frightened.

*II. Attitude of the Lithuanian Government*

The Lithuanian Government declares that it is prepared to negotiate with us on the situation of the German community of Memel and is striving to obtain in return for its compliance German recognition of the integrity of Lithuanian territory, including the Memel Territory. In this connection the Lithuanian Foreign Minister suggests that he be received by the Reich Foreign Minister. The Lithuanian Minister asserts (October 31) that our demands with regard to the Memel Statute have for the most part been fulfilled. An examination

shows that the essential demands are still unfulfilled, especially the repeal of the national security law, withdrawal of Lithuanian political police, and abolition of the right of the Lithuanian Governor to veto laws passed by the Memel Landtag.

A list of the demands that are still unfulfilled is enclosed<sup>1</sup> for a possible conversation with the Lithuanian Minister.

In Kaunas there is growing anxiety as to whether the German Government will be satisfied "merely" with fulfillment of the terms of the Memel Statute.

Recall of Šaulys, the Minister to Berlin; *agrément* requested for the Lithuanian Minister to Warsaw, Skirpa, formerly Military Attaché in Berlin for many years.

### III. *Attitude of the Memel-German community*

The Landtag elections on December 11 are generally regarded as a plebiscite on the reincorporation of the Memel Territory into the Reich. The leaders of the German community expect gains over the previous election results (1935: 80 percent Memel German votes; 24 out of 29 seats in the Landtag). The whole Memel-German community, which is filled with an exceedingly strong desire for liberation, is hoping, under the impact of the *Anschluss* of Austria and the Sudetenland consummated in 1938, that the reincorporation of the Memel Territory will also take place immediately after the results of the elections are ascertained (about December 15, 1938). Dr. Neumann has reported to us that if the reincorporation is postponed until a later date he would have to expect a spontaneous outbreak of popular feeling against the Lithuanians. Such an outbreak could be prevented only by an express order from the Führer enjoining further disciplined endurance under Lithuanian sovereignty. All available reports from Memel (Consulate General, Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the President of the Memel Directorate, informants) confirm this appraisal of the situation.

### IV. *Status of Lithuanian Foreign Relations*

Disappointment over the failure of the Soviet Union to help during the Polish-Lithuanian conflict in March 1938. Since then considerable coolness in Lithuania's relations with Russia. According to reports so far available the Soviet Union will give no military aid to Lithuania in a German-Lithuanian conflict over Memel. Military agreements between the Lithuanian and Soviet-Russian General Staffs do not exist, in the opinion of our Military Attaché.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (115/118050-51). The demands are the same as those presented to the Lithuanian Minister on Mar. 25, 1938 (see enclosure to document No. 340); only Nos. 3 and 4 of the 11 demands are described as having been met.

The normalization of Lithuanian relations with Poland, inaugurated in March 1938, was until recently extremely slow. Causes: the Vilna question; oppression of minorities by both sides; Lithuania's fear of excessive Polish infiltration. Since the settlement of the Czechoslovak question, which is regarded in Lithuania as a failure of French protection for the small countries of Eastern Europe, there have been strong efforts by Lithuania to establish closer relations with Poland, partly in order to counterbalance German pressure: discontinuation of Irredentist Vilna propaganda; conclusion of a press and radio agreement. On November 28 resumption of previously unsuccessful economic negotiations. Polish efforts to make Lithuania largely dependent on Poland; this would mean encirclement of East Prussia by Poland and shutting Germany off from Latvia and Estonia. We, on the other hand, should strive for: predominance of German influence in Lithuania, ensuring close political, military, and economic cooperation of Lithuania with Germany (as in the case of Czechoslovakia). For this purpose it would be expedient to grant Lithuania a free harbor zone in Memel, whereby the city and harbor would also retain their necessary and natural economic hinterland.

The relations of Lithuania with Latvia and Estonia are governed by the Baltic Entente of 1934, by which the Memel question is explicitly excluded, as "a specific problem," from the area of common interests.

#### V. *Legal situation*

In the Versailles dictate (article 99) the Memel Territory was separated from Germany without consulting the population. The determination of the subsequent fate of the Memel Territory was left open, since the Lithuanian state was not yet consolidated at that time and there were also Polish claims on the Memel Territory.

In the Memel Convention of May 8, 1924 (signatories: France, England, Italy, Japan, Lithuania) the Memel Territory was awarded to Lithuania, which had occupied the Memel Territory *by force* in 1923 at the time of the French invasion of the Ruhr. A plebiscite, which had expressly been termed necessary by the Commission of Inquiry of the Conference of Ambassadors, was again omitted. The right of national self-determination, which in general was explicitly recognized in the settlement of the Sudeten-German question, had thus been completely disregarded in the annexation of the Memel Territory by Lithuania.

It will therefore be possible to base the reincorporation of the Memel Territory into the Reich on the right of self-determination of the

population of Memel; the elections of the Landtag, which are to take place on December 11, could be used as evidence of the will of the people, and the newly elected representatives of the people could, when they first convene after the elections, pass a motion for the reincorporation of the Memel Territory into the Reich. To make such a decree by the Landtag effective would naturally require an express act by the Reich Government whereby the reunion of the Territory with Germany would be definitively declared. This would of course not be possible without the preparation of military forces.

From a formal treaty standpoint the signatory powers could object to the reunion. If England and France should actually raise such an objection, it could be rejected by a reference to the right of self-determination. Moreover, the signatory powers have never seen to it, as stipulated by the treaty, that the Lithuanian Government observe even the basic provisions of the Memel Statute—an argument, however, which cannot easily be used because it would also be directed against Italy and Japan as signatory powers.

The main opposition will not come from the signatory powers but from Poland.

VON GRUNDHERR

### No. 365

2534/520449-50

*Counselor Doertenbach to Minister Zechlin*

BERLIN, November 28, 1938.

MY DEAR MINISTER: By agreement with Herr von Grundherr, who is unfortunately unable to write you himself because of various conferences, I am sending you herewith for your strictly confidential information a memorandum which we have prepared in the last few days for the Foreign Minister.<sup>1</sup> It is meant to serve as a basis for the decision that is to be made within the next few days on the policy we should follow after the Memel elections. So far there are no indications whatever as to what the nature of this decision will be, whether to follow the line of the proposals in the memorandum or to postpone the territorial solution of the Memel question until a later date.

One thing can probably be said without exaggeration: a settlement of the Memel question in the form of a broadening of autonomy with retention of Lithuanian sovereignty will not be considered as a final solution. Put somewhat crudely, it would not have been contrary to

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 364.

the view here if the Ministry's telegram regarding M. Urbšys' plan for a visit<sup>2</sup> had read somewhat as follows: Negotiations on German-Lithuanian relations are desired only if Lithuania offers to return the Memel Territory to Germany.

You will see from the memorandum what great importance we attach, on the basis of your information regarding Poland's attitude and in connection with a settlement of the Memel question, to the establishment of good German-Lithuanian relations. For this reason we are also keeping a very strict control over the German press and radio in Memel questions and are avoiding anything that looks like election propaganda for the Memel Territory. In the event that you may be able to use these ideas vis-à-vis Lithuania, Herr von Grundherr is sending you as an enclosure a list of the recent Memel broadcasts of the Königsberg station.<sup>3</sup>

A copy of this letter has been sent to Herr von Saucken.

With respectful greetings and Heil Hitler!

DOERTENBACH

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 363.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

## No. 366

115/118054-55

*SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop*

II 212 Bdt.

BERLIN, November 28, 1938.

A 1 Bdt./Ah.

Subject: Developments in the Memel Territory.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE VON RIBBENTROP: A report is transmitted herewith on the sentiment in the German community in Memel, with the request that you take note thereof.<sup>1</sup>

During the last few days the political development in the Memel Territory has taken a turn which can prove dangerous. The fact that the Memel Germans are counting definitely on being incorporated into the Reich after the forthcoming election on December 11 and apparently intend, if necessary, to force the incorporation by provoking incidents, gives cause for concern. In certain circumstances developments in the Memel Territory might take such a course that the Reich would find itself confronted by facts which at present are alto-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (115/118056-63). The report stated that the course of events in Memel and elsewhere, and the recent weakness shown by the Lithuanian Government in the face of Memel-German agitation, had convinced the Germans there it was a case of "now or never" for reunion with the Reich. It seemed doubtful that the leadership could control its followers.

gether undesirable for the Reich in view of the international political situation.

In case an incorporation of the Memel Territory at the present moment is not in the interest of the Reich, it is urgently necessary that the leaders of the Germans in Memel receive clear instructions so that they can orient the German community toward the development desired by the Reich.

However, a Memel policy of the Reich that does not correspond to the present expectations of the Memel Germans should absolutely not be announced to the mass of the Memel population before the elections, in order to avoid a serious reaction on the morale of the German community such as might give new encouragement to the Lithuanians and possibly affect the number of votes cast. The essential thing is only that the leaders of the German community be in a position to start with the right propaganda immediately after the elections and that their followers offer the assurance that they will follow even unpopular directives and avoid disturbing incidents.

Should Dr. Neumann already have been advised to this effect, it seems indeed incomprehensible that he has not already informed at least his immediate collaborators of the proposed policy of the Reich and directed them accordingly. At any rate the conviction prevails, even in Dr. Neumann's immediate entourage, that the Memel Territory must absolutely be incorporated into the Reich immediately after the elections.

HEYDRICH  
SS-Gruppenführer

### No. 367

122/120705-06

*The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in  
Lithuania*

Draft Telegram<sup>1</sup>

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, November 29, 1938 [—4:05 p. m.]<sup>1</sup>

[No. 112 of November 29]

e. o. Pol. VI 2545.

For Minister Zechlin.

Please send a telegraphic opinion by the evening of November 30 on the following question for a report to the Foreign Minister:

If we exerted diplomatic pressure would the Lithuanian Government be prepared to cede the Memel Territory to Germany through negotiation?

<sup>1</sup> The copy used is a final draft and the information added in brackets is taken from the records of the Telegraph Office of the Foreign Ministry.



The Lithuanian authorities should not be sounded out on this matter. Same text to Memel.<sup>2</sup>

[WOERMANN]

<sup>1</sup> Consul General Saucken was informed that he and Dr. Neumann, leader of the Memel Germans, were to give their opinions on the question conveyed by the telegram at a conference with the Foreign Minister in Berlin on Dec. 1. See document No. 369.

## No. 368

122/120705-06

*The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 82 of November 30

KAUNAS, November 30, 1938—6:37 p. m.

Received November 30—8:45 p. m.

zu Pol. VI 2545.<sup>1</sup>

I feel that I must answer the question in the negative for the following reasons:

1. For reasons of domestic policy the Lithuanian Government is too weak to cede such an important part of the country as the Memel Territory through negotiation.

2. The argument that Germany would then make extensive concessions to Lithuania in regard to the port of Memel is not very strong, because Lithuania considers that the port of Memel is in any event dependent on the Lithuanian hinterland and that consequently Germany . . . (group garbled) would have to make such concessions to Lithuania purely in her own interest, regardless of the way in which the Memel Territory might be detached.

3. It is in keeping with Lithuanian mentality to maintain legal claims for the future, which would not be possible in case of cession through negotiation.

4. Heretofore it was out of the question for Lithuania to have Soviet Russia alone provide support; and to obtain security with the help of Poland alone might also have appeared to be inadequate. As a result of the latest developments in Polish-Russian relations,<sup>2</sup> hopes for a revival of the Russian proposal of 1935 to guarantee the integrity of the Baltic countries will undoubtedly be aroused here. If Poland should now agree to this idea, Lithuania would be offered the possibility of obtaining a guarantee from both countries; this would represent a considerable improvement for Lithuania over her previous position. Perhaps the arrival in Kaunas today of Lithuanian Minister Baltrušaitis from Moscow is connected with this question.

Same text to Memel under No. 43.

ZECHLIN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 367.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to a joint Russo-Polish communiqué of Nov. 26 reaffirming the nonaggression pact between the two countries. See documents Nos. 105, 106, 108.

## No. 369

122/120708-09

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE MEMEL QUESTION,  
DECEMBER 1, 1938

## Present:

Under State Secretary Woermann	Foreign Ministry
Consul General von Saucken	Memel
Senior Counselor von Grundherr	Foreign Ministry
Obergruppenführer Lorenz	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
Oberführer Behrens	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
Dr. Neumann	Leader of the Memel Germans

*Dr. Neumann*, at the request of the Foreign Minister, described the present situation in the Memel Territory: Since the termination of the state of martial law there had arisen in the Memel Territory a movement which demanded the reincorporation of the Territory into the Reich; this movement was so strong and had made such extraordinary progress that it now hardly seemed possible to repress it. *Dr. Neumann* answered in the negative the Foreign Minister's question whether *Dr. Neumann*, by asserting all his authority, could keep this movement within the bounds of discipline. He stated, among other things, that when the Landtag convened after the elections on December 11, the Memel German deputies would certainly refuse to take the oath to uphold the Lithuanian constitution, and that he was not in a position to prevent them from refusing. *Dr. Neumann* replied in the negative to the Foreign Minister's question whether the Lithuanians might possibly be willing to evacuate the Territory solely as a result of strong diplomatic pressure by us.

*Consul General von Saucken* confirmed the correctness of these statements.

*Under State Secretary Woermann* likewise upheld the view that the weak Lithuanian Government would not, merely as a result of diplomatic pressure, take upon itself the odium of surrendering the Memel Territory. With reference to those aspects of the problem bearing on foreign policy, he also stated that the Polish-Lithuanian *rapprochement* had recently made great progress.

*Obergruppenführer Lorenz* argued from the same points of view for an early solution of the Memel question, particularly in view of Poland's expansionist policy in the Baltic.

*Oberführer Behrens* expressed the idea that there were two possibilities for the solution of the Memel problem: to delay the solution until the entire problem of the East could be opened, or to settle the

Memel problem at once. He argued in favor of the latter for the reason that this "little solution" would very fittingly prepare the way for the "big solution," since it would be possible after the reincorporation of the Memel Territory into the Reich to work for close relations with Lithuania.

*Consul General von Saucken* supplemented this idea, stating that it was important that this evolution begin with the Memel Territory and that negotiations with Lithuania on cession of the Territory to the Reich were an abandonment of our past policy, which had hitherto concealed the aim of reincorporation.

*Senior Counselor von Grundherr* spoke in more detail on the particular procedure that might be followed: Correct conduct of the elections, meeting of the Landtag immediately after the result of the elections was known, a proclamation by the Memel-German party stating that the right of self-determination of the Memel population had been violated and resolving, on the basis of the right of self-determination, an *Anschluss* with the Reich. A petition to that effect to the Führer and Chancellor, decoration of the entire Memel Territory with swastika flags.<sup>1</sup>

*The Foreign Minister* said that on the basis of these statements he would submit the question for decision to the Führer and Chancellor.

GRUNDHERR

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<sup>1</sup> An unprinted draft memorandum (2546/523244-46), dated December and apparently prepared in connection with the discussion recorded above, outlines these steps in greater detail. It includes the text of a proposed proclamation by the Memel-German deputies separating Memel from Lithuania and appealing to Hitler to reunite the Territory with the Reich. See document No. 395, footnote 3.

## No. 370

115/117495

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, December 5, 1938.

The Foreign Minister received Herr Neumann on December 3 and made the following statement:

For the time being the Führer will not receive either Herr Neumann or Herr von Saucken. At present it is not planned to take any action in the Memel question; for that reason complete calm must be maintained. Herr Neumann has to ensure absolute discipline among his people. Upon his return to Memel he is to maintain an icy silence toward everyone, including his own people. The elections are to be conducted in an orderly manner, and when they are over the Memel Statute is to remain in force.

Herr Neumann promised to keep his people under control and to preserve discipline among them. The Foreign Minister promised him full support within the limits of the foregoing.

Respectfully submitted to the Under State Secretary.

BRÜCKLMAYER

No. 371

122/120723-24

*Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, December 5, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 2608.

CONFERENCE ON THE MEMEL QUESTION IN THE OFFICE OF  
UNDER STATE SECRETARY WOERMANN, DECEMBER 5, 1938

Present:

Minister Prince Bismarck	Foreign Ministry
Consul General von Saucken	Memel
Senior Counselor von Grundherr	Foreign Ministry
Dr. Neumann	Memel
Dr. Hoffmeyer	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
Counselor Doertenbach	Foreign Ministry
Secretary of Legation Staudscher	Foreign Ministry (Press Department)

1. *Under State Secretary Woermann* reports that according to instructions from the Foreign Minister forcible action for reincorporation of the Memel Territory is not contemplated at present.

2. *Dr. Neumann* is instructed to see to it that the Landtag elections are conducted without incidents and that the Memel-German population continues to conduct itself in a disciplined manner. *Dr. Neumann* states that he can guarantee this until the newly elected Landtag convenes (about January 15, 1939); then, however, he would request new instructions. *Dr. Neumann* bound himself to maintain complete silence regarding his Berlin discussions even to his own people.

3. The Lithuanian Government is to be kept in the dark in the future, too, regarding our plans in the Memel question. In this connection anything that might give the impression of German weakness must be avoided. In any discussions with the Lithuanian authorities use may be made of the assertion that basic provisions of the Memel Statute are still unfulfilled.

The German press is to avoid discussions regarding the future settlement of the Memel question; the necessity of supporting the

election campaign of the German community in Memel also by means of the attitude taken by the German press is to be met through the publication of factual reports (Memel-German demonstrations, Lithuanian encroachments, etc.).

4. On instructions of Obergruppenführer Lorenz, Hoffmeyer requests very urgently that the efforts of Dr. Neumann to maintain discipline among the Memel Germans be supported by repeated broadcasts by the Heimatdienst of the Königsberg radio station of the text of a speech which N[eumann] intends to make in Memel on December 7 or 8. The text of the speech is to be submitted in advance to the Foreign Ministry.<sup>1</sup>

5. The question of the Memel-German deputies taking the oath to uphold the Lithuanian constitution, which will come up at the first meeting of the newly elected Landtag (about January 15), is to be decided later.

DOERTENBACH

<sup>1</sup>The speech was delivered at Memel on Dec. 7. The text is published in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. VII, pt. II, pp. 538-545.

## No. 372

115/118068-69

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, December 6, 1938.

On the evening of December 5 the Foreign Minister again received Herr Neumann and Consul General von Saucken, Under State Secretary Woermann also being present.

I. The Foreign Minister repeated that the elections in the Memel Territory must be conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner and that Herr Neumann bore responsibility for this. Herr Neumann agreed.

The Foreign Minister told Herr Neumann that he was prepared to support him in every respect, if necessary, even with money and foreign exchange. He asked that any requests of this kind be addressed to Consul General von Saucken or Under State Secretary Woermann.

Herr Neumann stated that this week, before the elections, he would make an address, the contents of which he outlined briefly. This address would contain the warning to maintain peace and order. The Foreign Minister had no objection to the plan of broadcasting this address of Neumann's in the usual manner over the Königsberg radio station.

II. The Foreign Minister then requested a re-examination of the question as to what further procedure might be followed. Attempts

should be made through appropriate channels to determine whether the Lithuanian Government might be prepared to relinquish Memel voluntarily. These attempts, however, had to be made in such a way that the Lithuanian Government would still remain completely in the dark regarding our intentions. He agreed that Minister Zechlin should be called to Berlin to discuss this question, and that Herr Kleist of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop should continue the discussion with Consul General Dymša in an appropriate manner.<sup>1</sup> He instructed Under State Secretary Woermann to discuss further procedure in this matter with Herr Kleist.

The Foreign Minister declared further that, circumstances permitting, he would summon the new Lithuanian Foreign Minister to Berlin shortly after the elections. He instructed Under State Secretary Woermann to prepare two drafts for any eventuality, namely one draft containing a Lithuanian cession of the Memel Territory and another providing only for the complete fulfillment of the Statute. It was agreed that the Statute is elastic enough to permit such a draft to include a few demands not previously made. He instructed Herr Neumann to have all such requests sent here.

Herr Neumann will return to Berlin immediately after the elections, about December 17.

WOERMANN

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<sup>1</sup> On Dec. 1 and 2, Kleist wrote memoranda recording his discussions with Leopoldas Dymša, the Lithuanian Consul General in Königsberg (115/117498-500). The latter had been authorized to state Lithuania's readiness to accede to all German demands in the Memel question exceeding even those based on the Statute, as long as a blow to Lithuanian national pride could be averted. In the course of these talks the idea of a German-Lithuanian condominium over Memel was put forward by Dymša.

## No. 373

122/120727-28

### *The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 84 of December 6

KAUNAS, December 6, 1938—11:55 p. m.

Received December 7—5:15 a. m.

Commander in Chief Rastikis today asked Military Attaché Just to call on him and with the aid of a few notes made the following statement:

1. The Cabinet shift<sup>1</sup> is intended to place in key positions men who are able to pave the way for agreement and friendship with Germany. General Musteikis, his successor, would, exactly as he had done him-

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<sup>1</sup> On Dec. 5, 1938, the Lithuanian Government headed by Mironas was reorganized; as a result, Joseph Urbšys replaced Lozoraitis at the Foreign Ministry.

self, always present Germany as a model for the Lithuanian armed forces.

2. Lithuania has never concluded any treaties or agreements directed against Germany. Nor does Lithuania intend in the future to enter into any such treaties or agreements, although pressure is being exerted in this regard from various quarters. Nevertheless, Lithuania has no intention of deviating from her present principle; this was another of the reasons behind the Cabinet change.

3. Lithuania is resolved to settle the Memel question, which has always been an obstacle to real *rapprochement* and friendship between Germany and Lithuania, in the German sense. First of all, Lithuania is naturally prepared to do whatever the Memel Statute and autonomy require—for example, to withdraw the state security police. Lithuania is further prepared to negotiate with Germany on concessions going beyond the Memel Statute and would also agree to the creation of a statute for the Memel Territory in the manner of the Danzig Free State. Lithuania could not give up the Memel Territory entirely.

4. For the purpose mentioned in point 3, Lithuania would like to send Minister President Mironas and Foreign Minister Urbšys to Berlin before the elections. If the time before the elections were inconvenient, Lithuania would like to have them depart immediately thereafter, that is, about December 12 or 13.

Please inform the High Command of the Army, the High Command of the Luftwaffe, and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as soon as possible.

Same text to Memel under No. . . . (group garbled).

ZECHLIN

### No. 374

1930/438078

#### *The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 85 of December 6

KAUNAS, December 6, 1938—11:56 p. m.

Received December 7—5:15 a. m.

Pol. VI 2642.

Although no official visits will be paid to the new Foreign Minister by Chiefs of Missions until tomorrow, Urbšys asked me to call on him this afternoon and informed me that Šaulys had received an instruction today somewhat as follows:

1. Lithuania would like to know what Germany regarded as disturbing factors in German-Lithuanian relations and what Lithuania had to do in order to give relations a positive direction.

2. Lithuania wished to clarify jointly with the Reich what was contrary to the Statute, but at the same time declared in advance that she would give the greatest consideration to the German interpretation of the Statute.

3. She was prepared in the same way to reach agreement with Germany on the interpretation of the Statute in the future whenever new questions arose.

4. With regard to general policy Lithuania would like to learn the wishes of the Germans, adapt herself to them, and also guarantee their fulfillment.

5. The Minister President and the Foreign Minister were prepared to come to Berlin before or after the elections and, insofar as the Foreign Minister was concerned, without any formalities and without requesting that he be received by the Reich Foreign Minister.

Finally Urbšys stated that the Lithuanian Government endorsed everything that General Rastikis had said to the Military Attaché.<sup>1</sup>

I for my part emphasized again that the Reich Government expected above all that the 11 points would first be dealt with; I also pointed out that the Reich Foreign Minister was absent; for the rest I limited myself to receiving the communication.

Same text to Memel under No. 46.

ZECHLIN

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 373.

## No. 375

115/117508-09

### *Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, December 10, 1938.

It is self-evident that the overwhelming victory of the German idea in the Memel Territory should now necessarily have a decisive effect upon the fate of this region. It is self-evident that from now on the Memel population must be governed in all matters in such a way that they can feel themselves as Germans without reservation. However, it will necessarily depend on the interest of the whole German people whether the practical details of administration should for the time being be patterned after those of the Danzig Free State—in which case the people of Memel, for example, like the inhabitants of Danzig, can set up branches of the all-German National Socialist Party formations (SA, SS, etc.) in their country—or whether a complete union with the Reich should be carried out at once.

As things stand today, the Lithuanian Government now seems prepared to make all the concessions that could enable the people of the Memel Territory to have a German system of government. It seems questionable, however, whether the Lithuanians have already reached a point where they would be reconciled to a union of the Memel Ter-

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<sup>1</sup> The notation "[For] F[ührer]" on this document is in Ribbentrop's handwriting.



ritory with Germany without this causing among them a strong reaction against Germany and in favor of other countries (Poland). In any case, however, we would at the moment have to expect that, in case of early annexation of the Memel Territory to Germany, Poland would demand compensation or would compensate herself in Lithuania or elsewhere; this would not be in the German interest, but Germany could hardly prevent it in view of her desire for continued good relations with Poland.

For this reason it seems advisable for the present that a maximum effort be made to assure the people of Memel of a German régime, but that formal union should be avoided until clear decisions have been made about the whole complex of our relations with Lithuania. Germany doubtless has a strong interest in seeing that the Lithuanian hinterland is preserved intact for East Prussia and that Poland finds no pretext for appropriating even some portions of this territory or for infiltrating it in some other way (by joint management of certain affairs or the like). Lithuania would be of inestimable importance to East Prussia not only for economic but also for military reasons as a friendly, even accommodating hinterland, since a threatening encirclement of this region by foreign powers (Poland) would be averted once and for all and the outlet to the Baltic countries be kept open for Germany.

Before the Memel Territory is annexed to Germany, therefore, there seems to be good reason why this should not occur until relations with Lithuania are so stabilized that Lithuanian national territory constitutes a *noli me tangere* for any third power. Meanwhile a number of measures and agreements might be considered and prepared which, at the moment when the Memel Territory is joined to Germany, would make it possible for the Lithuanian Government to present to its own people other advantages in exchange. In addition to a customs union—naturally to be requested by Lithuania—and special advantages in the way of communications to the West, the possibility might be explored of making some sort of tangible compensation for public property in the Memel Territory. In this connection, the Lithuanian Army might possibly be provided with our war matériel at our expense, thereby be won over and gradually even coordinated with our military. It could also be considered whether the rest of Lithuania as such could in some way be guaranteed or protected by Germany.

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[EDITORS' NOTE. In the Memel Landtag elections held on December 11, 1938, the German representation was increased from 24 to 25 of the 29 seats. The German party list received 1,826,621 of the 2,095,206 votes cast, or slightly more than 87 percent.]

## No. 376

115/117519

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, December 12, 1938.

[Pol. VI 2713.]<sup>1</sup>

The British Chargé d'Affaires<sup>2</sup> called on me today and handed me the attached *aide-mémoire*. In it the British Government, as a signatory of the Memel Convention, states that it trusts that the German Government will use its influence on the Memellanders in the sense of maintaining the *status quo*. The British Government further states that it is prepared to consult with the German Government.

I told the Chargé that I reserved the right to take up this matter later, but I could tell him even now that complete peace reigned in the Memel Territory and that I saw no reason for a consultation.<sup>3</sup>

The French Ambassador,<sup>4</sup> who had come to make his first visit, made a similar *démarche*. I gave him the same reply.

The French and British notes differ in that the British note speaks of the Memellanders respecting the *status quo*, while the French note speaks of respecting the Memel Statute.

The French Ambassador wished to have more detailed information on the Memel question. He asked whether we still had grievances against Lithuania, whether these grievances referred to observance of the Statute, and whether the Lithuanian Government was informed of our views. I told him there were many complaints regarding failure to observe the Statute; our views were well known to the Lithuanian Government. M. Coulondre wished to know in more detail just what our grievances were, but I told him the list was too long for me to acquaint him with it now.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> The file number is taken from a copy of the document in the files of Political Division VI (4487/E097491).

<sup>2</sup> Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "I have had the story spread confidentially that the *démarche* caused astonishment."

<sup>4</sup> Robert Coulondre, who replaced André François-Poncet as French Ambassador to Germany, had presented his credentials to Hitler on Nov. 22.

2534/520473

[Enclosure No. 1.]<sup>\*</sup>

December 12, 1938.

1. There is reason to believe that the Memellanders are planning action inconsistent with the *status quo*, in the observance of which as a

<sup>\*</sup> The original is in English.

signatory of the Memel Convention His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are necessarily interested.

2. It is obvious that the German Government are in a position to exert greater influence upon the Memellanders than can be exerted from any other quarter and therefore His Majesty's Government as a signatory of the Memel Convention trust that the German Government will use their influence with the Memellanders to ensure respect for the *status quo*.

3. Moreover, in view of the fact that from their respective stand-points the German Government and His Majesty's Government cannot fail to be interested in the situation in Memel, His Majesty's Government are ready to consult with the German Government for any purpose which would appear useful.

2534/520479

[Enclosure No. 2] \*

BERLIN, December 12, 1938.

The French Government has received information which gives it reason to fear that certain elements of the population of Memel are planning action inconsistent with the Statute, in which France as a signatory power could not be disinterested.

The French Government does not doubt that the German Government, whose influence with these elements would undoubtedly be particularly effective, is using its influence to induce them to respect the Statute of the Territory.

It is prepared, for its part, to participate with the German Government in any consultation which might seem desirable.

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\* The original is in French.

## No. 377

2534/520481

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, December 13, 1938.  
zu Pol. VI 2713.<sup>1</sup>

Should one of the diplomatic representatives accredited here again make a *démarche* with us on the Memel question, the Foreign Minister requests that this be reported to him first so that he can decide himself whether he wishes to receive the diplomats in question personally.

If one of the chief officials of the Foreign Ministry should be addressed in private on the subject of the *démarche* in the Memel

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 376.

question, he should reply that we had been exceedingly surprised here at the British and French steps and that we had really expected that the French and British would finally have become tired of meddling in Germany's affairs.

Transmitted herewith to the State Secretary.

BRÜCKLMEIER

No. 378

3726/E037224-25

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

[BERLIN,] December 13, 1938.

zu Pol. VI 2713.<sup>1</sup>

An oral reply to their *démarches* of December 12 could be made—separately—to the French Ambassador and the British Chargé d'Affaires somewhat as follows:

1. The German Government is surprised at the great interest shown by the French (British) Government in the strict observance of the Statute, after the French (British) Government has for years been unable effectively to eliminate gross violations of the Statute by the Lithuanians. Moreover, the Memel Statute is still not being observed in essential points, as the German Government has repeatedly informed the Lithuanian Government in direct conversations in the past few months.

2. The German Government must express its astonishment at the fact that the *démarche* of the Ambassador (Chargé d'Affaires) was published without prior notification of the German Government.

3. The elections in the Memel Territory, as even the foreign press, including the French and British, had to admit, were conducted with exemplary discipline. The German Government therefore sees no cause for exerting its influence in the desired way on the Memel population, which heretofore has not been guilty of any violations of the Statute.

4. The great discipline shown by the Memel Germans must not blind us, however, to the fact that after the experiences of the Memel German population with the Lithuanian regime in the last 15 years, as well as with the repeatedly unfulfilled promises of the Lithuanian Government to observe the Statute, a feeling has developed among the Memel Germans which has been correctly recognized and appreciated even in wide circles of the foreign public, England and France included. The German Government is not in a position

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 376.

to alter this attitude of the Memel German population toward the Lithuanian State. In judging this question, due consideration must be given to the fact that the Memel Territory was separated from the German Reich by the Treaty of Versailles without regard for the right of self-determination and without the Memel population being consulted, and later, again without the Memel population being consulted, awarded to Lithuania. This was, to be sure, contingent upon the granting of autonomy, which in spite of an international guarantee, in the opinion of the German Government, was never respected by Lithuania.

GRUNDHERR

P. S. Since Chamberlain spoke in the British House of Commons of observance of the "Statute," (not "*status quo*"), we can also use the term "Statute" instead of "*status quo*" in speaking to the British Chargé d'Affaires, which will considerably facilitate the drafting of the answer to be given him.

GR[UNDHERR]

### No. 379

2534/520480

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, December 15, 1938.  
zu Pol. VI 2713.<sup>1</sup>

The attached note by Herr von Grundherr<sup>2</sup> has been superseded, since the Foreign Minister has already informed the French and British Embassies indirectly that he considered the *démarches* with regard to Memel entirely inappropriate. This was a matter of an Eastern Question for Germany that did not concern France and England at all. (The Foreign Minister is intentionally passing over the legal aspects of the matter.)

At a suitable opportunity, the Foreign Minister will personally make comments to that effect to the French Ambassador and the British Chargé d'Affaires after having taken the matter up to the Führer.

Transmitted herewith to Under State Secretary Woermann, with the suggestion that our Missions concerned be informed as soon as the replies have been given to the two foreign missions and the Führer has approved the procedure.

W[EIZSÄCKER]

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 376.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 378.

## No. 380

115/117531-33

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*

[BERLIN,] December 16, 1938.

Subject: Customs union with Lithuania.

In the case of Lithuania there would not be the same economic difficulties in the way of a customs union as in the case of Czechoslovakia.

1. The country and the number of consumers is much smaller.
2. Lithuania has almost no export industry that would have to be supplied with foreign raw materials.
3. Home consumption of foreign raw materials by the Lithuanian population is relatively small.
4. Germany's supplying Lithuania with the foreign raw materials needed for Lithuanian home consumption will probably be fairly well compensated by the additional foods with foreign exchange value that Germany receives from Lithuania.

On first examination of this question, it also seems to me possible to effect only a customs union with Lithuania, that is, without a currency union. However, this question must be given more thorough study.

A few years ago Lithuania entered into commitments of a general nature with Latvia and Estonia to the end that these three countries follow a uniform and mutually agreeable commercial policy. In case of a customs union Lithuania would have to withdraw from this general commitment.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions conveyed to me by Herr Gaus.

RITTER <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Karl Ritter at this time was employed by the Foreign Ministry for special duties in connection with economic matters. He had been withdrawn from his post as Ambassador in Brazil in August 1938 and at the request of the Brazilian Government was not returned. See ch. ix.

## No. 381

2546/523221-24

*Senior Counselor Grundherr to Minister Zechlin*

BERLIN, January 2, 1939.

MY DEAR HERR ZECHLIN:<sup>1</sup> First let me again express my sincere good wishes for 1939 for you and your family and for your work,

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<sup>1</sup> In German, "Sehr verehrter, lieber Herr Zechlin".

which will surely become particularly important this year. Many thanks for your interesting letter of December 24.<sup>2</sup> Concerning Gustainis<sup>3</sup> I learned that he attended the foreign press ball here, at which I was also present. He must have avoided me there. He spoke with Leibbrand<sup>4</sup> of the Aussenpolitisches Amt; that probably accounts for his information; it is regrettable that he was able to get it.

As we see it, the situation is now such that the Lithuanian Government really seems to be prepared for any sacrifice (real observance of the Statute and also considerable willingness to look the other way even if the Memel Germans *take* for themselves, in the Lithuanian view, rights in excess of the Statute) as long as it thinks it can thus save the Memel Territory for Lithuania. In view of this situation, the Memel Germans can afford to take some liberties. It is something else again whether the Lithuanian Government has not already actually progressed further, despite everything Gustainis has advanced, without wishing to admit it openly as yet for reasons relating to the tactics of negotiations.

Nothing further was said here during the Christmas holidays regarding Urbšys' or Mironas' trips to Berlin. The Foreign Minister, to whom I am *directly* responsible in all Memel questions, was at his estate in the Mark; he will leave shortly for Munich where—for your confidential information—he will see Colonel Beck<sup>5</sup> and tell him that the Memel question will have to be settled soon in accordance with German wishes, but that we are prepared to consider the economic interests of Poland in the Territory. If Beck should broach the *Lithuanian* question as such it will be intimated to him that we cannot recognize for Poland special interests in Lithuania.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commercial Treaty is naturally of great interest to us here, and particularly everything that relates to Memel. Is it true that the treaty provides that Poland can mill lumber in a kind of free port area?

I should be interested in further details of your conversations with Urbšys on December 21 or 22, which was also reported in the press.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2470/517501-03).

<sup>3</sup> The Lithuanian journalist Gustainis, a personal friend of Minister President Mironas, had been to Germany frequently to discuss with German officials possible solutions of the Memel problem. For his earlier conversation with Grundherr see document No. 352. In more recent conversations with a representative of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop on Dec. 3 (115/117494) and again with Grundherr on Dec. 7 (1930/433075-77), Gustainis had intimated Lithuania's willingness to cede Memel to Germany, provided this was done with some consideration for the national prestige and the vital economic interests of Lithuania.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Georg Leibbrandt, Head of the Ostabteilung of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, is meant.

<sup>5</sup> See documents Nos. 119, 120.

Can you write me something about it in a private letter—for my information only?\*

For special reasons, *one* point in your instructions for the orientation of conversations in *German* and Legation circles seems to me important; I do not think we should give too much emphasis outwardly, even in speaking to Germans, to the viewpoint that if the Memel Territory falls to Germany this must automatically drive the Lithuanians *entirely* into the arms of Poland. On the one hand it would be hard to prove, and on the other it would perhaps have an adverse effect on morale. It seems to me best to leave this question entirely open.

And now, in strict confidence, and only for you personally:

A few days after your departure, N[eumann] was granted an "audience"† lasting about forty minutes; the only other person present was the Foreign Minister. I am not informed about all phases of this audience, but I know that N. was highly satisfied because it was definitely promised that the matter would be settled in 1939, and the end of March or, even better, the middle of April was set as the desired date. In any case an acute crisis before this time is to be avoided. At the ensuing conference with the Foreign Minister, N., Lorenz,<sup>a</sup> Counselor Hewel, and I were present. N. was instructed to see to it that he was available at all times to the Foreign Minister and that a special liaison man be provided. In case the obvious connection via the Consulate General at Memel, expressly mentioned by the Foreign Minister, should for technical reasons be made difficult or impossible because of the danger of being compromised, a special liaison man to N. should be designated by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. In order not to have to use a new person, Lorenz and I selected Graefe of Tilsit (of the SD) for this, while Herr Hoffmeyer will maintain the liaison of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle with the Foreign Ministry. N. has maintained good liaison with us up to now. Only a few days ago he telephoned us from East Prussia. On the other hand, Saucken informed me by telephone today that he was having some trouble with N., who had become somewhat overbearing. To preserve equilibrium Saucken, too, would like to have an audience soon. At present, however, we see no suitable basis for this. It is true that the line of communication between Lorenz and Neumann has been given stronger

\* Zechlin replied on Jan. 5 (2546/523234-37) that this conversation with the Lithuanian Foreign Minister was rather uneventful and that Urbšys was disappointed although not surprised at his unwillingness to state clearly the German intentions in regard to Memel. Zechlin then emphasized the difficulties involved in keeping the Lithuanians indefinitely in the dark and expressed the hope that in the light of this confidential information, clear directives might soon be expected.

† Obviously, an audience with Hitler is meant.

<sup>a</sup> SS Obergruppenführer Werner Lorenz, Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.



emphasis, which may not be too easy on Saucken, but this cannot be helped.

Saucken informed me further that the Regierungspräsident of Marienwerder, Herr von Keudel, was making a trip, allegedly without any official purpose, via Memel, Kaunas, Riga, Reval, Helsinki. In Memel he had met Brindlinger,<sup>9</sup> Schreiber,<sup>10</sup> and the functionary of the Auslandsorganisation. He had also shown particular interest in your attitude on the German-Lithuanian and the Memel questions. Keudel mentioned quite casually to Saucken that he had long entertained the idea of going into the foreign service, and that all sorts of accidents had heretofore prevented his doing so. I shall look into this matter, since prominent personages are not supposed to make such trips without permission from the Führer.

Regarding the postscript to your letter of December 24, I should like to remark that we have taken under consideration the views you expressed therein. However, sentiment is against the granting of *sovereign rights* in a portion of the harbor. The crux of the matter would be whether this additional concession to the Lithuanians, which is not very great in itself, could really induce them to accept our solution. This I am inclined to doubt. In the last analysis there will always be the moment when we can go no further without applying "pressure."

So much for today. I should like to ask you to treat this whole letter in strict confidence.

Heil Hitler!

As ever, sincerely yours,

V. GRUNDHERR

<sup>9</sup> Mayor of the City of Memel.

<sup>10</sup> A former President of the Memel Landtag.

No. 382

115/118071-74

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI<sup>1</sup>*

[BERLIN,] January 3, 1939.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE MEMEL QUESTION

I. *Attitude of the Lithuanians*

a. A detailed address on foreign and domestic policy was given by Minister President Mironas in the Lithuanian Seimas on December 23, 1938:

The Lithuanian Government is prepared to comply with the Statute, with due consideration for the German viewpoint. Regarding

<sup>1</sup> A notation by Brückmeier of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat indicates that the memorandum was submitted to Ribbentrop.

future questions of interpretation, a procedure for quick agreement can be arranged with Germany. A member of the Lithuanian Government is at all times prepared to go to Berlin at the request of the German Government. The Autonomy Statute must remain the basis for relations between Memel and Lithuania. The autonomous Memel authorities and the new Landtag must cooperate loyally with the Lithuanian Government. Lithuania wished to maintain good relations with her neighbors, but not at the cost of her independence. The main purpose of the Government's declaration was obviously a domestic one: to counteract widespread Lithuanian criticism of the passivity of the Kaunas Government. The Minister President said nothing about Germany's attitude; he only emphasized that for Great Powers with a multiplicity of interests other questions were sometimes more important, and that such questions were not as important to them as they were to Lithuania.

b. A semi-official article in the press on December 29 stresses that the autonomous Memel Government must not exceed the scope of the Statute. The reproach of dilatory tactics which the Memelanders had liked to level at the Government could be flung back at them today. To clarify the interpretation of the Statute it was necessary for the Kaunas Government to come to a definite agreement with the autonomous Memel authorities.

c. The Lithuanian Government informed the President of the Memel Directorate of extensive concessions in the direction of compliance with the Statute.

(1) Immediate withdrawal of the Lithuanian state security police; an order to this effect is about to be issued.

(2) Abolition of the oath taken by deputies at the opening of the Landtag.

(3) Repeal of the Lithuanian expropriation law affecting property in the Memel Territory.

(4) Concessions in matters of recognition of the German language and employment of Memel-German officials.

d. To sum up: After the experience of the past weeks, the Lithuanian Government is prepared to make very extensive concessions in the Memel Territory if it feels that it can thus succeed in keeping the Memel Territory under Lithuanian sovereignty. The Lithuanian Government even seems inclined to reconcile itself to the Memel Germans arrogating to themselves rights going beyond the Statute. If there are elements in Kaunas who have reconciled themselves privately to the necessity of surrendering the Memel Territory, these ideas have as yet been given no concrete expression.

The new Lithuanian Minister, Skirpa, who has already visited State Secretary von Weizsäcker, will call on Under State Secretary Woermann and me unofficially tomorrow for the first time.

## II. *Attitude of the Reich German and Memel-German Authorities*

a. The people of the Memel Territory have continued to preserve complete discipline. Nothing appeared in the press regarding Dr. Neumann's audience with the Führer.<sup>2</sup>

b. The Memel Germans challenged the legality of the elections on the grounds that Jews had voted who no longer resided in the Memel Territory. As a result of this challenge, the convening of the Landtag may be postponed until the end of January or the middle of February.

c. The financial crisis in the German banks of Memel is not so acute at present, since bank managers in the Memel Territory have succeeded in obtaining from the Lithuanian National Bank an increase in their rediscount credit.

d. In his New Year's proclamation Oberpräsident and Gauleiter Koch of Königsberg, referring to the unstatesmanlike behavior of Beneš, indicated that Lithuania must steel herself to make far-reaching decisions, emphasizing the significance for Lithuania of the friendship and economic strength of the neighboring nation of 80 million Germans under purposeful leadership.

e. Regierungspräsident von Keudel, of Marienwerder, is at present making a trip via Memel and Kaunas to Riga, Reval, and Helsinki. In Memel he met the Mayor, the former President of the Landtag, Dr. Schreiber, and the representative of the Auslandsorganisation. He claims that he is not travelling on official business. Pol. VI was not previously informed of this trip.

## III. *Attitude of Foreign Powers*

a. To an inquiry from Mander, of the British House of Commons,<sup>3</sup> who for years has been particularly interested in the Memel problem, Prime Minister Chamberlain replied in writing that the Führer had told him at Berchtesgaden that with reference to the Memel Territory he would be satisfied with observance of the Statute. This was reported in British, French, and Lithuanian newspapers.

b. Shortly before Christmas the Polish-Lithuanian Commercial Treaty was signed. The text of the treaty has not yet been published. As far as is yet known, in addition to insignificant merchandise quotas, it gives Poland the right to float lumber on the Memel River and to use the harbor of Memel for exports. According to press reports, Poland intends to establish a consulate in Memel, and Lithuania consulates in Gdynia and Vilna.

c. The influential commander of the Estonian Army, General Laidoner, expressed himself to the effect that the Memel question was

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 381.

<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey Mander, Liberal M. P.

one of only local significance. He undoubtedly wished to emphasize thereby that in case of a German-Lithuanian conflict Estonia would remain disinterested.

GRUNDHERR

### No. 383

116/66581

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 33

BERLIN, January 13, 1939.

I told Minister Frohwein today that it would be advisable to warn the Estonian Foreign Minister that at the next conference of the Baltic countries at the beginning of February he should not let the Lithuanians involve him in any sort of statement concerning the Estonian interest in the *status quo* in the Memel Territory.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 384

122/120775

#### *The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MEMEL, January 15, 1939—7:25 p. m.

No. 7 of January 15

Received January 15—9:00 p. m.

Same text to Kaunas, No. 4.

It was learned on reliable authority that SA-Oberführer Krause, of Adelshof near Tilsit, who belongs to SA Group Ostland, made the following statements recently on the occasion of a conference on the establishment of an SA formation in Po . . . aul (two letters garbled), allegedly upon instructions from the highest quarters:

When the Landtag convenes at the beginning of February there will be great unrest and demonstrations which would require active intervention by the SA. Therefore the establishment of SA formations in the Memel Territory should be speeded up as much as possible so that they would be ready for action in case of need.

In agreement with Dr. Neumann and Herr Hoffmeyer, who is now here, I am asking you to see to it that such things do not occur again, and also that Krause's statements be corrected as soon as possible, since serious unrest in the population here could develop into unauthorized riots.

Please inform Obergruppenführer Lorenz.

SAUCKEN

## No. 385

2604/525243

*Minute by an Official of the Reich Chancellery*

Rk 1889 A

BERLIN, January 21, 1939.

Subject: Latvian Foreign Minister Munters.

Munters has been the Latvian Foreign Minister for about three years. He is a rather young man of high intelligence and is considered particularly well informed about economic questions; however, he is also known to be an opportunist who is entirely unreliable and extremely conceited.

Of German-Baltic extraction and married to a Russian, he is now a decided Latvian nationalist.

From the German point of view Latvian policy is unsatisfactory because of particularly bad treatment of the minorities as well as rather strong leanings toward the Soviet Union. On this point, however, there seems to be a certain turn in preparation of late under the influence of Estonia, which is friendly to Germany. However, German foreign policy still has no tangible proofs of an improvement in the present situation and therefore maintains a reserved attitude.

Latvia's form of government is authoritarian. Ulmanis has been President since 1936.

The Reich Foreign Minister will not receive M. Munters this time.

The Foreign Ministry would not consider it advisable at the present time for the Latvian Foreign Minister to be received by the Führer and Chancellor.

Respectfully submitted to the Reich Minister<sup>1</sup> in accordance with instructions.

R[ÖHRECKE]

<sup>1</sup>I. e., to Reich Minister Lammers, Head of the Reich Chancellery.

## No. 386

115/118083

*The Consulate General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry*

A 98

January 21, 1939.

Pol. VI 215.

Subject: Participation by members of the Security Unit<sup>1</sup> in courses in Germany.

The Consulate General has granted entry visas to 40 members of the Security Unit who are participating in a brief training course in East Prussia.

<sup>1</sup>An unofficial police formation of the Memel Germans.

The *Vakarai* and the *Baltischer Beobachter* of January 21 reported that 50 young men had departed by train for Germany to be trained as SA leaders. When these instructors had returned the real activities of the SA would begin.

The Legation in Kaunas will receive a copy of the present report.

By order:

V. HERWARTH

## No. 387

115/117529-30

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 68

BERLIN, January 25, 1939.

The Lithuanian Minister, who had asked for an appointment some time ago, called on me today. Since he tried from the very outset to give the conversation a somewhat ceremonious form, I reminded him that our relations with him were not yet official. (The Minister, as is known, has not yet presented his credentials to the Führer.)

Minister Skirpa made the following statements: On June 24, the Reich Foreign Minister had told the Lithuanian Foreign Minister that good neighborly relations depended on settlement of the Memel question.<sup>1</sup> The eleven-point list of grievances later<sup>2</sup> given the Lithuanian Minister at Berlin had been disposed of. The condition for good relations was therefore regarded in Lithuania as complied with. It was surely time to state this publicly.

I replied to the Minister that I was well acquainted with the background of the case. We had not described the list with the eleven points as an exhaustive one. Even today the Memel Germans had a number of points of grievance, with which the Lithuanian Government was perhaps even better acquainted than I. I should like to mention, for instance, that more than half of the Lithuanian state security police were still active in the Memel Territory, though in another function. The preferential treatment of semi-public Lithuanian companies, interference in the economic field, the treatment of Memel Germans in the Lithuanian Army, Lithuanian film censorship, and the like, were cited by the Memel population as reasons why the atmosphere could by no means be described as cleared as yet.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 346.

<sup>2</sup> Actually earlier. See enclosure to document No. 340.

I then went back to the past: For a decade and a half the Lithuanian Government had considered it expedient to trample upon the Memelanders and to make every conceivable difficulty for the Reich. The exasperation in Germany and particularly in the German East was therefore, as was well known, justified and deep-rooted. How could the Lithuanian Government expect sentiments to undergo a radical change for the better the moment Lithuania started repairing her old errors?

In conclusion, I told the Minister that his desire that the German Government give public recognition to the improvement in conditions was premature.

Minister Skirpa advanced a few arguments in reply, to be sure, but admitted the old sins of his Government which I had decried and refrained from expressing further wishes, which he apparently still had in reserve.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 388

115/118102-03

*The Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle to the Deputy of the Führer*<sup>1</sup>

February 4, 1939.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE HESS: My office has just received a telephone call which is recorded in the following minute:

"SS-Gruppenführer Rediess of Königsberg communicates the following by telephone:

'On February 3, 1939 Gauleiter Koch<sup>2</sup> summoned the leader of the Memel Germans, Dr. Neumann, as well as Consul General v. Saucken, and the head of the Gestapo office in Tilsit, SS-Hauptsturmführer Graefe, and told the three he had received orders from the Führer to explain to them that political developments in the Memel Territory could not continue in their present form and must be stopped at once. Dr. Neumann was threatened with being shot in the event of disobedience. In this connection Gauleiter Koch held the Berlin offices, particularly the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, responsible for the latest developments within the SA.'

In the interest of pursuing a clear-cut policy on Memel, I take the liberty first of all of pointing out that it is a complete distortion of

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Has been submitted to the Foreign Minister. Sch[midt]."

<sup>2</sup> Erich Koch, Provincial Governor and Gauleiter for East Prussia.

the facts for the Berlin offices to be held responsible for developments in the SA matter in Memel. As you yourself know, it is precisely these conditions that were brought about through the intervention of East Prussian Party officials over the head of Dr. Neumann and without the knowledge of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. Everything possible was done from Berlin to avoid ambiguity and further developments of this kind.

It is extremely detrimental to our policy in the Memel Territory, however, to have Dr. Neumann receive orders from various offices. Up to now Dr. Neumann has kept entirely within the scope of the instructions the Führer has given him. These instructions, as you know, were different from the orders now given by Gauleiter Koch. Please find out whether such a directive was given. If so, please inform my office in order that a uniform policy on Memel may be pursued.

Dr. Neumann will be in Berlin on Tuesday, February 7, and expects to receive from me explicit instructions for his further conduct.

Heil Hitler!

LORENZ

SS-Obergruppenführer

No. 389

2446/514889-90

*Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department*

BERLIN, February 6, 1939.

Kult. A 1305 (g).

Subject: The German minority in Latvia.

Today there was a conversation in the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle between SS-Oberführer Behrends, Minister von Kotze,<sup>1</sup> Senior Counselor von Grundherr, Senior Counselor Lorenz,<sup>2</sup> and me. The subject for discussion was the desire of President Ulmanis, conveyed to Herr von Kotze by a third party, to speak with Herr von Kotze privately on the situation of the German minority in Latvia. After a lengthy discussion it was agreed that Herr von Kotze should not avoid such a conversation. It was termed undesirable for the German Minister to involve himself during such a conversation in concrete negotiations, take over the role of mediator, or advocate the demands of the minority. Rather, the tactics of the Minister should be directed toward suggesting to M. Ulmanis the path of direct negotiations with

<sup>1</sup> Hans Ulrich von Kotze, appointed Minister to Latvia in December 1933. Under Neurath he had headed the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

<sup>2</sup> Of the Cultural Policy Department.



the minority, toward strengthening the authority of the latter and, if possible, toward avoiding a specification of concrete wishes the fulfillment of which would perhaps satisfy the Reich Government.

It goes without saying that the Minister, in accordance with his general instructions from the Reich Foreign Minister, will express to the President the liveliest interest in the well-being and prosperity of the German minority and state that a decided change in the treatment of the minority up to now is necessary.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary through the Director of the Cultural Policy Department and Counselor von Grundherr.<sup>3</sup>

V. TWARDOWSKI

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\* Marginal note: "I agree. If I were in Minister von Kotze's place, however, I would not waive the right offered him to have a voice in the matter, but would act in such a way that in case of need I could fall back on it." Weizsäcker], Feb. 8.

A copy of this note together with Weizsäcker's additional suggestions was sent on Feb. 10 to Kotze, who had meanwhile returned to his post in Riga (2446/514891-92).

## No. 390

122/120785

### *The Consul General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 29 of February 7

MEMEL, February 8, 1939—3:01 a. m.

Received February 8—6:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams No. 8<sup>1</sup> and No. 9<sup>1</sup> of February 7. For the State Secretary personally.

On the evening of February 2 I received the order from the Gestapo at Tilsit in the usual code first of all to come to Tilsit with Dr. Neumann on February 3; there a further communication would be made.

In Tilsit Dr. Graefe notified Dr. Neumann and me that he was to go to Königsberg at once with the two of us to Gauleiter Koch. He did not know the reasons.

Since clarification by telephone was not feasible, and on the other hand a discussion of military questions with the participation of corps headquarters was a possibility, I decided to go on to Königsberg.

In Königsberg Gauleiter Koch informed Dr. Neumann in my presence and that of Dr. Graefe and SS-Gruppenführer Rediess, who

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (4487/E097529; 3658/E034025). These telegrams from Grundherr and Weizsäcker respectively requested Saucken to relate the circumstances in which he and his two companions had been summoned by the Gauleiter and to explain the reasons for their compliance. Also in the files is the request from the Foreign Minister that an explanation be demanded of Saucken (4487/E097530).

had also been summoned, that according to instructions from the Führer's Deputy, which had been sent to him personally, in the future all interference by German Party officials in the Memel Territory had to stop; that, for the present, any sort of conflict with the Lithuanian Government was to be avoided, and that the leaders of the Memel Germans would be made responsible for carrying out these instructions.

In view of the special circumstances I limited myself to listening, and when the conference ended I suggested to Dr. Neumann that he personally obtain immediate confirmation of these instructions in Berlin, since this was actually not in Gauleiter Koch's competence. Then I informed Geheimrat von Grundherr by telephone of the substance of the conference and announced Dr. Neumann's visit.

SAUCKEN

### No. 391

122/120786

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 164

BERLIN, February 23, 1939.

Herr Neumann (Memel) called on me today and informed me that the Landtag in Memel would now probably convene on March 17. It was quite possible that it might convene earlier, but hardly later. Some time around March 10, Herr Neumann intends to call here again in order to obtain further instructions.

I told Herr Neumann I would appreciate it if he would undertake the work of assimilating the Memel Territory to the Reich in accordance with the instructions given him by the Reich Foreign Minister, but in close contact with our Consulate General.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 392

115/118105-06

#### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, February 28, 1939.

#### THE SITUATION IN THE MEMEL TERRITORY AT THE END OF FEBRUARY 1939

1. The expansion of the National Socialist organizations of the Memel Germans received a great impetus under the newly appointed National Socialist Directorate (President: Dr. Neumann's deputy, Bertuleit) and with energetic support from the Reich German authorities. A cultural association, Guard Corps (SS), SA, Hitler Youth Organization, Winter Aid Organization and an athletic association

have been organized and have commenced work. Organization of the Labor Front is making good progress.

The people are pressing more and more for an early union with the Reich. Numerous demonstrations in favor of *Anschluss* have been made by agricultural associations. Desertions of Memel Germans from the Lithuanian Army are increasing; at the next induction of Memel-German recruits (beginning of May) it is to be expected that they will generally refuse to serve.

2. The Lithuanian Government's initial indulgence towards the Directorate's demands with respect to the Statute and the open profession by the Memel Germans of the National Socialist ideology and attitude (such as had been expressly approved by Minister President Mironas) has been superseded by a perceptible stiffening in the treatment of pending questions by the Lithuanian Governor. (Censorship, questions of officials, financial adjustment, economic questions.)

The situation is still unsatisfactory with regard to observance of the Statute: the Lithuanian political police still exists although in camouflaged form; oppression of Memel-German business continues without essential change.

The Lithuanian Government indicates that it considers its sovereign rights, as guaranteed under the Statute, threatened by this development in the Memel Territory. Various statements have been made by members of the Lithuanian Government regarding the inseparable connection of the Memel Territory with Lithuania. See the attached telegraphic report from the Consulate General at Memel<sup>1</sup> for the attitude of the Lithuanian Governor toward the demonstrations of the Memel Germans for *Anschluss*. Attempts of the Lithuanian Government to elicit from us a statement as to our wishes in the Memel question (visit of Lithuanian Ministers to Berlin) have ceased since the middle of January. These have been superseded by Lithuanian efforts to obtain from us recognition of Lithuania's good conduct in the Memel Territory.

3. By contesting the election, etc., the Memel-German leaders, as instructed, delayed the convening of the Memel Landtag, of which both the Memel German population and the Lithuanian Government expect a decision on the future of the Memel Territory in accordance with our directives. According to the provisions of the Statute and the Election Law, March 19 is the last date for the convening of the Landtag. Dr. Neumann has requested that on March 10 he personally receive instructions here on how this session is to go off. If necessary, the session of the Landtag, as discussed with Dr. Neumann, could be confined simply to the business of organizing the Landtag. (Even if the population is prepared by suitable propaganda, however, incidents might still occur.)

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3658/E034028).

4. Signatory powers of the Memel Convention have shown no interest in the Memel question in the past weeks. Lithuania's international situation remains unchanged. No further progress has been made in Polish-Lithuanian *rapprochement*.

GRUNDHERR<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer.] Neumann. Berlin, March 10. Landtag, March 19."

Marginal note: "Has been submitted to the Führer. H[e]w[el], March 4."

### No. 393

115/118111

*The Director of the Political Department to the Consulate General at Memel*

Telegram

No. 16

BERLIN, March 14, 1939.

Pol. VI 613 g.

Obergruppenführer Lorenz, in agreement with Chief of Staff Lutze<sup>1</sup> and Dr. Neumann, requests that the return to Reich territory of the Reich German and Danzig SA instructors now active in the Memel Territory be effected at once.<sup>2</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Viktor Lutze, head of the Nazi Party storm troops.

<sup>2</sup> An accompanying minute explains that this order was transmitted through the Consulate General because the SA leadership had no adequate communications with its instructors in Memel.

### No. 394

115/118115

*Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, March 15, 1939.

e. o. Pol. VI 730.

At 12 noon today Gestapo Headquarters at Tilsit reported as follows by telephone:

The population of the Memel Territory spontaneously hoisted Swastika flags under the impact of Germany's invasion of former Czechoslovakia. It has been clearly established that no instructions were issued for this by anyone. No incidents have as yet occurred. The German population in the Memel Territory is in such an agitated state of mind that serious clashes are to be expected upon the slightest provocation from the Lithuanians.

DOERTENBACH

## No. 395

122/120793-94

*The Consulate General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

MEMEL, March 15, 1939—2:10 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

No. 51 of March 15

Received March 15—6:40 p. m.

Same text to Kaunas, No. 37.

Dr. Neumann will deliver the following statement this morning<sup>2</sup> before the Memel-German deputies gathered in the Landtag:

Statement. "Self-determination of peoples, which after the World War was supposed to form the basis for the new territorial borders in Europe, was gravely violated by the separation of the Memel Territory from the German Reich. Also at the inclusion of the Memel Territory in Lithuania by the Memel Convention of May 8, 1924 the desires of the population of the Memel Territory, the majority of whom, even in the opinion of the investigating commission of the Conference of Ambassadors, were German and not Lithuanian, were simply ignored. The Memel Convention declared a situation legal which had been brought about by force in the year 1923 by armed representatives of the Lithuanian Government. The Autonomy Statute for the Memel Territory, the text of which was supposed to guarantee the traditional rights and culture of the inhabitants of the Memel Territory, has constantly been violated by the Lithuanian Government in its basic provisions.<sup>3</sup> The one-sided interpretation of the Ministry of Transportation [*Statute*] which is expressive of the authoritarian views of the sovereign [*des Souveräns*] has led to a total undermining of our vital prerogatives as embodied in the state [*Statute*]. The state of war has been lifted, to be sure, but all the laws passed by the sovereign against us continue in force. This peculiar legal situation has also led to complete lack of economic freedom, which

<sup>1</sup> Several passages of this telegram were garbled in decoding. The text is printed here as decoded, but it has been possible to check this text against a more accurate one which was telephoned from Tilsit at 3:30 p.m. (115/118116-18); in each case the version as telephoned is indicated in brackets following the garbled version.

<sup>2</sup> Another copy (115/118112-14) of the telephoned message (see footnote 1) has the following marginal note: "Therefore apparently already done, and contrary to the agreement. Investigation under way. Result will be reported to the Foreign Minister. W[eizsäcker], Mar. 15."

<sup>3</sup> The text of the Neumann declaration to this point is almost identical with the text of a proposed proclamation by the Memel-German deputies, drafted in the Foreign Ministry in December and referred to in document No. 369, footnote 1. As originally drafted in December, and revised in various drafts in March (2546/523247-52), the proclamation differed from the final statement by declaring outright that the Memel Statute had proved itself unworkable, that the Territory could not have a prosperous development under Lithuanian sovereignty but only if it was reunited with Germany. It ended with an appeal to Hitler to undertake that reunion. That the military seizure of Memel was planned is evident also from the canceled drafts of several telegrams (2546/523255-59) in which German Missions were to be instructed to explain to interested governments that this action took place in response to the appeal of the Memel-German deputies backed by 87 percent of the Memel population.

is evident today in all areas of economic life as an obvious catastrophe. Economically speaking, the Memel Territory is a heap of ruins. Agriculture has suffered to a particularly grave degree. The last 16 [75] years have thus shown that the healthy development of the Memel Territory stopped with its entry into the Lithuanian state. Construction work which was carried out here and which was placed in the foreground with all propagandist means as proof of the Lithuanian solicitude for the Memel Territory was done at the expense of the Territory but not to its advantage. Everything, absolutely everything, was directed at ruining the German racial element, at depriving it of its rights and destroying it economically.

The Landtag will have to be summoned by the Governor by March 25. It is our task to bring a fundamental change in these intolerable conditions; we must regulate our political and economic life independently on the basis of justice in accordance with our own desires, and must secure our vital prerogatives in such a manner that they will no longer be exposed to arbitrary acts in the future. We shall not permit ourselves to be diverted by veiled and open threats by our opponents, and we shall create *that* law which is our due on the basis of justice, tradition and blood. The present time demands quick decisions; today, as the deputies to the Memel Landtag confirmed by the (group garbled) [Elections] Commission, we have, besides the right of legislating, also that of dealing directly with government agencies.

As the leader of all Memel organizations, and as elected deputy for the Territory, I believe that I am justified, on the basis alone of the authority given by 87 percent of the population of the Memel Territory, in undertaking all the necessary steps and measures. I shall be ruled in this only by the duty to serve my fellow countrymen and my home; I beg that you, too, my comrades and deputies, place your trust in me. But may the Almighty give us the strength to carry out our work for the benefit of our beloved home!"

After the declaration has been read Landesdirektor Böttcher will propose to the deputies that Dr. Neumann be given full powers in writing to the following effect:

"We, the undersigned deputies, have heard Dr. Neumann's declaration. We approve of this declaration and give renewed expression to our leader, Dr. Neumann, of our full and unrestricted confidence. We authorize Dr. Neumann to make statements and take the necessary steps in and with our names."

Dr. Neumann's declaration will be given to the press with the note that the Memel-German deputies expressed their confidence in Dr. Neumann.\*

HERWARTH

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\* In a telegram of Mar. 16 (122/120800) Consul General Saucken reported that the Neumann declaration had silenced at once criticism by the Memel-German population of the over-cautious tactics of their leaders. The Lithuanians took no countermeasures and appeared deeply shaken as a result of the simultaneous entry of German troops into Bohemia and Moravia.

## No. 396

122/120798

*The Consulate General at Memel to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MEMEL, March 15, 1939—11:35 p. m.

MOST URGENT

Received March 16—2 a. m.

No. 56 of March 15<sup>1</sup>

For Counselor von Grundherr.

With reference to telegrams Nos. 51 and 53<sup>2</sup> of March 15.

This afternoon Dr. Neumann informed the Memel-German deputies as well as the members of the Directorate<sup>3</sup> of the complete failure of today's conversation with the President of the Directorate and the Governor and declared that the Governor's attitude compelled the Memel Germans to take independent action.

This second meeting of the deputies was arranged by Dr. Neumann in order, if circumstances indicated, to be able to declare there, that following upon this morning's demonstration of confidence, *Anschluss* had been decided upon.

The press has not been informed of the second meeting.

HERWARTH

<sup>1</sup>This telegram was transmitted from Berlin to the Foreign Minister, who was in Prague for the entry of German troops, on the morning of Mar. 16 (115/118119). A reference in this latter copy indicates that telegram No. 51 from Memel (document No. 395) was also sent to him there.

<sup>2</sup>Latter not printed (122/120795). The telegram reported that the Lithuanian Governor had told Neumann and President of the Directorate Bertuleit in an interview lasting only 15 minutes that he could give no reply to the demands recently presented by the Directorate. The next day, Mar. 16, however, he informed Bertuleit that he would call the Landtag into session on Mar. 25 (122/120801).

<sup>3</sup>The Memel Consulate General reported in telegram No. 54 dispatched at 6:30 p. m. on Mar. 15 (122/120796) that the members of the Directorate had associated themselves with the vote of full powers given Neumann by the Memel-German deputies that morning.

## No. 397

115/117338

*Memorandum of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat<sup>1</sup>*

VIENNA, March 17, 1939.

State Secretary von Weizsäcker communicated the following by telephone:

1. Ambassador Henderson had informed him that he had been called to London for consultation.

2. According to a reliable source, the Lithuanian Government had inquired of the signatories of the Memel Statute what attitude they

<sup>1</sup>The memorandum is unsigned. The Foreign Minister had gone to Vienna after the entry into Prague.

would take in case of a German invasion. Nothing was yet known regarding a reply to this inquiry.

The signatories to the Memel Statute are England, France, Italy, and Japan.

### No. 398

115/118120

#### *Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, March 18, 1939.

e. o. Pol. VI 656 g.

At 12:30 this morning Dr. Neumann called me from Tilsit and asked what he should do about Gauleiter Koch's order to come to Königsberg for a conference today. On the basis of the telephone conversation between the State Secretary and Obergruppenführer Lorenz I told him that Obergruppenführer Lorenz and the Foreign Ministry regarded it as a matter of course that, in accordance with the Foreign Minister's instructions, he wait in the Memel Territory for further orders from the Foreign Minister. There was no objection to his sending a delegate to a conference with Gauleiter Koch.

Dr. Graefe, the chief of the Gestapo Headquarters at Tilsit, and Herr Hoffmeyer, the representative of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, then informed me that they had a report from the SD to the effect that Gauleiter Koch had termed developments in the Memel Territory to date a "silly, childish policy;" there was reason for assuming that he intended to "create accomplished facts" in the Memel Territory with the aid of the Memel-German SA in order to accelerate the *Anschluss* of the Memel Territory to the Reich.

Obergruppenführer Lorenz, to whom I transmitted this information through his office at Hoffmeyer's request, asked that it be forwarded to the Foreign Minister.

DOERTENBACH

### No. 399

FS/0047-50

#### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

RM 19

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER URBŠYS ON MARCH 20, 1939, FROM 12:15 TO 1:00 P. M.<sup>1</sup>

The Reich Foreign Minister stated in substance that it was certain that the Memel Territory wished to return to Germany. The situation

<sup>1</sup> Urbšys had arrived in Berlin the previous day and requested an interview with the Foreign Minister (122/120812).



was clear both for us and for Lithuania. That fact had to be accepted. There were two possibilities: one would be a friendly settlement. If this occurred, he believed a peaceful solution possible which would also result in friendly relations between the two countries in the future. The thorn that still rankled in German-Lithuanian relations today would then be removed once and for all. Germany could then be generous in economic matters, whether it be in the question of the free port or in other commercial treaties, in which Germany and Lithuania had, indeed, various opportunities for supplementing each other. If the Lithuanian Government did not appraise the situation properly and did not seek this amicable settlement in time, he did not know where it would all end. It was clear that if uprisings and shooting broke out in the Memel Territory, Germany could not idly look on. The Führer would act with lightning speed and the situation would slip from the hands of the politicians and be decided by the military. Nobody could predict what the developments would then be and what frontiers would be decided upon. He, the Foreign Minister, had always urged an amicable solution, and he was expressing hope, which he knew the Führer also entertained, that the Lithuanian Government would appraise the situation correctly and come very quickly to a decision. He again pointed out the danger inherent in conduct which, resulting from complete ignorance of the circumstances and probably from belief in some kind of help from abroad, did not take the right course. Should the Lithuanian Government realize this, he was prepared within the next few days to receive its plenipotentiaries in order to reach an agreement between the two countries. The situation in the Memel Territory had got out of hand. It involved people of German blood who could not be ordered about. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister replied that he alone was not competent to make a decision in the name of his Government. He was leaving for Kaunas today, would arrive there tomorrow, and would inform his Government at once. He asked whether an interim solution was not possible, to which the Reich Foreign Minister replied in the negative.

The Reich Minister further stated that he was of the opinion that those who had made the Treaty of Versailles had done very badly, and that the nations should liquidate this error in a spirit of friendship and get together on this basis. He also pointed out that time was pressing. Once clashes or street fighting started, it would be too late. The Führer would not tolerate this.

Urbšys said that minor clashes could occur at any time and that he would therefore like to have a definite time limit set, a definite num-

ber of days in which the Lithuanian Government could make up its own mind. During this period minor incidents should not be permitted to lead to any large-scale measures.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that developments in Lithuania were beyond our control and that he could therefore set no time limit. But he suggested, particularly in view of the convening of the Landtag on March 25, that plenipotentiaries be sent to Germany as quickly as possible.<sup>2</sup>

Urbšys also said that more time was probably needed for the economic discussions, and that only the basis for these discussions could be laid in the treaty which would be concluded within the next few days if the German Government declared itself in agreement. The Reich Minister was also of the opinion that the details could be left to a commission and suggested that Urbšys bring an expert along with him.

Urbšys thereupon took his leave.

HEWEL

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<sup>2</sup> In a telegram to the Legation at Kaunas transmitted at 9:30 p. m. on Mar. 20 (122/120813-14), Weizsäcker summarized the Ribbentrop-Urbšys conversation and gave the Minister the following instruction: "I request that toward noon tomorrow, Tuesday, you call on the Foreign Minister, and referring to his conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, ask him point blank when the plenipotentiaries will arrive in Berlin."

## No. 400

115/118125-26

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 21, 1939.

#### TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN STATE SECRETARY VON WEIZSÄCKER AND MINISTER ZECHLIN AT KAUNAS (from stenographic notes)

1. There is absolutely no time to lose. Developments might otherwise take a serious turn.

2. We expect the Lithuanian delegation to come here by special plane tomorrow and to arrive in the course of the day; this would be in the very best interests of the Lithuanian Government itself.

3. If the Lithuanian Government considers it absolutely necessary to declare "martial law" in order to reduce the danger of internal unrest, we cannot prevent it from doing so, but do not consider this step very opportune because:

a. A "state of martial law" might have repercussions in the Memel Territory, the consequences of which could not be accurately foreseen;

this should be stated very explicitly. (Herr Zechlin interjected at this point that martial law would be declared in *Lithuania*, not in the Memel Territory.)

b. Declaration of "martial law" might have an effect contrary to what was desired and might assume an undue international significance. As stated, we do not wish to tell the Lithuanian Government what to do in this respect. However, in order to keep the declaration of "martial law" from creating a sensation, as may be anticipated, it will have to make an additional statement. This additional statement would have to be of the following nature: it must state that the Lithuanian Government had decided to cede the Memel Territory to us voluntarily and that a delegation was en route to Berlin in order to arrange the particulars of this decision, especially the settlement of certain economic matters, in consultation with the German Government.

Herr Zechlin should add that, in case disorders should occur in the Memel Territory as the result of the measures now planned by the Lithuanian Government, we could not stand idly by. In that case we would have to take such military steps as appeared suitable to us; there could then be no further thought of negotiations.

It is absolutely necessary to determine the text of the communiqué jointly, for otherwise, due to misunderstandings, direct German action might be set in motion after all. Therefore the Lithuanian Government should inform us through Zechlin of the communiqué drawn up there, so that we could agree to the formulation.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 401

115/117543

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, March 21, 1939.  
e. o. Pol. VI 813.

Minister Zechlin just telephoned from Kaunas (1:30 p. m.) and reported as follows:

Foreign Minister Urbšys had just arrived in Kaunas at 12:00 noon. In accordance with instructions Herr Zechlin had called on him at the Foreign Ministry at once. M. Urbšys was unable to give him a final answer until sometime in the afternoon or evening. The Lithuanian Parliament (without the three deputies from the Memel Territory) had been in secret session since 11:00 a. m. A cabinet meeting had been called for 1:00 p. m. and a conference with President Smetona for 2:00 p. m.

Minister Zechlin will make a further report this afternoon or evening.

GRUNDHERR

## No. 402

122/120822

*The Minister in Lithuania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

KAUNAS, March 21, 1939—3:15 p. m.

No. 17 of March 21

Received March 21—5:10 p. m.

Urbšys just informed me by telephone that he has decided to advocate acceptance of the German proposal in the meeting with the President beginning at 2 p. m.

ZECHLIN

## No. 403

122/120838-39

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 22, 1939.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN STATE SECRETARY VON  
WEIZSÄCKER AND MINISTER ZECHLIN AT KAUNAS<sup>1</sup>

## Three points:

1. This very night the Government must retract the statement it just issued;<sup>2</sup> it must disclaim it and put in place of this statement the official version of the communiqué to be decided upon between us and the Lithuanian Government.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum has an undecipherable time notation which may be either 1 a. m. or 4 a. m. Another copy (122/120688-89) has the handwritten insertion: "Between 2 and 3 a. m."

<sup>2</sup> According to a DNB report (122/120831-34) the Lithuanian Government at 12:20 a. m. on Mar. 22 issued an additional statement to the communiqué (see footnote 3) on Urbšys' report to the Council of Ministers regarding his talk with Ribbentrop on Mar. 20; in it regret was expressed that the Berlin conversation "did not take place in a spirit that was compatible with the legal status of the Memel Territory." The statement then intimated that the German demands violated the Versailles Treaty, the German-Lithuanian frontier agreement of 1928 and the Memel Convention of 1924 which had stipulated that sovereignty over Memel could not be transferred without consent of the four signatory powers. This additional statement was disavowed a short time later by the Lithuanian Government.

<sup>3</sup> Various revised drafts of this document, described as communiqué No. 1, are found in the files (2546/523260-62). It was to be released by the Lithuanian Government and gave an account of Urbšys' conversation with Ribbentrop in Berlin on Mar. 20. Actually, according to DNB's report (122/120830-31), two versions appeared in the Lithuanian press. These correspond to the revised and unrevised versions found in the files. The revised version spoke of a German "proposal" for the return of Memel instead of a "demand" and put a much stronger emphasis on the spontaneous desire of the Memel population to unite with Germany, while the other version referred merely to German assertions to that effect.

2. This very night the text of communiqué No. 2 must be agreed upon.\* Two words are missing in this communiqué which refer to the approval of the Seimas; this is of international significance. We believe it important that the words "after consulting the Seimas . . ." be included; at any rate the Parliament should be mentioned in it.

3. I must ask you to arrive at a definite text of the communiqué this very night. The trip to Berlin by the persons concerned must be definitely scheduled and the matter settled here tomorrow afternoon.

The additional statement made in the matter indicates that the Lithuanian Government is making the vain effort of attracting the attention of the international public and other Governments and to draw them into the fight. This would turn out very badly for the Lithuanian Government; I therefore wish to issue an urgent warning. Please look up the proper persons at once and settle the above three points. It is in the best interest of the Lithuanian Government itself and of those whom it is its duty to represent.

W[EIZSÄCKER]

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\* This communiqué was to announce that Lithuania had agreed to the return of Memel to Germany and that a Lithuanian delegation would go to Berlin to settle the details. Drafts of this communiqué with the amendment requested by Weizsäcker written in are found in the files (2546/523263-65).

## No. 404

115/117544-45

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, March 22, 1939.  
e. o. Pol. VI 822.

At 1 p. m. today Lithuanian Minister Skirpa informed me by order of his Government, as follows:

1. The Lithuanian delegation will leave Kaunas for Berlin by plane at about 2 p. m.

2. Composition of the delegation:

Foreign Minister Urbšys,

Skirpa, the Lithuanian Minister here,

Colonel Grinius, the Lithuanian Military Attaché here, as well as

Messrs. Petkevicius and Krivickas (both legal advisers in the Foreign Ministry at Kaunas).

3. I once more pointed out to Minister Skirpa that it was especially important for the delegates to be provided with sufficient powers. Minister Skirpa promised that he would telephone to Kaunas on this score.

4. Since M. Urbšys had worked the whole night and was quite exhausted, he would be grateful if there were no immediate strenuous negotiations today.

I told M. Skirpa that we, too, had worked throughout the entire night; in view of the situation in the Memel Territory the conclusion of the treaty was so urgent that in my opinion personal considerations had to be disregarded.

5. M. Skirpa wished to learn the particulars about the calls to be made and the various points of the negotiations prior to the arrival of the Lithuanian delegation, if possible. I answered that I personally could not give him any information on this score.

6. By orders of his Government, M. Skirpa further told me that the Memel-German guard corps had taken possession of certain Lithuanian banks, companies, etc. in the Memel Territory. I told M. Skirpa that this was certainly done for the purpose of maintaining order, for the Lithuanians had withdrawn in many places. According to all reports available to me, the Memel Germans were maintaining exemplary discipline. For the rest, what he had just told me proved how absolutely necessary it was to settle the Memel question by treaty at once.

GRUNDHERR

## No. 405

6705/E506148

### *The Foreign Minister to the Führer*

BERLIN, March 23, 1939—1:30 a. m.

For the Führer, by radio to Battleship *Deutschland*<sup>1</sup>

MY FÜHRER: I report the signing of the treaty with Lithuania reuniting the Memel Territory with the Reich. Lithuania will complete military evacuation of the Memel Territory by 7 a. m. on March 23.<sup>2</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> At 11:40 p. m., and again at 1:30 a. m., Hewel had dispatched radiograms from the ship stating that the Führer urgently requested information on the results of the negotiations with the Lithuanians (6705/E506148-47). The *Deutschland* proceeded to Memel where Hitler addressed the population from the balcony of the municipal theater on Mar. 23.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the treaty (2871/563773-75) follows:

The Chancellor of the German Reich and the President of the Lithuanian Republic have decided to conclude a treaty reuniting the Memel Territory with the German Reich, thereby settling the questions pending between Germany and Lithuania, and thus paving the way for friendly relations between the two countries.

For this purpose they have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The German Chancellor:

Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Lithuanian Republic:

M. Juozas Urbšys, Foreign Minister, and

M. Kazys Skirpa, Minister at Berlin,

who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1. The Memel Territory, which was severed from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, shall be reunited with the German Reich as of this date.

Article 2. The Memel Territory shall be evacuated at once by the Lithuanian military and police forces. The Lithuanian Government will see to it

## No. 406

4487/E097537-38

*Circular of the State Secretary*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, March 23, 1939.  
Sent March 24—12: 20 a. m.  
e. o. Pol. VI 841.

For guidance in your conversations.

Following the visit which the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, on his return trip from Rome, paid the German Foreign Minister on his own initiative on March 20, on which occasion the Memel question was discussed very frankly, the Lithuanian Council of Ministers decided on March 21, with the Parliament participating as required by the Constitution, to settle the Memel problem by ceding the Memel Territory to Germany and to send a Lithuanian delegation under the Foreign Minister to Berlin for the purpose of agreeing on the details. The negotiations carried on here on March 22 were furthered by good will on both sides and resulted in the Treaty published by DNB.

In answer to provocative foreign reports I call special attention to the text of the Preamble and to article 4 of the Treaty (banning the use of force) which clearly indicate—following the only possible solution of the Memel problem—our desire for friendly neighborly relations with the Lithuanians. By the provision establishing a

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that upon evacuation the Territory is left in good order. Both parties shall, insofar as necessary, appoint commissioners who shall effect the transfer of the offices which are not in the hands of the autonomous authorities of the Memel Territory.

Settlement of other questions arising from the change of national sovereignty, especially questions of an economic and financial nature as well as those involving government personnel and citizenship, shall be the subject of a special agreement.

Article 3. In order to meet Lithuania's economic needs, a free-port zone shall be established in Memel for Lithuania. The details shall be arranged separately in accordance with the directives in the annex to the present treaty.

Article 4. In confirmation of their resolution to ensure the development of friendly relations between Germany and Lithuania, both parties pledge themselves to refrain from using force against each other and not to support the use of force directed against either of them by third parties.

Article 5. The present treaty shall come into force upon signature.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done in duplicate in the German and Lithuanian languages.

BERLIN, March 22, 1939.

JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP

J. URBŠYS  
K. SKIŖPA

free-port zone in Memel harbor<sup>1</sup> we have given full consideration to the need of the Lithuanian economy for access to the sea, and this was acknowledged also by the Lithuanian delegation.

The reincorporation of the Memel Territory was accomplished without incident.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup>By an agreement (2871/563778-80) supplementary to article 3 of the treaty of Mar. 22 a free zone was established for Lithuania in the port of Memel and a Lithuanian company was to be founded which would be granted a 99-year lease to operate certain harbor installations.



CHAPTER IV  
THE STATES OF NORTHERN EUROPE  
OCTOBER 15, 1937-MARCH 16, 1939

No. 407

1858/422510-12

*Minister Blücher to Senior Counselor Grundherr*

HELSINKI, October 15, 1937.

Received October 16.

MY DEAR HERR VON GRUNDHERR: We have spoken so often about German-Finnish relations that it seems almost superfluous for me to write you specially with regard to Holsti's visit.<sup>1</sup> But, since I missed seeing you last time I was in Berlin, I wish to write you now anyway.

In my opinion, the Reich Foreign Minister should open his conversation with Holsti with a few remarks regarding Holsti's intense activity as Foreign Minister. In that connection his trips to Moscow, Stockholm, Copenhagen, London, Paris, Geneva, and Reval, and his attendant efforts to normalize relations with Russia, to place relations with Sweden, Denmark, and Norway on a basis of constant close cooperation, to cultivate good relations with England and France, to form the closest possible ties with the League of Nations, and to deepen the relationship with Estonia, should be mentioned. On the other hand, the broad field of German-Finnish relations has not been similarly cultivated. This is more surprising since Finland, as a Baltic Power, has to consider in her policies principally the two Great Powers on the Baltic, Germany and Russia, and all her other diplomatic activities are carried on more or less as a sideshow.

Politically, we require nothing more of Finland than true neutrality. We would make no attempt to draw Finland closer to the Berlin-

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<sup>1</sup> Finnish Foreign Minister Holsti was to visit Berlin on Oct. 22-24, 1937. To an inquiry from the Finnish Minister on July 21 concerning a possible invitation for Holsti to Berlin (1858/422479), Weizsäcker replied coolly on Aug. 2 (1858/422481) that the Foreign Minister preferred not to extend a formal invitation for the present but would, of course, receive Holsti if he should pass through Berlin on one of his trips to Geneva. According to a memorandum of Oct. 20 by Grundherr (1858/422418-21), "Holsti's negative policy toward Germany" had aroused criticism among rightist elements and in the Army, and this visit was decided upon by the Government and the foreign affairs committee in Parliament "because the neglect of relations with Germany since Holsti's entrance into office was considered burdensome to Finnish policy."

Rome Axis. On the other hand, however, we could not remain disinterested if Finland should perhaps join a Great-Power bloc having anti-German tendencies. We do not, of course, consider her orientation toward the Scandinavian countries in that light.

We are surprised that the Finnish leftist press, although it is controlled by the parties supporting the present government, writes about other Powers in a much more friendly tone than about Germany, and often criticizes and attacks Germany. This is the more surprising because the German press carries only the most friendly articles on Finland.

It has also not escaped our attention that in many instances the Finnish Government measures with two different scales. It has permitted an English concern to work the large nickel deposits in the Petsamo district and gives the company all the facilities imaginable. On the other hand, the greatest difficulties are raised, allegedly for political reasons, when a German company wishes to enter into a contract with a Finnish company for converting fish into fish-meal in Petsamo. In view of Germany's great need of fish-meal, we attach considerable importance to the conclusion of the contract.

We are, in general, satisfied with the development of economic relations between the two countries. We should like to state, however, that Germany has an interest in Finland's continued readiness to deliver raw materials (principally wood pulp and copper), foodstuffs, and semi-manufactured articles as the basis for Finnish-German commercial relations.

Germany would appreciate receiving better treatment in the matter of supplies for the Finnish Army; the Finnish Air Force, in particular, is turning sharply in another direction (England) for its purchases.

Under the previous government Finland had, at our instance, introduced a specific duty in place of an ad valorem duty for German automobiles and had thereby made it possible for German automobiles to compete with the American product. She had, however, at the time neglected to extend this change to automobile spare parts and motorcycles. We deem it important that this be corrected without waiting for the next German-Finnish commercial negotiations and thereby losing valuable time in the automobile business.

Since there is no longer any Finnish unemployment, it would be desirable if the Finnish immigration and residence regulations could be relaxed at least for sales employees.

Finland's regular participation in the Leipzig fair from 1939 on would be welcomed.

The cultural field does not, in my opinion, need to be touched upon, since at the present time there is no friction there. For the same rea-

son, it is not necessary to bring up questions regarding the [German] colony, especially the Ortsgruppe (which is, in fact, forbidden by law).

I should like to stop here for today. I hope that I shall very soon be able to see M. Holsti, who has just returned from his trip north, and then I shall write you again.

If you yourself do not happen to be informed in regard to the important Petsamo affair, which it is desired that the Foreign Minister bring up, I suggest that you have a memorandum<sup>2</sup> submitted by Department W (Herr Benzler).

Heil Hitler and best regards.

As ever,

BLÜCHER

<sup>2</sup>Counselor van Scherpenberg of the Economic Policy Department (Department W) sent Political Division VI a memorandum (1858/422509) on Oct. 16 stating that negotiations for 1938 trade relations with Finland were to take place in late November 1937. Although German imports from Finland had been increasing, German exports to Finland had declined relative to British exports to Finland. An enclosed minute (5804/E422980) of the same date and by the same department described Finnish refusal of the German plan (supported by the Reich Economics and Food Ministries and by the Four Year Plan authorities) for a fish-meal factory near Petsamo. The Economic Policy Department explained the Finnish Government's forbidding Finnish firms to contract with German interests in this matter as the result of a press campaign in Finland. Germany was reputedly working for a military base on the Barents Sea, and there were also reports of British and Soviet diplomatic representations against the plan. The Economic Policy Department noted that Finnish policy seemed to be motivated by suspicions of Germany, whereas British interests had just been given nickel concessions in the Petsamo area.

## No. 408

3558/E023329-31

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Press Department*

BERLIN, October 21, 1937.  
zu Pol. VI 1979.<sup>1</sup>

Respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary:

M. Svinhufvud<sup>2</sup> made the following exposition to me at the luncheon given by the Finnish Minister:\*

Finland must regard Russia as her perpetual enemy because an independent Finland represents a constant threat to Petersburg, which

<sup>1</sup>Pol. VI 1979: Not printed (3558/E023327-28). This was a letter of transmittal accompanying the copy of this memorandum sent to Helsinki; it stated that former President of Finland Svinhufvud, on a visit to Berlin, had seen Himmler and Count General von der Goltz, as well as the author of this memorandum.

<sup>2</sup>Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, 1861-1944; Regent of Finland, 1918; President of the Council of Ministers, 1930-1931; President of Finland, 1931-March 1, 1937.

\*Aarne Wuorimaa.

only a reincorporation of Finland could eliminate. This fact can in no respect be changed by any Russian assurance or any treaty; and since the Russians, moreover, are "lazy and treacherous", Finland has no faith in any kind of Russian promise. It follows from this that any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland. Svinhufvud welcomes the German-Italian attitude vis-à-vis Soviet Russia and considers it a reassurance for his country. The Finnish people are pro-German, and this attitude will be maintained in the future, too.

Holsti, who is a man of the Geneva methods and atmosphere and moreover a follower of the Anglo-French group, has no popular support for his policy. His appearance is merely a temporary one and will pass, leaving no traces. If Holsti wants to try to achieve security and reassurance for his country by directly approaching Soviet Russia, let him go ahead. Such actions can never change anything in the basis underlying the Russo-Finnish relationship, because that basis is geographically and historically conditioned. It is dangerous for Finland that the Russians do not cease spreading the notion in foreign countries that Finland is incapable of governing herself and is constantly provoking her Russian neighbor; the purpose of this propaganda is only to establish or keep alive for themselves legitimate grounds for intervention. To other countries, therefore, Finland cannot repeat often enough (and prove it, too) that she is doing everything to avoid provoking her Russian neighbor and furnishing even the mere semblance of a pretext for intervention.

While Anglo-Finnish relations are good, the popular sentiment is not pro-British because British postwar policy, especially in relation to Soviet Russia, is regarded as unsound and disastrous. Just as the British Foreign Secretary spoke to the (pro-German) Finnish Minister in London one day about Russian anxieties, similarly even the Swedish Government, which observes things at close range, is also taken in by the Russian propaganda against Finland, so that good but redundant advice is offered even by Stockholm.

Svinhufvud stresses that the Finnish people know him, and he the Finnish people, and that both are aware of these facts. For this reason he is in a position to give a true picture of the popular sentiment in the country. It goes without saying that Finland is pursuing a policy of strict neutrality, but he knows that his country will not remain neutral in a war in Eastern Europe, but rather must at all times expect a Russian attack.

M. Wuorimaa requested me to make a report on my talk with M. Svinhufvud.

ASCHMANN

## No. 409

1858/422525-27

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 827

BERLIN, October 25, 1937.

e. o. Pol. VI 1978.

During the Finnish Foreign Minister's call on the 23rd of this month, M. Holsti asked me if I would care to give him my interpretation of the general political situation. I replied that we should first speak of German-Finnish relations. I added that he was well aware of the sympathy of the Germans for the Finnish people. It had found its most ardent expression in the support which Germany had given to Finland in its struggle for liberation during the war. Today also we had but one interest: that Finland's independence be preserved, as well as her ability to maintain neutrality under any circumstances that might arise. Finnish foreign policy was, in my opinion, decisively influenced by her geopolitical position. She had the powerful Russian Empire as a neighbor and on the other side bordered on the Baltic, where we occupied a dominant position. Finland thus had to reckon with both factors, Russia and Germany. I hardly needed to explain which of the two factors was the greater threat to Finland's independence. However, I still wished to call attention to the following: If Finland should ever again be in a situation where she had to defend her independence, she would receive hardly any assistance worth mentioning from states outside the Baltic area. So it was in Finland's own interest to cultivate good relations with the country that not only was well disposed towards her but that also had a certain interest in the maintenance of her independence, namely Germany.

M. Holsti readily agreed with this and declared that he was fully aware of the dangers threatening Finland from Russia. He had thought that he could lessen the continuing tension between Finland and Russia by an outward conciliatory spirit toward the Moscow Government; unfortunately, he had not succeeded in this.

I then went on to tell M. Holsti that we fully understood the association of the Scandinavian countries as an expression of their common culture.

Passing to the economic field, I told M. Holsti that, as far as I knew, German-Finnish economic relations had progressed satisfactorily during the past year. To be sure, the attitude of the Finnish Government in the so-called Petsamo case<sup>1</sup> had been a disappointment to us. We had regarded the sudden and unexpected refusal of the

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 407, footnote 2.

Finnish firm to conclude a contract with the interested German parties as an unfriendly act on the part of the Finnish Government. M. Holsti sought to excuse himself by saying that this refusal had been given during his absence by the Minister of Commerce, who had acted for him and had permitted himself to be influenced thereto by purely economic considerations.

After that, M. Holsti expressed a desire to hear my views on the Spanish affair and the East-Asian conflict, which I gave him in a few words.

My impression of M. Holsti is that he is a mediocre, weak, therefore perhaps intriguing politician without much character and without any backbone. He obviously feels most at home in Geneva and in the atmosphere there. I left M. Holsti in no doubt as to my attitude and that of the German Government toward the Geneva institution.\*

FREIHERR VON NEURATH

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\* Typewritten marginal note: "Notation by the Foreign Minister: Last paragraph not to be circulated."

## No. 410

2499/518548

*Minister Renthe-Fink to Counselor Schwager*

COPENHAGEN, October 29, 1937.

Kult. B 67-01.

DEAR HERR SCHWAGER: Many thanks for instruction Kult. B 67-01 of October 25;<sup>1</sup> from which I am glad to see that the matter has been placed on the right track through your energetic actions. As far as the Legation is concerned, the proposed program has my full and complete approval; however, I should like to stress once more what in my opinion must constantly be kept in mind, namely, that the important thing is to train the young people specifically for the struggle for existence and the particular conditions in Denmark, and that this must under all circumstances be sufficiently taken into account in their instruction.<sup>2</sup> The memorandum fortunately shows that all concerned have now become aware of this necessity.

With cordial greetings,

Heil Hitler!

As ever,

RENTHÉ-FINK

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2499/518543, 518539-40). This document transmitted a Reichsnährstand (the organization responsible for food production and marketing) memorandum of Sept. 22, 1937, outlining a plan for training and indoctrinating farm youth of the German minority in Denmark in a residential agricultural school within Germany, where they would live and work with German youth.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "Will be kept fully in mind in further discussions. Schw[ager], Nov. 9."

## No. 411

2677/528568-69

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 330 B

COPENHAGEN, November 1, 1937.

Received November 3.

Pol. VI 2029.

With reference to telegraphic instruction No. 70 of October 28.<sup>1</sup>

I took advantage of my visit with the Foreign Minister today to ask him whether, as I had heard, it was actually true that in the proceedings against Möller-Gravenstein, Dr. Kardel, and Dr. Christensen regarding the Stollig handbill,<sup>2</sup> with which you are familiar, the prosecuting authority had demanded deprivation of civil rights. I argued that although the accused had perhaps allowed themselves to make extreme statements, it would surely be wrong to evaluate literally everything they had said and to charge them with dishonorable intentions. Deprivation of civil rights would doubtless be regarded everywhere as unjustified and incomprehensible severity. It would introduce a new, aggravating note into the conflicts in the border region—conflicts which from the nature of the case were indeed inevitable, but which I assumed the Danish Government in the interest of mutual relations likewise wished to keep within certain bounds as far as possible. It seemed that the Danish authorities in North Schleswig attached far too great an importance to the incidents; I could see in it only a new sign of the increasingly harsh Danish course in North Schleswig about which I had already had opportunity at various times to speak with M. Munch in order to call his attention to the resultant dangers.

The Minister replied that the Stollig affair had caused a great deal of bad blood. The substance of the charge as to the handbill was as yet unknown to him. But he would now inquire into the details. The Minister was careful to add that the prosecuting authority was very independent and only very little influence could be brought to bear on it by the Government. Moreover, he had recently had occasion to ask the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education whether the previous course in North Schleswig had undergone any change within the jurisdiction of their departments, and they had both definitely denied this. I then remarked that it was with great interest

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (2677/528566). The instruction suggested the *démarche* which Benthe-Fink reports in this dispatch.

<sup>2</sup>The Stollig handbill case grew out of agitation by Jens Möller and other spokesmen of the German minority in Denmark who asserted that in unjustly prosecuting the Volksdeutsche, Thomas Pörksen and Jep Schmidt, the Danish Government and courts were really striking at the whole German community (2677/528542-64). See also document No. 419, footnote 2.

that I took note of the assurances of the two Ministers. But the important thing was that administrative practice should really be brought into harmony with these declarations.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 412

1766/405655-57

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 250 C 1

COPENHAGEN, November 25, 1937.

Pol. VI 2168.

With reference to my report 250 C 1 of July 8, 1937, and to the minute of Ministerialdirektor Freiherr von Weizsäcker, Pol. VI 1303 of July 14, 1937.<sup>1</sup>

Minister of State [Prime Minister] Stauning, whom I met yesterday for the first time since the conversation of last July, immediately asked me how the ideas expressed by him had been received in Berlin. I first stressed the fact that as before I had the impression that Berlin desired permanent good-neighbor relations with Denmark and, as the latest economic negotiations had proved again, was attempting to go far to meet Danish needs and wishes. The necessary conditions for such lasting relations could not, as experience showed, be created by declarations of a more or less general nature but only by a far-sighted, purposeful, and practical policy. Our interest was therefore directed primarily toward practical policy. I then pointed out that German-Danish relations were still encumbered by a League of Nations mortgage. The Danish Government had, to be sure, opened the door to a withdrawal from participation in League of Nations sanctions, but it had not yet declared frankly and unmistakably that it would henceforth refrain from ever taking sides against Germany. In this respect Holland and Switzerland had already gone very much further. It could therefore be assumed that Germany would first put the preliminary question as to whether Denmark was prepared to liquidate the League of Nations mortgage. I further remarked that it was, of course, difficult for the German Government to make public demonstrations of friendship for Denmark as long as Germany was necessarily dissatisfied with the Danish policy in regard to the German minority.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1766/405650-51; 5953/E438033-34). Early in July 1937 Minister of State Stauning suggested to Renthe-Fink that German-Danish relations could be improved if Germany would give Denmark an explicit nonaggression guarantee in some form. In a conversation in Berlin on July 14, Weizsäcker and Renthe-Fink agreed that this overture could not be entirely rejected and outlined the reply which Renthe-Fink would make to Stauning later in the fall after his return from leave. The statement Renthe-Fink reports in the above dispatch is substantially that agreed upon with Weizsäcker.



We had no intention of raising the question of Schleswig<sup>2</sup> now, but it was clear that the relations between Germany and Denmark were strongly influenced by the situation of the German minority. This gave me the opportunity, among other things, to discuss the Stollig affair again and to explain to M. Stauning that the loss of civil rights demanded in the trial of the veterinarian Möller would of necessity inject an aggravating factor into the frontier problem.

I had the impression that M. Stauning was disappointed at the answer he received. Obviously he had expected that his speech of last year<sup>3</sup> in Lund, in which he declined to let himself be drawn into a Scandinavian bloc against Germany, would receive more recognition from us. However, he did not seem to be willing to cut the thread entirely, for he stated that if Holland and Switzerland had already gone further in the rejection of League of Nations sanctions, this should also be possible for Denmark. At any rate, he would talk to the Foreign Minister about it. As far as North Schleswig was concerned, he stated that Denmark could not grant the German minority any special position and that Denmark was only defending herself against the excessive National Socialist propaganda being carried on there. I replied to M. Stauning that the German minority, even though it was now living under Danish sovereignty, was nevertheless entitled to feel that it was part of the German people and that tolerable relations between Germans and Danes in the frontier area could be established only if the special character of each side was scrupulously respected, in the manner laid down as a principle by National Socialism.

#### RENTHE-FINK

<sup>2</sup> Section XII of part III of the Treaty of Versailles (articles 108-114) and the plebiscites held under the terms of the treaty in February and March, 1920, formed the basis for a treaty signed by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and Denmark at Paris on July 5, 1920, and of a treaty between Denmark and Germany signed at Copenhagen on Apr. 10, 1922. Denmark was awarded the territory known as North Schleswig. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), vol. XIII, pp. 262-271.

<sup>3</sup> The report is in error; the speech was actually delivered on Mar. 8, 1937.

#### No. 413

26/16427-28

#### *Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI<sup>1</sup>*

Use of the Little Belt [Lille Belt] and the Sound [Öresund] is subject at present to no restriction, either by sea or in the air.

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum is in Hohenthal's handwriting and is undated. It was probably prepared in response to a query from the Italian Ambassador to Weizsäcker on Nov. 27 (26/16429) concerning Germany's attitude toward neutrality regulations proposed by the Northern States. On Dec. 4, Weizsäcker replied in terms of the above memorandum (26/16430).

In the planned redrafting of the neutrality regulations based on the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which were promulgated in 1912 by Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the use of the Little Belt and the Sound is again to be subject to restrictions. This time, too, the neutrality regulations are to be published by all four countries.

Basic German standpoint:

In peace as well as in war not only the Great Belt [Stor Belt] but also the Little Belt and the Sound must be open to unlimited free passage for our naval forces and aircraft. Any discrimination between naval and air forces in the neutrality regulations is impossible, because as naval warfare is carried on today naval and air forces form an inseparable unit. All this is quite apart from considerations of international law. Munch's statement that in principle they would stand for unrestricted passage through the Sound and the Belts is of course subject to the general reservations provided for.

In the deliberations of the Danish Government offices there is a manifest tendency to restrict air crossing of the Little Belt and the Sound or to forbid it altogether.

#### No. 414

2677/528599-800

*Minister Renthe-Fink to Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker*

COPENHAGEN, December 11, 1937.

Pol. VI 2348.

DEAR WEIZSÄCKER: The feeling in the German-Danish frontier zone is still running quite high. Most recently the incomprehensible and imprudent sentencing of the NSDAPN leader<sup>1</sup> to a rather stiff prison term has brought new tension. And the German correction, several days ago, of certain reassuring statements which, according to Danish assertions, were said to have been issued by the Propaganda Ministry in connection with the banning of the *Schleswiger*<sup>2</sup> in August, is not exactly calculated to pour oil on the troubled waters. If the situation should become still more critical, this cannot be a matter of complete indifference to us politically, either. It therefore seems to me that the time has come, despite all the support which we must give the Ger-

<sup>1</sup> The NSDAPN was the Nazi Party of North Schleswig, whose leader was Jens Möller. See document No. 411.

<sup>2</sup> *Der Schleswiger: Grenzland als Front und Brücke*, a German-language paper of the Danish minority in South Schleswig, published at Flensburg. For the circumstances of its banning as a daily in August 1937 see document No. 418; the paper was later reinstated as a monthly.

man minority group in its hard struggle for self-assertion, to exercise sharper control and firmer influence on the frontier policy of the offices in Kiel, Schleswig, and Flensburg. As is understandable, these offices are only too readily inclined to judge the situation one-sidedly in the atmosphere of the local frontier struggle. The hotheads in the German minority of North Schleswig ought to know that they cannot count on any backing if they go beyond certain limits. Otherwise we might easily lose control.

I should also consider it desirable for the Propaganda Ministry to keep closer contact with the officials of the Foreign Ministry in the German-Danish frontier questions. Even if one takes the position that the above-mentioned correction concerned a matter of the press, it should nevertheless not be overlooked that in view of the great importance which frontier questions have for Denmark and Danish policy, the matter was of general political significance.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

RENTHE-FINK

No. 415

2677/528601-02

*Ministerialdirektor Weizsäcker to Minister Renthe-Fink*

BERLIN, December 15, 1937.

Sent December 16.

zu Pol. VI 2348.

DEAR RENTHE-FINK: Many thanks for your kind letter of December 11. I am in entire agreement with you that we must see to it that the minority struggle in Schleswig does not overstep certain limits. But if the sea has been more stormy recently, not only in the Schleswig local papers but also in the press here, that is understandable in the light of Möller's quite severe sentence of 60 days in jail, concerning which you agree that what the Danes have given with one hand, by waiving the deprivation of civil rights, they have taken away with the other. For this reason too I assume that you approve of the article to this effect in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of December 12, No. 346, the appearance of which Herr von Grundherr saw to at your request. It corresponds to the statements which you intended, as arranged, to make to M. Munch and with which we were quite in agreement.<sup>1</sup>

We (like you) are somewhat more skeptical as to whether it was opportune at this time for the Propaganda Ministry to issue a state-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note on the file copy: "that the sentencing of Möller was sure to produce marked excitement."

ment in correction of its previous Irredenta declaration.<sup>2</sup> At any rate, it is now time to pour some oil on the troubled waters, and we have now done so. A few days ago we requested Herr Aschmann to instruct the press here to that effect, and Herr von Grundherr has personally emphasized this to Herr Schröder<sup>3</sup> in Flensburg; he has given a similar statement to the Schleswig Regierungsdirektor, Klaus Petersen, who happened to call on Grundherr yesterday, with the request that he transmit it to Gauleiter Lohse as well. Herr Klaus Petersen, by the way, was entirely of our opinion. We can therefore hope that things will be somewhat calmer.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>2</sup> In connection with the ban on the *Schleswiger* (see document No. 418), a delegation of the Danish minority in Germany visited the Propaganda Ministry, where the following statement was made to them concerning German policy on Schleswig: "For Germany there exists not a single Irredenta question in the whole Schleswig area, either on the one side or on the other." Gauleiter Lohse of Kiel protested to Goebbels that this statement, widely trumpeted in the Danish press, compromised the aspirations of the German minority in North Schleswig (2643/527076-77). A correction was then issued by the Propaganda Ministry stating that no reference to North Schleswig had been intended. What had been meant was that "there was no Irredenta in German-held Schleswig." (2643/527081).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 417.

## No. 416

2677/528593-94

### *The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 330 B

COPENHAGEN, December 16, 1937.

Received December 18.

Pol. VI 2317.

Subject: Sentencing of the NSDAPN leader in the Handbill Trial.

The prompt reaction of the German press to the sentencing of the NSDAPN leader by the court in Aabenraa has undoubtedly made an impression here. Although the view is frequently expressed among the Danish public that the German minority has already been granted far too many concessions and that it would now more than ever be a political mistake to yield to German pressure, the wish to avoid as far as possible an aggravation of the situation and to bring about a relaxing of tension nevertheless prevails in authoritative circles. Hence the officially inspired editorial, "Denmark and Germany", in the December 8 issue of *Politiken*, which is supposed to show that the sentencing of the NSDAPN leader in no wise signifies an attack on the German minority or a break with the previous Danish policy. When I saw M. Munch at the beginning of this week, he regretted from a political point of view that Dr. Möller had been sentenced

to imprisonment, but emphasized that Dr. Möller had himself to blame for this, since in his attacks on Danish justice he had gone far beyond the very liberal limits on freedom of expression which applied in Denmark. Denmark had at least granted the German wish that the demand for deprivation of civil rights be dropped. In answer to this, I told the Foreign Minister that it seemed to me as if what has been given with one hand had been taken back with the other through the sentencing of Dr. Möller to imprisonment. If leading men of the German minority were sentenced to imprisonment for nothing worse than working for their national group, a very dangerous course was being taken. That might very easily create martyrs, and the conflicts in the border region might be sharpened almost irreparably.

Since I assume that Dr. Möller will appeal against the judgment of the Aabenraa court, it goes without saying that the German press must continue, within the prescribed limits, to show interest. In the conflicts in the frontier area, the word *Irredenta* has of late been used repeatedly. It will be difficult for us to do anything for the German minority if in the eyes of the Danes their activity acquires an Irredentist aspect. That we do not recognize the boundary of 1920 is well enough known here.

RENTHE-FINK

### No. 417

2677/528634

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, January 12, 1938.

zu Pol. VI 50.<sup>1</sup>

For many years the editor Ernst Schröder<sup>2</sup> of Flensburg has been our agent [*Vertrauensmann*] on minority questions. During these years he has rendered great service to the Foreign Ministry with equal loyalty and skill. In so doing, he has doubtless unselfishly assumed financial burdens also. Because of the illness of his wife, which has extended over many years, he has got into especially serious financial troubles. This straitened situation has led him to seek a better position, and he has fairly good assurance of such a position in the editorial office of a large Hamburg newspaper. From the standpoint of the Foreign Ministry, it would be regrettable if he should give up his position, in view of the rather difficult present status of the Schleswig border struggle, while on the other hand it is comprehensible that for financial reasons he is looking around for another position

<sup>1</sup> Pol. VI 50: Not printed (2677/528630-33). This is the attached letter referred to in the final sentence of the first paragraph.

<sup>2</sup> Schröder edited a daily information service from Flensburg devoted to agitation of the North Schleswig question (in which he had been active since the early 1920's) and also headed the *Wohlfahrts- und Schulverein* which dispensed funds in North Schleswig provided by the Foreign Ministry.

offering greater income. It has been learned from conversations with him, however, that he would willingly remain indefinitely in his present position if given adequate support by us. The amount of 4,800 RM suggested by him in the attached letter to Herr von Grundherr would suffice.

I take the liberty of requesting that on grounds of serving a political interest this amount be made available to me, to be given to Herr Schröder of Flensburg.

Herewith transmitted to Counselor Dienstmann, Personnel Department.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>3</sup> Memoranda of the Personnel Department recorded that the grant was approved on Jan. 14 and paid on Jan. 25 in the amount requested (2677/528635-36).

### No. 418

2677/528641-43

#### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, January 21, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 126.

On January 17 I called on the Provincial Governor [*Oberpräsident*], Gauleiter Lohse, in Kiel and then on Herr Schow, the Lieutenant Governor [*Vizepräsident*] to discuss, at Gauleiter Lohse's request, the present status of German-Danish relations and the importance to be attached to minorities questions within the framework of these relations.

Both men showed much understanding for the fact that, despite the great importance of the minorities problem and the border struggle, these should not, if it could possibly be avoided, lead to such a burdening of German-Danish relations that serious repercussions were to be feared for our foreign and economic policy. It was also clear to both men that we are at a disadvantage since the Danish minority in Germany is very much smaller and since we are unfavorably situated at present (from lack of foreign exchange) to carry through the struggle, which requires financial resources.<sup>1</sup> They agreed with me also that it was only to our advantage to treat the Danish minority in Germany with the greatest possible consideration.

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<sup>1</sup> On Jan. 26 the Deutsche Stiftung, an agency which received funds through the Foreign Ministry for the support of German schools in North Schleswig, addressed a letter to the Foreign Ministry (2642/526914-16) complaining that it together with four other agencies doing cultural and welfare work in North Schleswig was not receiving the funds required. In the last nine months of 1937 only 539,000 of a scheduled 622,000 kroner had been received, and they had been informed that their monthly allotment of 70,000 kroner for 1938 was to be cut in half.

In the conversation it was revealed that the ban on the *Schleswiger* had come from the Governor's office.<sup>2</sup> The reason for it had been that the *Schleswiger*, often by quoting Danish newspapers, had carried numerous reports which were prohibited in the rest of the German press. Herr Lohse and Herr Schow now seemed to realize, however, that the ban, as it was carried out, and especially everything that occurred later in connection with it,<sup>3</sup> was detrimental to our interests. I expressed the wish that in future cases, before such politically far-reaching measures were initiated, the Foreign Ministry (Cultural Policy and Political Departments) should be consulted, and both men promised me this.

Gauleiter Lohse was very indignant at Herr Jep Nissen.<sup>4</sup> I question whether in the future he will refrain from attacking Jep Nissen further, even publicly, or at least from letting him be attacked. Nor was Herr Lohse in complete agreement with Herr Möller-Gravenstein, although fully recognizing him as leader of the NSDAPN, for in Herr Lohse's opinion he almost certainly lacks the qualities of a really great leader capable of winning a following. Gauleiter Lohse seemed to think that Assessor Stehr<sup>5</sup> of the Finanzinstitut Vogelgesang<sup>6</sup> might perhaps gradually develop so that after one or two years he could become leader of the NSDAPN.

Concerning the Vogelgesang Institute I called the attention of both men to the fact that the foreign press (French, Swiss, Dutch, and Polish newspapers) had given it much attention recently; this was naturally very undesirable since under certain circumstances it might sometime lead the Danish Government to intervene. One must assume that the partly accurate and very detailed accounts in these newspapers were probably based, unfortunately, on indiscreet statements made by the minority groups in quarreling among themselves.

Herr Lohse and Herr Schow promised that they would on occasion, when they were in Berlin, consult with the Foreign Ministry (Cultural Policy and Political Departments) and, especially in more

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 414.

<sup>3</sup> On Aug. 25, 1937, Renthe-Fink reported that the ban was having a most adverse effect upon German-Danish relations (2643/527050-52). On Oct. 26 Lohse, Schröder, and Oberbürgermeister Kracht of Flensburg had a meeting with Goebels in Berlin at which a milder policy toward the Danish minority was decided upon (2643/527068-73).

<sup>4</sup> Leader of a rival volksdeutsch party, the NSAN, (*Nationalsozialistische Arbeitergemeinschaft Nordschleswig*) which was very hostile to the NSDAPN and which was not recognized by the Germans (2642/526946).

<sup>5</sup> In a letter of Apr. 4, 1938, to Grundherr, Schow described Stehr as a North Schleswiger and Danish national "whom we sent to Hadersleben from here" (2768/536083-87). See also document No. 421.

<sup>6</sup> For the operations of this agency, see document No. 462. Its head was the lawyer Vogelgesang, a member of the German minority resident in Hadersleben, who according to a memorandum by Schwager on Dec. 1, 1937 (2499/518437) was also a political agent who made regular reports to the Foreign Ministry and to the German Minister in Copenhagen.

important questions, would get in touch with the Foreign Ministry before making decisions.

My stay in Kiel also gave me an opportunity to confer with Herr Ernst Schröder, Flensburg.

GRUNDHERR

## No. 419

2677/528647

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 8 of February 10 COPENHAGEN, February 10, 1938—4:35 p. m.  
Received February 10—6:20 p. m.  
Pol. VI 277.

For Press Department.

With reference to my report No. 330 B of December 16, 1937.

Although the Möller sentence yesterday<sup>1</sup> shows a Danish tendency to ease the tension in North Schleswig, I recommend that a reserved attitude be maintained in the press, in view of the approaching Pörksen case<sup>2</sup> before the Supreme Court.

RENTHE-FINK

<sup>1</sup> On Feb. 9, 1938, a district appeals court reduced Möller's sentence from 60 days in prison to a fine of 2000 kroner or 40 days' imprisonment. (2677/528648).

<sup>2</sup> On Feb. 18 Thomas Pörksen and Jep Schmidt, a Kreisleiter of the NSDAPN, were acquitted of charges of well pollution and destruction of property on a farm held by Germans "since the Thirty Years' War" but recently lost to a Dane through foreclosure (2677/528482-84, 528655). See also document No. 411, footnote 2.

## No. 420

1910/430051-52

*The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Department of the OKW*

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, March 28, 1938.  
Pol. VI 641 II.

At a dinner which Finnish Minister Wuorimaa gave on the evening of the 24th for the Finnish Commander in Chief, General Österman, and prominent German guests, I discussed various political questions with General Österman. In the course of the conversation, the problem of the fortification of the Åland Islands came up for discussion. I explained to General Österman that this was, in the first place, predominantly a Finnish question. But he would, of course, understand that as a Baltic Power we also were interested in it. Leaving the Ålands unfortified was dangerous in that some other Power could,



in certain circumstances, easily establish itself there. This would not be at all in the interest of Germany. Thus, if Finland should decide to fortify the Åland Islands, which could probably be done only by agreement with Sweden, we would at any rate not make any difficulties for Finland, although we were a signatory to the Åland Convention.<sup>1</sup> I would tell him in confidence that we should even welcome such fortification. On the other hand, we should, in my opinion, be doing Finland a disservice and be making the situation worse for her if we for our part carried on any kind of propaganda in favor of the fortification of the Åland Islands. For this reason the German press had shown the greatest possible reserve in regard to this question. General Österman plainly showed great satisfaction at my statements and said that this attitude was completely in accord with Finnish wishes. He also had reason to hope that real progress would soon be made in the matter. In Sweden many influential circles today shared the view that refortification of the Islands was necessary.

Of interest in this connection is another remark by General Österman to the effect that President Kallio, although a member of the Peasants' Party and outwardly reserved, nevertheless has a very good understanding of the realities of Finland's external political situation and of the necessity for strong Finnish preparedness and also enjoys the confidence and respect of the people despite his relatively short time as President; his relations with Field Marshal Mannerheim are also good.

By order:  
VON GRUNDHERR

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<sup>1</sup> A convention under League of Nations auspices providing for demilitarization and neutralization of the Åland Islands was concluded October 20, 1921, by Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Great Britain and Germany. The text of the Convention appears in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, pp. 211-221.

No. 421

2642/526937-88

*Minister Renthe-Fink to Senior Counselor Grundherr*

COPENHAGEN, March 31, 1938.

Received April 2.

Pol. VI 706.

DEAR GRUNDHERR: I am sending you herewith a copy of my letter of this date to Herr Schwager.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

RENTHÉ-FINK

[Enclosure]

No. 47 B

COPENHAGEN, March 31, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEAR SCHWAGER: In the instructions of December 31, 1937, and January 18, 1938—Kult B 65-01<sup>1</sup>—the Foreign Ministry expressed concern over the newspaper attacks on the Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang<sup>2</sup> and indicated a desire to keep the bank so far as possible out of the unavoidable arguments with the Danes in the daily frontier struggles. You know that I fully share this view and that I consider great caution advisable, in order not, some day, to jeopardize the work and the existence of the bank. If I return to this subject now, I do so because once again I see danger threatening from another side. In Stehr, the bank has taken on an excellent employee of great energy and ability. However, in view of the prominent and active part that Stehr is playing at the same time in the battle line, particularly as he has now become Propaganda Chief (see the *Nordschleswigsche Zeitung* of March 25, No. 71), his militant political activity cannot fail in the long run to have certain reactions on the attitude of the Danes toward the bank in which Stehr occupies a leading position. To be sure, the Danes are outwardly tolerant and, from fear of us, they will take care not to act openly against an institution of the German minority, but many means for secretly harassing the bank are available to the Danes if they do not like matters, and who can predict with certainty how far their tolerance will extend? So here then is a problem to which I would like to call your attention.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Herr von Grundherr.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

RENTHE-FINK

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 418, footnote 6, and document No. 462.

No. 422

2642/526940

*The Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

VIC 51/38

7862

BERLIN, April 6, 1938.

Received April 8.

Pol. VI 764.

I have granted the Northern Frontier Office [*Grenzmittelstelle Nord*] in Flensburg a Reich advance of 14,200 RM for the fiscal year

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the communication were also sent to the Propaganda Minister and the Governor of the province of Schleswig-Holstein.

1938 for the fulfillment of its mission in cultivating Germanism in the Nordmark. In addition, the same amount will be granted for the year from the Prussian budget.

By order:  
DR. VOLLERT<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ministerial Director and Head of Department VI (Germanism, Physical Training, and Surveying) in the Ministry of the Interior; this department's extensive jurisdiction included minority questions within Germany as well as frontier welfare [*Grenzlandfürsorge*].

## No. 423

2768/536088

### *The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 20 of April 13

COPENHAGEN, April 13, 1938—2:23 p. m.

Received April 13—4:15 p. m.

Pol. VI 796.

In the debate in the Folketing yesterday the German deputy<sup>1</sup> pointed out that there were a number of unsolved problems between Germany and Denmark in North Schleswig, which went back to the Versailles settlement and en bloc voting.<sup>2</sup> These had to be settled not by force but by the method of peaceful agreement. Foreign Minister Munch thereupon defended the frontier settlement and declared that it was thus quite natural that the frontier question had not so far been brought up, and that there was no basis for any frontier dispute between Denmark and Germany.

Although it might not be in line with our policy to bring up the frontier question at present, it still seems to me advisable, in the face of specific declarations by the Foreign Minister, to state, perhaps in the *Völkischer Beobachter* or the *Börsenzeitung*, that according to German opinion 1920 was not "fair play."<sup>3</sup>

RENTHE-FINK

<sup>1</sup> Pastor J. Schmidt-Wodder was the only German member of the Folketing.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to the manner in which the plebiscite of 1920 was carried out in two zones. The northern zone was assigned to Denmark as the result of a Danish majority of 75,431 to 25,328 in the zone as a whole. In the southern zone the territory was assigned on the basis of majorities in the separate communes. The whole of the southern zone fell to Germany because the 12,800 votes for Denmark, as against 51,724 for Germany, were so scattered as not to constitute a majority in any single commune. See *Foreign Relations of the United States*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 262-267.

<sup>3</sup> The quoted phrase is in English in the original.

Marginal note: "Minister Prince Bismarck decided with Minister Aschmann that nothing was to be done by the German press, as the matter is not important enough to take up in German newspapers. H[ohen]t[hal], Apr. 14."

## No. 424

26/16505-06

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 169 D

COPENHAGEN, April 13, 1938.

Received April 14.

Pol. VI 798.

Subject: Meeting of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers.

With reference to my report 169 D of March 30,<sup>1</sup> Minister Mohr,<sup>2</sup> whom I asked today about the results of the meeting of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers in Oslo, told me that no decisions of major importance had been made. In regard to the Abyssinian and Spanish questions the decision had been to keep in the background as heretofore and to await developments. As far as the League of Nations was concerned, they had not gone beyond acknowledging the well-known declaration of 1936,<sup>3</sup> which, however, was not interpreted alike by all the Scandinavian countries. Sweden undoubtedly had attached the most importance to clarity, but for the time being there was no reason for Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries to agree on one and the same interpretation and to reduce their views to a completely common denominator. The Hull refugee proposal<sup>4</sup> had been discussed, but various points still seemed to be so vague that it was necessary to make inquiries first. Strange to say, the Finnish Government had not been consulted at all. The draft for the revised neutrality regulations had been agreed on by all the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers and would now have to be submitted for final approval to the individual Governments, including the Icelandic Government, which up to now had not been consulted. Unless the various Governments came up with desires for changes at the last minute, he could assure me that the stipulations regarding the Baltic Sea approaches would be satisfactory to us. Another question which had been discussed in Oslo was military coordination between the individual Scandinavian countries. In this matter they had limited themselves to expressing willingness to examine the possibilities at hand. No practical decisions had been made as yet. They were exploring completely new territory. In this connection

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (26/16471-72). This report summarized Renthe-Finke's conversation of Mar. 30 with Munch regarding the topics to be discussed at a forthcoming meeting of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers at Oslo.

<sup>2</sup> Otto Carl Mohr, Director in the Danish Foreign Ministry.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 435, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> The United States Secretary of State had proposed an international conference on the refugee problem. The conference finally met at Evian, France, in July 1938. See ch. x.

M. Stauning had already denied that Denmark was considering fortifying the Sound. It naturally could not be foreseen what proposals the other Scandinavian countries might bring up for discussion.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 425

1766/405662-64

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 184 B

COPENHAGEN, April 19, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL

Received April 20.

Pol. VI 831.

Subject: North Schleswig Question.

With reference to my telegraphic report No. 20 of April 13.

Although real anxiety over North Schleswig first arose here after the seizure of power in Germany by the National Socialists, it decreased noticeably in the succeeding period, thanks to the calm atmosphere prevailing in the border region. Being reassured by our general attitude of friendliness toward Scandinavia and by our obvious efforts to pave the way for better neighborly relations with Denmark, many persons even yielded to the illusion that in practice Germany would make the best of the Versailles boundary line, and perhaps could even be brought to an explicit recognition of the existing state of affairs. But some time ago there was a change which is to be attributed primarily to the perceptible activation of the policy of the German minority. The orientation of our policy toward a Greater Germany, which was expressed in the reunion of Austria with Germany, undoubtedly strengthened the apprehension that after the solution of more vital problems Germany would also take up North Schleswig.

In these circumstances, special attention has been paid in local political circles to the fact that the German deputy, Pastor Schmidt-Wodder, in his recent speech in the Folketing not only discussed the demands of the German minority in the cultural and economic fields and with regard to the policy of land ownership but also alluded in an unmistakable way to the frontier question. In many circles this has been taken as the first notice of a German demand for revision. Nevertheless, the speech has generally been received quietly and without spiteful comments.

It must be acknowledged that Pastor Schmidt-Wodder's remarks on the border question were cleverly conceived. On the one hand, it was expressly emphasized that the present uneasiness over North Schleswig was unfounded, since Germany did not intend to use her newly gained power against Denmark, but that the border question

must be settled in friendly agreement. On the other hand, the sore spots of the settlement of 1920 were pointed out just as strongly, and the necessity was emphasized that Denmark reach a direct understanding with Germany on the frontier question and that a better state of affairs with good will on both sides be initiated.

In his reply, Foreign Minister Munch took the stand that there was no basis for a boundary dispute between Denmark and Germany, since the existing boundary was the fairest settlement that could have been found under the local conditions prevailing within the boundary area. At the same time, from the fact that the frontier question has not heretofore been raised, he attempted to draw the conclusion that the present boundary is considered the best solution by Germany also, a conclusion which, in my opinion, cannot be accepted without contradiction.

Discerning circles know perfectly well that Denmark can hardly evade a direct understanding on the North Schleswig question, in case such a demand should be made. However, the feeling of the necessity for a direct understanding has not yet sufficiently permeated the local public. There is, of course, also some hesitation about engaging in conversations as long as there is no certainty that agreement with us can be obtained on a basis tolerable for Denmark. It is evident that at present a basis tolerable for Denmark is hardly conceivable, even with ever so slight sacrifices of territory, if we consider what great significance North Schleswig possesses in Danish eyes, and that it is *the* great national question of the country.

Within the German minority in North Schleswig impatience is growing, as can easily be understood. On the one hand they see that the ratio between the German and the Danish element is changing, with the passage of time, to the disadvantage of the German element; on the other hand, through the strengthening of Germany, particularly in connection with the reunion of Austria with the Reich, German national feeling has received a powerful impulse in the direction of a like solution for North Schleswig.

As long as the moment has not yet come, in terms of Germany's political situation, to move for a solution of the North Schleswig problem, it will be especially important to control German activities in the frontier region in such a way that the question will not, because of some local development, become critical before this appears politically desirable. I was therefore very glad that the Party meeting of the NSDAPN at Hadersleben treated the question of revision with restraint.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "I had a talk with Lohse on April 13, 1938, in the sense [of this paragraph.] Also, in my opinion, before his speech, Schmidt-Wodder should have discussed the matter with Renthe-Fink. Grundherr, Apr. 21."

The speeches of the German deputy, Pastor Schmidt-Wodder, and of Danish Foreign Minister Munch are enclosed in German translation.<sup>2</sup>

RENTHE-FINK

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (1766/405665-74).

No. 426

1910/430060-61

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 941

HELSINKI, May 5, 1938.

Received May 10.

Pol. VI 937.

Subject: The Oslo Conference.

With reference to instruction Pol. VI 822 II of April 27.<sup>1</sup>

The Russian Minister called on the Finnish Foreign Minister recently and asked whether the problem of the Åland Islands had come up for discussion at the Oslo Conference. M. Holsti answered in the negative. The Russian Minister was satisfied with this brief reply and did not insist any further.

I for my part had the opportunity yesterday to ask the Finnish Foreign Minister the same question. M. Holsti gave the same negative reply and offered as a reason the fact that one of the participants at Oslo, i. e. Norway, was not a signatory to the Oslo Conference.<sup>2</sup>

M. Holsti tried to evade my further queries but then remarked that the main opposition to bringing up the Åland problem came at present from Sweden. When I replied that I thought a certain change was to be noted in public opinion there, M. Holsti launched into general statements, from which it was apparent that he did not wish to say anything further about the source of the opposition. But I had the impression that I had here struck a weak point in Finnish-Swedish relations.

Later in the conversation M. Holsti emphasized that there had been no discussion of a defensive alliance at Oslo; rather, they had only conferred on how they might aid each other with materials, especially raw materials, in times of crisis. They had not gone beyond generalities, however; the more detailed discussions would have to be held in a body of experts meeting from time to time.

BLÜCHER

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1910/430059). An instruction of Apr. 27 from Grundherr asking Blücher to verify whether the impression, recorded by the Minister in Tallinn in a report of Apr. 14 (1910/430056-58) was correct, that the question of fortifying the Åland Islands had been discussed at Oslo.

<sup>2</sup>A question mark appears in the margin opposite "Oslo Conference". Presumably the Åland Convention is meant.

2679/528676-80

*Senior Counselor Grundherr to Minister Renthe-Fink*

BERLIN, May 5, 1938.

MY DEAR HERR VON RENTHE-FINK:<sup>1</sup> Thank you most heartily for your letters of April 11,<sup>2</sup> concerning Timm's<sup>3</sup> activity in Copenhagen, and April 22,<sup>4</sup> concerning the foreign exchange estimates for the Legation, and in particular for your interesting report<sup>5</sup> including texts of the speeches by Schmidt-Wodder and Munch.

With regard to the latter report I should like to tell you explicitly that we completely agree in our evaluations. Accordingly, I had a detailed conference with Herr Lohse at Kiel on April 13 on the occasion of the naval war games and also did what was necessary here in the Ministry and particularly with the Cultural Affairs Department. I hope this will have the desired effect. It would interest me, by the way, to find out whether Herr Schmidt-Wodder communicated with you before his speech. In my opinion, it was his duty to do so if he raised such fundamental questions of foreign policy as the boundary issue, which go beyond minority problems. After conferring with Herr von Weizsäcker, we refrained entirely, as you will have noticed, from discussing the question further in the German press.

As far as the foreign exchange estimate for the Legation is concerned, I can assure you that we have put the matter in order here, so that we need not pursue it any further.

Now for the third and most difficult question: the activities of the Nordic Society [*Nordische Gesellschaft*].<sup>6</sup> Recently the Foreign Ministry has received so many complaints about the activities of the Nordic Society, and the personality of Herr Timm in particular, from all sides—from industry, from foreigners, from Germans, and from other German agencies—that Reichsleiter Rosenberg asked me to come to see him. I talked to him very frankly and spoke about as follows:

Naturally we approved of the aims of the Nordic Society, but we believed that the type of work carried on in the last few years had by

<sup>1</sup> In German "Sehr verehrter, lieber Herr von Renthe-Fink".

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2679/528681).

<sup>3</sup> Executive director in actual charge of the operations of the Nordic Society; Gauleiter Lohse was its titular head.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (2679/528682).

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 425.

<sup>6</sup> For further details on the Nordic Society see *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. xxv, document No. 003-PS (exhibit USA-603), pp. 15-25.



no means always been fortunate and in line with Herr Rosenberg's wishes. The many complaints from abroad were proof of that. Herr Timm was undoubtedly a good organizer and fund raiser, but he had on numerous occasions made most unfortunate choices of persons to receive invitations and also had not always exhibited the required tact in foreign countries, so that as a result he had seriously offended many foreigners. This was particularly true in Sweden and Finland. The Nordic Society must also bear in mind the numerous other German agencies which still actively disseminated propaganda in Scandinavia. In the years since 1933 this had led to such a flood of German propaganda-tourists and of German invitations addressed to foreign countries that frequently the impression had arisen—and not without justice, as I might state from my own experience in Helsinki<sup>7</sup>—of our courting the small States in a manner rather unseemly for a Great Power. Often the invitations were not reciprocated as they should be. Had arrangements ever been made in the North for any such event as the Lübeck Congress, even if only by private persons or semi-officially? Toward other Great Powers—I should like to mention England in particular—people in the North acted quite differently. For this reason I had advised Herr Timm not to hold the Lübeck Congress this year. Herr Timm had agreed to this, but later, without informing me, had revived plans for holding it after all. Herr Timm, I regret to say, has almost always agreed with my suggestions and then a little later done just the opposite. Consequently, he has made it difficult for me to cooperate with him with confidence. In my opinion, and this was the opinion of many experts, there should first be a temporary let-up in the systematic propagandizing of the North by the Nordic Society, and then the goals should be set up anew in agreement with the Foreign Ministry and our Legations.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg listened to all my remarks very attentively, occasionally interrupted with questions, and finally thanked me in a very friendly manner for my statements, which had interested him very much. He had also discussed these questions with the Reich Foreign Minister, who was a member of the grand council of the Nordic Society.<sup>8</sup> At that time it was agreed (for particular personal

<sup>7</sup> Grundherr was Counselor of Legation at Helsinki until June 1934.

<sup>8</sup> On Apr. 13 Rosenberg visited Ribbentrop, who promised his support for the coming conference of the Nordic Society on the grounds that opposition to it by certain Socialist elements in the Scandinavian governments was no reason for discontinuing propaganda activity among non-Socialist groups (F14/048). Erich Kordt informed Grundherr of Ribbentrop's wishes on the same date (2679/528670).

reasons on his part) that a smaller congress will nevertheless be held this year, but rather more behind closed doors. Otherwise he took the viewpoint that the Nordic Society should carry on its work principally in Germany, and not in foreign countries.

I have the definite impression that because of the wealth of material presented him recently Reichsleiter Rosenberg was very sympathetic to my statements. Following up this conversation he recently asked me to have the Legations submit reports, if possible within three weeks, which should contain: an evaluation of the activity of the Nordic Society during recent years, the mistakes made in connection therewith, good results achieved, and, in the second part, positive proposals for a reorganization. I shall immediately transmit the reports to Herr Rosenberg. At the same time he asked me also to call for similar reports on the Nordic Liaison Office [*Nordische Verbindungsstelle*] in which connection I may state that in the light of our experiences with Dr. Dräger<sup>9</sup> I could give Herr Rosenberg a much more favorable report.

I should therefore be very grateful to you, my dear Herr von Renthe-Fink, if you could send me as soon as possible a comprehensive report on the activities of the Nordic Society and the Nordic Liaison Office in Denmark, if possible without reference to any other report. I have the distinct impression that the psychological moment has now come when we can finally eradicate the trouble spots by reorganizing the Society through close cooperation between the Aussenpolitisches Amt and the Foreign Ministry. This will naturally take a little time.

However, I am quite convinced that the Legations should not take over the invitation functions, etc., of the Nordic Society, but that in the future such matters should actually be undertaken really only after detailed and confidential consultation with the Legations, so that we will not always be confronted with *faits accomplis*.

Finally, I am sending you a copy of a letter<sup>10</sup> from Timm to me and Reichsleiter Rosenberg. Would you please let me know your opinion on point 1 of this letter—the book exposition in Copenhagen?

Please excuse the length of my letter, but I wanted to give you a complete picture of the situation.

With best regards and

Heil Hitler!

As ever,

VON GRUNDHERR

<sup>9</sup> Dräger was President of the *Nordische Verbindungsstelle*, which was an organization similar to the *Nordische Gesellschaft* but run by the Propaganda Ministry.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed (2679/528672-75).

## No. 428

2679/528683-85

*The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A II e

OSLO, May 19, 1938.

Pol. VI 1031.

Subject: Nordic Society, Lübeck.

There should be no doubt as to the need for the Nordic Society, for it can render important and valuable services in the field of cultural relations between Germany and Scandinavia, and has already done so in a way which should not be underestimated.

Even though the necessity for the Nordic Society is definitely recognized, the objections which can be raised against its previous method of procedure should not be ignored. All too often the impression arises that the Nordic Society with its many activities is running after the small Scandinavian countries, which are outwardly pleased, to be sure, by these friendly German advances, but which in reality have their own ideas about this constantly one-sided courtship by a Great Power.

The Society's congresses in Lübeck do not leave any very deep impression on Norway. Two years ago the Norwegian press paid no attention whatsoever to the convention; last year a little more interest was shown.

An evening party which the Nordic Society arranged on a Hapag steamer at Bergen in July 1936 was, because of terrible organization, a great disappointment, and obviously did us a great deal of harm at that time.

The Nordic Society has not always been fortunate in the choice of guests to be invited to Lübeck. Fortunately, however, it has been cooperating lately with the Legation and the local Ortsgruppe, in the choice of guests, too, so that there has been a decided improvement in this regard. The proposed list of Norwegian journalists to be invited to the next congress was disastrous. Almost 90 percent of those proposed had to be stricken from the list because they were either politically quite impossible or altogether insignificant.

In summary it may be said that the love shown by the Nordic Society for Norway and apparently for the other Scandinavian countries as well has thus far been unrequited. Norway is still on the whole very skeptical toward the Third Reich, a condition which will, to be sure, change in the long run, but which at the present time we ought not to overlook. I do not believe that this favorable development is

being furthered by our running after Norway and pressing our friendship on her; it is at present not desired, at least not to the degree in which it is being offered.

Furthermore, in view of the present tactics of the Nordic Society, there is danger that the effect of the firm stand which the Reich's representative is obliged to take in connection with various transgressions and attacks on the Reich by the Norwegian press (theater, etc.) will be weakened when, on the other hand, an institution which is well known here to enjoy the support of high Reich and Party officials makes too ardent advances to the Norwegians, which they neither desire nor expect. The impression could easily arise that we are following a policy of duplicity, something we must particularly avoid in dealing with a people with the character traits of the Norwegians.

At the present moment, as far as Norway is concerned, the Nordic Society has the support only of persons of little or no importance in the country, a fact which will some day certainly injure the reputation and future effectiveness of the Society. If the Nordic Society could decide to work in very close contact with the officials responsible to the Führer and Reich Chancellor for the foreign policy of the Reich, and if it could do without open recognition and instead carry on its work quietly, for the most part, then, with proper leadership it could be a very useful organization.

There are no particular objections to be raised against the Nordic Liaison Office.

In the relationship of the two organizations to one another, their respective fields of activity should be explicitly defined.

I welcome very much the book exposition which is planned for the fall of 1938 in Oslo; the details will, I presume, be arranged in very close cooperation with the Legation.

DR. SAHM

No. 429

2679/528686-92

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 1152

HELSINKI, May 28, 1938.

Received May 31.

Pol. VI 1118.

Subject: The Nordic Society and Finland.

After initial jurisdictional conflicts, the work of the Nordic Society in the field of German-Finnish relations has, so far as the Legation

can judge from this side, been concentrated on the following principal tasks:

1. Arrangement of large functions in Germany and Finland.
2. Invitation of Finnish speakers and authors to Germany.
3. Dissemination of Finnish literature in Germany.
4. Publication of a magazine and establishment of a press service.

Foremost among the functions are the annual congresses in Lübeck. A great number of Finns, from the poetess Maila Talvio to a woman rune singer from the country, have been regularly invited, and last year on that occasion a Finnish peasant meal was even served to several hundred persons.

The Finns who took part in these festivities did not fail to express their appreciation of the friendly reception, generous hospitality, and good management; some of these statements also appeared in the press.

But there the matter ended. There have been no indications that the Finnish visitors, except for a small group, have been influenced politically or ideologically by the large Lübeck congresses.

Among the special events arranged, mention may be made of the exposition of German paintings at Helsinki in the spring of 1936, under the management of the Nordic Society. The paintings were skillfully selected, the exposition was well attended, and it left an altogether favorable lasting impression.

The same cannot be said regarding an exposition of the graphic arts which the Nordic Society, without prior knowledge of the Legation, organized in Helsinki in January 1937. In spite of the valuable material that had been brought together, attendance left much to be desired because of faulty management.

On the occasion of the 75th birthday of President Svinhufvud the Nordic Society arranged a big celebration in the White Room of the Palace in Berlin. This function found no response whatsoever with the public here, and even Mme. Svinhufvud only heard about it through me.

The invitations issued by the Nordic Society to Finnish scholars and authors to give lectures in Germany have in general been well arranged. Thus Mme. Maila Talvio and Professor Linkomies told me that they were very well received everywhere on their tours and had always had large audiences.

On the other hand, a serious blunder occurred at one time in connection with invitations to the Nordic writers' center.<sup>1</sup> Without previous inquiry having been made at the Legation, an invitation was

<sup>1</sup>This is apparently a reference to the establishment mentioned in document No. 431 as located at Travemünde.

issued to the Finnish author, Pavolainen. He returned the favor afterwards by publishing a book which, because of its clever mixture of approbation and malicious criticism, is the most dangerous work that has been written in Finland about the Third Reich, and owing to its extraordinary sale it has been very detrimental to us among broad sectors of the people.

The effects of the dissemination and translation of Finnish literature in Germany cannot be evaluated from Helsinki. Therefore I cannot permit myself to pass judgment on this branch of the activity of the Nordic Society. Still, I will not refrain from mentioning the fact that one sometimes hears the remark here that the Nordic Society is too one-sided in the choice of these works, and that it pushes the authoress Maila Talvio and the translator Rita Öhquist too much into the foreground.

*Norden*, the magazine published by the Nordic Society, appears in a rich format and frequently contains articles on Finland. It is the impression here, however, that they are seldom taken up by the Finnish press. There is also practically no evidence here of any activity by the Nordic Society's press service.

To the question, what influence the Nordic Society as such exerts in Finland, one could hardly be wrong in answering that this is limited to those who were its guests or who benefited by it in some other way. Other than those it has hardly acquired any supporters.

It is naturally very difficult for a German society to gain a foothold in a country which is more than 40 percent socialist and over 90 percent democratic. But aside from that, the Nordic Society itself has made mistakes. It has not carefully acquired a circle of friends among the generally reserved Finns and increased it systematically, but has for the most part operated by means of mass invitations to large functions. These invitations are even repeated annually without ever being reciprocated by the Finns, for a request to arrange an exposition cannot be considered a return invitation. Besides this, in the publications and at the functions of the Nordic Society everything from the North is regularly accorded unrestrained admiration, and these publications and functions give practically no consideration to the atmosphere prevailing between the two countries at any given time.

This has not failed to produce a reaction. Of course, there are people in Finland, too, who are always glad to be invited out and to be admired, and whom nothing can change in this attitude. But they are seldom among the politically influential persons. Among the latter, according to everything I hear, the procedure of the Nordic Society is all too frequently interpreted as a tempestuous unrecip-

located courtship and is even considered obtrusive by large sectors of people who are unfavorably disposed toward us. It is significant that some of the young students who come into contact with the work of the Nordic Society get the impression that Finnish culture must be superior to German, and in some cases while in Germany to study they have stated that they do not wish to adopt German culture, but rather to transmit Finnish culture to the Germans.

As to what conclusions may be drawn, there is no doubt that a society with the aim of cultivating good relations between Germany and the Scandinavian countries on an ideological basis is justified. But because of the way in which the Society is performing its task, it does not fulfill its aims and is harmful in many respects.

Considering the great difference in ideologies and the distrust with which the citizens of the small politically stagnant states of Northern Europe confront the Great Power Germany, charged with energies of expansion, we must forego mass functions and mass effect. Intensive rather than extensive work must be done, and individual rather than general effort must be expended. The proper dosage and the proper shading are constantly necessary.

It is apparent from this that to me the most important task of the Nordic Society is to reach the individual Finn, insofar as he is important and influential. As I already had the honor of explaining in a previous report, the radius of the Finnish circle of culture, which includes only  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million people, is too short. Even if the Scandinavian countries are added, it still needs to be extended. Creative Finnish personalities therefore require a greater sounding board. No country can offer a better one than Germany with her 75 million people and her language which is still familiar to most educated Finns from youth. In my opinion the Nordic Society should exert its main influence in Finland toward obtaining an audience in Germany for Finnish statesmen, scholars, and artists before suitably arranged groups, and thereby establishing lasting ties with their German colleagues.

The Nordic Society need not fear that it will disturb the balance of invitations by such arrangements, for a large number of German lecturers and artists come to Finland every year to obtain an audience.

Moreover, the dissemination of Finnish literature in Germany will certainly be appreciated here, if it is done in an impartial manner. In addition, a magazine devoted to Northern matters and a suitable press service would be justified if they took into account the points in the above discussion regarding Finland.

BLÜCHER

## No. 430

2887/565513-14

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

URGENT

STOCKHOLM, May 28, 1938.

A 885

R 12591.

Subject: Neutrality regulations of the Northern European countries.

With reference to our report A 828 of May 20.<sup>1</sup>

On May 27 the new neutrality regulations of the Northern European countries were signed at the Foreign Ministry here. In a communiqué issued to the press it was stated, among other things, that the still applicable neutrality regulations of 1912 affect only Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; that they were derived from the international agreements adopted at The Hague in 1907; and that they dealt with access to neutral harbors and territorial waters, etc., by warships belonging to belligerents. These regulations had had to be supplemented in view of experiences during the World War, since new weapons such as the airplane and radio, for instance, had acquired a new significance which could not be foreseen in 1912. The declaration just signed, which imposed the obligation on the signatories of not changing their neutrality regulations, without first exchanging views with the other signatory governments, if possible, was derived—like the previous declarations—from The Hague Convention of 1907, with a few amendments and additions; these dealt with military airplanes and the use of wireless telegraphy, with due regard to new techniques developed during the World War.

A copy of the agreement is enclosed,<sup>2</sup> consisting of a joint statement by the signatory Governments and the special neutrality regulations for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; it was placed at the disposal of the Legation by the Foreign Ministry here.

The neutrality regulations concerning Sweden contain, in addition to provisions pertaining to warships of belligerent countries in Swedish waters, also a provision in article 8 with regard to flying over the Sound. According to this it is permissible for military planes of belligerent countries to fly without unnecessary delay over the outer territorial waters of Sweden, bounded on the north by a line from Kullen to Gilbjerg Hoved and on the south by a line from Falsterbo to the lighthouse of Stevns and in the air above the area so defined. In flying over this area the military planes must

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2887/565512).

<sup>2</sup> The copy referred to has not been found; however, texts in French and Finnish appear in the files of Political Division VI (26/16612-37). English and French versions are printed in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXVIII, pp. 293-331.



keep as far as possible from the coasts. A statement regarding the concept of Swedish territorial waters, which is appended to the Swedish neutrality provisions, is worthy of note. According to this, Swedish territorial waters extend a distance of 4 nautical miles, i. e., 7,408 meters, measured from the area or line which forms the boundary of the inland waters.

By order:  
v. BELOW

No. 431

2679/528697-708

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

B 382

STOCKHOLM, June 2, 1938.

Received June 7.

Pol. VI 1167.

Subject: Activities of the Nordic Society in Sweden.

With reference to the instruction of Senior Counselor von Grundherr of May 7.<sup>1</sup>

In order to judge the activity of the Nordic Society in Sweden during the last few years and, in view of past errors, to be able to make suggestions for a reorganization, it is desirable to begin with the following general observations:

All activity in the field of cultural policy abroad must take into account the actual conditions that define the political attitude of the country and the trend of public opinion. In the course of its history, Sweden has always been on a footing of lively intellectual and economic exchange with its German neighbor across the Baltic, and in these spheres has always experienced stimulating influences. [On the economic side, it was the Lübeck Hansa that first brought Sweden into the network of its trade relations and thus opened up new paths for Swedish commerce.] Especially in the second half of the nineteenth century and until the World War, German shipping, commerce, and industry shared in developing the economic life of this then predominantly agricultural people with new impulses and possibilities for economic activity to the mutual advantage of the two countries. German science and technology gave modern Sweden its special character. The future Swedish physicians studied in Germany, the tech-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3667/E034333-36). The instruction was substantially the same as that conveyed in Grundherr's letter to Renthe-Fink on May 5 (document No. 427). Grundherr stated that he intended to show Rosenberg the reports by the Legations on the Nordic Society. In the copy of Below's report prepared for Rosenberg, the material enclosed in square brackets was deleted. Certain other changes in Grundherr's handwriting are noted below.

nicians worked in German factories, and the mercantile apprentices spent at least a part of their apprenticeship in German commercial establishments. German was the principal foreign language in the Swedish high schools, and practically every educated Swede knew German, since he had to master it for scientific as well as commercial pursuits. It may thus be stated without exaggeration that prewar Sweden was to a great extent oriented toward Germany in the economic and cultural field and thus also to a certain extent in its political sympathies.

Here, too, Germany's period of weakness after the World War brought with it a significant change. Although strong sympathies certainly remained, and the existing ties, especially of an economic and scientific nature, were cultivated, nevertheless the general interest in a Germany bereft of its status as a Great Power abated. The Swedes began more and more to regard the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly England, as their natural partner, the partner with whom economic ties became ever closer at Germany's expense, with whom new cultural bonds were created, and to whom political sympathies also went out more and more strongly. It cannot be denied that Sweden's former orientation toward Germany has today given way to a definite orientation toward England.

Nevertheless, and this is of fundamental importance in this connection, there are in Sweden even today, in all strata of life, many more people than public opinion would lead one to suspect to whom Germany and things German are very close, who expect of her again in the future new ideas and impulses for their country, and who see in the ideology of National Socialism very much that is valuable and desirable for their country too. However, a large proportion, and not only of these Swedes, simply has not yet grasped or quite understood the tremendous changes that have been taking place in the Third Reich in the past five years with a force that carries everything along with it. The Swede, in general, is slower in his thinking than the German. Therefore the Swede in general is impressed, to be sure, by the occurrences in the Third Reich, which are taking place in all fields simultaneously at what in his opinion is a dizzy speed, yet is also watchfully waiting, and demonstrates a certain reserve.

The activity of the Nordic Society since the accession to power<sup>2</sup> has, for the above reasons, from the first been observed and noted with deep mistrust. The management of the Society, in its operations here, has apparently not taken sufficient account of these factors' existence. The operations in Sweden, not always carried out with the requisite care and often rather ineptly, have strengthened the impression here that the above-mentioned mistrust is justified. A few blunders which furnish the Swedish public with evidence that the Nordic Society

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<sup>2</sup>1. e., the accession to power of the NSDAP.

dealt not only with cultural but also with economic and political matters have finally led the Swedish circles concerned to perceive in the Nordic Society an instrument of National Socialist imperialism under the guise of Nordic cultural and racial community. [This suspicion seems to these elements the more warranted inasmuch as they point out that a great number of leading personages in the Third Reich and the Party belong to the Society and give it encouragement through active collaboration.] According to the Swedish view widely held, there is a puzzling disproportion between the standing of the Northern representatives participating in the affairs of the Society's functions and the German commitment in organizational effort and number of prominent Germans participating [particularly, as liberal newspapers claimed in this connection, since none of the leaders of the Society has any cultural or scientific connection with the North].

The first case by which the Nordic Society ungracefully aroused the mistrust of the Swedish press was through the rental of a farm in southern Sweden in the summer of 1934. Through clumsy wording of a notice regarding the rental of this farm in *Nord*, the Nordic Society's press service, which was reprinted by the local paper, the matter received sensational and partly distorted treatment in the Swedish press. The Legation had not been previously informed of the intentions of the Society and was therefore not in a position to give information as to the actual facts when some Swedish newspaper offices telephoned to inquire. The failure to inform the Legation was in this case the more regrettable since the business manager of the Nordic Society had stopped over in Stockholm a few days previously and had also called at the Legation several times, without, however, mentioning anything about the leasing of a farm in Sweden for the Society.

With the same mistrust the Swedes took note of the founding of a Scandinavian writers' center in Travemünde. The result of the invitations to the writers' center has not been favorable. Thus, for example, the two representatives of the younger generation of Swedish poets, Johannes Edfeldt and Vilhelm Moberg, who were invited to Travemünde, had in the past few years become more and more prominent in the ranks of the leftist-radical intellectual element. Their names today can often be found on manifestoes issued by various committees for peace, for the Spanish Reds, or against the fascist states. For the summer of 1936, the Nordic Society extended an invitation to Travemünde to the Swedish Authors' Association, the president of which was at the time Marika Stjernstedt, a writer known for many years for her antagonism toward the Third Reich. Then, too, the literary collaborator of the Jewish publishing house of Bonnier, Dr. Sven Stolpe, who had previously distinguished himself by a disparaging article on the Führer in the Swedish press, was sent to Lübeck. Upon his return, Dr. Stolpe published various articles in

Sweden which, though the language was not offensive, were in reality so much the more presumptuous and antagonistic. The mistake here was that the Nordic Society had not inquired beforehand regarding the personality of the member selected by the Swedish Authors' Association in order to be able to refuse in time, if necessary. [The opinion expressed by an important member of the Society, characterizing Marika Stjernstedt as the "true representative of Swedish peasant literature and close to the soil", may have had something to do with this.] In the last few years it has become harder and harder to propose suitable candidates for an invitation to the writers' center at Travemünde. In Swedish circles concerned, it is therefore regarded almost as a favor if a writer or poet accepts an invitation to Travemünde.

Another fact that hurt the prestige of the Nordic Society in Sweden considerably was the manner in which they attempted in former years to deliver invitations to the Society's functions at Lübeck. After it had proved difficult, because of widespread mistrust, to get recognized scholars, for instance, to travel to Lübeck, agents of the Society, (e. g. Dr. Domes) have been in Sweden from time to time in order personally to induce the Swedish gentlemen concerned to accept the invitation. Thus, for example, at the beginning of 1936 attempts were made to the very limits of what could be considered dignified behavior to arouse interest among Swedish scholars for a "House and Home" exposition planned for the summer of 1936 and to persuade them to participate. The then president of the Swedish student federation said of these efforts that "in this country only weak characters who were financially embarrassed would accept an invitation extended in this manner." Another case in point: in the fall of 1936 the art historian of Göteborg, Professor Romdahl, was invited by the Nordic Society, which described him to the German authorities as a prominent pro-German Swede with strong sympathies for National Socialism. But as Romdahl is a friend and disciple of German Jews in art history, a very embarrassing situation for both sides was produced during the visit when M. Romdahl in the presence of Germans expressed his sympathies for his former teachers and friends. Professor Romdahl returned from this trip in vexation and resigned from the presidency of the Swedish-German Association in Göteborg.

The greatest damage that a careless and overzealous method of operation has done, and not merely to the work of the Nordic Society in Sweden, doubtless occurred as the result of the publication by the social democratic and liberal Swedish press in November 1934 of two confidential circular letters of the Society to the chiefs of its offices. These circular letters contained confidential reports of the Society's Stockholm informant concerning events in the newspaper offices of the *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, the financial situa-

tion of the *Nya Dagligt Allehanda*, and the possibilities of encouraging German exports and of giving German advertising to the Swedish press with regard for the attitude of the individual newspapers toward the Third Reich. Both the Marxist press and some rather large liberal papers did not neglect this opportunity to affirm that the Nordic Society was occupied not only with cultural matters but also was engaging in activities in the political and economic field which constituted an interference inadmissible in international relations. The rightist newspapers did not take up the affair at the time, but took cognizance of the matter itself with keen interest. The effect of these revelations, which also contained quite personal remarks concerning well-known Swedish personalities, can still be felt today.

As of very recent occurrence, I might finally mention that the executive director of the Nordic Society in the past winter held conferences with the State Secretary of the Swedish Ministry of Culture on the arrangement of a Swedish art exhibition in Germany, without in due order informing the Legation of it. Aside from the fact that in the past few years, considering the lack of reciprocity, entirely too many affairs have been organized by Germany for Swedish art, handicraft, etc., the German Minister had no information concerning Dr. Timm's conferences when State Secretary Knös spoke to him about the matter.

To what extent the founding of the laudable "Sweden-Germany" Association in Lund is attributable<sup>3</sup> to the *exclusive* initiative of the Nordic Society is hard to determine from here, particularly since the Legation was never informed as to the tenor of the conferences held by the Society with the Secretary of the Association, Gunnar Berg. On the other hand, through a detailed memorandum of January 1938, the Legation was informed by the President of the "Nordic Liaison Office" of a long conversation with M. Gunnar Berg.

These cases selected out of a large number show that the working methods of the Nordic Society in Sweden must<sup>4</sup> be changed. To bring about a fundamental change here one must first of all take into account more than heretofore not only the political and social conditions but also the mentality of the Swede. This is especially true of those Swedish personages in public life to whose collaboration the Nordic Society attaches importance and who, even if they do not belong to the Government faction, are nevertheless under pressure of prevailing public opinion and to a certain extent dependent on it. Precisely those circles which are valuable to us fear an unsuitable mixture of propaganda, pseudo-science and the Nordic idea, particularly since the Nordic idea propagated by the Society is misconstrued

<sup>3</sup> The words "as Herr Timm asserts" were inserted in Grundherr's handwriting before "attributable".

<sup>4</sup> Changed in Grundherr's handwriting to read "should".

and rejected here.<sup>5</sup> In the Swedish view, "Nordic" is a concept limited exclusively to the Northern European countries and has a very definite meaning. It includes above all freedom for expression of opinion, for political thought and action in the form of elections and majority decisions, which is "genuinely Germanic" according to conviction here.<sup>6</sup> [To this is added a strong ideological stress on tolerance toward those who think otherwise, without regard to racial and party allegiance.] This general attitude has led large circles in Sweden to the view that Germany [which through its "dictatorial regime" had renounced true Germanic freedom] was not suited to be the "*herald of the Nordic idea*" in the North. Therefore they suspect that this ideological propaganda is a cloak for political and intellectual expansionist aspirations. These ideas, significantly enough, are expressed not only in Marxist and liberal circles, but also among the Young Nationals who make a special point of stressing what is typically Swedish in their national attitude.

For these reasons it is advisable and necessary that cooperation between the Germans and Swedes such as is to be cultivated by the Nordic Society be organized as much as possible on a purely objective basis. In view of the open-mindedness of the Swede and his lively interest in foreign countries and their attainments, particularly in the scientific, technical and social fields, there will at any rate be many opportunities to bring home to him through facts and achievements such as the results of our research, our *Winterhilfswerk*, *Schönheit der Arbeit*, and *Kraft durch Freude* programs and the *Arbeitsdienst*, the inner values and dynamic forces of the German revival. This would also mean greater restraint in such matters as the size of gatherings and the material expense and the personnel involved in extending hospitality and honor to guests. Quite generally a strict observance of the principle of reciprocity must be demanded and maintained. This has been decidedly neglected on the German side during recent years. This disproportion creates on the Swedish side the feeling that, as the courted object of continued German favor, they have no need to do anything in return. This Swedish view that it is not necessary is forcefully illustrated, among other things, by a very recent example: In Germany, Swedish artists and ensembles such as "Den Svenska", the male choir, which recently returned from a trip to Germany, were honored with a large reception arranged by the Nordic Society's office in Saxony and attended by high-ranking Government and Party officials, whereas not even Swedish theatrical circles, to

<sup>5</sup> This sentence was changed by Grundherr to read: "Precisely in those circles which are valuable to us, the Nordic idea propagated by the Society is misconstrued and rejected."

<sup>6</sup> This sentence was changed by Grundherr to read: "It includes above all freedom for political action in the form of elections and majority decisions, which is 'genuinely Germanic' according to liberal convictions here."

<sup>7</sup> Grundherr inserted "gradually" after "to him".

say nothing of Swedish officials, took even the slightest notice of the troupe of the Berlin Schiller Theater under the direction of Staatsschauspieler Heinrich George during its Stockholm guest performance, although leading personages in cultural and theatrical life were guests of the German Legation together with the German artists.

In conclusion it may be said for the future activity of the Nordic Society in Sweden that in the interest of the cause and of its own success it should keep within the confines set by the political conditions obtaining in the country and the resulting attitude of the individual Swede. In particular, any activity which might, in view of the Swede's slower capacity to absorb, imbue in him a feeling of being pushed should give way to quiet waiting, which, in view of his essential receptivity, would surely meet with success in the long run. For this, however, it is necessary that the Society, disregarding certain considerations of prestige, carry on its work in accordance with the established viewpoints and entrust with Swedish affairs only such members of the staff as have no false notions about the North and possess a sound knowledge of the subject. In order finally to make possible the conduct of a unified policy with respect to Sweden, it is absolutely necessary that the cultural activity of the Nordic Society in Sweden be pursued only in closest agreement and constant contact with the German authorities concerned.

By order:  
BELOW

No. 432

2879/528693-96

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 176 VIII a

COPENHAGEN, June 3, 1938.

Received June 4.

Pol. VI 1159.

Subject: Activity of the Nordic Society in Denmark.

Among the Scandinavian peoples, the Danes occupy a special position with respect to National Socialist Germany, a position which, on the one hand, is conditioned by the geographical proximity and the feeling of close kinship and, on the other hand, by an all the stronger consciousness of the philosophical [*weltanschaulichen*] or at least ideological antagonism. This is expressed in a lively interest in developments in Germany and a brisk tourist traffic with the latter country, but also in an extraordinary sensitivity as regards everything that is felt to be propagandist influence on the part of their gigantic neighbor whose dynamics arouse uneasiness for their own complacent comfort. In every initiative regarding Denmark, however well meant,

Germany must always bear in mind this sensitivity if psychological mistakes are to be avoided.

Realizing this the Legation has kept in close contact with the Nordic Society and has participated in its endeavors and activities concerning Denmark, not only in order to promote them but also in order to avoid ill-feeling and discords.

By and large this has succeeded, because the Nordic Society for its part generally sought contact with and counsel from the Legation before taking steps in Denmark, but above all because it is excellently represented here by the Copenhagen representative of the *V[ölkischer] B[eobachter]*, Cavalry Captain (ret.) Schäfer, who is also Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP and head of the German colony. Herr Schäfer has always worked loyally with the Legation, not only in matters of the Nordic Society but also otherwise. In this way the occasional danger of excessive activity could be avoided and the main emphasis of the activity of the Nordic Society in Denmark directed to the cultural field.

A considerable and important part of the work of the Nordic Society, in the view of the Legation, consists in the establishment of personal ties with Danes who are exponents of the very diversified trends in the cultural and economic field in this country. This facilitates judging trends. On the other hand, through the Danes who are brought to Germany by the Nordic Society, who likewise must be treated with due regard for the considerations mentioned, an impression of the desires and achievements of Germany is imparted to all strata of the population, which feel the influence of these personalities in their native regions.

The congresses in Lübeck have, as you know, been well attended by visitors from Denmark and have undoubtedly made a great impression on the participants. To be sure, the Legation has the feeling that the effort to obtain as many visitors as possible detracts somewhat from the effectiveness of these meetings. The purpose of these affairs, as seen from here, is doubtless fundamentally good. The Legation believes, however, that if these affairs were of a nature that envisaged a greater individual collaboration of the foreign visitors with the German participants, a deeper and more lasting effect would be obtained than was true last year, for example. It is absolutely unnecessary that the visitors be offered so much diversity. If the Legation may go into detail here, the individual fields of activity ought to be agreed upon among the German leaders in the individual sections and an attempt should be made to exert an influence on the foreigners in the particular field over and above the individual lectures. The number and nature of the lectures and speeches could be arranged in a more effective manner. Thus, for example, the speech of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, which undoubtedly made a great impression upon the



guests from Denmark because of its clarifying nature and which was therefore especially valuable, would have had an even more lasting effect if there had been fewer lectures succeeding it.

It is proper that the Nordic Society, aside from handling Nordic interests in general, should refrain, in publishing its economic review *Nord*, from economic activity in Denmark, if only because it would otherwise compete with the German Chamber of Commerce in Denmark, founded a year and a half ago. The economic review *Nord* could, however, become a valuable link in the total work of the Nordic Society if it were edited by a real expert and were in closer collaboration with the commercial division of the Legation and with the German Chamber of Commerce, so that over-all German interests would be better expressed in its reports.

In summary, the Legation accordingly considers the activity of the Nordic Society useful if pursued in agreement with it and with regard for the psychological viewpoints previously referred to. This does not mean that the Legation considers it necessary to curb the independence of the Nordic Society, particularly not externally, by making this activity directly dependent on detailed instructions from government offices—especially from the Legation. Collaboration between the Nordic Society and the Legation will, on the contrary, be most effective if an understanding is reached from time to time as to the course and method of the work of the Nordic Society in Denmark, but with the latter functioning outwardly in an independent manner as an unofficial institution. In this way the common purpose of better German-Danish mutual understanding and closer relations between the racially-related peoples might best be served.

Whether the significance of the Nordic Society for Denmark would be affected by a possible extension of its field of activity beyond Scandinavia,<sup>1</sup> it is impossible to say with certainty at the present stage of development. But the possible importance of the matter must not be underestimated.

RENTHE-FINK

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[EDITORS' NOTE. A DNB dispatch (26/16546) of June 8, 1938, reported that Timm had resigned as Reichsgeschäftsführer of the Nordic Society "in order to devote himself to other activities", and that Hans Jurgen Krüger would provisionally succeed him. On June 25 Rosenberg, Lohse, and other officials agreed in a conference at Berlin that matters of cultural policy—particularly those affecting

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<sup>1</sup> On Mar. 12, 1938, Timm wrote (26/16460) to Frohwein, German Minister in Tallinn, that Ribbentrop was now a member of the grand council of the Nordic Society and was keenly interested in working with all Nordic peoples in Europe. Timm then suggested that Estonia offered a promising field of activity and invited Frohwein's support in cultivating it. Frohwein replied favorably, with approval of the Foreign Ministry (26/16457-59).

other countries—as well as all dealings with other Reich and Party agencies, should be closely supervised by Rosenberg's staff, whereas all trips abroad by employees of the Nordic Society and all speeches and articles which might in any way affect foreign policy were to be cleared with the chief of staff (Stabsleiter Schickedanz) of the Aussenpolitisches Amt (2679/528709).]

## No. 433

1766/405677-78

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

No. 184 B

COPENHAGEN, June 3, 1938.

Received June 4.

Pol. VI 1157.

With reference to instruction Pol. VI 1005 of May 25.<sup>1</sup>

It is probable that Minister of State Stauning is personally very much interested in seeing the North Schleswig question definitively settled. The question is, however, whether he would at present be in a position to put through a settlement acceptable to us. This question must in my opinion be answered in the negative if Denmark should be required to sacrifice territory. There is involved here a national question of the utmost importance for Denmark, which today also largely involves ideological conflicts and the preconceived notion that the Danish minority in Germany does not enjoy adequate freedom in its cultural and national existence. Even if Stauning and the people around him should be amenable to an accommodating settlement, it would probably be impossible for him, given the present situation in Parliament, to get it adopted; rather, he would have to reckon with resolute opposition from all bourgeois groups, and even from the Social Democrats, so long as such a settlement is not absolutely necessary.

The Minister of State, being an experienced tactician, knows that the discussion of a matter which is so important for Denmark as the German-Danish border will cause an extraordinary agitation of minds here, and at present, especially when a constitutional amendment and new elections are impending, he can hardly, in my opinion, enter a discussion in terms of *Realpolitik* of a solution involving a revision of the present boundary line.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6793/E514148-50; 1766/405675-76). This instruction gave the substance of Grundherr's conversation with Louis von Kohl, a Danish national residing in Germany, formerly employed in German propaganda and intelligence activities, who reported that certain leading Danish personalities were interested in negotiating a real settlement of German-Danish differences. Kohl asked Grundherr how Germany would receive an unofficial move in this direction, and Grundherr asked Renthe-Fink to comment.

As for the question whether it is advisable to use Herr von Kohl in this matter, it should be noted that Kohl is regarded here as our man on account of his activity during and after the war. If we use him as intermediary, it will be difficult to avoid giving the impression that the initiative comes from Germany.

Herr von Kohl's statement that Chief of Police Thune Jacobsen is a friend of the Minister of State is probably true. It seems doubtful to me, however, whether Stauning can simply be identified with the views of Thune Jacobsen. In any case the Minister of State will not permit even his friendship with the Chief of Police and the entirely possible coincidence of their views to lead him into negotiations, such as shifting the frontier to the Tiedje line,<sup>2</sup> which Herr von Kohl apparently meant and which would involve great dangers at present for the Minister's domestic policies.

If we on our part should feel the need to settle the North Schleswig question definitively at this time, there are in my opinion persons at our disposal more suitable politically than Herr von Kohl to make such an approach to Minister of State Stauning.

RENTHE-FINK

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<sup>2</sup> The Tiedje line was suggested by the German Schleswig-Holstein politician Johann Tiedje after the North Schleswig plebiscite of 1920. It was to run from the northern end of the Flensburg Fiord to Højer on the North Sea (i. e. north of the line finally agreed upon).

## No. 434

1910/430071

### *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A 857

Moscow, June 19, 1938.

Received June 22.

Pol. VI 1288.

Subject: Soviet attitude toward the question of refortifying the Åland Islands.

With reference to instruction Pol. VI 1059 of June 8.<sup>1</sup>

Last April, after the end of the conference of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers, Litvinov spoke to the Finnish Minister, Baron Yrjö-Koskinen, about the question of refortifying the Åland Islands. The latter said that he had received no instructions whatever from his Government and could therefore not make any statement.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6716/E509682-85). The Foreign Ministry had transmitted a report of the Legation in Helsinki which stated that there were indications that direct negotiations were under way between Finland and Sweden concerning refortification of the Åland Islands. Inquiry in the Finnish Foreign Ministry had brought no denial, but an acknowledgement that there was uncertainty as to what attitude the Soviet Union would take.

As the Helsinki Legation stated in report No. 941 of May 5 (instruction Pol. VI 937 of the Foreign Ministry), Finnish Foreign Minister Holsti shortly thereafter replied to a question by the Soviet Minister in Helsinki that the Åland problem had not been discussed at the Oslo Conference.

When the recently appointed Swedish Minister, M. Winther, paid Litvinov his first visit at the end of April, Litvinov, after exchange of the usual words of greeting, immediately asked him a whole series of searching questions on the Åland Islands. M. Winther, who was annoyed by Litvinov's inquisitorial manner, replied that he himself was not fully informed on the Åland question and furthermore had not received any instructions from Stockholm. Litvinov thereupon did not bring up the matter again.

SCHULENBURG

No. 435

26/16573-75

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 261 D

COPENHAGEN, June 29, 1938.

Received July 1.

Pol. VI 1372.

Subject: Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers in Copenhagen.

With reference to my telegram No. 28 of June 22 [27].<sup>1</sup>

The conference of Foreign Ministers of the seven states without alliances, soon to be held in Copenhagen on the initiative of the Scandinavian countries, is dressed up outwardly as an assembly of the Oslo Powers, but probably will go considerably beyond the present framework of Oslo, since not the economic, but primarily the general political situation of Europe will be the subject of the discussions. I learn that Switzerland, which actually does not belong to the Oslo Powers, was also invited, but that she declined to participate in the negotiations, pointing out the new situation created by the restoration of her full neutrality.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister, who stated that the plan for the convocation of the Conference had already been decided upon at the last meeting of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers in April, told me that he

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (26/16568). Renthe-Fink reported in this telegram that Munch had told him he expected the Copenhagen conference would register the strong determination of the Oslo States to remain aloof from conflicts of rival Great Powers.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 517, enclosure.

had in mind chiefly a discussion regarding the international situation in view of common interests in the question of neutrality and the League of Nations. He does not seem to be thinking of definite and positive decisions; rather, he intends to work for a joint press communiqué in which, without any mention of the League of Nations and in as undemonstrative a manner as possible, the wish of the Oslo Powers for a strictly impartial position with respect to the rival Great Powers will be stressed in quite general terms.

To my question what was meant by "impartiality", M. Munch replied that in his opinion this concept by its very nature included neutrality and even went beyond that, because from the point of view of international law, neutrality became an issue only in case of war between two powers, whereas the principle of impartiality determined policy even in peacetime. The concept of neutrality, moreover, was juridically so elastic that it was easily capable of several completely different interpretations, whereas the concept of impartiality, in his opinion, unmistakably indicated a quite definite attitude.

It is evident that this attitude is largely dictated by the thesis of the basic irreconcilability of neutrality with membership in the League of Nations, and that M. Munch hesitates openly to draw the ultimate conclusions. I therefore told him that vague formulas and manifestations were not sufficient to bring about a definite clarification of the obligations under the League of Nations. It seemed to me that the right thing for the Oslo States was to notify the League of Nations openly of just which political actions the Oslo States would henceforth be willing to take within the framework of the League of Nations.

The convocation of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers shows the need of the countries without alliances to establish closer contacts, in view of the world situation, which all of them consider menacing, and to reduce their political attitude as far as possible to a common denominator. In fact, since the Geneva Declaration of 1936,<sup>3</sup> the policy of the countries concerned has not developed uniformly as regards the question of neutrality and the League of Nations, and the political situation has changed fundamentally in many respects. The meeting may therefore acquire a certain importance for the future attitude of neutral states, and it would probably be important for our interest to explain to the Foreign Ministers sufficiently in

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<sup>3</sup> A statement issued July 1, 1936, by the Foreign Ministers of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain and reflecting a decline in confidence in the League after the Ethiopian crisis. It stated that since the Covenant as a whole was not in full force, their several countries would have to reserve judgment in applying article 16.

advance of the meeting our views on points that are of consequence to us.<sup>4</sup>

RENTHE-FINK

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "To Deputy Director of the Political Department: Please submit draft regarding last sentence. Influence ought to be exerted cautiously, particularly since most countries concerned seem to be already following the desired course. W[eizsäcker], July 2." See document No. 436 for the resulting instruction.

### No. 436

26/16579-80

#### *Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, July 6, 1938.<sup>2</sup>  
zu Pol. VI 1372.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor von Kamphoevener.

If opportunity arises, please point out discreetly to the Government there that in our opinion the only chance for the smaller countries to keep out of future conflicts is by returning to the comprehensive concept of prewar neutrality and following it faithfully. In the last analysis this requires an unequivocal repudiation—not merely a relaxation—of the obligations under article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant, since even its merely formal continuation might enable the interested powers to apply inadmissible diplomatic pressure if they deemed it necessary.

Please report on the steps taken there.

By order:  
BISMARCK

<sup>1</sup> The dispatch (with document No. 435 as an enclosure) was sent to the Legations in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium. The Legation in Denmark received the same instructions. Information copies of the enclosure were sent to the Missions in Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Switzerland, and to the Consulate at Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Although the circular was dated July 6, it was dispatched to the various addressees between July 12 and 16.

### No. 437

26/15965-56

#### *The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry*

A 2797

THE HAGUE, July 19, 1938.  
Received July 20.  
Pol. VI 1527.

Subject: Denunciation of Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant.

With reference to instruction Pol. VI 1372 of July 6.

Unfortunately the instruction of July 6 did not arrive here until the 13th.<sup>1</sup> Had it by chance been in my possession one day earlier, I

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 436, footnote 2.

should have had opportunity to discuss the question in detail with Foreign Minister Patijn, with whom I spent the afternoon informally. As it was, I still did have opportunity to talk with Minister President Colijn about the matter. M. Colijn stated that the time when the Netherlands would unequivocally denounce article 16 might well come eventually, but that in his opinion it had not come yet. The Netherlands Government had at one time given its own interpretation of article 16, which could be summarized to this effect: an army which crossed the frontier of the Netherlands without her approval would unconditionally be deemed an enemy. Nor would an appeal to article 16, still formally in force, in any way alter this. Possibly the Netherlands Government would again precisely define its interpretation of article 16 before the forum of the League of Nations at the coming September session.

For the impending Copenhagen conference of the Foreign Ministers M. Patijn had received instructions not to commit himself. When the Netherlands gave her own interpretation of article 16, the other Northern States refused to join her. Now they intended to form a bloc, but Holland desired neither to act as the spokesman of such a bloc nor to let any other country speak in her name.

ZECH

### No. 438

26/15965-66

#### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 261 D

COPENHAGEN, July 20, 1938.

Received July 21.

Pol. VI 1541.

Subject: Impending conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers at Copenhagen.

With reference to the instruction Pol. VI 1372 of July 6, 1938.

The return from Evian<sup>1</sup> of the Deputy Chief of the Political Division in the Danish Foreign Ministry, M. Rasmussen, gave me the opportunity yesterday once more to explain to him, as directed in the instruction cited above, Germany's position regarding the question of neutrality.

M. Rasmussen will presumably participate along with M. Munch in the discussions of the Foreign Ministers, who this time are each taking along one official of their departments. I referred to the con-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 424, footnote 4.

versation between Minister von Renthe-Fink and Foreign Minister Munch, conducted along the same lines at the end of June,<sup>2</sup> and my own conversation with Foreign Minister Munch on July 11,<sup>3</sup> in order to define our views still more precisely in accordance with the above-mentioned instruction, which had meanwhile arrived.

M. Rasmussen remarked that he was familiar with our conception and understood it very well. He said he would transmit the contents of this conversation to the Foreign Minister even before the beginning of the conference.<sup>4</sup> Judging by his attitude toward the Third Reich, M. Rasmussen should be a suitable interpreter of our views. For the rest, M. Rasmussen could not tell me anything new regarding the conference scheduled for July 22 and 23. He only confirmed, among other things, what M. Munch had already told me, that the Foreign Ministers would discuss the refugee question, among other things, on the basis of the results achieved at Evian-les-Bains, and, M. Rasmussen added, particularly the further treatment of this question at the conference planned for August 2 at London. In London they intended to elect an American as chairman and four other members of a committee which is to lay down the guiding principles for the "desired negotiations with Germany" on the one hand and with those countries which could be considered for immigration of German and Austrian refugees on the other.

It is remarkable that the Danish press, which, as I reported, had at the time announced the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers at Copenhagen, is at present silent on the matter.

DR. HENSEL

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 435.

<sup>3</sup> According to a letter from Hensel to Grundherr on July 12 (26/16603-05), Munch said in reply to Hensel's questions that no further talks had occurred between the Foreign Ministries concerned and that no agenda would be fixed for the conference, which was to be concerned with finding the extent of agreement among the participating governments. The refugee and neutrality problems would certainly be discussed. Hohenthal, replying to Hensel's letter on July 15 in Grundherr's absence, suggested that it would be worthwhile to refer again expressly to prewar neutrality (26/16606).

<sup>4</sup> Hensel appended the following postscript to a letter of July 20 to Hohenthal (2768/536104-05):

"Wednesday, July 20, 1938—12:30 p. m.  
"Moreover, M. Rasmussen just called me and asked whether my statement yesterday on our standpoint toward the neutrality question was based on official instructions. This was important because he had to transmit the statement to Foreign Minister Munch. I replied affirmatively, remarking that yesterday I had conveyed not my personal attitude but the German attitude. Hensel".



## No. 439

26/15971-72

*The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

A 712

BRUSSELS, July 20, 1938.

Received July 21.

Pol. VI 1542.

With reference to your instruction Pol. VI 1372 of July 6 and to our reports A 658 of June 29<sup>2</sup> and A 711 of July 12.<sup>3</sup>

Even before receiving the instruction I had already spoken along similar lines to influential Belgian personalities at every opportunity. I did so again only recently with the Minister President.

In this connection we must not lose sight of the particular situation of Belgium. The concept of prewar neutrality has a stigma attached to it here, because at the founding of the country it was forcibly imposed by the Great Powers. Remembering this, people object, as you know, to the expression and concept of "neutrality" in general. As the King once told me, this is ungrateful of the Belgians, since, under the protection of this neutrality they enjoyed until the World War an era of development and prosperity for generations. However, as the King himself stated, it cannot be denied that the word "neutrality" is nevertheless in bad repute in Belgium. Instead, therefore, of talking of a policy of neutrality they prefer to call the new Belgian foreign policy a "policy of independence", thereby emphasizing that they are self-reliant and that Belgium is no longer subject to any external compulsion.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For other documents on Belgium, see ch. v.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6711/E590587-89). The report conveyed a statement by Secretary General van Langenhove of the Belgian Foreign Ministry concerning Belgium's intention to attend the conference of the Oslo Powers. He had said that while nothing new was expected from the conference, Belgium "considered it useful that the group of states which attributed to article 16 a purely optional character should so far as possible form a united front."

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (1170/328329-33). In this document Richthofen described his conversation on July 12 with Spaak on a crisis in the latter's "policy of independence", which was being widely criticized in the Belgian press as too advantageous to Germany. Spaak said that the charges were unfounded and he planned soon to reiterate publicly that his policy represented solely Belgian interests. Richthofen's impression was that despite hostility even in his own camp, the Minister President was determined to press "independence". Spaak also said that he expected the meeting at Copenhagen to be symbolic of the desire of a group of nations independent of the Great Powers to keep out of their conflicts. He had little confidence in the League of Nations.

<sup>4</sup> For the "change in Belgian foreign policy" signaled by King Leopold's speech of Oct. 14, 1936, see *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937), pp. 351-360. Cf. document No. 496, footnote 2.

A servitude under the Geneva Pact, particularly under article 16, is no longer recognized in Belgium today. The Belgian Government is endeavoring to give a more and more definite form to its view that the provisions of article 16 imply no obligation. For this reason the invitation to Copenhagen and the cooperation with the Scandinavian States have been gladly accepted, because the Belgian Government will have a better position vis-à-vis the Marxist opposition and its doctrinaire wing advocating "collective security" if it can appeal to a common front with the socialistically governed countries of the North.

A formal denunciation is not considered necessary here, and, besides, courage is lacking for this. Nor, in view of the very strong position which the Socialists occupy within the Government, is it possible at present to conceive of any Belgian Government which could give formal "notice" to the League in Geneva. The desire to imitate Switzerland's example<sup>5</sup> is probably gaining ground. However, this development must first ripen and depends largely upon domestic developments. At present, when even the policy of "independence" is experiencing a certain crisis, the time has at any rate not yet come.

RICHTHOFEN

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<sup>5</sup> See document No. 517, enclosure.

## No. 440

26/15977-78

### *The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

A 1173

STOCKHOLM, July 20, 1938.

Received July 22.

Pol. VI 1543.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Neutrality and sanctions-obligations of Sweden.

With reference to your instruction Pol. VI 1372 of July 6, and to our report A 1153 of July 12.<sup>1</sup>

In the course of a visit to the Foreign Ministry here I had opportunity to talk to the chief of the Political Division, Ministerial Counselor Söderblom, about the impending Copenhagen conference

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (26/16607-08). In this document Below reported that the Director of the Political Department in the Swedish Foreign Ministry had told him that the Copenhagen meeting would be more political in character than previous meetings, and also that during a visit to Stockholm earlier in 1938 Foreign Minister Beck had expressed Polish agreement with the Swedish attitude toward the League.

of the Oslo States. Since it was revealed that Foreign Minister Sandler is leaving for Copenhagen this very evening, I took advantage of the opportunity offered me to discuss again the Swedish position regarding article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. M. Söderblom stated, among other things, that on the question of sanctions there was no difference between the attitude of a large section of Swedish public opinion and the official Swedish position on the issue itself, but only in the views concerning the methods to be employed hereafter. For, whereas one section of public opinion demands that Sweden should—under threat of withdrawing if it comes to that—have the League of Nations explicitly confirm the position announced by Professor Undén in Geneva as to the optional character of the provisions regarding sanctions,<sup>2</sup> the Government thought that they should first await the result of the impending conference in Copenhagen and the September session of the League of Nations, which would have to deal with the matter anyhow on the basis of the report by the Committee of Twenty-eight. The Swedish Government's view in any case was that no power could force Sweden to participate against her will in any sanctions imposed by the League of Nations. From the non-application of sanctions in numerous cases in which under the League of Nations Covenant there was every cause for imposing sanctions, a kind of "customary law" had arisen, under which Sweden at any rate intended to reserve full freedom of action.<sup>3</sup> At this point I remonstrated that according to the unilateral Swedish declaration the *formal* obligation to participate in sanctions decided upon by the League of Nations still remained in force. In this connection I brought up, as instructed, the statements (transmitted in the instruction cited above) concerning the Reich Government's view on this question. M. Söderblom made detailed notes of the wording I used, which followed the instruction closely, and stated that he would immediately report the German view to the Foreign Minister, before the latter left for Copenhagen this evening.

By order:  
BRUNHOFF

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<sup>2</sup> Dr. Östen Undén, Swedish delegate to the League intermittently from 1921 to 1939, in January 1938 told the Committee of Twenty-eight that Sweden would have to reserve freedom of action in regard to future applications of sanctions. This position was sustained by a majority of the Riksdag after a debate in June 1938. The Committee of Twenty-eight was a special body of the League to consider proposals regarding "the application of the principles of the Covenant."

<sup>3</sup> On July 19 Swedish Minister Richert told Weizsäcker that the Copenhagen conference (especially since Belgium and the Netherlands would now participate) would be an important step toward the solidarity of the small powers wishing to remain neutral in the next war. Richert emphasized Sweden's determination to be completely neutral (26/15961).

## No. 441

6712/E509598-99

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 1506

HELSINKI, July 20, 1938.

Received July 21.

N. P. 6720.

Subject: Copenhagen Conference.

With reference to your instructions Pol. VI 1372 of July 6, and N. P. 6230 of July 8.<sup>1</sup>

Influencing the Finnish Government as directed in the first instruction is hindered by the fact that Foreign Minister Holsti on his return from America<sup>2</sup> is going directly to the Copenhagen Conference without first stopping in Finland. I talked instead to the State Secretary; however, I had the feeling during the conversation that he was not informed about the intentions of his chief and therefore avoided any precise formulation. He merely pointed out that Finland naturally wished to be released from the obligations under article 16, but could not strive for a position like that of Switzerland.

M. Holsti has, in fact, suffered a relapse into his former terminology, particularly in the last few days in London. He spoke to British journalists of the keen interest that Finland showed in the future of the League of Nations and in all measures which could make it a more effective instrument of peace.

This remark caused *Hufvudstadsbladet*<sup>3</sup> to point out in an editorial yesterday that Chamberlain's statement to the effect that the small countries should not rely upon the League of Nations was not forgotten in Finland.<sup>4</sup> Finland at present took more interest in neutralizing certain dangers entailed in continued League of Nations membership than in making the League more effective. These dangers lay in the fact that the articles on sanctions continued to be juridically binding, although morally Finland had released herself from these obligations by repeated declarations. Switzerland was the only member nation that was free from the obligation to impose sanctions. The Western Powers and Russia had given the North to understand that Switzer-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6712/E509596). The instruction requested regular reports on the attitude being taken by the Finnish press toward the conference of the Oslo Powers to be held at Copenhagen on July 23.

<sup>2</sup> Holsti headed the Finnish delegation to the Tercentenary Celebration of the First Settlement by Swedes and Finns in America. See Department of State, *Press Releases* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1939), vol. xxx (1938), p. 28.

<sup>3</sup> A Helsinki newspaper affiliated with the Swedish People's Party, which represented the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority.

<sup>4</sup> The reference is presumably to the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on Mar. 7, 1938. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1942), vol. i, pp. 28-29.

land's case should not be considered a precedent. The relationship toward the League of Nations would therefore have to be clarified by the Northern Powers and by the League. But it was difficult to suppose that M. Holsti, inspired by London, could be won over to firm tactics. However, the problem remained. No one was released from an obligation to impose sanctions by a mere unilateral declaration.

That *Hufvudstadsbladet* speaks so frankly is very significant. Certainly it will find response in many circles.

However, Government circles are at the moment very guarded in their statements.

I have also taken the opportunity to influence through an intermediary Counselor Pakaslahti,<sup>5</sup> who is going to Copenhagen, along the lines suggested in your instruction.

V. BLÜCHER

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<sup>5</sup> A. Pakaslahti, Director of the Political Department in the Finnish Foreign Ministry.

#### No. 442

1766/405670-80

#### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 290 P

COPENHAGEN, July 26, 1938.

Received July 28.

Pol. VI 1597.

Subject: Field Marshal Hermann Göring's visit to Denmark.

Minister President Field Marshal Hermann Göring's unofficial surprise visit of several days to Denmark was received by the Danish public in an unexpectedly friendly and respectful manner. It developed into an unequivocal success for the Field Marshal's personality and is all the more remarkable since, in spite of an increasing understanding of the Third Reich, aversion and prejudice against the National Socialist regime are still predominant here.

In the entire press detailed descriptions of this visit and numerous photographs supplanted the conference of Foreign Ministers of the Oslo States, the political topic of greatest current interest. The tone of the newspapers, especially that of the Social Democratic government press, was favorably influenced from the very beginning by the fact that the Field Marshal knew how to allow for the always latent inferiority complex of the Danes and won over everyone who talked with him or even merely saw him, because of his natural behavior. People lined up wherever the Field Marshal was expected and greeted him either with respectful silence or with cordial clapping of

hands, in some cases with jubilant acclamation. Spontaneous sympathy was shown especially at the end of Gründgens' open-air presentation of Hamlet in the court of Kronborg Castle, where the presence of the Field Marshal had been a special attraction.

The comprehensive security measures taken by the Danish police in friendly cooperation with the members of the Field Marshal's body-guard should be all the more appreciated since no program could be drawn up for this brief private visit.

It is assumed that the details of the visit are known through the dispatches of DNB's correspondent here.

DR. HENSEL

No. 443

26/16014-16

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 289 D

COPENHAGEN, July 28, 1938.

Received July 30.

Pol. VI 1609.

Subject: Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers in Copenhagen.

With reference to our report No. 261 D of July 20, 1938, and to our reports No. 289 D of July 27<sup>1</sup> and July 28.<sup>2</sup>

The result of the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers in Copenhagen on July 22 and 23, the course of which it is assumed is well enough known in Berlin, has been expressed in a communiqué, the Danish text of which is enclosed.<sup>3</sup>

To begin with, it is surprising that of the number of subjects announced for discussion, the communiqué actually deals only with the question of sanctions, describing article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant as not obligatory. The Oslo Powers therefore take a stand on the question of sanctions not primarily from the point of view of absolute neutrality, but rather from that of freedom of action or sovereignty in relation to the obligation under article 16 of the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7028/E522477-81). The report summarized opinions concerning the Copenhagen conference published by leading Danish newspapers.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7028/E522482-84). The report summarized reactions of the Danish press to comments and criticisms of the Copenhagen conference published in German, French, and Italian newspapers.

<sup>3</sup> Not reprinted. Clipping from *Politiken*, Copenhagen, of July 25, 1938 (26/16020), with German translation (26/16025-26). The seven participants—Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, and Sweden—issued on July 24 a statement expressing earnest anxiety about the international situation and full readiness to participate impartially in any efforts for conciliation. They would continue to work through the League of Nations, but they could no longer regard the sanctions system as obligatory upon themselves or upon other League members. An English translation was printed in the *London Times* on July 25, 1938.

League of Nations Covenant. Since they did not even go so far as to denounce this provision, let alone return to prewar neutrality, it means that the powers represented are for the time being still far from adopting our viewpoint, on which they are well-informed. In this connection two factors may have played a part. First, retarding elements, such as the attitudes of Holsti, and especially of Munch, which are determined by League ideology, might have prevailed in the deliberations according to the so-called "law of most resistance". Secondly, it also seems true that a notable easing of tension has occurred in world politics since the conference was first announced. I can imagine that the participants at the conference, particularly under the psychological impact of this factor, were content with a comparatively cautious wording pending the forthcoming discussion of this question in Geneva. For our appraisal of this result it seems significant that it was sharply criticized by the French.

Right after the conference I was able at the home of the Netherlands Minister here to discuss this whole problem with the Netherlands Foreign Minister, and thus to explain our viewpoint once more. While M. Patijn told me during this three-way conversation that the communiqué accurately reflected Dutch views, I nevertheless gained the impression from confidential hints of his colleague that the Dutch were not yet satisfied with the results.

The statements made by the Belgian Legation here went considerably further. There it was stated that the communiqué was the first step toward a complete release from article 16. The following was added confidentially: The next step would be that one of the Oslo Powers would approach England and France orally forthwith, i. e. before the next Geneva session, to seek a formal release from the obligations under article 16, basing their hopes on the argument that prior to such a release it could hardly be expected that any of the small states would declare a Great Power an "aggressor", should the occasion arise.<sup>4</sup>

According to reliable reports, the refugee question and the question of relations with the Franco Government were also briefly discussed at the conference, but no agreement was reached which it was thought could be made public.

In the *refugee question* they obviously did not overcome the obstacle that, on the one hand, they were unwilling openly to abandon the principle of the right of asylum, and, on the other hand, were neither

<sup>4</sup> Further information on these proposed negotiations has not been found in the German documents; however, Krauel forwarded from Geneva a memorandum "Proposals in regard to League Reform to be made by the Representative of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom", dated Foreign Office, Aug. 31, 1938 (26/16086-87). These proposals seem to agree substantially with those of the Oslo States.

willing nor able to carry it out in practice. At any rate, no progress was made beyond the Evian discussions<sup>6</sup> and the impending negotiations in London are awaited with some embarrassment.

In the *Spanish question* they are said to have agreed only that it would be left to each of the countries represented to arrange its relations with the Franco government according to its own judgment. Sweden in particular was said to be outspokenly opposed to granting Franco the rights of a belligerent power. Furthermore, Dr. Munch, as heretofore, maintained the Danish viewpoint that sending to Nationalist Spain a Danish representative with diplomatic or consular functions was out of the question. Still, Danish economic interests are so strong there that the Danish Government presumably will soon have to agree to sending a representative of Danish economic organizations to Nationalist Spain without official functions.

The sensitivity of the Danish press close to the Government to the critical foreign comments on the communiqué—regarding which a separate report<sup>6</sup> has been transmitted—should be proof that the Danish public is not altogether convinced of the practical political importance of the conference results.

DR. HENSEL

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 424, footnote 4.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2.

## No. 444

26/16029-30

### *The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry*

A IV 1 c 5

LUXEMBOURG, July 30, 1938.

Received August 1.

Pol. VI 1615.

Subject: Conference of Northern States in Copenhagen.

With reference to my report A III 1 of July 18, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

I had occasion to discuss with Foreign Minister Bech his impressions of the Copenhagen conference. Minister Bech, however, could not tell me anything beyond what has meanwhile become generally known, for, he said, nothing had actually been discussed that was not mentioned in the joint declaration.<sup>2</sup> The wording of the joint declaration, which was to prepare the position to be taken at this year's Geneva meeting had been produced through scrupulously careful and pains-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (26/15948-49). In this report Radowitz said that Bech had told him he would seek a full repudiation of article 16 at Copenhagen; he counted on strong support from Spaak on this question.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 443, footnote 3.



taking work. They will not ask formal recognition in Geneva of the position stated in the declaration, for they consider that they would be in a worse position if they did not receive such recognition. They will therefore confine themselves to informing the League of Nations of the viewpoint of the so-called alliance-free states. Whether this would be done in a joint declaration or whether each minister would speak separately for his government had not yet been determined.

In his exposition Foreign Minister Bech made the significant statement that all participants at the conference were completely convinced of the Führer's sincere desire for peace, but that the fear was expressed that perhaps Field Marshal Göring did not share this strong desire for peace to the same degree. In reply to this I pointed out to Minister Bech how illogical it was to attribute war plans to the very man who was charged with the execution of the Four Year Plan and who knew as no one else that involvement in war would most critically endanger this Plan. On the other hand, it was not surprising that Göring, the soldier conscious of his responsibility, passionately advocated everything that appeared necessary from a military point of view for the security of the Reich in any contingency.

RADOWITZ

No. 445

8558/E023332-38

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 70 g

HELSINKI, August 1, 1938.

Pol. VI 1655.

Subject: Factors which will determine the attitude of Finland in case of war.

It is unmistakable that the possibility of a European war is being taken into account to an increasing extent recently in Finland.

Various reasons are given for the danger of war. Most of all are mentioned: the heaping up of tinder throughout the world, for which the Czech question would supply the spark; the intensive work of international Jewry, noticeable for some time, toward a coalition war against Germany; the favorable opportunity for a war of annihilation against the Third Reich offered by Germany's isolation and the rearmament of the democratic Great Powers; and, finally, the alleged impasse in German economic policy, for which there would be no solution other than war.

It is not worth while going into these arguments here, but it is interesting that the Soviets no longer play any role in them as instigators of a world conflagration.

There arises the question as to what attitude Finland will take in the event of war.

In answering this question it will not help much to say that Finland is remaining neutral, no longer recognizes the mandatory provisions of article 16, and would be guided by the neutrality regulations recently published. One must assume, rather, that the concept of neutrality is very elastic and that, besides, in case of a European war, Finland's attitude will be determined by stronger forces than a concept of international law and its interpretation as conditioned by the times.

Finland's attitude in the event of war will depend on the interaction of factors already known with later circumstances as yet unknown. In this report I shall refrain from making any prophecies and only touch upon the factors that are now evident.

Finland has two Great Powers as her neighbors: Russia directly with a common frontier over a thousand kilometers in length, and Germany indirectly since both countries are situated on the Baltic. The Finnish-Russian border contains a particular element of danger by reason of the fact that Finnish territory and the islands off the coast more or less seal off from the sea Russia's largest port, Leningrad. Finnish policy in times of war will always consider Russia primarily and Germany secondarily and thus will take into account the balance of power existing on the Baltic at any given time. Finland, however, in contrast to the Baltic countries, is not a purely Baltic state, but has an emergency outlet to the ocean in the north which is open the year round. Finland thus has at her disposal additional operational possibilities of which she can be deprived in an emergency by Russia but not by Germany.

Besides these geographical factors, it may be accepted as an equally definite fact that at present Finland can only lose by war but not gain anything. Finnish territory is sufficient to feed the population and possesses adequate mineral resources. There are Finnish minorities, to be sure, in contiguous territories, but they constitute no *Irredenta*. Above all, the Karelian question<sup>1</sup> is a subject which engages the lively interest of youth, but it has been completely written off by the serious politicians in recent years. In the present distribution of power in the world, Finland is in a position not only to maintain her population on a much higher standard of living than formerly but even to accumulate considerable reserves for bad times. Finland today is therefore a satiated country interested in maintaining the *status quo*. Any war constitutes a source of danger for Finland which at the very

<sup>1</sup> A long-standing territorial dispute between Finland and the U. S. S. R. regarding interpretation of the Treaty of Dorpat of June 8, 1920. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923*, pp. 245-248.

least would necessarily affect Finland's export markets; in many cases, however, it would endanger the safety, even the existence of the country itself. A large sector of public opinion will, therefore, in case a European war breaks out, instinctively turn against the country which, in the eyes of the people here, bears the odium of aggressor. In deciding the question who the aggressor is, Finnish public opinion will allow itself to be influenced by the *communis opinio* in Stockholm and London.

How the opposing fronts line up in case of war will be a matter of primary importance for Finland's attitude. Until recently a war between Germany and Russia was regarded here as the likeliest possibility. If Russia should be the first power to occupy Finnish territory in such a war, Finland would automatically be led over to the German side. Should Germany be the first to violate Finnish territory, the Finnish people would offer armed resistance.

So long as Finnish territory is respected by both belligerents, Finland would do everything to stay out of the conflict. Moreover, the sympathies of the Finnish military, the Finnish Defense Corps [*Schutzkorps*],<sup>2</sup> and Finnish Rightist circles would be on the German side. But for the ruling Leftist circles the question of the cause of the war, the attitude of the democratic Great Powers, and other circumstances would be more important than the fact that Russia is a participant in the war.

Recently, however, the conviction has taken root in the Government and the parties supporting it, as well as in the top military command, that Russia is incapable of waging a war for years to come. In the minds of influential Finns, Russia is therefore discounted at present as a probable chief participant in a war.

Since the Czech question now dominates the political scene, they see here on the one side Berlin, and on the other side Prague, Paris, and London and also, to a certain extent, Moscow in their train.

National Socialism and Bolshevism, therefore, no longer appear as the two polar opposites but, instead, National Socialism and Democracy confront each other as probable opponents.

For a Finn this means nothing more or less than a complete shifting of the front. It must cause just as great a shift in Finland's ideological attitude toward a possible war. Eighty to ninety percent of the people are democratic in their sympathies and will not renounce these sympathies in a war that is represented to them as directed against Democracy.

Besides this ideological attitude, however, practical considerations as to which of the belligerents is to be regarded as the stronger and

<sup>2</sup> A paramilitary successor of the White Guard of 1918; it received some official recognition and support.

as the probable victor will play a role. So far as I am able to learn from confidential conversations, the strength of the Berlin-Rome Axis is underestimated among the leaders, while at the same time the Paris-London coalition is overrated. One of the Finnish leaders in foreign policy who is considered pro-German told me some time ago: "We consider a Paris-London coalition in the economic, intellectual, and, ultimately, even military field stronger than the Berlin-Rome Axis."

In the event of war we may not expect much support from the Finnish press. The powerful liberal and socialist press will, just as in peace time, take its slogans from Stockholm and London. Should England be one of our opponents the clamor of this press would completely drown out the organs of the National Coalition party and the IKL [Patriotic National Movement], which are favorable to us.

The Finnish officer corps will occupy a special position. So good and comradely a relationship exists between the Finnish officer corps and the German Army that the Government has to take this into consideration in making its decisions. The late Swedish Minister President Branting said once during the World War: "No war against Germany can be waged with the Swedish officer corps." The same might also be said of the Finnish officer corps. But, on the other hand, with the present distribution of forces, the Finnish officer corps cannot risk giving practical expression to its sympathy for Germany in war time, against the will of the Government. We must also take into account the fact that at the head of the Army and exercising great authority is Field Marshal Mannerheim, who is free from sentimentality.

In the economic field, however, Finland will hardly be in a position in time of war to sell her products to other than Baltic countries. To be sure, she can get nickel and other very valuable goods to the ocean via Petsamo, but it will hardly be possible to get the main product, lumber, out of the Baltic Sea. So long as Germany controls the Baltic it would be in the interest of Finnish lumber producers to ship sawn timber, mining timber, and pulp wood to Germany and in the interests of the Finnish farmers to send their surplus food production to Germany. We must not lose sight of the fact, however, that there are forces in the country that can prevent this. In view of the agitation against Germany among the workers by the Socialist press, it will not be difficult to start strikes against shipments to a Fascist country. A strike of the transport workers alone, who are known to be particularly radical, can stop all shipments.

Besides, the possibility must be taken into account that a financially strong country, such as England, may by buying up the entire export-

able production reduce to zero the interest among producers and exporters in trade with Germany.

A circumstance in our favor is the fact that Finland has no coal. If Finland does not succeed in obtaining British coal via Sweden she might be reduced to a position of dependence upon us in this field, which would be valuable to us; but in this connection we must not forget that Poland might fill this gap in the Finnish economy.

Anyone who does not wish to wander into the field of prophecy must stop here. From the foregoing there is no doubt, unfortunately, that in the factors distinguishable today that will determine Finland's attitude in case of war, the predominant elements are those that must be termed negative from the German standpoint.

V. BLÜCHER

No. 446

26/16048-47

*The Minister in Norway to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A <sup>1</sup>

Oslo, August 3, 1938.

Received August 6.

Pol. VI 1656.

Subject: Prewar neutrality.

With reference to your instruction Pol. VI 1372 of July 6, 1938.

On August 2 I had occasion to talk with Foreign Minister Koht on the basis of the instruction cited above. I explained to him that the possibility for the smaller countries to stay out of future wars lay in a return to the comprehensive concept of prewar neutrality and in faithful compliance with it. From the fact that Koht, who is otherwise very reserved, was unusually receptive, I may draw the conclusion that he has concerned himself with this question and that it interests him very much. He first asked the question that I had expected—"What is prewar neutrality?"—and without waiting for my reply to this question he made approximately the following statement: Through the World War as well as subsequently, conditions have changed so essentially that what was once generally valid no longer applies today. The wheel of history cannot be turned back. But neither can principles now be established that are generally applicable; rather, decision must be reserved depending upon the circumstances prevailing, and then the decision must be made quickly and implemented effectively. Moreover, economic developments in the individual countries, particularly the exportation of raw mate-

<sup>1</sup> The ciphers ordinarily included in the reference numbers of Mission reports are absent from the original of this document, presumably omitted by error.

rials, will be essentially different from those during the World War. Most countries have adopted the policy of satisfying their economic requirements as far as possible from their own resources. The result will be that in a future war governments will be concerned with keeping available raw materials within the country as far as possible and exploiting them accordingly.

When I pointed out that this would not be possible in the case of certain raw materials, such as ores, since production exceeded home consumption, he did not go into the matter any further.

In answer to my further question whether this matter had been discussed at the recent conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Oslo Powers at Copenhagen, he replied very emphatically in the negative.

If this matter should be further discussed either here or elsewhere, it might be advisable, for the guidance of conversations, to limit the very comprehensive concept of prewar neutrality more closely to those questions in whose treatment the German Government is especially interested.

In reply to Economic Policy Department's W 383 g. Rs.,<sup>2</sup> I have sent a special report<sup>2</sup> along with a copy of this report.

DR. SAHM

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

## No. 447

1910/430073

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL  
A 1927

STOCKHOLM, August 11, 1938.  
Received August 13.  
Pol. VI 1708.

Subject: Finno-Swedish negotiations concerning modification of the Åland Convention.

Apropos of my question regarding the object of the recent visit of Finnish Foreign Minister Holsti to Stockholm, M. Boheman, the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry here, gave me the following information, with the request that it be transmitted in strictly confidential manner to my Government.

As we probably knew, negotiations concerning a modification of the provisions of the Åland Convention were pending between the Swedish and Finnish Governments, as the parties most vitally interested. These negotiations were well under way but not yet concluded. He could therefore not give me any details at the present time. In any case, however, it was not a question of removing the limitations from the Convention altogether; rather it involved chiefly

Finnish, though also Swedish, "measures for better guaranteeing the neutrality of the Åland Islands", which measures were to be carried out by mutual agreement. After an accord was reached, the Swedish and Finnish Governments would submit their proposals jointly to the Powers signatory to the convention.

BELOW

No. 448

3684/E035459-61

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, September 21, 1938.  
e. o. Pol. VI 1978.

Yesterday Captain Muhl, the Swedish Naval Attaché, whom I know well and who is being transferred to Stockholm, paid me his farewell visit. M. Muhl revealed his concern that in a great European conflagration with Germany at war against Russia a dangerous situation might arise for German-Swedish communications in the Baltic Sea, threatening in particular our ore shipments from Luleå and the ferry connections between Trälleborg and Sassnitz. This might possibly force Germany to take countermeasures. M. Muhl appeared to fear in general that in defending ourselves from Russian (or British) action against us in the Baltic Sea (that is, in the Skagerrak and Kattegat) a situation might arise which could lead us to violate somehow the neutrality of Scandinavian territory. I told M. Muhl that personally I was firmly convinced that in case of war we contemplated no violation of Scandinavian territory whatsoever in our military operations on land, at sea, or in the air. On the other hand, in my opinion, the situation might take an entirely different and unforeseeable turn:

(a) if one of the Scandinavian countries should participate at all in a so-called sanctions policy against us, and (b) if other powers should violate the neutrality of Scandinavian territory, especially at sea or in the air by establishing naval or air bases on Scandinavian territory, unless the Scandinavian countries did everything in their power to defend themselves against such violation. M. Muhl understood this perfectly. In this connection I particularly stressed that in case (b) the violation would come from the other powers, and Scandinavian neutrality would thereby be rendered illusory by these powers; case (a), however, would mean that the Scandinavian Government concerned abandoned neutrality of its own accord. But then it would have to recognize the possible consequences of thus abandoning a neutral policy.

M. Muhl then turned in particular to the question of the Swedish ore deliveries, and asked if we were counting on the continuation of full deliveries in case of war. I replied that to us it was self-evident

that ore shipments to Germany must be kept at least at the same level even in case of war, in accordance with the existing delivery contracts. I had to state most emphatically my conviction that this point is of greatest importance; it is actually the one hyper-sensitive point in German-Swedish relations, one which, I thought, Sweden ought not to open up at all. M. Muhl declared that he had expected this attitude; he merely remarked that in Nuremberg Field Marshal Göring had said we were well supplied with ore for a long time to come. I replied that in my opinion this point of view was irrelevant to the question of judging Sweden's actual neutrality. M. Muhl also expressed doubt whether our ore supplies were actually adequate for any length of time. He could hardly imagine how in a conflict also involving England the ore could reach Germany during winter, since the Gulf of Bothnia was frozen over from October to May, and shipments would have to go by way of Narvik and the Atlantic Ocean. I did not go into this question any further and merely replied that how we would get the ore to Germany was really our concern. M. Muhl showed plainly in the course of the conversation that he personally, at least, was seriously worried about a possible Russian thrust into Norwegian Finnmarken and Swedish Lapland. Naturally I supported him in this train of thought.

In this connection it is particularly interesting to us that in Stockholm, M. Muhl will have charge of naval mine defense and of protecting shipping lanes within Swedish territorial waters against mines, etc. It will surely be useful, particularly for our Naval Attaché in Stockholm, to maintain close contact with him.

GRUNDHERR

### No. 449

1910/430095

*The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in Finland*

Telegram

No. 70

BERLIN, September 21, 1938.

Sent September 22—1:10 p. m.

zu Pol. VI 1943 I.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to report No. 1843 II of September 13.<sup>1</sup>

If you should be asked about the position of the German Government with regard to the refortification of the Åland Islands, please

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1910/430093-94). Counselor of Legation Adelmann at Helsinki reported that Secretary General Kivikoski of the Finnish Foreign Ministry said he thought most of the signatories of the Åland Convention would concur in the proposed refortification, but that France might be influenced by the Soviet Union (not a signatory) to object. Adelmann asked if he might make use of the statements contained in a memorandum of Mar. 25 (identical with the document printed as No. 420) which had been sent to him in an instruction of Mar. 28 (6716/E509679-81).



state that you have no instructions on the matter from Berlin. There are no objections if in this connection you convey as your personal views the statements up to the words "make no difficulties" of the memorandum<sup>2</sup> transmitted with instruction Pol. VI 641 of March 28, 1938.

WOERMANN<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> That is, to the end of the seventh sentence of document No. 420.

<sup>2</sup> Typewritten minute by Grundherr, the drafting officer: "From the tactical point of view it would appear more expedient if the Finnish Government is informed here in Berlin of our official views, as a signatory power of the Åland Convention, on the question of the refortification of the Åland Islands. In this connection we have the opportunity to declare that we expect the Finnish Government never to become involved in any sort of sanctions policy against Germany."

Marginal note: "After transmission, attention Herr von Grundherr: I should like to leave open the question as to *where* the official declaration will be made later on. W[oermann]."

## No. 450

1910/430087-82

### *Circular of the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, September 24, 1938.

zu Pol. VI 1912<sup>2</sup>

1916<sup>3</sup>

1932.

I am transmitting herewith for your confidential information copies of reports of September 10 and 12 on the Åland question from the German Legations at Helsinki<sup>3</sup> and Stockholm<sup>2</sup> respectively. At the same time I am enclosing the text of the French translation of the speech of September 8 by Foreign Minister Sandler,<sup>4</sup> which was put

<sup>1</sup> Addressees of this circular and its accompanying enclosures were the Missions in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Finland (minus the enclosure referred to in footnote 3), Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Consulate General at Memel, and the Consulate at Geneva; copies were dispatched between Sept. 26 and 30 by diplomatic pouch or courier. Copies were also sent to the Foreign Department of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the High Command of the Navy, and the Air Ministry. In a shorter version of the dispatch sent to the Legation in Sweden, Grundherr stated that he had discussed the Sandler speech at length with Swedish Minister Richert and had told him that Sandler's "sharp words against a blind *status-quo* policy were particularly gratifying."

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (1910/430077-81). A report by Counselor of Legation Below in Stockholm on the speech discussed in the circular and on the attitude of the Åland Islanders, as expressed by a majority of the Landsting at Mariehamn, who desired continuance of the Convention of 1921.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (1910/430082-86). A report by Counselor of Legation Adelman in Helsinki on a speech by M. Cajander, President of the Council of Ministers, regarding Finland's attitude in the Åland question, plus some information acquired by the German Military Attaché as to the practical measures proposed for fortifying the Islands.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (6716/E509686-700).

at my disposal by the Swedish Government and which is noteworthy in many respects.

From the German point of view it is gratifying that Foreign Minister Sandler, although a Social Democrat, in one passage of his speech points out the danger of a blind *status-quo* policy. Noteworthy from the military point of view are his statements about mutual assistance by the Scandinavian States respecting their economic supplies in case of a conflict, in which connection the question of mutual provision of war matériel among the Scandinavian States was also discussed. M. Sandler's statements regarding a joint air defence are likewise noteworthy, as well as the statement that Northern Scandinavia, the southern coastal regions, and the Åland Islands are to be considered as points which are particularly menaced in Scandinavia. M. Sandler discusses in detail the Swedish Government's views on the new settlement of the Åland question.

The Swedish Minister in Berlin during a conversation also called my special attention to this passage in the speech: "it is of very great importance to the two states on the Gulf of Bothnia that in case war threatens in the Baltic Sea such a key position—meaning the Åland Islands—should not under any pretext fall into the hands of a Great Power." From this sentence and the sentences immediately following in M. Sandler's speech the conclusion can probably be drawn that, should occasion arise, the Swedish Government is prepared to intervene for the security of the Åland Islands.

By order:  
VON GRUNDHERR

### No. 451

1766/405681-88

#### *The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 339 M

COPENHAGEN, September 28, 1938.

Received September 29.

Pol. VI 2049.

Subject: Attitude of Denmark in case of a European conflict.

With reference to my report No. 339 M of September 26.<sup>1</sup>

During my call today, I explained to the Foreign Minister, who had returned from Geneva feeling very pessimistic, the German stand on the Czech question, on the basis of the instructions received and the Führer's address.

M. Munch declared that, in his opinion, the situation was to be considered very serious. If it came to an armed conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia, he did not believe in the possibility

<sup>1</sup> Vol. II, document No. 628.

of localizing it, unless Czechoslovakia should disregard the counsel of England and France. He still had hope, however, that an agreement would be reached between Germany, on the one side, and England and France, on the other, before it was too late. In reply to the inquiry addressed to him from various sides as to whether he would participate in an international effort at mediation, he has declared that Denmark would not refuse her cooperation if some action such as the plebiscite held in the Saar region was involved.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister remarked further that if it should come to a conflict in Europe, Denmark would undoubtedly have an interest in retaining Germany's confidence in a correct Danish attitude. Denmark would not participate in sanctions of any kind and would maintain neutrality and impartiality not only in the political and the military field, but also in the economic field. Of course, Denmark would have to keep up her trade not only with Germany, but also with other countries, England in particular. In his opinion, this should be based on the ratio existing between the individual countries during the preceding year. M. Munch evaded the question whether Denmark would avoid taking any position at all in case of a possible action against us by the League of Nations.

When I told M. Munch that neutrality would naturally have to be effective in the domain of public opinion and of the press also, adding that I had to make emphatic representations against the partisan and spiteful attitude of a large portion of the newspapers, he said that Denmark would take the same measures as in the World War. Besides, immediately after his return he had urged the Danish newspapers to adopt more restraint than heretofore.

So far Denmark had not adopted any large-scale precautionary military measures. As is known, only the crews in the coastal fortifications and in the Navy, who otherwise would have been released in the fall, had been kept on. If new measures should be taken, he would endeavor to inform us concerning them in advance. Of course, in such a case he would also have to inform England and France. The precautionary measures taken, which in case of an aggravation of the situation would extend not only to the coasts but also to the land frontiers, were not at all aimed at us, but would have the purpose only of maintaining order in the sense of the obligations of neutrality incumbent upon Denmark.

<sup>2</sup>On Sept. 29 Renth-Fink stated in a letter to Grundherr (2768/536122) that the United States Government had approached Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries with the suggestion that they join in a last appeal to Hitler and Beneš to compose their differences peacefully. From what Munch told Renth-Fink, the latter believed that the Danes were reluctant to take such a step, and regarded it as wiser to limit themselves to making available their good offices if requested. Meanwhile Denmark was exchanging views with the other Scandinavian states, and this might bring a decision whether to join the proposed appeal.

In addition, the Director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed to me that Denmark would not take any stand as long as conflict was confined to Germany and Czechoslovakia. A declaration of neutrality would be made only if there was a conflict between Germany and some other Great Power.

I assured the Foreign Minister that, in case we should become involved in a conflict, we on our part would also lay stress on maintaining relations of friendship and confidence with Denmark, provided Denmark assumed a correct attitude toward us.

RENTHE-FINK

No. 452

1910/430108-09

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 13, 1938.

Pol. VI 2144.

M. Boheman, the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm, visited me today on his trip to Berlin, Paris, and London.

I strongly urged upon M. Boheman an improvement in the tone of the Swedish press.

On his part M. Boheman brought up the Åland question. In order to prepare us he wished to inform me that in one to two months the Swedish and Finnish Governments would approach us, as a signatory of the Åland Convention, in order to obtain our approval of a new settlement between Sweden and Finland. In broad outline, this would consist in the following:

Finland would obtain the right to make certain military preparations on a number of the islands in the Åland group, namely, on the islands south of a line approximately corresponding to the 60th degree of latitude. The inhabitants of the islands located north of this line would in the future be subject to military service on the islands; these inhabitants had hitherto under the international agreement been exempt from military service. Furthermore, Finland reserved the right in case of need to request Swedish aid for defending the neutrality of the Åland Islands, and Sweden was disposed to grant such a request.

I remarked on the matter only in passing, stating that so far as I knew the refortification of the Åland Islands would probably not be opposed by Germany. Naturally, a detailed examination would have to be reserved.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 453

1910/430107

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, October 14, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VI 2189.

The Finnish Minister yesterday told me the following privately and confidentially:

The fact that the Swedish Government has finally consented to fortification of the Åland Islands on the scale now known was attributable solely to the anxiety of the Swedish Government over the possibility of a German attack on these islands. The Minister did not say expressly that the Finnish Government had exploited this argument vis-à-vis the Swedish Government; however, in view of M. Holsti's being involved, there can hardly be any doubt about it.

GRUNDHERR

## No. 454

2653/527353-54

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 157 A

COPENHAGEN, October 25, 1938.

Received October 26.

Pol. VI 2243.

Subject: Reaction to the Führer's statement on the territorial demands of Germany.

The Führer's statement in his speech of September 24 [26] in the Berlin Sportpalast, that after the solution of the Sudeten-German question there was no longer any territorial problem for Germany in Europe, has been received here with interest on account of its implied significance for North Schleswig. Insofar as the public discussed the statement to any considerable extent, a tendency was noted to give it the interpretation that all Germany's frontiers, and hence the German-Danish frontier as well, were thereby recognized by Germany as final. This interpretation has been used against the German minority in order to indicate to it that it now has to reconcile itself to the existing frontier and will be guilty of disobedience to the Führer if it continues to discuss the frontier and strive for a revision.<sup>1</sup> Especially the chairman<sup>2</sup> of the Conservatives, who, as you know, are the spokes-

<sup>1</sup> Another copy of the document (2653/527355-56) has a marginal note in Grundherr's handwriting: "Just what the Lithuanians have told the population of Memel."

<sup>2</sup> J. Christmas Møller.

men on the frontier question, has expressed himself to this effect on various occasions, particularly in the last Rigsdag debate.

The Government has so far not taken any public stand; nor has it discussed the subject with me. This reserve is probably due to the fact that the Führer's statement did not specifically refer to the German-Danish frontier and that the tactics of the Danish Government are to represent the border question as definitively settled and at the same time to emphasize that from the ethnic point of view there could be no better and juster solution. Naturally it remains the unexpressed wish of the Danish Government to obtain an explicit and specific recognition of the German-Danish frontier, all the more so as the enormous strengthening of Germany and the intense growth in self-confidence of the German minority have recently increased the anxiety of wide circles in Denmark about North Schleswig.

The leaders of the German minority did not take the Führer's statement to be a recognition of the German-Danish frontier. This is indicated by the statement made at the conference of party officials at Aabenraa at the beginning of October by the NSDAPN leader, the veterinarian Dr. Möller: The Danes want to read into the statements of the Führer regarding territorial demands in Europe a recognition of the German-Danish frontier, although this has not been the subject of any negotiations between Berlin and Copenhagen. Did they dare to maintain that the principle of self-determination was satisfied by the fictitious plebiscite with the *en bloc* division in 1920? And what then of the consequences which they would have to draw from their own attitude?

RENTHE-FINK

No. 455

2653/527357

*Minister Renthe-Fink to Senior Counselor Grundherr*

COPENHAGEN, October 25, 1938.

Received October 26.

zu Pol. VI 2243.

DEAR GRUNDHERR: In today's report No. 157 A, of which I am enclosing a copy,<sup>1</sup> I have presented, in accordance with your wish, the reaction of Danish public opinion to the Führer's statement regarding the territorial demands of Germany. You will see from it that there is a tendency here to infer an indirect recognition of the German-Danish frontier or a renunciation of territorial revision, while the German minority of course ardently advocates the opposite point of

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 454.

view. I can understand that there is no desire in Berlin to go into any further details as to interpretation of the Führer's statement, and for that reason I have refrained from asking for instructions as guidance for my conversations. But naturally I am repeatedly approached on the matter. I have so far used the expedient of tossing the ball back and saying that actually, quite apart from our attitude, the Danes should see the necessity of seeking a direct understanding with us on this question. However, in order that I may be quite sure of my course, I should appreciate it if you would speak to the State Secretary about the matter and write me a few lines.

With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!

As ever,

RENTHE-FINK

No. 456

2658/527360-61

*Senior Counselor Grundherr to Minister Renthe-Fink*

[BERLIN,] November 2, 1938.

Sent November 3.

zu Pol. VI 2243.

MY DEAR HERR VON RENTHE-FINK: AS a result of the excessive work load in connection with Memel affairs I have unfortunately not had time until today to thank you for your interesting report No. 157 A of October 25 and your letter of the same date addressed to me. I have discussed the matter on a higher level here in the Ministry. We have taken the following position here (for example vis-à-vis Lithuania, i. e. for Memel naturally, in reply to a question of the Lithuanian Minister concerning the meaning of the Führer's statement, "no more territorial demands in Europe"): Naturally we cannot and must not interpret a statement by the Führer, although there is one thing that the Führer's statement undoubtedly does not mean: namely, that the Reich Government has disinterested itself in the fate and treatment of Volksdeutsche on our frontiers. In this connection I was able to point to a passage of the Führer's speech in Nuremberg in which this thought is expressed.<sup>1</sup>

We naturally read your report No. 11 D of October 18 with the greatest interest.<sup>2</sup> I also discussed that on a higher level here, and we

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 357.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (1766/405684-87). The report reviewed a speech by Minister of State Stauning in which he stated that recent events had shown the unwisdom of frontier settlements in 1918 which took advantage of the temporary German weakness. According to the report, Stauning said that "The Peace of 1918 was a very bad bit of jerry-building." But he added that because Denmark's frontier revision at that time had been just and her minority policy since then equally so, he assumed that Denmark could confront future developments with calm.

came to the decision that no response was to be made to the feelers by Stauning, either in the press or through you. The decisive factor here was that we are now really loaded down with foreign-policy problems; first in the Southeast, then in Memel, where elections are to take place on December 11, and in Danzig. I also believe that this policy of silence is the correct one, since it will make the Danes more amenable, especially if in the course of time perhaps other frontier problems may be settled in a manner favorable to us.

So much for today. With cordial greetings,  
Heil Hitler!

As ever yours,

VON GRUNDBERR

No. 457

2619/525576-80

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

Pol. VI 2367.<sup>1</sup>

I. *The Scandinavian countries, including Finland*, took a neutral stand during the Czech crisis, in line with the neutrality policy<sup>2</sup> they have been stressing more and more in recent years (to keep out of all conflicts between the Great Powers, article 16 not obligatory, leaving the Governments full freedom of action in arriving at any decision on sanctions). The press in these countries, however, particularly the Social Democratic and the leftist press, as well as a considerable section of public opinion have not shown what we would consider a really neutral attitude; this was especially true in the days between Godesberg and Munich. In the press the following arguments were advanced especially against German policy and also against that of the "Big Four" at Munich:

Germany's policy is a policy of force. France and England left Czechoslovakia in the lurch. The Great Powers decreed the fate of Czechoslovakia. Behind all these statements lay the fear that in case of a great European conflagration the medium-sized and small countries would be overpowered by the big ones and that might would triumph over right.

(a) *Norway*

The Norwegian Minister President<sup>3</sup> terms Norway's neutrality as something that goes without saying. M. Hambro, the President of the Norwegian Storting, spoke in a very anti-German manner, and—

<sup>1</sup> The document is undated but was initialed by Grundherr on Nov. 8, 1938, when he referred it to other officials of the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 424, 435, 440, 441, 443, 446 above, and vol. II, document No. 628.

<sup>3</sup> Minister of State Johan Nygaardsvold. See also vol. II, document No. 484.



after Munich—declared in violent attacks on Chamberlain and the Führer that peace had been maintained by an act of violence without parallel in the history of civilized nations. M. Hambro found particular words of praise for M. Beneš. It was interesting to note that part of the Norwegian press strongly opposed M. Hambro, though probably mainly for criticizing Chamberlain so sharply.

(b) *Denmark*

Minister of State Stauning adhered to neutrality,<sup>4</sup> and in a radio address at the height of the crisis he gave the Danish people to understand that there was no reason for them to be apprehensive. An export ban issued September 29 on certain goods (such as raw materials and colonial products) but excepting normal exports and the fulfillment of commercial agreements was lifted on October 1.

Atrocity propaganda against Germany which appeared in various Danish newspapers, particularly in the days following the German military occupation of the Sudetenland, gave the Danish Government occasion—though not without energetic intervention by our Minister—to adjure the press and the public to exercise calm and objective judgement. Blaedel, the well-known writer on foreign policy of *Berlingske Tidende*, who is particularly hostile toward Germany, was given a long leave and in addition his radio talks on foreign policy were for the time being discontinued.

(c) *Sweden*

The Swedish Government also assumed an irreproachably neutral attitude.<sup>5</sup> Swedish military circles, as was revealed by a conversation with the Swedish Naval Attaché in Berlin,<sup>6</sup> were obviously concerned that if Russia entered the conflict, the sea routes from Sweden to Germany might be disturbed by Russian submarines and Sweden might thus be drawn into the conflict. The question of continued delivery of Swedish ores to Germany apparently also occupied the Swedish Government during these days. It apparently considered first stopping all Swedish ore exports completely and then apportioning them in "a strictly neutral manner" so that 50 percent would go to England and 50 percent to Germany—a considerable reduction for Germany. We stressed to the Swedes the fact that continued shipments to Germany in the usual volume as provided in present

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 451.

<sup>5</sup> On Sept. 27 the Foreign Ministry sent to its principal Missions a circular (3696/E035888-90) summarizing Foreign Minister Sandler's speech of Aug. 28 regarding Swedish foreign policy. In the circular, signed by Grundherr, the speech was characterized as showing in some passages "a will to objectivity and a gratifying understanding for the German point of view and for the need to revise [the Treaty of] Versailles." See also vol. II, document No. 485 for additional material on the Swedish attitude during the Czech crisis.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 448.

delivery contracts was for us a *noli me tangere* (cf. my conversation with the Swedish Naval Attaché here). The attitude of the press and the public in Sweden was in large part decidedly anti-German, particularly after Godesberg. Representations to the Foreign Ministry by our Minister caused the Government to call upon newspaper editors to exercise more reserve in judging and discussing these historic events.<sup>7</sup> In reply the press, as in the other Scandinavian countries, asserted in its editorials that it was morally obligated not to suppress the truth.

(d) *Finland* would also have remained neutral in case of war; she would have opposed occupation of any part of her territory by a belligerent power. The press, which except for the small rightist segment was not friendly to Germany, during the crisis discontinued its attacks on Germany and took pains to maintain a neutral attitude.

## II. *The three Baltic countries*

Shortly before the Czech crisis became acute the Governments of the three Baltic countries had issued declarations to the effect that they did not consider article 16 (sanctions) obligatory upon them. It is characteristic of the political course of the three countries of the Baltic Entente that this declaration was made at the insistence of Estonia, which had already been negotiating on this question for some time with the Latvian and Lithuanian Governments. The Governments of all three countries took a neutral attitude during the crisis. But if one takes into consideration the inner convictions of the Governments, as well as public opinion and the attitude of the press in these countries, a considerable divergence of opinion is evident.

### (a) *Estonia*

The Estonian Government and the Army adopted a strictly neutral attitude during the crisis. On the other hand, the attitude of the press and the general public was different. These frequently gave expression to their very definitely anti-German attitude, even toward Volksdeutsche and German nationals living in Estonia. There seems to have been no lack of attempts to induce Estonia to abandon her neutral course; it is reported that the French and British Legations in Reval also took part in them. It is a fact that numerous British and French agents visited Estonia during the critical days.

### (b) *Latvia*

The Latvian Government outwardly maintained the principle of neutrality, to be sure; but the authoritarian Government at least

<sup>7</sup> A copy of a confidential letter by Minister of State Per Albin Hansson and Sandler requesting Swedish editors to observe caution not only in their editorial comment but also in contributed material, cartoons, and headlines was sent to Berlin by Minister Wied on Oct. 10 (3514/E020769-75).

tolerated the very tendentious anti-German reports in the Latvian press. In parts of the population the mood was extremely agitated during the days of the crisis, and this was clearly shown by the hostile attitude toward German nationals and Volksdeutsche. The popular mood was such that in the event of a Russian invasion of eastern Latvia the Russian Army would presumably have been received with open arms by the people, and in case of war even the Latvian Government would have been neither willing nor able to offer serious resistance to a Soviet Russian invasion. During the crisis Russian submarines are said to have betrayed their presence in the Gulf of Riga by radio communications.

(c) *Lithuania*

The Lithuanian Government at the very beginning declared its desire to remain neutral in case of a European conflict. Lithuanian public opinion did not react in any significant way during the period of the crisis. In the Memel Territory the population likewise maintained discipline during those days.

GRUNDHERR

No. 458

2608/525314-18

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 137 g

HELSINKI, November 21, 1938.

Received November 26.

Pol. VI 2533.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Transformation of the Åland problem.

The Finnish and Swedish Governments and the General Staffs of the two countries have for months been negotiating on the Åland question. Apparently they wish first of all to achieve full agreement between themselves before approaching the other signatories to the Convention. It is significant that Germany, which is the only Great Power signatory on the Baltic Sea and whose interests are considerably affected by discussion of the question, was not kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.

If matters are considered from an outsider's viewpoint, one cannot avoid the impression that the Åland problem is undergoing a transformation.

From the Treaty of Paris in 1856 to the World War it was a matter of preventing Russia from exploiting the geopolitical possibilities of the Åland Islands against Sweden and from making these islands a "pistol pointed at the heart of Sweden." During the World War

these tendencies gave way to military considerations. In 1921, however, when the Åland Convention was concluded under the aegis of the League of Nations without Russia's participation, the signatories were again influenced by fears which referred chiefly to Russia in spite of the fact that Finland now exercised sovereignty over the island group.

The complete failure of the League of Nations, Russia's weakening and passivity, as well as Germany's growing strength and dynamic character are three factors which have since deeply influenced views on the Åland problem and are greatly occupying public opinion, especially in Sweden and Finland, the two countries most concerned. Confidence in the League of Nations has probably disappeared similarly in both countries. According to Finnish reports, the Russian danger no longer plays any role in Sweden. In Finland, to be sure, it is exploited by the military and the defense corps and the circles back of them as propaganda for arming the nation, but the leading persons themselves no longer believe in it. The Finnish impression is that the so-called German danger has finally replaced the Russian danger in very extensive circles in Sweden, and the Swedish negotiators at the Åland conferences are said to have made no secret of the fact that they regard Germany especially as a presumptive aggressor. In Finland the officer corps and the rightist parties are so far not expecting any danger from Germany, but the Government and the leftist parties supporting it, which have, after all, two-thirds of the people back of them, differ little from the Swedish attitude toward Germany.

While we had hitherto assumed in Germany that the fortification of the Åland Islands was directed against Russia, we must now get used to the idea that the Governments of the two countries chiefly involved, Sweden and Finland, intend to construct these fortifications against Germany. If, therefore, these two countries ask us in the near future to approve the abrogation of the Åland Convention, they are requesting nothing more or less than our consent to a fortification of the Åland Islands *against Germany*.

However, the question is not only *against whom* the islands are to be fortified, but also *how* they are to be fortified. Hitherto it has always been stated officially that it is only a question of fortifying a few skerries in the southern part of the group. Irresponsible publicists, however, have already said that skerries located between the Swedish mainland and the Åland group and hence dominating the Kvarken Strait would also have to be included in the fortifications. These skerries do not belong to the Åland group, and their fortification is therefore not subject to the approval of third powers.

Such an extension of the fortifications would have the effect not only of safeguarding the Ålands against a sudden attack but also of creating a complete defense belt from the Finnish Coast to the Swedish Coast, with the Åland Islands forming the center. With this belt Sweden and Finland could in wartime close the Kvarken Strait and shut off the Gulf of Bothnia from the rest of the Baltic. Whether this would be to Germany's advantage or disadvantage in an emergency would depend on the political constellation at the time. In any case, our shipping connections with the ore-loading port of Tornio and the other northern harbors of Sweden, as well as with all the harbors of Finland, would be subject to the will of the two nations controlling the fortifications. Our political position in the Baltic region could hardly fail to be adversely affected thereby.

According to information from various quarters, however, the two Governments and their military advisers are actually only planning, for the time being, to construct the proposed fortifications on the southern skerries of the Åland group. But we should not lose sight of the possibility that once the signatory powers have consented to fortification of the Åland Islands the thought of extending the fortifications to the Kvarken Strait will also gain ground in official quarters. Then, however, we shall no longer have any legal means of opposing it.

In view of the changes described I should like to suggest that even now, before the request for modification of the Convention is received, the Åland problem be re-examined and special study be given to the question whether our consent to the fortification of the Åland Islands should perhaps be linked with reservations which would guarantee us against the closing of the Kvarken Strait.

BLÜCHER

No. 459

2602/525208

*The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 184 B

COPENHAGEN, January 3, 1939.

Received January 5.

Pol. VI 34.

Subject: Statements by the Minister of State and the Foreign Minister on the North Schleswig question.

With reference to my reports No. 419 C 1 and 50 C 1 of January 2.<sup>1</sup>

In their New Year's speeches Minister of State Stauning and Foreign Minister Munch again referred, among other things, to the frontier

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2602/525199-201 and 525202-05). The two reports contain a lengthy account of the statements made by the two Danish leaders.

question. Occasion was provided by the constantly recurring biased reports of the Soviet press and certain French sources to the effect that in the commercial-treaty negotiations Germany exerted pressure on Denmark in the frontier question and that a secret agreement between Germany and Denmark on a frontier settlement already existed. Although these rumors have often been denied officially by the Danes, they have continued with great persistency in the local Communist press. The two Ministers therefore felt that they ought emphatically to counter these rumors again and label them as completely absurd. In so doing they took the familiar stand that since in 1920 the frontier had been drawn according to the right of self-determination of nations and the German minority had been granted free cultural activity, there was no longer any German-Danish frontier problem. Unlike Foreign Minister Munch, Minister of State Stauning asserted that at the time both parties had promised to respect the result of the plebiscite.

Since our tactics have hitherto been to avoid an open discussion of the frontier question and to meet Danish statements on it with official silence, I believe that it might be advisable this time, also, to leave it to the frontier press to discuss the statements made by Minister of State Stauning and Foreign Minister Munch and undertake a rectification, especially since it is a question of statements which were made incidentally.

RENTHE-FINK

## No. 460

2608/525354-58

### *Memorandum of Political Division VI<sup>1</sup>*

zu Pol. VI 180.<sup>2</sup>

Subject: Conference in the Foreign Ministry on January 17, 1939,  
on the Fortification of the Southernmost Åland Islands.

A list of the participants is attached.<sup>3</sup>

*Under State Secretary Woermann:* Germany cannot raise any objections against the fortification as such of the southern part of the

<sup>1</sup> The document is unsigned but is initialed at the end by both Grundherr and Hügél of Political Division VI. Both also made minor handwritten corrections.

<sup>2</sup> Pol. VI 180 is a covering letter (2608/525352-53), not printed, which transmitted the memorandum for information to the Foreign Intelligence Section of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, to the High Command of the Navy, and to the German Legations in Finland and Sweden.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (2608/525359). The Director of the Political Department served as chairman and representatives were present from the Political, Legal, and Economic Policy Departments of the Foreign Ministry, as well as from the Navy and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Åland Islands proposed by Finland and Sweden. The fortification is rather in Germany's interest. It is true that in the eyes of the Swedes the fortification of the islands is frequently regarded as directed against Germany or at least *also* against Germany. For us, however, the essential thing is that the Åland Islands are safeguarded against possible seizure by Soviet Russia. The only question which should therefore be discussed is whether the plan for fortifying the Åland Islands should not be used as an occasion for persuading the Swedes to give certain assurances. The German Minister in Helsinki has, as is known, brought up the question whether the closing of the Kvarken Strait would be contrary to our interests. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has proposed that we consider making our consent to the fortification of the Åland Islands conditional upon a declaration by Sweden that she is prepared: (1) to maintain ore deliveries at their peacetime level even in the event of war, and (2) to guarantee the safety of our ore shipments, especially in the Gulf of Bothnia.

*Lieutenant Commander Neubauer:* Germany does not intend to use the Åland Islands for military operations in the foreseeable future. It is therefore best for Germany if the Åland Islands remain in neutral hands. Their fortification lessens the danger that a non-neutral power will establish itself there. The fortification is therefore in our interest. As far as the Gulf of Bothnia is concerned no German military operations are contemplated there. The possibility brought up by Minister von Blücher is not at present considered especially serious by the Naval High Command. In the event of war Swedish ore shipments could probably be cut off more simply by means other than a closing of the Gulf of Bothnia.

*Under State Secretary Woermann:* There is a possibility that Russian submarines may appear in the Gulf of Bothnia.

*Lieutenant Commander Neubauer:* The ore transports can sail in Swedish territorial waters if Sweden remains neutral. Otherwise the German Navy would take the proper steps to protect the ore shipments.

*Under State Secretary Woermann:* It would be possible to tell the Swedes, as soon as they approach us with regard to modification of the Åland Convention, that we could agree to the modification only under certain conditions.

*Counselor van Scherpenberg:* We know that in the event of war the Swedes intend, for reasons of neutrality, to divide ore exports between England and Germany so that each will receive 50 percent. Such a settlement would mean a reduction in the German quota. We

might counter this plan by urging Sweden to increase the total ore exports; this would be quite possible under Swedish law. In connection with the discussion of the plan for modifying the Åland Convention we could perhaps try to demand a guarantee from Sweden that ore deliveries to Germany would not be reduced in the event of war.

*Senior Counselor von Grundherr:* The complications in the negotiations concerning modification of the Convention—complications which might possibly result from such a demand—might in practice be more disadvantageous to Finland than to Sweden.

*Ministerial Counselor Dr. Eckhardt:* I have heard from a reliable source that in the September crisis the British brought very strong pressure to bear on the Swedes for discontinuance of ore deliveries to Germany, pressure which the Swedes would probably not have been able to resist very long.

*Counselor van Scherpenberg:* The British influence on the Graen-  
gesberg Company is not very great; the Swedish Government controls about 50 percent of this company.

*Under State Secretary Woermann:* Isn't it true that strikes would play no decisive role among the possibilities of disrupting our ore imports from Northern Sweden in the event of war? Sales to England might represent a much greater danger than work stoppage. For that matter, Germany could not, by the methods under consideration, protect herself in any way against a strike.

*Lieutenant Commander Neubauer:* Germany would protest against any violation of neutrality, exert pressure on Sweden in accordance with the situation, and if necessary defend herself with suitable means.

In the negotiations about modifying the Convention it might be pointed out that we of course expect Sweden to defend her neutrality with all available means; if she should not wish or be able to do this, Germany would have to draw the logical conclusions and reserve the right to take special measures.

*Under State Secretary Woermann:* The result of the exchange of views is as follows: If the Swedes approach us, we could tell them that we would have no objections to giving our consent to the proposed modification of the Convention; we should, however, like to take the opportunity to discuss the question how we might assure our ore imports even in the event of war.

*Lieutenant Commander Neubauer:* The following addition to our communication to the Swedes should be considered: In view of the ultimate purpose of the preamble of the Åland Convention, we consent to the modification of the Convention, because under the given

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\* Present on behalf of the High Command of the Navy.



circumstances (impotence of the League of Nations) the purpose of the Åland Convention (the neutralization of the Åland Islands) would be better achieved if the Convention were modified as proposed.

*Senior Counselor von Grundherr:* We have been informed that during the September crisis a Swedish expeditionary force to the Åland Islands was under discussion. The thought constantly recurs that Finnish and Swedish troops are to defend the islands jointly. An extension of the militarization provisions to Sweden as well is not in our interest. If the Swedes should send troops to the Åland Islands, we, as a signatory to the Åland Convention, should have the right to do exactly the same. Moreover, we should consider whether we ought not to question the Finns in great detail on how far they intend to have the Swedes participate in the defense of the Åland Islands.

*Under State Secretary Woermann:* It has been agreed that as soon as the Swedes approach us, they are to be told as follows: We shall be very glad to agree to modification of the Åland Convention as such, but we should like to know something about how Sweden proposes to safeguard our interests in the Swedish ore deliveries in the event of war. However, we are to avoid the impression that our approval is conditional on a settlement of this question.

The approval of the higher authorities will still have to be obtained for this reply to the Swedes.

*Lieutenant Commander Neubauer:* The main thing is that the Åland Islands remain neutralized and the powers defending the islands remain neutral.

### No. 461

2608/525360-62

#### *The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 105

HELSINKI, January 18, 1939.

Received January 20.

Pol. VI 181.

Subject: Åland Islands.

At the end of the first long conversation which I had with the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> after my return he brought up of his own accord the question of the Åland Islands.

M. Erkko stated that the negotiations with the Swedes had been long and difficult. The misgivings of the Swedes had been directed especially against the fortification of the main islands.

<sup>1</sup> J. Elias Erkko became Foreign Minister of Finland in December 1938.

The Finnish Government did not yet know how Russia stood on the question. Although Russia was not a signatory power, she might nevertheless make difficulties in the League of Nations, and, moreover, one probably must expect that in the preliminary stage of consulting the signatories France and England would in one way or another take Russia's position into account. He had already told the British Minister emphatically that it would be absolutely incomprehensible to Finland if England did not approve the fortification unconditionally. In the Åland Convention the signatory powers had obligated themselves to respond to an initiative of the League of Nations for aid in the defense of the islands in any emergency. The most recent political developments had shown that the actual implementation of this provision was henceforth out of the question. If England could no longer take part in the defense of the islands, however, she should at least consent to their fortification.

M. Erkkö then said he would like to assume that Germany agreed to the fortification. I replied that we Germans had no idea as yet of what we should agree to. There had in the meantime been long negotiations between Finland and Sweden, but the result had not yet been communicated to us officially, so that it was not yet possible for us to take a stand at this stage.

M. Erkkö admitted this and remarked that he had now called together in Helsinki all the Finnish Ministers assigned to the signatory powers. The Ministers were being informed here in detail regarding the entire matter and would then explain it to the Governments concerned.

I then asked how the further *modus procedendi* was planned. The Åland Convention of October 20, 1921, had at the time been concluded under the aegis of the League of Nations. Of the signatory powers, Germany and Italy had since withdrawn from the League of Nations. If the Finns were now thinking of bringing about a new agreement, again under the aegis of the League of Nations, it was difficult for me to imagine that Germany and Italy would participate.

M. Erkkö replied that he had already taken this into consideration in his plans. He was now thinking that after receiving the approval of the signatory powers he would notify the League of Nations of it, and he believed that he would then receive a free hand.

On the following day I had a one-hour conversation with Field Marshal Mannerheim, who did not, however, discuss the Åland question.

BLÜCHER

## No. 462

2499/518641-47

*Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

Kult. B. 65-01 19/1

DIRECTORS' MEETING ON JANUARY 19, 1939, 10:00 A. M.

## Present:

Senior Counselor Dr. Schwager	Foreign Ministry
Ministerial Counselor Burmeister	Finance Ministry
Regierungsrat Dr. Woelffel	Finance Ministry
Dr. Luig	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
Hoffmeyer	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
Meissner	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
Schickedanz	Aussenpolitisches Amt
Dr. Winkler	Vereinigte Finanzkontore
Dr. Krahmer-Möllenberg	Vereinigte Finanzkontore
Dr. Werner	Vereinigte Finanzkontore
Dietrich	Vereinigte Finanzkontore

*Re point (1) of the agenda:*

Assistance for North Schleswig (cf. the report presented by Assessor Stehr<sup>2</sup> and our letter of December 1, 1938<sup>3</sup>).

The representative of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore, G. m. b. H. made the following statement:

In the year 1936 the Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang, a German financial institution, was founded with a capital of 500,000 Danish kroner, and at the same time considerable amounts of money were made available to this agency in the form of credit. The Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang was given the task of covering the financial needs of farmers of German descent by means of loans in cases where it was no longer possible to use Danish mortgage institutions. This assistance had become especially necessary as a result of the extraordinary losses inflicted on German-owned agriculture by the Danish currency policy. Owing to the deterioration of the economic situation which came about in the course of time, it also became necessary to take over impoverished farms in order to save them from seizure by the Danes. As a

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum is unsigned; it is a record of the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore G. m. b. H. of Berlin, a camouflaged financial agency of the Foreign Ministry to provide credits for German minorities in various European countries. In March 1937 the agency was given the cover name "Exzelsior A. G." (2669/528021-24, 528122).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2499/518618-24). The report by the official of the Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang was written from Hadersleben on Jan. 15. The statements made about the land situation in the memorandum printed here are based on that report.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (2630/526154-67). The letter from the Vereinigte Finanzkontore was addressed to the Foreign Ministry, the Minister of Finance, and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. It transmitted the results of a preliminary report by Stehr on the threat to German landholdings in North Schleswig, and proposed financial assistance in the amount of 5 million Danish kroner.

result of this development such heavy demands were made on the Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang that the sums of money available had to be replenished. As the German foreign-exchange situation became increasingly straitened, the possibilities of transfer decreased. This necessitated, for further outlays of funds, dividing the area of North Schleswig to be assisted into a southern zone and a northern zone. Instructions had to be given that the limited funds available were to be used especially in the southern zone, which is still in part solidly settled by farmers of German descent and is more closely defined as the so-called irregular quadrangle, while assistance to the politically less interesting northern zone necessarily had to be neglected. The Danish authorities follow the developments very carefully and lose no opportunity of acquiring land from the Germans. Thus, according to the Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang, as of January 1, 1938, the German losses of land amounted to about 34,000 hectares. Although it has thus been possible gradually to take this considerable property away from the German minority, the Danes are not satisfied with this. Rather, it has been found that the aim of the Danish land policy is now to attack the property of the German minority in the southern zone. For the attainment of this goal there are to be noted two points of attack aimed at introducing the Danish element into the southern zone and thereby breaking up the still partly solid settlement of the German minority.

One of the operations of the Danes is directed against the fenland and upland area of about 10,000 hectares between Højer and Tønder. A large-scale drainage project said to have required the expenditure of about 5 million Danish kroner was carried out in this area. Of this amount the state took over two-thirds of the costs, while the remaining amount was levied on the individual owners, who, on the basis of a law of 1925, are gradually to pay off capital and interest on it. The German owners affected thereby are, however, not in a position to pay the so-called improvement assessment because the complementary reclamation installations, namely the necessary drainage works, have not been carried to completion at all, or only to a very small extent, and consequently the drainage costs are not counterbalanced by correspondingly greater income from the individual farms. So far the Danish Government has not been strict in collecting the improvement assessment but now it intends to enforce its claims vigorously. Since the owners are not in a position to meet their obligations in cash there is said to be a plan for enforcing their payment by corresponding cession of land. The further purpose connected with this procedure is said to be a plan for merging the land areas thus acquired in a redistribution project and then opening them up for settlement. If the German population here is not granted adequate help, a considerable loss of German land must be expected.

The second attack is directed against German areas along the southern frontier. The Danes have a large road-building project under construction, which provides especially for a highway along the frontier road stretching from Højer in the west along the entire frontier to Pattburg-Bau and having an extension in a new road along the northern bank of the Flensburg gulf. This highway is partly completed. As far as traffic is concerned it is without importance because a few kilometers north of it there is an excellent highway, which connects the east with the west. The aim of the Danes with the said new highway is to acquire German living space adjacent to it and open this up for Danish settlement. There are concrete examples which show that the Danes will spare no funds in order to attain the goals of their land policy and will even use the method of offering exorbitant prices. It is clear that in its battle to defend German land against the Danes the German minority must lose, since the Danes are able to use all the financial power of the state. The representatives of the German minority consider it all the more necessary to defend the German soil very resolutely with all the means available. This defensive struggle is to be carried on:

1. through the very strongest political concentration of our fellow Germans in the NSDAPN, and through this body itself;
2. through the action of a self-help organization deriving its funds from voluntary contributions;
3. through *systematic* use of the limited funds available;
4. through training the youth to habits of saving.

This intensified effort of the minority, however, will not suffice. On the contrary, it is now necessary to have further help from the Reich.

In this connection it should also be mentioned that the decline of agriculture in Denmark and the lack of the necessary means to restore it and to retain property ownership necessarily involve injury to cultural interests. The effects are already apparent in an increasingly pronounced decline in the numbers of the younger generation. Although German schoolhouses have been built, the number of children who are to attend these schools is constantly decreasing. The difficulty of the struggle for existence has the effect that tradesmen and laborers move to the old Danish territory, where they get either better opportunities for profit or better wages. In an area where agriculture is depressed and the peasant must practice the strictest frugality in ordering necessary agricultural equipment, the tradesman and artisan eventually can no longer earn a living. This trend, too, is to be halted by the use of the funds requested from the Reich.

Finally, the representatives from North Schleswig pointed out that in view of the impending elections this spring the greatest possible success should be sought for the German minority, and that for this

purpose an increase in the financial assistance of the Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang was desirable.

The financial requirements have been calculated on the basis of an amount of 2,000 Danish kroner per hectare in 10 percent of the areas which today are still in German hands. In a conference on January 5 in the offices of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle we requested in the presence of Dr. Möller and Assessor Stehr that the sum of 5 million Danish kroner referred to in the memorandum, which is to be distributed over three to four years, be split up. It is to be used for:

1. above all, taking over large impoverished estates with the help of credits for that purpose, and rendering solvent farms which are endangered as a result of overdue improvement assessments;

2. establishing settlements on land which is already available and creating opportunities for settlement which arise in connection with the taking over of farms.

After an examination of the situation in the individual border parishes the following requirements have been termed *urgent*:

- a) for credits to take over property..... 500, 000 Danish kroner  
(of these, 130,000 Danish kroner  
immediately, by February 1, 1939)
- b) for the establishment of settlements  
on land already available..... 225, 000 Danish kroner
- c) for the establishment of settlements  
on land which can be separated  
from farms that are taken over.... 225, 000 Danish kroner

The urgent requirements have therefore  
been given as ..... ca. 950, 000 Danish kroner

In the debate that followed it was agreed that in order to make further discussion of the project possible it was first necessary to determine whether the German foreign-exchange situation permitted the appropriation of an adequate amount of foreign exchange. An attempt was further made to find an order of magnitude for the requirements. The result was that an effort will be made to avert the possible loss, through cession of land, of the farms in the Tønder marsh that are encumbered with improvement assessments, through appropriate influence by the proper political authorities upon the Danish Government. There would then remain the amount requested for taking over farms as well as for the needs of settlement. It is out of the question to achieve a complete defense of German land by the acquisition of farms. Even if it were at all possible to appropriate additional funds, they could be used only in the most urgent cases where the special interest of national policy demands it. Whether a total of 500,000 Danish kroner would suffice for this purpose, would have to be studied.

For clarification of this question Dr. Möller will be invited to a conference here.

For a policy decision on the question of foreign exchange the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle will establish personal contact with Field Marshal Göring through SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz and Dr. Winkler, in order to determine whether there is any possibility of obtaining permission for the transfer of this amount. The corresponding amount in reichsmarks will be made available from the funds of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>In a letter of May 19, 1939 (2499/518653-54), Krahmer-Möllenberg of the Vereinigte Finanzkontore wrote to Consul General Grosskopf in the Foreign Ministry that Winkler had not been able to gain access to Göring, and since the latter's office had lately refused much smaller allowances of foreign exchange for use in Denmark, it was unlikely that a favorable decision could be obtained.

## No. 463

2608/525363-65

### *Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, January 20, 1939.

e. o. W V 183.

To what extent the German iron ore shipments from Sweden can be maintained even in case of war probably depends largely on the power situation at the outbreak and during the further course of the war. In any case the question would probably become acute only if England were on the side of our opponents.

In any case, however, the following factors are probably important:

Ore shipments from Sweden to Germany during the last few years have amounted to from 9 to 11 million tons. Of this about 2 million tons were taken from southern and central Swedish ore deposits, and were shipped mostly from Gävle and Oxelösund; the rest came from northern Sweden. Of this 3 to 4 million tons were shipped from Luleå on the Gulf of Bothnia and the rest from Narvik (Norway).

In case of war, the shipments via Narvik might be largely cut off. Presumably the ore shipments from central Sweden can continue undisturbed. At the present time the port of Luleå has a shipping capacity of approximately  $4\frac{1}{2}$  million tons during the average of seven months a year when it is ice-free. This capacity could probably be somewhat increased by appropriate construction. Shipments of northern Swedish ore through southern Swedish ports are feasible only to a very slight extent because of technical considerations affecting the rail line.

Under the given traffic conditions the prospect for German ore deliveries would thus automatically be limited to about 6 or 7 million tons. How much of this amount can actually be taken naturally depends on German ability to pay.

Between the German iron-manufacturing industry and the Swedish mines there are long-term delivery contracts which in any event should assure the receipt of some such amount.

During the September crisis, according to reports we received, the Swedish Government considered allowing the export of ore to Germany and England in equal amounts, in order to demonstrate its desire for neutrality.<sup>1</sup> Actually the Swedish Government would show real neutrality if it permitted the normal peacetime ore exports to Germany of recent years to continue undiminished. For reasons already stated, however, ore shipments to Germany would in practice be reduced so sharply that the total Swedish production would in fact be great enough to allow for export to England of a quantity of ore equal to the amount Germany could import.

In the given circumstances it hardly seems necessary and advisable at present to obtain assurances from the Swedish Government as to a definite amount of ore for Germany. On the other hand, in connection with the discussions—which are of course based on the assumption of Swedish neutrality in case of war—regarding the fortification of the Åland Islands, it would be desirable to get from Sweden, even if only verbally, a promise that in the event of war she would take no measures to limit our normal ore shipments.<sup>2</sup>

VAN SCHERPENBERG

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 457.

<sup>2</sup> On Jan. 26 after a joint *démarche* (see document No. 464) on the Åland question was made by the Finnish and Swedish Ministers, Weizsäcker asked the latter to remain a few minutes and informed him that the German Government wished later to discuss with his Government ore shipments in case of war (2608/525366).

### No. 464

2608/525367/1-2

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 70

BERLIN, January 26, 1939.  
e. o. Pol. VI 275.

The Finnish and Swedish Ministers called on me together today in order to make the expected *démarche* in the Åland question. The Finnish Minister, being the senior and the one chiefly concerned, was



the spokesman. He first gave me the enclosed note<sup>1</sup> of January 21, then the map<sup>2</sup> belonging thereto, giving oral explanations the substance of which he also handed to me in the form of a memorandum.<sup>3</sup>

M. Wuorimaa added by way of explanation that a similar *démarche* was being made with the other signatories of the Åland Convention. This was also the reason for transmitting the note to us in French, since the same text was to be delivered in all capitals concerned.

The Swedish Minister then supported the *démarche* of the Finnish Minister and handed me a note,<sup>4</sup> a map, and a memorandum,<sup>5</sup> which supposedly are identical with the Finnish documents.

I did not read the note in the presence of the two Ministers. Since the League of Nations Council was mentioned in the oral explanations, (cf. memorandum) I interposed the question as to what the League of Nations still had to do with the matter if the signatories were in agreement. The Finnish Minister made reference to article 7 of the Convention but was unable to give any further information.

I told the two Ministers in conclusion that I would bring the substance of the *démarche* to the notice of the Foreign Minister as soon as possible after his return. At the proper time the Foreign Minister would perhaps wish to discuss the matter further with the Ministers. Naturally I was not now in a position to make a statement. We would, however, proceed to study the notes as soon as possible.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2608/525372-75). The note stated that the Convention of 1921 providing for demilitarization and neutralization of the Åland Islands had been conceived as part of the League of Nations security system and that since this system had been weakened, the Governments of Finland and Sweden had agreed that the Convention required modification. They proposed that Finland should be allowed to take measures for military defense in the southernmost part of the Islands, south of a line fixed at 59°58'1" N. latitude. Germany's assent as a signatory of the Convention of 1921 was requested.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6794/E514154-61).

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (2608/525376). The separate memorandum expressed the hope that the German Government would consent to the proposal without delay since it was intended to submit the matter to the Council of the League of Nations in May.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (2608/525367/3-70).

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (2608/525371).

## No. 465

2619/525590-92

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 73

BERLIN, January 27, 1939.

Pol. VI 312.

The Swedish Foreign Minister was in Berlin today on his return trip from Geneva and France and, with the Foreign Minister away, paid me a visit.

M. Sandler began by expressing pleasure at the optimism with which M. Bonnet had spoken with him of Franco-German relations.

Then M. Sandler turned to the gloomy speculation now frequently heard—which he evidently shares—on what the year 1939 will bring. I differed with these statements on several points and then turned the conversation to the question of neutrality.

M. Sandler asserted several times emphatically the determined will to neutrality not only of his Government but also of the other three Scandinavian countries. It was an interesting sign of the times that Finland, although until recently a supporter of *securité collective*, now inclined entirely toward the three Scandinavian countries and formed with them a front of independence and neutrality toward all sides. For Sweden in particular M. Sandler declared that even in case of war she wished to continue to have good relations with all countries and to maintain a free exchange of goods in order to protect her vital needs.

(The last remark might be referred to upon initiation of the proposed conversations<sup>1</sup> on the supply of Swedish ore in case of war.)

Since in Geneva last fall the smaller European countries expressed more or less clearly their intention to remain neutral in case of war, the next stage must be to set them against any participation within the framework of the League of Nations in votes on war and peace, aggressors and victims, etc.

I therefore continued as follows:

Since M. Sandler was a great League of Nations specialist, I should be interested in knowing whether he would really be willing in case of war to participate as a member of the League Council in a vote under article 16 of the League Covenant. If his country desired to avoid war, even such an action would constitute important moral support for one of the warring parties and would be incompatible with neutrality. M. Sandler admitted this and said that in such a case the procedure of the Swedish Government would be dictated by the soberest interests of self-preservation—which was probably intended to mean that they would refrain from taking a stand. I interjected here that Sweden was certainly correct in this procedure, for intervention by the Western Powers in the Baltic Sea was today more than ever out of the question.

Then I went over to the necessity of preparing neutrality even in time of peace, acknowledged certain recent attempts of the Swedish Government to keep the Swedish press within bounds, but warned

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 463, footnote 2.

M. Sandler against [Stockholm's] becoming Prague's successor with regard to asylum and support for emigrants.

Contrary to my expectation, M. Sandler said nothing of Sweden's known wishes as a member of the Committee of Three on the Danzig question.<sup>2</sup> Nor did we speak of the Åland problem. I found out only through an incidental question that the Swedish Government actually had made a *démarche* also in Moscow concerning fortification of the Åland Islands because, as M. Sandler said, it was necessary to ask the opinion not only of the signatories but also of the main parties interested, including Soviet Russia as a member of the League of Nations Council. On this point I reserved the German reaction completely.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>2</sup> On Sandler's role in the Committee of Three of the League Council see documents Nos. 123 and 124.

## No. 466

441/221355-57

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, January 28, 1939.

e. o. Pol. VI 316.

When Swedish Foreign Minister Sandler passed through Berlin I had an opportunity on January 27 to speak with him for about three quarters of an hour.

1. M. Sandler spoke first of the *Åland question*. He stated that a few years ago he still opposed fortification of the Åland Islands. Since then, however, the situation had fundamentally changed; one had to be able to learn. Unfortified, the islands represented a dangerous vacuum which could attract military forces of warring powers in case of a conflict. At this remark of M. Sandler I pointed out that in the critical days in September units of the Russian Baltic fleet had indeed been definitely ascertained off Hangö, whereas the German fleet, contrary to a tendentious British report, had been not in Königsberg, but in Kiel. This remark impressed M. Sandler very much; he said that this information was of great value for him. In the further course of the conversation he remarked that the Swedish and Finnish Governments had also brought up the matter in Moscow, since Russia, as a Baltic power, was naturally also very much interested in the Åland question. The Russian Government had been asked not to make any difficulties in Geneva for the Swedish and Finnish

proposals. It was significant that the Russians had then brought up the question whether the fortifications which were to be built would also be strong enough to withstand an attack by a *Great Power*.

In discussing the Åland question M. Sandler emphasized several times that the important thing was to see matters from a standpoint of *Realpolitik*. I rather assume that these remarks were not unaffected by conversations which I have had at various times with the Swedish Minister here, in which I had discreetly taken a stand against the excessively formal juridical points of view in Sandler's speeches judging our "away from Versailles" policy.

2. Foreign Minister Sandler then touched on the *Danzig question* and said that this was really none of Sweden's business; that an attempt should be made to withdraw from it.

3. M. Sandler then assured me that the Swedish Government had no intention of making Stockholm a *center for emigrants*. Sweden had no "need" whatsoever of *émigré* "intellectuals" (writers, editors, etc.); on the other hand, the admission of persons such as non-Aryan artisans from Czechia was another matter.

4. The Swedish Foreign Minister then spoke of the *German press* and expressed gratitude that the Foreign Ministry had corrected in later articles certain factual inaccuracies in the German press treatment of the Åland question. He mentioned particularly the article "Sweden's Security" in the *Berliner Börsenzeitung* of January 25, which he termed very objective and calm. He also mentioned the two articles by Dr. Megerle<sup>1</sup> on Scandinavia and the Baltic countries which appeared some time ago at our instigation and which he termed very interesting. They had had an enlightening effect and at the same time had spared what he had to admit was the rather pronounced pride of the Swedish people.

5. Foreign Minister Sandler then emphasized that he accorded particular value to *cultivating cultural connections between Germany and Sweden*. He recalled in this connection Prof. Thunberg of the Commercial College in Stockholm, who was in Berlin twice recently. He termed his efforts particularly worthy of encouragement.

6. In closing I asked M. Sandler to express any wishes, if possible, through the Swedish Minister here, with whom we worked well together. M. Sandler understood this correctly as an allusion to his public speech against alleged intervention by German authorities through investigations into Swedish-Jewish business partnerships.

Finally, M. Sandler assured me that it was particularly interesting for him to have been able to speak at some length with State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker.

V. GRUNDHEER

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 351, footnote 1.

## No. 467

2608/525381-82

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 208

HELSINKI, February 8, 1939.

Received February 7.

Pol. VI 389.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Åland Islands.

The Finnish Foreign Minister told me yesterday in a private conversation that the Russians had attempted to create difficulties in the Åland question. Maisky and Suritz<sup>1</sup> had told the Foreign Ministers in London and Paris that there was a secret agreement between Germany and Finland. This provided that Finland was to fortify the Åland Islands and in an emergency to put the fortifications at Germany's disposal. A similar statement was made by a Swedish journalist in the *Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*. This journalist had shortly before been here in Helsinki and had called on the Russian Legation here, so that his report could also be attributed to a Russian source. In London, however, Lord Halifax had in the meantime promised an affirmative reply to the Finnish *démarche*. In Paris, on the other hand, Minister Bonnet had not yet made any statement. He had at first promised the Finnish Minister prompt action, but after the *démarche* by Suritz had stated that the matter was not urgent.

In the conversations in Moscow on the Åland question the Russians had charged that Germany had by purchase acquired Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland.

M. Erkkö added that the Russians were always very theoretical and were now bringing up everything with which they believed they could cause difficulties. He was of the opinion that the purchase of land or islands was a commercial matter.

The conversation then turned to the Estonian islands of Ösel and Dagö, especially to the question whether after the fortification of Åland they would be drawn more sharply into the Russian field of vision. M. Erkkö stated that he had no indications of this so far. The Estonians, too, had as yet told him nothing to this effect and had approved the fortification of Åland promptly and unconditionally. On another occasion he had heard from the Estonians that the two islands were comparatively easy to defend. The Estonians had based their statements on the testimony of German officers who during the

<sup>1</sup> Soviet Ambassadors in Great Britain and France, respectively.

war had said that the capture of the islands would not have been possible had as much as one full-strength Russian regiment been there.

M. Erkkö added that as far as he knew, however, the main Estonian fortifications were near Reval.

I have heard since the conversation took place that two Germans bought a few small islands not far from Helsinki. It is possible that the Russian statements referred to this.

BLÜCHER

## No. 468

2602/525209-10

### *The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 8 A

COPENHAGEN, February 7, 1939.

Received February 8.

Pol. VI 405.

Subject: Statements by the Danish Foreign Minister on the Führer's speech.<sup>1</sup>

When I called on the Foreign Minister yesterday, he turned the conversation to the Führer's speech and emphasized the great interest with which the Danish Government had received the statements of the Führer on the relations of Germany with her neighbors. M. Munch attached special importance to the fact that the Scandinavian countries had this time been mentioned by name and welcomed the words of the Führer on the "peacefully stabilized [*befriedete*] frontiers of the German Reich in the North." In that connection he touched upon the controversy which had arisen in the Danish press on the exact interpretation of the concept, "peacefully stabilized frontiers," and pointed out that many circles in Denmark saw therein a recognition of the German-Danish frontier. I told the Foreign Minister that if they saw a recognition of the present frontiers in the statement, they were going beyond the literal German. The meaning was that peaceful relations prevailed on the said frontiers. When the Foreign Minister then remarked that, practically, this seemed to him to amount to the same thing, I emphasized that the statement by the Führer was in any case a further proof of the peaceful intention of our policy.

The Foreign Minister also attached special importance, from the Danish point of view, to the renewed declaration of the Führer that National Socialism was not for export, and saw therein a denial of the assertions of the Danish National Socialists that they could count on German support. He also thought he could predict that in the approaching elections the Danish National Socialists would obtain only one seat, if any, in the Rigsdag.

<sup>1</sup> In the Reichstag on Jan. 30, 1939.

When the conversation turned to the Führer's statements regarding the attitude of the Scandinavian countries toward article 16, I pointed to the speech of the Swedish Foreign Minister at the War College in Stockholm at the beginning of November 1938, and to his remark that for a state which declared itself neutral the most correct course would be to remain completely aloof from participation in the discussion of questions of sanctions. I told M. Munch that it would be objectionable and unneutral moral support of a Great-Power group if the Scandinavian countries, which after all wished to keep out of any conflict, nevertheless participated in any way in the discussion and voting of sanctions within the framework of the League of Nations. M. Munch replied that his policy, like that of M. Sandler, was to participate no longer in the discussion of questions of sanctions within the framework of the League of Nations. He and M. Sandler had agreed on this last September in Geneva.

From the statements of the Foreign Minister it was evident, moreover, that his rather pessimistic statements at the recent meeting of the Scandinavian Progressive parties as to the political situation in Europe were based on reports of the Danish Legations in London and Paris. I contradicted his view by referring to the Führer's speech.

RENTHE-FINK

### No. 469

26/16139-40/1

#### *The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 374

HELSINKI, February 24, 1939.

Received February 26.

Pol. VI 564.

Subject: Conference of the Northern Foreign Ministers in Helsinki.

The regular conference of the Northern Foreign Ministers took place here from February 20 to 22.

A translation of the communiqué issued after the conference is enclosed.<sup>1</sup>

In addition I learned the following from the Finnish Foreign Minister:

During an exchange of views on the general political situation they had agreed that the international situation was very tense, but that there was no immediate danger of war.

Reports from the Japanese Government indicated that in March Japan would assert her claims to fishing rights, regardless of whether Russia approved or not.<sup>2</sup> Japan was proceeding on the as-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (26/16140/2). Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were present at the conference.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. IV, document No. 549.

sumption that Russia would not offer any resistance. But prudent policy of small neutral countries must also take account of other possibilities.

In regard to the Spanish question, Finland had proposed not to delay the recognition of Franco any longer. The other Foreign Ministers had promised to take up the matter with their Cabinets.

It would shortly be M. Sandler's turn to leave the League of Nations Council. Finland showed no inclination to compete for the vacancy, and would rather give precedence to Holland.

In the question of emigrants, the views of the four Governments were fairly close. None of them had any desire to accept large numbers of emigrants permanently, unless perhaps in the case of certain definite categories of skilled workers. Only Sweden took a somewhat more favorable attitude toward the emigrants.

The question of mutual aid in foodstuffs and raw materials in war-time occupied a considerable part of the discussions. Among other things, they wished to take precautions against having countries producing large amounts of raw materials assign specific quotas to each of the four Northern countries in case of war. The tendency was to try to get a single quota established for all the Northern countries, so that the goods could then be freely apportioned among the four countries. In addition, discussions were to be begun with America to get her to promise in peacetime to deliver definite amounts of raw materials in case of war.

The four Foreign Ministers had exchanged experiences acquired during the September crisis and in particular had informed themselves about all measures prepared at that time and about the texts of their neutrality declarations.

I shall send a special report<sup>\*</sup> on the remarks which Minister Erkkö made on this occasion in regard to the Åland question.

BLÜCHER

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<sup>\*</sup>Not printed (2609/325441-42).

## No. 470

429/218677-78

### *The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

MOST URGENT

SECRET

Telegram No. 13 of March 14.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister informed me very confidentially that the Russians were showing remarkable interest in the Finnish island

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<sup>1</sup>Times of dispatch from Helsinki and receipt at Berlin of this telegram are not indicated on this copy, which was found in the files of the Moscow Embassy.



groups between Hogland and Leningrad. Litvinov had proposed to the Finnish Minister in Moscow that these island groups be exchanged for parts of the East Karelian areas. The Finnish Government had refused. Thereupon Litvinov had proposed that the islands be leased by Russia and promised consent to the fortification of Hogland. The Finnish Government had again refused. Litvinov replied that he would not regard this reply as final.

In the meantime Stein, the Russian Ambassador to Rome, had arrived here and wished to speak with the Foreign Minister. The Finnish Government would not consent to the Russian offers with regard to the islands. If Russia should occupy these islands in wartime, Finland could hardly prevent it; however, to cede Finnish territory voluntarily in peacetime was out of the question. Possibly the Finnish Government would agree in an exchange of notes to remain neutral in case of a general war.

Here the conversation was broken off by an interruption. I could only tell the Foreign Minister that occupation of these islands by the Russians in peacetime would mean military control of Finland, but that Finnish neutrality in the event of war seemed to me practical politics.

VON BLÜCHER

No. 471

2609/525458

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 14 of March 14

HELSINKI, March 15, 1939—9:46 a. m.

Received March 15—10:45 a. m.

Pol. VI 731.

The Finnish Foreign Minister today again pressed for a reply to the Åland note. He now had to bring the Åland question before Parliament, since new elections were impending. Delay also had other disadvantages. There were, for example, rumors that the agitation of certain Swedish circles against settlement of the Åland question was attributable to German intrigues and that Germany was exploiting the state of suspense in order to drive a wedge between Finland and Sweden. In any case further delay in replying might be equivalent to a rejection.

Please send telegraphic instructions.

BLÜCHER

## No. 472

2609/525459

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Finland*

Telegram

No. 23

BERLIN, March 16, 1939.

Sent March 17—10:00 a. m.

zu Pol. VI 731.

With reference to your No. 14.<sup>1</sup>

For guidance in conversation.

The German Government, as you know, altogether welcomes the intention of the Government there to have *Finland* insure the neutrality of the Åland Islands more effectively than hitherto. If our reply has not been sent yet, this is due to the fact that the Finnish-Swedish proposals contain points of view that are new to us and require study. As a signatory to the Convention, and as the greatest Baltic power, we cannot be indifferent to the granting, as envisaged in the proposals, of special rights to a signatory power other than Finland. Our reply, as you know, is also made especially difficult by the fact that for us, as a non-member of the League of Nations, decisions of the League of Nations Council can no longer be binding.

A definitive reply will follow as soon as the present political situation makes this technically possible.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 471.

<sup>2</sup> For the further course of negotiations on refortification of the Åland Islands see vol. VI. On Mar. 22 Foreign Minister Erkkö told the Finnish Parliament that "he had no reason to assume that the replies of the remaining countries with reference to granting Finland the right of fortification would be negative" (2609/525461). Germany accepted the Finnish-Swedish proposal on May 2, 1939.

CHAPTER V  
BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1937-MARCH 15, 1939

No. 473

1143/325191-96

*The State Secretary to the Embassies in France and Great Britain*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

BERLIN, September 24, 1937.

Sent September 28.

e. o. Pol. I 770.

With reference to our telegram No. 230 (Paris), No. 222 (London) of June 1, 1937.<sup>2</sup>

In order to facilitate the German-Belgian conversations on the international position of Belgium, the Belgian Government some time ago suggested sending an expert of the Belgian Foreign Ministry to Berlin for unofficial confidential discussions. This official was in Berlin last week. The discussions with him led to the drawing up of the accompanying preliminary draft of a German note,<sup>3</sup> written in both German and French, which would be confirmed with thanks by the Belgian Government in a short note, as was done on April 24, 1937, vis-à-vis England and France.<sup>4</sup>

The draft is now being studied by the Belgian Government. As soon as it informs us of its position the decision of the Führer and Chancellor will be obtained here. The exchange of notes would then be undertaken around the middle of October.

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the instruction were sent to the Missions in Rome and Brussels. The Embassy in Italy was requested not to notify the Italian Government as Mussolini would be informed in general terms during his visit to Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6808/E517878-79). The telegram informed the two Missions of approaches made by Count Davignon, Belgian Minister in Berlin, with a view to associating Germany with the note exchange of Apr. 24, 1937, between Britain and France on the one hand and Belgium on the other. See footnote 4.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (1143/325201-05). The draft is identical with the final text printed as document No. 475, except for the addition to the latter of the formal opening and closing sentences. This file copy bears the following marginal note: "Approved by the Führer. v. N[eurath], Sept. 30."

<sup>4</sup> The Anglo-French note to Belgium of Apr. 24, 1937, released the latter from her obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, which had been denounced by Germany on Mar. 7, 1936, simultaneously with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. For the texts of the Anglo-French note and the Belgian reply see British White Paper, Cmd. 5437 (1937).

In explanation of the draft I should like to say the following:

Our interest—and it is in accord with the wishes of the Belgian Government as expressed to us—is to have the German-Belgian relationship as similar as possible to the relationship of England and France with Belgium as established in the exchange of notes of April 24, 1937. An arrangement of the relations of Belgium with Germany, England and France on this sort of parallel basis, however, is naturally limited by the fact that Belgium belongs to the League of Nations along with England and France, while Germany does not.

In the exchange of notes of April 24, 1937, England and France released Belgium from her special Locarno obligations, but for their part maintained their guarantee obligation vis-à-vis Belgium on the basis of the double assurance of the Belgian Government that Belgium will not make her territory available as a base of operations for an aggressive war, and furthermore, will faithfully fulfill her obligations under the League of Nations Covenant. We must, of course, attach importance to Belgium's giving the first assurance to Germany, too, since if it should figure only in the Anglo-French-Belgian exchange of notes it would, in spite of its general phrasing, have an anti-German emphasis. On the other hand, it is necessary in so far as possible to counter the consequences which might arise to the disadvantage of Germany out of the second Belgian assurance regarding the League of Nations obligations. As things stand this is mainly a matter of the right of troop transit in accordance with article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant. Since it is not possible to commit Belgium to a restriction of her obligations under article 16 or even to a contractually binding restrictive interpretation of these obligations, there remains only the possibility that Belgium express in a general way her determination to follow an independent policy separate from France and England, and that we, moreover, make our own obligation to respect the integrity of Belgium dependent upon her not in the end lining up militarily on the side of Germany's enemies in an armed conflict.

The phrasing of the accompanying draft accords with this. Section 1a stresses the determination of the Belgian Government to pursue a policy of independence with full sovereignty. Section 1b reiterates the Belgian assurance that Belgian territory will not be made available as a base of operations for an aggressive war. Finally, in section 2, the German obligation to respect Belgian integrity is expressly pronounced inoperative in case Belgium should cooperate in a military action directed against Germany during an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. This last condition would also be fulfilled if Belgium should permit the French or British to march through Belgium.

Please treat this matter as *strictly confidential* until further notice. It is quite possible that the Belgian Government will first make sure of the agreement of the British and French Governments before informing us of its position. If in this or any other connection you should be approached on the matter, please maintain an entirely noncommittal attitude.

(State Secretary)

No. 474

1143/325226/1-28

*Circular of the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, October 12, 1937—2:45 p.m.

Pol. I 813 (Angabe II).<sup>2</sup>

For your information.

Soon after the Anglo-French-Belgian exchange of notes of April 24, 1937, in regard to the release of Belgium from the Locarno obligations and the renewal of the Anglo-French guarantee of Belgium, German-Belgian conversations regarding the form of the international status of Belgium were initiated at the request of Belgium. The conversations have now led to the agreement on a German-Belgian exchange of notes, which will be published on October 14<sup>3</sup> together with semi-official explanatory comments.

Referring to the intention of the Belgian Government to pursue an independent policy, the German note assumes the obligation to respect the integrity of Belgium unless, in the event of military conflict, Belgium should side militarily with our enemies. The latter condition would also obtain if Belgian territory should be placed at the disposal of French or British troops, for instance, for passage or as a base of operations. At the same time Belgium is assured of German support in case she is attacked from another quarter.

Although Belgium for her part assumes no definite obligation in return, the exchange of notes is of political advantage to us in that

<sup>1</sup>The addressees were 18 Missions in Europe (excluding Paris, London, and Rome; see footnote 2), and the Embassies in Washington, Tokyo, and Nanking.

<sup>2</sup>Angabe I (1143/325225-26) was a separate telegram to the Embassies in Paris, London, and Rome stating that the Belgian Government and the Führer had approved the drafts of an exchange of notes which had been sent with the instruction of Sept. 24 (document No. 473). A supplementary paragraph to Rome stated that the Italian Ambassador had been informed in full and had replied that the exchange of notes did not affect Italian interests. Attolico had already stated earlier that Italy did not wish to be excluded if there was a multilateral arrangement involving France and Britain but would have no objection to a bilateral agreement between Belgium and Germany.

<sup>3</sup>Publication was moved up to Oct. 13 because, as was explained in a telegram to Paris, London and Rome (1143/325229), indiscretions were beginning to occur in the foreign press.

Belgium no longer feels dependent on England and France alone and acquires the basis for a really independent balance-of-power policy. The main thing for Germany to emphasize abroad is that the German assumption of a unilateral obligation toward a smaller nation represents a generous contribution toward guaranteeing peace in Western Europe, and thereby anticipates an important part of the proposed new Western Pact.\* The exchange of notes is at the same time further proof of the fact that separate negotiations regarding concrete problems lead to a quicker and better result than abstract and vague collective pacts.

V. MACKENSEN

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\* In denouncing the Treaty of Locarno on Mar. 7, 1936, Germany had offered to conclude a new pact with her Western neighbors, but desultory negotiations on the project during 1936 and 1937 had led to no conclusive result. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, (London, 1938), vol. 1, pp. 324, 361-363.

### No. 475

2175/471586-68

#### *The Foreign Minister to the Minister of Belgium*

BERLIN, October 13, 1937.

MR. MINISTER: In the name of the German Government I have the honor to inform Your Excellency as follows:

The German Government has with particular interest taken note of the public declarations which the Belgian Government has made in clarification of the international position of Belgium.

It has, for its part, repeatedly expressed its views in this respect, particularly by means of the declaration of the German Chancellor in his speech of January 30, 1937.

On the other hand, the German Government has taken note of the declaration of April 24, 1937, by His Britannic Majesty's Government and the French Government.

In view of the fact that it may still take some time before the conclusion of a treaty destined to replace the Locarno Pact, and with the desire to strengthen the peaceful endeavors of the two countries, the German Government considers it appropriate to define its attitude toward Belgium at this time.

To this end it makes the following declaration:

1. The German Government has taken official notice of the view expressed by the Belgian Government on the basis of its own authority, namely:

- a) that it intends in full sovereignty to pursue a policy of independence,
- b) that it is determined to defend the borders of Belgium with all its forces against any attack or invasion; to prevent Belgian

territory being used either for the passage of troops or as an operational base for an attack on another state by land, by sea, or in the air, and for this purpose to organize effectively the defense of Belgium.

2. The German Government declares that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are of common interest to the Western Powers. It confirms its determination under no circumstances to impair this inviolability and integrity and at all times to respect Belgian territory, except, of course, in the case that Belgium should take part in a military operation directed against Germany in the course of an armed conflict in which Germany is involved.

3. The German Government, like His Britannic Majesty's Government and the French Government, is prepared to render Belgium assistance should she be subjected to an attack or invasion.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Mr. Minister, to renew to you assurances of my highest consideration.<sup>1</sup>

FREIHERR VON NEURATH

<sup>1</sup>The text of the Belgian Minister's brief formal acknowledgment, as well as the texts of official commentaries by the German and Belgian Governments, also released on Oct. 13, have been printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1939), pp. 193-196.

## No. 476

2175/471550-51

### *Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

#### DIRECTIVE FOR THE GERMAN PRESS

1) Any discussion of the effect of the exchange of notes on the problem of Eupen-Malmédy is to be avoided.

2) There is, furthermore, to be no interpretation, beyond that of the official communiqué,<sup>2</sup> of the passage in the German note, under 2) at the end, where Belgian participation in a military action directed against Germany is mentioned.<sup>3</sup> In particular, any discussion of the question as to what the situation would be if Belgium should take part in economic sanctions is to be avoided.<sup>4</sup>

3) It is not advisable to emphasize too strongly that with the exchange of notes German-Belgian relations are now entering upon a

<sup>1</sup>The document is undated and unsigned, but was presumably made available to the German press on Oct. 13 simultaneously with the release of the official documents. Gaus, the Director of the Legal Department, initialed it on Oct. 12 and referred it to Weizsäcker.

<sup>2</sup>The official commentary, referred to in document No. 475, footnote 1, is meant.

<sup>3</sup>Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Since the communiqué does not attempt any exhaustive interpretation either. Treaty alone authoritative."

<sup>4</sup>Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Strict interpretation."

particularly friendly phase. Naturally, however, it may be emphasized, in accordance with the last sentence of the official communiqué, that the exchange of notes will undoubtedly have a very great influence in the development of good-neighborly relations. It should also be emphasized that with the declaration by the Reich Government, Belgium has now obtained a firm basis for a real policy of balance of power between the Great Powers.<sup>5</sup>

4) Positive emphasis should be given to the viewpoint that by its step the Government of the Reich has made a generous contribution toward guaranteeing peace in the West without having demanded any special privileges for itself. Thus, it has for its part anticipated an important point in the proposed Western Pact without thereby making the continuation of negotiations for the Pact more difficult.

5) Finally, it should also be stated that the exchange of notes is further proof of the well-known thesis that separate negotiations regarding concrete problems lead to far quicker and better results than negotiations regarding vague and general ideas of collective security.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "The expression 'Belgian neutrality' should be avoided."

## No. 477

141/127192

### *The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 62 of October 13

BRUSSELS, October 13, 1937—6:26 p. m.

Received October 13—11:00 p. m.

M. Spaak summoned me this morning upon my return in order to express his Ministry's and his own thanks on the conclusion of our negotiations. He told me that he was really very satisfied and that also the King, who had returned yesterday and to whom he had at once reported, had expressed his great satisfaction at the outcome.

The Foreign Minister was very much gratified at the fact that the American Ambassador, whom he had also informed yesterday when he called to see him on another matter, had termed the German-Belgian exchange of notes an important contribution to the improvement of the general political atmosphere.

The Minister is anxious only about its reception in his own party. But he showed gratification over the results of conversations he has had thus far with Belgian politicians, Hymans, for example.

At the close of our conversation the Foreign Minister spoke of developments in the Spanish affair, which he viewed with the greatest pessimism.

RICHTHOFEN



## No. 478

141/127193-94

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 790

BERLIN, October 14, 1937.

I received the Belgian Minister at 11:45 a. m. today and handed him the original of the German declaration. Count Davignon stated that he had been authorized by M. Spaak to express his special thanks for Germany's declaration, and for the very great understanding which Germany had shown toward Belgium. The King of the Belgians was also very much pleased at the outcome of the negotiations, he said. For my part I thanked Count Davignon for the help he had given and the work he had done during the negotiations.

Then I told him, however, that I felt obliged to bring up two more points which could not be ignored on this occasion. The first was that the list of names of German officers to be surrendered, which was set up after the war, was still in existence and likewise a number of judgments in absentia against so-called German war criminals.<sup>1</sup> This was a situation which could not be permitted to exist between two states having normal, indeed even friendly, relations. I wanted to ask him to tell his Government this for me, in order that it might consider how the matter could be settled. When Count Davignon assured me that no one in Belgium any longer thought of the existence of the list of persons to be surrendered and the judgments in absentia, and that actually any Germans who might travel to Belgium and whose names were on the list or who were subject to the judgments would never encounter any difficulty, I replied that this was all the more reason for settling the matter formally, as well.

The second question was that of Eupen-Malmédy. As the Minister had already been informed, we would not take up this question in the exchange of notes, but naturally we should also have to treat it publicly if the Belgian press brought the question up. Count Davignon assured me he had done everything he could to prevent discussion of this question in the Belgian press but could not undertake to guarantee that some newspaper or other would not fail to observe the instructions that had been issued. I further told the Minister that I considered it advisable for the Belgian Government to grant the German minorities the greatest possible freedom in the pursuit of their cultural interests. That would probably be the best way of assuring that the question of Eupen-Malmédy would not come up for discussion.

FREIHERR VON NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 494.

## No. 479

141/127200

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 14, 1937.

Lieutenant Colonel Scheller of the War Ministry inquired of me today as to the significance of numbered paragraph 3 of the German-Belgian agreement of October 13. He said General von Fritsch<sup>1</sup> was particularly interested in knowing to what extent military preparations should be made for the possible assistance we had promised Belgium.

I told Lieutenant Colonel Scheller that, in my opinion, those military plans and preparations which were to be contemplated in pursuance of numbered paragraph 3 of the agreement, coincided practically with the plans and preparations which would be necessary anyway for the emergency provided in numbered paragraph 2. The nature of our assistance under No. 3, as well as the decision to render this aid at all were, if the occasion arose, to be subject to prior German-Belgian agreement.

Moreover, I suggested to Lieutenant Colonel Scheller that the War Ministry's question again be directed, if it was so desired, to the Foreign Ministry in writing.

I then outlined briefly, with respect to Luxembourg, Holland, as well as our other neighbors, the possibility of arrangements similar to the German-Belgian agreement.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Commander in Chief of the Army.

## No. 480

1144/325305-06

*The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry*

A IV 1 c 5

LUXEMBOURG, October 21, 1937.

Received October 23.

Pol. II 2836.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Luxembourg's attitude toward the German-Belgian guarantee.

With reference to the telegraphic instruction of October 12, Pol. I 813.

As was to be expected, Minister of State Bech sounded me out a few days ago in connection with our guarantee to Belgium. He expressed

his satisfaction about our step, which could only be advantageous for Luxembourg, too, since it indirectly reaffirms our attitude toward Luxembourg, as he understands it. Naturally this strengthened still more his desire to obtain for his country, too, "a modern guarantee" in some form or other, a desire that was of great concern to all the political elements in the country and the pursuit of which would, of course, be given the greatest impetus by our latest step with respect to Belgium.

Bech realized that our situation with respect to Luxembourg was entirely different from that with respect to Belgium, and that at the present time every prerequisite was lacking for a similar declaration regarding Luxembourg. He would, however, give thought to the question whether a similar situation could not also be created for Luxembourg.

I was able to reply to the Minister of State that, as is known, it is our desire to see the whole Western zone absolutely free from every possibility of war, and that this desire was and still is the sole basis of all our Western Pact negotiations. Since these negotiations were dragging on interminably, however, we would also avail ourselves of opportunities to contribute to safeguarding the peace in Western Europe by separate negotiations on concrete problems, since we expected better results from these negotiations. Indeed, we had gone even further in our latest step toward Belgium by assuming unilateral obligations in pursuance of our main political line in the West.

Of course, we also took this same attitude, in principle, toward Luxembourg. But the question whether and how we could also arrange to make a guarantee of any kind to Luxembourg depended mainly on the other big partners in this game.

Minister of State Bech asked if he might revert to the matter again shortly.<sup>1</sup>

Public opinion in this country unanimously welcomes the German step with respect to Belgium and discusses many variations of the theme: "And what will become of Luxembourg?" I enclose articles of this nature.<sup>2</sup>

Only the organ of the Socialists indulges in cynical observations on the guarantee. Its attitude is best characterized by the cartoon also enclosed.<sup>3</sup>

RADOWITZ

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 500, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

## No. 481

2175/471578

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 25, 1937.

During his visit today the Dutch Minister mentioned his Government's satisfaction on the score of the German-Belgian agreement of October 13. At the same time, however, he again intimated plainly that Holland by no means desires a similar agreement with the neighboring Great Powers.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Minister Zech reported from The Hague on Nov. 5 (1190/330513-14) that he had the impression from a conversation with Secretary General Snouck of the Dutch Foreign Ministry that this was also his view, but he, Zech, understood that opinions were divided in the Cabinet. On Dec. 3 Zech reported (1190/330534-36) that Foreign Minister Patijn had clarified the issue in a parliamentary statement. He said that since Holland was not a signatory of Locarno and had no treaty arrangements with France and Britain, her position differed from Belgium's and there was no occasion for her to seek an arrangement with Germany like Belgium's.

## No. 482

141/127211

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 18, 1937.

Last night, at a social gathering, the Belgian Minister reverted to the subject of the German-Belgian exchange of declarations on October 13 and stressed the fact that as time went on he noticed more and more with especial satisfaction that this step was welcomed by the general public here in Germany also. How greatly King Leopold's independent foreign policy is working in favor of Belgium's international position could again be seen from the reception that was accorded the King not only by the British Government, but also the British public.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister followed these statements with the remark that in view of this good effect it would really be too bad if this year, again, a Rhenish Gauleiter should deliver an address at the New Year to the people of German descent in Eupen. He would regret it if only because such a demonstration would be unfavorable to a development that would materialize some day in any case. I expressly committed him to this last remark.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>1</sup> King Leopold visited Britain Nov. 16-19, 1937.

## No. 483

1212/332412-13

*The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

A 462

BRUSSELS, November 30, 1937.

Received December 4.

Pol. II 3202.

Subject: Statements of the Belgian Chief of Staff on extension of the Belgian defense system.<sup>1</sup>

The Chief of the General Staff of the Belgian Army, General van den Bergen, recently drew me aside at a dinner that he attended at the Legation and told me the following:

I knew, of course, that the system of defenses erected in Belgium after the war was directed solely against the East, namely against us. I would doubtless understand that such a system could not be changed overnight, because of the great expense involved. He could tell me, however, that in some six months' time I would notice that Belgium was also protecting herself in another direction.

I thanked the General for the information and told him I would be very happy to observe such a development.

Just what the General was alluding to by this remark is not yet clear. It will probably not become evident until spring or summer whether fortifications are also being built to the south, or whether it is only a matter of impending transfers of garrisons.

The Chief of the General Staff told the Military Attaché, when the latter visited him on taking over his post here, that the King's new policy had the support of the entire Belgian Army. The General's recent remark to me seems to prove this. The statements of the Chief of the General Staff then and now are all the more interesting and valuable because he still belongs to that category of officers within the Belgian Army who are said to have strong French sympathies.

RICHTHOFEN

<sup>1</sup>A marginal note by Neurath refers the report to the War Ministry.

## No. 484

141/127212

*Minute by the Director of the Political Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, December 7, 1937.

Lieutenant Colonel Scheller of the War Ministry raised the following question with me today:

The German fortifications in the West have thus far extended toward the North only as far as the beginning of the Belgian border.

The question now is whether, on the basis of our improved relations with Belgium, fortification of the German-Belgian border could be dispensed with. The resources needed for such fortifications are not inconsiderable and could be put to good military use elsewhere. Consideration should perhaps also be given to the question whether the Belgian Government would be embarrassed politically by the construction of such fortifications.

I first replied to Lieutenant Colonel Scheller that I did not think Belgium could take offense at our building such fortifications, since they are of a purely defensive character and would also bear witness to our promise not to violate Belgium's borders. So far as the military necessity for the fortifications is concerned, I would, on first thought, not consider such fortifications entirely dispensable, but could imagine the advisability of installations for blocking the main highway, for instance, and of the preparation of provisional defenses which could be set up quickly in an emergency. The question was too important, however, for me to give a binding answer at once. I would submit it to the competent authority in the Foreign Ministry and give a definite reply later.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 485

1251/338076-78

*Minister Richtofen to Senior Counselor Rintelen*

BRUSSELS, January 29, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

Pol. II 302.

DEAR HERR VON RINTELEN: A few days ago several persons from St. Vith, accompanied by Consul Lautz,<sup>2</sup> called on me in order to express their apprehension concerning the continued existence of the Agricultural Association<sup>3</sup> and its publication, the *Rundschau*.

<sup>1</sup> Initialed by Rintelen on Feb. 1.

<sup>2</sup> German Consul at Liège.

<sup>3</sup> In German, *Landwirtschaftlicher Verband*. This organization was founded in 1919 for German farmers of the Eupen-Malmédy area who had been cut off from the German agricultural organizations when the territory was assigned to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles. The economic activities of the Verband included a savings and loan bank, marketing and dairy cooperatives, and insurance (as agent for German firms). In addition, it operated an agricultural school, published a newspaper, and arranged local festivals and fairs at which German speakers appeared and German films were shown. In petitioning the German Government for funds on Jan. 7, 1938 (1251/338064-75), it stated that its purposes were: "To organize all Germans and pro-Germans, farmers in particular, in order to achieve the most complete economic independence possible from Belgian organizations, and thereby to work against assimilation, to fight foreign penetration, and to effect a return to the German fatherland. This aim was and is, therefore, political and it was only a tactical necessity to camouflage the political mission of the Agricultural Association with the organizing and economic activities of a farmers' organization".

They told me, and Consul Lautz confirmed, that they reach people with the *Rundschau* who could never be reached by the Heimatsfront. The latter organization was intriguing, however, to bring the Agricultural Association under the suspicion of being pro-Belgian.<sup>4</sup> As a result they had recently been notified that the annual contribution of 10,000 marks from Berlin could no longer be paid. Thedieck had left them some hope, to be sure, and advised them to submit a special application; however, they did not know how the matter now stands. They only knew that a campaign is continuously being waged against them and that they are being denounced anonymously to all sorts of authorities in Germany.

I should be very grateful to you if you would take the matter up and clarify it. I believe that a collapse of the Agricultural Association would be a serious blow to the Germans in the ceded territory.<sup>5</sup> We have not yet reached the point where we can unite everybody in the Heimattreue Front, and cooperation with the Agricultural Association must really be possible.

Perhaps you would write me at your convenience how matters stand.

With best regards,

As ever,

RICHTHOFEN

<sup>4</sup>The Heimatsfront (full name, the Heimattreue Front) was a strictly political organization of the German minority in Eupen-Malmédy which came into existence only after the rise of the Nazi party in Germany. In the document cited in footnote 3 the Agricultural Association argued that its own leaders had been instrumental in bringing the Heimattreue Front into existence and that 80 percent of the local leaders of the two organizations were identical. It replied to the charge of lack of political aggressiveness by arguing that open political activity was not its mission, but that only the sound economic organization of the German minority which it represented could provide the basis for such activity.

<sup>5</sup>Marginal note in Rintelen's handwriting: "So do I."

No. 486

1251/338079-81

*Senior Counselor Rintelen to Minister Richthofen*

BERLIN, February 7, 1938.

Sent February 8.

zu Pol. II 302.

DEAR HERR VON RICHTHOFEN: In reply to your letter of January 29, 1938, I can tell you that the apprehensions expressed to you by Consul Lautz and several persons from St. Vith with regard to the continued existence of the Agricultural Association are in the main without foundation. The authorities here, too, are still of the opinion

that the Agricultural Association must be maintained. The leaders of the Association enjoy complete confidence; the insinuations being spread about them—which are also known here—are regarded as unjustified.

The question whether the annual contribution shall be continued has nothing to do with these insinuations. Rather, the situation is such that when the last payment of 10,000 reichsmarks was made, the Association was informed that no promise could be made with respect to further assistance in the future.<sup>1</sup> Such promises cannot be made, for one never knows whether the funds will be available the following year. Besides, it does not seem advisable to relieve an association in advance from the trouble of attempting to balance its budget out of its own funds.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

As ever yours,

R[INTELEN]<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>An exchange of correspondence between the German Legation in Belgium and the Ausland-Pressebüro, Berlin, in December 1937 (1444/364679-80) reveals that an almost equal amount, 800 marks per month, was being paid at this period as a subsidy to the Flemish nationalist publication, *Volk en Staat*, of Antwerp.

<sup>2</sup>The copy used is a handwritten draft by Counselor Marschall von Bieberstein of Political Division II, and was initialed by Rintelen. It also bears the following note: "I discussed this matter with Ministerial Counselor Driest of the Ministry of the Interior. M[arschall]."

On Mar. 2 Rintelen directed a minute (1251/338088-89) to the Personnel and Budget Department of the Ministry requesting that a grant of 10,000 marks be made, pointing out that the Ministry of the Interior had given its support. He recalled that 12,000 marks had been given in the fiscal year 1935 and 10,000 in 1936 and added: "A further consideration is that a marked discouragement has evidenced itself among German circles in the Eupen-Malmédy area in consequence of the German-Belgian exchange of notes on Oct. 13, 1937. It appears all the more necessary, therefore, to show by a grant of additional aid that there is no reason to throw in the towel in this work with the German minority." The Personnel and Budget Department replied on Mar. 10 giving its approval and a note on this latter document (1251/338084) indicates that the funds were transmitted on Mar. 10.

## No. 487

3326/E008241

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, February 19, 1938.

Pol. II 516.

A few days ago, at a social function, the Belgian Minister gave me the express assurance that the recent meeting of Belgian diplomats at Brussels had demonstrated the steadfastness of Belgian policy. Belgium would continue to pursue its policy of independence step by step and without attracting attention.

WEIZSÄCKER



## No. 488

FS/0081-30

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 4, 1938.

The Belgian Minister, Count Davignon, called on me at 5 p.m. today. He told me that in his first conversation with me he was happy to be able to refer to good German-Belgian relations. The King of the Belgians, with whom his personal relations were close, had stressed to him a desire to give German-Belgian relations a more and more intimate form. A first step had been taken by the conclusion of the German-Belgian agreement supplementing the neutrality agreements also concluded with France and England. I asked the Belgian Ambassador three questions:

1. Does Belgium in carrying out her neutrality policy intend to fortify also her southern boundary facing France?

The Belgian Ambassador answered this question with a plain "yes". He added that the fortifications had already been started. The fortifications, however, were very expensive and their completion would require some time.

2. I asked the Belgian Minister whether there were still any obligations at present like those of the Franco-Belgian agreement of 1920, and whether General Staff discussions or exchanges of General Staff officers with France were continuing.

The Belgian Minister answered this question with a plain "no". The King was determined to maintain absolute neutrality.

3. Finally, I asked the Belgian Minister whether there was an agreement with England for cooperation on aviation questions. The Belgian Ambassador answered this question likewise in the negative.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 489

1190/230559-60

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry*

A 850

THE HAGUE, March 10, 1938.

Pol. II 704.

Subject: Holland's probable attitude in the event of a Western European conflict.

The debate on foreign policy which took place in the First Chamber last week, during which there was so much discussion of Dutch independence, of the possibility of a violation of Dutch neutrality, and the right to march through Holland in case of war, shows how

much interest is being taken in these questions here at present. And since the rearmament program, which has been launched energetically, shows that they have awakened to the facts of life in military matters, it is worth considering what attitude the Netherlands would probably take in case of war in Western Europe.

This appraisal is based on the present internal political structure of Holland, a country which, on the basis of its development and the mentality of the great majority of its population, must still be considered a Western democracy today. Two principles will probably be decisive for the political leaders of this state, regardless of the specific situation in case of a conflict:

1. Holland must, in so far as possible, attempt to keep out of a war;
2. Under no circumstances can Holland fight against England.

The first point needs no explanation; it is deeply rooted in the national character of the Dutch.

The second point is in keeping with the line which Dutch foreign policy has consistently pursued since the Napoleonic wars, and it can be logically explained not only by ideological concepts, but also in a very practical concern for the large colonial possessions in the Indies, which would be lost the moment Great Britain became an enemy.

The Netherlands Government, which has so often declared that Holland would protect her independence against any aggressor, would be in a serious dilemma if, in case of war, England should flagrantly violate Dutch neutrality. Such an eventuality is quite remote, however, since they know very well in London that Holland can be relied on unless foolish mistakes are committed.

What has been said regarding relations with England does not apply equally to France and Belgium. There the actual circumstances in each case would have considerable influence. But if France and England are allies, Holland will be still less inclined to side with their enemies.

Whether Holland will succeed in preserving her neutrality in case of war is therefore of decisive importance to us. This is a question, however, in which military considerations play at least as strong a role as political ones, and therefore no attempt will be made to answer it here.

Should Holland not succeed in remaining neutral, however, her attitude toward Germany in case of a war in Western Europe, in which England would be Germany's opponent, would be determined automatically.

This situation cannot be changed even by the undoubtedly sincere efforts of the new Dutch Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> to make the policy of his

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<sup>1</sup> J. A. N. Patijn became Foreign Minister in June 1937.

country really independent and to free it from too much consideration for England. Even the decline of British prestige in the Netherlands which could be noted recently as a result of the Abyssinian conflict and events in the Far East must not obscure the fact that Holland will, to be sure, do everything in her power to remain neutral in case of a Western European conflict, but if this is not possible, circumstances would force her irresistibly to the side of England.

FEINE

## No. 490

1798/409577-82

*The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

A 328

BRUSSELS, March 18, 1938.

Received March 19.

Pol. IV 1850.

Subject: Belgium and the events in Austria.

On March 15, when I handed M. Spaak the note containing the notification with regard to Austria, he received and took cognizance of it with the comment that he could not conceal the fact that the events which had led to the union of Austria with Germany had been a terrible shock to all the smaller countries and had tremendously increased their feeling of uncertainty and their anxiety. I replied to the Minister that if the world had taken the trouble to view the situation in Austria objectively and not only from the aspect of hatred for Germany, then the neighboring peoples would long ago have known and reconciled themselves to the fact that the reunion of Austria with Germany had to come about, and that it would be achieved with so much the more elemental force if other states artificially bolstered a government that was alien to the people in order that it might suppress the existing Greater German movement by the most despicable and insidious means. I also reminded the Minister that in Austria, after the end of the World War, his party comrades<sup>1</sup> had been the first to demand *Anschluss*. He admitted that the peoples themselves had to decide their fate but it was our "method" of procedure that was necessarily disquieting to all the smaller countries. I replied to the Minister that the whole of Europe could only be thankful for this "method." For if we had let matters slide, civil war and possibly foreign intervention in Austria would have been the result and a new world war could then probably no longer have been averted.

Nevertheless, on the next day, during the deliberations in the Chamber on his budget, the Minister reverted to the German

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<sup>1</sup> The Social Democrats.

"methods," which had disturbed the Government and a large part of the country.

Since the Austrian events, there has undoubtedly been considerable nervousness and even a sort of panicky feeling throughout the country. I notice this also in my private intercourse, where I cannot help observing in many places a considerable reserve toward me, which had practically disappeared in the past year and a half. On the other hand, however, congratulations from many quarters have been extended to me on the great German success.

Finally, I have also been told repeatedly that the most sensible thing Belgium could do would be to agree with Germany as soon as possible on the return of Eupen-Malmédy. I have naturally not contradicted this, but stressed the fact that the denationalization of minorities is no longer possible today. I hear, moreover, that in the lobbies of Parliament, too, a number of voices have recently been raised in favor of taking up negotiations with Germany with a view to returning Eupen-Malmédy. It is being said—whether in jest or seriously, I was unable to learn—that the King also had been addressed on the subject and had replied: "Baron Vaxelaire (the largest department store owner in Brussels) should wrap it (Eupen-Malmédy) up and send it to Hitler".

That the press would be mobilized against us was to be expected. There is only embarrassment and secret rage, since it cannot be denied that the entry of the Führer into Austria was a triumphal entry such as no emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, of the German nation, or of Austria-Hungary, had ever been accorded; that the German troops were received everywhere with flowers; that within a few hours and without any shedding of blood, all the key positions in the government passed into National Socialist hands—an indication of the strength of National Socialism in Austria, which had previously been spoken of as only German propaganda. Also, the hopes that had been pinned upon Italy and the Catholic Church in the opposition camp have crumbled to nothing since the exchange of correspondence between the Führer and the Duce, as well as the last important speech by Mussolini, were published.<sup>2</sup> Cardinal Innitzer's declaration of loyalty reported by Havas was received here with actual stupefaction. The news was reported only with some delay. To an inquiry I caused to be made at various editorial offices of Catholic newspapers, the reply was given that they themselves first had to verify the report in

<sup>2</sup> For Hitler's letter of Mar. 11 to Mussolini, see vol. I of this series, document No. 352. Hitler telegraphed to Mussolini from Linz on Mar. 13; Mussolini replied on the 14th. (English translation in *London Times*, Mar. 15.) An extract from Mussolini's speech on Mar. 16 is printed in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 236-237.

Vienna. Meanwhile, the reports were published in ordinary make-up among other news items, while if the reverse had been the case they would naturally have been printed in the very largest type.

During a visit that I had to pay to Minister Spaak today with regard to another matter, I took the opportunity to speak to him once more about Austria and the criticism of our action that he had uttered in Parliament. This time he admitted that our action had probably prevented civil war and worse. But we had to take into consideration that the public here was too uninformed about Austria and therefore thought only of the entry of the German troops. He was forever being asked, as he had been only last evening at a meeting where he had to defend his policy of independence, whether he could reconcile this policy with his conscience and saw no danger that Belgium might on the morrow be confronted with a similar ultimatum, followed by the entry of German troops. He was trying as much as he could to calm the people and make it clear to them that the German-Austrian relationship was not to be compared with the German-Belgian relationship. But the air was so charged with electricity that all efforts were unavailing and it was hopeless to combat the alarmist reports in the press. The most recent events in Spain were causing tremendous unrest among the Socialists,<sup>3</sup> and the general nervousness was being further increased by the Polish-Lithuanian conflict.<sup>4</sup>

In this connection I spoke to the Minister about the rumored mobilization of the Belgian Army, which since yesterday evening had caused uneasiness throughout the whole of Belgium. I had already ascertained through a visit by the Military Attaché to the Chief of the General Staff what the real situation was, but it was to have been expected that the military maneuvers under way since this morning, even if they had been arranged a long time ago, would necessarily give rise to the wildest rumors and cause increased nervousness. The Minister thereupon read to me the statement (which will follow by separate mail) of the Minister of Defense, General Denis, which had just appeared in the first afternoon paper, and added that the Cabinet would convene today in order to consider whether something more should be done to calm the public in the matter of the alleged mobilization. I have actually heard that wailing women and girls are standing near all the barracks.

RICHTHOFEN

<sup>3</sup> On Mar. 16, and for two days thereafter at intervals of a few hours, German and Italian planes directed a series of air attacks against Barcelona. Huge losses of life were reported.

<sup>4</sup> See ch. III, documents Nos. 321 ff.

## No. 491

3873/E046685-87

*The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

A 351

BRUSSELS, March 25, 1938.

Received March 26.

Pol. II 843.

Subject: Discussions in the Belgian Senate regarding the return of Eupen and Malmédy.

According to confidential reports from a reliable source, the question of the return of Eupen and Malmédy to Germany was discussed at the session of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Belgian Senate on March 24. Count de Grünne, a former Rexist, now an independent senator, explained at length that the regions ceded to Belgium had been and had remained German and that it was ridiculous to speak of "our liberated brothers." These regions were a source of great danger for the future of Belgium since they could touch off a quarrel with Germany. It was therefore in the interest of Belgium to return them to Germany.

Count Grünne's speech met with an entirely sympathetic reception in the committee. The only one who firmly opposed Count Grünne's suggestion was Senator van Overberg of the Flemish-Catholic party. But his statements are said to have been not particularly convincing and to have made little impression in the committee.

As I hear from various sources, the question of the return of Eupen and Malmédy continues to be a topic of lively discussion in political circles. The view has been variously expressed that if a plebiscite were held in Belgium regarding the return of Eupen and Malmédy to Germany, 75 to 80 percent of the people would declare themselves in favor of returning them. In parliamentary and senatorial circles there are quite a number of influential men today who are creating sentiment for the return, employing the argument that it was necessary to act quickly in order to obtain something in return from Germany. For, if they waited, the day would come when Germany would demand the return without any equivalent. The release of the 75 million reichsmarks held in the Foreign Exchange Clearing Office is frequently mentioned in this connection as the German equivalent which could be requested by Belgium.

From all that I hear I have the impression that the question of the return of Eupen and Malmédy has reached a new stage and that we now have excellent prospects of attaining our goal. Our action in Austria, which brought home to the whole world the speed of our decisions and their lightning execution with the help of a splendid organization of all the forces of the state, left the Belgian politicians

breathless and produced a general feeling of apprehension. In many persons this feeling gave rise to the desire to eliminate as much as possible all controversial issues that might encumber German-Belgian relations.

I request consideration whether it would not be advisable to exploit this mood and put out cautious feelers. Possibly the forthcoming visit of Reichsbank President Schacht, which is to take place on March 31 or April 1 may offer a favorable opportunity for bringing up the question in one form or another.

I would suggest getting in touch with the President of the Reichsbank and in any case that I be provided with detailed instructions.

RICHTHOFEN

### No. 492

4470/E087819

#### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, March 30, 1938.

zu Pol. II 843.

To be submitted through the State Secretary to the Director of the Political Department.

The Foreign Minister spoke with Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht by telephone regarding report No. A 351<sup>1</sup> from the Legation in Brussels. He asked him not to commit himself on the Eupen-Malmédy question and in any case not to bring up the subject of his own accord. Dr. Schacht promised to act accordingly.

The Foreign Minister now asks that the German Legation in Brussels also be informed as soon as possible that we want to have the Belgians approach us. On the other hand, any feelers that the Belgians might put out should not be rejected, since we are naturally interested in the subject.<sup>2</sup>

ERICH KORDT

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Mackensen's handwriting: "which I sent to Herr Schacht yesterday by agreement with the Foreign Minister." The reference is to document No. 491.

<sup>2</sup> A brief telegram in this sense was dispatched to Brussels the same day (3873/E046688).

### No. 493

4470/E087820

#### *The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Belgium*

BERLIN, April 7, 1938.

Pol. II 999.

Upon his return from Brussels Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, informed the Foreign Minister that the Belgian King's former

secretary, who at present occupies an influential position in the Belgian National Bank, had of his own accord broached the question of Eupen-Malmédy to him in Brussels. He had been particularly interested in whether our viewpoint on this question was still the same, namely, that in case of an agreement Belgium would retain the Walloon villages of Eupen and Malmédy and only the German villages would be returned. The Belgian King and Reichsbank President Schacht were known to have discussed the matter previously on this basis. To this Herr Schacht had replied that he was not informed regarding the details of the problem. However, since the Führer was opposed to incorporating alien ethnic groups into the Reich, he could imagine that a solution along the lines suggested would be possible in the future, also. He had not gone more deeply into the subject.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to the concluding statements in report B. 1095 of April 4,<sup>2</sup> the Legation is asked to continue to take an attitude of watchful waiting on the question of Eupen-Malmédy.

By order:

VON RINTELEN

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<sup>1</sup> The text of the dispatch to this point is identical with the passage on this subject in the memorandum which Ribbentrop wrote on his talk with Schacht (F14/042-040).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3873/E046697-99). The report gives an account of the formalities of Schacht's 2-day visit in Brussels, during which, it is stated, the Eupen-Malmédy issue was not broached. The report concludes with the following observation: "It would probably not be a mistake to allow the Eupen-Malmédy question to rest until a better occasion. The recognition that Belgium cannot digest Eupen-Malmédy is now so general that the subject is discussed quite openly here."

## No. 494

141/127215-17

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

SECRET

BERLIN, July 7, 1938.

Today I asked the Belgian Minister to visit me and told him the following on a purely private and personal basis:

As he knew, at the time of the signing of the German-Belgian agreement last year there were unofficial conversations between Belgium and Germany as to whether our respective missions should not be advanced to embassies. The plan had not been realized at that time. Several problems, as for instance that of the so-called "war criminals",<sup>1</sup> stood in the way. In the meantime Foreign Min-

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<sup>1</sup> Under articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had been required to deliver for trial by military tribunals of certain Allied Governments persons accused of war crimes or crimes against the nationals of those Governments. Germany had refused to deliver such persons. In consequence, charges against certain individuals who had been listed by the Belgian Government as wanted for trial were still pending.



ister von Ribbentrop had examined the matter once more. The Belgians had evidently not dropped the idea entirely either, as witnessed, for example, by an article in the *Métropole* day before yesterday. The German Foreign Minister was in sympathy with the idea, and inclined to take it up officially if it was certain that the Belgians really had such a plan and that it could be realized by a simultaneous and joint decision. The wording then should be to the effect that (without mentioning a particular occasion) the two Governments had agreed to change their respective legations to embassies. There should be no connection made with other questions. However, I wanted to repeat that a settlement of the unfortunate "war criminal" question seemed to us necessary. Count Davignon might find out whether the situation in Brussels was such that our purely private talk could be transferred to an official plane.

Count Davignon listened to my remarks with composure. He stated that he himself had kept out of the matter entirely in the past because he had a personal interest in it. But officially, too, it would not have been fitting for the Belgian Government to come forward with a request to advance our legations to embassies, for he, Davignon, had been accorded every courtesy in Berlin. Our mutual policies are proceeding well, and as minister of a small country among the ambassadors of the Great Powers he could not call his position incongruous. On the other hand, the position of our minister as representative of a neighbor which was the mightiest continental state had always been awkward and abnormal in the eyes of the Belgian Government, too, since there were no fewer than nine ambassadors of foreign powers in Brussels. Davignon believed that his Government was certainly disposed to take the contemplated step and thought the form I mentioned was suitable, in which neither Belgium nor Germany would appear to take the initiative. The Minister will consult with his Government and then talk with me again. He does not believe that parliamentary obstacles of any kind are to be expected. As far as he knows his Government could take the contemplated step entirely on its own authority. It would surely consider the move a suitable expression of Belgium's policy of independence carried out vigorously by the King, Minister Spaak, and himself.

Our conversation continued with a few remarks about the above-mentioned "war criminal" matter, which in Davignon's opinion could be resolved in an inconspicuous manner; at the same time the Belgian Government evidently wants to make a bargain, however, by eliciting a promise to stop the German propaganda in Eupen-Malmédy, which has now, according to Davignon, again become evident, though it has

little political importance.<sup>2</sup> It was understood, he added, that it would by no means be impossible for Germany and Belgium to negotiate about the question of Eupen-Malmédy at a suitable time. Belgium also had no objections to our cultivating cultural connections there, but the propaganda in question obstructed every thought of settlement. There seems to have been a conversation on this subject between the Belgian Foreign Ministry and Minister von Richthofen in the last few days, about which a report from Brussels has not yet been received here.<sup>3</sup>

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup> On July 20 Minister Richthofen wrote a personal letter to Weizsäcker (1145/325403-04) in which he said that his efforts since the exchange of notes on Oct. 13, 1937, to have the war criminal question disposed of had not met with any success. Earlier he had been told by van Zuylen, political director in the Belgian Foreign Ministry, that the Belgian Government did not feel strong enough to introduce the matter in Parliament and did not see how the subject could be handled except by legislative action. Then in June van Zuylen had said they had found a way to liquidate the matter but felt that a return gesture by Germany that would strengthen Spaak's position was desirable. He suggested that the sending of the children of the German minority in Eupen-Malmédy to Germany for summer vacations be stopped.

On July 26 Count Davignon told Weizsäcker (1145/325416) that "the Belgian Government has now found a way to bring the question, so-called, of persons accused of war crimes to a close through administrative channels, without legislative action and without attracting public attention." Weizsäcker assured him that Germany did not "lay any particular value on a public settlement of the affair."

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (3873/E046735-39). Richthofen complained to Spaak that the Belgian press had broken the "silent understanding" that the Eupen-Malmédy question not become the subject of polemics in the German and Belgian press. Spaak replied that the open pro-German agitation conducted among the minority was the cause, and it would be better if the press truce could be continued.

## No. 495

1145/325405

### *The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 38 of July 23

BRUSSELS, July 23, 1938—1:20 p. m.

Received July 23—3:45 p. m.

Pol. IV 4919.

The King sent me word to call on him today, since he would be away in August, in order, as he told me, to express to me his personal thanks for all I had done to further relations between Belgium and Germany.<sup>1</sup> In the course of the conversation, the King brought up the Czechoslovak problem and expressed his great anxiety over the situation. He asked me repeatedly whether I really believed that the situation would be satisfactorily resolved without war. I pointed out

<sup>1</sup> Richthofen was leaving the Brussels post to be replaced by Bülow-Schwante when the mission was raised to an embassy. See document No. 501.

repeatedly that the course of developments depended on Prague and on whether the realization would dawn there that something would really have to be done for the Sudeten Germans. The powers would also have to use their influence with Prague to the end that no more provocations occurred in the future, with respect to which we would have to retain our freedom of action. The King showed understanding and compared our policy with the driver of an automobile who is confidently going his way but is exposed to danger that an accident might befall him from a side street. The King also expressed his indignation over the international press, with respect to which democratic regimes were powerless. In keeping with the pessimism of the King is the fact that the Chief of the General Staff was, as he told me several days ago, asked by the King to spend his leave at home and not, as he had wished, in travel abroad.

RICHTHOFEN

## No. 496

1145/325431-33

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

A 906

BRUSSELS, August 31, 1938.

Pol. II 2697.

Subject: Belgium's Neutrality.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the general feeling of crisis which prevails in Europe at present, the question how the Belgian policy of independence is to be regarded and whether, in case of a European war, Belgium's neutrality can be counted on has acquired added importance.

From the reports of the Legation it is known that the policy of independence inaugurated by King Leopold in his memorable speech of October 14, 1936,<sup>2</sup> has been faithfully carried out by Belgian Foreign Minister and present Minister President Spaak, that on every occasion it has been approved almost without opposition in the Chamber and Senate, and that the great majority of the Belgian people are also behind this policy. It is also known that the Belgian General Staff, too, has reorientated itself in accordance with the policy of independence and is trying to take it into account in preparing the defenses of the country.

Such opposition to the policy of independence as has in the last few months been expressed here and there in Walloon, Liberal, and Socialist circles, which the Legation has often reported on, does not,

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 439 for another report from Brussels on this general subject.

<sup>2</sup> The text of King Leopold's speech is printed in *Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened, 1939-1940* (published for the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 1941), pp. 53-56. This publication also has the following statement (p. 4): "The precise significance of the speech was not understood abroad; it was taken as a new departure in Belgian policy." See also document No. 439, footnote 4.

in comparison, carry too much weight. The policy of independence has too broad and sure a basis in the interests of the country to be endangered by these attacks.

The idea is generally held here that Belgium can gain absolutely nothing even in a victorious war. Even such outspoken sympathies for France as are found in certain Walloon circles, for example, will therefore hardly be able to induce the Belgian Government to give up its neutrality lightly in favor of France, especially since these sympathies of the Walloons are opposed by a decided disinclination in the Flemish camp to fight for French interests. Recently a Belgian newspaper described very accurately the attitude of the great majority of the Belgian people in the short sentence, "Our sole enemy is war." Indeed, the desire to keep out of all quarrels dominates Belgian foreign policy, and in case of a European war Belgium will, in enlightened self-interest, do everything in order to maintain her neutrality and give none of the belligerents any occasion or pretext for drawing her into the conflict.

This being the case, the question arises whether Belgium is also prepared to defend her independence by force of arms against everyone. That this would be done with regard to Germany cannot be doubted for a moment. Whether there would be armed defense against possible violations of neutrality by England and France as well appears to me doubtful.

The Military Attaché in his report of August 3, 1938,<sup>3</sup> stated that the Belgian Army would, on orders from its supreme commander, go to the defense of the country against an unprovoked attack, whether the front was to the east or to the south, although in the latter case not with the same conviction and enthusiasm. It seems doubtful to me, however, whether in the present situation an order to march against the neighbor on the south would ever be given.

In the event of a conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia in which France and England intervened in favor of the latter, Belgium would, I am convinced, try at first to remain neutral. However, even before England and France took any action against us a very strong anti-German feeling would develop here. It may be expected that the hardly forgotten period of occupation would be called to mind again and the laboriously repressed hatred of Germany would break out anew. Even now certain indications of increasing hostility are becoming noticeable, even in Flemish circles.<sup>4</sup> I consider it out of the

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> In a report of June 13 (1586/353242) Richthofen recalled that the Flemish press had attacked the French Ambassador at the time of the Austrian *Anschluss* when he sounded Belgian opinion on passage of French troops through Belgian territory. The report, in reply to an inquiry from Berlin, stated that the Belgian policy of independence was fortunately now so firmly entrenched in the entire population that French pressure alone would no longer make Belgium amenable to French desires for such a concession.

question that with such a probable development, which would be exploited and encouraged in every way by Anglo-French propaganda, a Belgian Government would be able to take military steps against a violation of neutrality by the British or the French and thereby place itself on the German side, especially since political and military circles here think that the Western Powers have better prospects of success.

In conclusion I should like to say that as the situation now stands Belgium will try to maintain her neutrality as long as possible in the event of a European conflict. However, if she should somehow be forced to abandon her neutrality, she will join the Western Powers.

V. BARGEN

### No. 497

1145/325435-87

#### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

A 924

BRUSSELS, September 7, 1938.

Received September 8.

Pol. II 2764.

Subject: Conversation with Baron van Zuylen on Belgium's military security measures.

After the partial mobilization of the French became known, it was rumored here that Belgium would take precautionary military measures of a similar nature. It was said that reservists had already been called up in some cases.

In order to learn definitely the intentions of the Belgian Government, which held Cabinet meetings yesterday and the day before, I called today on the head of the Political Department in the Foreign Ministry here, Baron van Zuylen—the Minister and the State Secretary could not be reached—and discussed the situation with him.

Baron van Zuylen assured me that in the two Cabinet meetings no decisions of any kind had been made with reference to the foreign-policy situation; there had only been a general discussion. The King and the Government adhered to their policy of independence and were determined not to depart from this course in the future, either. In reply to my question whether any military measures had been taken or were contemplated—I had heard rumors that reservists had been called up—Baron van Zuylen stated that nothing of the kind was planned.

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<sup>1</sup> On Sept. 10 Bargaen reported that he had been able to see Spaak and had received the same assurances on Belgian policy in the Czech crisis as conveyed in the above report. For the report on the conversation with Spaak see vol. II, document No. 454.

Baron van Zuylen mentioned in this connection that the Belgian Government had, however, learned of certain military measures which we had taken on the Belgian frontier during the last few days. I replied that I knew only that we were building certain fortifications on the Belgian frontier, about which we had previously informed the Belgian Government and the Belgian General Staff. In our opinion these fortifications represented a strengthening of the German guarantee to Belgium, since they were evidence of our defensive attitude, and greatly reduced the temptation for any enemies of ours to cross Belgian territory in order to penetrate into the Rhineland. Baron van Zuylen admitted this and stated that these fortifications were not causing the Belgian Government any anxiety. By the precautionary measures mentioned he had meant something else, concerning which the Belgian Government was reliably informed. However, these preparations on the part of Germany would also not cause the Belgian Government to take any military measures for the present. Naturally one could not know how the situation would develop. It was therefore quite possible that in the future Belgium would also be forced to take some sort of military measures in the interest of her own security. These too, however, would be dictated only by the desire to remain aloof from any conflict.

I pointed out to Baron van Zuylen that in certain circumstances such measures were a very serious matter. They could easily give us the impression that Belgium was declaring her solidarity with France.

Since thus far there have been no indications of special military preparations, the statements of Baron van Zuylen are probably correct. They appear all the more credible because the Belgian military declare that the Belgian frontiers are constantly and adequately protected (cf. the enclosed item from today's *Indépendance Belge*).<sup>2</sup>

BARGEN

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<sup>2</sup> Not reprinted (1145/325438).

## No. 498

1145/325448-49

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, September 20, 1938.

e. o. Pol. II 2902.

The Belgian Minister called on me today and first spoke confidently about the general situation. Then he brought up the subject of the attitude of the Belgian Government in the last few weeks—

<sup>1</sup> Bülow-Schwante was at this period awaiting transfer to Brussels as Ambassador (see document No. 501). Earlier he had served as Chief of Protocol but was relieved following the Führer's visit to Italy in May, allegedly because of Hitler's displeasure with the protocol arrangements made by him on that occasion.

which was presumably the real purpose of his visit. He was happy to be able to state that Belgium had given a practical demonstration of the German-Belgian agreement, and he hoped that this would also be recognized by Germany. Count Davignon emphasized the following points:

1. The press had maintained calm, reserve, and objectivity, with the exception of a few Communist utterances, and had supported the political leadership of the Government.

2. The military measures had been kept within the narrowest and absolutely necessary limits and had been applied to the German and the French frontiers in exactly the same manner.

3. The Belgian Government, especially the Minister President, had emphasized at every opportunity a firm desire for neutrality and independence in every direction. In order to prevent from the outset any public debate, the Belgian Government had rejected proposals for calling Parliament and the Foreign Affairs Committee, or for issuing statements on the foreign situation. The communiqué of the Minister President enclosed herewith had been published in the Belgian press on September 17.\*

The Belgian Minister concluded his statements with the remark that the Belgian Government hoped it had contributed in some small measure to the maintenance of peace by the attitude it had demonstrated, especially by its positive desire for neutrality and the military measures it had taken against France as well.

I replied to Count Davignon that the attitude and the measures of the Belgian Government had naturally been followed with great interest by Germany and that the practical effects of the German-Belgian agreement had been noted with satisfaction.

I should like to suggest that when the opportunity presents itself a friendly word of appreciation be spoken to the Belgian Minister, who has been very active in this matter during the last few weeks.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Under State Secretary.

VON BÜLOW-SCHWANTE

\*Not printed (1145/325450). The statement declared that the Government did not believe that the international situation required summoning the parliamentary bodies, and that it was determined to adhere to its "policy of independence".

## No. 499

328/195342

### *The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 17 of September 28 LUXEMBOURG, September 28, 1938—6:58 p. m.

Received September 28—8:45 p. m.

Foreign Minister Bech has just asked me to inquire of the German Government by way of precaution whether in the event of war the

Luxembourg Government could rely on Germany's faithfully adhering to her previous, clearly stated position on the inviolability of Luxembourg territory, as long as it was not disregarded by the other side.<sup>1</sup>

RADOWITZ

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<sup>1</sup> On Sept. 30 Radowitz reported (328/195343) that he had been confidentially informed by the Luxembourg Foreign Minister that on Sept. 29, before settlement of the Czech crisis at Munich, the French in reply to a similar inquiry had given binding assurances as to the inviolability of Luxembourg territory in case of war.

## No. 500

328/195344

### *The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Luxembourg*

Telegram

No. 52

BERLIN, October 1, 1938.

[zu] Pol. I g 3704<sup>1</sup> and 3742.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 17<sup>1</sup> and 18.<sup>2</sup>

Please inform M. Bech that the German position on the question of the inviolability of Luxembourg territory is known to him from the negotiations of recent months and is unchanged.<sup>3</sup>

VON RIBBENTROP  
*Foreign Minister*

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 499.

<sup>2</sup> Pol. I g 3742; Not printed. Telegram No. 18 is the document summarized in document No. 499, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Shortly after the exchange of notes between Belgium and Germany on Oct. 13, 1937, Luxembourg had requested consideration of a similar guarantee of the inviolability of her territory (see document No. 480). On Mar. 26, 1938, a long exploratory conversation took place in Berlin between Gaus and the Luxembourg Secretary General Wehrer (115/117899-903). On Apr. 25 Ribbentrop informed Weizsäcker (4471/E087530) that he had spoken with the Führer, who had approved continuing the conversations and authorized the preparation of a draft treaty. On July 19 when Gaus handed a draft to Wehrer (115/117915-18), the arrangement had taken the form of notes to be handed Luxembourg by Germany and France. No direct Franco-German negotiations occurred but Wehrer traveled back and forth between Berlin and Paris trying to get agreement on the texts of the notes. The principal difficulty, as Gaus explained to Wehrer on Dec. 22, 1938 (115/117927-28), after the Czech crisis had caused a lengthy interruption in the negotiations, was that the French wished to guarantee Luxembourg neutrality in a form which could keep in force Luxembourg's obligations under the League Covenant, whereas Germany wished to define Luxembourg's neutrality absolutely, that is, excluding any Luxembourg participation in League sanctions. For the outcome of the negotiations see document No. 505.



## No. 501

2134/466955

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 11, 1938.

Count Davignon today handed me the enclosed copy of his new letter of credence as Ambassador.<sup>1</sup> Count Davignon naturally hopes soon to receive his first audience as Ambassador. Herr von Bülow-Schwante will be received in Brussels on October 14.

Following his congratulations on the very successful policy of the Führer, Count Davignon added his observations on the new situation which has arisen in Europe. He thought that France, after this departure from her traditional policy of alliances with our eastern foes, wished to and had to reorient herself. She would, of course, not give up her ties with England but would manifest a strong desire for peace and tranquillity and, probably in the question of colonies, too, would be more cooperative than England. He considered the personal cultivation of Franco-German relations an important element in our further European policy.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 494. The raising of the legations to embassies had been delayed by premature revelation and criticism in the French press, which was inspired from Belgian sources. On Aug. 26 Davignon explained to Weizsäcker (141/127221-22) that this Belgian opposition was of no consequence. Spaak had decided not to call the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs over the issue, but had merely informed the party leaders. The matter would not appear in the Belgian press until the formal announcement was made. On this basis it was agreed to effect the change in the final week of September. The Czech crisis had then caused a further delay.

## No. 502

102/111218-21

*The Minister in Luxembourg to the Foreign Ministry*

A IV 1 b 11

LUXEMBOURG, November 22, 1938.

Pol. II 3670.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Attitude of the people of Luxembourg toward the Reich Germans in the country.

It was possible only recently to complete the thorough and lengthy investigations made in all parts of the country together with the Landesgruppenleiter. This study proved to be very useful, however, since we now have a clear picture of the attitude of the people of

Luxembourg in and after the days of political tension—a picture which might easily have been distorted in the midst of the excitement.

During the time when the excitement was at its peak, that is, from the middle to the end of September, the Reich Germans in the country were in a difficult position, as mentioned in the report under reference.<sup>1</sup> Everywhere, in the city of Luxembourg itself, as well as in the industrial centers and in the country, they were exposed to hostile insults. Everything German was disparaged and in effect Germany alone was declared responsible. Especially loud were the complaints which reached us from the districts in which the radical influence is stronger—from Differdingen, Rümelingen, Petingen, Rodingen, where our German comrades for the most part work in the mines which extend underground into France. In Dudelingen, too, which has a socialistic town council, and in Wiltz, there were serious radical disturbances. Things were quieter in Esch-sur-Alz, where our German colony has greater solidarity and where the comradely spirit which undoubtedly exists among the workers forestalled any violent demonstration.

It was found that nothing more than abusive language occurred and that in particular no acts of violence or other serious conflicts took place. The excitement then soon subsided, so that about the middle of October things had returned to normal. The Luxembourger is a rough individual and likes violent expressions. Especially under the influence of alcohol he inclines easily to extremely objectionable language, to which he himself probably does not attach the significance which the German, who is much more sensitive on this score, attributes to it.

Nevertheless, it has recently become plainly apparent that the Luxembourgers of all strata and classes, with very few exceptions (those connected with the Luxembourg Association for German Literature and Art) are emotionally tied to the French, that they see in France their second homeland and the defender of their idea of freedom. In this connection the old historical antipathy to the "Prussian" and to all discipline and obligations on the part of the individual surely play the dominant role. This attitude is strengthened by a complete lack of understanding for the whole philosophy of the Third Reich, particularly for the National Socialist ideology. Too lazy to occupy himself at all intensively with these questions, the Luxembourger, from the outset, rejects everything, because of his fear of any kind of restriction of his freedoms.

In addition there is the agitation of the left-wing groups, which naturally affects the industrial centers particularly. It could be observed, however, that, despite everything, there exists among the

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6809/E517683-84).

workers a feeling of comradeship which does not, it is true, prevent political attacks, but does not tolerate action against individuals or against industrial plants.

I must also mention in this connection the dominating influence, principally on the devout rural population, of the *Luxemburger Wort*.<sup>2</sup>

On the strength of the data collected, I spoke several times with Minister Bech, who made the whole question the subject of a discussion in the "Conseil d'Etat", with the result that all members of the Government agreed to work for an objective and correct attitude toward the Reich Germans in the country. Accordingly the press was also summoned and the standpoint of the Government made clear to them. And the press—including the Socialist papers—obeying the instructions of the Government, exerted its influence upon the public, as the report under reference shows.

I also thought it wise to have a long talk with Blum, the Socialist Minister of Justice, on this complex of questions. I found that he had full understanding for the need of seeing to it, precisely among the working population, that each individual was aware of his duty as a citizen of a neutral state and regulated his attitude accordingly toward the citizens of the large neighboring states. Minister of Justice Blum and Labor Minister Krier, the two Socialist members of the Government, thereupon vigorously developed this idea at meetings of representatives of the rank and file which they called. Minister of Justice Blum told me in a later conversation that it had not been very easy to bring a few refractory individuals to order, but that he could now vouch for it that this idea of obligations toward the Germans had taken hold completely, particularly in the working classes, and that he firmly believed that the results of these efforts would soon be apparent. I also pointed out to Minister Blum that it would not suffice to attempt to exert this influence at one or two meetings of rank and file leaders, but that educational work would be necessary over a longer period, disseminating the same idea again and again, until it was firmly rooted among the workers. This was met with an understanding attitude also.

I can state that the Government conducted itself with complete correctness during the period of political excitement. But this attitude is attributable solely to calculated considerations of political expediency. In their *innermost* rejection of the National Socialist ideology, however, *all* members of the Government are in harmony.

RADOWITZ

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<sup>2</sup> A Catholic-Conservative newspaper.

## No. 503

328/195348

*Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I*

BERLIN, November 28, 1938.

As instructed, I called on General Keitel today and asked him whether he still held to his opinion as to the desirability from the military point of view of a Franco-German declaration to Luxembourg regarding its territorial integrity and political independence.<sup>1</sup>

General Keitel stated to me that even in the present circumstances he adhered to his view that such a declaration, which would insure the neutrality of Luxembourg, was desirable. He pointed out in this connection that militarily, to be sure, such an agreement would be of practical value only so long as Belgium preserved its neutrality.

Respectfully submitted to Ministerialdirektor Gaus in accordance with instructions.

VON DER HEYDEN-RYNSCH

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 500, footnote 3.

## No. 504

167/132768;  
167/132772-75

*The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry*[Extract]<sup>1</sup>

A 361

THE HAGUE, January 25, 1939.

Pol. II 294.

Subject: The Netherlands in 1938.

With reference to report A 72 of January 8, 1938.<sup>2</sup>

. . . . .

*Foreign Policy*

There is no doubt, especially since the September crisis, that the fear has generally increased that a European war, which would possibly entail flights over Dutch territory by foreign combat forces,

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<sup>1</sup> It is not the practice of the editors of these volumes to publish extracts of documents. This document is an exception. Since it is the Minister's year-end report, it deals at length in the unpublished portions with domestic conditions in the Netherlands. In the interest of space these have been omitted. The full report is on microfilm (167/132768-75).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6810/E517688-94). The document is a similar report for the previous year, entitled "Holland in 1937".

might make it very difficult for the Netherlands to preserve neutrality. In spite of these fears, her foreign policy is still the most stable element in the structure of the national life of Holland. Her slogan is still "a policy of independence". What this means was quite clearly defined—in contrast to "a neutrality policy" on the Swiss pattern—in a speech by Foreign Minister Patijn in the Chamber in November, to the effect that the policy of independence means that there is no commitment of any kind and always leaves the Netherlands free to decide in a given case, in accordance with her own interests, whether to remain neutral or not. That the Dutch would try their utmost to preserve the neutrality of the Netherlands in the event of a European conflict is altogether self-evident. At international gatherings also—whether the Copenhagen conversations of July 22, or the League of Nations sessions in September—M. Patijn let none slip by without proclaiming this Netherlands "policy of independence".

The most important practical result of this foreign policy in the past year was the final and formal repudiation by Holland of her obligations under article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant. The prestige of the League of Nations has in general sunk lower. And the ranks of those in favor of a complete withdrawal have increased somewhat. The general feeling, also the opinion of the Government, tends to the view, however, that while no great advantages are any longer to be expected from the League of Nations, on the other hand, as M. Patijn recently stated it, continued membership in the League of Nations would not entail any disadvantages and the small states fundamentally had an interest in the "continuation of this institution as such."

As early as last February, the Netherlands on its own initiative recognized the Italian empire of Abyssinia.

The taking up of relations with Nationalist Spain at the end of July—which is not, to be sure, regarded officially as recognition—is also an expression of the above-mentioned policy of independence.

No noteworthy changes have occurred in the correct and normal relations of the Netherlands to the other countries of the world. There may have been a certain cooling off with respect to Japan, which, it has recently been more and more feared, will, in its Asiatic expansionist urge, gradually threaten the existence of the Netherlands Indies colonial possessions.

The friendship with Belgium has been strengthened, due principally to the very successful state visit of King Leopold to the Netherlands, which took place in November. However, in accordance with the strictly observed principle of independence, no political or mili-

tary treaty commitments were made even with Belgium. Nor have any such ties been contracted with other states. The conjectures that are heard from time to time to the effect that such secret agreements existed with England are always very vigorously denied. Confidence in the power of British imperialism has received many a blow in the past year. Nevertheless, England remains as ever the foreign power that Holland's policy most closely follows.

### *Relations with Germany*

The mood of the Dutch people with respect to Germany has in the past year, and particularly since fall, suffered a decided deterioration. In this connection, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Hollander has never loved the German, that he has always viewed the great neighbor on his eastern frontier with a mixture of fear and distrust. A Dutch historian once told me that our two countries, since the time when their ways had parted, have stood with their backs to each other. Germany had looked toward the east and Holland toward the west. And the Netherlands today still looks toward the west. For the liberalistic and individualistic Hollander, England is not only a country whose form of government especially appeals to him but, in his opinion, both in the mother country as well as in the colonies, is also his powerful protector. In contrast, he finds the dynamic development of forces in the new Germany disquieting and is innately unsympathetic toward it. In the 125 years without a war and without any significant occurrences in the field of foreign policy, the Hollander has grown fat and has lost entirely the heroic spirit of adventure of former days. Thus he fails to understand what is going on in Germany, and the powerful rise of his great neighbor in disregard of all obstacles, fills the Hollander with a certain fear, not fear of attack or conquest by Germany, but rather concern that by a shift in the balance of power in its disfavor, the position of Holland in the manifold relations between the two countries will grow steadily worse.

Naturally there are people here, too, particularly among those who know Germany from personal observation, who fully recognize the tremendous achievements of National Socialism. But this recognition has not been able to prevail in the general sentiment of the country. The tone of the press, particularly—which, moreover, depends very much on what is thought and written in England—with a few exceptions displays all the nuances from provocation to sardonic rejection. In the final weeks of the past year, to be sure, thanks to the intervention of the Government, a certain improvement is to be noted in this field, and I know that the Foreign Minister personally is trying to moderate the attitude of the bourgeois newspapers.

ZECH

## No. 505

328/195356

*Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department*

BERLIN, February 18, 1939.

The negotiations on the settlement of the Luxembourg question, on which the Luxembourg Chargé d'Affaires has been engaged with me on the one hand and with the responsible official in the French Foreign Ministry on the other, have finally, after protracted and in part difficult exchanges back and forth, led to the French adopting our standpoint, though in a somewhat awkward formulation.

The text of the German-Luxembourg exchange of notes and of the identical French-Luxembourg notes, as provisionally agreed upon, is appended.<sup>1</sup>

These two exchanges of notes would be supplemented by a simultaneous Belgian-Luxembourg exchange of notes in which Belgium, without assuming any guarantee for her part, obligates herself to respect unconditionally the inviolability of Luxembourg territory. The text of the Belgian-Luxembourg exchange of notes will be determined in Brussels very shortly, but involves no problems of importance for us.

The French negotiators will now submit the agreed text of the appended notes to M. Bonnet for his final approval. The Luxembourg Chargé d'Affaires has asked me for my part to obtain the approval of the German Government. All of the notes would then be exchanged simultaneously in Luxembourg between the Luxembourg Foreign Minister and the three Ministers there.<sup>2</sup>

Please instruct me whether I may now inform the Luxembourg Chargé of definite German approval.

GAUS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (328/195357-60). The Luxembourg Government "confirmed its determination to maintain the political independence of the Grand Duchy, and thereby to remain faithful to its traditional policy of neutrality with due respect for its international obligations."

The French and German Governments took note of this statement in their separate replies and each declared that it "acknowledged anew its obligation to respect Luxembourg's political independence and territorial integrity and to guarantee them against any external attack." Further they pledged themselves "in all circumstances to respect the inviolability of Luxembourg territory except in the case that Luxembourg should take part in a military action." In the German drafts of July 19, 1938 (115/117917-18; see document No. 500, footnote 3) and Dec. 1, 1938 (115/117925-26), this clause had been framed to parallel the statement made to Belgium on Oct. 18, 1937, and read: "except, of course, in the case that Luxembourg should take part in military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved." The French had objected to this formulation (115/117927-28).

<sup>2</sup> The exchange of notes never took place. On Apr. 15, 1939, Radowitz reported from Luxembourg (328/195362) that Bonnet had replied to a Luxembourg inquiry in Paris that he agreed in principle but did not think the moment appropriate for the planned exchange of declarations. On Aug. 25, 1939, Germany informed Luxembourg that she would remain faithful to the attitude toward Luxembourg neutrality she had adopted in the prolonged negotiations and "would under no circumstances challenge the inviolability of Luxembourg territory", provided that Luxembourg preserved an unobjectionable neutrality (328/195365-66).

## No. 506

1244/337249-51

*An Official of the Embassy in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

A 231

BRUSSELS, March 15, 1939.

Received March 16.

Pol. II 780.

Subject: Rexist wishes concerning participation of Eupen and Malmédy in the elections.

The Rexist Deputy, Derudder, previously unknown to me, visited me last Saturday and put forward certain wishes intended to improve the election prospects of the Rexistists in the district of Verviers. M. Derudder exuded profuse assurances of friendship and repeated again and again that the Rexistists regarded the Spanish Nationalists, the Italians and the Germans (in this order) as their political friends. They had, as I probably knew, always adopted a friendly attitude towards Germany and had multifarious ties with Germany. We could assist the Rexistists in the forthcoming election by persuading the Germans in Eupen and Malmédy to refrain from putting up their own candidates and instead, as in the last elections, to cast a blank ballot. The Rexistists would then perhaps be successful in getting their own candidate elected for the district of Verviers, thus preventing the re-election of the cabinet minister, Albert Devèze, nominated by the Liberal Party in Verviers; this would also serve our interests.

First of all, I profited by the opportunity to point out to M. Derudder that the friendly attitude of the Rexistists to Germany, of which he spoke, had for months past found no echo in their newspapers or in their speeches but rather that in them an obvious effort was noticeable, by means of unfriendly reports and expressions of criticism, to disassociate themselves from Germany. M. Derudder admitted this but explained it as necessary for tactical reasons, because the Rexistists and their relations with Germany had become all too great an object of suspicion among the Belgian public (cf. Report A 21 of January 18, 1939).<sup>1</sup> As to his request itself, I told M. Derudder that I was unfortunately unable to enter into proposals of that kind. Our work in Belgium was carried on through legal channels; we had no relations with the Heimattreue Front,<sup>2</sup> which was an organization of Germans with Belgian citizenship. We were therefore not in a position to exercise any influence on their attitude in the forthcoming

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (6811/E517698-706). In a long report on the continuing decline of the Rexist movement during 1938, Bülow-Schwante wrote that "their openly expressed sympathy for Germany has alienated the Belgian population from them."

<sup>2</sup>See document No. 485, footnote 4.



elections. If he thought that this attitude was important to the Rexists in Verviers, I could only advise him to approach the Heimattreue Front directly. Any contact arranged by the Embassy must remain out of the question.

To this M. Derudder replied that he fully understood this point of view. Moreover, he had not come on Degrelle's instructions but it had been his own personal idea to assist the Rexist Movement in this manner. Would it not then perhaps be advisable for him to get in touch with Gauleiter Grohé in Cologne on the subject? I answered him that I was ignorant of the relations between Gauleiter Grohé and the Heimattreue Front. If, however, any such existed, they could certainly not be used for the purpose of persuading the Heimattreue Front to adopt an attitude which might conceivably run counter to its own interests. I then wished M. Derudder a friendly goodbye.

I must observe that I adopted a negative attitude toward M. Derudder's request because it appeared to me completely unjustifiable. To support a movement which by all accounts has at the moment no prospects of any kind<sup>a</sup> is all the less indicated in that, as reported, its attitude towards us recently has been far from satisfactory. Sympathies of which we are assured solely behind closed doors, while a different face is shown in public, help us little.

In the meantime, incidentally, the Heimattreue Front has published an election manifesto from which it transpires that it has nominated its own list of candidates for the Chamber as well as for the Senate; so any consideration of the Rexist request is now completely out of the question.

I am reporting the interview with Deputy Derudder merely in case he at any time approaches the leadership of the Gau at Cologne.

V. BARGEN

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<sup>a</sup> In a report of Mar. 8, 1939 (3325/E008194-200) on the forthcoming Belgian elections, the Embassy stated that although the Rexists had won 21 out of 202 seats in 1936, their first appearance in an election campaign, recent divisions within their camp dimmed their future prospects. This prediction proved accurate for in the election of Apr. 2, 1939, the Rexist deputies in the Chamber were reduced to 4. They likewise retained only 4 of the 12 Senate seats they had won in 1936.

CHAPTER VI  
SWITZERLAND  
SEPTEMBER 29, 1937-JANUARY 27, 1939  
No. 507

2625/443905-10

*The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 1147

BERN, September 29, 1937.

Received October 4.

Pol. II 2587.

Subject: Unfriendly attitude of Swiss public opinion toward Germany.

The fundamental suspicion which exists in Switzerland concerning the intellectual and political influence of her big neighbor to the north was expressed so clearly on several occasions recently that the improvement in German-Swiss relations mentioned to me in many quarters when I took office four months ago can, unfortunately, still not be described as permanent.

The transition of the bourgeois press from its previous critical attitude toward Germany to an aggressive one began with the expulsion of German press representatives from England and the ensuing counter-measures taken in Germany,<sup>1</sup> as well as with Gauleiter Bohle's alleged statements concerning the official position of the Auslandsorganisation abroad, which were reprinted in one edition of the *Berliner Tageblatt*. The speeches made at the Stuttgart Conference of Auslandsdeutsche<sup>2</sup> unfortunately did not serve to mollify opinion in Switzerland, as would have been desirable. In the most vehement manner the press called attention to the alleged dangers which might arise for Switzerland's political independence if the country were "infiltrated" by foreign party organizations.

The report given at Stuttgart by Ortsgruppenleiter Ahrens of Lucerne about the Party's work in Switzerland, which was printed

<sup>1</sup> In August 1937 the British Government refused to renew residence permits of three German journalists, whereupon the German Foreign Ministry demanded the recall of the senior Berlin correspondent of the *London Times*. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1938), vol. I, pp. 330-331.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpts from speeches by various officials at Stuttgart, Aug. 29, 1937, appear in Department of State publication 1864, *National Socialism: Basic Principles* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 345-354.

in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and subsequently in almost all Swiss newspapers, helped to stiffen the anti-German attitude of the Swiss people. Later there was even an outspokenly anti-German demonstration by leftist circles in Lucerne (cf. report A 1122 of September 24).<sup>3</sup> In evaluating this demonstration it should be kept in mind, to be sure, that it is in the main a tactical maneuver on the part of the Socialist Party. Although this type of propaganda led at least one Catholic-Conservative paper in Lucerne to take a stand against exploiting purely for partisan reasons the supposed intentions of the NSDAP organizations in Switzerland, one can hardly expect the anti-German attitude of the majority of bourgeois newspapers to undergo a change.

The polemics of the Marxist and bourgeois newspapers against the position of Counselor of Legation Freiherr von Bibra, the representative of the AO in matters concerning German nationals in Switzerland, conforms to the present attitude of the Swiss people toward us. The attacks in the bourgeois press are the more telling since its representatives could easily have learned in the Bundeshaus that the Government was familiar with Bibra's position and had given permission for him to carry on his activities.

Also the manner in which the papers here handled the Nuremberg rally could only give the Swiss people a distorted picture of the true meaning of these gatherings. At Nuremberg it was primarily the talk given by Dr. Dietrich, the German Press Chief, which offended the democratic feelings of the Swiss editors. After Stuttgart and Nuremberg the Swiss shelved indefinitely the conferences between representatives of the German and the Swiss press, the aim of which had been to make more friendly the reports in each country concerning the other's internal affairs; at the beginning of August it was hoped that these conferences would proceed as planned, but as early as the end of August prospects became less favorable, after a report in *Der Angriff* which offended Swiss sensibilities. The reason is probably not so much a lack of willingness—many sensible representatives of the Swiss press are thoroughly willing—but rather the constant suspicion that German authorities might attempt to exert direct influence on the Swiss press.

The major part of the population is opposed to our foreign policy and to internal developments in Germany. The attitude becomes more unfavorable the closer one gets to the German frontier. As shown by a number of letters from German nationals in the Swiss border areas, the Germans there are subject to very great pressure which occasionally finds expression in violent anti-German demonstrations, such as could be observed at Winterthur and Schaffhausen last May when German visitors were returning from the international soccer

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (3823/E043701-04).

games at Zurich. The excitement of the border population over insignificant incidents, such as, for example, the flight of a German dirigible over Swiss border-defense maneuvers at the end of April, and reports concerning German maneuvers or the construction of German fortifications near the frontier, is heightened by the scribbling of a certain press, primarily the *Basler National-Zeitung*. In a large part of the Basel population, "is Germany about to march through Basel or to invade Switzerland" is the stereotyped question first asked of German travelers.

When German officers attended the maneuvers of the Third Division near Bern, occasional statements by Swiss authorities indicated that it was not considered impossible that the German uniform might be insulted in the streets. A number of Swiss officers quite spontaneously expressed their regret about the anti-German feeling at present prevailing in the country.

French-speaking Switzerland has so far adopted a strikingly objective attitude toward Germany, conditioned by domestic considerations and the sharp criticism of the Popular Front in France. Lately it has become more and more evident that France is striving to improve the feeling there in her favor. The political significance of Marshal Pétain's visit at the maneuvers of the First Division near Lausanne probably lies particularly in an attempt at again cultivating the natural pro-French feeling by sending such an outstanding personality. And the population did welcome Marshal Pétain very enthusiastically wherever he went. In the same connection the terms with which Motta<sup>4</sup> greeted Pétain attracted notice, that is, the remark that his visit was being celebrated by Switzerland as an indication of security.

The derogatory comments about religious controversies in Germany are another factor in worsening the picture of Germany transmitted to the Swiss people by their press. During the past few days, a stir was created by a pastoral letter on the Federal Day of Prayer by the Swiss bishops in which they warned against "false nationalism".

The "National Front" groups take a largely positive attitude toward Germany. Unfortunately they still have not found a workable form of organization, and they were obliged to accept a conspicuous defeat in the elections in Schaffhausen a week ago. One of the contributing factors in this defeat seems to have been the disclosure of financial support given the Front groups by Germany, about which I shall report separately.<sup>5</sup>

Those Swiss youth groups which have a positive attitude toward Germany and which are striving for a spiritual reorganization of

<sup>4</sup>Dr. Giuseppe Motta, Federal Councilor, Chief of the Political Department or Swiss Foreign Ministry.

<sup>5</sup>Not printed (6859/E518178-79).

Switzerland, are, of course, greatly impressed by what is going on in Germany and are therefore spiritually dependent on her. As the result of this attitude they are at a great initial disadvantage in their attempts to influence internal politics.

The political aims of Switzerland and Germany run parallel in one important direction even today. The anti-Communist attitude is not confined to the extreme right alone but extends even into the bourgeois left. Motta's stand against Communism and Soviet Russia in the League of Nations should also be remembered in this connection. Alongside the Federal Council's anti-Communist attitude—which is, to be sure, toned down by the political situation and democratic considerations but is nevertheless clearly recognizable—there is a strong movement in Swiss domestic politics which has already won out in French-speaking Switzerland and which will have its first test in German Switzerland in an anti-Communist initiative proposal that promises to be successful at Zurich. The attitude of the Swiss Attorney General's Office against Communism remains consistent. Therefore increasing understanding, at least for Germany's anti-Communist policy, may be expected in Switzerland.

The unfriendly attitude described above has had no effect on the attitude of the governmental authorities, who continue, in a correct and obliging way, to strive for good cooperation with the Legation.

KÖCHER

### No. 508

6857/E 518162-64

#### *The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 170

BERN, February 22, 1938.

Received February 25.

N. P. 1862.

Subject: The Swiss Government's reception of the Führer's speech—German-Swiss press relations.

With reference to report A 171 of February 23,<sup>1</sup> subject: Swiss press on the Berchtesgaden conference<sup>2</sup> and the Führer's speech of February 20, 1938.<sup>3</sup>

In today's session the Federal Council discussed the Führer's Reichstag speech of February 20, 1938, to which Federal Councilor Motta himself listened over the radio.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6857/E518166-67).

<sup>2</sup> On Feb. 12 Chancellor von Schuschnigg of Austria received Hitler's demands at Berchtesgaden. See vol. I of this series, document No. 295.

<sup>3</sup> See *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, edited by Norman H. Baynes (London, 1942), vol. II, pp. 1376-1409.

The acting chief of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Federal Political Department, Minister Frölicher, to whom I spoke afterwards, informed me that the passage of the Führer's speech in which he expressed his satisfaction over the strong efforts toward real neutrality made by a number of European states had been received by the Federal Council in the knowledge that the Führer was probably referring primarily to Switzerland. Together with the Führer's preceding remarks regarding the normal and, in part, friendly relations which Germany had with her neighboring states, the Federal Council considered it an assurance that the relationship between Switzerland and the Reich was good.

The Federal Council had appeared to be especially gratified at the unambiguous definition of the German concept of fellow Germans who legally did not belong to the Reich but were nevertheless Germans, inasmuch as Switzerland might find in it assurance that Switzerland was not an object of German racial policy, in spite of the fears to the contrary which had occasionally been voiced.

The Federal Council, and especially Federal Councilor Motta, had been especially pleased to hear the words of recognition which the Führer had expressed for Professor Burckhardt's work in Danzig.<sup>4</sup>

In regard to Austria Frölicher expressed the opinion that Switzerland naturally was interested in having Austria remain a buffer between Germany and Italy so that Switzerland did not have to deal with only "two neighbors at her borders", as he expressed it. On the other hand, the internal stability of her neighbors was very important to Switzerland. Switzerland was not blind to the fact that Austria apparently was unable to bring about domestic conciliation on her own.

I took the opportunity right during the discussion of the Führer's speech to bring up German-Swiss press relations again. Hearing the speech personally must after all have convinced Federal Councilor Motta, as well as Frölicher himself, that hereafter the Führer intended to reply very differently to the attitude of the foreign press which maliciously sabotaged even an objective understanding of the domestic and foreign policies of the Reich. The Führer's words could leave no doubt that they were also to be applied to Switzerland. Particularly after the events on February 4<sup>5</sup> and 12<sup>6</sup> the Swiss press had shown that it was dependent on English and French as well as dubious Viennese sources. In a completely undisciplined manner it had obviously printed the reports not on the basis of their veracity

<sup>4</sup> On Burckhardt's role as High Commissioner for Danzig. see ch. I.

<sup>5</sup> On Feb. 4, Hitler assumed direct control of German Armed Forces and replaced Neurath with Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2.

but of their sensational content. There was therefore a striking example of the need for stronger official Swiss influence on the press. In the speech of February 20 the Führer had expressed a very serious warning for the future—which also applied to Switzerland.

Minister Frölicher agreed with me in every respect in my strong criticism of the news policy and the attitude of the Swiss press. These were deeply deplored particularly by the Political Department. Federal Councilor Motta was seriously trying through personal influence on the editors to bring about a change which, to be sure, would become noticeable only gradually. At his instigation an article had for instance appeared in the January issue of the Bulletin of the Swiss Publishers' Association from the pen of its president, Rietmann, the publisher of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. The article cautioned the Swiss press to exercise discipline in questions of foreign policy.

KÖCHER

No. 509

1204/331729-30

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II*

BERLIN, March 16, 1938.

e. o. Pol. II 742.

Dr. Stier of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle called on me at noon today to tell me that, according to the information available to the Mittelstelle, events in Austria had aroused great excitement among the population of the Principality of Liechtenstein. That office believes that by making use of the present circumstances it would be easy to put a National Socialist government in power in the Principality of Liechtenstein also. The question now confronting the Mittelstelle was whether this situation in the Principality of Liechtenstein should be exploited, as could easily be done with some intervention by Germany, or whether it might be better to refrain. Herr Stier's further statements indicated that the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle believed that with the help of its agents it would be possible to bring a National Socialist government to power in Liechtenstein without thereby changing the status of the Principality from the standpoint of international law.

Dr. Stier requested the opinion of the Foreign Ministry, whereupon I promised to bring the matter up here. As my personal opinion I told him that the Mittelstelle might perhaps do well to advise proceeding with caution in Liechtenstein, since a spread of the *Anschluss* movement beyond the former Austrian frontiers did carry with it

the danger of complications.<sup>1</sup> Herr Stier added that the Mittelstelle had submitted the matter to the Führer's Deputy and that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces had also been informed.<sup>2</sup>

V. RINTELEN

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Rintelen's handwriting: "Liechtenstein is represented by Switzerland in diplomatic matters."

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum (6321/E471502) by Erich Kordt of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, dated Mar. 17, states: "The Foreign Minister is of the opinion that an action in Liechtenstein is not feasible." A marginal note by Rintelen on this document indicates that Stier was informed of this decision on the evening of Mar. 16.

## No. 510

2349/487564

### *The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>*

#### Telegram

No. 13 of March 16

BERN, March 16, 1938—9:26 p. m.

Received March 16—11:00 p. m.

[Pol. II 755.]<sup>2</sup>

With reference to telegram No. 2 of March 16<sup>3</sup> and report A 18 of March 5 from the Consulate General at Zurich.<sup>4</sup>

Prompted by fears for Liechtenstein's independence, the Chief<sup>5</sup> of the Liechtenstein Government took part in negotiations here today on reorganizing relations between Liechtenstein and Switzerland, a matter which has been discussed before.

The subject under discussion is the question how Liechtenstein might come to enjoy neutrality rights similar to those of Switzerland. For example, a neutrality declaration on the part of Liechtenstein is under consideration. Switzerland seems to desire to include the Liechtenstein frontier into her own national defense system.

Please send me instructions in case the Bundeshaus should mention the matter to me.

KÖCHER

<sup>1</sup> A file note by Lammers (2349/487565) annexed to this document reads in part as follows: "1. Reported to the Führer. 2. Discussed with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. . . ."

<sup>2</sup> The file number is taken from another copy of the telegram (1204/331731).

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6321/E471503). This telegram, filed as Pol. II 754, conveyed an unconfirmed report that the Landtag of Liechtenstein, seeking to protect the dynasty and the Catholic Church, had voted 14 to 1 to seek closer ties with Switzerland immediately.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (1204/331723). A report on a rumor emanating from Liechtenstein of military conversations purportedly held by Switzerland, France, and Great Britain.

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Josef Hoop.



## No. 511

1204/331732

*The Director of the Political Department to the Minister in  
Switzerland*

Telegram

No. 26

BERLIN, March 18, 1938—7:30 p. m.  
zu Pol. II 754<sup>1</sup>/755.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 13.<sup>2</sup>

Please do not raise any objections to Liechtenstein's efforts toward neutralizing the territory of the Principality, making a reservation for more detailed study by us, if that seems indicated. On the other hand we should register undisguised astonishment if any intention of including the Principality in the Swiss national defense system should be expressed. Moreover, such intentions would run counter to the idea of neutralization.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 510, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 510.

## No. 512

115/117377

*Memorandum by an Official of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*

BERLIN, March 18, 1938.

Subject: Liechtenstein.

On Monday, March 21, 1938, there will be a session of the Liechtenstein Landtag. The Chief of Government, Hoop, on that occasion intends to put through a plebiscite on the independence of the Principality following Schuschnigg's example.

The Fatherland Union (Dr. med. Otto Schädler, leader) will propose a plebiscite on *Anschluss* with the German Reich.

For the time being it has been given out that the German Reich wishes a new election only for the purpose of installing a National Socialist government. The Customs Union with Switzerland can then be terminated within a year, so that *Anschluss* can be effected legally.

Switzerland seems already to have resigned herself to the idea of *Anschluss*. The Swiss customs officers and the local police, who protect Swiss rights in Liechtenstein, have received instruction to withdraw across the Rhine frontier in case of a conflict.

The present Fatherland Union wanted to appear under the name of *NSDAP Liechtenstein* in the new elections. It was advised not to do so; that is the reason for the suggestion by the Liechtensteiners of the new designation: National German Freedom Movement.

The Freedom Movement will introduce a Liechtenstein flag with the swastika, first as a party flag and then as a state flag.

Ten thousand francs will be necessary and sufficient to support this program.

STIER<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Dr. Kordt: Oberguppenführer Lorenz urgently requests that the attached note be brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister. Mar. 19, Gottfriedsen".

Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting "The Propaganda Ministry wants to prepare an *Anschluss*. Of military importance? Unrest in Switzerland. 10,000 inhabitants." An undated memorandum in Ribbentrop's handwriting (115/117380-81) is also in the file: "1. Oppose election. 2. Absolutely no intervention by us. 3. Exclude *Anschluss*. 4. No objection to a Monaco [*sic*] or Danzig-type status. 5. Prince of Liechtenstein to remain. 6. Perhaps customs and currency union later. 7. Written assurance that . . . 8. Hoop is bound by Catholicism."

## No. 513

1798/409482

*The State Secretary to the Minister in Switzerland*

Telegram

No. 32

BERLIN, March 22, 1938—4:25 p. m.  
zu Pol. IV. 1672 II.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Altenburg.

With reference to No. 10 of March 14, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

Please express our gratitude to the Swiss Government for its understanding and friendly attitude in the question of the Austrian *Anschluss* and emphatically counter, as you have already done, any outlandish reports concerning an allegedly impending assault on Switzerland.

MACKENSEN

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<sup>1</sup> Köcher's telegram No. 10 of Mar. 14, Pol. IV 1672, is printed as document No. 382 in vol. 1 of this series.

## No. 514

1204/331748-49

*The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 308

BERN, April 4, 1938.

Received April 6.

Pol. II 996.

Subject: Principality of Liechtenstein.

With reference to instruction Pol. II 826 of March 25, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

On the basis of the above-mentioned instruction I spoke once more with Minister Frölicher in the Political Department about the relationship between Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and learned the following:

When German troops entered Austria, Switzerland had provided military protection for her eastern frontier. The Government of Liechtenstein, for its part, had requested that the frontiers of its country also be protected, since only a few customs officials were on frontier duty. The Swiss Federal Council had rejected this request, but later Switzerland had discussed with Dr. Hoop whether Liechtenstein might not be included in the Swiss system of national defense and whether Liechtenstein on her own might not want to declare herself a neutral country.

I asked Minister Frölicher whether the question of possibly erecting fortifications on Liechtenstein territory had also been considered, whereupon he said that such measures might be altogether possible in case Liechtenstein were included within the military borders of Switzerland. However, Liechtenstein so far had not made any such request. Moreover, such a step would, of course, not be taken without previously consulting neighboring states, i. e., Germany above all.

I made it very clear to Frölicher that we could not agree to Liechtenstein's being included in the Swiss national defense system, since we would consider this a measure directed against us. I also gave him in substance the final passages of the above-mentioned instruction regarding the neutralization of the Principality of Liechtenstein. I had the impression that the people here were not quite clear about the consequences of Switzerland's projected action with regard to the Principality of Liechtenstein.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1204/331739-45). A long instruction to Bern of Mar. 25, prepared by Rintelen for Weizsäcker's signature, concerning the issues raised by an unofficial visit in Berlin by Hoop and Schädler. The instruction enlarged on Weizsäcker's telegram of Mar. 18 (document No. 511) and stated that whereas Germany would welcome any change in Liechtenstein's status that brought her closer to the Reich, any closer ties between Liechtenstein and Switzerland would be "undesirable". Nor would Germany support a move to neutralize the Principality separately from Switzerland.

In conclusion Frölicher assured me once more, however, that the *status quo* would be maintained and that at least for the present, unless Liechtenstein approached Switzerland, there was no reason for a change. For the rest, the Swiss Government had welcomed the fact that the Fatherland Union, which represented a very strong minority, was now also represented in the Liechtenstein Government.

KÖCHER

## No. 515

4473/E 087864

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, May 3, 1938.

The Swiss Minister called on me today and, on instruction from his Government but, as he said, semi-officially and personally, handed me the attached memorandum on Swiss neutrality.<sup>1</sup> He added that a copy had also been handed to our Minister in Bern.

M. Dinichert then made a lengthy statement on the relationship of Swiss neutrality to the League of Nations, which furnished nothing new, however. He mentioned that the memorandum had been occasioned by the fact that in connection with the Abyssinian conflict the Italian Government had expressed to Switzerland doubts as to whether participation in economic sanctions was compatible with neutrality.

M. Dinichert assumed that the Swiss proposal would be accepted at the coming session of the League of Nations. An official communication would then probably be sent to Germany after the session.

I answered affirmatively the Minister's question whether the Swiss step would be favorably received here.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (4473/E087865-68). The text of this memorandum is identical with that submitted by Switzerland to the League of Nations. See League of Nations, *Official Journal*, May-June 1938, pp. 385-387.

## No. 516

183/85831

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 14, 1938.

I asked the Italian Chargé d'Affaires to call on me today, so that I, too, might express some appreciation of the successful course of the Führer's trip.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hitler visited Italy May 3-9, 1938; see documents Nos. 758-762 in vol. 1 of this series.

Thereafter Magistrati raised the question of the Geneva resolution on the neutrality of Switzerland.<sup>2</sup> I told Magistrati that basically we had no objection to formulating a statement in this matter on our part, too, in conformity with the Italian suggestion. According to my information, to be sure, today's resolution by the Geneva Council made reference to Switzerland's obligation to continue to extend hospitality to the League of Nations. Since this was evidently also meant to apply to times of war, it should be investigated how such hospitality could possibly be compatible with true Swiss neutrality. I assumed that in the German press we would touch on this point, which had not yet been clarified.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>2</sup> For the text of the resolution of May 14 and the discussion in the Council of the League, see League of Nations, *Official Journal*, May-June 1938, pp. 368-375.

No. 517

183/85832-34

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 20, 1938.

The Swiss Minister today handed to the Foreign Minister the attached note on the subject of Swiss neutrality. On this occasion the Foreign Minister referred to the possible untoward consequences in wartime of Swiss hospitality to the League of Nations and he also mentioned to M. Dinichert the still very objectionable attitude of the Swiss press. Most of the Swiss newspapers had had to be banned in Germany because of their campaigns against our country. We are told about the freedom of the press and the lack of authority on the part of the Swiss Government. But what sort of Swiss neutrality would there be in the event of war, if such publications were expressing the will of the people? Where was there any honest neutrality in that?

The Minister was afraid that the Foreign Minister wanted to establish a connection between the new declaration sought by Switzerland on the question of her neutrality and an improvement in the conduct of the Swiss press.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Minister denied any intention of linking these matters. On the contrary, he referred to the statements made by the Führer to former Federal Councilor

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<sup>1</sup> On May 18 Dinichert spoke to Ribbentrop of the League resolution on Swiss neutrality and expressed hope that Germany and Italy would issue similar declarations. Ribbentrop replied that the Foreign Ministry would be glad to study the question, but pointed out that an improvement in press relations would help to maintain true Swiss neutrality (F 13/316).

Schulthess<sup>2</sup> and also voiced his pleasure over the progress Switzerland had lately achieved vis-à-vis the League of Nations. However, the Foreign Minister left Minister Dinichert under a certain pressure with regard to the attitude of Swiss publications.

The note of the Swiss Government is attached.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]<sup>1</sup>

Swiss Legation in Germany  
IV 10/6

BERLIN, May 20, 1938.

MR. MINISTER: As Your Excellency is aware, Switzerland is continually animated by the desire to continue the policy of neutrality which has guided her for more than four centuries and to observe most strictly the pertinent obligations contained in the treaties of 1815.

The Federal Resolution of March 5, 1920, relating to the adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations, which was ratified on May 16 of that year by a plebiscite, was adopted only after the Council of the League of Nations in its declaration of February 13, 1920, at London had solemnly declared that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland as an international obligation for the maintenance of peace was not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The London declaration expressly states that Switzerland was not under obligation to participate in any military action or to permit the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of military undertakings on her territory. However, it does not contain a release from participation in economic or financial measures provided for in article 16 of the Covenant. Since experience has shown the vagueness of the distinction which in 1920 it seemed possible to make between the various measures contemplated in the article mentioned, on April 29, 1938, the Federal Council transmitted to the Council of the League of Nations a memorandum of which I had the opportunity semi-officially to advise the Foreign Ministry. This gave notice of Switzerland's intention, in view of her perpetual neutrality, no longer to participate in any manner in the application of sanctions provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Council of the League of Nations passed a resolution on May 14 which takes note of this intention and declares that Switzerland will not be called upon to participate in sanctions.

<sup>1</sup> On Feb. 23, 1937, Hitler received Schulthess, gave him categorical assurance of Germany's respect for Swiss neutrality, and asked him to convey this assurance to the Swiss Government. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1937*, vol. 1, p. 350, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> An identical note was sent to the Italian Foreign Minister; see document No. 525, footnote 1.

The Swiss Confederation is thus released from any commitment which could possibly cast any doubt on her unshakeable resolution to remain neutral under any circumstances.

I have the honor to communicate the foregoing to you, Mr. Minister, by direction of my Government, and I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency assurances of my highest consideration.

PAUL DINICHERT

No. 518

183/85842-43

*Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department*

BERLIN, May 20, 1938.

When the Swiss Minister came to take leave today he tried to win me over in his usual insistent manner for the request which he had made to the Foreign Minister, namely, that Switzerland be given an answer to her notification of the Geneva resolution—to the effect that Germany was willing to recognize and respect Swiss neutrality in the future, too.

I told him that I could not make any official statement in the matter. If he wished to hear my purely personal opinion I could not deny that on the basis of the facts he himself had presented the Swiss request appeared very peculiar to me. After all, the situation was such that Switzerland had at last rid herself of international legal commitments which, without any doubt, had not been compatible with true neutrality. It was certainly to be welcomed that Switzerland was now reverting once more to real neutrality. It was difficult to see, however, how this could be an occasion for Germany to make any binding statements about respecting Swiss neutrality. In my opinion this was an entirely unsuitable request. I could imagine, although I did not yet have the Ministry's view in the matter, that Germany would acknowledge the Swiss note with an expression of satisfaction and might perhaps add that in the German Government's opinion, true and real neutrality on Switzerland's part represented an important element in European peace; I could not imagine, however, that there would be renewed formal recognition of Swiss neutrality on this occasion.

GAUS

No. 519

183/85841

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, May 25, 1938.

On the occasion of his farewell visit today, the Swiss Minister again raised the point that Switzerland would be glad to receive a German

and perhaps, he added, also an Italian declaration in reply to the notification by her note of May 20, 1938, on the League of Nations resolution concerning Swiss neutrality. He referred to his latest conversations with the Foreign Minister, with the State Secretary and Herr Gaus.<sup>1</sup> He said that the Foreign Minister did not really take up his suggestions but dwelt chiefly upon German complaints concerning the press. His interview with Herr von Weizsäcker was quite brief because of the events in Czechoslovakia, so that he wanted, in any event, to repeat the suggestion to me once more. To my remark that the Swiss note contained nothing to that effect, M. Dinichert replied that he had expressly been instructed to discuss this phase of the matter orally. In reply to his repeated questions about our views I mentioned that the Führer had already made the well-known declaration to Federal Councilor Schulthess some time ago,<sup>2</sup> and I added that the second part of the League of Nations resolution was not exactly pleasing to us, since, on the basis thereof, the League of Nations could in time of war carry on propaganda against Germany from Swiss territory, especially with the radio station. M. Dinichert dwelt on this at some length and finally repeated that he believed he would be speaking in the name of his Government in asking us to refrain from replying, if the reply were to contain any reservations or other comments.

WOERMANN

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<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 517 and 518. Weizsäcker's memorandum of his conversation on May 21 is not printed (183/85840).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 517, footnote 2.

## No. 520

1494/370101-03

*Counselor of Legation Freiherr von Bibra to State Secretary Bohle*

BERN, June 1, 1938.

DEAR GAULEITER BOHLE: Two days ago Minister Frölicher, who left for Berlin yesterday morning by plane,<sup>1</sup> called on me to take leave. Frölicher made use of the opportunity to tell me confidentially that he had considered it his duty prior to departure to find out from the Swiss authorities concerned their attitude toward the AO of the NSDAP in Switzerland. This had become especially necessary since the Social Democrats had submitted a proposal aimed at the Federal Council, demanding sharp measures against the AO of the NSDAP, among them a ban on the *Deutsche Zeitung in der Schweiz*. Frölicher

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<sup>1</sup> Frölicher had been designated to succeed Dinichert as Minister to Germany.



told me confidentially that this proposal would probably be discussed in Parliament, involving renewed disagreeable attacks, but that it would be rejected by the Federal Council; therefore I could regard with equanimity both the present and any future attacks by the Social Democrats as they were not to be taken seriously. He had been with the President of the Confederation only half an hour before and had discussed the question with him. The President, too, had told him that he defended my previous direction of the Landesgruppe<sup>2</sup> and that so far there was no objection to the *Deutsche Zeitung in der Schweiz*.

During an earlier conversation I once more discussed with Frölicher the question of official recognition for the Landesgruppe. On this as on earlier occasions Frölicher expressed the view that, considering the difficult domestic situation in Switzerland, the position of the Federal Council would be seriously endangered if we were to insist on this demand at this time. I well knew the attacks which the Federal Council had to endure because of its attitude toward the AO of the NSDAP in Switzerland. It would, of course, be very disagreeable for the Federal Council if by officially recognizing the Landesgruppe it exposed itself to additional severe attacks besides those expected in Parliament in the near future. This same view has been expressed to the Minister again and again by Frölicher and other representatives of the Swiss Government.

Assuming that Minister Frölicher will call on you in the very near future, I take the liberty of suggesting that you make use of the opportunity to say a few cordial words of thanks to Frölicher for having supported the interests of the AO with so much energy and understanding vis-à-vis the Swiss internal authorities who frequently were very difficult. It is mainly due to Frölicher that the Swiss Government officially recognized Kuske as acting commissioner, Bendler as the specialist for German Labor Front affairs, Fräulein Petschat as secretary, Horn as editor, Fräulein Eckhard as secretary of the journal, and Fräulein Duncker as official director of the Women's Labor Association for all Switzerland. Actually I have only three important openings left, which I hope to be able to fill in the near future; first, a capable Hitler Youth leader to assume the duties of youth leader for the country; a student to look after the students in Switzerland; and, third, a Party member for "Strength Through Joy" matters, whom I hope to be able to appoint in the very near future.

If in your conversation with Frölicher you could casually mention that you believed he would probably in the not too distant future succeed in having the Landesgruppe again officially recognized here,

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 507.

and that you attached great importance to this, then I believe that such a remark from you would greatly support our efforts here.

Otherwise there is nothing of particular importance to report here at the moment. The promotional work for Stuttgart is making good progress.<sup>3</sup>

Please give your wife my very cordial regards.

Heil Hitler!

As ever,

V. BIBRA

<sup>3</sup> Stuttgart, "*die Stadt der Auslandsdeutschen*" was the headquarters of the *Deutsches Ausland-Institut* and the site of its annual rallies.

## No. 521

183/85845-47

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 9, 1938.

The Italian Ambassador today communicated to me the following with regard to the question of renewed recognition of Swiss neutrality:

The Swiss Minister in Rome suggested there that the Swiss note in question<sup>1</sup> be answered approximately as follows:

a) Expression of satisfaction over what Switzerland has accomplished;

b) Renewed affirmation of Italy's intention to respect Swiss neutrality. But if Italy were compelled to add a reservation because of the hospitality granted by Switzerland to the League of Nations, the Swiss Government would prefer to receive no reply at all to its note.

Since the Italian Government, Attolico continued, did not wish to express approval of Swiss hospitality toward the League of Nations and, besides, had already solemnly declared its intention to respect Swiss neutrality, the Italian Government would now probably reply merely that it had received the Swiss note and, with regard to Italy's attitude toward Switzerland in case of war, refer to its well-known earlier declarations.

I told Ambassador Attolico it was possible that our reply would be along similar lines. Probably we would refer in our reply to the well-known declaration made by the Führer to former Federal Coun-

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure to document No. 517.

cilor Schulthess.<sup>2</sup> But the formulation of the reply was still to be prepared; it was not yet definite.

Immediately afterwards the Swiss Minister called on me in order to inform me of the declarations the Führer had made to him this morning<sup>3</sup> and in order to avoid any mistake in his own reporting to Bern.

I told M. Frölicher that there was, of course, no objection to his transmittal of the Führer's words to Bern; the Führer's words could not be twisted. But I had to insist that the contents of the Führer's statements not appear in the Swiss press. Our reply to the Bern Government with respect to the note on neutrality might well contain a reference to the Führer's declaration to Federal Councilor Schulthess, but the wording of our reply was not yet settled. Understandably enough we would not deviate much from the Italian reply. Approval of Swiss hospitality toward the League of Nations would, in any event, not be found in our reply. Any assurance of German neutrality toward Switzerland would be founded, as a matter of course, on the premise that Switzerland in turn would observe her neutrality in every detail.

The Swiss Minister, who was naturally still very much under the impression of the statements made to him by the Führer today, showed appreciation for my remarks and observed that during the recent discussion in Geneva Federal Councilor Motta had already vigorously resisted an acknowledgement in express terms of Swiss hospitality toward the League of Nations in time of war. In time of war Switzerland would certainly be on her guard to avoid becoming a playground of League machinations against us. To consolidate this policy of Switzerland also vis-à-vis the League of Nations in time of war was the next step planned by Bern. Among other things the treaty between Switzerland and the League of Nations with respect to the operation of the League's radio station near Nyon was soon coming up for renewal; there, too, the League of Nations would be pushed back a step.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 517, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> A Ribbentrop memorandum dated June 8, 1938 (document No. 597 in vol. III of this series) describes this interview as having occurred on June 8. No explanation for the discrepancy has been found, but the official diplomatic list of the Foreign Ministry for June 1938 states that Frölicher was accredited on June 9. See also document No. 523 below.

## No. 522

183/85851

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, June 13, 1938.

The Swiss Minister told me today that he had to carry out one more instruction of the Swiss Federal Council which he had not yet mentioned to us. It concerned the creation of better press relations. I told the Minister that he probably was aware that the Foreign Minister had only recently taken up this matter with M. Dinichert and I asked him what the Federal Council actually had in mind in making this proposal. M. Frölicher said that in the first place it involved a mutual discontinuance of the banning of newspapers. He himself had in Bern only recently vigorously advocated a more favorable attitude of the Swiss press toward Germany and he believed that further progress in this matter was to be expected on the Swiss side.

I asked M. Frölicher to continue the discussion of this matter with Minister Aschmann.

WOERMANN

## No. 523

183/85855

*Note by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, June 14, 1938.

In a short conversation with the new Swiss Minister on the occasion of the presentation of his credentials,<sup>1</sup> the Führer and Chancellor expressed his satisfaction that Switzerland had recovered her full neutrality. It was to be desired that the small countries in Western Europe follow Switzerland's example. A war in the West would be quite impossible if all of the small countries were neutral and determined to defend their neutrality.

In concluding the conversation the Führer mentioned Germany's determination to respect the neutrality of Switzerland in all circumstances. This was the foundation of our whole policy in regard to Switzerland and this would not be changed in any way in the future.

The Swiss Minister thanked the Führer for his statement and said that he would report it to his Government.

Herewith submitted to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop as directed.

DR. SCHMIDT  
*Counselor of Legation*

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 521, footnote 3.

## No. 524

183/85852-53

*Memorandum by the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, June 14, 1933.

This morning M. Frölicher, the new Swiss Minister, paid me his first call.

The conversation, which lasted about a quarter of an hour, was exceedingly spirited and cordial. I expressed to the Minister my appreciation of his efforts to facilitate the work of the Party groups in Switzerland and also expressed the hope that in the course of time he would succeed in obtaining official authorization for the Landesgruppe, which was banned after the assassination of Landesgruppenleiter Gustloff.<sup>1</sup> Frölicher pointed out that for all practical purposes the Landesgruppenleitung had been restored, since the Swiss Government was aware that Counselor of Legation von Bibra was exercising the functions of a Landesgruppenleiter. He was happy to tell me that Herr von Bibra was carrying out his assignment with great tact and consummate ability. He also believed that he could state that the attitude of even the Marxist press in Switzerland had improved a shade of late.

I pointed out to the Minister that all German nationals abroad are strictly forbidden to engage in any way in domestic politics in the host country and asked him to notify me of every single case of a violation of this principle ascertained by his Government. I also invited him on some occasion to visit the head office of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP in order to gain some idea of how the AO works. The Minister accepted this suggestion with eagerness and emphasized that his Government had no reason for any complaint regarding the activities of the AO's groups.

Of interest was his remark that at one time the French Government had applied strong pressure upon the Federal Council for the dissolution of the Landesgruppe in Switzerland, although, as the Minister himself added, France was creating no difficulties whatever for the Landesgruppe of the AO in France.

The Minister then briefly inquired about our difficulties in Brazil<sup>2</sup> and mentioned that the large Swiss colonies abroad were always glad to participate in the activities of the German colonies in foreign countries.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

E. W. BOHLE

<sup>1</sup> The assassination of Wilhelm Gustloff at Davos, Switzerland, on Feb. 4, 1933, occasioned a vehement German press campaign against Switzerland, whereupon the Federal Council in a decision of Feb. 13 banned all Nazi organizations and activities among German nationals resident on Swiss territory. See *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, pp. 45-46.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 605 ff.

## No. 525

183/85848-49

*Note to the Swiss Minister*BERLIN, June [21],<sup>1</sup> 1938.

MR. MINISTER: By note of May 20, 1938,<sup>2</sup> your predecessor in office informed me that Switzerland, animated by the desire to continue her traditional policy of neutrality and to observe most strictly the obligations deriving therefrom, has induced the Council of the League of Nations to pass a resolution which releases Switzerland from any obligation to participate in the application of sanctions provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations. On behalf of the German Government I have the honor to reply as follows:

The German Government has noted with great interest that the Swiss Government has been successful in its efforts to secure its release from obligations which indeed were likely to endanger the neutrality of Switzerland. The German Government welcomes this outcome because it considers the unqualified maintenance of Swiss neutrality as an important element towards securing the peace of Europe. The Swiss Government may therefore rest assured that its reiterated resolution to remain neutral will always be met by the corresponding resolution of the German Government to recognize and to respect this neutrality. I need only to refer to the various utterances, known to the Swiss Government, wherein the German Government has already emphatically expressed its views in this regard.

I avail myself . . . .

(Foreign Minister)

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<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is an unsigned and undated draft, prepared for Ribbentrop's signature. The published version, dated June 21 and signed by Ribbentrop, omits the word "various" and substitutes "clearly" for "emphatically", both changes being in the final sentence. *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, Jahrg. 5 (1938), p. 645.

The Italian Foreign Minister replied to an identical Swiss note of May 19 along similar lines, as discussed by Weizsäcker and Attolico in document No. 521. The text of Ciano's note was published in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of June 24, 1938 (reproduced in *Monatshefte*, loc. cit., p. 646); the Italian version was published in the *Giornale d'Italia* of June 25, 1938.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure to document No. 517.

## No. 526

183/85856

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 23, 1938.

The Swiss Minister called on me today in order to carry out the following instruction of his Government:

The Swiss Government has taken note with very great satisfaction of the German reply<sup>1</sup> on the subject of Swiss neutrality. It desires promptly to convey through its Minister its gratitude for our spirit of understanding and for our valuable assurances.

I accepted the communication of the Minister with thanks and again told the Minister that the intended release of the texts of the notes will take place tomorrow, Friday, June 24, at 11 a. m.<sup>2</sup>

I also told the Minister that I had replied to an inquiry of Ambassador Attolico, whether it would not be sufficient to publish a summary, by telling him that we had already promised the Swiss Minister to publish the full texts.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 525.

<sup>2</sup> The texts appeared in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of June 25.

### No. 527

2129/464679

#### *The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 45 g

BERN, July 26, 1938.

W 692 g. Rs.

Subject: Switzerland's economic importance for Germany in an international conflict.

With reference to your instruction W 383 g. Rs. of June 7, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

I am enclosing ten copies of a Legation memorandum concerning Switzerland's economic importance for Germany in case of an international conflict.<sup>2</sup> On July 23, at an official conference of the German Consuls in Switzerland, with the Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel von Ilseman, also present, I brought up for discussion the conclusions contained in the memorandum, according to which no important deliveries can be expected from Switzerland in case of a conflict. At that time the Consuls likewise confirmed that in case of an international conflict the Reich can hardly expect to obtain economic assistance from Switzerland.

With regard to various specific questions (means of communication, reliable German and Swiss firms, confidential business agents, etc.) contained in the instruction referred to above, I shall report

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<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2129/464680-708).

further after the conclusion of the confidential inquiries now also being made by the Consulates.

KÖCHER

No. 528

183/85865

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division II*

BERLIN, September 24, 1938.

zu Pol. II 2931.<sup>1</sup>

The Swiss Minister called on me today with regard to a matter which he introduced as an exceedingly urgent and important one for Switzerland. It concerns an effort to obtain from Germany, Italy and France, i. e., Switzerland's three neighbors, declarations in principle that these countries were prepared, in view of Switzerland's special geographical situation, to maintain the supply of essential goods to her even in the event of war. M. Frölicher remarked that the Swiss Government asked for and received a similar declaration from the German Government in 1914; such a system was in effect throughout the World War. If the Swiss Government was now approaching Paris, Berlin and Rome to request a similar declaration, it was in the hope of obtaining the same positive result this time as in 1914. For the details the Minister referred to the text of a memorandum which he handed me at the same time and which is attached hereto. He emphasized that Switzerland was mainly anxious at the present time to obtain the declaration in principle for which he was asking and for the receipt of which he would hold himself in readiness day and night. The details listed in the memorandum under (a) to (c) could be discussed later.<sup>2</sup>

The Minister added the personal remark that he was convinced that the prompt issuance of a declaration indicating consent on the part of Germany would make an exceedingly favorable impression upon his Government and would influence German-Swiss relations very favorably; as far as France was concerned, Bern was certain of an affirmative reply.

I promised M. Frölicher to submit his request to the proper authority immediately and otherwise confined myself to the remark that,

<sup>1</sup> The original file number was assigned to the memorandum handed over by the Swiss Minister during the interview described: see footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum is not printed (183/85866). Switzerland listed three undertakings requested of Germany, Italy, and France: (a) that they would permit goods enroute to Switzerland at the outbreak of war to proceed unhindered; (b) that during a war they would assign certain ports for transshipment of overseas goods destined for Switzerland; (c) that they would guarantee the forwarding of such goods to the Swiss frontier, if necessary with Swiss help.



in view of the situation today, his demand was surely a matter of only theoretical significance.<sup>3</sup>

V. RINTELEN

<sup>3</sup>When the Swiss Minister renewed the request on Oct. 14 to Weizsäcker, the latter replied that he supposed it had been superseded by events. Frölicher said, however, that France had given a favorable reply in writing, and if the matter came up in parliamentary debate his Government would like to be able to say it had a German reply also (4473/E087862). Negotiations followed which were prolonged by objections of the Economic Policy Department to any formula which would seem to commit Germany to maintaining during war a normal flow of essential commodities to Switzerland (2025/443997-99). Ultimately, in an exchange of notes on June 28, 1939, it was agreed that both sides would maintain transit freight traffic "so far as possible", and that, in the event of war, negotiations would be undertaken to consider "to what extent the mutual exchange of vital commodities could be maintained" (2025/444054-64).

## No. 529

2025/443959-66

### *The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

A 846

BERN, October 18, 1938.

Pol. II 3288.

Subject: Swiss neutrality during the period of tension.

Supplement to report A 751 of September 2, 1938,<sup>1</sup> and with reference to report A 810 of October 10, 1938.<sup>2</sup>

The tension during the last weeks in September, which was ended by the Munich Agreement, was a sort of dress rehearsal for Switzerland's neutrality policy. Contrary to a number of other neutral countries, such as Belgium and Holland for example, the Swiss Government hesitated until the last moment to take drastic measures for mobilization and was in the end able to avoid them entirely. It confined itself to one single visible security measure, which, to be sure, was ordered very early—on September 12—namely, placing demolition charges at bridges, railroads, and street crossings as planned and having these guarded by small detachments of the volunteer frontier guard. To be sure, it was fortunate for Switzerland that during the period of tension considerable parts of the Swiss Army were taking the usual autumn training and repeater courses. She did not extend these courses, but permitted them to end normally even during the tension. Even after the outcome of the Godesberg conversations, which was regarded as very ominous in Switzerland, she refrained from extending the courses ending on September 24.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (2025/443940-45), a report on Swiss public opinion.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (6860/E518183-90). The report gave an account of the strong anti-German tone of the Swiss press during the German-Czech crisis in September, and urged that pressure be brought to bear on the Swiss Government to effect a change in the leadership of the Swiss news agency.

But whether she accomplished what was certainly her purpose, namely to keep the population calm, seems very questionable to me in view of the panic existing in many places for days at a time.

The Federal Council has repeatedly had to withstand considerable pressure from influential representatives of the people and from cantonal governments, who maintained even earlier that it was indispensable to declare at least a partial mobilization. It became known that such a step was taken in Basel, where the population became especially nervous because of the city's exposed situation. The bank vaults were already emptied and their contents taken into cities further in the interior. The press also criticized the optimism displayed by the Federal Council, although in a very disciplined manner, to the effect that in order to be able to meet a sudden attack Switzerland ought to mobilize in time and not only at the last moment. Only now, in retrospect, is this criticism being voiced as a basic reproach against the attitude of the Government (cf. the enclosed articles from the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of October 11 and 18, 1938, "Courageous Pessimism" and "The Inexorable Test");<sup>\*</sup> it is summarized in the statement that Switzerland would not have been prepared at any frontier in case of a large-scale surprise attack.

On the whole the Federal Council showed backbone in the face of all efforts to induce it to act rashly or to take far-reaching measures. During the weeks following September 12 it issued short statements to the press almost daily, which were meant to convince the population of the preparedness of the Government and the General Staff. Preparations for mobilization, which undoubtedly left much to be desired at the beginning of the tension, were advanced greatly thereafter. The Military Attaché reported continuously on the details of these preparations, so that I can confine myself to mentioning a few of the measures: expansion of the air defense system, preparations for removing valuables and property from the threatened border districts, especially Basel; preparation of storage facilities for evacuated goods in the interior of Switzerland; increased stock-piling of important goods on the part of the authorities; export bans on essential raw materials.

Regular and militia officers were given no further leave after September 15. The choice of a general was postponed, however, although the authorities repeatedly said that it was immediately imminent, and finally, though at the last moment, it was omitted entirely. The Federal Council had met the afternoon of September 28 at 3:30 p. m. in order to decide on alerting the frontier guard and probably also to make the last preparations for choosing the general, when, shortly

<sup>\*</sup> Not reprinted.

after the beginning of the session, news of the Four Power meeting in Munich reached it, so that the decision for partial mobilization, which had already been taken, could be set aside. On the morning of September 29 the Federal Council met once more and announced in a proclamation broadcast by radio that in case the Munich Conference failed, immediate mobilization of the frontier guard was planned as a first measure.

While the danger of a German invasion—which the leftist press in particular described as imminent—was formerly the primary cause for concern in Switzerland, during the period of tension hardly any opinions of real consequence were heard which felt obliged to warn of a German invasion. On the contrary, in Government circles, in the Army, among the intelligent population, as well as locally (especially in Geneva and Basel) fear of a French invasion was expressed—although this was mentioned in the press only later.

The Military Attaché and I have received a number of reports about *démarches* made by France to the Swiss Government, and I shall enumerate them in the following three points:

1. France is said to have called the attention of the Federal Council to the fact that Swiss food imports from the port of Marseille could not be guaranteed any longer if France should become involved in a war with Germany.

2. The French General Staff is said to have approached the Swiss General Staff on September 12 or 13 with a request for conferences with the aim of stationing two Swiss divisions in the vicinity west and southwest of Basel for the protection of the southern flank of the French troop concentration.

3. At the height of the tension (September 27 and 28) France allegedly inquired twice in the Bundeshaus about Switzerland's probable attitude in case French forces should march through Swiss territory. The first inquiry is said to have been answered in a "negative" way, the second with the additional comment "that Switzerland would energetically oppose with armed resistance any attempts to violate her territory."

That the French communication mentioned under point 1 is correctly represented need not be especially doubted, if it is taken into account that the Marseille-Lyon-Paris railroad, which also supplies Switzerland, is of the greatest importance for French mobilization and is therefore to be reserved for important military transports. It would therefore be in accordance with French conduct in the World War if Switzerland had now been told that in case of war the port of Cette [*Sète*] would be assigned to her for her supply needs.

As for French *démarches* to Switzerland under points 2 and 3, which at first appeared rather incredible to me, especially since the Federal Council did not mobilize in any way as a result, I would

assume on the basis of what a high Swiss officer told me that they actually were made in one form or another. Without answering my question as to whether France had actually taken such steps, this officer pointed out that in his opinion Germany had consciously placed special emphasis on preparedness for war without actually being armed to the extent she had been in 1914. He mentioned casually the untrained reserves and the lack of cadres. France, for her part, had done the same, although, in contrast to us, in my informant's opinion she had not been prepared to go to war. Therefore, if France inquired in Switzerland about the possibility of crossing Swiss territory, this was pure bluff instigated by the *2ème Bureau*.<sup>\*</sup> The same applied to the treatment accorded the Swiss in Alsace-Lorraine in the second half of September; they had been induced by the authorities to flee to Switzerland. The Swiss Government and General Staff had recognized this bluff for what it was and consequently had seen no cause to mobilize.

Thus the Government here acted very calmly during the crisis and had the full support of public opinion with regard to the maintenance of political and military neutrality toward all sides.

It decided on the appeal for peace, which it made the evening of September 28 both to the Führer and Chancellor and to Beneš, after urgent intervention by the American Chargé d'Affaires here the afternoon of the 28th. Since the Munich conferences had been announced in the meantime, the manifesto, which contained nothing that was of special significance any longer, did not receive undue attention.

I reported in detail on October 10, 1938 (A 810) regarding the attitude of the Swiss press during the period of tension and my repeated steps in this question. The effects of this agitation, which are still in evidence today, have made the position of German nationals in Switzerland so difficult that the task of remedying this situation must be one of our first concerns.

During the period of tension the small German tradespeople, whether they were Party members or not, were subjected to a silent boycott which, while usually unorganized, was effective. Incidents of workmen being insulted at their work and women while shopping, etc., are being reported to the Legation from all parts of German-speaking Switzerland. The economic existence of many Germans who are already suffering greatly from the crisis in Switzerland is endangered; the number of those being repatriated to Germany is increasing.

I have made representations in the Political Department in every single case that has become known to me. Apologies were made.

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<sup>\*</sup> The Intelligence section of the French General Staff.

I was promised action and action was taken in individual cases, although the Government has not shown enough energy to make a basic approach to the problem. During every conversation I was given new assurances that the Government was doing everything in its power, but that it had to request our consideration at the present time for its domestic position. In November a referendum was expected on the financial program. During the intervening period the Government could not take steps against the Social Democratic press, since it would thereby expose itself to the suspicion of using foreign policy as a pretext for silencing its opponents at home.

Besides Councilor Motta, I also pointed out most earnestly to President Baumann, on whom I had called as instructed in order to transmit the Führer's thanks for the Federal Council's peace telegram, the consequences of the attitude of the Swiss population. Again and again I pointed out the sources which are systematically at work to keep the mood of panic alive (emigrants, the *National-Zeitung*, and Social Democratic newspapers). Each time I have observed that the Government is not lacking in the necessary understanding. The last weeks have shown unmistakably, however, that it does not possess the required force and initiative and therefore was actually helpless in the face of developments in public opinion.

In view of this state of affairs, which is almost intolerable for German nationals, the idea of taking countermeasures against Swiss citizens in Germany suggests itself, and this has been proposed to me here in the form of requests or demands by many of the endangered German citizens. However, it appears doubtful to me that the Germans in Switzerland can actually be helped in this manner. For I am afraid that countermeasures would not bring the Swiss people into the stores of German citizens, but would rather increase the antipathy in Switzerland against all German citizens. There is also the danger that the constructive work of the AO in Switzerland would be jeopardized, especially since it may be expected that before long the Social Democrats will launch a federal initiative to ban National Socialist organizations. We must also consider the possible effects a stricter policy against Switzerland on our part might have on the domestic position of the present Federal Council.

In case these considerations do not seem decisive there, and German countermeasures appear advisable if the attitude of the population against the local Germans continues, I request instructions to this effect, so that I can collect and report to you any especially flagrant incidents which might give us occasion for action.

KÖCHER

No. 530

2600/525185-86

*The Legation in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 934

BERN, November 15, 1938.

Received November 21.

Pol. II 3635.

Subject: The Swiss Government and the Ortsgruppen of the AO of the NSDAP in Switzerland.

In the campaign of recent weeks by the democratic and Marxist parties against Swiss groups advocating regeneration along National Socialist lines, the Marxists made the attempt to put through measures against the Ortsgruppen of the AO of the NSDAP as well. A number of Ortsgruppenleiter as well as individual German citizens prominent in the work of the Ortsgruppen or the German colony were made the targets of newspaper attacks which called for a social and economic boycott; the Legation protested sharply several times on this score, orally and in writing, to the Swiss Political Department (cf. the last report, A 916, of November 15, 1938).<sup>1</sup> At the Police Directors' conference in Bern on November 4, 1938, under the chairmanship of Federal President Baumann, which considered the measures planned against the regeneration movements, the activities of the Ortsgruppen of the AO of the NSDAP were also discussed, according to newspaper reports. It is probably correct to assume that this question was brought up for discussion at the insistence of a number of cantons under Red leadership.

In reply to these attempts the stand of the Federal Council was expressed by President Baumann in Parliament on three occasions during the past week in a manner conforming to the policy previously manifested by the Federal Council with regard to the Basel anti-National Socialist initiative measure; namely, that it did not intend to let the cantons take the decision about authorization of the Ortsgruppen of the AO of the NSDAP out of its hands, but would continue to keep this matter "within its own competence."

Thus, during the discussion in the National Council on November 9, 1938, about sustaining the ban on Communists of the Canton of Vaud, President Baumann repeated the statements he had made on a similar occasion before the Council of States on September 22, 1938, where he said that the National Socialist organizations of German citizens in Switzerland were not engaged in any illegal activities; complying with directives issued by the Federal Council, they were dealing only with their own and not with Swiss affairs and should

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6861/E518194-205).

therefore be tolerated. Moreover, the right of foreigners to organize was a federal matter and did not come under the authority of the cantons.

In the session of the National Council of November 12, 1938, (and similarly in the session of the Council of States on the same day) the President, in his speech about measures against the Swiss National Socialist groups, rejected the interpellation made the day before by Schneider, the Left Socialist deputy from Basel (though it was originated as early as March of this year) concerning the activities of the NSDAP in Switzerland (cf. enclosure).<sup>2</sup> According to the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* he made the following statement:

"We must make a clear distinction between the organizations with which we are dealing. On the one hand there are the Ortsgruppen of the NSDAP, which are composed exclusively of German citizens; on the other hand there are the Swiss organizations which more or less espouse the National Socialist ideology. As for the National Socialist organizations of the Germans, attention should be called to the fact that they are subject to the directives issued by the Swiss Justice and Police Departments on September 26, 1935. Experience has shown that these directives have heretofore proved effective, and the organizations in question are under constant supervision. If the German organizations in Switzerland adhere to the directives and to Swiss law in general, the Federal Council holds in principle that the Ortsgruppen of the NSDAP can be tolerated in Switzerland just as are the organizations of citizens of other countries."

A copy for the executive of the AO is enclosed.

V. BIBRA

<sup>2</sup> Not reprinted.

## No. 531

2025/443971-74

### *The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 996

BERN, December 3, 1938.

Received December 6.

Pol. II 3832.

Subject: Conversation with Federal Councilor Motta about anti-German sentiment in Switzerland.

With reference to reports A 978 of November 28, 1938; <sup>1</sup> A 994 of December 2, 1938; <sup>2</sup> and A 977 Ang. III of December 3, 1938.<sup>3</sup>

On December 1 I had a lengthy conversation with Federal Councilor Motta about the development of public opinion in Switzerland with regard to Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6862/E518209-23).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3825/E043838-39).

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

Mentioning his repeated assurances that he would do his best to stop newspaper agitation against Germany, I told Motta that in spite of the press conference held at his initiative at the end of October 1938, I had been obliged to note that the anti-German sentiment which had given him and me cause for grave concern during the period of tension in September still existed and had even increased. I had the impression that certain Swiss editors, who unfortunately still exercised greater influence on the general attitude of the press than did circles close to the Federal Council, were in fact systematically sabotaging the Council's efforts. I reminded Motta that a biased press had been able to exploit the actions taken by the Swiss Attorney General's office against the regeneration movements, against alleged German agents, and in general against Swiss who had dared to voice openly their sympathy for Germany (cf. my last report on this subject, A 123 g of November 17, 1938 <sup>4</sup>) in such an inflammatory manner that the Swiss public had got the impression that Germany was carrying on *Anschluss* propaganda in Switzerland. Unfortunately the Swiss telegraph agency under the direction of M. Luedi was playing what I was obliged to term a disastrous role in fostering this impression among the Swiss people. It was also regrettable that the Attorney General's office did not see fit to state that there was no connection between Germany and the regeneration movements. After all, according to available information that was what their investigations had shown. The Swiss press gave a great deal of space to all reports which could be exploited against Germany. The *National-Zeitung* was attacking statesmen like Chamberlain and Daladier for attempting to reach an understanding with Germany. Important events of a gratifying nature, which affected Switzerland herself directly, as for example the Franco-German *rapprochement*, were hardly mentioned at all. It was also incomprehensible to me how unintelligently and credulously the Swiss press had played up the report of Karratsch, the correspondent of the *N[eu]e Z[ürcher] Z[eitung]*, about our sending students who were "ready for action."<sup>5</sup> In my opinion it was obvious that the hundred and fifty students who came to Switzerland from Germany did not represent a threat to Switzerland. He could be sure, moreover, that Germany did not attach great importance to leaving these students in Switzerland, for they could study with equal

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (3832/E044025-31).

<sup>5</sup> Reports had appeared in the Swiss press that a notice posted at the University of Berlin had offered financial assistance to German students wishing to study in Switzerland and had specified that the students must be "*politisch ein-satzbereit*," that is, prepared to be active politically. A storm of protest followed among Swiss students and in Switzerland.



advantage at other foreign universities. The Krahle case,<sup>6</sup> finally, was a typical example of the extent to which this incitation had already penetrated the population.

I then called Federal Councilor Motta's attention to the large number of German businessmen driven out of Switzerland as a result of the boycott agitation and told him that if such conditions continued, there would necessarily arise in Germany an anti-Swiss sentiment which could only be disadvantageous to Switzerland. Even the objective criticism voiced recently by several German papers in a very restrained manner about the propaganda being carried on at present in Switzerland had only given rise to intensified agitation and had not brought about understanding and a saner outlook. Finally I emphasized once more the danger to German-Swiss relations if the press did not adopt a different course in the near future.

Federal Councilor Motta, for his part, admitted that the circumstances described were serious, but said that he definitely hoped to improve the situation gradually through his continued efforts. He added that it was unfortunate, however, that the nervousness of the Swiss population concerning the German danger was constantly being kept alive by hints on the German side which appeared again and again, quite unofficially to be sure, in books, journals, or in direct conversations with Swiss people, to the effect that Switzerland would be incorporated into Germany sooner or later. He enumerated a number of such cases similar to some with which I was already familiar from letters sent to me. In reply I told Federal Councilor Motta that these statements had for the most part to be considered as an indignant reaction to the unrestrained Swiss criticism of Germany, but promised that I would transmit to the German Government in Berlin his request that the situation be remedied.

Motta again assured me of the Government's intention to guide public opinion back into quieter waters. In its next session the Federal Council would undoubtedly take up the latest incidents that had disturbed German-Swiss relations, namely the Krahle case, the question of the students who were "ready for action" and Frölicher's

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<sup>6</sup> In November 1938 the newspaper *Der Bund* of Bern published a letter, alleged to have been addressed by a German lawyer to a client in Switzerland, which referred to a "future Reich Governor in Bern." Krahle, a German resident of Bern, wrote to *Der Bund* in protest against the publication of the letter. The paper's comment on Krahle's protest, which it did not publish, led the Bern public to believe that Krahle had identified himself with the views expressed by the German lawyer, and angry demonstrations before Krahle's jewelry shop followed. Subsequent investigation established that Krahle was not an advocate of *Anschluss* for Switzerland, but had merely protested against the letter's publication because he believed it to be a forgery.

speech in Munich.<sup>7</sup> Finally I told Motta once more that I believed that only energetic action by the Government could change the course of the Swiss press.

The Federal Council discussed the latest incidents in yesterday's session and issued the enclosed statement<sup>8</sup> on this matter. In it the Federal Council makes known the full text of the announcement posted at Berlin University, suggesting study in Switzerland, which had been objected to. Its interpretation of the text is the desired and necessary correction of the fears expressed by the Swiss public.

Subsequently the statement of the Federal Council took up Minister Frölicher's speech in Munich, the authentic text of which was not yet available; however, the Federal Council had no fault to find even with the version published by DNB. Rather it was inclined to agree with the considerations lending support to Switzerland which M. Frölicher drew from the solemn recognition of the right of self-determination of peoples. When the exact text of the entire speech is available, the Federal Council will make a final statement in the matter.

KÖCHER

<sup>7</sup> The Swiss Minister in Germany, Frölicher, made a speech on Nov. 25 to Swiss residing in Munich. Some of the Swiss press charged that he had spoken favorably of the Munich agreement and had intimated that a certain section of the Swiss press had a disturbing influence on Swiss-German relations.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed (6858/E518172-74).

## No. 532

2446/514888

### *Circular of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle<sup>1</sup>*

Subject: Switzerland

BERLIN, December 17, 1938.

Reference: I 2 k 2 G/Ea

Kult A 1266g.

As the result of the agitation in Switzerland and the ban on the three National Socialist groups,<sup>2</sup> the Party offices are at present being besieged by Swiss who wish to obtain Reich support for a National Socialist movement. In particular it is frequently suggested that with the support of the Reich the Swiss residing here be gathered into a National Socialist organization.

These efforts should be met with the greatest caution, since intervention by the Party can interfere with our established foreign policy

<sup>1</sup> The circular was sent to principal officials of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, to the executive of the VDA (Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland), and to the Gestapo. The Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry received an information copy.

<sup>2</sup> Three minor organizations of Swiss citizens advocating National Socialist views were banned by a decision [*Beschluss*] of the Federal Council issued on Dec. 9. This decision, based on provisions of the Federal Constitution, outlawed organizations whose activities facilitated the propaganda of foreign powers or tended to undermine the democratic principles on which the Swiss Government was founded (2600/525177-84; 2601/525191-94).

toward Switzerland. In particular it should be kept in mind that the Swiss who are trying to establish contact with Party authorities might even be *agents provocateurs*.

The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle therefore requests that you merely take cognizance of such requests by Swiss nationals and that after making an investigation of the applicant you send a report about the person and the application to this office. For security reasons the applicant himself must not be referred to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.

Further directives will be issued after investigation of each separate case.

Heil Hitler!

LORENZ  
SS-Obergruppenführer

No. 533

183/85879

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 42

BERLIN, January 16, 1939.

During a conversation about the situation I told the Swiss Minister today that, contrary to a view prevailing in Switzerland, Swiss security had gained by Austria's return to the Reich. As long as the military and political lines of communication of the German-Italian Axis and the French alliances with Eastern Europe intersected in Switzerland and the French west-east line ran through a weak and defenseless Austria, the Swiss might have been justified in being somewhat concerned. Now that France could no longer reach the east via Austria and was becoming largely disinterested in Eastern Europe, Switzerland's position was substantially eased.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 534

2134/467365-66

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 72

BERLIN, January 27, 1939.

I had the Swiss Minister call on me today in order to give him an answer concerning Bockhoff's article on the neutrality question in the *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Minister had complained to Weizsäcker on Jan. 16 about the article which appeared in the January issue of the journal under the title "Neutrality and Democracy in the Twentieth Century". Frölicher argued that whereas neutrality had always been defined as applying to the acts and pledges of governments, the article introduced the concept of a people's neutrality [*Volksneutralität*], and thus extended neutrality to cover the attitudes of private individuals and institutions, including the press. He feared that Bockhoff's article disavowed the Führer's assurances to respect Swiss neutrality under all circumstances (183/85876-78).

Since M. Frölicher told me at the outset that the Swiss Federal Council was very much interested in the result of our conversation of today, I presented my view in great detail. I began with the statement made by the Führer both to M. Frölicher<sup>2</sup> and to Federal Councilor Schulthess.<sup>3</sup> That statement was an accepted maxim for us. However, I continued, even in the case of such an unambiguous statement of intention it would not, of course, merely be a question of a unilateral German obligation. It naturally presupposed absolute Swiss neutrality in return. It was absurd to begin counting neutrality only from the time war broke out. Especially in an era of total war Switzerland's neutrality obligations began in the preceding period of peace. Switzerland was obligated to conduct herself in times of peace in such a manner that it would not be difficult or impossible for her to realize her desire for neutrality during war. Furthermore, a certain peacetime attitude on the part of Switzerland might do direct injury to Germany in a manner incompatible with neutrality. I called the Minister's attention to the article by the prominent Swiss jurist Dr. W. Bueckhardt in the *Politisches Jahrbuch der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1912*, which I had been given by the Legal Department. Then I took up Swiss "freedom of the press" and denied that the Swiss Government had the right to hide behind it. Rather, the Swiss Government was obligated, in the interest of maintaining good relations with us, somehow to insure the necessary influence over the press. We took cognizance of Federal Councilor Motta's intention, reported by M. Frölicher, to improve this situation, as well as of the regulations already issued.<sup>4</sup> However, the result was insufficient so far. If the number of German articles criticizing Switzerland were compared with the number of Swiss articles against Germany, the resulting ratio would certainly be 1:100. Therefore the excitement about Bockhoff's article, which was no diplomatic note but which I would nevertheless not disavow, appeared unjustified to me. This excitement would be comprehensible only if it was believed in Switzerland that by the critical discussion of Swiss conduct we wished to prepare the way for a change in our relations in case of war and to deviate from the Führer's statements. Switzerland, however, had no occasion or justification for assuming this.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 521, and vol. III, document No. 597.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 517, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> The Swiss decision referred to in document No. 532, footnote 2, also forbade propaganda tending to arouse hatred against minority groups, including groups of foreign nationals. The German Legation had been assured by the Swiss Government that under this decision the Government had power to curb press attacks against Germany (2025/443967).

After I had given M. Frölicher a few more examples of the conduct of the Swiss press, he said that it would be best if the controversy about the Bockhoff article were now gradually permitted to die down.<sup>5</sup> I told him that I was of the same opinion.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>5</sup>On Jan. 30, however, after visiting Bern, Frölicher called on Weizsäcker again and said that his Government wished to issue a communiqué with reference to the Bockhoff article stating that on the basis of discussions with the German Government it had been ascertained that Germany had no intention to call into question previous pledges on the subject of Swiss neutrality. In subsequent conversations Weizsäcker requested changes in the text and finally on Feb. 10 Frölicher informed him that it had been decided to abandon the communiqué (183/85886-92).

CHAPTER VII  
TURKEY  
JULY 16, 1937-FEBRUARY 10, 1939  
No. 535

2128/463410-15

*The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Turkey*

BERLIN, July 16, 1937.

Pol. I 2715 g.

With reference to instruction Pol. I 309 of April 15, 1937,<sup>1</sup> and to report A 634 of May 7.<sup>2</sup>

After the conclusion of the London naval conversations<sup>3</sup> the moment seems to have come to open negotiations with the Turkish Government on the Montreux Convention.<sup>4</sup> In accordance with the Rome conversations between Count Ciano and the Reich Foreign Minister,<sup>5</sup> about which the Embassy has already been informed, it

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3561/E023384-85; 6852/E518131). This instruction informed Ankara that Germany had no objection to Italy's intended accession to the Montreux Convention, and was herself planning to negotiate a similar agreement with Turkey at a later date.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Anglo-German naval conversations resulted on July 17, 1937, in the signing of a supplementary agreement to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935. Its principal aim was to incorporate into the earlier agreement the provisions of the London Naval Treaty of Mar. 25, 1936. (See *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937), pp. 110-116. The agreement of July 17, 1937, is published in *British Treaty Series No. 2* (1938), Cmd. 5637. Copies in English and German are also to be found in the files (1622/388184-204).

<sup>4</sup> The Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, abrogated the regime for the Straits set up under the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923. The provisions which had aroused most controversy at Montreux and had then played a significant part in German opposition to the Montreux Convention referred to the case of a war in which Turkey was non-belligerent, as laid down in articles 19 and 25 of the Convention; in such a case, warships of belligerent powers were not to pass the Straits in either direction except in fulfilment of obligations under the League Covenant, or to render assistance to a victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey and concluded within the framework of the Covenant. The most significant feature of the Montreux Convention was Turkey's newly acquired right to remilitarize the Straits. Germany, not being a signatory of the Lausanne Treaty, did not participate in the Montreux Conference and Italy refused participation in view of the attitude of the League during the Ethiopian war. (On the Montreux Conference, see *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, pp. 584-651; for the official text of the Convention, see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. CLXXIII, pp. 213-241).

<sup>5</sup> Neurath was in Rome from May 3 to May 5, 1937, and according to the official communiqué, discussed with Mussolini and Ciano "the major political and economic problems of interest to Germany and Italy" (*Documents on International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1939), p. 206; for Ciano's record of these conversations see *L'Europa verso la Catastrofe* (Milan, 1948), pp. 175-178).

will be necessary to proceed in agreement with Italy; I therefore request you to keep in touch with your Italian colleague in this matter and to see that the negotiations to be initiated by us proceed as far as possible parallel with the Italo-Turkish negotiations; before they are finally terminated there will have to be an understanding between the two Governments in conformity with the Rome agreement of May 4, 1937.<sup>6</sup>

As the prospective Turkish memorandum has so far not been delivered, the note of March 9, 1937, transmitted with the report of March 10<sup>7</sup> constitutes the last utterance of the Turkish Government in the present question. The introductory oral discussions must, to begin with, refer to the line of reasoning of this note. In view of the Turkish objection that after all we had had no part in the Lausanne Convention and yet had benefited from its provisions, I request that you emphasize that the situation has changed fundamentally since we have regained equality of rights. We were very ready to respect Turkish rights and sincerely welcomed the fact that Turkey regained her freedom to re-arm; by the reservation made by us in the first instance against the Montreux Convention, however, we had wished to make known that we, as a European Great Power, could not remain indifferent in a matter which was of the utmost importance, not only for our trade interests, but also from the point of view of naval policy. Just as we recognized Turkish equality of rights, so it was only right and proper that Turkey should regard us as a partner with equal rights in the Straits question. In this connection I

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<sup>6</sup>According to a memorandum by Neurath of May 4 (1486/368599-600) on his talks with Ciano, he had told the latter that Germany would recognize the Montreux Convention in a bilateral agreement with Turkey after the termination of the London naval conversations; eventually the two Foreign Ministers agreed that Germany and Italy would consult each other prior to any definite recognition of the Montreux Convention. The Embassy in Ankara was informed of this by instruction Pol. IV 2360 of May 8, 1937 (1486/368601-02).

<sup>7</sup>Not printed (1833/418881-83). This Turkish note was a reply to the German viewpoint which had been conveyed to the Turks by the German Ambassador on the basis of a Foreign Ministry instruction, Pol. I 3184 of Jan. 5, 1937 (1833/418854-63). The German viewpoint, as set down in this instruction, was that Germany could not accept the Montreux Convention and would have to reserve her freedom of action in regard to it. This German position was explained by references to the principle of equal rights for Germany, by the deterioration of Germany's naval position since the Russian Black Sea fleet could now pass easily into the Mediterranean while Russia's Black Sea coast was safe from attack; finally, Germany objected to the restriction of the movements of German ships by virtue of a treaty in which she had not participated.

The Turkish reply of Mar. 9 (1833/418881-83) pointed out that Germany had not been a signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. The Montreux Convention was merely a revision of the Straits Convention of 1923. Turkey had proposed this revision with the sole aim of acquiring a position where she could better serve the cause of order and security.

request you to refer to the assurances in the penultimate paragraph<sup>8</sup> of the Turkish note, and if called for, also to the declaration made by the Turkish Foreign Minister during the Montreux conference (in the session of July 13, 1936, *Actes de la Conférence de Montreux*, p. 121) in which he explicitly claimed the right for Turkey "*de signer en cas de nécessité, avec tels pays qui lui conviennent, des accords analogues, conçus dans le cadre de la réglementation qui sera en vigueur.*"

Very narrow limits are, by the nature of things, set to our aims at the proposed negotiations. The enclosed draft of a note comprises our maximum demands.<sup>9</sup> This note is to serve as directive during the negotiations and, in the event of a favorable issue, is to constitute our contribution towards the proposed exchange of notes. In this connection the following must be observed:

A rather vague formula has intentionally been chosen for our recognition of the Montreux Convention; with special regard, therefore, for possible Turkish sensitiveness, it is not explicitly stated that we lay claim to the special privileges appertaining to the signatory powers. I beg you, nevertheless, to state verbally that now, after the entry into force of the agreement, we expect to be notified by the Turkish Government in conformity with article 24, paragraphs 4 and 5, like a signatory power.

The proviso regarding the League of Nations and the bilateral treaties of assistance accords closely with the Japanese version; this takes our interests into account in every respect, and least opposition might be expected against it from the Turkish side. In this question as well, however, I request you to make contact with the Italian Embassy, as, according to information from Count Ciano, Italy wishes to introduce a corresponding proviso.

The passage in the enclosed draft concerning the right of transit by air and by land resulted from the concern felt by the War Ministry regarding the effects which unrestricted recognition of the Montreux Convention might have on the right claimed by us of transit by air over the Great Belt.<sup>10</sup> Detailed information on this question is given

<sup>8</sup> The penultimate paragraph reads as follows: "Faithful to her principle of fulfilling scrupulously her commitments, Turkey will exert her full efforts to the end that all powers shall enjoy equally and without exception all the advantages deriving from the new Straits regime insofar as they apply to international commercial navigation. At the same time she will take care to eliminate from this maritime route all hostile and antagonistic elements, to the end that it may remain constantly a route of harmony and peace."

<sup>9</sup> No such draft was found with this copy, which is from the files of the German Embassy in Rome. Moreover, an inquiry in Berlin, made by the Rome Embassy on Aug. 12 (2128/463420), indicates that no draft of a note had been enclosed either with this instruction or with the next one of Aug. 7 (document No. 536) which had arrived in Rome on Aug. 12.

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 413.



in the enclosed secret protocol<sup>21</sup> of a conversation between representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry, which is amplified by a memorandum on the situation from the point of view of military policy. Although at the end of the conversation the War Ministry withdrew its objections with regard to the Great Belt, a qualifying explanation of our recognition in this respect would perhaps anticipate possible objections from the Danish side. This seems all the more desirable since, according to a report from Copenhagen, the whole question of neutrality rights was discussed at the conference of the Scandinavian states, and in connection with this, would probably come up for discussion with us.

The enclosed protocol moreover shows that the War Ministry does not raise any objections to our accession, and will also accept it if an alteration or interpretation of the Convention in our favor should not appear feasible at the present stage. At present the wishes expressed by the War Ministry in regard to naval policy can also, at the most, be taken into account on the following points only:

According to paragraph 6 of annex II in connection with article 8 of the Convention, auxiliary vessels (*bâtiments auxiliaires*) which fulfill certain conditions also come under the heading of warships within the meaning of the Convention. We, on our part, have considerable interest in the widest possible interpretation being given to the conception "auxiliary vessels," particularly in order that Soviet-Russian Government ships carrying war materials or troops through the Straits should generally come under that heading, and thus be subject to the restrictions provided for the right of passage of warships. Hence it would be valuable if, in the course of the negotiations, agreement could be reached with the Turkish Government that paragraph 6 is to be interpreted in the sense indicated; it is true that on the Turkish side they will hardly feel prepared, out of consideration for the other signatory powers, to include this point in the exchange of notes; hence it has not been mentioned in the attached draft. In this question, too, close cooperation with Italy, whose interests in this matter run parallel with ours, will be advisable.

Finally, regarding our intervention in the revision proceedings, this does not yet follow simply from the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with Turkey, because the question is one which can only be decided by all signatory powers acting conjointly. We can therefore not forego a Turkish promise to sponsor our participation with the other signatory powers.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>21</sup> Not found.

## No. 536

2128/463418

*The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey*

BERLIN, August 7, 1937.

Pol. I 3936 g.

With reference to report A 1532 of July 27.<sup>1</sup>

I request you, at the next opportunity which offers, to inform the Turkish Foreign Minister in broad outline of the manner in which we propose to effect a settlement of the Straits question between Germany and Turkey. Such a communication is looked upon here, within the framework of German-Turkish relations, as being useful and would not hinder a continuation of the negotiations *pari passu* with the Italo-Turkish negotiations, since the German declaration would about correspond to Count Ciano's declaration which has already been placed before the Turks.

I request you to report on the reception of this first German step and at the same time to inform the Italian Ambassador there immediately after it has been carried out.

By order:

VON WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2128/463416-17). In this reply to the instruction of July 16 (document No. 535) the Ambassador reported a conversation with the Italian Ambassador. The latter had expressed his personal opinion that nothing further would develop with regard to Italy's accession to the Montreux Convention "until the Abyssinian question was settled in the League of Nations by recognition of the Italian Empire at least on the part of Turkey." Since this state of affairs made it impossible to comply with the instruction of July 16 to have the German-Turkish negotiations run parallel to those between Italy and Turkey, the German Ambassador requested a telegraphic instruction as to whether the German proposals should be submitted to the Turkish Foreign Minister at once.

## No. 537

2129/464271-73

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

A 1694

THERAPIA, August 27, 1937.

Pol. I 4559 g.

With reference to instruction Pol. I 3936 g of August 7.

In the course of a general conversation with the Foreign Minister today, I informed him in broad outline, on the basis of the dispatch of July 16, of our attitude towards further negotiation in the Straits question. Aras replied that if the memorandum had not been trans-

<sup>1</sup> The copy selected is from the files of the German Embassy in Italy. It was sent to Rome for information purposes on Sept. 2, together with a covering note mentioning that this report from the Embassy in Turkey had not yet been used for a reply to an inquiry made by the Italian Chargé in this matter (2129/464270). Therapia was the summer residence of the German Embassy.

mitted it was because the text of the Turkish note of March 9<sup>2</sup> by itself had, in all essentials, already contained all points of view and assurances for guaranteeing the application of the Montreux Convention to relations with Germany. He would also welcome it unreservedly if the legal position were elucidated by a German reply to the Turkish note. But if we wished by a *bilateral agreement* to declare the provisions of the Convention binding in the relations of our two countries, then he could not, at first glance, agree at once, but would have to reserve to himself the right to examine thoroughly whether this did not require consultation with the other signatories. I questioned this by drawing attention to his statements at Montreux, as well as to the circumstance that, according to our intentions, it was only a question of relations between the two countries. He insisted on the necessity for a detailed examination of this question; until now Turkey had announced the principle of the application of the Convention to other states only by unilateral declaration, either in general terms by a statement in the Chamber or directly as in the cases of Poland and the United States of America, and, naturally, Turkey would not concede fewer rights to Germany than to these two states. He admitted that by using precise wording his specific objections could be removed, but he wished to reserve his opinion on this subject.

He would have to do the same with regard to the German Government's intention to make reservations regarding nonmembership in the League of Nations; he asked us to consider, at any rate, that the United States of America, which was not a member either, had made no such reservation; if such a reservation was conceded in the case of Japan as a signatory power, this had been in exchange for the return services which Japan had rendered during the negotiations at Montreux by giving assent to the other points. Against this I pointed out to him that Germany's position of equality and obvious political considerations give her just as much right as Japan to such a reservation.

I turned the conversation finally to Germany's participation in the event of a revision of the Convention. He did not exclude the possibility that, if ever this eventuality or the necessity for a new Convention were to materialize, Turkey could, even without consulting other signatory powers, demand that Germany be included. But it was self-evident to him that Turkey would make this dependent on a political *quid pro quo* commensurate with the situation at the time.

The long conversation ended with a promise from Aras to examine personally all the questions raised. As he was going to Geneva now and Turkey was expecting several state visits in October, the suitable date would not be until the beginning of November. Aras then

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 535, footnotes 7 and 8.

requested in particular, with a promise of reciprocity, that nothing about the projected conversation should be allowed to reach the public.

I have acquainted the Italian Ambassador, Galli, who leaves for Rome next week, with the essential points of the conversation. He thought Aras' cautious reserve was to be explained by his fear of doing something or other which might offend the Soviets; the actual relations between Turkey and the Soviets were so unstable even after the Moscow visit,<sup>3</sup> or rather because of its unsatisfactory results, and in spite of outward demonstrations of friendship, that every move which would annoy Moscow might lead to very serious differences. Perhaps Galli goes too far in his pessimistic estimate of Russo-Turkish relations, but concern about deterioration of these relations is certainly to a great extent the guiding motive of the Turks. For example, according to Aras' own statement, Turkey did not permit publication of the cancellation of the visit of the Turkish fleet to Odessa for fear of prejudicing relations.

KELLER

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<sup>3</sup> The Turkish Foreign Minister paid a diplomatic visit to Moscow in mid-July. At the end of the talks a communiqué was issued, emphasizing the various mutual interests of Turkey and the Soviet Union. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 423-426.

## No. 538

395/212602-03

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 23, 1937.

The Turkish Ambassador called on me this evening and brought up the following two points:

1. The Turkish Government, as I knew, had for a long time been receiving deliveries of war matériel from German firms, especially Krupp. These shipments had until recently been sent by ship through the Mediterranean. Events in the Mediterranean<sup>1</sup> had made it necessary to change the shipping route. For some time the deliveries had therefore gone overland via Czechoslovakia and Rumania to Constanza where they were taken on board a Turkish ship. At present a battery of four guns of medium caliber, which had already arrived in Bremen, had been reloaded on a freight train of approximately 25 cars and was now to go to Constanza. The consent of the Czechs and Rumanians had been obtained. The Turkish Government requested of us that the transportation by the German State Railway be facilitated, and above all *expedited*, in every possible way, since

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 141, footnote 9.

Turkey attached great importance to receiving this battery as soon as possible. The Ambassador asked that we find out, perhaps through the Krupp representatives in Berlin, where we could exert pressure to expedite the shipments, and then act accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

2. Everything for war [*sic*] for one of the largest Turkish copper mines in the heart of Asia Minor had been delivered by Germany. The contract with the Augsburg-Nuremberg Machine Factory for the construction of the electric power plant there had provided for delivery in 12 months. From a telegram sent by his Government he understood that the contracting firm had declared at the last minute that it could not meet this deadline and that it would take 16 months instead of 12 months for delivery. Turkey was thereby placed in the extremely difficult position of not being able to start operating any part of the mine, since everything depended on the completion of the electric power plant. The Turkish Government therefore asked us to use all our influence to make the Augsburg-Nuremberg Machine Factory meet the deadline which it had originally accepted of its own accord.

V. MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum by Mackensen dated Oct. 26 on the occasion of another visit by the Turkish Ambassador indicates that this request had been complied with (395/212604).

## No. 539

3890/E048804-08

### *The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

A 2377

ANKARA, January 18, 1938.

Subject: Organization of the NSDAP abroad.

With reference to instruction AO 7 of November 26, 1937.<sup>1</sup>

Except for the Diplomatic and Consular Missions Turkey has no establishments at home or abroad for maintaining contact with citizens living outside of the country. Only on the national holiday, that is, on October 29, is there a reception for citizens at the Turkish Missions abroad, to which, if circumstances permit, a public invitation is extended in the local press. Except for this, however, party activity, which in Turkey is anchored in the Popular Party, ends at the political frontiers. Even at home civil servants are prohibited from belonging to a party—just as civil servants abroad are.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6855/E518153-54). In this instruction Bohle, after complaining about the many objections to the activity of the Auslandsorganisation raised by foreign governments, asked the various Missions to report on the methods used by the various governments to maintain contact with citizens residing abroad. Simultaneously, Bohle requested information as to the degree of freedom enjoyed by organizations of foreign nationals in that particular country, in comparison with the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP.

Only a single exception to this principle was recently made for acute propagandistic reasons, i. e., in view of the forthcoming national elections in the Sanjak of Alexandretta;<sup>2</sup> an attempt was made to open in the Sanjak, with the support of public funds, one of these "People's Houses" such as are maintained by the Party in all important places within the country itself. The French Mandate authorities, recognizing correctly that the decisive considerations here were political and propagandistic, closed this People's House at the end of November at the time the interim regime for the Sanjak was proclaimed.

In the same manner Turkish law forbids foreigners to form political and other associations founded on the basis of race. Likewise, Turks as well as foreigners who have settled in Turkey are forbidden to wear the dress and insignia of foreign political or military organizations. Some of the legislation in question is not of very recent date. The legal provisions on the subject are transmitted herewith in translation.<sup>3</sup> The responsible political and police authorities carefully see to it that these regulations are very scrupulously observed by all foreign groups that might be concerned. This applies especially to the formation of Communist Party cells. To the extent that such attempts were made at all, they were always immediately and brutally suppressed in the New Turkey. The same attitude, though in a considerably milder form, is also observed toward activities of groups of the Fascio and the NSDAP, which as is well known, are not officially recognized. In this connection it might be of interest that years ago an association of Turco-Tartars from Russia was also dissolved.

The Fascio, the oldest authoritarian party, in its striving to organize the Italians abroad, also met with a flat refusal when it attempted earlier to form groups in Turkey as well. Thus, only last year the Italian Consul General in Izmir, who wanted to send out invitations to a private showing of a propaganda film through the "Casa d'Italia", was forbidden by the Vali to show this film on the grounds that the "Casa d'Italia" had no legal existence as such and could therefore not send out invitations to a film presentation.

The fact that the "Casa d'Italia" has its own house in Istanbul, for example, is of no importance in this connection; for anyone, including Turks, has access to this house. According to members of

<sup>2</sup> The Sanjak formed part of the French Mandate for Syria, but by the Franco-Turkish treaty of October 1921 the district was given a special regime which insured some degree of local autonomy for the population, a considerable portion of which was Turkish. When the Franco-Syrian treaty of September 1936 opened up the prospect of an early termination of the Mandate, Turkey expressed alarm over the probable fate of the Alexandretta Turks in a future Syrian state. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1937*, pp. 465-517, and for the later development, document No. 211 *supra*, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6855/E518151-52).

the Italian Embassy here, a directive has been issued not to hold festivities or meetings of the Fascio on these premises.

This is the situation that the NSDAP encountered in forming its Ortsgruppen in Turkey, first of all in Istanbul, and in general it abided by these conditions. The former leader of the Ortsgruppe in Istanbul, Herr Guckes, did, it is true, very often hold Party functions in the rooms of the German welfare association "Teutonia" at which banners were displayed and uniforms were worn. It was probably due only to the good connections of the Ortsgruppenleiter at that time with the Turkish police that these functions, which were contrary to Turkish law, were not prohibited.

These facts are known not only to the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, but also—as was confidentially ascertained recently—to the Foreign Ministry. From certain indications it must be concluded that the responsible authorities here have actually considered taking action against these functions and closing the meeting house of the German association. If this has not yet been done it is perhaps due, among other things, to the fact that the present leader of the Istanbul Ortsgruppe, Party Comrade Mewes, has discontinued these earlier practices and insists that such functions with banners and uniforms be held only on extraterritorial ground in the rooms of the German Consulate General, which are at the disposal of the Embassy.

In Ankara the provisions of the Turkish law have been strictly observed from the beginning and Party functions and meetings have been held exclusively on the extraterritorial premises of the Embassy.

In Izmir, too, which has its own Ortsgruppe, such meetings are held, with the approval of the Vali, exclusively in the rooms of the Consulate.

So long as the Ortsgruppen that are active in Turkey adhere to the policy referred to above no change is likely in the attitude of the Turkish authorities for the time being.

No other foreign political parties are engaged in any noticeable political activity in Turkey. Swiss, Austrians, and Yugoslavs have formed associations, but these have no other purpose than to cultivate the idea of national fellowship in a purely social form. These associations are to be considered in the same way as the German welfare association "Teutonia" or the French "Union Française," which all serve purely social purposes in the main, but are nevertheless watched with suspicion by the police.

The foregoing report was drawn up in cooperation with the present acting Ortsgruppenleiter here.

(Ambassador's Signature)\*

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\*The copy used is a draft from the Embassy files. It was initiated by the Counselor of Embassy, Kroll, and by one other unidentified official.

## No. 540

2129/464277-79

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

ANKARA, February 23, 1938.

A 122

Pol. I M 885 g.

Subject: Straits Convention of Montreux.

With reference to instruction Pol. I 6700 g of January 5, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

I. We hear from the Italian Embassy that Italian shipping has to date always conformed *de facto* to the provisions of the Montreux Convention and has paid the relevant fees, etc., without reservation.

II. As regards the possibility of successfully pursuing the conversations with Turkey, the question has not been broached again from the Turkish side, in spite of occasional hints on my part to responsible personages of the Foreign Ministry. I therefore took the opportunity recently to recall the matter to the official in charge, Minister Esad Atüner. On that occasion he was privately given a copy of the draft,<sup>2</sup> enclosed with instruction Pol. I 2715 g of July 16, 1937, for an exchange of notes with the Turkish Government on the question of the Straits Convention, with the express request to treat the subject matter in strict confidence and to let me know, at an opportune moment, his personal, unofficial opinion of the German proposal. M. Esad has now informed me that he has examined the text thoroughly but has not yet arrived at a definite decision, because the problems raised are important and complicated. He has also had an unofficial study made by the head of the legal department of the Foreign Ministry. As to the result of his preliminary examination, he expressed the view that the German proposal for an exchange of notes, of which he had also informed his Minister, was unusually interesting, but, of course, went far beyond the purely formal notes which had been exchanged in this matter with the American and Polish Governments. He thought that a definite pronouncement on the question whether Turkey could assent to the German proposal for such an exchange of notes would only be possible after further detailed examination.

In other words the Turkish Foreign Ministry intends to continue with the dilatory methods pursued thus far. The secret reason is obviously this, that the Turkish Government would not like—least of all

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2129/464276). The instruction asked a question which is answered in the first paragraph of this reply, and further requested an opinion as to the possibility of resuming discussions with Turkey on the Montreux Convention.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 535, footnote 9.



at the present moment—to bind itself irrevocably by such an exchange of notes. It sees in the signing of our formula the prospect of having to enter into fresh negotiations about the Straits with the obligation to permit German participation; or it would be bound by the provisions of the present Straits Convention, with the result that Turkey, in the event of a possible subsequent alteration to which Germany, for whatever reason, would not agree, would have to apply toward Germany the provisions of the old Convention.

III. It should be of importance for the question of cooperation with Italy that in Turkey they expect Italian accession to the Straits Convention following the recognition of Italy's claim regarding the Empire of Ethiopia. It is to be gathered from numerous remarks by the Italian Ambassador here, that Italy will draw this inference from the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, and this, too, without regard to the date of a visit by the Italian Foreign Minister to Ankara. As to this visit there has been no more negotiation of late, but, as the Italian Chargé d'Affaires told me a few days ago, it remains for the present postponed *sine die*. Hence it will be of importance for Italy's decision whether, and in what form, Turkey will announce the eventual recognition of the Italian Empire, and this will presumably be made clear by the result of the conference of the Balkan Entente, which is being held here from the 25th to the 28th.<sup>3</sup> It is generally accepted here that the question of the recognition of the Empire is one of the items on the agenda of the conference. That Turkey is, in principle, disposed to meet the Italians on this point, has been reported elsewhere (cf. tel. No. 29 of February 11, 1938).<sup>4</sup>

IV. It does not seem to me necessary to reiterate to Turkey our intention of maintaining our fundamental reservation. In view of the official correspondence relating to the reservation, and after my renewed and very exhaustive conversation with the Foreign Minister in August 1937<sup>5</sup> concerning Germany's interest in the Straits, Dr. Aras can be in no doubt that it would not be admissible to draw the conclusion from our continued *de facto* observance of the provisions of the Straits Convention, that there was any relaxation of our reservation as stated. Moreover, it followed clearly from the fact that the matter had been discussed with Esad Atünér, as also from the substance of the conversation itself, that the continued existence of the reservation cannot be called in question either *de jure* or *de facto*.

KELLER

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 541. footnote 4.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (6853/E518135).

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 537.

## No. 541

2129/464274-75

*The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy*

BERLIN, March 23, 1938.

Received March 30.

Pol. I M 885 g.

With reference to instruction Pol. I 4559 g of September 2, 1937,<sup>1</sup> and instruction Pol. I 3936 g of August 7, 1937.

I transmit herewith a copy of an instruction relative to the Straits question addressed to Ankara on January 5, 1938,<sup>2</sup> as well as the report of February 23<sup>3</sup> received in reply.

The report shows that Turkey continues to delay her reply to us because she apparently does not wish to commit herself at present. On the other hand the conference of the Balkan Entente<sup>4</sup> has obviously clarified the attitude of Italy, which was still in doubt when the report was drawn up. According to Italian press reports available here, it appears that Italy's accession to the Montreux Convention must be expected in the foreseeable future since recognition of the Ethiopian Empire by Turkey is now in view.

I request you to ascertain from the Italian Government whether it has in fact envisaged an early accession to the Montreux Convention and intends to resume the deadlocked negotiations on that subject with Ankara. Further, I request you to describe the present state of our negotiations in the Straits question, and in so doing to draw attention to our earlier exchanges on this subject, in particular to the agreement reached in Rome between Freiherr von Neurath and Count Ciano on May 4 last.<sup>5</sup> According to this, a German-Italian agreement was to precede final recognition of the Montreux Convention. You are to intimate that, in our view, a simultaneous German-Turkish settlement seems desirable.

For the rest it would hardly need to be emphasized that, particularly in regard to the Soviet Union, German-Italian interests in matters of

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 537. See footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2129/464276). See document No. 540, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 540.

<sup>4</sup> The meeting of the Council of the Balkan Entente took place in Ankara, Feb. 25-27, 1938. The final communiqué stated that the question of Ethiopia had become non-existent for the Balkan Entente, since Yugoslavia had already accredited a Minister to Italy in a form involving recognition of the Italian Empire, while Rumania was about to do so. The Entente therefore recommended to its other two members, Greece and Turkey, that they follow the same course in the hope that such a step in international cooperation would eventually be followed by Italy's accession to the Montreux Convention. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1938*, vol. 1, pp. 284-286.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 535, footnotes 5 and 6.

naval policy concerning the Convention are entirely parallel. Perhaps there would also be the possibility that during the present negotiations an interpretation of the Convention favorable to these interests might be reached on certain points: here we have in mind in particular the interpretation of the term *bâtiments auxiliaires* (on this point cf. the passage in the penultimate paragraph of the instruction to Ankara, Pol. I 2715 g of July 16, 1937, sent to you with instruction Pol. I 3936 g of August 7 last). In order to ensure a common line on such individual questions also, we consider a continuing exchange of information on the negotiations of the two countries to be still desirable.<sup>8</sup>

By order:  
WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>8</sup> Marginal note: "To Herr R[intelen]. Please take care of the preparation. First of all, a brief memorandum will probably have to be drafted as basis for a discussion with the Italian Foreign Ministry. P[lessen] Mar. 30." Plessen was Counselor and Rintelen Military Attaché in the Rome Embassy.

## No. 542

1593/384191-93

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 209

BERLIN, April 5, 1938.  
Pol. VII 464.

Turkish Ambassador Hamdi Arpag called on me at 1:00 p. m. today in order to tell me the following:

The Turkish Chief of State, Atatürk, had instructed him to express his most sincere thanks for the greetings sent him, and to bring me his personal greetings.

The Ambassador continued by saying that German-Turkish relations had always been friendly. The Turkish Foreign Minister had instructed him to emphasize this in particular, and at the same time to explain the political position of Turkey. Turkey had always tried to maintain friendly relations with all countries. In so doing, she had always tried to take account of German wishes. Politically Turkey's position rested on the following:

1. The Peace of Lausanne,
2. The necessity to provide for national security, and finally,
3. The well-known Turkish National Pact of Ankara.<sup>1</sup>

On this basis Turkey had followed a policy of conciliation and neutrality toward all sides. Particularly friendly ties connected Turkey

<sup>1</sup> A statement of principles of the Turkish national revolution, such as self-determination, the opening of the Straits, abolition of capitulations, etc. It was first proclaimed on Sept. 13, 1919, and was eventually adopted by the Turkish Parliament on Jan. 28, 1920.

on the one hand with the states of the Balkan Pact,<sup>2</sup> that is, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, and on the other hand with the nations of the Near Eastern Pact,<sup>3</sup> that is, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Turkey considered as her friends: in the first place Germany, then England, Russia, and also the United States of America. Relations with Italy had also become quite good, which was evidenced by the fact that soon four Turkish destroyers would be built in Italian shipyards. Unfortunately, the relations of Turkey with France were not entirely satisfactory.

Turkey was trying to keep out of all coalitions. On this basis she hoped to be able to resist a friendly pressure which might at some time be exerted by Russia or by other countries. Turkey had rejected in particular the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. Surely I had not failed to notice that Russo-Turkish relations had become considerably cooler of late. The Turkish Ambassador hinted here that Anglo-Turkish relations, on the other hand, had become stronger. Turkish policy, as he had explained it to me, imposed the obligation to refrain, above all, from doing anything which might be directed against a friend. To corroborate his remarks the Turkish Ambassador gave me the appended statement<sup>4</sup> which he seems to have formulated himself, and which is supposed to contain Turkey's political creed. I answered the Turkish Ambassador that we also placed the greatest value on good relations with Turkey, but I added that in spite of all the efforts of the Turkish Government the Turkish press did not write as objectively about Germany as we could perhaps expect, considering our general attitude toward Turkey. The Turkish Ambassador promised to report this at once to Ankara, in order to effect an improvement in the attitude of the Turkish press. Furthermore, he would call on Minister Aschmann in the course of the week, in order to discuss this matter with him.

At the close of the conversation the Turkish Ambassador mentioned that the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, would visit Turkey in the fall, and that this season was particularly favorable for visits in general. At this somewhat obscure hint, I asked him whether he had in mind a visit by me to Turkey. He answered that a visit from the German Foreign Minister would, to be sure, be very welcome

<sup>2</sup> Signed on Feb. 9, 1934, and providing for mutual guarantee of frontiers against aggression by any Balkan state. For the text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1934* (London, 1939), vol. cxxxvii, pp. 496-499.

<sup>3</sup> Signed on July 8, 1937, at Saad-Abad Palace in Teheran and providing for noninterference, nonaggression, consultation, and mutual guarantee of common frontiers. For the text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1937*, vol. cxli, pp. 712-714.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (1593/384194). This statement expressed in general terms the idea that for countries linked to one another by ties of friendship, it was a matter of honor not to join coalitions or international actions directed against the other partner.

in Turkey, particularly since the Turkish Foreign Minister had already been in Germany twice as a guest of the German Government. I answered that at the moment I could not make any plans, but that I should be pleased to come to Turkey at some later date.

RIBBENTROP <sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note: "Compare the Turkish press in its attitude on the question of air transit rights with the Ambassador's statements. H[entig], Apr. 6."

## No. 543

2129/464303

### *The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy*

BERLIN, April 29, 1938.

Received May 2.

Pol. I M 1390 g.

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 125 of April 25.<sup>1</sup>

As a conclusion to the discussion on the Montreux Convention carried on here with the Italian Embassy, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires was informed on the 26th that Germany has no objection to the Italian Government's intention to accede to the Montreux Convention and that we would refrain from requesting the Italian Government to use its influence with the Turkish Government to bring about a simultaneous settlement of German-Turkish relations on this question. Thus there is, then, no further interest in the continuation of the conversations conducted by the Naval Attaché there on the Straits treaty, especially since the Naval High Command does not desire that the question of defining auxiliary vessels be brought up. I am enclosing an instruction from the Naval High Command<sup>2</sup> issued as a result of the Naval Attaché's report of March 19.<sup>3</sup> There is now no objection to the Naval Attaché's answering Admiral Count Raineri-Biscia's question according to Point 2.

By order:  
WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2129/464302).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2129/464304-05). Raineri-Biscia, the Italian Foreign Ministry's expert on naval treaties, had asked whether Germany actually wanted the Italian Government to press, in its negotiations on joining the Montreux Convention, for a more sweeping definition of the term "auxiliary vessels" which would seriously restrict Soviet transports of war material into the Mediterranean. In point 2 of its instruction of Apr. 27, the German Naval High Command clarified this point raised by the Italians by stating that changes in the Spanish Civil War situation had since made this whole question irrelevant; besides, it would not be in the German interest to raise the general problem of auxiliary vessels.

<sup>3</sup> Apr. 19 is meant; this document, which is not printed (2129/464298-301), occasioned the Naval High Command's instruction referred to in the previous footnote.

2789/547354-56

*Ambassador Keller to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

ANKARA, May 17, 1938.

DEAR HERR VON WEIZSÄCKER: The War Ministry has received a request from Turkey to admit up to 12 more officers besides the 12 already assigned to German army units. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces does not favor granting this wish. The Military Attaché at the Embassy, Colonel Rohde, who was asked for his opinion, feels on the other hand that it would be well to assume an obliging attitude toward the Turks in this matter; he believes that granting of the Turkish wish creates an opportunity to bargain for a *quid pro quo* in the political field. I fully share his opinion, if only because the Turkish Army has strong sympathies for Germany and high regard for German military achievements; thus we have a backing in military circles which also has a political effect. To that extent I consider it justified to deal with the Turkish wish not only from a military and rather technical standpoint, but also from the political point of view.

The maximum objective would, of course, be that in return for such an obliging response to the Turkish wishes in the military field, we would have the assurance that we will not find Turkey some day on the side of a hostile coalition. In view of the obvious lack of proportion between the concession given and the compensation received—admission of a few officers on the one hand, and an assurance of neutrality on the other—we can, of course, never obtain this objective. Aside from that, Turkey will not consent to define her attitude in a future conflict. Absolute freedom in defining her position up to the last minute is one of the main pillars of Turkish policy. In spite of her close friendship with England, as Aras emphasizes at every opportunity, Turkey has kept her independence of decision; I also do not believe that there is a secret agreement which would essentially restrict this freedom of decision. Even the new treaty with Greece,<sup>1</sup> which provides for a maximum of close political and military co-operation, still, in the final analysis, leaves all roads open for Turkey.

To what extent the maximum objective can be approximated by what is attainable is after all a question of formulation, which can be left open until the matter is actually discussed with the Turks. However, in defining more closely the political *quid pro quo* to be obtained, the following could be considered; (1) an assurance by Turkey that she will not send her officers for training to other, or certain other,

<sup>1</sup> The additional treaty between Greece and Turkey of Apr. 27, 1938, completing the Treaty of Friendship of Oct. 30, 1930, and the Pact of Sept. 14, 1933, between the two countries.

countries—particularly not to Russia—and (2) measures to raise and make more secure the position of the "Military and Naval Mission" which has been serving at the War Academy in Istanbul.

I do not wish to go into details until the attitude of the military has been determined; for this purpose Colonel Rohde will report in person at the War Ministry at the end of May. I should like to recommend, however, because of the political aspect, that the Foreign Ministry also concern itself with this matter. I should be grateful if you would give Herr Rohde an opportunity to explain his views. In any case he will inform you of his presence in Berlin.

With the best greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours sincerely,

VON KELLER<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Weizsäcker replied to this letter on June 14 (2789/547357-58) informing the Ambassador that by making use of the latter's political arguments, it had been possible to get the approval of the military for increasing to 24 the number of Turkish officers assigned to German army units. Weizsäcker also said that Colonel Rohde, the Military Attaché, suggested asking in return for this concession guarantees as to German influence on military training, but that the Foreign Ministry preferred to let the Ambassador decide whether such a request would be advisable.

## No. 545

98/107691-96

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, June 29, 1938.

### BRIEF FOR THE GERMAN-TURKISH ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS BEGINNING ON JUNE 30

Soon after March 13, 1938, the German Government invited the Turkish Government to send a delegation to Berlin in order to negotiate with regard to the questions arising in German-Turkish economic relations from the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. The Turkish Government thereupon expressed the desire also to establish during the same negotiations the program for the exchange of goods and payments between the entire German Reich and Turkey for the period of 1 year subsequent to the termination of the agreements now in force, i. e., for the period from September 1, 1938, to August 31, 1939. We agreed to this, particularly since the Turkish Government emphasized the great importance which it attaches to the negotiations by sending the State Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Numan Menemencioglu.

A settlement of the questions relating to Austria will presumably be relatively simple, since there was no extensive exchange of goods between the two countries, and no tariff treaty. Austrian exports to

Turkey in 1937 amounted to 7.1 million schillings in value, and Turkish exports to Austria, to 12.1 million schillings. Turkey's main concern will probably be to have the assurance of tobacco sales to Austria in about the same amount as in the past. This will probably be possible without any special difficulties.

In these circumstances the regulation of the exchange of goods between the entire Reich and Turkey for the coming year is by far the most interesting and important part of the negotiations.

The exchange of goods between the German Reich and Turkey has increased considerably in recent years, as is evident from the following figures:

	Imports	Exports
	(In millions of reichsmarks)	
1932	40.1	31.0
1933	37.9	36.3
1934	67.5	50.9
1935	93.4	67.3
1936	118.5	79.4
1937	97.8	111.1

In spite of this development, which is as a whole satisfactory, the negotiations carried on last year in July and August were particularly difficult, because as a result of Germany's large unfavorable balance in clearing payments there had developed a balance of 91 million reichsmarks in favor of Turkey, which balance, by clogging the clearing system, threatened to paralyze the entire exchange of goods. We were therefore forced last year to deprive the Turks of the right to export unlimited quantities to Germany, and to reduce German imports from Turkey to 60 percent of those of the previous year. This agreement had such favorable results for Germany that in the period from September 1, 1937, to March 31, 1938, our exports amounted to 90 million reichsmarks and our imports to 45 million, while in the corresponding 7 months of 1936-1937 it was the other way around—our exports amounted to 45 million and our imports to 90 million. Thus in the first 7 months after last year's agreement went into effect we shifted the balance of trade by 90 million reichsmarks in our favor. The balance in favor of Turkey has been entirely eliminated and for several days we have now had a favorable balance of 3½ million reichsmarks in Turkey. It is understandable that the Turks were not at all satisfied with this arrangement, although it was unavoidable in the interest of restoring the balance of trade between Germany and Turkey, and that they therefore urgently demand a revision of the agreement.

It is especially fortunate that the good effects of the old agreement now make it possible for us to make special concessions to the leader of the delegation, Ambassador Numan, who is particularly agreeable



to us. In the course of the negotiations, we will probably be able to concede to him an increase in Turkish exports to Germany of 75 per cent over the amount in the present treaty.

Over and above this there is the possibility, according to the results of the preparatory discussions, of placing at the disposal of the Turkish economy, in case the Turkish Government makes such a request, a larger credit in the amount of 50 up to perhaps even as much as 80 million reichsmarks in the form of long-term commercial credits. In addition, just within the last few days we have informed the Turkish Government that we would agree to a long-term credit transaction by the I. G. Farben Industry in the amount of 45 million reichsmarks. To judge from the fact that someone close to the Turkish Government has been quietly sounding out leading German bankers, it may be expected that M. Numan will present further requests here for credit, which we could grant within the limits outlined previously. The Turks seem to have had in mind even larger amounts.

In addition to their economic results, the negotiations have also a certain political significance. It is important for us to bind Turkey still closer to us economically than before, not only because of the personality of the politically influential leader of the delegation, but particularly because of England's efforts, constantly increasing of late, to eliminate German influence in Turkey, especially in the economic sphere. Since our share of Turkey's foreign trade is already somewhere between 40 and 50 percent, Turkey would indeed be more and more dependent on Germany economically if trade increased further. According to various reports, it appears that the Turkish loan for industrial and war-matériel deliveries amounting to 16 million British pounds, just negotiated in London, does not mark the beginning of a total reorientation of the Turkish economy toward England. The Turkish Government evidently was only concerned with preventing, by means of this treaty with England, the danger of too great economic dependence on Germany. Besides, it probably wants to play off against one another the different creditors in possible credit negotiations. In any case, it is certain that the British loan has not nearly satisfied the Turkish need for credit and that there is still sufficient room for increasing German deliveries in both clearing and credit transactions, in order to obtain the desired objective of binding Turkey closer to Germany economically and thus strengthening our political influence in that country.

According to the reports of our Embassy in Ankara, Ambassador Numan intends not only to conduct the economic negotiations, but at the same time, in political conversations with the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary, to discuss the general political relations between Germany and Turkey.

## No. 546

96/107717-21

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy  
Department*

BERLIN, July 5, 1938.

W III 4880.

Yesterday the leader of the Turkish economic delegation, Ambassador Numan Menemencioglu, called on me in order for the first time fully to explain in a long private conversation his viewpoint and the viewpoint of his Government on the pending negotiations.

In the course of the conversation M. Numan dropped his previous cautious reserve and declared that he had come to Berlin in order to try to obtain a considerable expansion of German-Turkish trade. He made no secret of the fact that there were influential personalities in Turkey who believed that a curtailment of the trade with Germany was more advantageous for Turkey, because Turkey needed foreign exchange and because Germany paid too low a price for Turkish products, while, conversely, Turkey had to pay 20, 30 or even 40 percent more for German products than for products offered by the countries competing with Germany. Contrary to this view, he himself was convinced, however, that it must be possible to arrive at an arrangement with Germany which would make possible an expansion of the present trade in a manner that would be satisfactory to both sides.

The most important prerequisite for attaining this goal was, he said, a guarantee of adequate prices for the Turkish exports to Germany and an increase in the rate of exchange guarantee granted by Germany for the credit balances of the Turkish State Bank with the German clearing house. He proposed that in case both these points should be settled in accordance with Turkey's wishes, every restriction on the importation of Turkish goods into Germany should be lifted. Then complete equality would be re-established, since German goods could, after all, be imported into Turkey without any restriction.

In accordance with my instructions from the Foreign Minister I replied with reserve to the proposal that Turkish exports to Germany be freed from every restriction and stated that I would first have to discuss this important question with my delegation and the Ministries concerned. (I wish to remark on this score that a lifting of all restrictions will probably not be possible for considerations of principle and because of the danger that we would then have to admit too many unwanted Turkish products; however, it would be possible to increase imports by 75 percent as compared with the last treaty year.)

With regard to the complaints about German price policy I explained to M. Numan with the aid of numerous examples that during the past year we had tried to satisfy Turkey's wishes insofar as possible and had overpaid as much as 12 percent for Turkish agricultural products and in some cases even more than 40 percent for cotton. To give up price controls altogether was not possible since they formed a decisive element in our whole foreign-exchange policy; nor could we concede, moreover, that Turkey had a valid reason for selling to Germany at higher prices than to other countries.

The guarantee of the rate of exchange up to 28 million reichsmarks which was still in force was the last remnant of a treaty which had been concluded several years ago; since then we had on principle not granted a guarantee of its rate to any country. In last year's negotiations the Turkish Government had been informed that even the limited guarantee up to 28 million reichsmarks that was being maintained for another year would have to end with the expiration of the present treaty, that is, on August 31, 1938. The statement to this effect had been repeated officially to the Turkish Government by our Ambassador in Ankara in November 1937, when, as a result of the Turkish Government's publication of the treaty contrary to agreement, we had been placed in a very awkward position vis-à-vis other countries, which had referred to this precedent. We had at that time been compelled to tell the governments concerned that in the case of Turkey it was only a question of a liquidation measure from an old treaty. (I wish to remark in this connection that despite fundamental objections, a guarantee of perhaps 25 million reichsmarks could be maintained for another year; an increase, however, is out of the question.)

M. Numan insisted, however, that an increase in the guarantee was decisive for the outcome of the negotiations.

I then spoke to M. Numan about the latest Anglo-Turkish credit agreement. I told him that we naturally had no objection whatever to Turkey's continuing to expand her trade with other countries as well. But in view of the especially close German-Turkish economic relations we could not permit Germany to be forced into a secondary position on the Turkish market through preferential treatment of other powers. Accordingly, we expected that with reference to opportunities for exports to Turkey and especially for imports from Turkey (ore, etc.) we would at least not be placed in a less favorable position than England.

M. Numan replied that he wished to speak to me quite frankly about the Anglo-Turkish agreement. It was understandable that some circles in Turkey were trying to avoid an excessively one-sided economic orientation of Turkey toward Germany and to give special attention to cultivating economic relations with the greatest European

industrial country next to Germany. But this did not by any means signify that for that reason there was a desire to turn away from Germany. The fact that he had come here with the intention of further expanding German-Turkish trade was the best proof of this. Turkey's need of foreign industrial products and especially capital goods was so great that even after the conclusion of the agreement with England, Germany had an adequate market in Turkey. He was also prepared to ensure that Germany would not be discriminated against in relation to England. He would consider how this might be assured and would make proposals to me to that end.

So far M. Numan has not made any request for credit.

In conclusion we agreed that after a clarification of these most important points, all other questions, and particularly the extension of the German-Turkish treaties to include Austria, would not cause any special difficulties.

The work of the subcommittees, which in the meantime have held a number of sessions, has in fact already led to quite satisfactory results.

CLODIUS

### No. 547

2725/532785-87

#### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, July 6, 1938.  
W III 4880/II.

#### BRIEF No. 2 ON THE GERMAN-TURKISH ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS

In the second plenary session<sup>1</sup> of the two delegations, held today, there was a renewed discussion of the three questions which M. Numan had already called the most important in his conversation with me on July 4:<sup>2</sup>

1. completely unrestricted Turkish export to Germany
2. the German price policy
3. maintenance of the rate of exchange guarantee.

I have the impression that M. Numan regards the first question as the cardinal point in the entire negotiations and that he would consider his mission in Berlin to have failed if the Turkish wishes on this point were not granted.

<sup>1</sup> Documentation on the first session has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 546.

The complete lifting of all restrictions on the value or volume of Turkish exports would constitute a special arrangement which at present is not accorded any other country in this form. Nevertheless, in view of the special importance which attaches to these negotiations because of the strong economic drive by England in Turkey and the entire Southeast, as well as because of the personality who is conducting the negotiations for Turkey, I am of the opinion that we should try to find some arrangement which would in the main take the Turkish wishes into account. Since M. Numan has now agreed to the appointment of intergovernmental committees which Turkey has so far always rejected, these committees might be given the task of arranging, if necessary, for a curtailment of imports from Turkey—to which M. Numan would agree—if it should develop that free importation again was leading to the formation of a large Turkish credit balance in Germany and hence upsetting the balance of payments. In addition, it would somehow have to be made certain that the nature of Turkish exports to Germany did not change to our disadvantage. Finally, Turkey would have to give a clear assurance to the effect that we would be in a position to purchase from Turkey, in adequate amounts and at reasonable prices, the goods that we are chiefly interested in, without suffering any disadvantages as a result of the special position accorded England. If it should be possible to reach definite agreements with the Turks on these three points, it would, in my opinion, be possible to grant M. Numan the big concession of unrestricted export of Turkish goods to Germany.

In case M. Numan is successful in this question, it may be that, with reference to price control, a general statement of good will on our part and a promise to examine individual cases sympathetically will be sufficient.

In the guarantee question we shall not be able to maintain our completely negative viewpoint if we wish to achieve the expansion of trade aimed at by M. Numan. In case of a satisfactory settlement in the question of unrestricted export, however, it will perhaps be possible to arrive at an agreement on this score too, if we are prepared to maintain the guarantee at approximately the present scale (28 million reichsmarks). I believe that in view of M. Numan's obvious effort to arrive at a generous settlement, we should concede this much also in the question of the guarantee.

M. Numan will be received by Minister Funk at 5 o'clock this afternoon. I have arranged to have Herr Funk informed in advance about the status of the negotiations.

CLODIUS

96/107729-33

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 247

BERLIN, July 7, 1938.

The Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Numan Menemencioglu, called on me today in the country.<sup>1</sup> I first spoke to M. Numan about the Straits question, which is still unsettled between Germany and Turkey, and explained to him that in my opinion it was time to dispose of this problem. Germany was ready to conclude a bilateral agreement with Turkey, by which the provisions of the Montreux Convention would also become effective as between Germany and Turkey. We further expected from Turkey a promise not to undertake any revision of the Montreux Convention without Germany.

M. Numan answered that the question of making the Montreux Convention effective also between Germany and Turkey had been the subject of thorough study by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. A legal opinion had been obtained. He deeply regretted that insurmountable difficulties stood in the way of Germany's participation in the form desired by us. Actually Turkey did not enjoy sovereign rights with regard to the Montreux Convention. Any change in the Convention and even a participation by Germany required the consent of all signatories to the treaty. Turkey could not conclude any agreement with another power regarding the Straits question without such consent.<sup>2</sup> An independent step by Turkey, as desired by Germany, might call forth protests on the part of the other treaty partners, and it was to be feared that the Montreux Convention itself would even be endangered thereby. The only course he could think of was that Germany had to announce reservations with regard to the Montreux Convention and that a formula should then be found by which Turkey

<sup>1</sup> Numan Menemencioglu had seen Ribbentrop previously on July 1 (96/107705-07). On this occasion he reviewed Turkey's relations with other countries. Turkey intended to cultivate especially good and friendly relations with Germany and would not join any coalition of powers against Germany. In Numan's opinion, the Turkish-German relationship could best be based on a policy of benevolent neutrality. Ribbentrop in his reply suggested a diplomatic alignment of the states which had been injured by the peace treaties against the *status quo* powers, in order to achieve necessary revisions. He agreed that a policy of benevolent neutrality between Germany and Turkey would be the most suitable basis on which closer cooperation could later develop.

<sup>2</sup> Menemencioglu had made this point already the previous day in a conversation with Legal Director Gaus and State Secretary Weizsäcker (1593/384222). On this occasion he also assured the Germans confidentially that, although article 19 of the Montreux Convention permitted the warships of belligerent powers to pass the Straits to assist a victim of aggression if there were a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, such a contingency would never arise, as Turkey would never agree to such a treaty.

took cognizance of this German declaration. He did not see how Turkey could make any promise to Germany beyond that.

I replied to M. Numan that I failed to understand this interpretation. It was incomprehensible to me how other powers could object to having the same agreement arrived at between Germany and Turkey that existed between Turkey and other powers. And the declaration that Turkey would not in the future conclude any new agreements without Germany should, in my opinion, not be difficult for Turkey. On the other hand, it was surely a very unsatisfactory situation if Germany had to announce reservations with regard to the Montreux settlement. In my opinion, such a situation was very troublesome for the relations between the two countries. In case the Montreux question could be adjusted, German-Turkish relations seemed to me decidedly capable of further development.

M. Numan told me that Turkey wanted to follow a policy of neutrality. Basically, Turkey did not desire any revision. With reference to the Balkan states, Turkey was bound only by the Balkan Entente. For the rest, Turkey only wanted to accomplish her internal reconstruction in peace, and she realized that she had to make up for a lag of a hundred years.

Upon my objection that Turkey had, after all, followed a revisionist policy in the Straits question after the German march into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, and, in addition, had even now gained a good deal by revision in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, M. Numan replied that he fully recognized the indirect aid rendered by Germany in the revision of the Straits Statute. On the other hand, Turkey desired no return to Ottoman imperialism. Any further revisionist policy, however, would lead to this. There were no longer any Turkish populations along Turkey's frontiers except in Thrace, and there Turkey had explicitly waived revision.

I answered M. Numan that Germany understood Turkey's desire for neutrality, and I could imagine that following settlement of the Montreux question, German-Turkish relations also might be reformulated in this direction, perhaps in the manner in which Turkey had regulated her relations with Italy: first, by a promise of neutrality in the event of unprovoked attack on one of the treaty partners, and then, by the promise not to enter into any diplomatic combination against the other country even in peacetime.

M. Numan replied that Turkey, so far, had concluded such agreements only with the Soviet Union, France, and Italy—in other words, with the actual neighbors of Turkey. Otherwise, a similar agreement existed only with Hungary, having been concluded for sentimental and racial reasons. With England, on the other hand, there were no written agreements of any kind. Since there were no differences between Germany and Turkey, he could not quite see the ad-

vantage of a treaty of neutrality. He could assure me, however, that Turkey had not entered into any commitments against Germany and that she was even in a position to conclude a military alliance with Germany tomorrow. He considered it better if in German-Turkish relations, as in Anglo-Turkish relations, mutual neutrality was taken for granted and no agreements regarding it were concluded.<sup>3</sup>

I contradicted M. Numan and told him that, after all, the absence of such a treaty placed Turkey in a false position. It did not seem reasonable to me that Turkey should have concluded an agreement with all the leading countries not to participate in any hostile diplomatic combinations while Germany was left out. German-Turkish relations were good; still, we had frequently had reason to complain about the Turkish press. For the rest, however, the conclusion of a German-Turkish treaty of neutrality did not seem to me decisive. Upon my question whether Turkey had perhaps made a commitment to the Soviet Union not to enter into any neutrality agreement with Germany, M. Numan answered with an emphatic "No". I did not then pursue this matter any further.

M. Numan then raised several economic questions also and inquired about the possibility of further deliveries of German war matériel, whereby Turkey would become more independent of England. I did not pursue this subject further and only agreed in general with his statement that a further development of German-Turkish economic relations would be advantageous for both countries.

RIBBENTROP

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<sup>3</sup> Similar assurances were given to the German Ambassador in Turkey on July 10 (1593/384210), when he questioned the Turkish Foreign Minister on the significance of the Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship of July 4. (See document No. 211, footnote 2.) On this occasion, Rustu Aras stated that the treaty with France did not go any further than the usual treaties of this kind but that it would be entirely unnecessary to conclude a similar treaty between Turkey and Germany; he declared emphatically that Turkey would never participate in diplomatic combinations directed against Germany.

## No. 549

2725/532791-95

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy  
Department*

BERLIN, August 8, 1938.

W III 6033.

### BRIEF ON THE GERMAN-TURKISH ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS OF JUNE 30 TO JULY 25, 1938

The occasion of the negotiations was the inclusion of Austria in German-Turkish economic agreements. Since, however, the German-



Turkish economic agreements now in force expire on August 31, 1938, the general economic relations between the two countries were also settled, at the request of the Turks, for a period of 1 year, that is, until August 31, 1939.

From the outset it was evident that the Turks were striving to arrive at as comprehensive a settlement as possible and to create the necessary conditions for a considerable increase in reciprocal trade.

The most important questions to be discussed in the negotiations were the following:

1. The volume of trade.

During the current treaty year Germany's imports from Turkey had been curtailed to 60 percent of the volume of the preceding year, because Turkey's considerable credit balance in the clearing transactions, amounting to 91 million reichsmarks in the summer of 1937, could not be covered exclusively by additional German exports.

Since the increase in German exports to Turkey and the said curtailment of Turkish exports to Germany had by June 1938 led to a complete settlement of the balance, the Turks proposed that all restrictions on imports now be lifted again on both sides. Since the German Ministries concerned were of the unanimous opinion that because the imports from Turkey included a very large proportion of vitally important goods such an arrangement would be to our advantage, the wish of Turkey was granted. Accordingly, imports will be unrestricted on both sides during the next treaty year and will be subject only to the *general* import provisions in force in the two countries.

2. In the treaties of former years Turkey had been promised a guaranteed rate of exchange for the amounts credited to her in the accounts of the German clearing house. In 1937 this guarantee was limited to 14 million Turkish pounds. During the latest negotiations it was possible, in spite of considerable opposition from the Turks, to put through a further reduction to 13 million Turkish pounds. This reduction is of considerable importance to us in principle because it makes it easier for us to maintain the position vis-à-vis third countries that as a matter of principle we do not give any guarantee with respect to the rate of exchange of the reichsmark and that in the case of Turkey it is only a question of a liquidation measure.

3. In the credit agreements of last May with England, Turkey, as is known, gave England definite commitments as to deliveries of raw materials to cover the credits granted. The Germans therefore made it a central point in the negotiations to demand that Germany, as Turkey's best customer by far, should by no means be treated less favorably in this respect than England. At first the Turkish delegation tried stubbornly to avoid assuming any definite obligations in

this respect on the ground that the agreement with England was a credit agreement and not a general trade agreement. Finally, however, the Turks undertook to guarantee at least the same deliveries of ores and wheat to Germany during the next treaty year as in 1937. German requests for exports in excess thereof will be given especially favorable consideration. Furthermore, the leader of the Turkish delegation made the oral statement that Turkey was perfectly agreeable to an additional increase in the German imports of raw materials and food from Turkey. In particular, he would, as soon as he returned, try to make possible an increase in the export of chromium ore from about 65,000 tons in 1937 to about 100,000 tons during the coming treaty year.

Finally, the leader of the Turkish delegation declared very emphatically that the purpose of the credit agreement with England was by no means to reduce German-Turkish trade. Not only was Turkey prepared at any time to conclude a similar agreement with Germany, but, for political reasons, she would even be very eager to do so.

4. The Turkish Government attached special importance to having a clear understanding that, for the duration of the treaty, war matériel would be delivered via the clearing system. Since, to judge from recent experiences, we could not in any case count on being able to sell war matériel to Turkey for payment in foreign exchange of even a small part of the purchase price, and since the German agencies concerned are very anxious for economic and military reasons to continue participating in war-matériel transactions with Turkey, Germany declared that for the duration of the treaty, war matériel can be purchased under the clearing agreement.

5. The settlement of all the problems connected with bringing Austro-Turkish commercial relations under the German-Turkish economic agreements was effected without any special difficulty.

In conclusion it should be said that the Turkish delegation evidently tried to leave the impression with us that Turkey attached great importance to the development of her economic relations with Germany both now and in the future. The increase in German-Turkish trade which is to be expected as a result of the agreements of July 25, 1938, will contribute considerably toward impeding England's economic penetration of Turkey and strengthening Germany's economic position there, in spite of the Anglo-Turkish credit agreement of last May.

CLODIUS

## No. 550

1593/384223-26

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, August 16, 1938.

SECRET

zu Pol. VII 1083.<sup>2</sup>

Drafting Officers: Senior Counselor Schliep  
Schlobies

The German-Turkish economic negotiations which took place in Berlin in the period between June 30 and July 25 offered the opportunity to discuss with the leader of the Turkish delegation, the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Numan Menemencioglu, several political questions pertaining to German-Turkish relations.

Since the difficulties which had arisen between France and Turkey in the Sanjak question were settled during the economic negotiations by means of several agreements, among them a new Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship,<sup>3</sup> the question of the effect of this treaty on German-Turkish relations was raised. As was already pointed out in circular instruction Pol. VII 992 of July 29,<sup>4</sup> Numan denied that the new treaty had brought about any change in the traditional Turkish policy of neutrality, especially with regard to Germany, but rejected, on the other hand, a treaty definition of German-Turkish relations by means of a neutrality pact patterned after the Franco-Turkish treaty.

A further subject of the conferences was Germany's position with regard to the Montreux Convention.<sup>5</sup>

Since Germany was not a party to this Convention, the Turkish Government had at the time of notification received the reply that Germany had to reserve in every way her position on the questions dealt with in the Convention. In the meantime we had intimated to the Turkish Government that we were ready to settle these questions

<sup>1</sup>This circular was sent to all the principal Diplomatic Missions and to a number of Consulates General in the Middle East and to the Consulate at Geneva, as is indicated on another copy of this document (3495/E019861-63).

<sup>2</sup>Pol. VII 1083: Not printed (1593/384222). See document No. 548, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup>See document No. 211, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup>Not printed (74/54358-63). The instruction reviewed the agreements reached between France and Turkey on the Sanjak question, and also referred to Numan Menemencioglu's statements on Turkish neutrality made to Ribbentrop on July 7 (see document No. 548).

<sup>5</sup>A note on the draft at this point states that the following paragraph was prepared separately in Political Division IM. The insert was initialed by Kampboevener, head of that division.

and had finally suggested that the terms of the agreement be placed in effect between Germany and Turkey by means of a special bilateral act in the form of an exchange of notes. This suggestion has so far been handled in a dilatory manner by Turkey; Numan, too, again took the position that Turkey did not have the right unilaterally to conclude an agreement regarding the Convention with a non-signatory power. He was thereupon handed a new draft<sup>\*</sup> which takes into account the formal legal objections. Although Numan did not take a definite position on this suggestion either, the impression prevails that he believed this new course feasible for Turkey. At any rate Numan promised to have our draft examined and, if necessary, to send us a version in French. Moreover, attention should be called to Numan's repeated statement that at the first opportunity presenting itself for revision of the Convention, the Turkish Government would officially demand from the present signatories the acceptance of Germany into the circle of signatories, and that the case of a treaty of assistance mentioned in article 19, paragraph 2, of the Convention, which would be binding for Turkey, would never arise; for Turkey would never become a party to such a treaty.

The political results of the conference with Ambassador Numan may be summarized to the effect that it was agreed, upon examination of German-Turkish relations, that they were unchanged, but that Turkey still hesitates to give German-Turkish relations a new and more intimate form, at least at the present time.

By order:  
WOERMANN

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<sup>\*</sup> Not found. See document No. 556.

## No. 551

1593/384227-29

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

A 1702

Therapia, August 22, 1938.

Received August 25.

Pol. VII 1152.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Franco-Turkish relations; French efforts to exploit the recent Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship for propaganda.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 5931 of August 9.<sup>1</sup>

During a long conversation which I had with State Secretary Numan about a number of questions, following his return from Germany, I referred to a correspondent's report from Istanbul appearing in

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<sup>1</sup> Not found.

the *Temps* of August 2, No. 28083, as well as to various statements of French diplomats which had come to our knowledge. In this connection I referred to the French efforts to represent the recently signed Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship over and above its actual content, as a great diplomatic victory for France, and to read into it a meaning with regard to its significance for Franco-Turkish relations as well as for the general foreign-policy orientation of Turkey that, in so far as we knew, by no means conformed to the view of the Turkish Government.

Numan replied to me that he was aware of these efforts of the French. The Turkish Government also had repeatedly had opportunity to note them. At the most, French diplomacy could score the Franco-Turkish agreement as a victory only because France had finally decided, following almost 2 years of opposition, to take an intelligent stand on the Sanjak question and thus to eliminate an issue which seriously obstructed Franco-Turkish relations. In return France had merely obtained the Turkish Government's agreement to renew the Treaty of Friendship which it had denounced previously with slight, essentially formal, changes. The French did not have any other reason to speak of a victory. However, it was well known that France's unstable internal political situation induced every French cabinet to exaggerate into a great victory every action that in any way lent itself thereto, in order to strengthen its internal political position. I interjected that this, however, did not seem to me the only reason for the French tactics in this matter. I had the impression rather that French diplomacy, in the interest of strengthening its prestige, which had declined sharply during the last few years, was perhaps more concerned with purposely giving the public mind the impression, and especially in the countries of the Southeast, that for the price of giving up the Sanjak, it had succeeded in winning Turkey over to the London-Paris axis. Numan concurred, but did not believe that France would find much credence with such an interpretation of the recent agreement. He, at any rate, was of the conviction that the responsible French circles had no illusions concerning the real state of the relations between Turkey and France. His trip to Berlin, as he could tell me confidentially, had in this respect received the most serious attention in France as well as in Russia. The French Ambassador here had made his dissatisfaction very clear to him when bidding farewell at the station before the beginning of the trip to Berlin. They were well aware both in Paris and in Moscow that he had not taken the trip merely for the sake of the German-Turkish economic negotiations. The discussions on this subject could, after all, also have been carried on in Ankara and by the responsible officials of the Economics Ministry, as is the rule with regard to other countries. On the contrary, it was very well known that his mission to Germany

originated in the express intention of the Turkish Government to stress friendship with Germany in a conspicuous manner. The Turkish Government was endeavoring, of course, to restore good and cordial relations with France also. Whether it would succeed in this, depended in the first place on the consolidation of France's internal political situation, the further development of which was not yet clear at the present time.

I shall leave it to your discretion to decide whether it might not be advisable to counter by a suitable campaign of information the French propagandist efforts in interpreting the agreements concluded with Turkey.

KROLL

### No. 552

2725/532799-800

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

No. 134

BERLIN, September 15, 1938.

Sent September 16.

zu W III 7009.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to the conversation between Numan and Clodius (cf. section A 2 and B 4 of the memorandum of July 26<sup>2</sup>) please inform the Turkish Government that we are prepared to conclude a credit agreement on the following basis:

A banking syndicate will grant the Government a 10-year commercial credit of 150 million reichsmarks. Claims of German exporters will be guaranteed by the Reich within the limits of this credit. The interest rate is to be fixed by negotiation. The credit is to cover only certain large orders to be specified in detail; for example, the establishment of chemical industrial plants, completion of the Adana project, development of harbors and the like. Furthermore, certain deliveries of war matériel may be included; for example, fortification of the Dardanelles. The Turkish Government will not be required to place individual orders in Germany. Within the framework of the agreement financial arrangements may be made for work which is to be done and paid for in Turkey in connection with deliveries (for example, wages for Turkish laborers, payments for Turkish sub-contract deliveries, etc.). Repayment is to be effected through the clearing agreement. In the event that difficulties arise in

<sup>1</sup> W III 7009: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6854/E518141-45). In this conversation Numan Menemencioğlu explained the nature of the Anglo-Turkish credit agreement, and expressed Turkey's willingness to conclude a similar agreement with Germany.

clearing settlements or the clearing agreement is terminated, the Turkish Government must give special assurances to guarantee transfers. Furthermore, agreements going beyond the agreement of July 25 should be concluded for the delivery of raw materials and grain.

We propose that a Turkish delegation be sent here for negotiation of an agreement approximately on this basis. Preliminary discussions could be conducted there on the occasion of the forthcoming visit of the Minister of Economics; it is desired here that the above proposal be outwardly connected with this visit. Please ensure, therefore, that no previous notice is given.

In view of the alleged intention of France likewise to offer Turkey a loan or credit and in the event that the proposed visit of the French Foreign Minister takes place in the near future,<sup>3</sup> a prompt transmittal of the above proposal seems advisable.

Please report by wire.

WIEHL

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<sup>3</sup> A letter of Sept. 2 by Minister of Economics Funk to Minister of Finance Schwerin von Krosigk which was found in Clodius' file (2725/532706-98) also calls attention to the urgency of making the German credit offer prior to the projected visit to Ankara by the French Foreign Minister: "These French credits, similar to the credits granted to Turkey by England last May (16 million) are primarily to serve the purpose of undermining Germany's strong economic position in Turkey. They must be regarded as a part of the economic offensive against Germany launched in Southeast Europe and the Middle East by France and England. It is absolutely imperative that the Turks be informed of the German credit offer before they are presented with an offer of credits by the French." The visit of the French Foreign Minister to Ankara did not in fact take place. Funk's journey to Ankara which is referred to earlier in Wiehl's instruction formed part of an extended visit to several capitals in Southeastern Europe and the Near East. He left Berlin on Sept. 18, arrived in Belgrade on Sept. 30, and proceeded to Ankara on Oct. 6.

## No. 553

2725/532802-03

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

No. 141

BERLIN, September 23, 1938.  
zu W III 7259.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to your 166.<sup>2</sup>

I. Minister Funk considers it important that the credit agreement be signed while he is in Ankara, or at least that an announcement as to complete accord on the conclusion of an agreement can be made.

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<sup>1</sup> W III 7259: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2725/532801): This telegram, sent on Sept. 19 in reply to Wiehl's instruction of Sept. 15 (document No. 552), reported that when Numan Menemencioğlu was informed of Germany's credit offer, he indicated agreement in principle on the part of the Turkish Government. He added, however, that it was for the Minister President to state the official Turkish position in regard to the specific terms suggested by Germany.

It is therefore requested that the discussions be expedited as much as possible. We propose  $5\frac{1}{2}$  percent as the rate of interest. Please point out in this connection that in the past we have always demanded 6 percent in similar cases, in accordance with the condition of the German credit market. We are willing, however, to conform to the British rate of interest in the present case. In order to make possible the low rate of interest the Reich Government will undertake to give German exporters a 100 percent guarantee, which is a very generous concession.

Please report by wire.

II. Minister Funk requests that his replies to possible speeches by the Turks be drafted there. It will not be necessary to submit them here in advance.

III. We attach special importance to an early start of conversations on tariff reductions. In case the appointment of a Turkish Government committee should still take some time, it will not be necessary to wait for it, in our opinion, since the conversations in any case are being conducted by the Embassy and the competent Turkish authorities.

Please report by wire.

WIEHL

#### No. 554

2725/532805

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the  
Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

BERLIN, October 4, 1938.  
e. o. W III 7494.

Turkey requested a 10-year credit of 40 million reichsmarks for the delivery of aviation equipment. We consider the transaction of interest because it would presumably assure Germany a decisive advantage in supplying the Turkish air force. Please wire us your opinion on this matter. If the Turks should propose inclusion under the 150 million credit, please answer evasively and point out that the determination of what individual items are to be included under the credit must be reserved for later negotiations on the details of the credit agreement.

For your information: the aviation industry hopes that it will obtain more favorable conditions with respect to the rate of interest and especially the time limit on the credit if aviation equipment is not included under the 150 million credit; this would be particularly desirable on account of the rapid deterioration of aviation equipment.

Please inform Minister Funk.

CLODIUS



## No. 555

2725/532806

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 191 of October 11

ANKARA, October 11, 1938—5:05 p. m.

Received October 12, 1938—12:30 a. m.

The visit to Turkey of the Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics, the public aspects of which have been reported by DNB, went off in a decidedly friendly and cordial atmosphere, with great outward honors being shown. The fact that it occurred immediately after the Munich decisions and led to an accord on the credit agreement raised it far above similar visits of this nature and marks it as a politically important event. Turkish statesmen, as well as the Turkish press and public, are using the visit as an occasion for emphasizing the strong interest in close economic cooperation with Germany and in friendly relations with the country in general. Diplomatic circles here regard the nature of the reception of the Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics in Turkey, as well as the conclusion of the credit agreement, as evidence of the further decline in the relative power of Soviet Russia in this country and of Turkey's decision to avoid a one-sided orientation toward England.

The Reich and Prussian Minister of Economics contributed considerably toward this success by the open and persuasive nature of his personality.

KELLER

## No. 556

2726/532814-15

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

No. 10

BERLIN, January 5, 1939.

During his visit today on the occasion of the German-Turkish economic negotiations,<sup>1</sup> Turkish Under State Secretary Numan immediately brought up the question of the Dardanelles. Recalling the great interest which the Reich Foreign Minister had expressed in this question, he declared that he had examined from every angle the question of Germany's accession to the Dardanelles Convention and the most suitable form for it. Of all the many drafts, the one that he now brought with him, and which herewith was being handed to

<sup>1</sup> The credit agreement arranged in principle during Funk's October visit remained to be negotiated in detail. See document No. 557.

me,<sup>2</sup> had seemed to him to be the best. The Turkish proposal consisted, first of all, of a letter from the Turkish Foreign Ministry to our Embassy and, secondly, of a German reply. The substance of our draft was included therein. Our express wish to participate on an equal footing with the other signatories in a revision of the agreement had been implicitly taken into account in the Turkish text. Moreover, he, Numan, was instructed to give us an explicit assurance again to this effect—which he was now doing. In order to satisfy our wishes fully, the exchange of notes proposed by Numan would be published after it was signed. Since this was essentially a Turkish matter, the Turks felt that the signing should take place in Ankara.

Although I read the Turkish proposal in Numan's presence, I reserved a closer examination of it in the light of our previous draft.

Numan would like to come to an agreement with us on his proposal during his stay here, which is expected to last about a week, so that he may then be able to make further arrangements for the signing of the notes.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2726/532816-17). The principal clause in these drafts affirms that the regime of the Straits set down in the Montreux Convention applies to all foreign powers and that therefore Turkey is willing to give Germany equality with the signatory powers of the Convention with reference to passage through the Straits of warships and merchant vessels.

## No. 557

96/107753-54

### *Memorandum by the Head of Economic Policy Division III*

BERLIN, January 20, 1939.

I. On January 16 the German-Turkish credit agreement<sup>1</sup> negotiated between Minister Clodius and the Under State Secretary in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Numan Menemencioglu, was signed. By this agreement we opened for the Turkish Government a credit of 150 million reichsmarks in the German Gold Discount Bank for the payment of industrial orders which Turkey is to place in Germany. The orders are to be placed before December 31, 1941. The time limit of the credit will in every case be 10 years. The rate of interest is 5 percent. In order to cover the payments made by the Gold Discount Bank, the Turkish Government will issue treasury bonds, which are to be amortized in semi-annual installments. The amortization is to be effected through the German-Turkish clearing arrangement. Agreements on a corresponding increase in the export of Turkish products to Germany are found in Schedule II of a confidential protocol annexed to the agreement. German deliveries are in principle

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (5163/E304090-128).

and by preference to be shipped in German vessels. The agreement is to enter into force through an exchange of notes in Ankara after the legal requirements in question have been fulfilled.

A list of the big orders envisaged for the purpose of filling out the framework provided by the credit agreement is annexed to the confidential protocol (Schedule I): mining installations, installations for implementation of Turkey's agricultural development program, installations for power plants, for rolling stock, also for a number of industrial plants and merchant vessels, and, finally, also for war matériel (up to an amount of 60 million reichsmarks).

II. In connection with the credit negotiations Herr Clodius and M. Numan Menemencioglu discussed a number of other problems having to do with German-Turkish economic relations. The Embassy in Ankara has been given instructions regarding further discussion of these matters. Herr Clodius and M. Menemencioglu also discussed the complaints regarding German deliveries of ships to Turkey which M. Menemencioglu had brought up on January 3 with the State Secretary.<sup>2</sup> Most of these complaints were settled satisfactorily; M. Menemencioglu, who called on me in this matter yesterday together with the Turkish Ambassador, promised me a definitive statement regarding a memorandum on the subject which the Krupp firm had submitted in the meantime.

MORAHT

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<sup>2</sup> On this occasion Menemencioglu had complained that German firms like Krupp and Neptune Shipyards had delivered to Turkey merchant ships and naval craft with deficiencies in construction and materials and that there had also been delays in carrying out other deliveries (96/17751-52).

## No. 558

96/107755

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department*

BERLIN, January 20, 1939.

On receiving Turkish State Secretary Numan today the Foreign Minister expressed his astonishment over the fact that Numan had not yet been able to reach an agreement with me in the Montreux question. He could by no means understand the legal subtleties which the Turks had brought up. If the Turkish Government was politically resolved to settle the matter with us, it should not be deterred by such subtleties. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, was moreover not particularly interested in coming to an agreement quickly. As long as such an agreement was not reached the reservation that we had brought up naturally remained unchanged; beyond this he had, at the moment, no further statements to make about this matter.

GAUS

## No. 559

1593/384233

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 22 of February 1

ANKARA, February 1, 1939—7:45 p. m.

Received February 2—2:15 a. m.

Pol. VII 174.

From certain incidents, especially during the last few weeks, it is apparent that President Ismet İnönü<sup>1</sup> is anxiously trying not to offend the sensibilities of the Russians on account of their fear of an orientation of Turkish foreign policy toward Berlin. The Russians believe they can see therein a confirmation of their assumption that Ismet is pro-Soviet, and consider that the time has come for reactivating their relations with Turkey. I am told by a reliable source that the Soviet Ambassador here, who has been in Russia for 2 months on leave, is bringing with him a comprehensive program for closer cooperation.

Although the Russian hope for a closer alignment of Turkish foreign policy with Moscow is completely illusory, according to statements made to me by Foreign Minister Saracoglu<sup>2</sup> and Secretary General Numan after the election of Ismet and also according to the view of most informed persons here, it is nevertheless the opinion here that in order to counteract the Russian campaign it would be advisable to urge more strongly that greater reserve be shown. I should like to suggest that a statement to this effect be made to Numan before he leaves Berlin. Such a warning would make it easier for Numan to defend his own policy. Moreover, the Turks would see therein a plausible explanation of the delay in appointing our new Ambassador.<sup>3</sup> The argument I have used thus far, that we are seeking a *personnalité en vue* as the candidate, is somewhat worn out by too frequent use.

KROLL

<sup>1</sup> Following the death of Kemal Atatürk, General Ismet İnönü had been elected President of the Turkish Republic on Nov. 11, 1938.

<sup>2</sup> In the course of a reshuffling of the Turkish Cabinet after the death of Kemal Atatürk, Sükrü Saracoglu had replaced Rüstü Aras as Foreign Minister.

<sup>3</sup> The post of German Ambassador in Turkey had been vacant for several months.

## No. 560

96/107758

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 126

BERLIN, February 10, 1939.

The Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Numan Menemencioglu, when calling on me today brought up of his own

accord the rumors regarding an alleged Black Sea treaty. Numan indicated that he knew nothing about this officially, but he believes that the initiative came from Moscow; it could hardly be anything serious. After all, Turkey would not conclude a treaty charging her with the defense of the Black Sea on the Straits whereby she would carry all the burdens and the other treaty members would reap the benefit. Turkey would certainly never make any agreement which would be counter to German interests.

Nevertheless, I called Numan's attention, as a warning, to certain reports which we had received about an increasing Russo-Turkish intimacy.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> In a report (1593/384234-37) received the following day, the Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey stated that the death of Atatürk had not basically changed Turkey's attitude toward Russia and that Turkey had not made any new commitments. Nevertheless, the report continued, a certain change in the atmosphere of Russo-Turkish relations had been noticeable, since President İnönü appeared more anxious to emphasize Turkey's correct attitude vis-a-vis Russia than Atatürk had been.

CHAPTER VIII  
THE NEAR EAST  
JUNE 1, 1937–APRIL 18, 1939

No. 561

1495/370141-42

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain, the Consulate  
General at Jerusalem, and the Legation in Iraq*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 1, 1937.

83-21 A 25/5 (g. Rs.) (226g).

The latest developments in Palestine<sup>1</sup> force a decision as to what attitude Germany is to take in the face of the possible formation of a Jewish state or Jewish political structure under the British mandate.

For the orientation of your conversation:

1. The formation of a Jewish state or a Jewish-led political structure under British mandate is not in Germany's interest, since a Palestinian state would not absorb world Jewry but would create an additional position of power under international law for international Jewry, somewhat like the Vatican State for political Catholicism or Moscow for the Comintern.

2. Germany therefore has an interest in strengthening the Arab world as a counterweight against such a possible increase in power for world Jewry.

3. It is not to be expected, of course, that direct German intervention would influence essentially the development of the Palestine question. Nevertheless, it is advisable not to leave the interested foreign governments entirely in the dark about our viewpoint.

*Supplement for London:*

Therefore, please indicate to the Government there when occasion offers that Germany is also interested in developments in Palestine. Although Germany has hitherto aided the emigration of Jews of German citizenship to Palestine as much as possible, it is incorrect

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<sup>1</sup> Palestine had been in ferment since the large-scale Arab riots of October 1936, an upshot of which was the appointment of a commission of investigation (Peel Commission) by the British Government. On July 7 the report of the Commission recommended the partition of Palestine into 3 parts, one Jewish, one Arab, and one under permanent British mandate. See British Cmd. 5479 (July 1937): *Palestine Royal Commission, Report*.

to assume that Germany would also welcome the formation of a political structure more or less under Jewish leadership in Palestine. We do not believe that the efforts to tranquilize the international situation would be aided by the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

*Supplement for Bagdad:*

In this connection the German understanding for Arab nationalist aspirations should be expressed more clearly than before, but without making any definite promises.

*Supplement for Jerusalem:*

The economic and political measures for the promotion of Jewish emigration (Haavara) which may possibly arise from this diplomatic instruction on the basis of the proposals made by you in report Polit. 16 of March 22<sup>2</sup> are reserved for later decision.

NEURATH

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<sup>2</sup>Not printed (90/100002-19). This detailed report from the Consulate General in Jerusalem reviewed past German policy toward Palestine and stated that Germany's policy of promoting the emigration of German Jews to Palestine threatened to undermine sympathies for Germany in the Arab world. The report charged also that German exports served exclusively the goal of promoting the transfer of Jewish fortunes from Germany to Palestine by virtue of the monopoly of the Jewish transfer agency Haavara. (See documents Nos. 564 and 580.) The report recommended a policy which would still promote Jewish emigration to a certain extent but which would also consider Germany's relations with the Arabs as well as Germany's interest in getting foreign exchange in return for her exports to Palestine.

No. 562

1495/370143-44

*Memorandum by an Official of the Personal Staff of the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 5, 1937.

Subject: Jewish national state in Palestine and transfer of capital of Jewish emigrants to Palestine (Haavara Agreement).

The executive of the Auslandsorganisation—Foreign Trade Office—communicated the following to the Head of the AO in the Foreign Ministry:<sup>1</sup>

"The Haavara Agreement with the Zionist organizations places the whole of German exports to Palestine in the service of the transfer of capital of the Jews emigrating or intending to emigrate from Germany to Palestine. As a result, those Aryan and non-Jewish

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<sup>1</sup>The original letter of the Foreign Trade Office, dated May 26 and signed by E. A. Schwarz, has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry (72/51629-31). It includes important passages which were omitted from the letter as quoted in this memorandum. These passages have been supplied in footnotes below at the points of omission.

customers in Palestine who import German goods are forced to support the immigration of Jews. Haavara transfers amount economically to draining off goods without an economic *quid pro quo* either in foreign exchange or in the form of goods. Politically it means valuable support for the formation of a Jewish national state with the help of German capital.

"The Foreign Trade Office [of the Auslandsorganisation] has been fighting for the amendment of this agreement for over 2 years.<sup>2</sup> The Ministry of Economics explains its hitherto rigid maintenance of the present system by stating that the highest authorities allegedly wish that as many German Jews as possible be given the possibility of emigrating to Palestine in order to reduce our emigration balance. In order finally to obtain a revision of the rigid Haavara system, which is now becoming urgently necessary, I have conducted negotiations with Geheimrat Pilger<sup>3</sup> and his staff in the direction of an agreement and accord between the Foreign Ministry and the AO on this question of principle: is it justifiable to put the whole German export trade to Palestine in the service of Haavara and thereby indirectly contribute German capital to the formation of a Jewish national state?<sup>4</sup>

"The Foreign Trade Office of the AO, on the basis of previous experience, therefore requests a revision of the Haavara Agreement, which:

1. drains off economic goods from Germany without a *quid pro quo* in goods or foreign exchange;
2. compels the non-Jewish elements in Palestine to finance Jewish immigration;
3. facilitates the formation of a Jewish national state with the help of German capital."

Herewith submitted to Referat Deutschland.

EHRICH

<sup>2</sup>The original letter reads as follows: "The Foreign Trade Office has been fighting for the amendment of this agreement for over 2 years without having been successful, so far, against the resistance from the Economics Ministry. We have gained a valuable ally since the appointment of Party Comrade Döhle as Consul General at Jerusalem. Since that time, Geheimrat Pilger (Foreign Ministry), Consul General Döhle, and the Foreign Trade Office are agreed that the Haavara Agreement in its present form is no longer acceptable and that it will have to be amended." The rest of this paragraph is the same as in the document printed.

<sup>3</sup>Head of Political Division VII.

<sup>4</sup>In the original letter this is followed by two paragraphs, thus: "According to the statements made to me on May 24, 1937, by Counselor Schumburg of the Foreign Ministry, the views held by Referat Deutschland are now identical with those of the Foreign Trade Office; they are also shared by Geheimrat Pilger. Only the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry, now as ever, maintains a rigid position on Haavara.

"In order to force the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry and the Economics Ministry, on the basis of political considerations, to revise their previous position, Referat Deutschland intends to have issued for general guidance an instruction stating that Germany has no interest in the establishment of a Jewish national state. Proceeding from this political statement, it will then be possible to change the economic features of the Haavara Agreement as well."

The last part of the original letter, except for slight differences in style, is identical with that of the document printed.



## No. 563

1495/370139-40

*Memorandum by the Chief of Protocol*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 11, 1937.

zu 83-21 A (g. Rs.) 4/6. (227 g).<sup>2</sup>

Enclosed I submit for your information and with the request for further action:

1. A telegraphic instruction for London, Jerusalem, and Bagdad, dated June 1, 1937.<sup>3</sup>

2. A statement of position from the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP, dated June 5, 1937.<sup>4</sup>

To:

Economic Policy Department: For revision or termination of Haavara Agreement in consultation with the domestic authorities or Party offices concerned;

Cultural Policy Department: For revision of the German measures for promoting the emigration of the Jews, in consultation with the domestic authorities or Party offices concerned.

The Referat Deutschland agrees with the viewpoint of the AO of the NSDAP. Ref. D. takes the stand in principle that a considerably increased emigration of Jews out of Germany is to be obtained not through any administrative "promotion" on the part of Germany—possibly even entailing sacrifices of foreign exchange (Haavara)—but by encouraging the Jews' own *urge* to emigrate. In my opinion this goal could be reached through sharpening of domestic legislation regarding the Jews (for example, special taxes on Jewish income) to an extent which would automatically result in the emigration of the Jews on their own initiative.

Herewith submitted to the Economic Policy Department and the Cultural Policy Department with the request for further action.<sup>5</sup>

VON BÜLOW-SCHWANTE

<sup>1</sup> The Referat Deutschland which was concerned with liaison between the Foreign Ministry and other offices of the State and the Party was at this date under the direction of the Chief of Protocol.

<sup>2</sup> The related document to which this file number refers has not been identified. Possibly it is the memorandum printed as document No. 562, the only available copy of which carries no file number.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 561.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 562.

<sup>5</sup> Apparently as a result of this memorandum a meeting of the numerous interested agencies—Ministries of the Interior and Economics, Foreign Exchange Control Office, Auslandsorganisation, Reichsbank—was held in July and it was resolved to make a study of the question (1542/375515-20). Opposition to the views expressed by the Auslandsorganisation and Referat Deutschland in the above document led to a prolonged bureaucratic deadlock. See documents Nos. 575, 579, 580.

7055/E524081-90

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, June 22, 1937.  
e. o. 83-21 A 15/6.

Subject: German attitude on the question of founding a Jewish state in Palestine.

The disturbances in Palestine in 1936 led to the creation of a British Royal Commission under the direction of Lord Peel.<sup>2</sup> This Commission was to investigate the Jewish and Arab claims in Palestine and to find a solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict. The Commission's report, which has meanwhile been completed, has not yet been published. However, it has become known from press comments that the report apparently also considers the idea of partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish zones.

The Jewish press—also in Germany—has for months been passionately advocating the establishment of a Jewish state or at least a Jewish-controlled political structure under the British mandate, in which connection propaganda is being carried on for the greatest possible extension of Jewish territory. In the foreign press friendly to the Jews, world Jewry is cleverly beating the drum for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. According to reports from the German Embassies in Stockholm<sup>3</sup> and Helsinki,<sup>4</sup> well-known Zionist leaders have approached the Swedish and Finnish Governments and attempted to win support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Arab world follows this development with burning interest and combats every measure of the British mandatory power that might strengthen Jewish influence in Palestine. The Arab world is also beginning to mobilize the world press and to direct attention to the danger of a Jewish state in Palestine. According to available reports the Governments of the Arab states—especially that of Iraq, but that of Egypt as well—stand absolutely on the side of the Arabs in Palestine.

The attitude of the various governments with respect to the possible establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine has not always been clear heretofore. What proposals the Peel Commission will make to the British Government is not yet discernible. In answer to an in-

<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to all Diplomatic Missions, to the principal Consulates, and to the Reich Ministries concerned (7055/E524091-97).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 561, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (7055/E524072-73).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (7055/E524074-75).

quiry, British Foreign Minister Eden merely stated to the German Ambassador in London that the solution of the Palestine question was one of the most difficult problems of British foreign policy. In fact, the British mandatory power is probably in the difficult position of loyally fulfilling the promise given by Balfour during the war to found a Jewish "National Home" in Palestine, without disregarding the Empire's urgent consideration of the Arab world. In these circumstances it may well be assumed that this consideration is strong enough to exclude for the present any solution that would do full justice to Jewish wishes. On the other hand, one must not overlook the fact that international Jewry, especially in the United States of America, is trying to influence the decision of the British Government, and not without success.

A fairly clear position, and a negative one, has been adopted by Italian public opinion. Recently there have been an increasing number of Italian press comments directing critical attention to the Jewish question even in Italy. The Italian attitude toward the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine is, to be sure, determined less by anti-Semitic animosity than by the fear that England might develop the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine into a platform for her Mediterranean policy. That this fear is not entirely unfounded is shown by the language of the Jewish press, which—though perhaps only to catch the ear of the Peel Commission and curry favor—constantly points out the identity of Jewish and British interests in Palestine. Mussolini's declaration of friendship to the Arabs on the occasion of receiving the "Sword of Islam"<sup>5</sup> might also be indicative in judging the Italian attitude with respect to developments in Palestine.

So far as can be seen up to now, French Mediterranean interests would not be affected to the same extent by the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine as would the Italian sphere of interest. Still, it is not possible to determine what attitude France would adopt toward a resolution placed by England before the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations concerning a reorganization of the Palestine mandate.

The events described have led to a revision of the German position with regard to the problem of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Heretofore it was the primary goal of Germany's Jewish policy to promote the emigration of Jews from Germany as much as possible. In order to achieve this goal sacrifices are even being made in foreign-exchange policy. Through the conclusion of a transfer

<sup>5</sup>In the course of a visit to the Italian colonies in North Africa, Mussolini was presented with the "Sword of Islam" in Tripoli on Mar. 18, 1937. On this occasion he expressed his sympathy with Islam and with the Moslems of the whole world. See *Documents on International Affairs, 1937* (London, 1939), pp. 267-269.

agreement with Palestine (the so-called Haavara Agreement)\* the Jews emigrating to Palestine are allowed, in order to establish a livelihood, to obtain the release of specific amounts in the form of additional German exports to Palestine. This German attitude, dictated by requirements of domestic policy, virtually promotes the consolidation of Jewry in Palestine and thereby accelerates the development of a Jewish state in Palestine; this might contribute to the view that Germany favors the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

In reality, however, it is of greater interest to Germany to keep Jewry dispersed. For when no member of the Jewish race is settled on German soil any longer, the Jewish question will still not be solved for Germany. Rather, the developments of recent years have shown that international Jewry will of necessity always be the ideological and therefore political enemy of National Socialist Germany. The Jewish question is therefore at the same time one of the most important problems of German foreign policy. Thus there is also considerable German interest in the developments in Palestine. For a Palestine state will not absorb world Jewry, but—somewhat similar to the sphere of activity of the Vatican State—will provide it with an additional position of power under international law which might have fateful results for German foreign policy.

Although direct German interference in the development of the Palestine question is not intended, the German Embassy in London, as well as the German Legation in Bagdad and the German Consulate General in Jerusalem have received instructions which take this viewpoint into account.<sup>7</sup>

1) The British Government has been informed by the German Ambassador in London that Germany has, to be sure, heretofore promoted the emigration of Jews to Palestine as much as possible. It was, however, erroneous to assume that Germany would likewise favor the establishment of a political structure in Palestine more or less under Jewish leadership. In the face of anti-German agitation on the part of international Jewry, Germany could not assume that the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine would promote the peaceful development of the nations.

2) The German Legation in Bagdad has received instructions to manifest more clearly than before Germany's interest in Arab national aspirations.

3) Jerusalem has received identical instructions.

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\*The original agreement was contained in an exchange of letters between the Ministry of Economics and S. Hoofien of the Anglo-Palestine Bank in August 1933 (7052/E523995-524014) and the terms were summarized in a circular of the Ministry of Economics on Aug. 28, 1933 (7052/E524015-23). See also document No. 580.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 561.

To what extent these foreign-policy instructions will lead to a change in domestic measures in the field of emigration policy is for the present subject to the examination and decision of the German domestic authorities concerned.

I ask you to report in case it becomes noticeable there that Jewry is making efforts to arouse the interest of the public or the Government in favor of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

By order:  
VON BÜLOW-SCHWANTE

### No. 565

1526/373516-19

*The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry*

No. Pol. 37

JERUSALEM, July 13, 1937.

Received July 17.

Pol. VII 751.

Subject: Triple partition of Palestine and its consequences for the German colonists.

With reference to report Pol. 35, Angabe II of July 10, 1937.<sup>1</sup>

The Landesgruppenleiter and I discussed with the mayors and Ortsgruppenleiter of the German settlements concerned the situation that would arise from the execution of the plan for triple partition.<sup>2</sup>

I stated that we had to reckon seriously with the possibility of the execution of the Royal Commission's triple partition plan, which had been approved by the British Government. Great Britain wished to rid herself of the obligations of the Balfour Declaration and the present mandate, in any case; the opposition of the Arabs to the partition plan was not universal, and therefore the possibility of acceptance by Emir Abdullah<sup>3</sup> and the Nashashibi Party<sup>4</sup> could not be excluded; and though, for tactical reasons, there was very sharp Jewish opposition, we had to be prepared for acceptance of the plan by that side, too, after amendments had been made.

Even though it was not impossible that the plan of triple partition would share the fate of previous plans and be abandoned, still we had to examine calmly the situation resulting from the plan and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1526/373509-11). In a conversation with an official of the Royal Commission, Consul General Döhle had learned that some of the German settlements in Palestine would ultimately be located in the Jewish zone under the partition plan.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 561, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Abdullah Ibn al-Husayn became Emir of Transjordan in 1921.

<sup>4</sup> The National Defense Party led by Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi opposed the leadership of the Grand Mufti within Arab nationalism.

consider how the interests of the German settlers might best be protected.

According to the proposal of the Royal Commission only the German settlement in the city of Jerusalem would fall within the new mandated area, and only the settlement in the city of Jaffa would fall within the Arab state; all other settlements would be included in the Jewish state.

I then informed the representatives of the German settlers of the possibility that Wilhelma<sup>3</sup> might be added to the new mandated area and also that the British counted on retaining the Haifa district under direct mandate for a period of 10 years.

During the discussion the opinion was almost unanimously held that the existence of German settlements in a Jewish state would *in the long run* be impossible. Only one person voiced the opinion that no final judgment could yet be given as to the possibility of the continued existence of the German settlements in the Jewish state and that we should try it first. In this connection it was thought that in view of the large number of Jews still remaining in Germany the Jewish state would not adopt any discriminatory measures against the German settlers in Palestine. However, the general opinion was to the effect that even assuming correct behavior on the part of the Jewish government agencies, the Jewish people would work for the displacement of the German settlers by means of boycott and other measures and that therefore the existence of German settlers in the Jewish state would be possible only for a limited period.

The desire of the representatives of the German settlers was,

1. As a permanent solution, to aim at placing the German settlement directly under the new mandate.
2. If this could not be achieved, as a temporary solution, a considerable extension of self-government in the individual settlements and of minority rights.

The Landesgruppenleiter and I pointed out that the development of the situation made it necessary quickly to put into practice the advice given to the communities some time ago and to adopt resolutions that sales of property which threatened the compactness of the communities should be effected only with the approval of the community leaders.

I emphasized the fact that only in case the communities adopted such resolutions would there be any possibility of assistance, and that as far as possible the German Government would render such assistance for carrying out the resolutions. The Landesgruppenleiter expressed the same opinion.

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<sup>3</sup> One of the German settlements. The information in this paragraph came from the British official referred to in footnote 1, and was conveyed to Berlin in the report cited there.

It was suggested that the individual communities should discuss with the local administrative authorities the possibility of establishing self-government. Wilhelma has already taken such steps and made an application to this effect on July 7.

The German settlers should be advised to "keep calm" and should be apprised of the necessity of united action in order that freedom of movement may be maintained.

I pointed out to the settlers that only on the basis of special instructions from the Foreign Ministry could I take any step with the Mandate Government toward complying with their desire to have the German settlements placed directly under Mandate administration. I consider the prospects for the success of such a step as very slight, but I believe that the possibility of such a solution cannot be ruled out entirely. If such a step were publicized it would no doubt cause strong Jewish opposition, which in case of failure might later have an unfavorable effect on the German settlers. Special treatment of the German settlers would be facilitated for the Mandate administration by the fact that there are no other compact European settlements in Palestine outside of the new mandated area.

I request telegraphic instructions as to whether such a step should be undertaken now or whether the decision should be postponed.\*

DÖHLE

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\*Marginal note: "I think we should still wait. v. N[eurath], July 21."

## No. 566

1526/373532-33

*The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Letter

No. Pol. 39

JERUSALEM, July 15, 1937.

Received July 21.

Pol. VII 787.

The Grand Mufti<sup>1</sup> visited me today and described to me the Arab attitude to the partition plan, stating that the Palestine Arabs were united in their rejection of the plan. The rest of the Arab and Mohammedan world had the same attitude: here he referred to declarations of the Arab countries. In their struggle against the Jews and pro-Jewish policies, the Arabs hoped for support from those Great Powers whose interests lay in the same direction, in which connection he mentioned the antagonism between England, France, and Turkey on the one hand and Italy and Germany on the other hand. The Grand Mufti stressed Arab sympathy for the new Germany and

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<sup>1</sup> Haj Amin al-Husayni.

expressed the hope that Germany was sympathetic toward the Arab fight against Jewry and was prepared to support it.

1. The Grand Mufti then requested that I communicate to the German Government his wish that it give him advice as to how to overcome the present difficulties. At my suggestion that the phrasing of such a question was too indefinite to permit an answer and that, after all, there was no question of our playing the role of an arbiter, he made his wish more specific: whether Germany was prepared to take a stand against the Jews and the plan for the creation of a Jewish state—either in the press or in some other way. Without making full use at once of the contents of telegraphic instruction No. 14 of June 1, 1937,<sup>2</sup> I expressed myself as prepared to forward his request to Berlin and stated as my personal opinion that I believed such a request could be fulfilled. I added that it was perhaps tactically in the interests of the Arabs if German sympathy for Arab aspirations were not too marked in German statements and that, practically, a negative attitude toward a Jewish state would have the same effect for the Arabs.

2. The Grand Mufti then expressed the intention of sending an agent to Germany incognito to discuss German and Arab-Mohammedan interests, which, in his opinion, are parallel. I expressed my willingness to facilitate for the agent the accomplishment of his mission and also the possibility of contact with responsible authorities if he would visit Germany like any other foreigner on a trip. I request telegraphic instruction as to whether I should answer the Grand Mufti affirmatively in the sense of No. 1 of telegraphic instruction No. 14 and whether there is any objection to the trip of an agent and to the continuation of conversations with the Grand Mufti.

DÖHLE

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<sup>2</sup> Document No. 561.

## No. 567

7061/E324146

### *The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Cipher Letter

No. 1757

BAGDAD, July 17, 1937.

Received July 20.

Pol. VII 774.

The Minister President told me that he was counting on the support of Italy and Turkey in the League of Nations in his fight against the partition plan for Palestine. He inquired how the German Government intended to support him in his fight against a Jewish state in Palestine.



I told him that the German Government and Italy were working together in League of Nations questions. The Minister President seems to expect a statement from a responsible German personage against the plan for a Jewish state.<sup>1</sup>

He further stated that Iraq could carry on the battle against a Jewish state successfully only if she did not have to give in to the present financial pressure from England, and that therefore an immediate non-British loan would be a great help for Iraq.

The Minister President expects an answer by telegram.<sup>2</sup>

GROBBA

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "To the Director of the Political Department. This is out of the question. We wish to keep aloof from this controversy. v. N[eurath], July 22."

<sup>2</sup> Grobba was informed of Neurath's views in a Foreign Ministry telegram of July 30 (7061/E524148). This telegram pointed also to the absence of a unified Arab opinion on that issue but stated, in reply to another inquiry from Grobba dated July 20 (7061/E524147), that there would be no objections to conversations between the Iraqi representative and the German Consul in Geneva. The latter was similarly informed by a Foreign Ministry telegram of July 31 (7061/E524150).

## No. 568

1526/373534

*The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Letter

No. Pol. 43

JERUSALEM, July 22, 1937.

Received July 28.

Pol. VII 828.

With reference to report Pol. 39 of July 15.

The confidential agent (see point 2 of the above-mentioned report) will arrive in Berlin at the end of July and will report to Pilger's<sup>1</sup> successor or to the Political Director. He will

1. identify himself by a general letter of recommendation No. 164 of June 21,<sup>2</sup> which I made out for him last month;
2. refer to my reports and give the numbers Pol. 39 of July 15 and Pol. 43 of today.

DÖHLE<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Counselor Hans Pilger, the former head of Political Division VII, had been appointed Minister to Afghanistan.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal notes: (1) "What is this about? W[eizsäcker], July 28."

(2) "Handled by telegraphic instruction of July 30. H[entig], July 31." This instruction signed by Weizsäcker (7061/E524149) stated that "a visit by the confidential agent seemed to be pointless as long as the attitude of the Arab states was uncertain."

(3) "Mussa Alami, staying at present in Karlsbad, is announced for today together with an English-speaking person, Husayni, from Jerusalem. H[entig], Aug. 26." No documents on this interview have been found.

## No. 569

1526/373535-38

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII*

BERLIN, July 29, 1937.

zu Pol. VII 828.<sup>1</sup>

## THE PALESTINE QUESTION

Since the report of the British Royal Commission was published this month, the Palestine question has aroused the press of all Europe and also of states of the Near East to a greater or lesser extent, but by no means in a uniform manner. After an initial silence the European newspapers have gradually confined themselves to reporting—mostly in very general statements—the facts given by the parties directly concerned; the Near Eastern press, on the other hand—at least individual parts of it—at first turned very violently against the plan and has only recently imposed greater reserve upon itself. The protests which came from Iraq, above all from Minister President Sulayman Hikmet, were the most violent. Only the utterances of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem were similarly vehement. The Turkish press was very reserved; the Egyptian press was against it only at first and in the papers of the opposition, but gradually allowed the storm to subside and, according to the reports of both the Ambassador and our informants which agree in this, now takes only a lukewarm stand. King Saud<sup>2</sup> of Arabia has taken no definite stand at all; the Emir Abdullah was entirely on the English side at first, but in consequence of the ensuing attacks has changed his Cabinet and likewise kept still. The opposition to the British plan has really increased only on the Jewish side. While it was treated quite objectively in the beginning, the Zionists have recently come out more strongly with their demand: "No Jewish state without Zion." What happened in the British Parliament is known. The Commission's proposals were first referred to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations to be laid again before the House of Commons in a new and amended form.<sup>3</sup> The time

<sup>1</sup> Pol. VII 828, document No. 568.<sup>2</sup> Ibn Saud, King of Hejaz since 1926, of Saudi Arabia since 1932.<sup>3</sup> The debate on the Report of the Peel Commission took place on July 20 and 21 in both houses of Parliament and revealed considerable opposition to the Report in all parties. The House of Commons finally resolved that the proposals contained in the Report should be brought before the League to enable the Government to present a definite scheme to Parliament at a later date. An extraordinary session of the Permanent Mandates Commission to examine the Palestine problem on the basis of the Peel Report and of other relevant material opened on July 30, 1937. On Aug. 18, the Mandates Commission reported to the League Council favorably on the British partition scheme and in September the Council authorized Britain to submit a definitive scheme, and until such time reserved its own decision on the substance of the question. The appointment of a Technical Commission for the drafting of such a plan was delayed as a result of new Arab disturbances in the fall of 1937; finally, on Feb. 28, 1938, a Palestine Partition Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead was appointed by the British Government. (On the further development of this partition plan, see document No. 581, footnote 2.)

gained thereby is generally considered a success for the British Government.

In compliance with telegraphic instruction 14,<sup>4</sup> point 1, Jerusalem and Bagdad reported immediately, both in general to the effect that further positive steps were expected—either a declaration by responsible personages, or a public stand against the Jewish state, or even measures against the developments initiated by the British Government. The visit of an agent of the Grand Mufti was announced to us from Jerusalem;<sup>5</sup> Bagdad asked that we place at the disposal of its representative in Iraq<sup>6</sup> the good offices of our Consul in Geneva for the purpose of dealing with the matter.

I requested that the visit of the representative of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who is now confined in the Mosque of Omar and to whom almost nothing could be said at the present time, be dropped; on the other hand, I saw no objection to permitting the Iraqi representative to establish contact with our Consul, whom I shall instruct from here concerning the handling of the matter.

Just recently the storm in Iraq has subsided because of the fact that England is said to have taken very energetic measures, whereupon the actions and cries of protest from there ceased.

According to what I was personally able to ascertain, there is, of course, in the whole Islamic world a widespread aversion to permitting the Jewish state to come into being, but on the other hand there is not the least inclination to quarrel with England over this question. They are well aware that England considers the question important enough to impose her point of view by force of arms, without restrictions.

Even an Indian delegation which went to London to make a protest did so with the definite realization that nothing could be accomplished in England itself.

Regarding the fate of the German settlements, which at the moment appears to be rather a burning question, the following can be said:

The German settlers, for the most part Templars,<sup>7</sup> amount to 2,000 persons in all. The settlement in Jerusalem will be in the British mandated territory, that in Jaffa in the Arab Zone. The geographical location of the remainder is such that separation from the projected Jewish state does not appear possible; Sarona, for example, is to a great extent directly within the area of Tel-Aviv, a large Jewish city which is constantly growing and will probably also be the capital.

The settlers themselves wish to remain where they are.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 561.

<sup>5</sup> See documents Nos. 566 and 568.

<sup>6</sup> *Sic*; probably should read: Iraq's representative in the League. See document No. 567, footnote 2.

<sup>7</sup> A group of German religionists organized in 1854 and settled in Palestine in 1868 to await the end of the world. They had developed a prosperous economic life there.

Should the Jewish state come into being with those boundaries, which, however, it will probably take years to fix (according to British estimates, up to 10 years), the question of the continued existence of these settlements within the framework of the Jewish state would have to be settled some day. The possibility of their continued existence would certainly be very much imperiled, even if a very comprehensive guarantee should be given that their economic life would not be destroyed. It is therefore to be recommended that all existing possibilities of a solution be carefully considered well in advance. It would be unfortunate first to wait until the settlers are ruined economically and then seek to reach decisions. One must also consider whether the maintenance of a German minority—the only one, incidentally, in the Jewish state—does not hinder our freedom of action with respect to the Jews.

HENTIG

No. 570

3496/E018911-14

*Memorandum by an Official of Referat Deutschland*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, August 7, 1937.

GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BRITISH PLAN FOR THE FORMATION  
OF A JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE

1. *Present situation:*

The plan of the British Peel Commission, which provides for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state with a territory reserved for the British, is before the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations for decision after deliberation by the British Parliament resulted in no unequivocal approval of the plan.<sup>2</sup>

2. *Possible development:*

The plan is attacked by both the Jews and the Arabs as being unjust and inadvisable. In this connection it should not be overlooked, however, that Jewish criticism confines itself to finding fault with the contemplated size of the territory of the Jewish state as being too small, while the Arabs deny the political expediency of any Jewish state at all. It is difficult to estimate the strength of the Jewish and the Arab groups, chiefly because both groups are divided among themselves. However, the interest of the British Empire in a Jewish state in Palestine as the basis of its Mediterranean interests should be regarded as an essential factor in judging the future development of

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum and the one originating in Political Division VII, which is the next document printed, were prepared at Weizsäcker's request (1495/370132) in anticipation of a report by him to the Foreign Minister.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 569, footnote 3.

the Palestine problem. In this connection, to be sure, the Empire's consideration for the Arab world will act as a brake, even though it may probably be anticipated that this retarding action will slacken in time. Significantly, the Jewish press even now stresses the identity of Jewish and British interests.

### 3. *German interests:*

In the telegraphic instructions to London, Jerusalem, and Bagdad,<sup>3</sup> it has already been laid down as a principle of policy that Germany can have no interest in a Jewish state in Palestine, since this would mean an additional basis of international power for world Jewry, just as the Vatican State is for political Catholicism. In any case, it should be regarded as certain that world Jewry would not be absorbed by a Jewish state, but would only use it as an additional active political organization (Jewish citizenship, Jewish Diplomatic Missions, Jewish representation in the League of Nations, etc.). The German interest in the promotion of Jewish immigration to Palestine is therefore offset by the far greater interest in preventing the formation of a Jewish state. The Jewish question as a domestic problem would be replaced by the considerably more dangerous one of an opposition of world Jewry to the Third Reich based on recognition by international law. We therefore have a definite interest in preventing the formation of a Jewish state and in maintaining the political division of Jewry.

### 4. *Measures:*

The consequence of this examination might—apart from internal measures such as the diverting of Jewish immigration to states other than Palestine—be a decision to support the Arab world with money and arms. In view of the development of Anglo-German relations, such a measure is out of the question. Nevertheless, instructions have already been issued to our Missions concerned (London, Jerusalem, Bagdad), in which the German interest in the situation is made clear.

Since Italy, too, in view of her Mediterranean interests, on the one hand, looks with apprehension upon the formation of a Palestine state and, on the other hand, has proclaimed her protection of Islam, a German-Italian action<sup>4</sup> in favor of Arab interests and parallel to the Berlin-Rome Axis would be calculated to make the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine more difficult. The objection that such an action might be one-sidedly advantageous to Italy's Mediterranean interests and thus offend England is, however, of such paramount importance that such a suggestion to Rome has hitherto not been consid-

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 561.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in the handwriting of Bismarck, who initialed the document on Aug. 12: "Is such [action] still possible today?"

ered. But it would be conceivable that the Palestine question might play a role in a German-British-Italian conference in which German interests, too, could be asserted.

It will be necessary henceforth to exert our influence so that no third states—above all, Poland and Rumania—may take a stand in the League of Nations, for example, in favor of a Jewish state in Palestine in order thereby to promote the settlement of the Jewish question in their own national territory. (It is interesting to note in this connection that the Soviet Government is obviously on the side of the Arabs.) Likewise, Jewish *démarches* with foreign governments must be counteracted by our foreign Missions.

Should the Jewish state nevertheless be established in Palestine, German foreign policy would be confronted with a new problem, the gravity of which might far outweigh the domestic Jewish question.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the Acting State Secretary.<sup>5</sup>

SCHUMBURG

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<sup>5</sup> Marginal note: "Herr v. Kotze. Please submit to the Foreign Minister if this has not yet been done. M[ackensen], Aug. 20."

No. 571

1542/375514;  
3496/E019907-10

*Memorandum of Political Division VII*

BERLIN, August 7, 1937.

BRIEF ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION

*a) Status of the question.*

The report of the Royal Commission on Palestine, which provides for the partition of Palestine into an independent Arab, an independent Jewish, and a British mandated area, has first been referred by the British Parliament to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and is then to be resubmitted to the House of Commons in amended and better documented form. The Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, which is at present studying the Palestine Report, will not confine itself to this report alone, but will also study the reports of the Mandatory Government for the 2 previous years and make proposals to the League Council on *all* possible solutions to the Palestine question.

The two parties directly concerned, Jews and Arabs, oppose the plan. The attitude of the Jewish press has in the course of time become increasingly hostile to it. It has hardened into the demand, "No Jewish state without Zion". On the other hand, the responsible Zion-

ist leaders seem to be willing to accept the report at least as a basis for negotiations.

The attitude of the Arabs, which was first characterized by considerable disunity, has in the course of time lost some of its vociferousness but, on the other hand, has gained in firmness and unity. Particularly violent were the attacks on the plan emanating from Iraq, especially from Iraqi Minister President Hikmet Sulayman, which even necessitated a *démarche* on the part of the British Government. Even now the Iraqi Government, through its delegate, has registered a protest with the League of Nations against the partition of Palestine and has demanded that the Jews, as a numerically limited minority, be placed under Arab rule.

The other Arab states, despite all their manifestations of sympathy for the Arabs of Palestine, have not committed themselves. The Turkish Press has been very reserved.

Only a few of the non-Oriental governments interested in the Jewish question have thus far taken a position. The U. S. A. is obviously sympathetic to the formation of a Jewish state. This is also true of a number of the East European countries; Poland considers the Jewish share in Palestine as inadequate; Rumania is inclined to hew to the same line as Poland on the Jewish question. It is noteworthy that the Russians are opposing the Jewish state. Italy, which necessarily fears the strengthening of the British position in the eastern Mediterranean through the implementation of the Peel Plan, has—probably in view of the forthcoming conversations with England—been reserved in her statements on the Palestine question.

*b) Probable course of events.*

Although it is still too early to make detailed predictions as to future developments, it may be safely assumed that the Jewish state in Palestine will become a reality in the foreseeable future, either in the form proposed by the Royal Commission or in some other form. Such a solution is required by the interests of the British Empire, to which the present situation in Palestine corresponded less and less the longer it lasted. England evidently considers this question important enough to impose her viewpoint by force of arms, if necessary, against insurrection attempts on the part of the Arabs.

*c) The situation with respect to our interests.*

Our standpoint on the Palestine issue, which is a modification of our former stand, was expressed in circular instruction 88/21 A 15/6 of June 22 and was also communicated to the British Government by our Embassy in London. The formation of an independent state more or less under Jewish leadership will not be welcomed by Germany, although she has heretofore sought to promote the emigration

of Jews to Palestine as much as possible and even made sacrifices to this end in her foreign-exchange policy. (Through the conclusion of a transfer agreement with Palestine, the so-called Haavara Agreement, Jews emigrating to Palestine were enabled, by means of supplementary German exports to Palestine, to obtain release of sums to establish their livelihood.) A Jewish Palestine state will not absorb Jewry but will give it—somewhat like the Vatican State—an international basis of power, which in view of the anti-German agitation of international Jewry would hardly further the peaceful development of nations.

The advantages of a Jewish state existing under international law might be given as follows:

(a) Relieving the German Reich of a large number of Jewish emigrants who still must be cared for today.

(b) Making it possible, when we are attacked by Jewry, to deal with official representatives and not, as heretofore, with anonymous and therefore irresponsible elements, of which the Jews, particularly, have a great many at their disposal.

d) *Possible measures to be considered by us.*

The following practical objectives would therefore enter into consideration for Germany:

(1) Taking measures to prevent or make difficult the formation of a Jewish state.

(2) Protecting the existence of the German colonists in Palestine, either in the country itself or by timely resettlement in other areas.

*Diplomatic measures* which could be taken by Germany against the Jewish state would be these: to establish contacts with other European governments which for some reason or other are likewise opposed to the Jewish state, for the purpose of creating a front for joint action, or to give direct and indirect support to movements that are directed against the Jewish state. Direct support of the Arabs with arms and money could also be considered, either in Palestine itself or via other Arab countries, primarily Iraq.<sup>1</sup>

Diplomatic measures with the aim of diverting Jewish emigration from Germany away from Palestine and toward other countries could, on the contrary, hardly be considered for the time being.

In case that the aforementioned diplomatic measures are implemented, two factors would, to be sure, have to be taken into consideration:

1. Our relations with England which must under no circumstances be put under an unnecessary strain thereby;

2. The notorious political unreliability of the Arabs.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in the handwriting of Weizsäcker, who initialed the document on Aug. 13: "As soon as we become visibly active, the effect will be the *opposite* from the one desired by us."



Whether *internal measures* paralleling those in the field of foreign policy should be taken is at present still the subject of negotiations:

Blocking emigration to Palestine; directing emigration to other countries through administrative measures; discontinuing the transfer of Jewish capital from Germany to Palestine through denunciation of the Haavara Agreement. The last proposal especially meets with strong objections in quarters concerned with economic policy.

The question as to the *fate of the German settlements in Palestine* appears very urgent in the event that the Jewish state becomes a reality. These German settlements contain some 2,000 persons, mostly Templars, and almost all are in Jewish territory. Consequently all possibilities of a solution should be weighed even now, so that we can take the necessary steps in time and not be caught unawares by developments.

(1) A resettlement has been contemplated: in Palestine itself, either from the Jewish to the Arab state or to the British Mandate area, or to the neighboring countries, especially to Syria; or, finally, to former German East Africa. Such a resettlement would, of course, encounter the opposition of the colonists themselves,<sup>2</sup> who would not voluntarily leave the country in which they have been living for several generations.

(2) Continued existence as a minority in the Jewish state would undoubtedly lead to the destruction of the German settlements.

(3) Therefore, in the event of their remaining in the country, guarantees would have to be obtained. The League of Nations could guarantee self-government to the German settlements; placing them under the British Mandate might also be considered<sup>3</sup> since the Peel Plan provides for British mandated enclaves in the future Jewish territory. It is probable that the British would not be unsympathetic toward such a proposal, which could furnish them with the pretext for establishing additional bases in the country. At any rate, when our Consul General in Jerusalem stated his fears concerning the fate of the German settlements after the reorganization, they expressed their particular interest in this question.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Yes."

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "This would please me most, if the British will go along with it."

<sup>4</sup> In the same file is a memorandum (1542/375506-13) which, although unsigned and undated, was presumably written by Hentig expressing his own conviction that continued Jewish immigration to Palestine was in the interest of Germany. He argued that the dispersal of German Jews to other countries, where they exercised an anti-German influence, was far more damaging to Germany than their concentration in Palestine. He pointed out further that at the then current rate of German Jewish immigration to Palestine, thirty to forty thousand per year, all German Jews would have left Germany within 10 years.

## No. 572

1526/373550-54

*The Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 10, 1937.

No. Pol. 56

Pol. VII 910.

Subject: Policies of the Mufti of Jerusalem and of the Arab National Committee.

With reference to your telegraphic instruction of July 30, 1937,<sup>1</sup> and reports Pol. 39 and 43 of July 15 and 22, 1937.

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who for some time has been under constant surveillance and who remains strictly within the compound of the Mosque and in the premises of the Supreme Moslem Council in Jerusalem, has been informed, pursuant to the instruction referred to above, that a visit to Berlin by an emissary appears premature and should be postponed at least until the attitude of all the Arab states to the Palestine question has been clearly defined. The Mufti thereupon sent word to the Consulate General that his emissary was already in Europe and perhaps had already arrived in Berlin. It was therefore doubtful whether the new instructions to postpone the visit to Berlin would reach him in time.

The Mufti availed himself of the opportunity to let the Consulate General know that he had taken cognizance with joy and satisfaction of the German press comments against the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. With that alone the German Government had rendered a great service in the struggle of the Arabs in Palestine for their independence. If he were now permitted to make a further request for support by Germany, it would be for Germany to use her influence with the Polish Government in order to induce Poland to adopt a more benevolent attitude toward the aims of the Palestinian Arabs. The Arab National Committee was of the opinion that considerable danger threatened from Poland especially, since Poland had a particular interest in maintaining the possibilities of immigration to Palestine and in creating as extensive a Jewish state as possible. As was evident from press reports, Zionist leader Weizmann<sup>2</sup> intended after the Zionist Congress in Zürich<sup>3</sup> to go to Warsaw in order to enter into conversations with the Polish Government. These conversations could only be aimed at inducing Poland to support the Jewish endeavors with the greatest possible intensity. He, the Mufti, had therefore addressed a letter to the Polish Government in which it was explained in detail that in case a Jewish state was created the absorptive capacity of this new state would be so small

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7061/E524149). See document No. 568, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

<sup>3</sup> The Twentieth Zionist Congress opened in Zürich on Aug. 3, 1937.

that it would not substantially alleviate the Jewish problem in Poland, let alone solve it. The Polish nation in particular would understand the fight of the Arabs against the severance of a part of their country, for Poland herself had been partitioned in the course of history and had fought for decades against the partitioning of the country and for the creation of an independent state.

The Mufti's spokesman was given the reply that the Consulate General was not in a position to express an opinion on the possibility of such a step on the part of the German Government, but that it was willing to forward the request to the proper German authorities.

As far as we can see from here, the Mufti's fears that the plan for the creation of as large a Jewish state as possible will be supported by Poland are fully justified. Even if the absorptive capacity of a Jewish state created within the boundaries of the Peel recommendation is limited, according to cautious estimates there should nevertheless exist possibilities for the immigration within the next few years of at least 500,000 Jews. If Weizmann should now assure the Polish Government that opportunity for immigration to Palestine would be made available for perhaps 300,000 Polish Jews, the Polish Government will certainly consider it as in its interest firmly to support, both in the League of Nations and to the British Government, the endeavors for the establishment of an independent Jewish state.

From the further conversation with the Mufti's spokesman it appeared that in the circles of the Arab National Committee seemingly great hopes are being entertained with regard to support from the Arab states. The opinion prevails that a united front against the partition of Palestine under Iraqi leadership has already been established<sup>4</sup> as the governments of all these states had more or less emphatically expressed their objections to the partition of Palestine. Something new was the information that Hikmet Sulayman, the Iraqi Minister President, was said to have issued an invitation for a joint conference on the Palestine question to the governments of all Arab countries. This conference is allegedly to convene even before the session of the Council of the League of Nations in September and lay down a unified policy for the Arab states. Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are said to have already accepted the invitation, while a reply from Egypt has not yet been received.<sup>5</sup>

If such a conference should actually materialize and arrive at joint decisions on the attitude of the Arab states toward the Palestine question, much would have been gained for the Arabs. However, there are well-founded doubts whether such a conference will not fail, owing to England's resistance and the fear of the Arab states to commit

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Hentig's handwriting: "Not correct."

<sup>5</sup> Such a meeting of representatives of various Arab countries was eventually held at Bludan in Syria, Sept. 8-10, 1937.

themselves too far. As is clear from the reports of the Legation in Cairo, Egypt in particular does not show any great inclination to intervene energetically in favor of the Arabs of Palestine. She does no more than is required to save face vis-à-vis the Arab Nationalists. Ibn Saud, too, has so far not yet publicly abandoned his reserve. Thus, aside from the not very firm protest by Syria, Iraq alone, by her telegram of protest to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, has so far dared to go further and taken active steps against the partition of Palestine. From conversations with the Iraqi Consul here one gains the impression that Iraq greatly fears the unrest that would be carried into the Arab sphere by the establishment of a Jewish state. For the solution of the Palestine question Iraq now apparently intends to go back to the old plan of former Foreign Minister Nuri Pasha,<sup>6</sup> which is based on the idea that there would be no objection against a Jewish migration of some size into the Arab sphere if Palestine and Transjordan were to be proclaimed an Arab kingdom and would join a federation of the Arab states. The Iraqi Consul intimated that the Mufti—probably because of the poor prospects of his present policy—was in the last few days more favorably inclined toward this plan, which he had so far always sharply rejected, and that a reconciliation on this basis between the Mufti and Abdullah was not impossible. That negotiations are under way between the Mufti and Emir Abdullah is also confirmed from another quarter. If such a reconciliation were to take place—which appears highly doubtful, however, because mutual mistrust and hatred are likely to be too strong—the beginning of a united front would have been created on the Arab side, which would no longer let the prospects for the solution of the Palestine problem in favor of the Arabs appear as hopeless as is the case today.

By order:  
DITTMANN

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<sup>6</sup> Nuri al-Said Pasha, many times Minister President and Foreign Minister of Iraq.

## No. 573

1554/377528-29

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

RM 831

BERLIN, October 26, 1937.  
Pol. VII 1139a.

The British Chargé d'Affaires called on me today and, handing me the enclosed newspaper clippings,<sup>1</sup> complained about the unfriendly tone used against England in the German press of late. He referred principally to the captions under the accompanying pictures. I told

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<sup>1</sup> Not reprinted (7060/E524136-42).

the Chargé that I took note of his complaint, but at the same time requested him to inform his Government that I had thus far refrained from collecting newspaper clippings with all the insults and attacks on Germany which were constantly being printed in the English newspapers. If the British Government thought it advisable to arrange for an exchange of newspaper articles I had no objection; but I was convinced that the material I would collect from the British newspapers would be considerably more voluminous than that which he could submit to me.

Furthermore, I continued, in looking at these pictures from Palestine something occurred to me which I requested him to report to his Government. I was aware that since the British plan for the partition of Palestine had been proposed serious threats had been uttered by Jews against the peaceful German colonists in Palestine who in case of partition would come within the Jewish territory. Just a few days ago our attention had again been called to this fact by an unimpeachable British observer. I therefore desired now, as a precaution, to call attention to the fact that in the event of the partition of Palestine we should have to insist upon guarantees for the German colonists residing there, the majority of whom were German citizens. The Chargé d'Affaires, to whom this whole matter was new, promised to report it to London.<sup>2</sup>

FREIHERR VON NEURATH

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "To Pol. VII files, together with the information received recently from the British source to which the Foreign Minister referred. H[entig], Oct. 27." This source is identified in a dispatch from London sent on Oct. 20 and signed by Woermann (7060/E524135). Woermann reported that Sir Ernest Bennett, a Conservative MP, had just called on him to inform him of strong threats against German settlements in Palestine made by Jews in Haifa, a fact which had come to Bennett's attention during a recent trip to that country. In a marginal note to this London dispatch, dated Oct. 28, Neurath requested that the matter be taken up by the Embassy in London as occasion offered.

## No. 574

1605/385458-61

### *The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2638

BAGDAD, November 9, 1937.

Received November 16.

Pol. VII 1212.

Subject: Uniformity of the Arab attitude on the Palestine question.  
Desire of Ibn Saud for regular diplomatic relations with the German Government.

Rumors regarding the concentration of Saudi-Arabian troops on the southern boundary of Transjordan.

With reference to previous reports.

The private secretary of King Ibn Saud, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who recently signed a treaty at Damascus with the Syrian Government for

the extension of the treaty of friendship and good neighbor relations concluded on November 10, 1931, in Jidda between the French Mandate and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has been here for the last few days in order to discuss political questions with the Iraqi Government.

When I had a rather lengthy conversation with him on November 5, he asked me what Germany, which was just as much interested as the Arab countries in preventing the establishment of the Jewish state planned by England in Palestine, intended to do to keep this plan from being realized.

I replied that the Arab countries had the principal interest in frustrating these plans, and that Germany's attitude regarding this question would depend on the stand taken by the Arab countries.<sup>1</sup> Germany was following this question with great interest; she had the impression, however, that the attitude of the Arab countries on this question was not uniform. Clear-cut declarations against the plan for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine had been made only by Iraq and, recently, in Geneva, also by Egypt.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin replied that this interpretation was not correct. Crown Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia, at the time of his visit during the coronation in London, and later, on July 21, 1937, during his stay in Paris, had issued statements to reporters in which he clearly brought out the fact that the Saudi Arabian Government was opposed to the plan for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. These statements had been published in the Egyptian newspaper *Ahram* some time between July 28 and 30, 1937. Imam Yahya<sup>2</sup> had also stated that he disapproved of the British policy in Palestine. Furthermore, several days ago the Syrian Minister President Jamil Mardam had issued a similar statement which would surely appear in the press shortly. The attitude of the Arab countries in this question was thus entirely uniform.

At that I told him that his information would interest my Government very much, in particular the report regarding the attitude of his own Government, since it was generally believed that King Ibn Saud was particularly friendly toward England.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin replied that not only Ibn Saud but all Arabs were friendly toward England; but this attitude did not extend to British actions in Palestine.

I thereupon told the Sheikh that Anglo-German relations were also friendly. Failing to appreciate this fact, the Palestinian Arabs expected active support from Germany which she was not able to give

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<sup>1</sup> Another copy of this document (1541/375429-32) shows here the following marginal note: "This suggestion can at present not be accepted. H[entig], November 24."

<sup>2</sup> Ruler of Yemen.

them, and I asked him what kind of German support of the Palestinian Arabs he had in mind.

He replied that diplomatic support would be sufficient for the present.

I then asked the Sheikh whether it was true that King Ibn Saud had concentrated troops on the southern border of Transjordan.

He replied that Ibn Saud had not sent any new troops to the southern border of Transjordan, and that these rumors were perhaps based on the fact that the troops stationed there had been replaced.

The Sheikh stated further that King Ibn Saud would greatly welcome having Germany send diplomatic representatives to Jidda. The Palestine case showed that it would be advantageous for both Governments if they had an opportunity of consulting with each other on questions in which both countries were interested.

I replied that the German Government appreciated very much the importance of the possibility of keeping in constant touch with the Saudi Arabian Government, particularly regarding Pan-Arabian questions, but for reasons of economy did not see its way clear to sending a permanent diplomatic representative to Jidda. I asked him what King Ibn Saud would think of having one of the German diplomatic representatives in a country bordering on Saudi Arabia also accredited at Jidda, and whether in that event the Saudi Arabian Government would be willing to reciprocate and likewise accredit to Berlin one of its representatives in some other European country.

He said that he thought this quite possible and hoped that the German Government would come to such a decision.

I promised him that I would report the information he had given me and his suggestions to my Government. At the time of this discussion Sheikh Yusuf Yasin was not aware of the report sent out on November 6 by *Transocean*, No. 1369, to the effect that the son of the Imam of Yemen, Yahya, had sent a letter to Mr. Eden at the time of his visit in London, in which he called the latter's attention to the unfavorable reaction aroused in Yemen by the British actions in Palestine and warned him of the dangers of such a policy, in view of its repercussions in the entire Arab world.

The report that Ibn Saud had concentrated troops at the southern boundary of Transjordan was confirmed to me by Arabs when I passed through Damascus, and the reason given was that Ibn Saud wished to call attention to his claim to Akaba and Maan. It was also maintained that the British had said they were disposed to let Ibn Saud have Akaba on condition that the harbor remain in their hands and they be permitted to retain a garrison there. My Italian colleague told me that his Government had reliable information regarding the concentration of Saudi Arabian troops at the southern

boundary of Transjordan. It even knew the names of the leaders of the tribes concentrated there.

In contradiction to this, King Ghazi<sup>3</sup> told me several days ago that the British had informed him these reports were false. They had flown over the southern boundary of Transjordan without finding troop concentrations anywhere.

GROBBA

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<sup>3</sup> Ghazi I, King of Iraq, 1933-1939.

## No. 575

1542/375521-29

*The Reich Foreign Exchange Control Office to the Foreign Ministry*

Dev. A 60754

BERLIN, December 7, 1937.

Attention Geheimrat Hentig

Received December 8.

Pol. VII 1305.

MY DEAR GEHEIMRAT: With reference to our discussion today I am transmitting to you a copy of the summary showing the results of Jewish emigration from Germany so far and the possibilities at hand for promoting and generally rendering possible the further emigration of Jews. I sent this summary to the Minister President in a letter of November 15, 1937, for the attention of Ministerial-dirigent Gramsch of the Geschäftsgruppe Devisen.<sup>1</sup> I believe that you will be able to see from this summary the most important of the detailed considerations which not only justify but demand continuation of the activities of Haavara.

Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

UTERMÖHLE

[Enclosure]

### JEWISH EMIGRATION

#### I. RESULTS TO DATE

Of the 120,000 Jews estimated to have emigrated from Germany since 1933 approximately 40,000 have gone to Palestine and about 40,000 to countries overseas. The practice of taking along goods, which during the early years was rather generously permitted in view of the foreign exchange situation then existing, and of taking along foreign securities originally in unlimited quantities, provided they had been held for some time, as well as of allotting foreign currency in cash has meanwhile been almost completely stopped. In spite of the fact that during the early years of Jewish emigration a consider-

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<sup>1</sup> i. e., the agency for foreign exchange in Göring's Four Year Plan Ministry.



able amount of property was taken along by the Jewish emigrants, the average amount of foreign exchange exported by all of them is estimated to be little more than RM 3,000 per capita. It must be taken into consideration, moreover, that the Palestine transfer alone, which is an additional export of goods and is consequently most acceptable as far as foreign exchange is concerned, amounts to RM 70 million, in round figures, and in the case of the exodus from the Saar area in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Agreement<sup>2</sup> the amount comes to approximately RM 23 million.

## II. TRANSFER POSSIBILITIES

1. The providing of cash foreign exchange, foreign exchange in clearing arrangements, and foreign exchange of limited disposability has in time become more and more restricted and has recently almost disappeared.

2. It was possible to dispose of real estate or rights to real estate without obtaining permission until Administrative Ordinance Ten was issued. Real estate transfers can now be of only very limited use for emigration because of the irregularities which occurred (see RE 132/37 of September 23, 1937<sup>3</sup>).

3. Originally emigrants were permitted to take along or, as the case might be, dispose of foreign securities already in foreign countries and foreign bonds held by Germans; this was restricted more and more and today has been stopped almost completely. When foreign securities are released in exceptional cases, generally at least four times the amount involved must be placed at the disposal of the Reichsbank in foreign exchange. Only when the overwhelmingly greater part of the property is located abroad and is thus beyond our reach may a part of the securities be released in order to enable the Reichsbank to seize the balance and save some foreign exchange.

4. According to decree RE 1/36, emigrants could take along goods for their own use. This possibility has been restricted more and more for reasons pertaining to raw materials and foreign exchange and is of no importance for emigration today.

5. The possibility for the transfer of a slight sum consisted in the release of foreign life insurance policies in cases where the transfer could be effected without involving the Reichsbank in the foreign part of the insurance. Recently the payment of an appropriate amount of foreign exchange or the payment without compensation of a

<sup>1</sup> Signed Dec. 3, 1934. See *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1935, pt. II, No. 10.

<sup>2</sup> This and the following references in this document, given as they appear in the German original, are to various directives issued by the Ministry of Economics for the guidance of the agencies charged with administering the foreign exchange regulations of the Reich. For the texts of some of these directives see the publication of the Bank for International Settlements, *Die Devisenbestimmungen in Deutschland* (Basel, 1945), T: 10-T: 35 in particular.)

considerable sum in reichsmarks to the German Gold Discount Bank has been required in these cases, too. Moreover, this possibility of transfer also loses its importance, since life insurance policies are henceforth only to be taken out on the basis of reichsmarks.

6. If the emigrant brings in supplementary export business, a small percentage of the export foreign exchange may, in individual cases, be allocated after strict scrutiny of the supplementary character of the transaction. These cases are also rare.

7. The sale of property located within the country, a matter generally involving considerable losses to begin with, in return for emigrant blocked marks, is feasible by now only for emigrants of considerable wealth, considering an exchange rate of approximately 18 percent on blocked marks.

8. The utilization of blocked accounts in partial payment of German shipments of goods to foreign countries is prohibited in the case of a large number of commodities (A. E. 18/37 D. St. Ue. St. of February 25, 1937).

### III. FUTURE PROSPECTS

The explanations in part II show that Jewish emigration of the desired proportions can no longer be attained with the possibilities that have been indicated. The following are the only remaining methods:

1. Jews with property possibly in excess of 50,000 reichsmarks will gradually emigrate under the stress of domestic political measures and dispose of their property abroad for blocked marks. Taking into consideration the refugee tax [*Reichsfluchtsteuer*] they succeed in transferring approximately 13 to 14 percent of their property. If these "well-to-do" Jews leave Germany, the impoverishment of the Jewish communities, which has been proceeding at an exceedingly rapid rate, will come to the point where they will no longer be in a position to give assistance to destitute and unemployed Jews. Of the approximately 360,000 Jews still in Germany, approximately 90,000 are at the present time receiving assistance (the Jewish Winter Relief gave assistance to approximately 83,000 persons in the approximate amount of RM 3,500,000 during the winter of 1936/37). We shall have to reckon with the fact that in a comparatively short time there will be considerably more Jews in Germany on relief for whom there will practically speaking be scarcely any opportunity for emigration. In 1936 the amount of money paid out by the Jewish relief organization in Germany for ship passages and other services was 18 times as much as in 1932 (RM 1,621,000 as compared to RM 91,000). Only a small percentage of the Jews, provided they are healthy and young enough, can be trained for agricultural work or in a trade in

Jewish establishments and later emigrate as workers. Since these training possibilities are limited only to Jewish establishments in accordance with the wishes of the Minister of the Interior, these opportunities are exceedingly meager. Emigration would have to be exclusively confined to young people and consequently the rest of the Jews remaining in Germany would have to be given some means of livelihood.

## 2. Emigration to Palestine via the Haavara system.

This emigration is paid for by foreign exchange created from a purely supplementary German export of goods. If this foreign exchange were not made available for emigration, goods could be sold to the Germans and Arabs in Palestine only to a very limited extent because of the boycott which the Jews would no doubt initiate. By means of a contraband list it is guaranteed that cash foreign exchange is made available to the Reichsbank to be freely disposed of for goods containing raw materials and commodities which can be used to produce foreign exchange. Hitherto approximately  $\frac{1}{3}$  of all the Jews emigrating from Germany have gone to Palestine. This includes the Jews who fled to European countries in 1933. If only emigration to countries overseas is taken into consideration, approximately as many as  $\frac{1}{2}$  of all emigrants went to Palestine. The Jews who emigrated to Palestine as "capitalists" (with 1,000 pound sterling entry money [*Vorzeigegeld*]) have gradually brought over more and more relatives and other Jews from Germany. The allotment of worker certificates is connected with the "transfer of capitalists" and cannot be separated from it. According to Weizmann's explanations at the Zionist Congress in Zurich the future Jewish state in Palestine will be able to accommodate approximately 2 million more people. It should be possible, by utilizing the Haavara system, to include a greater proportion of poor Jews and to attain an annual immigration of from 20,000-25,000 Jews to Palestine. At the present time the restriction of the certificates by the Government of the British Mandate stands in the way of this. On November 4, 1937, however, Ormsby-Gore, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that this restriction was purely a temporary measure (until March 1938). A future Jewish state would be able to direct the immigration of Jews according to its own wishes. According to the figures of the Jewish Agency 3,972,000 Palestine pounds sterling were brought from Germany to Palestine in the years 1934, 1935, 1936, and 8 months of 1937 (by comparison, 6,731,000 Palestine pounds sterling were brought to Palestine from Poland).

## 3. Emigration by means of foreign exchange brought into Germany by repatriates.

The foreign exchange to be turned over by immigrants from countries without foreign exchange restrictions is sold to the Jews at a premium of 100 percent after a certain percentage has been deducted

and paid over to the Reichsbank. This procedure is set forth in Allg. vertr. Erlass 131/27 D. St. It facilitates the emigration of classes of Jews who would otherwise have no possibility of any kind for leaving Germany. In addition the more well-to-do Jews are forced to place means at the disposal of the destitute Jews, so that they also can emigrate.

Under the provisions of RE 104/36 D. St. of July 20, 1936, repatriates turned in foreign exchange at the current rate of exchange in the approximate amount of RM 10,454,000 in the course of approximately 1 year (October 1936 to October 1937). On the other hand the repatriates received approximately RM 16,300,000 (thus on the average the immigrants were given a bonus of approximately 55 per cent). Of the incoming foreign exchange the Reichsbank received approximately RM 2,125,000 without granting any compensation in return. In addition it received from repatriates in the course of the last year (under the provisions of RE 53/35) foreign exchange at the official rate in the amount of approximately RM 2,850,000. Up to October 15, 1937, emigrants were given foreign exchange in the amount of about RM 4,800,000 on the basis of RE 153/36. For this the Jews paid approximately RM 9,644,000 to the German Gold Discount Bank.

By raising the commission paid to the banks in the United States of America as intermediaries for repatriation, the amount of foreign exchange brought in by immigrants went as high as approximately RM 1,640,000 from September 16 to October 15, 1937. Even if one can expect only about RM 1,500,000 in foreign exchange to be incoming each month (on the basis of RE 104/36)—of which the Reichsbank will receive approximately RM 300,000 without having to make any payment in return—then at least 800 especially undesirable Jews may be removed from Germany every month with the balance of approximately RM 1,200,000 in foreign exchange. If this system can be continued, there is the possibility of utilizing for this system a part of the foreign exchange being used in the form of Haavara marks for Jewish subsistence payments from abroad to relatives within the country, in addition to using it for emigration to Palestine. By eliminating the gift tax for payments of that kind the amounts could, in my estimation, be increased to a considerable degree. New methods could then also be sought in order to incorporate additional amounts of foreign exchange into this system—for example, by the transfer of real estate and mortgages having practically no realizable value, which could gradually be converted abroad by the Jews; or by diverting a portion of the foreign exchange obtained from exports for purely supplementary transactions (the construction of power plants, dams, etc.).

But if even the foreign exchange obtained from repatriates—obtained by paying the repatriates a bonus—is to be no longer available

for purposes of emigration, and if emigration to Palestine were to be greatly curtailed as undesirable, I see no possibility of carrying out the emigration without directly or indirectly sacrificing foreign exchange in some other disadvantageous way.

## No. 576

1626/389299;  
1626/389302-06

*The Propaganda Ministry to the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

VII 7082/24.11.37/400-6/7

Attention Minister von Hentig

BERLIN, December 14, 1937.

Received December 22.

Pol. VII 1365.

Copies of 5 enclosures<sup>2</sup> are herewith transmitted for information and with reference to the recent conversation.

By order:  
KNOTHE<sup>3</sup>

[Enclosure 1]

BERLIN, November 24, 1937.

MY DEAR HERR KNOTHE: Having been unsuccessful, despite several attempts, in reaching you by telephone today, I should like in this letter to ask if I may trouble you for an appointment.

I come from Damascus on behalf of the Grand Mufti of Palestine, His Excellency Haj Amin al-Husayni, who at the present time is in Beirut, and also on behalf of the Great Arabian Club in Damascus and the Administrative Board of the National Bureau for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, and I am planning to return to Damascus after our conference.

Herr Geiger, the Chief of the Ortsgruppe of the NSDAP in Beirut, with whom you are very well acquainted, gave me a letter<sup>4</sup> to you at the time of our first conversation, and he will get in touch with you as soon as he has assumed his new post in the German Embassy in Paris.

I should be very grateful if you would have a message sent me at telephone number 664403 as to when I may call on you in person.

Heil Hitler!

DR. IMAM

<sup>1</sup> These documents were also sent to the War Ministry and to the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

<sup>2</sup> Only three of these enclosures are printed here. The other two (1626/389300-01) are letters of introduction from Arab organizations for Dr. Imam, the writer of enclosure No. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Knothe was an official of the Foreign Department in the Propaganda Ministry.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

[Enclosure 2]

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, December 1, 1937.

MY DEAR HERR KNOTHE: Shortly before I left for Paris, where I now have taken up my new assignment at the Embassy, Dr. Said Imam of Damascus, whom you met at the time of his visit last year, visited me in my home. Dr. Said Imam is a well-known political figure in Damascus. He belongs to the Nationalist bloc and is the founder of the new Arabian Club and of the Association of Arabs who studied in Germany. His stay in Germany is connected with matters pertaining to the Syrian independence movement and the struggle of the Arabs in Palestine against the Jews. The Consulate General at Beirut announced Dr. Imam's visit to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin.<sup>5</sup> Dr. Imam also bears a card of introduction from Consul General Seiler<sup>6</sup> to Minister von Hentig.

Dr. Imam has a number of wishes, some of them rather delicate in nature, which fall to some extent within the scope of the Foreign Ministry and the Propaganda Ministry.

I should be very happy if you, my dear Herr Knothe, would receive Dr. Imam and listen to what he has to say. Dr. Imam is, among other things, the confidential agent of the Grand Mufti, from whom he has a letter of introduction.

In my opinion it would be well to confer with the persons handling Syrian and Lebanese affairs in the Foreign Ministry before you speak with Dr. Imam, for the matter is in my opinion extremely important. The Foreign Ministry has been informed of Dr. Imam's wishes.

These lines are in compliance with the request of Dr. Imam, who asked me to give him an introduction to you this year, too.

I thought that I would still meet you in Paris; I was told, however, that you returned to Berlin a few days before my arrival. It is too bad that we were therefore unable to get together for a short visit.

Hoping that you will excuse me for troubling you again, I remain with Heil Hitler!

Very truly yours,

E. GEIGER

[Enclosure 3]

An offer to

I: The appropriate authorities in Germany  
from

II: 1. The Grand Mufti of Palestine, His Excellency Amin Effendi al-Husayni, also acting in his capacity as President of the Arab Executive Committee of Palestine;

<sup>5</sup> The message from the Consulate General at Beirut has not been found.

<sup>6</sup> German Consul General at Beirut.

2. The Administrative Board of the Arab National Bureau for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment in Damascus;
3. The Board of Directors of the Arabian Club in Damascus.

*Nature of the activities:*

I. [above] will support the Arab independence movement ideologically and materially;

II. [above] will very extensively support I ideologically within the framework of mutual understanding and cooperation between Germany and the Arab-Islamic world.

*Basis:*

A frank and clear agreement of a private nature between I and II for mutual cooperation while maintaining and respecting the national convictions of both peoples.

*Program:*

I will support II:

1. Ideologically, by expressing sympathy with the Arab independence movement in domestic and international political circles and at every other favorable opportunity;

2. Materially, by sending supplies for the independence movement (also for payment);

3. By equipping all enterprises and propaganda centers established by II in the common interest.

II will support I by:

1. Promoting German trade in the Arab-Islamic world;

2. Preparing a sympathetic atmosphere for Germany, which will make itself felt in case of war;

3. Disseminating National Socialist ideas in the Arab-Islamic world;

4. Combatting Communism, which appears to be spreading gradually, by employing all possible means;

5. Boycotting all Jewish goods;

6. Continuing acts of terrorism in all French colonial and mandated territories inhabited by Arabs or Mohammedans (e. g., Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco);

7. Combatting and preventing with all possible means the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine;

8. Disseminating German culture in the Arab-Islamic countries;

9. Willingness, in case of success of the independence movement, to utilize only German capital and intellectual resources.

The manner in which the above-mentioned nine points are to be carried out shall be left to the discretion of the military and political leaders of the Arab independence movement and to the public and secret organizations working with them, which are dispersed throughout the Arab world.

The proposals are expressed in brief outline and naturally need to be explained in detail.

No. 577

1542/375530-32

*The Consul General at Jerusalem to the Foreign Ministry*

No. Polit. 4

JERUSALEM, January 14, 1938.

Received January 26.

Pol. VII 92.

Subject: Decision on whether the policy we have followed so far vis-à-vis Palestine can be retained or whether it must be changed.

With reference to report Polit. 16 of March 22, 1937.<sup>1</sup>

In connection with the question brought up in the report cited—whether the policy we have followed so far vis-à-vis Palestine can be retained or whether it must be changed—a decision on the political aspect was reached in telegraphic instruction No. 14 of June 4, 1937,<sup>2</sup> to the effect that the formation of a Jewish state would not be in the interest of Germany and that Germany would therefore be interested in strengthening Arab power to counterbalance an increase in Jewish power. The decision on economic or political measures bearing on the promotion of Jewish emigration (Haavara), although promised in that telegraphic instruction, has not yet been received.

In the report cited I already referred to the fact that retention of the economic policy we have been following vis-à-vis Palestine would involve the danger of our losing the sympathy hitherto shown us by the Arabs, and that Arab public opinion might even turn against us if an Arab leader truthfully revealed the German measures to facilitate the immigration of German Jews into Palestine. I have observed that the hitherto decidedly pro-German attitude of the Palestine Arabs has lately begun to waver. This might be traced to the fact that the Arabs in Palestine had counted on active German support in their fight against the Jews and the Mandate Government and were disappointed because such support failed to materialize. While during the disturbances in 1936 to be a German Aryan was like having a kind of safe conduct for unrestricted travel in Palestine, this is no longer completely true. I fear that the Arab population's hatred of the British will soon develop into a hatred of Europeans in general, and that the Arabs will then make no exception in the case of German residents here.

I have the honor to submit as an enclosure<sup>3</sup> a summary of an article which appeared in the Arab newspaper *Al Jam'iyyat al-Islamiyyat* (The Islamic University) on January 9, 1938. The article contains sharp criticism of the terms insisted upon by Germany

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 561, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> The instruction sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad and London on June 1, printed as document No. 561, is meant.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (7059/E524131).



in connection with the purchase of Palestinian oranges, and it urges the German colonists to make representations to their Government. *Al Jam'iyyat al-Islamiyyat* is an Arab nationalist newspaper and has so far been sympathetic toward Germany. The entire problem of our measures to facilitate the immigration of German Jews into Palestine was not touched upon in the article in question. We must, however, expect that the article may mean the beginning of polemics against us. The unfavorable purchase terms in the orange agreement with Palestine are attributable to the consideration given the Jews and the unrestricted transfer of Jewish property from Germany to Palestine via Haavara, and they can easily be changed if the consideration given the Jews is curtailed.

I should regret it if, by delaying the decision or by renewed confirmation of the economic policy we have so far followed, we were to lose our influence on the Arab population and produce among the Arabs a sentiment which would make it difficult for us later to restore their present favorable attitude.

A decision in the economic and political fields on the question set forth in subject report is, in my opinion, urgently needed.\*

DÖHLE

\*An undated memorandum (1542/375588-40) drafted by Hentig, the Head of Political Division VII, comments on this report. Hentig took the position that the question of the Haavara Agreement was primarily economic and it was up to the responsible economic officials to judge it from that point of view. So far as the political aspect was concerned, he was of the opinion that the decisive question was whether Jewish emigration from Germany should be continued or stopped. The chances for establishment of a Jewish state were very slight anyway but even if they were not, the prevention of the Jewish emigration from Germany would only lead to the influx of Eastern Jews into Palestine. Hentig finally expressed himself in favor of bringing these arguments to the attention of the highest authorities, and requesting a decision.

## No. 578

1605/385474-75

### *The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 142

BAGDAD, January 20, 1938.

Received January 27.

Pol. VII 106.

Subject: Ibn Sand's desire to enter into diplomatic relations with Germany.

With reference to report No. 2633 of November 9, 1937.

In connection with our conversation of November 5 of last year in Bagdad, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, King Ibn Sand's private secretary, sent me through the Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires in this city a letter<sup>1</sup> which is enclosed in translation.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1605/385476).

In that conversation I had reminded the Sheikh that the debt owed by the Saudi Arabian Government to Herr Heinrich de Haas, the former German honorary consul in Jidda, was still unpaid and told him that it might facilitate the opening of diplomatic relations with Germany, which is desired by King Ibn Saud, if this matter would be settled. In his letter to me Sheikh Yusuf Yasin reverts to this matter and states that at his instance the Minister of Finance has expressed the willingness to pay half of the balance of Herr de Haas' claim of 2,000 pounds sterling (gold) this year and the other half next year, and he was asking Herr de Haas to let him know in whose name the amount was to be paid and to whom it was to be delivered. Herr de Haas is to give the Minister of Finance a receipt for the amount paid. Kindly notify Herr de Haas of this.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin writes further that Khalid Beg al-Qarqani, who has the surname of Babai al-Walid, was charged and authorized by the Saudi Arabian Government to travel to Germany to purchase arms and he requests me to ask my Government to give him the required assistance so that he can buy the arms at moderate prices and against installment payments. The open balances are to be secured by a bank guaranty. I leave to your discretion such further action on this matter as you may deem advisable.

Referring to our previous conversation about the possibility of opening diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the German Government, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informs me that his Government has consented to the accreditation in Jidda of a German representative stationed in another country. In keeping with Saudi Arabian mentality, however, he claims contrary to the truth that this was a request by the German Government which I had conveyed to him, and he speaks of having the German representative who is being considered for the Jidda appointment simultaneously accredited in another country. As a matter of fact Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had expressly told me that his Government would be glad if a German representative already accredited to another country were to come to Jidda for a few months every winter. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin does not, by the way, mention in his letter that his Government was also prepared to accredit a diplomatic representative in Berlin.

Sheikh Muhammad Ide al-Rawwaf, the Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires here, who delivered the letter to me, especially stressed the last named item in the letter, stating that King Ibn Saud was most eager for a German representative to be accredited to him as soon as possible. It would be sufficient for him to stay at Jidda for a few months every winter, leaving a deputy in charge during his absence.

I wrote to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, acknowledging the receipt of his letter and informing him that I had communicated the contents to my Government.

GROBBA

## No. 579

1542/375533-37

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, January 27, 1938.

zu 83-24 A g 13/1 (15 g).<sup>1</sup>

During the conferences and discussion on the question of the Haavara Agreement which have taken place between the Ministries in the last few years, the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry has always taken the stand that this Agreement cannot be continued in its present form; as regards the treatment of the Germans as well as the Arabs in Palestine it creates conditions which from the viewpoint of the Foreign Ministry can, for political as well as economic reasons, no longer be permitted. The Ministry of Economics and especially the Foreign Exchange Control Office have taken the stand that removal of the abuses as regards the treatment of Germans and Arabs in Palestine, as demanded by the Foreign Ministry, might be brought about by amendment of the Haavara Agreement. The Auslandsorganisation took the stand that a complete removal of these abuses could be obtained only by abolishing the entire Haavara Agreement. During conversations which have taken place the last few days with the Ministry of Economics it became evident that the Ministry of Economics now also favors the opinion that it would be more expedient not just to amend the Haavara Agreement but to abolish it and replace it by another system. A joint discussion between the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economics and the Auslandsorganisation is contemplated in order to determine how the Haavara Agreement should be abolished and what system should then take its place. These conversations have so far been postponed only because the completion of the reorganization of the Ministry of Economics had to be awaited first. Immediately after February 1, however, the discussion of this question will be taken up.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, as pointed out above, there is agreement between the agencies most concerned that the Haavara Agreement must be ended. On the other hand, the said agencies are agreed, as was confirmed a few days ago by both a representative of the Ministry of Economics and a representative of the Foreign Trade Office of the Auslandsorganisation, that there could be no question of simply abolishing the Haavara Agreement, but that another system must take its place. The Economic

<sup>1</sup> This reference is to a letter from the Ministry of the Interior which has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> Complete documentation on further attempts to resolve conflicts of views between the participating agencies has not been found. See, however, document No. 580.

Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry as well as the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Trade Office of the Auslandsorganisation are, as before, of the opinion that the Führer's general directive to facilitate Jewish emigration from Germany by all available means cannot be fulfilled if Palestine is excluded in this connection. There is no chance to promote the emigration of Jews to any other country in the world on economic conditions equally favorable to us. In addition there is the view, held especially by the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, that Jewish emigrants anywhere else in the world, especially in all centers of international trade, can harm us much more economically and through propaganda and press than in Palestine, where the possibility of such action is practically non-existent.

The telegraphic instructions to the Embassy in London and the Legation in Bagdad, signed by the Foreign Minister,<sup>3</sup> which are mentioned in the draft of the letter to the Ministry of the Interior,<sup>4</sup> contained only the information that Germany was determined to fight with all political means available to her against the birth of an independent Jewish state. But in dealing with this matter the Foreign Minister did not decide that emigration to Palestine was also for that reason to be prevented. Nor can it be gathered from the said instructions that the decision to fight the birth of a Jewish state politically contains in itself a decision on the question whether Jews can or cannot emigrate to Palestine. Furthermore, since last June the question of the creation of an independent Jewish state has, as a result of the political development of this problem meanwhile, entered so completely new a stage that even if a decision on the emigration question had been reached at that time it would now need to be reexamined.

According to the Aussenpolitisches Amt, the Führer has recently decided again, after another report by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, that Jewish emigration from Germany shall continue to be promoted by all available means. Any question which might have existed up to now as to whether in the Führer's opinion such emigration is to be directed primarily to Palestine has thereby been answered in the affirmative.<sup>5</sup>

In view of this state of affairs it is suggested that the letter from the Ministry of the Interior should be answered as follows:

"The Foreign Ministry continues to take the position that the formation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine is undesirable.

<sup>3</sup>Document No. 561.

<sup>4</sup>Apparently Referat Deutschland prepared a draft reply to the letter from the Ministry of the Interior.

<sup>5</sup>Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "We should have this in writing. Any further discussion would then be superfluous." There is a draft letter to the Aussenpolitisches Amt, initialed by Hentig on Jan. 31 (3496/E019923), asking for this written confirmation, but the letter evidently was not sent. The draft was initialed by Bismarck on several occasions and was finally consigned to the file on Mar. 3.

[The German Government will therefore continue to fight against the formation of such a state with all political means available.<sup>1</sup>] Judging from the latest developments, to be sure, it seems that the formation of such a state will fail anyway, because of other opposition.<sup>7</sup> According to a report which we received within the last few days from Aussenpolitisches Amt,<sup>8</sup> the question of the emigration of Jews from Germany to Palestine has been settled anew by a decision by the Führer to the effect that emigration shall continue to be promoted. At the earliest possible date, therefore, the Foreign Ministry will examine together with the Ministry of Economics, which is mainly interested in the economic aspect of the matter, and with the Auslandsorganisation what system might appropriately be substituted for the Haavara Agreement; its elimination is still considered necessary by the Foreign Ministry, too, because of the disadvantage at which it puts Germans and Arabs living in Palestine.<sup>9</sup>

Herewith respectfully returned to Referat Deutschland through the Director of the Economic Policy Department.

Please forward the letter of January 13 from the Ministry of the Interior—I 1501/III/38 g-5012d—(Ausw. Amt. 83-24A (g) 13/1 (15 g)) to the Economic Policy Department which is competent in matters pertaining to German trade with Palestine and consequently also in the matter of the Haavara Agreement.<sup>10</sup>

CLODIUS

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "By what means?" The sentence in brackets was stricken through by Bismarck apparently in response to Weizsäcker's comment.

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Uncertain." This sentence was then revised in Bismarck's handwriting to read as follows: "Developments, according to reports received by us, are to the effect that the formation of such a state is meeting with resistance from all sides so that it cannot be expected to materialize in the near future."

<sup>8</sup> This clause inserted in Bismarck's handwriting.

<sup>9</sup> Marginal note: "To Deputy Director Political Department: If the Führer has decided that the stream of Jewish emigration shall continue to be directed toward Palestine too, further discussion is superfluous. In that case, however, I am in favor of omitting from the letter all political reflections regarding promotion or non-promotion of a possible Jewish state."

<sup>10</sup> "I should appreciate it if the Political Department would intervene to that effect. W[eizsäcker], Jan. 28."

No. 580

2029/444544-46

*Memorandum of Referat Deutschland<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, March 10, 1938.  
83-24 A 10/3.

The so-called Haavara Agreement, the continuation of which is the subject of controversy between political and economic offices inside

<sup>1</sup> The document is unsigned. The file number was not stamped on until July 23, 1938, on which date it was also initialed by an unidentified official. The marginal comments noted below are in the same handwriting and presumably of the same date.

and outside the Foreign Ministry, enables Jews emigrating from Germany to Palestine to transfer a certain portion of their property to Palestine, in that the Jewish emigrant exports a corresponding amount of German goods to Palestine. The German exporting firm is paid out of the Jewish emigrant's reichsmark account; the latter receives in Palestine the proceeds of the sale in foreign exchange. In practice the system is considerably more complicated than described because of the clearing offices which are involved and the deductions which have to be calculated.

For more than a year Referat Deutschland, together with the Auslandsorganisation and other agencies, has been trying to obtain the termination of the Agreement, for the following reasons:

1. In view of the strict foreign exchange legislation the Haavara Agreement offers the German Jew the only possibility of transferring his capital abroad.

2. The building of a Jewish state is strengthened by the influx into Palestine of German capital in Jewish hands; this is decidedly not in the German interest, since it would not have the effect of absorbing world Jewry but would simply some day bring it an incalculable gain in political and international power—as the Vatican State has done for political Catholicism. (In *Mein Kampf* the Führer expresses the same idea; the Embassy in London and the Legation in Bagdad have already been instructed to this effect.)

3. We have no interest in promoting the emigration from Germany of rich Jews who take their capital with them. Rather there is a German interest in Jewish *mass* emigration, which Palestine, however, neither can nor wants to absorb. Last year, for instance, Palestine admitted only about 1,500 German Jews. On the other hand, capital export to Palestine by way of Haavara has been reported at 90 million reichsmarks for the coming months!

In the opinion of all agencies concerned, especially the Party agencies—with the exception of the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Exchange Control Office<sup>2</sup>—it is therefore high time and urgently necessary to plug this gap in German foreign exchange legislation through which German capital in Jewish hands is flowing abroad and can even be utilized for the creation of a Jewish state. The Foreign Ministry already pointed out in the circular instruction of July 1937<sup>3</sup> the danger inherent in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and now the Ministry of the Interior intends to

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "No longer applicable since the personnel changes in these agencies."

<sup>3</sup> Apparently the reference is to the Foreign Ministry circular of June 22, 1937, printed as document No. 564.

submit a memorandum to the Führer and Reich Chancellor. The following questions are to be submitted to the Führer and Reich Chancellor for decision:

1. Is it still defensible to concentrate the emigration of rich Jews on Palestine and thereby contribute to the building of a Jewish state not in the German interest? Would it not be more suitable to scatter the Jewish emigration and thus promote anti-Semitic sentiment in the world? (The Auslandsorganisation and Referat Deutschland consider the latter the right solution.)
2. Is it not necessary to denounce the Haavara Agreement at once, even though interested German exporters advocate retaining it by using specious political arguments? The Auslandsorganisation and Referat Deutschland are of the opinion that German export firms are interested in its maintenance simply because they realize a considerable profit—though no foreign exchange—from the combining of Jewish transfer interests with German export interests.

To begin with, the Ministry of the Interior has asked the participating offices, including the Foreign Ministry, for an opinion. The Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry cannot be induced to sign the attached draft<sup>4</sup> drawn up by Referat Deutschland, as it is based on political rather than economic considerations.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the draft has already been signed by the Head of the Auslandsorganisation and the Director of the Political Department (with a supplement). The decision of the Foreign Minister is therefore requested.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Not found. See document No. 579.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note (see footnote 1): "Has been in the Economic Policy Department since April."

<sup>6</sup> The issue continued unresolved for a considerable period longer. See document No. 587.

## No. 581

1541/375455-56

### *The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Minister*

BAGDAD, July 5, 1938.

Pol. VII 885.

MY DEAR FOREIGN MINISTER: When I spoke about the Palestine problem with Foreign Minister Taufik al-Suwaydi<sup>1</sup> a few days ago he said that he was under the impression that in British Government

<sup>1</sup> Foreign Minister of Iraq 1934, 1937-1938.

circles the idea was gaining ground that the question could be solved only through the creation of an independent Arab state with a Jewish minority. It was certain even now that the Woodhead Commission<sup>2</sup> was a complete failure and would not be able to offer any sort of practical suggestions for the solution of the problem. The mood in British Government circles, which already inclined toward the Arab solution of the Palestine question, would certainly be considerably intensified if Germany made it clear to the British Government that she would welcome a solution in line with Arab demands. Germany, whose negative stand against the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was known, was fully justified in concerning herself with this problem.

I answered the Foreign Minister that in this matter Germany could only support the efforts of the other Arab states, but had so far failed to note any united stand on this question on the part of the various Arab countries. To be sure, Iraq had at various times lent support to the Palestinian Arabs, but Germany had been unable to note a like attitude on the part of the other Arab states. Ibn Saud, in particular, seemed to be observing great restraint in this matter.

Taufik al-Suwaydi replied that the attitude of the Iraqi Government to the Palestine question was known. The Iraqi Government had submitted its suggestions for the solution of the Palestine question to the British Government 2 months ago. Because of her ties with England, Iraq naturally could not push matters to the point of breaking with England. Egypt was still less free in her decisions. But Ibn Saud had considerably changed his attitude in this matter in recent months. He was in constant touch with the Iraqi Government regarding joint action and had likewise added his signature to the Iraqi memorandum. Precisely the fact of Ibn Saud's signing had made a strong impression on the British Government.

Taufik al-Suwaydi then repeated his view that the British were completely perplexed in regard to Palestine and that therefore the psychological moment was favorable for intervention by Germany. He did not doubt that the British decision would then favor the

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<sup>2</sup> The Commission headed by Sir John Woodhead and appointed in February 1938 was charged with the drafting of a definite partition scheme, after the League had authorized the Mandatory Power to formulate such a plan (see document No. 569, footnote 3). The Woodhead Commission, having visited Palestine from April to August 1938, eventually submitted a report to the British Government (Cmd. 5354 of Oct. 19, 1938) stating that the original partition plan was impracticable unless the territories and the autonomous rights allotted to Jews and Arabs were drastically reduced. Thereupon the British Government dropped the whole plan.



Palestinian Arabs. By such intervention Germany would earn the eternal gratitude of the Arab world.<sup>3</sup>

With sincerest regards and Heil Hitler!

I am, my dear Foreign Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

F. GROBBA

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<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "We have already expressed ourselves against the Jewish state and could do so again at the proper time and under the proper circumstances. He[ntig], Aug. 17."

## No. 582

1606/385489-91

### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII*

BERLIN, August 27, 1938.

e. o. Pol. VII 1157.

The Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, Fuad Bey Hamza,<sup>1</sup> was in Berlin from August 23 until today, August 27. At the King's request he had to cut short his cure in Carlsbad after only 4 days in order to be at the disposal of the Crown Prince on his mission to London. Fuad Hamza did not express himself in any detail about this mission, but he did in three long conversations give a general outline of the attitude of his country, and especially of King Ibn Saud toward England. He pointed to the strained economic situation as well as the particular political circumstances which made it impossible for the King to act freely according to his own political inclination. We would always have to reckon with the fact that because of the caution required, which the King has constantly observed, he not only would not be hostile to England, but in certain circumstances would positively cooperate with her. But this would not in any way alter his fundamental attitude toward general Arab problems and toward us. He declared that under these circumstances he understood perfectly if, in some particular situation or other, we avoided emphasizing our friendship. The Saudi Arabian policy was based on long-range considerations, and in these circumstances he had no desire for any momentary help, if it meant embarrassing Germany.

He described relations with Italy as in a process of constant improvement. To be sure, the Arabs and the King as well had not yet quite overcome their distrust of Italy. But Mussolini had personally

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<sup>1</sup> Actually, Emir Faisal was Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia while Fuad Bey Hamza was Deputy Foreign Minister, a post he had held since December 1930.

made very extensive and reassuring statements to him, which there was no reason to doubt. In the Palestine question Mussolini had changed his fundamental position repeatedly but had recently disinterested himself completely. Still, he was prepared to furnish proof of his friendly sentiments, if not in Palestine then directly in Arabia. But King Ibn Saud had constantly resisted accepting such proof (arms shipments were probably what was meant) in order to retain his freedom of action.

Fuad Bey Hamza then passed over individual questions such as that of diplomatic representation, which he considered of secondary importance, and inquired regarding the policy which Germany would adopt toward Arabia. The King had looked to us again and again, because we actually did not have or seek any political interests in the Arab region.

I confirmed this to Fuad Hamza and called his attention to our generally friendly attitude—in view of common enemies, too. The most important thing, it seemed to me, was to establish a really lasting basis for mutual relations; this would, in my opinion, be possible only through a comprehensive understanding based on personal relations and knowledge of conditions on both sides. I then outlined a limited program in the cultural field, with which he seemed to be very much in agreement. The possibility of linguistic preparation of students, such as was being given in Bagdad, for example, seemed to appeal to him most of all. He went so far as to inquire about the number of students we might accept. I thereupon described to him the development of measures of this kind which we had taken with respect to other countries. He likewise immediately accepted the suggestions for a radio station and closer press relations through the Egyptian-Syrian and Palestine-Arab press. Nor did I neglect to inform him that we would likewise be interested in the study of the Arabic language and in literary translations from Arabic into German and vice versa.

Since I was of the opinion that of all the Arab negotiators who have heretofore visited us Fuad Hamza was the most reasonable, the one least influenced by the viewpoints of the moment and, above all, who might later be of decisive importance to us, I also put him in touch with Vice Admiral Canaris after having consulted Ministerialdirektor Prüfer.

Fuad Hamza, who has lived in the greatest possible seclusion here with his English-speaking wife and his 2½ year-old child, promised upon his departure that he would maintain the newly formed connec-

tions in every way. He will probably also make use of the invitation to the Party Rally, which he values very highly.

HENTIG

No. 583

1605/385492-93

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 3, 1938.

Pol. VII 1263.

Freiherr von Harder of the Aussenpolitisches Amt called on me the day before yesterday. I told him that at the present time the idea of accrediting our Minister in Bagdad to Saudi Arabia as well was being considered.<sup>1</sup> Herr von Harder said that the desire of the Aussenpolitisches Amt would thereby be fulfilled to that extent. He then spoke about assigning a certain Herr von der E. . . (?)<sup>2</sup> to the German Mission in Saudi Arabia.

Herr von Harder, furthermore, brought up the matter of the armament transaction with Saudi Arabia which has already been discussed several times.<sup>3</sup> According to his statement it was a question of a 5-year Reich guarantee, to the amount of about one million reichsmarks, for deliveries of rifles and the establishment of an ammunition factory in Saudi Arabia. The credit is to be paid off in installments over a period of 5 years. In so far as payment in goods cannot be made, it is to be made in ready foreign exchange. The Ministry of Economics (Ministerialrat Schottky) was very much interested in the matter and was prepared to give a Reich guarantee if the Foreign Ministry would recommend it for political reasons. Admiral Canaris had likewise been consulted about the matter and had shown a very lively interest (?).

The Aussenpolitisches Amt would like very much to have the matter cleared up before Nuremberg, since otherwise Reichsleiter Rosenberg wanted to take the question up with the Foreign Minister at Nuremberg.

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 574, 578, and 582.

<sup>2</sup> Handwritten corrections on this copy have rendered the rest of the name illegible.

<sup>3</sup> The background of this transaction is given to a certain extent in an unsigned memorandum of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of July 23, 1938, which was sent to the Foreign Ministry by Harder (1605/385485-88). According to this document, contacts between the Aussenpolitisches Amt and certain politically influential personages in Saudi Arabia had been maintained since 1937. In the spring of 1938, one of Ibn Saud's economic advisers had discussed with German business circles possibilities of German deliveries of war material to Saudi Arabia and had also expressed the desire to have German technical personnel assist in the construction of roads in Saudi Arabia. He urged a speedy and favorable answer on the part of the German agencies concerned in the armament transaction. See also document No. 590.

Herewith returned to Senior Counselor von Hentig in accordance with oral agreement. If possible, please inform me by courier at Nuremberg as to what action has been taken.<sup>4</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of Sept. 6, 1938 (1605/385494) addressed by Hentig to Woermann at Nuremberg states that officials of the Ministry of Economics did not favor the armament transaction, since Germany would not thereby receive any ready foreign exchange, and that in the view of Economic Policy Division III and Political Division VII no overriding political or economic considerations seemed to favor the transaction.

### No. 584

1605/385497

#### *An Official of the Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi Party to the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>*

8027

BERLIN, September 26, 1938.  
Pol. VII 1327.

Subject: Saudi Arabia.

MY DEAR HERR WOERMANN: With reference to yesterday's conversation I should be very grateful to you if, in pursuance of the foreign-policy goals discussed, the question of the political necessity of granting economic credits to Saudi Arabia<sup>2</sup> in principle could be decided as soon as possible and the Ministry of Economics be informed thereof.

I shall refrain from emphasizing details in this letter, since my collaborator, Party Comrade von Harder, had already given you an oral report<sup>3</sup> on the subject.

The matter is particularly urgent because, after the discussions last spring, the Arabs are now pressing for a final decision and on the other hand there is danger that any day German industry will make other dispositions of the reserved material (rifles) as a result of the expiration of the time limit.<sup>4</sup>

Heil Hitler!

MALLETE

<sup>1</sup> The letterhead indicates that this document originated in the Foreign Trade Section in the Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi Party.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 583, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> On Sept. 26 Woermann informed Hentig (1605/385495-96) of this conversation with Harder. Harder had said that the Ministry of Economics would commit itself only if the Foreign Ministry would sponsor the transaction.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal notes:

"H[err] v. Hentig: Please confer with me. W[oermann], Sept. 26."

"Ibn Saud's Foreign Minister is so far from being convinced of his master's neutrality that he himself advised routing arms shipments by way of Iraq."

"In the present situation we would by this trade treaty be delivering the arms chiefly to the British. Hentig, Sept. 27."

"Herr v. Hentig: Please prepare soon a draft for an answer in friendly terms. W[oermann], Sept. 28."

"Draft attached. He[ntig], Sept. 28."

The reply sent is printed as document No. 585.

No. 585

1605/385498-99

*The Director of the Political Department to the Foreign Policy Office  
of the Nazi Party*

September 29, 1938.<sup>1</sup>  
zu Pol. VII 1327.

With reference to your No. 8027 of September 26, 1938.

MY DEAR HERR MALLETKE: I thank you very sincerely for your friendly suggestion of September 26, which naturally caused us to consider the Saudi Arabian matter very thoroughly, even during these last days of crisis. As you know, we have decided to establish official relations with Saudi Arabia in the very near future and for this purpose have already made a request through the Saudi Minister to Cairo that our representative in Bagdad be accredited to the King in Jidda.

Regarding the attitude of the King himself we have recently received very detailed information from the best possible source—his Foreign Minister. In answer to a question from the military whether we could even count on the neutrality of Ibn Saud, it had to be conceded that the special conditions of the Kingdom and the predominant British influence would probably not yet permit the King to reveal his true feelings, which could not be friendly toward England. Accordingly, as things stand today, we have to expect that Ibn Saud, who is not revealing his attitude regarding the Palestine question either, will be found on the British side. From a political point of view, therefore, we cannot at the present time recommend arms deliveries to the King on credit.

Fortunately, however, the situation has changed fundamentally since yesterday. I therefore propose that we return to this matter after a report has been submitted by our Minister, who will leave shortly for Jidda.

Heil Hitler!

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup>The copy used is a draft prepared by Hentig (see document No. 584, footnote 4). It was approved by Woermann on Sept. 30, and sent in a clean copy on Oct. 1. It was marked for the attention of Malletke in the Foreign Trade Section within the Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi Party.

No. 586

1541/375491-98

*The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

No. 2821

BAGDAD, November 2, 1938.  
Pol. VII 1523.

Subject: Alleged anti-German interview by the Foreign Minister.

Before his departure from London, Foreign Minister Taufik al-Suwaydi gave an interview to a representative of the magazine *Great*

*Britain and the East* which was published in the October 13 issue; the local newspaper, *The Iraq Times*, in its October 20 issue carried an abstract, a clipping of which is enclosed.<sup>1</sup> On this occasion the Foreign Minister allegedly made the following statement with reference to the Palestine problem: "This problem is not a British colonial question: it is an international problem of the highest importance. The feeling in Iraq over this question is terribly strong. We are the allies of Great Britain, and in her hour of peril we would surely go to her aid. As a matter of fact, we were quite prepared to play our part had the necessity arisen recently, and to implement our word. But nothing can stop the sympathy of Arab for fellow Arab."<sup>2</sup>

This statement conflicts with the reassuring information which Minister President Jamil Madfai<sup>3</sup> gave me on September 28 and with the predominant opinion in political circles here to the effect that in case of war between Germany and England, Iraq would probably have remained neutral. The Minister President told me that because of its sympathy with Germany the Iraqi Government would use all the opportunities afforded by the treaty of alliance with England to delay taking any kind of measures against Germany. Consequently, after the interview was published, I called attention to this contradiction and asked for an explanation from the Minister President, from Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas-Mahdi, from Sabih Najib, the General Director in the Foreign Ministry, from the Foreign Minister's brother Naji Pasha Suwaydi, formerly Minister President and President of the Iraq Committee for the Defense of Palestine, and from a leading Arab nationalist here. All of them told me they were convinced that Taufik Suwaydi had not used these words, and that they must have been distorted by the interviewer in a manner favorable to British interests.

The Minister President told me that Taufik Suwaydi had had to conduct his London conversations in accordance with the instructions of his Government, and these had been very different. He, the Minister President, could only repeat what he had already told me on September 28. I myself knew the sentiment in Iraq toward Germany. Iraq was convinced of Germany's friendly feeling toward her and would adapt her own attitude toward Germany accordingly.

Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas-Mahdi declared that during the critical period the Government of Iraq had studied thoroughly the scope of its obligations under the treaty of alliance with England, but had not yet come to any decision in regard to its attitude in case of an Anglo-German war.

<sup>1</sup> Not reprinted (7058/E524127).

<sup>2</sup> The quotation is in English in the original.

<sup>3</sup> He had succeeded Hikmet Sulayman in August 1937.

Sabih Najib called attention to the fact that Taufik Suwaydi had only an inadequate command of the English language, and if the interview was given in that language, could have expressed himself only awkwardly, which might be the reason for the false report.

Naji Pasha al-Suwaydi was very much worried about his brother's alleged interview. He declared that his brother was a wise and discreet man who certainly had not made such a mistake. His brother had probably told the British that Iraq could not fulfill her obligations toward England under the treaty of alliance unless England accepted the demands of the Palestinian Arabs. At least that should have been the import of his statement.

The Arab nationalist declared that if Taufik Suwaydi had really given this interview, he had thereby placed himself in opposition to Iraqi public opinion.

All of them assured me that Taufik Suwaydi would upon his return be able to correct the report without any difficulty. In answer to my proposal that in this case it would be best if Taufik Suwaydi set the magazine right in regard to the interview, the Deputy Foreign Minister and the General Director in the Foreign Ministry declared that Taufik Suwaydi would probably not be able to do this lest he offend British sensibilities; he would, however, certainly give me a satisfactory explanation of the incident.

On October 29 I had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Foreign Minister. He asserted, obviously contrary to the truth, that he had not read the published text of the interview. He had had a long conversation with the representative of the magazine on every possible subject, including Palestine. But the interview had not been submitted to him before publication. Naturally he had stated merely in accordance with the text of the treaty of alliance, that Iraq as an ally of England was prepared, if necessary, to fulfill her obligations under the treaty. When I laid before him the newspaper report of the interview he said that he had certainly not stated that during the recent crisis Iraq was fully prepared to play her part. The journalist in question had obviously formulated the statement in a manner to accord with British wishes. He then declared further that the various statements by the Führer and Chancellor regarding the Palestinian Arabs had aroused great enthusiasm in all Arab countries. Not only Iraq but the entire Arab world was grateful to the Führer and Chancellor for these frank statements. We should, moreover, consider the following:

He had spoken very candidly to the British statesmen about the situation in Palestine and tried to make clear to them that the interest of Iraq in this question was a very serious one and that England did

well to take into consideration the sentiment in Iraq and consequently pay attention to her proposals. For this reason he had also stated: "The feeling in Iraq over this question is terribly strong."<sup>4</sup> Naturally, in this connection he had had to stress the importance to England of the Iraqi alliance. For this reason he had pointed out that, in case of danger to England, Iraq was prepared to come to her assistance in fulfillment of her treaty obligations. The significance of his negotiations with the British statesmen had been that of a commercial transaction. He had offered them Iraqi assistance if they would fulfill the demands of the Palestinian Arabs. In so doing he had not gone beyond referring to the generally known text of the Iraqi-British treaty of alliance. We, too, were after all interested in having the Palestine question settled in a manner satisfactory to the wishes of the Arabs. Consequently his statement had not been contrary to German interests.

I replied that Germany did not, to be sure, desire the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and that a sort of confidential diplomatic cooperation between the German Government and the Iraqi Government in the Palestine question had already developed. But we could not help feeling greatly astonished that Iraq now sought—at the expense of Germany, so to speak,—to make a deal with England in regard to her desires respecting Palestine and that for this purpose statements were made by authoritative Iraqi quarters which could only be interpreted by us as unfriendly.

The Foreign Minister thereupon declared that he had not had any such intention. He had welcomed and appreciated to a very high degree the cooperation with Germany thus far in the Palestine question; but this cooperation naturally found its limit wherever England gave the Iraqi Government to understand that it was contrary to British interests. Of course, he had not said anything to the British during his conversations in London about our cooperation in the Palestine question, and when questioned had denied that Germany, like Italy, was engaged in active propaganda in Iraq.

He declared further that if England became involved in a war Iraq, as her ally, would have to do substantially what England advised her to do. Thus, if England had demanded that Iraq declare war against Germany, then Iraq would have had to comply with this demand. To be sure, he considered it quite likely that in case of war England would herself have advised Iraq to remain neutral. Iraq had neighbors who were stronger than she, such as Turkey and Iran, for example, with whom she had not concluded any nonaggression pacts.

<sup>4</sup>The quotation is in English in the original.



Finally, he requested me to call the attention of my Government to the explanations previously mentioned and to convince it that neither now nor in the past had he harboured any unfriendly feeling toward Germany.

I replied that his statements surprised me very much. At the time the desire for confidential German-Iraqi cooperation in the Palestine question had originated with him. Surely there could never have been any doubt in his mind that if this cooperation became known to the British, they would consider it highly undesirable; consequently, I could not imagine what could have induced him to inform the British of it. Any German-Iraqi cooperation in the Palestine question was possible only if it was kept secret from the British and, furthermore, was based on complete mutual confidence. I feared, however, that this confidence might be prejudiced as far as the Germans were concerned and made impossible for the future, if German misgivings regarding his alleged interview were not completely dissipated. Consequently I considered it advisable for him to repeat in a private letter to me the statements he had made in rectification of his interview. I assured him that this letter would be treated as strictly confidential on our part. Taufik Suwaydi declared that he was prepared to do this. I reminded him of his promise today. He gave as his excuse the pressure of work caused by the opening of Parliament and the reshuffling of the Cabinet; he did, however, promise me the letter in the near future.

During his European trip Taufik Suwaydi gave numerous interviews which have been published in the newspapers of the Arab countries; in so doing his main desire was probably to get publicity for himself. Several of these interviews also aroused ill will in Arab nationalist circles. Thus, Vice Consul de Chapeaurouge from Beirut, who is here on leave, informed me that the Grand Mufti was very displeased because of an interview given by Taufik Suwaydi in Beirut. Taufik Suwaydi had declared that the Palestine question would shortly be settled by the political leaders independently of the disturbances in Palestine. The Grand Mufti is said to have considered this as a stab in the back against the Palestinian rebels and is, moreover, displeased that Taufik Suwaydi should now thrust himself forward in this issue and not pay enough attention to him as the chiefly responsible leader. From Arab nationalist quarters I have also learned that the Grand Mufti induced Minister President Jamil Madfai to send Nuri Said to London at the same time in order to assist Taufik Suwaydi with his greater experience.

GROBBA

## No. 587

1495/370154

*An Official of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry  
to the Executive of the Auslandsorganisation*

BERLIN, November 12, 1938.

Subject: The Haavara system.

Enclosed I am transmitting a carbon copy of a report of October 28, No. 2192<sup>1</sup>—from the German Consulate General at Jerusalem regarding the Palestine Germans and the Arabs, and I call attention in particular to the last paragraph, in which plans for an extension of the Haavara system are mentioned.

Since certain quarters are still championing the Haavara system, I suggest that the Auslandsorganisation now take the initiative once more in vigorously urging upon the authorities concerned the long-overdue abolition of the Haavara Agreement.

Heil Hitler!

By order:

FISCHER

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1554/377559-61). According to this report, speeches by the Führer expressing sympathy for the Arab cause had helped greatly in protecting German settlements in Palestine during Arab riots. On the other hand, it would have most unfortunate effects on German-Arab relations and especially on the safety of the German settlements, if Berlin expanded the Haavara system which in Arab eyes strengthened Palestine Jewry in its struggle against the Arabs.

## No. 588

1605/385464-66

*Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VII*

BERLIN, January 10, 1939.

The Foreign Ministry has thus far, for political as well as economic reasons, taken a negative attitude in the question of *arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia* which the Aussenpolitisches Amt especially has been advocating for a long time, pointing to the alleged role of the Wahabi Kingdom as the center of the Islamic Arab world.

I. Up to the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Agreement<sup>1</sup> regarding the delimitation of spheres of influence in the area of the Red Sea, military support of Ibn Saud by Germany was excluded by our relations with Italy as well as England, if for no other reason. Subsequently, to be sure, on the one hand Italy's relations with Ibn Saud have, according to reliable reports, improved considerably, and

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<sup>1</sup>Of Apr. 16, 1938; see British Treaty Series No. 31 (1938), Cmd. 5726. For a German analysis, see vol. I of this series, document No. 755.

on the other hand certain restraints in Germany's relations with Saudi Arabia which arose from our former relations with England have been eliminated. Nevertheless, we shall always have to reckon with the fact, freely admitted by responsible Saudi Arabians, that Ibn Saud, in view of his particular political and economic situation, probably will not only not attack England, but will even ally himself with her. Consequently it does not seem impossible that the arms which we send to Ibn Saud will some day even be used *against* us. As a warning example of the unreliability of the Arabs, it may be mentioned in this connection that despite the moral and probably even material help which the Arab insurrectionists in Palestine have received from the Germans, they feel no obligation toward us and do not shrink from rigorous measures against defenseless German settlers.

II. In view of the potentialities of the country for development it will always be advisable to establish and extend economic ties with Saudi Arabia. In place of the German honorary Consulate in Jidda which was abolished in 1932, the German Minister to Bagdad has recently also been accredited to Ibn Saud and will shortly present his credentials. Thus, to begin with, the desire expressed by the Ministry of Economics and the Aussenpolitisches Amt to expand our relations with Saudi Arabia has been complied with. It will then also be easier to obtain a definite view of the economic and commercial possibilities for Germany.

In any case, however, even if the political objections referred to above were to be disregarded, it would not be possible to recommend the armaments transaction proposed by the Aussenpolitisches Amt unless it produced ready foreign exchange. But, according to the negotiations which the Aussenpolitisches Amt has thus far carried on with individual Saudi Arabian representatives, this is not the case. Rather payment by deliveries of Saudi Arabian products in exchange is contemplated. In addition, Saudi Arabia demands a 5-year credit, which in the light of previous experience is not without risk (Saudi Arabian Treasury notes have not been redeemed since 1932!). Both conditions are contrary to the general principles laid down by Field Marshal Göring for the delivery of armament matériel.<sup>2</sup>

III. Finally, reference may be made to the fact that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, when asked by the Liaison Office of the Foreign Ministry what its attitude was in regard to the matter, expressed itself as opposed to such shipments, pointing to the political unreliability of Ibn Saud. According to the statement of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces no weapons have so far been delivered

<sup>2</sup> These principles are summarized in a circular on a meeting at which Göring presided on May 2, 1938, when the future of German armament export policy was discussed (7054/E524036-38).

to Saudi Arabia legally, and only insignificant models through illegal channels.<sup>3</sup>

1) For co-signature by Economic Policy Division III.

2) To be submitted through the Deputy Director of the Political Department to the Under State Secretary.

SCHLOBIES

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<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Hentig's handwriting: "Ibn Saud's unstable position to be kept in mind."

No. 589

1605/385522-29

*The Minister in Iraq to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

JIDDA, February 18, 1939.

No. Dj.44

Pol. VII 662.

Subject: Conversations with King Ibn Saud and his political adviser concerning the political situation of Saudi Arabia and her relations with England, Italy and Germany.

Suggestions by Ibn Saud for political and economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Germany.

In the period from February 12 to 18 I had a number of long conversations in Jidda with His Majesty King Ibn Saud and his political adviser, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, concerning the international situation of Saudi Arabia and especially her relations with England and Italy; their main topic was the King's desire for close political and economic cooperation with Germany. From the very beginning the conversations were carried on with great frankness and on the basis of the complete confidence of the Saudi Arabian Government in Germany's good intentions.

It became evident very soon that the general impression about Ibn Saud, particularly in the other Arab countries, that he is a friend and a pliable tool of the British, is wrong. He feels himself to be encircled and oppressed by England and has the desire to free himself from this encirclement if possible. Out of prudence he assumes a friendly attitude toward the British, but in the depths of his heart he hates them and complies with their desires only reluctantly. The opposite impression concerning him, which is current in the other Arab countries, is based upon the fact that Ibn Saud maintains an attitude of reserve with regard to the pressure of the Palestinian Arabs and their friends for armed assistance, so as to avoid a conflict with the British. I experienced an example of Ibn Saud's relationship with England during my stay in Jidda. A well-known Arab nationalist from Bagdad appeared in Jidda on February 11 by in-

struction of a committee preparing an uprising in Transjordan, in order to ask Ibn Saud for support for the planned action. Early on February 14 the British Minister, Sir Reader Bullard, made an urgent request to the King for a meeting. At the meeting he informed him that he had learned that the nationalist was in Jidda. The latter was a well-known enemy of England. As a friend of Ibn Saud, the British Government had to advise him to see that the nationalist left Saudi Arabia at once. Ibn Saud informed the nationalist of this, and the latter left at once. Ibn Saud, according to a reliable report, was furious at the British measure, but told the Minister in a very friendly way that the nationalist had come here on some sort of personal business not known to Ibn Saud and would leave at once. He is said to have told the nationalist that whenever he was in a position to fight a war he would fight England first.

The upshot of the conversations carried on with me was the conclusion that Saudi Arabia and Germany have a common mortal enemy, namely the Jews, and that, moreover, both are defending themselves against British hostility, which, in Saudi Arabia, expresses itself in a threat to its territory and to the supremacy of the King, whereas in Germany it is directed against the regime in power by means of a press and propaganda campaign. The common nature of their interests requires that the two countries cooperate. The Führer and all of Germany have on numerous occasions announced their interest in the Arab cause; the Saudi Arabian Government therefore hopes that they will also be willing to cooperate with it on a firm basis in the future. At the same time there is agreement that neither Saudi Arabia nor Germany wishes a war with England, and that both are trying to reach their objectives by peaceful means. For Germany the aim is a strengthening of her position in the world by winning friends on whom she could rely even in wartime. The Arab world, and especially Saudi Arabia, which has a leading position in the Arab world and is the only really independent Arab country, is an important friend for Germany. The aim of the Arab world and especially of Saudi Arabia is the preservation of complete independence. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries can attain this objective only with outside help. Saudi Arabia is therefore turning to Germany to request her support, both moral support in case of possible foreign oppression and material aid by means of arms deliveries at low prices and favorable conditions of payment. She is offering Germany her sincere friendship in return and promises at least benevolent neutrality, if not more, in case of war. The close cooperation with Germany which Saudi Arabia desires must be very discreet, so that it might not cause other countries to take countermeasures. This cooperation is to apply mainly to Saudi Arabia, but in addition, if possible, also to

the other Arab areas. If Germany wishes to take any measures in the Palestine question, the Saudi Arabian Government is willing to be of assistance in the implementation of these measures.

Saudi Arabia has friendly relations with Italy, with regard to which country she maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality during the Abyssinian war and from which she has profited in various ways; her confidence in Italy, however, has been affected by the latter's agreement with England on the joint guarantee of the independence of Saudi Arabia.<sup>1</sup> The Saudi Arabian Government would be grateful to the German Government if it could convince Italy that it is more to her interest to win the friendship of the entire Arab world than to alienate the entire Arab world by annexing Arab territory.

The conversations led to King Ibn Saud's presenting to me in definite form his suggestions for cooperation with Germany, with the request for an answer from the German Government. Nothing was settled upon as to the form of a possible agreement. I believe I can infer from the course of the negotiations that Ibn Saud will be content for the time being with oral German assent if it is accompanied by effective German actions for the fulfillment of his wishes, in particular by arms deliveries.

For the purpose of regulating the treaty relationships between Saudi Arabia and Germany on a new and broader basis, the Saudi Arabian Government desires the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and a commercial treaty as well as an agreement on the exchange of goods produced in the two countries.

Crown Prince Saud was present at some of my conversations with the King. He had me informed by a number of his men that he is most desirous of getting to know Germany, and that he would therefore be grateful for an invitation from the Führer or the Reich Government to come to Germany for a visit. He has already received an invitation from the Italians; he is not so much interested in this, however, and will accept it only if Germany should send him an invitation.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN OFFER OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH GERMANY

In evaluating the significance of the Saudi Arabian offer of political and economic cooperation with us, please consider the following:

##### 1. *Military-geographical factors.*

Saudi Arabia embraces most of the Arabian peninsula, i. e., the area between the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. This area is important in case of war because England's air and sea com-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 588, footnote 1.

munications with Iraq and India pass along its borders and therefore can be threatened from here. Points along the borders of this area which are especially important for England are Akaba, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, which closes the Red Sea on the south, and the Strait of Ormuz, between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Moreover, the following can be threatened or interrupted from Saudi Arabia: The British air route from Palestine to Iraq and along the Arabian Coast of the Persian Gulf to India, and the oil pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is important for our possible air routes to Asiatic and African countries.

Saudi Arabi includes the area—the part situated on the Red Sea (Hejaz)—which rose against Turkey in the first World War at the instigation of the British and so also fought against Germany, as a result of which the Turkish fronts in Arabia collapsed and Turkey's Arabian territories were lost. In the future, then, this area could belong to our friends rather than our enemies.

## 2. *Political factors.*

Although King Ibn Saud is not the Caliph, and will not be in the foreseeable future, nevertheless he does exert great influence on all Arab countries and even all Mohammedan countries, owing to his possessing the holy places of the Mohammedans, his strong personality, and the fact that he is the ruler of the only really independent Arab country. In case of war his attitude will be of immense interest for the entire Mohammedan world and will be decisive for many. Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and Syria will be still less inclined than before to participate actively in a war on the side of England or France if they have to reckon with counteraction by Ibn Saud. Also the Mohammedans in British India and the Dutch Indies, who send tens of thousands of pilgrims to Mecca every year, will be greatly influenced by the attitude of the ruler of the holy places in case of war.

Whereas it can be assumed to be certain that at the outbreak of war the Germans in the other Arab countries would be either interned or expelled, Saudi Arabia will in the future permit them to stay and even to carry on political activity. Thus we will be able to have a base in Saudi Arabia from which we can influence the other Arab and Mohammedan countries politically.

## 3. *Economic factors.*

### a. In peacetime:

With the opening of her very rich petroleum and gold deposits, Saudi Arabia is entering a new stage of economic development. The exports of petroleum from the province of Al-Hasa (on the Persian

Gulf) will presumably amount to several million tons a year, and will bring Ibn Saud an income of 200,000 gold pounds for every million tons exported. This income will be increased by the royalties from other petroleum concession companies in the country and the gold mine company. Thus in the future the country will no longer be dependent upon the greatly varying income from the pilgrims but will be in a position to establish a regular budget. At present the country is still in a very primitive condition. The standard of living of its population is extremely low. It will therefore be a very good market for European goods in the future. The largest purchaser will be the Government, which needs weapons, automobiles, factories for a small armaments industry, electrical plants, means of communication, water works and many other things. Saudi Arabia is willing to give us a preferred position as suppliers of these goods.

*b. In wartime:*

Even in time of war the country will have a petroleum industry with a refinery and gold mines in operation—that is, two raw materials the importance of which increases in time of war.

*4. The German contributions.*

*a. Moral support:*

We are to promise Ibn Saud to lend moral support to the Arab countries, and especially his own country, in case of alien oppression. He is evidently thinking of support similar to that which we gave Palestine. If we do this we will even be able to appear before the world as the protector of right against wrong. At the same time we might get into a conflict of interests not only with England but also with Italy, if the latter has designs on Arab territory in Asia, especially Asir, which belongs to Saudi Arabia, or Yemen. It cannot be assumed that Ibn Saud is equally interested in the Arab territories in Africa, particularly Tunisia. Perhaps we can come to an understanding with Italy on this problem in advance. If a reassuring promise can be obtained from Italy in this regard, this would at the same time be very comforting for Ibn Saud, and it would render feasible a sincere German-Italian cooperation on the Arabian peninsula. At the same time, however, this would restrict in favor of Italy our possible leading position in Saudi Arabia. In a discussion of this question with Italy we must not inform her of the content of our secret conversations with Ibn Saud without his permission, since these conversations are supposed to remain secret in accordance with an agreement between him and me.

*b. Aid through arms deliveries:*

Ibn Saud asks for help in arming his country. His first request is for the delivery of rifles and ammunition as well as a small cartridge



factory. On instructions from him, the Royal Counselor, Sheikh Khalid ul-Hud, is in contact with Ferrostahl in Essen concerning the ordering of 8,000 rifles with 1,000 rounds of ammunition each and a small cartridge factory, but has for some time received no answer to his purchase offer. This order is supposed to represent only the beginning. The Saudi Arabian Government needs three more cartridge factories, as well as anti-aircraft guns and other war equipment. Compliance with these wishes of the Saudi Arabian Government will also involve having German experts working on the matters concerned in Saudi Arabia. We will have to leave military aviation to the Italians, who have already taken the lead in this respect.

Ibn Saud is willing to pay for the deliveries of war matériel to the extent of his financial ability. He will need credit, however, for the time being. His ability to pay will improve from year to year through the royalties from the companies holding concessions. He will certainly fulfill his financial obligations toward us. The fact that the Saudi Arabian Government did not pay its debts to German firms, dating from the time of the activity of Honorary Consul de Haas,<sup>2</sup> any sooner is because it felt it had been taken advantage of in those transactions, as I have now learned. The claims of the German firms are said to include commissions amounting to 50 percent that were paid to an oriental who turned out to be a swindler. When I told the Saudi Arabian Finance Minister that the German firms were willing to reduce their claims by about one half he immediately sent me a check in the desired amount of 1,412 pounds sterling.

5. *Discretion in the agreements.*

The agreements between Saudi Arabia and Germany are to be carried out so confidentially and the aid we are to give is to be provided in such a discreet manner that they will not give any other powers, notably England, any reason for countermeasures. Therefore the circle of those who know of these agreements should be limited as far as possible. As already stated, it will not be necessary for the time being to put the agreements in writing; if we inform Ibn Saud orally of our acceptance of his proposals and at the same time fulfill his desires regarding arms this will suffice for the time being. The new treaties with Germany desired by Saudi Arabia, a treaty of friendship and a commercial treaty, are naturally conceived of as agreements of the usual type meant for publication. It is known that Ibn Saud is very suspicious and reserved. His frank statements to us are a sign of his absolute confidence in us. His whole personality

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 578.

is a guarantee that he will keep his word to us, even if it is only given orally.

In case additional negotiations are necessary with King Ibn Saud or Sheikh Yusuf Yasin it would be best to conduct them orally, too. Since the King is returning to Riyadh shortly I would have to go there for this purpose. The way to get there from Basrah is either 3 or 4 days by automobile via Kuwait or by plane to Bahrein, from there several hours by motor boat to Al-Hasa and from there to Rivadh in 2 to 3 days.

*6. Need for a quick German decision.*

Ibn Saud is in a great hurry with his rearmament. He expects us to make a quick decision. He will consider quick German assent as a sign of our confidence in him. Since the agreements on both sides can be effective only if they rest upon absolute confidence on both sides, our quick acceptance of his wishes is a prerequisite for the success of the agreements. If we should delay for some time with our answer, and especially if we should not comply quickly with his desire for arms, then he will probably buy them elsewhere, presumably in Italy. Italy is willing to deliver the desired arms to him on credit and on still more favorable terms than those he suggested to us. If the Italians receive this order for armaments then we will be excluded from this business in the future, too. That would mean that we renounce in favor of Italy the opportunities offered us in Saudi Arabia. Even the British are willing to deliver arms, though on less favorable terms. It is certainly not in our interest to let Ibn Saud think that he has to put himself at the mercy of the British and accept their terms. In no case must we neglect replying to Ibn Saud's proposals or simply reject them. It would be a severe disappointment for Ibn Saud, especially in view of the confidence he has shown in us, and it would be practically impossible for us ever again to undo the consequences. He would surely turn away from us permanently.

It should also be kept in mind that the British, knowing the importance of the person of Ibn Saud and of his country for them, will be willing in case of war to pay him a very high price for active participation on their side. The sums paid monthly by England in such cases amount to many times what we would be giving Ibn Saud if we should deliver free of charge the arms he wants now. On the other hand, there is no doubt that in case of war Ibn Saud will reject even the most inviting British offers if by that time the cooperation with us which he desires has come about.

I respectfully request instructions concerning the answer to be given King Ibn Saud—cabled instructions, if his offer for purchasing arms

is accepted on the terms offered or on other conditions. I suggest that if necessary I be summoned to Berlin for an oral report.

As enclosures, I am attaching memoranda concerning the following:

1. Conference with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on February 12, 1939.<sup>3</sup>
2. Conference with King Ibn Saud on February 13, 1939.<sup>4</sup>
3. Conference with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on February 15, 1939.<sup>5</sup>
4. Farewell audience with King Ibn Saud on February 17, 1939.<sup>6</sup>
5. Final conference with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on February 18, 1939.<sup>7</sup>

GROBBA <sup>8</sup>

1605/385533-38

[Enclosure]

ANNEX NO. 2 TO REPORT NO. DJ. 44 OF FEBRUARY 18, 1939, FROM THE  
GERMAN LEGATION IN JIDDA.

Statements of H. M. King Ibn Saud regarding his country's political relations with England, Italy, and Germany and the situation in the Arab world.

On February 13 I was summoned to King Ibn Saud for an audience. This invitation was a consequence of the conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who had reported to His Majesty about his conversation with me. This audience was supposed to last about half an hour; it took about an hour and a quarter, however. Crown Prince Saud and the King's two counselors, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Khalid ul-Hud, were present. The subject of the conversation was the same as during the conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

H. M. the King made the following statements:

*The general situation in his country:*

The King confirmed the statements of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and repeated that he is trying to live in peace with all governments and persons. That is the great objective in the administration of the affairs of his country. Impelled by this desire, he has long been wanting a *rapprochement* and the assumption of direct relations with Germany. He is sincerely happy that this is now being initiated.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (1605/385530-32).

<sup>4</sup> See enclosure.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (1605/385537-38).

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (1605/385539).

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (1605/385540-41).

<sup>8</sup> With this report and its enclosures Grobba sent a covering letter to Woermann (7057/E524123) suggesting that these documents not be circulated in the usual way in view of their confidential character. Although he said he had already learned from Hentig that the decision in Berlin on Ibn Saud's request for arms was negative, he urged that at least a part of the request be met. These documents were not registered in the files until Apr. 22, 1939.

Externally he wants to create good and firm relations and domestically he wishes to strengthen and consolidate his country to such an extent that it is in a position to offer resistance to threats. The internal consolidation of his Government has made great advances, to be sure; still, the internal situation is not yet at the point where certain political intrigues by a third party would remain unsuccessful. Externally his country is surrounded on every side by areas under British rule and by British protectorates, and he is too strongly aware of the constraint and pressure which the British are trying to exert upon him from these frontiers.

*Relationship with England:*

The King said the same as had Sheikh Yusuf Yasin about the relationship of Saudi Arabia to England. For the reasons already mentioned he must get along with England, although he very well knows that all the British assurances of friendship are *lies*. He acts as if he believes the assurances of friendship of the British and takes them at their face value, so as not to give them any excuse for causing the kingdom difficulties from its frontiers. In his heart he rejects the British absolutely, since their entire policy is directed solely toward firmly establishing their rule over the Arabian territories once and for all and bringing all these areas under subjection. With *lies*—the King repeated this word several times in connection with the British policy on the Arabian peninsula—the British would try to penetrate into his country, too, so as to deprive it of its full independence. As long as this situation exists, however, he himself has to be pleasant to the British, with a friendly face and anger in his heart. The aim, however, is to free himself more and more from British influence in a manner that should not be too noticeable as long as he is not in a position to check the excessive influence of the British in the Arab world. For this purpose, however, Saudi Arabia is seeking friends in the world in order to create a stronger position for herself through increasing internal strength and *rapprochement* with other powers.

Even in the last great war England tried to induce him to fight on her side against the Turks and thus also against Germany. As a reward the British offered him the caliphate and the title of king. He rejected this, however, and stated that he did not wish to fight against fellow believers and that in general he did not have the intention of fighting anyone.<sup>9</sup> His aim is absolute peace for his country and friendship with all. Thereupon England supported Sherif Husayn in Hejaz and installed Emir Abdullah in Transjordan and Faisal in Iraq; Bahrein and Kuwait, which originally belonged to his coun-

<sup>9</sup> Marginal note in handwriting: "And what about the battle of Jarrab?"

try, England kept for herself and in this manner greatly impeded his freedom of action. England's attitude in the Syrian question (Alexandretta)<sup>10</sup> was not such as to confirm her alleged friendship for the Arab countries. And her attitude in the Palestine question belied any friendship for the Arab countries. The King never spoke of British friendship other than as an "alleged" friendship.

*Relationship with Italy:*

His Majesty touched upon the relationship with Italy only very briefly and in a manner similar to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

*Attitude toward Germany:*

The King stated that he has followed Germany's rise and unification with the greatest of interest and he will continue with equal attention to follow every step undertaken by Germany to increase her strength and greatness. He has the greatest respect and admiration for Germany's Führer. Relations with Germany, which have now been established in a direct manner, will surely assume great importance for Saudi Arabia. Friendly feelings for Germany have existed for a long time, and they are sincere. Germany is the power whom one can approach quite frankly and whose friendship can be trusted, for her aims are generally known. Germany makes no claims to Arab territory and mutual interests join her with the Arab world: *the Jewish question*. The Jewish question is as much a question of life and death for Germany as it is for the entire Arab world. Germany has done well to bring the Jewish question nearer to a solution. He sees in the Jewish question a danger for the entire world. In view of the similarity in the political situation of Germany and Saudi Arabia and the mutual character of their interests he is ready to cooperate closely with Germany. He promises an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward Germany in case of a European war. He would then act as he did vis-à-vis Italy in the Italo-Abyssinian war. If Germany, for her part, is ready to cooperate with him, then there are two things which he would like to propose:

1. Moral support in opposition to any acts of oppression and threats against Saudi Arabia by third parties, and
2. German aid to Saudi Arabia in her domestic development and arming for the maintenance of her independence.

In this connection the King pointed to the Saudi Arabian request for the erection of a cartridge factory and the purchase of a considerable number of rifles. The German weapon (Mauser rifle) is valued very highly in Saudi Arabia. The King also made reference to the negotiations in Berlin of Sheikh Khalid ul-Hud (called al-Qarqani) and remarked in this connection (in view of the support for the Arabs

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 539, footnote 2.

in Palestine) that he gave Sheikh Khalid ul-Hud his consent for sending arms for Palestine in the shipments for Saudi Arabia. In this matter he is in very close contact with the Grand Mufti, who is his personal friend. If Germany, for her part, is ready to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in the suggested manner, he extends his hand for the further development of relations between the two countries in this sphere as well. Caution must be exercised, however, so that England does not prematurely learn anything thereof and is not able to take countermeasures.

*The situation in the Arab world:*

The King expressed himself as follows on the situation in the rest of the Arab world: All Arabs and Mohammedans in the various parts of the world have great respect for Germany, which is increased by the fight which Germany is waging against the Jews, the arch enemy of the Arabs. This is not true of the governments of some of the countries. He mentioned Iraq in this connection, where the King well knows that if he breaks with the British it would also be the end of throne and crown. Egypt has in the past years tried to free herself of British influence, which became so firmly rooted there especially through its establishment of the Khedive throne. Very recently, however, Egypt has been seized by fear of Italy and thus has again drawn closer to England.

*The Jewish question:*

He has always asked for reports on the Jews and their activities in Germany from those of his people who visited Berlin. He has always thought it a disgrace that the real Germans should have to struggle through an impoverished life while the Jews and their families are putting on airs in the big hotels along Unter den Linden.

*Contact with the Grand Mufti:*

On this question, the King said, he will express his opinions through reliable channels if the occasion arises.

GROBBA

No. 590

1605/385511-12

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII*

BERLIN, February 28, 1939.

ARMS DELIVERIES TO ARABIA

I. *Saudi Arabia:* More than a year ago the Saudi Arabians established contact with the Aussenpolitisches Amt here in Berlin through the King's personal physician. Even at that time the Aussenpoli-

tisches Amt called our attention to the possibilities existing in Saudi Arabia and recommended the arms deliveries desired by the physician. In the summer of last year the Saudi Arabian Minister of Commerce, Khalid al-Qarqani, who has the King's confidence and is the former partner of our honorary Consul at Jidda, Herr de Haas, after having first requested to see me visited me at the Foreign Ministry. In the course of a conversation which lasted one and a half hours he presented his wishes as regards arms, to the effect that the German Government should let Ibn Saud have 15,000 to 20,000 modern carbines and the necessary ammunition as cheaply as possible. I discussed the matter only very reservedly, stating that Saudi Arabia certainly wished only very modern arms but that we could not at present sell any of these because of our own rearmament, and that we had already had to reject similar requests on the part of neighboring countries. A student sent along as interpreter, the son of the above-mentioned physician, then incautiously gave me to understand that the Saudi Arabian agent had already been in Berlin for 2 weeks and that after an immediate conference with the Aussenpolitisches Amt (v. Harder, Malletke) a gentleman from that office had taken him to Ferrostahl directly following this first visit.<sup>1</sup>

After these negotiations, which remained without result, Fuad Hamza, the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, then took up the question of arms deliveries. He carried on his negotiations directly with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. He urged in this connection not only deliveries for his King but also for Palestine and stated that the route via Saudi Arabia was entirely safe. The shipments were assembled individually by the Intelligence Division [*Abwehr*]. The steamer was ready to sail when absolutely definite information was received that Fuad Hamza was in British pay. Consequently the shipment via Saudi Arabia was halted as well as a second shipment that had been negotiated with the Iraqi Minister President and was to have been routed through the Persian Gulf. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces shares our view that in these circumstances our political position could not be expected to improve through such arms deliveries, but that they would rather work to our disadvantage. The economic conditions for the deliveries are also unacceptable.

II. *Yemen*: The Yemen transaction, on the other hand, is being arranged purely on an economic basis between a German firm located there and the Yemenites. Reporting this to Italy in my opinion appears too much like recognizing Italian control and might also be taken amiss by the Imam Yahya.

V. HENTIG

<sup>1</sup> See also document No. 583, footnote 3.  
954935-53-57

No. 591

723/264558-59

*Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, March 3, 1939.

Note for Party Comrade Dr. Garben.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to our conversation of yesterday I request that you obtain a clarification of the following matter:

On February 27, in the Ritz Hotel in Paris, a luncheon was held which served as a preparation for the establishment of the German-French Economic Committee. In addition to French politicians and industrial leaders, Counselor of Embassy von Campe, representing the German Embassy in Paris, and I, representing the Dienststelle, participated. In the course of the conversations following the luncheon the possibility of granting contracts to German industry for French colonial and mandated territories was also mentioned. Herr von Campe mentioned in this connection that a Rhine firm had obtained an order to the value of 15 million reichsmarks for the construction of tanks in the harbor of Damascus, but that at the last moment 20 German fitters who were needed were refused permission to enter the Syrian Mandate territory by the French Mandate authorities.

As chance would have it, Senator Henry-Haye, who was present at the discussion, is the *rapporteur* on Syria in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He had exact information about the matter. In the fall of 1937, 2 weeks after Baldur von Schirach's forced landing at Damascus, an Arab club had been formed with German money, the objective of which was to stir up the Arab population against the French Mandate authorities. One of the natives who had been enlisted by the Germans for this activity of the club had then made a report to the French authorities and had recently given Henry-Haye personally more detailed information regarding the matter. Henry-Haye had immediately inquired at the German Embassy in Paris, where Counselor of Embassy Dr. Bräuer had stated that nothing was known officially in Germany about any club of this kind.

Henry-Haye declared that he had exact and unequivocal documentation on this club and was consequently forced to bring this question up some time for public discussion in the Senate.

I told Henry-Haye that I could definitely say one thing: Baldur von Schirach had nothing at all to do with the founding of such a club, because I had learned from him personally the details regarding his forced landing in Damascus at that time which was entirely unforeseen and had taken place merely because, in the heavy fog, it was

<sup>1</sup> Garben was an official of Sonderreferat Partel, the office within the Foreign Ministry responsible for liaison with the National Socialist Party.



impossible for him to land immediately in Ankara on his return flight from Persia.

If the information which had come to Henry-Haye regarding the existence of an Arab club in Damascus inspired by Germans should prove correct, it could in my opinion only be a question of an unauthorized action by private German individuals who had proceeded without any instruction or approval from German Government officials. I promised Henry-Haye that I would have the matter cleared up, and Counselor of Embassy von Campe for his part assured him the matter would be investigated by the Embassy.

My personal conviction is that any German participation in the Arab movement should be permitted only if enough foreign exchange and sufficiently capable personnel are available, so that such participation would give promise of success. Since in the present case neither of these prerequisites appears to exist, it seems to me advisable to initiate an investigation as to whether in actual fact Germans are making efforts to influence the Arabs as reported, and, if necessary, to put a stop to such efforts as quickly as possible, since they are only apt to alienate the few enthusiastic supporters Germany still has in French parliamentary circles.

ABETZ<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The document was edited, presumably by the recipient Garben, to eliminate all references to French personalities and to substitute the name of Abetz where the first person had been used originally. The final sentence of the next to last paragraph and the last paragraph were omitted and the following note added in handwriting: "Please inform us of what you know about the matter, so that further action may be taken by the Foreign Ministry." It is not clear to whom this revised copy was to be transmitted.

## No. 592

1605/385547-48

*Under State Secretary Woermann to Minister Grobba*

BERLIN, April 18, 1939.

Sent April 26.

e. o. Pol. VII [sic]

[zu] 661,<sup>1</sup> 662,<sup>2</sup> 663.<sup>3</sup>

Drafting Officer: Schlobies.

DEAR HERR GROBBA: I am taking advantage of tomorrow's courier to send you by a safe route and in brief the Ministry's views concern-

<sup>1</sup> Pol. VII 661: Not printed (7057/E524123). See document No. 589, footnote 8.

<sup>2</sup> Pol. VII 662: Document No. 589.

<sup>3</sup> Pol. VII 663: Not printed (1605/385542-46). In a letter to Woermann on Mar. 7, Grobba stated that Arab fear of Italian ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean was a hindrance to an increase of German influence. He sug-

ing the questions raised in your letters of February 18<sup>4</sup> and March 7.<sup>5</sup> Although we continue to place great value upon friendly relations with the Kingdom of Ibn Saud—we have given an open demonstration of this by accrediting you in Jidda—nevertheless, in view of what must be regarded as the still unclarified attitude of Ibn Saud toward England in the event of war,<sup>6</sup> we have no interest in taking up closer ties with him in the form of a treaty of friendship. I must ask you to convey this to the Saudi Government with all the tact indicated, perhaps in this way, that you represent our reserved attitude as being in the Arabs' own interest.

The question of arms deliveries to the Arabian peninsula is most closely related to this. After exhaustive study we have reached the conclusion that delivery of war materials to Saudi Arabia is out of the question. That applies still more to Yemen, where the Italians, as they have given us to understand often enough, are particularly sensitive.

In summary, I must state therefore that ~~in view of events in Europe which engage our full attention at this time~~, we do not for the present think of undertaking any fundamental change in the policy we have hitherto followed in the Arabian peninsula.<sup>7</sup>

Herr von Hentig, who has received approval from the Ministry for a brief side trip to Bagdad, will in the meantime have explained to you orally the Ministry's views on the questions with which you are concerned.

With best greetings and Heil Hitler!

Yours,

WOERMANN

gested that Germany try to get the Italians to publicly renounce territorial ambitions in that area. The Arabs had no objections to Italian designs on Tunis.

Schlobies noted on his draft of Woermann's reply to Grobba printed here that Hentig, then on a tour of the Middle East, had been sent copies of Grobba's two communications, and had replied that he did not share Grobba's optimism concerning the possibility of extending German influence in that area.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 589.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3.

<sup>6</sup> The canceled passages were stricken from the final draft.

<sup>7</sup> About a month later, however, the policy was in fact changed. A representative of King Ibn Saud was received by Hitler on June 17, and negotiations were undertaken for an arms transaction. For documents on this development, see vol. VI.

CHAPTER IX  
LATIN AMERICA  
NOVEMBER 30, 1937-MARCH 10, 1939

No. 593

1173/328680-81

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX*

BERLIN, November 30, 1937.  
zu 83-60 H    October 25.<sup>1</sup>  
"                November 19.<sup>2</sup>  
"                October 6.<sup>3</sup>

On November 19 Referat Deutschland<sup>4</sup> suggested, particularly in view of the political development in Brazil,<sup>5</sup> that the Foreign Ministry take the initiative for the adherence of Brazil and other South American countries to the German-Japanese-Italian Agreement to combat Bolshevism.<sup>6</sup>

Pol. IX comments on the matter as follows:

Among the South American countries only the adherence of the three big ABC states—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—would be of any political importance. Any German initiative would have to begin with them.

But the Governments of the ABC states will refuse to join for reasons of foreign as well as domestic policy. The new Brazilian

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (1173/328672-73).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (1173/328677). The substance of this memorandum is contained in the first paragraph of the document printed here.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (1173/328636-40). This is a memorandum on the subject, "America and Palestine as the Operations Base of World Jewry"; it advocates a more intensive cooperation between the German police and South American police against Jewish and Communist influences.

<sup>4</sup> Referat Deutschland was responsible for liaison between the Foreign Ministry and other Government agencies, and also between the Ministry and organs of the Nazi Party. Its primary concerns were with "racial policy", anti-Comintern and anti-Bolshevist activities, and the like. At this date it was under the general direction of Chief of Protocol Bülow-Schwante.

<sup>5</sup> On Nov. 10, 1937, President Getulio Vargas, who was nearing the end of his term of office and legally could not succeed himself, set aside Brazil's constitution and proclaimed a new one which permitted him to remain in office 6 years longer. Although a plebiscite to obtain popular approval was provided for, this was never held and President Vargas governed by decree under emergency provisions of his own constitution until 1945.

<sup>6</sup> On Nov. 6 Italy had become a co-signatory of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of Nov. 25, 1936. See vol. I, document No. 17.

Government has already declared expressly that it is opposed to adherence. Our Embassy in Rio de Janeiro recently reported<sup>1</sup> that we should not work for the adherence of Brazil to the Anti-Comintern Pact. On the other hand, in order to emphasize the importance of the Anti-Comintern Pact for South America, the Information and Press Department could be asked whether the Transocean telegraphic service to South America might be more fully supplied with suitable reports on the subject.

Returned herewith to Referat Deutschland.

FREYTAG

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (6939/E518366-68). A political report of Nov. 16, 1937, analyzing the effects of the events of Nov. 10 and stating that the Brazilian Government would continue to be anti-Communist in internal politics but would abstain from any such international activity because of its relations with the United States and Britain.

## No. 594

1173/328712-15

### *The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

RIO DE JANEIRO, December 23, 1937.

No. 1927/2

Received December 27.

83-60 H.

Subject: German-Brazilian cooperation in the fight against the Comintern.

With reference to my telegraphic report No. 127 of December 22, 1937,<sup>1</sup>

I had of course expected that eventually I would be approached here regarding German-Brazilian cooperation in the fight against the Comintern. But I had not expected that it would be so soon.

The Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, Dr. Francisco Luiz da Silva Campos, who also has jurisdiction over the police of all of Brazil, had an intermediary, Alvarenga,<sup>2</sup> ask me first, and then asked me himself:

1. Whether the Embassy was prepared to assist him unofficially and confidentially in organizing an anti-Comintern exhibition in Brazil very soon, on the pattern of the anti-Comintern exhibition in Germany. João Daudt de Oliveira,<sup>3</sup> a Brazilian who was in Germany last

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (1173/328707), a telegraphic summary of the full report printed here.

<sup>2</sup>Fernando Nilo de Alvarenga, Second Secretary of the Brazilian Embassy in Berlin, at this date on leave in Brazil.

<sup>3</sup>An annex to this report which is not printed (1173/328716) comments on the personalities mentioned. Oliveira is described as a rich industrialist who belonged to the President's innermost circle of political advisers, but played no public role in Brazilian politics.

summer, had told President Getulio Vargas and him of the anti-Comintern exhibition. The President was very desirous of organizing the same thing, or something similar, in Brazil as soon as possible. The Brazilian Government was prepared to pay the expenses. An amount of 5,000 to 7,000 reichsmarks was mentioned.

2. Whether the appropriate authorities in Germany would be willing in the near future to receive in confidence one or two Brazilian administrative or police officials who would obtain information regarding the methods used in combating the Comintern and establish permanent contact with the Anti-Comintern Bureau.

I answered the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs that I would report immediately to Berlin regarding his inquiry. To be sure, I did not think that the German anti-Comintern exhibition could be lent to a foreign country in its entirety. Nor did I know whether duplicates of the photographs and other items from the exhibition could be made as quickly and completely as desired.

The enclosure <sup>4</sup> contains detailed information regarding the Brazilian personages concerned.

The Embassy urgently recommends that an early and affirmative reply be made to the inquiry by the Brazilian Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs.

The first and main reason is that the cooperation requested by the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs is, I assume, completely in line with the German anti-Comintern policy. This reason is in my opinion decisive enough and actually makes mention of other reasons superfluous. Nevertheless I should like for the sake of completeness to bring up a few other considerations.

As mentioned, Dr. Francisco Luiz da Silva Campos is the most important person in the civil administration of Brazil today, next to the President. It would be of great value to us to fulfill his wish quickly and as actively as possible and thereby win his cooperation with Germany in other matters too. Thus I would probably be given the valuable opportunity of being in constant personal touch with him. Owing to the lack of other visible successes of the new regime, subordinate agencies especially are devoting themselves with increasing energy to the realization of the nationalistic aspirations which have been in existence for a long time. Objections have been raised in a few places to the wearing of the Party badge. The recently reported measures against some German schools are also along the same line. Constant personal contact with the Minister concerned would probably offer the best opportunity to press the German viewpoint. Furthermore, the only Cabinet member who takes a somewhat pro-German attitude, at least in economic questions, namely Finance

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3.

Minister Souza Costa, will perhaps soon retire and be replaced by the present Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, Oswaldo Aranha, who certainly will not take a pro-German attitude. This makes it all the more desirable to win the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs over to our side.

The Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs will in any case carry out his plan regarding the anti-Comintern exhibition, with or without German cooperation. He would then probably seek the support and cooperation of some other country, in all likelihood Italy.

It has been considered here whether the Embassy should refer the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs to Herr Oehlke (cf. instruction 83-60, A. 21/10 of November 4, 1937).<sup>5</sup>

Oehlke is no doubt well informed regarding the German fight against the Comintern and regarding the anti-Comintern exhibition. During our trip together on the *Cap Arcona* he mentioned several times that he had studied these questions in particular during his stay in Germany. But Oehlke is already too well known by the small circle of Brazilians who are engaged in the fight against the Comintern. If he were now to be singled out here in this question, rumors would probably soon be started in this circle that would be displeasing to the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs. The Minister would probably think that referring him to Oehlke meant that the Reich Government did not want to cooperate with him directly. Oehlke's appearance in the foreground would also easily create the impression that it was a matter of German propaganda. Brazilian initiative in this matter must not be covered up.

We are therefore of the unanimous opinion here that the appointment of Oehlke for this task is out of the question. He might perhaps render useful service later if and when the exhibition is arranged.

I request telegraphic instructions and in order to simplify them I shall ask a few specific questions:

1. Can the inquiry by the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs be answered affirmatively in principle?
2. Can an anti-Comintern exhibition on the pattern of the one shown in Germany be delivered? The accompanying texts would of course have to be written in Brazilian Portuguese.

<sup>5</sup> The instruction has not been found, but according to a file note (6907/E518285) it concerned the transmittal through Otto Oehlke of anti-Communist material from the Anti-Comintern to the Brazilian press. Oehlke, a German journalist resident in Rio de Janeiro, was an agent of the Propaganda Ministry. On Feb. 9, 1938, Ambassador Ritter transmitted a report (1097/318376-86) through the diplomatic pouch for him. It was a rambling account of discussions with a Brazilian police official who offered in the name of his superior, the police chief for the Federal District, "a strictly confidential arrangement outside diplomatic channels" for cooperation with Anti-Comintern authorities in Germany. In his covering report Ritter warned against the connection as an unreliable one.

3. When could it arrive here?
4. Will there be a charge, and, if so, how much?
5. Would one or two Brazilian officials be welcome in Germany for the purpose mentioned above? So far at least no word has been said here to the effect that a free voyage or a free stay in Germany is expected, as happened in the case of Captain Correa Miranda.<sup>6</sup>

I refer again to the request by the Brazilian Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs that the matter be expedited and treated confidentially.<sup>7</sup>

RITTER

<sup>6</sup> During the winter of 1936-37 there had been discussions between the German and Brazilian Governments for an agreement that the police of the two countries should cooperate to combat Communism. No agreement was signed, but in the spring of 1937 Captain Alfonso Henrique de Miranda Correa, Head of the "Delegacia Especial de Seguranca Política e Social", visited Germany as Himmler's guest to study anti-Communist methods practiced by the Gestapo (920/295188-235).

<sup>7</sup> The Foreign Ministry informed Ritter by telegram on Jan. 24 (1173/328722) that the exhibit material was being sent and that the police officials would be welcome in Germany though the question of who was to pay the expenses should for the time being be left open. Because of the deterioration in relations between Brazil and Germany in the summer of 1938 the exhibit was delayed until November. The 7,000 reichsmarks the Germans demanded in payment led to a prolonged negotiation in 1939. Finally, in January 1940, the Brazilians deposited 4,098 guilders in an Amsterdam bank for the credit of the Anti-Comintern (1173/328754-99).

## No. 595

257/168167-68

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 3 of January 10      BUENOS AIRES, January 10, 1938—9:38 p. m.  
Received January 11—6:00 a. m.

For the Propaganda Ministry.

With reference to our telegram No. 2 of January 8.<sup>1</sup>

The information you have regarding the allegedly favorable financial status of the *Deutsche La Plata Zeitung* is, in view of statements by Tjarks<sup>2</sup> and Stocker,<sup>3</sup> incomprehensible. Although the economic development of the enterprise has recently shown signs of improvement, its financial situation has entered a stage of crisis and is in immediate need of adjustment. The status of the newspaper has probably

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Proprietor of *Deutsche La Plata Zeitung*.

<sup>3</sup> Stocker & Cia. was a Buenos Aires firm of printers and publishers.

greatly deteriorated since the Ambassador transmitted to State Secretary Funk the memorandum of December 17, 1935.<sup>4</sup>

Tjarks quite agrees with your demand for an auditor's report.<sup>5</sup> Today's conversation with Stocker and Bank Director Leute (Banco Germánico of Buenos Aires) gives the following picture: Stocker refuses to make any further deliveries of newsprint without immediate payment in each case; he also demands redemption of bills due monthly to the sum of 15,000 pesos. For this reason the paper will presumably be forced to discontinue publication at the end of this week, unless help arrives in time. In agreement with Leute, the Embassy suggests that a remittance amounting to the equivalent of 25,000 reichsmarks, as part payment of the support which Tjarks was promised in Berlin, be transferred here by January 14 to bridge the period of about one month until the results of the audit are available. The remittance would have to be sent from there via the Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank in Berlin.

With reference to earlier reports by the Embassy and the local representative of the Propaganda Ministry, attention must be called emphatically to the fact that if the *Deutsche La Plata Zeitung* suspended publication even for a few days this would have the most serious political repercussions, particularly in regard to the position of the German colony here and the prestige of the Third Reich in Argentine circles especially. There is danger that, at the moment when it unavoidably becomes known, the financial crisis of the *Deutsche La Plata Zeitung* will be unrestrainedly exploited by Jewish and Masonic circles for their own purposes. Telegraphic instruction requested.<sup>6</sup>

MEYNEN

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> No instruction calling for an audit has been found. A report of Feb. 21 (257/168171-72) by an official of the Auslandsorganisation stated that an audit arranged by the Embassy revealed that the large profits claimed in previous years had been illusory, as they were based on claims which could never be collected. The report also indicated that before 1933 the paper had depended to a considerable extent upon advertising by Jewish grain companies and other enterprises, and that after this ceased, the paper regularly carried without cost large appeals by the local Nazi Party. The AO official stressed the urgency of preserving the paper, which had been most useful to the Nazi organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Its failure would represent a victory for the opponents of Germany.

<sup>6</sup> According to the AO report (footnote 5), Economics Minister Funk allocated 25,000 RM to the paper in response to Meynen's telegram. It appeared, however, that assistance in getting newsprint was necessary immediately, and that subsidies would be required for 2 more years (257/168171-72). Then on Mar. 18 Aschmann wrote to the Propaganda Ministry stating that the paper had given outstanding support to German interests in Argentina as well as in South America generally and was indispensable to the present and future progress of the German community. He urged that the needed newsprint and an additional 25,000 RM be made available to the paper through the Embassy in Buenos Aires (257/168175-76).



No. 596

6971/E520443-50

*The Ambassador in Chile to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 511

SANTIAGO, March 8, 1938.

Received March 15.

Pol. IX 378.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Germany, Chile, and the United States.

With reference to your instruction Pol. IX 205 of February 15.<sup>1</sup>

The problem brought up in the instruction referred to was already touched upon indirectly in my report No. 46 of January 7, 1938.<sup>2</sup> My observations, applied to conditions in Chile, coincide fully with those of my colleague in Washington. The agitation of the American press in this country, in which the United Press has an outright monopoly on news, has produced a sort of war psychosis, which has led many to believe the Old World to be on the eve of a new global conflagration that will inevitably extend to the New. The Chilean oligarchy, completely under the spell of the hegemony of the British Empire, is furthermore convinced that in this coming showdown the group which includes Great Britain will emerge from the conflict victorious—a belief which also benefits the United States as long as the British and North American policies move in the same direction. This again gives rise to the desire not to become involved in any clash with the probable victors in a world war. This position is eased for the Chilean Government by the fact that the milder policy of Franklin Roosevelt toward the Ibero-American Republics has caused the latent popular feeling of distrust of the notorious big-stick<sup>3</sup> policy to recede, while the increasing Americanization of the mode of living in the political circles that set the tone smooths the way for the influence of Uncle Sam. These considerations moved me to assert in the conclusion of the aforesaid report of January 7 that *rebus sic stantibus* our relations with Chile would be strongly influenced by the prevailing status of our relations with the United States just as much as by our relations with England.

The situation is therefore favorable for the Anglo-American Powers to exert influence directed against us (or Japan) in case of war—more favorable in my opinion than in 1917, when the memory of American

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6971/E520443-47). With this instruction the text of telegram No. 48 from the German Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry, published as document No. 440 in volume I of this series, was forwarded to the German Embassy in Chile.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> The words "big-stick" are in English in the original.

encroachments in Mexico, Santo Domingo, etc., prevented the development of a Pan-American feeling embracing the U.S.A.

It must be regarded as certain that in the event of a conflict the U.S.A. would, as in 1917, exert strong pressure on the other American nations in order to persuade them to join the United States. What success it would have in this hypothetical case depends on so many circumstances determined by the prevailing situation that any predictions would be only idle speculation. But this much can be stated with some degree of certainty: the attitude of Chile would be materially influenced by that of the other large Latin-American Republics. It is at least doubtful whether Chile would have been able even in the last war to withstand the threats of the Americans, although there was—and still is—strong sympathy for Germany, had it not been for the support of Irigoyen and Carranza.<sup>4</sup> Today as well, only a very strong Chilean Government could, without such support, enforce the will to neutrality that undoubtedly exists. The present government, however, is weak.

In order not to overburden this report, which is intended to answer a specific question, I should like to report separately on opposing forces and influences—present, planned, or desired—to counteract the efforts of the enemy.

VON SCHOEN

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<sup>4</sup> Hipólito Irigoyen, President of Argentina, 1916–1922, 1923–1930; Venustiano Carranza, President of Mexico, 1917–1920.

## No. 597

2206/474268

### *The Minister in Peru to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 18 of March 26

LIMA, March 26, 1938—1:52 p. m.

Received March 26—8:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 19 of March 24.<sup>1</sup>

The President wants the 88 mm. guns used in Germany. For this Krupp requires 12 months, with the possibility of sending one battery earlier. I request most emphatically that one battery be delivered immediately from supplies on hand. It is a question of demonstrating at the Pan-American Conference to be held here in December that in case of necessity Peru is not defenseless even against the North American air force.

SCHMITT

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2206/474269). Clodius had stated that 18 months would be the earliest possible delivery period for the German artillery pieces desired by Peru.

No. 598

2351/487658-80

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX*

BERLIN, March 30, 1938.

zu Pol. IX 460.<sup>1</sup>

It may be assumed that the protest made by Mexico at Geneva<sup>1</sup> can be attributed chiefly to domestic motives. Our Legation in Mexico takes the same view (see telegram No. 8 of March 21—W VIII NA 732).<sup>2</sup> Under these circumstances I do not believe that an official protest by us would induce the Mexican Government to change its views and withdraw its protest. Rather there is the danger that the sharp measures envisaged by us would cause a further deterioration of the political relations between Germany and Mexico, which might have an adverse effect on our economic relations and also, in particular, on a number of current advantageous commercial transactions. The economic expert for Central America, with whom I discussed the matter, takes the same view. But on the other hand we cannot simply accept the Mexican protest without action of any sort. In my opinion, the instructions to the Legation in Mexico ought to be issued in a more moderate form. An official protest should not be made, but instead the Legation should be instructed to express our surprise and to clarify matters in the sense of the draft telegram.<sup>3</sup>

Respectfully submitted through the Deputy Director to the Director of the Political Department.

FREYTAG

*Senior Counselor*

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*Attached Minute*

BERLIN, March 30, 1938.

In my opinion it should be stated in the instruction to the Legation in Mexico—which, by the way, appears to have sent very scanty

<sup>1</sup> Pol. IX 460: Not printed (6904/E518263/1-63/3). The file number was assigned to a dispatch of the Consulate at Geneva forwarding the Mexican note to the League of Nations, which is the subject of the memorandum printed here. The Mexican note, dated Mar. 19, denounced the German "coup de force" in Austria as a flagrant violation of international treaties and obligations, and called for application of article 10 of the League Covenant.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3945/E054299).

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6904/E518264-65). This instruction, signed by Weizsäcker but marked "cessat" (canceled), directed the Legation to lodge the "sharpest protest" with the Mexican Government, stressing the following arguments: the glad acceptance of the *Anschluss* by most Austrians, the removal of a violation of Wilsonian self-determination, and the singular divergence of the Mexican Government's attitude from that of other governments more familiar with Austrian matters.

reports regarding this matter—that the German Government basically has no interest in the correspondence in question between the Mexican Government and an institution alien to the German Government; however, the public was interested in the matter, and it had also come to the attention of the German Government through the international press. Should the assertions expressed there in regard to the contents of the Mexican note be correct, one would have to conclude that the Mexican Government suffers from a deep and lamentable—almost tragi-comic—ignorance of the continuity of historical events in Europe and legal relationships, particularly with respect to the right of self-determination.

The Minister should inform the Mexican Government orally of the above, expressing our very great surprise regarding the content of the press reports; for the rest, by way of explanation, he should make use of the arguments contained in the first draft of Pol. IV 2043.<sup>4</sup>

Through the Deputy Director to Political Division IX.

W[EIZSÄCKER]<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The reference is to the draft summarized in footnote 3.

<sup>5</sup> An instruction signed by Weizsäcker (2351/487661-63) was sent on Apr. 2 to the Minister in Mexico. He was directed to submit no formal protest but to make vigorous oral representations. The arguments provided him were those of the canceled instruction summarized in footnote 3.

## No. 599

2621/525726-29

### *The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. B 7/7

RIO DE JANEIRO, March 30, 1938.  
Received April 5.  
Pol. IX 490.

### POLITICAL REPORT

It is difficult to see why the Brazilian Government has for the last two months carried on a campaign against the entire German element in Brazil—against German nationals and their organizations as well as against Germans of Brazilian citizenship.

I am speaking now not about the constantly recurring propaganda articles against Germany in one section of the Brazilian press. These articles can mostly be attributed to Jews, *émigrés*, irate Catholic clerics and their supporters, disgruntled and disaffected Germans, and recently also Austrians, as well as to the venality of the local press. Only to a small degree are they attributable to real Brazilian enemies of Germany. If this is recognized, the importance of this press propaganda will not be overrated.

I am speaking here rather of the fact that the Federal Government itself and several of the local state governments not only permit a campaign to be carried on against the NSDAP, individual members of the Party, German schools, etc., but even approve of it. From my many conversations with the President, the ministers involved, military officers and police chiefs, I have now come to the conclusion that these things are not just happening incidentally or more or less because of ineptness of the Government or the administration. Rather, the German question is the subject of constant and exhaustive discussions by the President with his ministers and of the ministers among themselves and with the leading interventors, generals, and state secretaries for the three southern states. What are the reasons that lead the Brazilian authorities to take this attitude? President Vargas, even though his position has been threatened and is very greatly weakened at the present time, would be strong enough to prevent this attack on the German element if he really wished to do so. If he does not, what are his reasons?

It is surely not true that the President has a personal antagonism against Germany or Germans. On the contrary, on every occasion he emphasizes his high esteem for the Germans, the fact that he was reared among them in the south, that he has personal friends among them, and that the Germans have performed important services for Brazil in the administration, the army, and the commercial life of the country. The President, however, is obsessed with the idea of eliminating the existing ethnic differences in the Brazilian population and creating a homogeneous Brazilian race with a uniform language and culture. In this undertaking the approximately one million Volksdeutsche in the three southern states disturb him the most, because they have retained their language, culture, and racial consciousness more than the Italians, the Dutch, the Poles, and others. Even if they believe our assurances that the activity of the NSDAP is strictly limited to German nationals, they fear that the strong organization of German nationals and the newly-awakened German national consciousness exert a spontaneous and inevitable influence on Brazilian citizens of German origin, and that from now on their own efforts to do away with ethnic differences in the Brazilian population and create a Brazilian race will be weakened. The same attitude also serves to explain the occasional suppression of German schools and of the German language in the churches, as well as the hostile attitude toward every form of united and exclusive action by the German element, irrespective of whether German nationals or Brazilian citizens of German origin are involved.

Another factor influencing the President is his present strong political dependence on the United States of America. Whereas last year

the United States carried on the fight against Germany principally in the economic and commercial spheres, it has now changed and extended the field of action, and at the present time its opposition to Germany is mainly political. The events of November 10, 1937, in Brazil, together with the possibility of an Integralist-influenced government,<sup>1</sup> have alarmed the United States. It feared that a really authoritarian regime might be set up in the largest South American country, and that in view of the similar latent possibilities in several other South American countries this might prove infectious for all South America. It considered that this endangered its whole pan-American political ideal of democracy and individualism. It is practically certain that the President's break with the Integralists and the draconic persecution to which they are subject at present are very strongly attributable to the direct influence of the United States. For the same motive the United States is also combatting other organizations in South America which it considers similar, such as the NSDAP. This is all the more the case since it hopes that a general deterioration of relations between Germany and Brazil might thereby be brought about and that it will be able indirectly and more completely to achieve its economic goal of driving Germany out of the Brazilian market.

In addition there are probably also military reasons. It has been surprising to me time and again to encounter purely military viewpoints when discussing the general political situation in Brazil with well-informed Brazilians. The only potential military opponent of Brazil is Argentina. But for the present and for a long time to come Brazil is decidedly inferior to Argentina in a military way. The center of military power in Brazil, particularly also in an industrial sense, lies in the central states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Geraes. But from this center of power there are practically no strategic railroad connections whatever with the southern states. Considering the superiority of the Argentine Navy, the military connections with the southern states by sea will, when it comes to the test, be controlled by Argentina. If in such a case the military connections with the southern states are not kept open by the United States of America, then the three southern states, the population of which is largely of German origin, will be in a quite defenseless position in the face of military seizure by Argentina.

In this connection I wish to refer to the reliable report which I have received to the effect that quite a while ago the Brazilian Gov-

<sup>1</sup> The Integralists were an authoritarian rightist party formed in 1932 under the inspiration of European fascist movements. Although they supported Vargas in the coup of Nov. 10, 1937, the President's failure to give them any major role in the new Government led them to attempt an uprising in May 1938. See document No. 593, footnote 5, and document No. 604.

ernment notified the United States that it intended to award a very large armament contract abroad (Krupp). It requested that the fact of this large financial expenditure not be used as an argument against Brazil in considering the question of the suspension of interest payment on the Brazilian foreign debt. In an exchange of notes the Government of the United States expressly declared itself satisfied with this armaments contract.

Perhaps there are also other reasons which I have not yet encountered for the present attitude of the Brazilian Government toward the German element. In any case it is certain that in spite of a certain amount of personal sympathy with the German element on the part of the President and some of the influential military men and ministers, politically they are opposed to everything German and all German activities. I also believe that this attitude is not merely temporary, but that we must reckon with it as being permanent. I am therefore very skeptical regarding the success of my present efforts to settle the controversy about the prohibition of the NSDAP in the southern states.

RITTER

No. 600

257/168777-79

*The Minister in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

MEXICO CITY, April 8, 1938.

III B 10

Pol. IX 803.

Subject: Creation of sentiment against Germany in the Spanish-American Republics by the United States Government.

Up to now no efforts on the part of the Government of the United States to create sentiment against Germany have been observed.

Although probably no decisive importance should be attached to the decidedly amiable attitude exhibited toward us on all occasions by the American Ambassador and his staff here, still in a country such as Mexico, where discretion is not emphasized, attempts by Americans to create sentiment against Germany could scarcely have remained entirely hidden and not at least have come to our attention as rumors; the dislike of their northern neighbor evident in wide Mexican circles and the sympathy and admiration for Germany are still too great for that. I should like to refer to the statement made by the Counselor of the American Embassy here to a Mexican attorney we know, which I mentioned in my last telegraphic report,<sup>1</sup> in

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2351/487665).

connection with the Mexican protest against the reunion of Austria with the German Reich: he said that it was typical of them (the Mexicans)—a remark which surely does not lead one to conclude that the American Government has an understanding with the Mexican Government regarding important foreign policy questions with which it is not immediately concerned.

Official pressure on the part of Mexico's northern neighbor is of course not necessarily to be inferred from the fact that the American press and telegraphic service, corresponding to the attitude within their own country, influences public opinion here very unfavorably against us by means of propagandistic and distorted reports; and since news reports from such sources have greater interest for Mexico than those emanating from Europe, counterinfluence in our favor is rendered more difficult.

Of course the situation as regards the hostile American position against the economic interests of Germany, as the most troublesome competitor in Mexico, is on an entirely different plane. There is no lack of reliable indications that the American Embassy and the trade commissioner of the United States are working against us with all the means at their command. As an example, I should like to refer to my report IV G d 4 of October 18, 1937,<sup>2</sup> concerning German cooperation with the Administración General del Petroleo Nacional for the opening up of the national oil reserve; mention was made here of the fact that a resolution is supposed to have been introduced by the National Revolutionary bloc in the Senate for the purpose of preventing the Administración General from selling Mexican oil through the mediation of Professors Benz and Erk, who had arrived in Mexico a short time before to inquire into the possibility of creating a German oil base in Mexico. At that time a rumor was making the rounds, which could not be confirmed, to be sure, that an attempt had been made by the Americans to disturb the German-Mexican negotiations: American Ambassador Daniels had called on the Mexican President in order to state that the United States was prepared to accept all of the oil available for export; furthermore, the Ambassador had invited a number of Senators to visit him in order to persuade them to oppose the German efforts. Attempts of this kind do not appear to have had any practical success.

Independently of possible American wishes and exertions, the fact must be taken into account that, at the present time, at least, the mood of a large and possibly decisive part of the population of Mexico, which, after all, in the reports on proceedings at Geneva is considered

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (5749/E416369-85).



to belong to the Communist bloc<sup>3</sup> in the League of Nations, is so definitely oriented against the authoritarian, or "Fascist" countries, as they are called here, that in all probability even without pressure from the northern neighbor the Government would hardly be able to maintain a neutral attitude in case of armed conflict. In this connection the Mexican protest<sup>4</sup> to the League of Nations occasioned by the reunion of Austria with Germany impressed me as symptomatic. Whether Mexico will go so far, however, as to join *actively* with the powers with which the United States of America is aligned, is difficult to say. As we know, the political relations between the two countries, thanks to the good neighbor and non-intervention policies of President Roosevelt, have recently been improving from year to year, and it appears that they will also be able to sustain the present test with regard to the petroleum conflict.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, one gets the impression that even the strong flow of tourists from the north, bringing money into the country, is incapable of overcoming the aversion which wide circles of the Mexican people feel against the "gringos;" the principal factor, however, will be whether Mexico believes that it is with or without closer relations with the United States of America that she can maintain the political and economic independence which she has won. To this extent the fact that Mexico, as a country bordering on the United States, is in a different position from that of the other Central and South American countries is just as likely at the critical moment to influence her against joining up with her northern neighbor as the other way around.

FREIHERR VON RÜDT

<sup>3</sup> On Feb. 25, 1938, Weizsäcker sent to all Missions a lengthy critique of the League's 100th Session (Jan. 27 to Feb. 2); in this he referred to a "Communist group" consisting of the U. S. S. R., "Red Spain", and Mexico (26/18442-51).

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 598.

<sup>5</sup> On Mar. 19 the Mexican Government had expropriated United States, British, and Netherlands oil properties. For the resulting problems, see *Survey of International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1941), vol. I, pp. 666-668, and *Documents on International Affairs, 1938* (London, 1942), vol. I, pp. 426-472. On Mar. 21 Rüdts sent a telegram to Berlin suggesting that the new situation offered an opportunity for larger German purchases of Mexican oil (3945/E054299). On May 4 he reported (2292/483555) that an intermediary, acting at the express wish of the Mexican president, had asked if Germany might be interested in making arrangements for long term oil purchases. In Germany Prince von Hohenlohe-Rothentfels and other industrialists warned that this might lead to difficulties with Great Britain (2292/483556-59), but nevertheless negotiations went ahead and German purchases were made (5749/E417397-98), with the American oil operator W. R. Davis taking an active part as agent of the Mexican Government. In a memorandum of Mar. 30, 1939, an official of the Economic Policy Department pointed out that Germany had been the first country to buy "stolen" oil from Mexico in 1938, and asserted that the Mexicans had good reason to be grateful to Germany, even though the transactions had been completely advantageous to Germany (2292/483562-63).

## No. 601

2836/487022-24

*The Minister in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 189

MONTEVIDEO, April 21, 1938.

Received July 11.<sup>1</sup>

Pol. IX 1215.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Role of the United States in relations between Germany and Uruguay.

In Uruguay it is obviously less possible than in other South American countries to speak of direct agitation of a political sort by the United States against Germany with a view to possible war. The reason for this is to be found principally in the person of the North American Minister here, Dawson, who is relatively friendly to Germany. This naturally does not alter the fact that America is exerting very strong pressure against Germany commercially. And the indirect result of the dominant influence of the United Press and the Associated Press is of the greatest importance. These two agencies with their news services so dominate the public here that European problems, at least, are seen principally through North American eyes. The very significant British influence is also apparent in this country. England, after all, is for the time being the most reliable and largest permanent customer for Uruguayan meat products. So long as England and North America agree in their political views with respect to Germany, Uruguay in an emergency would certainly be found supporting the two great Anglo-Saxon nations. Moreover, the consideration that in case of a military conflict Germany would be lost as a customer and supplier, while England would become still more important than now, at least as a customer, is all too obvious. The fact that in the Foreign Ministry here and in other influential Government and business circles many persons friendly to Germany are to be found, including the President, General Baldomir, as well as Vice-President and Minister of Finance Charlone, brightens this picture for peacetime. In case of war, however, this fact will hardly cause more than a delay in the severance of relations. It cannot be denied that Roosevelt has achieved extraordinary results in South America generally and also in Uruguay with his good-neighbor policy. In times of peace business considerations will prevent the authorities

<sup>1</sup>In a postscript Langmann apologized for an inadvertent delay in dispatching his report, copies of which were sent also to the Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

from adopting the views sketched above. North America is very unsatisfactory as a customer for Uruguayan products. On the other hand, trade connections with Central Europe are very close. It is already obvious to me, however, that continued Anglo-Saxon agitation in the whole of South America, and certainly in Uruguay, regarding the so-called totalitarian states has resulted in a situation similar to that which applied to imperial Germany before the war. At that time the splendor and might of imperial Germany were the object of admiration. Today the brilliant rise of National Socialist Germany is regarded with even more astonishment and respect. It also cannot be denied that the purposeful and vigorous way in which the new Germany pursues her policy actually arouses sympathies here and there—sympathies which are increased still more by the enthusiastic statements regarding the internal development of the new Reich made by Uruguayans returning from Germany. But the old propaganda against “insatiable imperialism” and “Imperial Germany’s expansionist desires which threaten world peace” is employed to an even greater degree against the new Germany. The Versailles dictate is generally regarded today as a piece of folly, to be sure. Furthermore, although Uruguay belongs to the League of Nations, Uruguayans are deeply disillusioned about the Geneva institution. But nevertheless little Uruguay, which in any case suffers from an inferiority complex because of her size, for reasons of psychological necessity inclines toward the allegedly democratic idea of collective defense and therefore lends a ready ear to the siren call of Pan-Americanism. The Uruguayans are absolutely convinced that the principal dangers for the small countries stem from the totalitarian powers. Occasionally they also fear that the “bad example” of Germany and Italy might have an effect on America. Moreover, the certainly not unskillful clamoring of the Anglo-Saxon Powers about the “propaganda” of the totalitarian countries is obviously producing an impression here. They forget that actually the old principle of the cry “Stop thief!” is involved here. The picture is somewhat softened by the fact that, in the first place, it is not known whether Roosevelt’s Pan-American policy might not be replaced some day by a new North American imperialism; and, secondly, the consciousness of a certain helplessness vis-à-vis the commercial pressure of the Anglo-Saxon countries might create a feeling of hostility toward the authors of this pressure. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that in a crisis Uruguay would range herself on the side of the Anglo-Saxon Powers much more rapidly than in the last World War. An article recently published in the opposition paper *El Plata* is very indicative of the skeptical feeling toward North America. The view is expressed at the end of this

article that the democratic foundation for the Pan-American idea is quite unstable. This does not, however, alter the general attitude.<sup>2</sup>

LANGMANN

<sup>2</sup> On May 19 Langmann reported that the relatively favorable German position in Uruguay had deteriorated sharply in recent weeks because of events in Argentina and Brazil, so that there was danger of severe restrictions. Both he and the Landeskreisleiter, Dalldorf, had tried to influence Charlone and other officials through reassuring statements as well as by reminders that close ties between the German colony and the Reich would be a guarantee of close economic relations between Uruguay and Germany (200/140987-93).

## No. 602

8023/598880-83

### *Memorandum of the Cultural Policy Department<sup>1</sup>*

e. o. Kult A 850 g.

Drafting Officer: Consul General Lorenz.

Subject: German-Italian cooperation in South America against anti-foreign measures undertaken at North American instigation.

#### *I. School and language question in Brazil.*

The Governors of the southern Brazilian states, who are military men at present, have issued regulations completely jeopardizing the German character of our school system there. Particularly drastic is the law in the state of Santa Catharina, where the German schools are being practically assimilated to the Brazilian Government schools. In particular, all instruction in the lower grades is to be carried on in the language of the country, insofar as it is not a question of foreign language instruction. Also on wall maps and in inscriptions inside and outside the school building the language of the country is to be used exclusively. No private school may directly or indirectly be maintained or supported by foreign governments or institutions. No name of foreign origin may be chosen for the school. Except for state guests of honor no lecturer at meetings or school festivities may use any foreign language. Similar regulations were issued in the other southern states.

The action is directed not against the German schools alone, but in general against all foreign schools. But since the German element is very numerous and has particularly extensive school facilities, it is hardest hit by these measures.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A cover note dated Apr. 29 (3023/598879) indicates that this document was prepared by Lorenz for Heinburg of Political Division IV for use during Hitler's visit in Rome. Another copy of the document (348/201532-35) is in a file of the State Secretary consisting of papers assembled for Hitler's visit. See document No. 608 for the discussion with the Italians.

<sup>2</sup> According to another memorandum (235/156958-62) on this subject the German Embassy in Brazil instructed the German schools that they had no choice but to conform to the new laws.

There are reports that the Federal Government of Brazil is formulating a school law that will presumably extend the aforementioned measures to the entire nation.

The Federal President himself places particular stress on the language question. Evidently he has notions of creating a Brazilian people on the model of the North American "melting pot".<sup>3</sup>

## II. *Measures against the political activities of foreigners in Brazil.*

A Brazilian law of the 18th of this month extends the injunction against political activities to foreigners also. This makes the activity of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP in Brazil almost impossible. The President orally based this measure on the circumstance that one could not grant to foreigners the right of political assembly on Brazilian soil, a right which is denied to natives. This law, also, is formally directed not against the Germans alone, but against all nations.<sup>4</sup>

The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs has pointed out that party organizations would assuredly also be banned in all countries of the South American continent.

## III. *Similar hostility to foreigners in other South American states; collaboration with Italy to oppose North American influence.*

In other South American countries, for instance in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, there are already indications of the beginning of a similar hostility to foreigners.

Evidently, along with economic warfare, North American diplomacy is attempting with all the means at its disposal to eliminate German political and cultural influence in South America in order to establish a Pan-American bloc—also in the event of a war—and for this the procedure in Brazil is to point the way.

Italy, with whom we have preponderantly parallel interests there, too, is basically affected much as we are by the anti-foreign measures. It would therefore be advisable that at the forthcoming conversations at Rome the Italian Foreign Minister be urged to send instructions to the Italian Chiefs of Missions in South America, to the effect that—in political questions and those affecting the national communities—they

<sup>3</sup> The words quoted are in English in the original.

<sup>4</sup> On Apr. 21 Ambassador Ritter reported (235/156956-57) that he had made an immediate oral protest to the Brazilian Minister of the Interior. He urged Berlin to have the German press treat the party ban as "a consciously unfriendly act against Germany attributable to the influence of the United States."

In a written protest (263/170931-35) handed to the Brazilian Foreign Minister on May 10 Ritter argued that the Nazi Party, unlike parliamentary parties in other states, was a state party entrusted with official tasks, and that therefore Brazil's ban had struck at "an organ of administration of the German state." He insisted further that the party was strictly instructed to abstain from any intervention in the affairs of host countries. He also complained of "a systematic campaign of press agitation against Germany and everything German."

should enter into a confidential exchange of opinions with the German Chiefs of Missions, so that, although acting separately, they may pursue a common objective.

It should be noted that in connection with the application of the anti-foreign measures, Italy, as a Latin and Catholic power, is treated with more consideration by the Brazilian authorities. Because of the slight importance of her commerce she is also less feared by the United States of North America. Nevertheless, Italy should have a political interest in cooperating with us in South America in order to combat the North American campaign against the authoritarian states.

## No. 603

6902/E518238-40

### *The Ambassador in Chile to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 1222

SANTIAGO, May 7, 1938.

Received May 17.

Pol. IX 755.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Threat to Germanism in Chile.

With reference to your instruction Pol. IX 490 of April 11.<sup>1</sup>

The report of March 30 from the Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, sent here with the instruction cited above, discusses a problem which is becoming increasingly important for us in Chile, too; the attitude of the National Government and of public opinion toward the German population, both German nationals and Chileans of German origin.

The situation in Chile is similar to that in Brazil insofar as there is no question here of an essentially anti-German attitude in leading circles. The President, who knows Germany only slightly and does not speak German, inclines more to France than to us, but is by no means anti-German. The elements that set the tone in the majority parties, Conservatives and Liberals, have strong sympathy for Germany; in the case of the former this sympathy is somewhat dampened at the moment as the result of the controversies between the Reich and the Catholic Church.<sup>2</sup> The Armed Forces are decidedly pro-German. Even the Radicals, who are strong precisely in the "German" south (old memories of '48), are by no means all against us in principle, even if the party as such, through inclusion in the Popu-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 599 was forwarded by the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Chile as Pol. IX 490.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. I, ch. vi.

lar Front, is being forced on an anti-German course through the hostility of the Marxists who, despite numerical inferiority, set the tone in the *frente popular*.

In these circumstances, how can one explain these attacks on the German Reich and the German nationals and Volksdeutsche within the country, and the, at the very least, lukewarm attitude of the Government?

In answering this question I must again point out a striking similarity between conditions here and those described by my colleague in Rio: The anti-German movement, which is becoming increasingly open, originates only to a limited extent within the country itself. Certainly in Chile, as in Brazil, there are elements which react with nationalistic anxiety, or, more correctly, envy, to the area in the south settled entirely by Germans. In the industrial city of Valdivia, where the wealth is concentrated in German hands but the working population is indigenous, i. e. largely Indian, Marxist agitation has combined class antagonism with nativistic feelings, and the same has recently been noted in the agricultural district of Osorno. These manifestations must not be over-rated, however; comments acknowledging the achievements of the German settlers, who did not displace any Chileans from their native soil, but out of virgin forests fashioned flourishing provinces which for years were separated from the rest of Chile by the then still unconquered Araucania, strongly predominate. Even the feeling of envy, which usually in such cases is very strong because of the good economic position acquired by superior achievement, is more theoretical than actual; for the average citizen from northern and central Chile, who is incredibly spoiled as far as climate goes, looks upon the South, one of the rainiest regions of the earth, only as a vacation spot during the few tolerably dry summer months. Besides this the Chileans, far more than the Argentineans and apparently also the Brazilians, with all their love for their country, are nevertheless racially tolerant and prefer to let everyone pursue happiness in his own way in matters of faith, language, and customs. The frequent cries of anxiety in the Chilean newspapers regarding alleged German plans of conquest in South America come mainly from foreigners or are taken from foreign sources. These are not always North American, but the majority of them are. Earlier reports—I refer especially to No. 511 of March 8, 1938, and No. 649 of March 9, 1938,<sup>3</sup>—have pointed out the increasing political activity directed against us by the United States. I must therefore, like Ambassador Ritter, come to the conclusion that the anti-German agitation emanates, if not exclusively, then at any

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

rate preponderantly from the United States. The communication from the Embassy in Rio on April 25,<sup>4</sup> to the effect that a ban on the NSDAP in the whole of South America, etc., was to be expected, confirms me in this belief. When I was working at our Legation in Mexico in 1917, we were informed, after the break with the United States, of a statement by an American representative in one of the other Latin American capitals—I think it was Havana—to the effect that the Latin American countries would have to follow the American example whether they would or no, and Mexico would be one of the first. The views stated by Minister Oswaldo Aranha, on which the above-mentioned communication from Rio is based, are strongly reminiscent of that statement during the war, and therefore I would not credit its origin simply to the Itamaraty.<sup>5</sup> I have therefore devoted more space than I normally would to describing the present situation as to the agitation against the Germans in Chile, a description which really only repeats more briefly what has already been said, because, in my opinion, it points to the logical conclusion that the prospects for a realization of the Brazilian Foreign Minister's threat should be judged not by local factors alone. In Chile the forces directed against the Germans are not strong enough, at least at present, to force through such drastic measures as have been taken generally in Brazil and sporadically in Argentina. How far Chile follows Brazil's example will depend rather on the amount of pressure exerted upon Chile; to speak bluntly, on the value that the United States attaches to the execution of such measures and the price she is willing to pay for it. I am not thinking of money alone, for in Chile not everything can be bought, by any means, but of the manipulation of public opinion, and political and economic pressure; not only the direct pressure resulting from their own propaganda—the United Press remains our Public Enemy No. 1 [*öffentliche Feind Nr. 1*] in Chile—but also the indirect pressure exerted through other American countries. For although of their three neighbors the Chileans hate the first, despise the second, and have no real trust in the third despite all effusive protestations of affection, nevertheless the idea of Pan-American solidarity has undoubtedly gained ground. In the Moneda,<sup>6</sup> however, they seldom dare to assume the leadership in Pan-American questions. Pan-Americanism for the present still means the leadership of the United States, even if at times it is only indirectly evinced. The present Chilean Government is weak, more-

<sup>4</sup>In a telegram of Apr. 24 (263/170887) reporting to the Foreign Ministry a conversation in which the Brazilian Foreign Minister warned that such a ban was possible, Ritter stated that he was notifying his colleagues in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.

<sup>5</sup>The Brazilian Foreign Ministry.

<sup>6</sup>The Chilean Foreign Ministry.



over: domestically, because presidential elections are impending, and the comfortable Chilean middle class fears the growth of extremist movements without being able to arouse itself to energetic counter-measures; in the field of foreign policy, because discerning Chileans are privately aware of the questionable nature of the ambition to play the Great Power with a population of four and a half million—half as many as Colombia, two-thirds as many as Peru—and therefore prefer to avoid friction with other American countries. The forthcoming visit, noted in our report No. 1265 of May 5,<sup>1</sup> of Chilean Foreign Minister Gutierrez to Rio de Janeiro will show whether an attempt will be made by the Brazilian Government to persuade Chile to emulate the measures taken in Brazil.

VON SCHOEN

<sup>1</sup>This report has not been found, but an account of the visit is given in a report of June 2, 1938, by the Embassy in Brazil (6905/E518269-72).

## No. 604

2621/525732-34

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

No. B 5

RIO DE JANEIRO, May 12, 1938.

Received May 17.

Pol. IX 762.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Attempted insurrection in Brazil.

With reference to telegram No. 61 of May 11, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

A revolt broke out against the government of Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro on the night of May 10-11; it came as no surprise to an observer of local conditions. This is the second revolt that has had to be suppressed with bloodshed since the dictatorship of the President began on November 10 last year. This time an attempt was even made to seize the President himself. He and his family, even the women, had to defend themselves with revolver in hand.

These incidents again confirm the unpopularity of the present regime ever since the Chief of State broke his word to the Integralist Party. Only by establishing military control over the whole country is it still possible to keep the regime in power. New revolts are to be expected in the future.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (6901/E518232-33). In this telegram Ritter recommended sensational handling in the German press of the events in Brazil, with emphasis on popular discontent against "Vargas' complete submission to the orders of the United States of America" and against his "betrayal of the Integralist movement".

At present order has again been restored in Rio; quiet apparently also prevails in the rest of the country.

It is said that the Government knew that an uprising was in preparation. This appears very doubtful, for in that case it would be incomprehensible that the Presidential Palace was so poorly guarded. Perhaps, however, the Government thought that the time to strike had been set for later. It must be stated objectively that the preparations were entirely inadequate. Despite the fact that only a few defenders were present in the Presidential Palace, they were able to hold out for about an hour against a superior force before the arrival of reinforcements, certainly a situation possible only in a country like Brazil. The President is said again to have distinguished himself by his especial coolheadedness, as on previous occasions. In other respects, also, the success of the rebels was only of very short duration. In particular, in raiding the private apartments of certain high-ranking officers, they did not succeed in arresting them, astonishingly enough.

Naturally the Government is trying to represent the affair both at home and also abroad as having little significance in relation to the situation in the country, not neglecting, nevertheless, to underscore the heroism of all leading personages involved. In view of the unfriendly attitude of this Government toward German interests in Brazil, I have taken the liberty of suggesting that this insurrection be given sensational treatment in the German press and, if possible, also in the press of other European countries. This would bring home to the present Government that it might become impractical for them to continue to show so little understanding for German interests as they have heretofore.

It is also of interest that only a few hours before the outbreak of the revolt the Minister of the Interior and Justice, who is responsible for the security of the country, made a radio address in which he assured the people that they might sleep in peace.

To sum up, one can say that through yesterday's events the Getulio Vargas régime has become even more unpopular in the country than before. He will probably have to enforce his dictatorship still more severely than in the past. The Army and the police, who put down the insurrection—in which units of the Navy participated—have probably gained still more influence. Since the rumor is being circulated in the city that German elements had organized the insurrection in agreement with the Integralist Party, the feeling toward everything German will deteriorate further.

Perhaps I might take the liberty of suggesting that discussions of the situation in Brazil in the press, and also on other occasions, be directed along the following lines: In view of conditions in Brazil, it seems no less than grotesque for North America and other American countries continually to hold up the example of democratic govern-

ment to the European countries with authoritarian governments. A statement on yesterday's events transmitted by the Foreign Ministry here is enclosed in translation.<sup>2</sup>

The Embassies in Buenos Aires and Santiago, and the Legation in Montevideo have received copies of this report.

BITTER

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6901/E518234).

No. 605

235/156963

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

RIO DE JANEIRO, May 13, 1938—1:19 p. m.

No. 63 of May 13

Received May 13—6:45 p. m.

In São Paulo a number of Party members were arrested for "investigation of their political activity in Brazil"; König, the representative of the central office of the Reichsbahn in Rio de Janeiro, who was there on a visit, is among them. I shall protest to the Foreign Minister today and demand their immediate release. Please let me know your views on relations with Brazil, and also what steps, if any, have been taken there vis-à-vis the Brazilian Ambassador. I expect further arrests of Reich citizens here. Should the tone of the *démarches* be made still sharper? Propaganda from North America charges Germans with organizing day before yesterday's revolt. The Brazilian Government has thus far permitted this propaganda.

BITTER

No. 606

6901/E518233/1-33/3

*The State Secretary to the Ambassador in Brazil*

Telegram

No. 89

BERLIN, May 14, 1938—8:25 p. m.  
zu Pol. IX 735.

With reference to your telegram No. 63 of May 13, 1938.

I received the Brazilian Ambassador<sup>1</sup> today and, on the basis of your

<sup>1</sup> Dr. José Joaquim de Lima e Silva Moniz de Aragão, Ambassador since June 17, 1936. Weizsäcker's memorandum (263/170905-07) of this conversation includes a few additional points, particularly his assurance to Senhor Moniz de Aragão that no Reichsdeutsche were involved in Brazilian politics and his insistence that their customary cultural relations to Germany not be interfered with. Weizsäcker also mentioned the keen German interest in the welfare of the Volksdeutsche.

material, very emphatically pointed out that the measures taken by the Brazilian Government against Germans there had caused great excitement in Germany. There was danger that our relations with Brazil might thereby be permanently affected. We asked the Ambassador, in the interest of the friendly relations between our two countries, to try to persuade his Government to withdraw its general measures against the German element. This meant above all that the arrested German nationals should be released from prison and that no new arrests should occur. I also mentioned that the violent North American propaganda against the Germans in Brazil which we had observed, and the fact that it was tolerated, were contributing toward aggravating the situation still further, and suggested to the Ambassador that he urge his Government to take measures against this inflammatory activity of the North American journalists.

The Brazilian Ambassador deeply regretted the developments that have occurred in the relations with the German element in Brazil, which in itself was highly esteemed, and promised to convey at once to his Government the substance of our conversation. He hoped by his representations he could achieve what we wished, but requested a few days' time for his reply. Should he have no word by Tuesday he would call the Foreign Minister by telephone.

The steps taken there have our full approval. In accordance with your proposal, the tone of the press campaign here has become sharper.

Our relations with Brazil, which are friendly in themselves, do not prevent you, too, from further sharpening the tone of your *démarches*. However, we are aware that we have no means of pressure available, or at least only to a very small extent. The importance of what is at stake, namely, the prestige and the preservation of the German colony in Brazil, requires plain speaking, however.

I should be grateful if you would continue to keep us informed.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 607

235/156978

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 64 of May 14

RIO DE JANEIRO, May 14, 1938—2:24 p. m.

Received May 14—9:00 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 63 of May 13.

Today several newspapers make much of a report that Germany had financed the revolt. The President is in possession of precise

information regarding the intervention of a foreign nation. In his speech yesterday, too, the President mentioned "help from outside." Although so far it has been possible to disprove every one of the assertions made to me by the Foreign Minister regarding König's<sup>1</sup> participation in the coup, and it is to be hoped that some of the arrested men will be released, the situation is steadily becoming more acute as a result of the general agitation. Am I authorized to point out that continuation of this agitation against Germany will necessarily lead to my departure and possibly even to a severance of diplomatic relations?

RITTER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 605.

## No. 608

6590/E492873

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 16, 1938.

a. o. Pol. IX 776.

During the Führer's trip to Italy, Minister Aschmann and I spoke to persons in the Italian Foreign Ministry regarding German-Italian collaboration (suggested by Ambassador Ritter)<sup>1</sup> with respect to the Brazilian Government because of the serious disruption of our relations resulting from the treatment of German and Italian nationals. It was explained to Herr Aschmann that Italy had made some sort of secret arrangement with the Brazilian Government. Nor did I find any especial sympathy among the Italians for my suggestion that we could nevertheless act jointly. Ministerialdirektor Buti<sup>2</sup> told me that the Italian Fascist groups in Brazil were entirely colorless and unpolitical in nature.

It would be desirable to inform Herr Ritter of this. Perhaps it would also be of interest to Herr von Mackensen, to whom I was unable to give more information orally.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> In a telegram of Apr. 27 (3023/598884) Ritter reported that Italians in Brazil were legally in the same position as Germans, but that the Italian Embassy showed little inclination to cooperate with him in counteracting United States pressure. He therefore suggested that an effort be made in Rome to work out suitable measures of collaboration.

<sup>2</sup> Gino Buti, Director General of the Department of European and Mediterranean Affairs in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> The substance of this memorandum was circulated to the Missions at Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Rome (263/170928-29).

## No. 609

235/156977

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Brazil*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, May 16, 1938—9:00 p. m.

No. 91

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegraphic report No. 64.<sup>1</sup>

In order to be able to answer the final question in your telegraphic report No. 64, the Foreign Minister requests that you address another telegram to him personally giving your unreserved opinion as to whether, as a result of bungling and mistakes on the part of persons of German origin or of other German elements, the reproaches levelled and measures taken against us are in any way justified.

The Foreign Minister wishes to intercede energetically for those unjustly prosecuted and to proceed against unjustified reproaches, but wishes to be very sure of his ground and to be supported by detailed data. Since German-Brazilian relations, which are of great importance to us, are directly at stake, the Foreign Minister would not like, when taking energetic action, to stumble upon Brazilian objections with which he was perhaps not yet acquainted.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 607.

## No. 610

235/156982

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 71 of May 18

RIO DE JANEIRO, May 18, 1938—1:47 p. m.

Received May 18—7:25 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 91 of May 16.

First. I am unaware of any bungling or mistakes by persons of German origin or by German elements which justify the reproaches made against me now and the measures taken in connection with the revolt. I am also convinced that the Brazilian Government is not in possession of any proofs of the participation of German nationals in the revolt. If they had found anything tangible in the course of the arrests, investigations, and confiscations, which have been going on for weeks, they would surely have published this now in connection with the revolt and used it against us.

Secondly. At an earlier date, on the other hand, up to the beginning of 1937, bungling on the part of German elements did occur, but this gave no adequate cause for the recent ban of the Party organization and bears no relation of any kind to the present revolt.

Thirdly. I would appreciate it for my further conversations if you would allow me the liberty of hinting at or threatening the extreme consequences mentioned in the closing sentences of telegraphic report No. 64 of May 14.

RITTER

No. 611

263/170914

*Circular of the Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, May 18, 1938.

The situation requires the following measures in support of the work of the Auslandsorganisation: First, avoidance of any open activity, and concentration of forces on internal indoctrination. Second, separation from Volksdeutsche; dismissal of Volksdeutsche and persons with double nationality from the Party, the German Labor Front, and their formations; separation of German nationals from volksdeutsch organizations with political objectives. Third, preparation for the establishment of organizations for German nationals led from within by the Party. Chile is an example. Submit statutes of organization to Berlin. Detailed directives follow by courier.

BOHLE

<sup>1</sup> The message was sent to all German Missions in Latin America with the instruction that it be handed to the Landesgruppenleiter or other local head of the Auslandsorganisation (263/170925).

No. 612

235/156984-87

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 18, 1938.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Freytag.

The Brazilian Ambassador called on me today and informed me of the reply that he had received from his Government to his telegram of the 14th.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 606.

According to this the König affair<sup>2</sup> is already settled; the man had only been taken into custody by the police because his automobile had been seen in the critical hours in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace. After being interrogated he had been released.

The anti-German comments in the Brazilian press did not represent the views of his Government; furthermore, they had appeared only in second-rate newspapers which had no influence. The Brazilian Government had already taken steps to assure that the general tone toward Germany would be friendlier. In doing so it was proceeding in the expectation that the German press would now also soften its tone.

The annoyance with Germany was attributable to the fact that one of the leaders of the insurrection was a former officer who represented a number of German firms. The Ambassador was not able to name the person, nor did he know whether it was a German national or a person of German origin who was involved.

M. de Aragão also asked that personal attacks upon President Vargas cease. He pointed out that, even in the last critical days in Brazil, press attacks on the German Head of State had not been permitted.

In brief, he expressed the hope that, in view of the good will shown by his Government, as well as by the German authorities, it would be possible after the end of the press campaign to settle one by one the difficulties existing between Germany and Brazil.

I replied that I was not so optimistic. The Brazilian authorities had been guilty of a number of unheard-of encroachments on the rights of German nationals. In this connection I gave him a number of details from today's memorandum<sup>3</sup> of the AO on the situation in Brazil. I repeated to him, with reference to the earlier conversation,<sup>4</sup> that above all we protected the interests of German nationals, but that German public opinion could also not be indifferent if Volks-deutsche were persecuted only because of their origin and if general attacks on German civilization and culture went unchecked. I insisted finally upon the immediate release of all German nationals whose guilt was not indisputably established. I also demanded, in support of Ambassador Ritter's demand, that the Brazilian Government issue at once a press communiqué unreservedly denying the dangerous calumny regarding participation by Germany in the

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 605. Ritter reported in a telegram sent at 10:28 p. m., May 18, that König, after being held 4 days and threatened with being shot, had been released only through Ritter's most emphatic representations (263/170916-17).

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 606.



revolt." Should these demands not be fulfilled in the very near future I saw no possibility of restraining the German press. I also informed him in this connection that we had ordered Herr Ritter to inform us at once by telegram regarding the number and names of the German nationals arrested for political reasons, since we attached decisive importance precisely to this question.

The Ambassador promised to cable to his Government what I had told him and to recommend warmly the fulfillment of our two demands. He stated as his personal opinion that Vargas had certainly not meant Germany in his remark about a "financing of the revolt from the outside," but in all probability had been thinking of his Brazilian political opponents, who had been directing the movement against him from Argentina and Uruguay.

At the close of the conversation I promised the Ambassador that on our side attacks on President Vargas would cease, since I, too, was of the opinion that Heads of State should be kept out of the political battle in the newspapers.

W[EIZÄCKER]

\* Ambassador Ritter reported (235/156998-157002) on May 21 that the Brazilian Government had released the following communiqué: "Part of the Brazilian press has asserted that German firms and German nationals participated in or lent support to the events of May 11 in Rio de Janeiro. The competent Brazilian authorities state that up to the present they have no evidence which sustains this assertion."

## No. 613

257/168738-39

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 18, 1938.

Yesterday evening at his house the Argentine Ambassador made an insistent attempt to make clear to me that the good relations between Germany and Argentina had been disturbed in recent years by German blunders. Ever since 1934 he, Labougle, had given the German Foreign Ministry to understand, and had tried to make clear to State Secretaries Meissner and Lammers, that the activity of German nationals in Argentina was bringing about unfortunate developments in our relations. And now, on April 10, there had been a registration on lists at the German Embassy and in the German Consulates in Argentina which could not be termed anything else than a plebiscite undertaken on Argentine sovereign territory.<sup>1</sup>

Since certain of the claims which Labougle advanced were unclear and could not be sufficiently clarified by my questions, and the con-

<sup>1</sup> This registration occurred in connection with the plebiscite on the *Anschluss* and general election for the Reichstag. See *Survey of International Affairs*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 232-235.

versation took on a more and more official character, I suggested to Labougle that he visit me in the next few days so that his complaints could be given definite form, and injuries which had been done or which were to be expected could be rectified. Somewhat hesitantly the Ambassador agreed to call on me in the near future in order to continue the conversation.

Señor Labougle indicated unmistakably that there is close agreement between his Government and that of Brazil in the question of handling the German element. Therefore it seemed particularly necessary to me to keep the Brazilian precedent from spreading further, if possible, and to direct the disagreeable conversation into official channels. I shall not put down the details on paper until Labougle has paid his visit at the Ministry.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 614.

No. 614

2084/451117-19

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 18, 1938.

Pol. IX 759.

As agreed yesterday,<sup>1</sup> the Argentine Ambassador called on me today. He related at great length the incidents which to his personal knowledge had led to a critical situation for the Germans in Argentina. Señor Labougle tried to give an objective account and repeated that he, for his part, was not making any complaints, but was only presenting his observations in the interests of both sides.

The Ambassador's account was somewhat as follows: Argentina was a country in which, in general, everyone could do or not do just as he pleased. Therefore, to begin with, after the seizure of power [in Germany] nothing had been put in the way of the NSDAP organizations that had gradually been formed. A factor contributing to this had been the generally pro-German attitude in the country, which, as we knew, had not participated in the war and had made political and other sacrifices for the sake of its neutrality. The friendly attitude of Argentina had, unlike that of many other countries, even survived the *Anschluss* with Austria, although in the course of recent years leftist newspapers and elements in opposition had increasingly called attention in a critical way to procedure in the German Party organizations. The mood had become serious, however, on April 10, 1938.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 613.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 613, footnote 1.

On this date, the day of the Reichstag elections, the German Embassy in Buenos Aires and the German Consulates had entered names on lists which had been equivalent to a vote, although the Embassy had declared that these entries had nothing to do with an election or a vote. (The Ambassador could not say for certain whether, besides these entries at our Missions, a special vote had taken place on a steamer which, in order to conduct a vote, had passed the three-mile limit.)

To my objection that perhaps a misunderstanding was involved regarding the events on April 10, but that at any rate there was nothing very concrete, Labougle replied that one could not, to be sure, speak of actual violations of Argentine laws or regulations. What had given cause for unrest and opposition was rather the manner in which the German nationals conducted themselves. Meetings, marches, uniformed troops, exercises, and the like had been observed—things which were little to the taste of the Argentine people. It all smacked of duress and control, in connection with an organization from outside the country, for that matter, and was therefore unwelcome in his country. Argentina had also had a small Fascist-like movement, but it had been insignificant and had now disappeared entirely. Other foreigners, such as the Italians, who evidently had no difficulties, or hardly any, kept up their community life in a way which seemed harmless to the Argentines and was not disturbing.

At my further insistence, Señor Labougle then ventured the surmise that the incidents described would not have been taken so amiss if the problem of dual citizenship did not play an important role in Argentina. Because of the law of the land [*jus soli*], there were quite a number of Argentines of German extraction for whom Argentina claimed Argentine citizenship, but Germany German citizenship. For example, so far as he, Labougle, knew, the German Missions in Argentina did not grant visas on Argentine passports of such persons, but had German passports issued for them. Through this mixing of nationality, Argentina considered that the German organizations mentioned interfered in the internal life of the country, and this would certainly not be tolerated in the long run. Measures such as those in Brazil were imminent.

To my further question of what sort of friendly advice Señor Labougle could give so as to prevent such prohibitions—particularly with respect to German cultural institutions—and the resulting ill will between Germany and Argentina, the Ambassador could only say that we should simply re-organize our Party organizations in Argentina and replace them with less obtrusive, new organizations with an inoffensive appearance. He could not advise continuation of the present NSDAP organizations in secret or under camouflage. If

they were set up in an unpolitical and unofficial way, however, he believed a large part of the difficulties would be surmounted.

In conclusion, the Ambassador repeated that he was speaking purely *privatim* and, simply as a friend, was expressing thoughts which might perhaps be useful and illuminating for us.

I received Labougle's statements without committing myself in any way.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 615

2084/451121-25

### *The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

1129

BUENOS AIRES, May 18, 1938.

Received May 24.

Pol. IX 828.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Anti-German sentiment in Argentina.

The anti-German sentiment which has recently become evident in important South American countries and which has already led to positive measures by the Government here in Argentina, too, necessarily raises the questions of the reason for such action by this Government, and what we can do in order to remedy this unpleasant situation.

It is hardly necessary to explain that, much as in Brazil, principally North American groups are behind all this anti-German propaganda: elements hostile to us, especially Jews, and North American businessmen envious of the development of German trade have combined and are working with similar groups in the South American countries—among them, of course, also numerous émigrés—in order to fight the influence of the new Germany in all fields. In addition there is the hostile attitude of the Catholic Church, which is still quite influential in a country as Catholic as Argentina; the Church obtains its information exclusively from anti-German papers and magazines, and on occasion feels obligated here to act more papal than the Pope. Finally, mention should also be made of the circles which have always been active against us within the country, which have the *Argentinisches Tageblatt* and the *Critica* for their mouthpieces, and which for years have been carrying on shameless propaganda against the new Germany and her representation here; in spite of the greatest efforts it has not been possible to put an end to this unsavory activity.

Since all these forces have been active for years, we must ask ourselves, if we wish to get to the root of the matter, why at this

precise moment the Argentine Government felt it necessary at all to yield to these efforts which hitherto have been unable to win any influence over official policy. Certainly this can be explained to a considerable extent by the change of government which occurred recently. The former government of General Justo, which grew out of the almost Fascist dictatorship of General Uriburu, was basically opposed to such demagogic tendencies, and Dr. Saavedra Lamas, the Foreign Minister, was opposed to overly strong North American influence in Argentina, as was clearly recognizable during the Pan-American Conference which took place here at the end of 1936. The new Foreign Minister, Dr. José María Cantilo, appears rather to be anti-Fascist since the time he served as Ambassador to Rome,<sup>1</sup> and quite ready to defend the usual democratic liberal ideals together with President Roosevelt. The new President<sup>2</sup> is better versed in administrative and financial matters than in foreign policy and, being an old Radical of the Alvear school, probably has no special sympathy for Germany—although he never passes up an occasion to emphasize his appreciation and admiration for Germany. He evidently leaves the Foreign Minister rather a free hand, and wants above all to have as quiet an administration as possible; in other words, he wishes to avoid any conflicts which are more than superficial. Both statesmen are in full agreement in avoiding all difficulties with the press; consequently they are unfortunately inclined to be very lenient to demagogic slogans, as for example the expression, "fight the isms," which has come up recently.

On the other hand we cannot disregard the fact that certain events have had a very unfavorable effect on public opinion here. I have reported the most important cases of this kind, which may appear insignificant, taken separately, but which nevertheless have had a very unfavorable effect owing to their treatment in the press and to its usual attempts at generalization. I might call to mind the fact that about 6 months ago the large daily papers, led by the biggest local paper, *La Prensa*, which is otherwise very restrained in such matters, for the first time sharply criticized the appearance of the sports unit here in brown uniforms for the Langemarck<sup>3</sup> memorial parade; small changes in our regular uniform do not alter the fact that the Argentines consider this attire the uniform of the SA in Germany. Shortly thereafter the newspapers here criticized the so-called "concert of the thousand German children," of which, in the

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Welzsäcker's handwriting: "In Rome he was piously pro-Italian" [*In Rom war er sehr Italien-fromm*].

<sup>2</sup> President Roberto M. Ortiz was elected in September 1937 and assumed office on Feb. 20, 1938.

<sup>3</sup> A battle in Flanders, November 1914, in which German units composed of student volunteers suffered heavy casualties.

Argentine conception (*jus soli*) at most 25 percent were actually German, that is, children of German nationality. There are also other instances, in themselves quite insignificant, but suitably exploited by the press, such as the posting of a sign reading "National Socialist German School" at a school in the territory of Misiones, etc. This was followed by intervention by the Governor in Misiones as the first official step, and the arrest of the local cell leader. This man undoubtedly has the best National Socialist convictions, but possibly not too much tact; through intercession by the German Consul in Posadas he was released after 24 hours. Even at that time this Governor stated that he would not tolerate any political tension in his district such as that created by the German groups fighting one another, and that in general he could not permit any "isms" in his especially endangered frontier area. Strangely enough, the large-scale demonstration which took place on April 10, 1938, in place of the elections, which were impossible here, created special dissatisfaction; it was considered an inadmissible plebiscite on Argentine soil.<sup>4</sup> Actually the German-Austrian Society here unfortunately drew up lists for signing despite the express opposition of the Embassy and the Landesgruppe, so that outwardly the impression of a plebiscite, even though a limited one, was created. Public opinion here objects to this with unwonted sharpness; it is impossible to make clear even to persons who are really very favorably inclined toward us that the Germans living here must, after all, have the right to come together on a day which is really historic for their homeland and to make known their affection for the Führer and their approval of the policy which he has adopted and carried out. Two objections are encountered again and again in this connection: first, that a demonstration of this kind must not have the character of a referendum inadmissible on Argentine soil; and, second, the much more serious assertion that the celebration which was held was not confined to German nationals, but that among the 20,000 participants there were undoubtedly also Argentine citizens, according to the Argentine view, who in no circumstances should have participated in such a political demonstration.

And this, I believe, brings us to the core of the entire problem, the correct evaluation of which must be decisive for our further procedure: as long as the Argentine Government is convinced that such functions are confined exclusively to persons who in Argentine opinion are indisputably German nationals, there will hardly be serious difficulties; but as soon as the suspicion arises that Volksdeutsche are in-

<sup>4</sup> In a report of Apr. 13, 1938 (6590/E492625-29), the Embassy described the demonstrations of Apr. 10 which were sponsored jointly by it and the Landesgruppe to celebrate the *Anschluss*; it also attributed the counter-demonstration of the same day to an anti-German press campaign and to "Jewish wirepullers."

cluded, it will consider this evidence of inadmissible political influence and interference with the assimilation of the immigrant element which is being promoted in every way. A high Argentine official told me some time ago: "What would happen to Argentina, which is after all to a great extent a country of immigrants, if the Italians should start to sort out their 3 million, the Spaniards their 2 million, and the Germans their quarter of a million immigrants and organize them into their own groups?" This is the *vox populi* of this country, and this anxiety reappears again and again in all the difficulties which we are encountering lately. This is exemplified particularly by the measures taken against German schools, which are time and again reproached more or less openly for trying to educate the children born in Argentina, who are Argentine citizens according to the view here, not as Argentines but as Germans. In addition, the very skillful North American propaganda has actually aroused in many people a certain fear of a limitation through foreign ideologies of the country's democratic freedom; this explains the slogan about fighting "isms," i. e., Fascism and Falangism also. Unfortunately we must not forget that as the result of the Jewish propaganda and the animosity of the Catholic Church we are in an especially exposed position; the Italian Fascists and Spanish Falangists are not opposed by these two forces, or at least not to anything like the same extent. Consequently we must always count on especially sharp and unfavorable comment and criticism.

If on the basis of these facts we ask ourselves the question how we might still save what can be saved of the German element here, the problem of separating German nationals from Volksdeutsche necessarily arises; to be sure, those persons with dual nationality, whether recognized or not, considerably complicate this problem.

In my opinion this separation, which has already become necessary and has been carried out in all of Europe—probably for very similar reasons—might perhaps be accomplished by our first establishing an association with purely cultural objectives for German nationals only, such as has been permitted even in Brazil. Consideration should be given either to developing an existing organization or to creating a new and entirely unpolitical one which would have to be registered as a juridical person under the law. This association could at the same time serve as a coordinating agency for all other German societies—an arrangement for which I have been striving for a long time and the absence of which regularly makes itself felt in a very unpleasant manner when it is a question of reaching the entire German element, as for example in the case of the Winterhilfswerk, etc. This association of German nationals would, of course, have to be directed entirely along the lines of our Movement.

At the same time the existing organizations should be fostered, with emphasis on and under the leadership of the Volksdeutsche, since this appears to me the only way of maintaining the big German installations established by former generations, such as the valuable German Hospital, the schools, athletic centers, clubs, churches, etc.; the German nationals alone are not rich enough to keep up the big and costly installations indefinitely without subsidies from home, and these would probably be made impossible for us.

I should like to confine myself to these broadly sketched suggestions, since I am not able to foresee whether the German Government is inclined to pursue this suggestion for Argentina. I respectfully request instructions in the matter, and shall then take the liberty of making more detailed suggestions which would, of course, have to be worked out in consultation with the Landesgruppe.

Copies of this report are being sent to the Embassies in Rio and Santiago as well as to the Legation in Montevideo.

THERMANN

### No. 616

263/170928-29

*The State Secretary to the Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, May 21, 1938.

Pol. IX 776 Ang. I.

1. During the Führer's trip to Italy, German-Italian collaboration against the anti-foreign measures of the Brazilian Government was suggested to the Italian officials.<sup>2</sup> The Italians answered evasively, asserting that Italian Fascist groups in Brazil were of a completely colorless, nonpolitical character. Italy had, moreover, come to a confidential understanding with Brazil regarding this question.

The Argentine Ambassador, too, said in yesterday's conversation<sup>3</sup> that, in contrast to the Germans, the Italians and other foreigners as well pursued their community life in a way that seemed safe and harmless to the Argentines.

2. The Polish Ambassador, unsolicited, suggested parallel action against the anti-foreign measures of the Brazilian Government. We agreed.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The telegrams were numbered respectively 68, 104, and 32 of May 21.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 602 and 603.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 614. The apparent discrepancy in dates may indicate only that the telegram was drafted a day or two before being sent.

<sup>4</sup> Ambassador Lipski's conversation with Weizsäcker occurred on May 18 (263/170918).



8. Please go into these points when you report, and investigate especially Italy's experiences in the field of the cultural struggle and the organization of the Fascist Party abroad, since we can perhaps make use of them in the present situation.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 617

2621/525739

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

B 7/7

RIO DE JANEIRO, May 25, 1938.

Received May 31.

Pol. IX 887.

For the Protocol Department.

With reference to our telegraphic report No. 47 of April 21, 1938,<sup>1</sup> and our letter B 5 of May 17, 1938,<sup>2</sup> from Counselor of Embassy von Levetzow to Minister von Bülow-Schwante.

The following small incident occurred during my last visit to the Foreign Minister here on May 21.

On the occasion of the sojourn of the Chilean Foreign Minister in Rio de Janeiro the Foreign Minister invited me and the other members of the Embassy to a ball scheduled for May 24. On my last visit I expressed my thanks for this invitation and told him that under normal circumstances it would, of course, be a pleasure for the Embassy to accept the invitation. But I did not consider it appropriate for the Embassy to dance at a ball of the Foreign Minister as long as German nationals were under arrest on the entirely unfounded suspicion of having somehow taken part in the attempt on the life of the Brazilian President and the revolt against the Brazilian Government. This statement was followed by a brief exchange, at the end of which the Foreign Minister stated that in this case he would have to instruct the Brazilian Ambassador in Berlin not to accept any more invitations from the German Government. To this I replied that there was no need of such an instruction to the Brazilian Ambassador in Berlin, as he would receive no more invitations from the German Government in any case, as long as the NSDAP was forbidden here. The Minister seemed to be rather taken aback and angry at this communication.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (235/158956-57). This is the telegram summarized in document No. 602, footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> In this letter (6966/E519407-09) Levetzow complained of the Brazilian Government's attitude toward Germany, and urged that German dissatisfaction might be brought home to the Brazilian Ambassador in Berlin personally by means of a social boycott. Bülow-Schwante was Chief of Protocol.

With reference to the above-mentioned incident, I request that strict measures be taken to see to it that the Brazilian Embassy and staff in Berlin do not receive any invitations from the Reich Government for the present.<sup>3</sup>

RITTER

<sup>3</sup> On June 3 Ribbentrop called Weizsäcker's attention to this statement and asked him to write to Ritter requesting him to restrain himself in the making of such declarations so long as he did not have specific instructions authorizing them (2621/525740). Weizsäcker wrote Ritter, on June 9 (2621/525741-44), stating that in this matter he "had drawn a check on Berlin without the certainty that it could be honored." He said that Berlin preferred not to carry disagreements with other governments into the realm of social relations, and Ritter was to tell the Brazilian Foreign Minister that there was no social boycott of his Ambassador in Berlin.

## No. 618

2621/525756

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 2, 1938.

Pol. IX 1197.

On his own initiative the Italian Ambassador spoke today of the fact that in Brazil the Italian minority enjoyed an advantage to the extent that the legal provisions against the German minority and their schools had not yet been put in force against the Italian minority. This explained why the Italian Ambassador in Rio had not yet consented to a parallel action with Ambassador Ritter. Perhaps the more favorable position of Italy was even a precedent that we might use to advantage.

The Ambassador also added some remarks privately to the effect that judging by his own experience in Rio the most effective policy was to spare Brazilian sensibilities and adopt a cordial tone even in a difficult situation.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 619

257/168981-83

### *The Minister in Peru to the Foreign Ministry*

III B 2

LIMA, June 4, 1938.

Pol. IX 1048.

Subject: Attitude of public opinion toward Germany.

Peru is a country whose form of government does not differ from ours, and we have no economic or other conflicts with her. There is no

volksdeutch element here to cause difficulties. The sentiment here can therefore be regarded as a reflection of the effect which recent events have had on disinterested parties.

To begin with, it must be said that the attitude of public opinion toward Germany is different from the attitude toward domestic questions here. A person who supports the authoritarian government of Benavides<sup>1</sup> is by no means for that reason a friend of Germany, something which is, for example, clearly brought out in the attitude of the very powerful Catholic element here. The latter is closely connected with the Benavides government, but is not for that reason any less hostile to us here than elsewhere. Even if the episcopate disavows the Rotarians, as just recently occurred here, this does not by any means indicate a more friendly attitude toward us.

The attitude toward us also has little to do with the attitude toward Italy and Nationalist Spain. Both these countries are in a better position here to begin with because of racial affinity and Catholicism. Anyone here who desires a totalitarian state has in mind the Italian or the Spanish model; German problems either do not apply here or are considered too complicated.

Such sympathy as we had won here pertained principally to our fight against Communism, our practical domestic achievements, and our peaceful foreign policy.

Because of recent events this has now been very much changed, as has already been reported in another connection. The respect for our practical domestic achievements has remained undiminished. In view of the new developments, however, our struggle against Communism appears to have been forgotten, and it is also believed that the Communist menace in the world has decreased. The propaganda of our enemies has been successful in that there is no longer any confidence in the peaceableness of our policy. Our onetime friends have become uncertain and those who wavered up to the present have now gone over to our enemies. The visit of the League of Nations delegates to Lima gave an interesting insight into this. It must, unfortunately, be said that along with Catholic elements just about all the intelligentsia and many businessmen also are now arrayed against us. They have been captivated by the view disseminated by enemy propaganda that Germany represents the sole threat to world peace and is perhaps also pursuing sinister plans in South America. On the part of the United States the dollar also plays its role. It is firmly believed that in case of danger France will without question be supported by England and also by the United States.

<sup>1</sup> General Oscar R. Benavides, President of Peru 1933-1939.

When, as was the case at a function arranged by the Rotarians here in honor of the League of Nations delegates, the diplomatic representatives of practically all nations were invited and attended en masse with the exception of those of Germany and Italy, it was an obvious expression of the fact that these two nations were isolated in the face of the strong solidarity of all the others; and the herd instinct alone creates a desire to join the big majority.

In spite of this situation, the respect felt for our practical achievements can be increased. Furthermore, the example afforded by us—that only by a united will can a nation be made to prosper—will continue to win adherents. From a long-range viewpoint our position has not grown worse, but has improved as a result of the increase in internal and external power. It is a question of the immediate situation. Whether the idea that we are the sole disturbers of the peace will disappear, depends on the course of events and further clarification. What for the present will probably remain here, however, is the impression that Germany is encircled just as in 1914 and that, in the long run at any rate, her opponents will retain the upper hand.

Simultaneously with this unfavorable change in viewpoint here a change in the attitude toward France has also taken place. People believe that they no longer need fear that France will slide further to the left and are confident that order will prevail there henceforth. Thus the only thing that stood in the way of unity with France here has disappeared. The great predilection here for everything French, based on long tradition, has been revived, and people vie with each other in showing sympathy with France.

The newspapers here generally carry very few articles clearly expressing their own views, and the most important paper, *El Comercio*, has not yet abandoned its basically benevolent attitude toward us. Therefore, proofs in the press of the change in the general attitude described above are actually to be found more between the lines and in the wording of the headlines of dispatches from the news agencies. It is these dispatches with their vast number of stubbornly biased news reports unfavorable to us that principally exert a destructive influence.

DR. SCHMITT

## No. 620

257/168189

*The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

1306

BUENOS AIRES, June 7, 1938.

Pol. IX 1007.

Subject: Organization of the Fascio in Argentina, and Italian experience in the cultural field.

With reference to your telegraphic instruction No. 68 of May 21.<sup>1</sup>

The statements by the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin, according to which the Italians here and other foreigners as well, in contrast to the Germans, carry on their community life in a form that is considered safe and harmless by the Argentines, are on the whole probably in accordance with the facts. This was also brought out in Deputy Dickmann's recent speech in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies—transmitted in report No. 1238 of May 30, 1938<sup>2</sup>—on the alleged National Socialist propaganda in South America.

A conversation which one of my colleagues had with the Counselor of the Italian Embassy here about the experiences of the Italians in Argentina in the cultural field and about the organization of the Fascio here, gave the following picture:

The Fascist Party organization in Argentina is *not* a juridical person. Its entire activity is carried on in such a way that it is regarded by the Argentines merely as a welfare and cultural organization. It carries on no political propaganda of any kind, not even within the Italian colony. The head of the Fascist Party in Argentina has been instructed by the central office in Rome to comply with all orders from the Italian Ambassador. If he did not do so, he would be dismissed from his office on the report of the Ambassador.

The cultural organizations of the Italians in Argentina are also encountering continual difficulties at the present time, in spite of the fact that, quite intentionally, they have not been organized for "struggle." Otherwise, however, the situation of the Italians in Argentina may, in the opinion of the Italian Embassy, be easier than that of the Germans, since the Italian mentality is closer to the Argentine, and the Fascio is not opposed by the Jews nor—with certain qualifications—by the Catholic Church.

THERMANN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 616.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (257/168180-83). Thermann dismissed Dickmann's charges of May 18 as in "the usual tone of Jewish-Free Masonic World Democracy".

## No. 621

8150/665803-04

*The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 1312

BUENOS AIRES, June 7, 1938.

Received June 13.

Pol. IX 1006.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Position of the Germans in Argentina.

With reference to my report No. 1238 of May 30.<sup>1</sup>

Reports I have recently received in confidence from sources close to the President seem to indicate that the government of Dr. Ortiz has by no means abandoned the idea of possibly taking more severe measures against the Germans here. In this connection I take the liberty of referring to my report No. 1308<sup>2</sup> of today's date regarding the visit of the Chilean Foreign Minister to Buenos Aires, during which this question seems to have been discussed, as it was previously on the occasion of the visit to Rio and, allegedly, also during the visit of the Argentine Foreign Minister to Santiago. I should like here to subscribe entirely to the view of Ambassador Baron von Schoen and Ambassador Ritter to the effect that further developments in this question will depend to an important extent on the strength of the pressure exerted by North America. That this pressure still exists and has even increased of late is evident from all the reports that the Embassy has received recently. They clearly present the pattern with which we are already sufficiently familiar, namely, that of North American Jewish capital trying to do all it can to injure Germany economically on the American Continent. In particular, I hear that Jewish circles in North America and corresponding elements here have agreed to wage an intensified campaign against German economic interests in Argentina in the immediate future, and that in this connection the Jews are cleverly manipulating nationalistic feeling—which is growing rapidly in Argentina at present—in order to turn it against Germany and repeatedly draw attention to the alleged German threat to South America.

It is naturally also of the greatest importance that we furnish them no provocations of any kind. Should developments actually take this unsatisfactory turn, the fears expressed by the Embassy in the report

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (257/168180-83). An analysis of political attitudes in Argentina after Dickmann's speech; Thermann concludes that if caution is observed, further restrictions can be avoided. See also document No. 620, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6906/E518276-81).

it made when the Ortiz government took office would unfortunately be confirmed (see report No. 661 of March 11).\*

Copies of this report are being sent to the Embassies in Rio and Santiago and to the Legation in Montevideo.

THERMANN

\* Not printed (6595/E493966-79). The report expressed concern that the new government might take measures against German cultural institutions and the Nazi Party organization.

## No. 622

2621/525746

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 110 of June 27

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 27, 1938—7 p. m.

Received June 28—3:05 a. m.

Pol. IX 1160.

For the State Secretaries only.<sup>1</sup>

Kopp, the Secretary of the Federação . . . (group garbled),<sup>2</sup> one of the closest co-workers of Cossel<sup>3</sup> and other Party members prominent in questions of Deutschtum, was arrested on Friday. He died on Saturday, allegedly by suicide. There is a very strong suspicion that he was murdered by the police. Since Kopp was a Volksdeutscher with Brazilian citizenship, the Brazilian Government would undoubtedly regard any inquiry on my part as interference in domestic affairs. Former Kreisleiter Schinke, who has dual nationality, was transferred here after about 3 months' detention in Florianopolis; he spent Friday in the same room as Kopp. I therefore consider that his life is also in danger, since he perhaps has detailed information about the Kopp case.

For the present we have no particulars in regard to the reasons for the action against Kopp. A further report will follow.

RITTER

<sup>1</sup> This presumably refers to Weizsäcker and Bohle, but the distribution stamp on the document indicates that other officials were also notified.

<sup>2</sup> The missing words "25 de Julho" were supplied in handwriting by Freytag with the additional marginal note: "A volksdeutsch organization embracing all Brazil." The Federation of July 25 was so-called in memory of the first German settlers in Brazil, who arrived on July 25, 1824.

<sup>3</sup> Hans Menning von Cossel, Landesgruppenleiter for Brazil, flew to Berlin on May 22 for conferences with the AO, Rudolf Hess, Ribbentrop, and the Foreign Ministry. Early in July he returned to Brazil as Cultural Attaché in the Embassy (263/170968-74, 170980).

## No. 623

2621/525748-51

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

No. 993

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 29, 1938.

Received July 5.

Pol. IX 1167.

With reference to telegraphic reports Nos. 110 and 111<sup>1</sup> of June 27, 1938.

We have passed through another dramatic and unfortunately also tragic week.

In regard to the death of the Brazilian citizen, Kopp, Secretary of the Federação 25 de Julho, I wish to add as a supplement to the telegraphic reports that Kopp was already dead when the Embassy learned of his arrest. A physician at the morgue made it possible to have an examination, without the knowledge of the police authorities. A report of this examination is enclosed.<sup>2</sup> According to the report it is scarcely credible that Kopp committed suicide. However, if it is a case of suicide, the suicide occurred after the other wounds or at any rate only after severe torture and threats of death. We shall probably never find out what actually happened.

At the time of the founding of the Federação 25 de Julho in 1935 Kopp was made Secretary. Since the President of the Federação is very old, Kopp actually carried on the business of the Federação himself rather independently. The Federação, as you know, set itself the task of fostering in a non-political manner Deutschtum and cultural ties with Germany among German-Brazilians.<sup>3</sup> This task brought about close relations between Kopp and Reichsdeutsche and naturally with the Embassy and the Party as well. His personal relations with those in the Party and the Embassy who had to do with cultural questions and the press were particularly close.

Immediately after the incident became known I tried by questioning persons known to have had dealings with him to clarify the nature of his relations with German personalities. In that connection the DNB representative Horn, with whom Kopp had close personal contact as well, made the statement that approximately 8 days before his arrest Kopp had received a warning. At that time Kopp told Horn that he had removed and deposited in a safe place two large bundles

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2621/525747). The latter telegram reported that leading NSDAP members and the Embassy were heavily compromised by papers taken from Kopp. These documents are described in the longer report printed here.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (2621/525752). The medical report did not indicate any judgment as to whether Kopp committed suicide.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Freytag's handwriting: "Herr Kundt told me that the Federation was also intended to get Brazilian-Germans into the political life of Brazil." Kundt was an official of the Cultural Policy Department.



of files from the office of the Federação. It would be going too far afield to give all the details of the statements here. It must, however, be assumed that these two bundles of files fell into the hands of the police. Of course none of us knows all that was contained in these two bundles of files. But Horn has informed us that a short time ago Kopp showed him two documents. One was a written plan for a new Integralist revolt which was to break out soon in the southern states. The other was a draft of a secret plan for the German-Brazilian Youth Ring, which is to be reorganized. This draft had been drawn up jointly by Instructor Neubert, the former leader of the German-Brazilian Youth Ring, and Kopp.

When Neubert was subsequently questioned he was at first silent about this document. It was only after I had spoken to him about it because of the above-mentioned statement by Horn that he reluctantly admitted the existence of this document, submitted it, and confirmed that he had given Kopp a copy of it. I am enclosing it as an annex.<sup>4</sup> Other statements, an explanation of which would lead too far afield, unfortunately make it appear practically certain that this document is in the hands of the Brazilian police. A reading of this document immediately shows how seriously the Embassy is compromised. It is self-evident that this document was drawn up without my knowledge, without the knowledge of the other members of the Embassy, and without authorization. Neubert has in an incomprehensibly thoughtless manner misused the names of the Ambassador and the Embassy without any authorization.

Since it turned out to be true that this second document was in Kopp's possession, it must also be assumed that the other statement by Horn, to the effect that Kopp had in his possession a written plan for a new, imminent Integralist revolt in the southern states, is correct. The fear that this document also is in the hands of the police is strengthened by the fact that several other leading members of the Federação 25 de Julho have been arrested in the south and that Schinke was brought here from Florianopolis. It is natural for the police to infer then that the Embassy also knew of this document.

What the immediate consequences will be as far as the Embassy and relations with the German Reich are concerned, in case the above-

<sup>4</sup>Not printed (2621/525753-55). The document is titled "Unofficial Agreement on Relations between Formations of DBJ [*Deutsch-brasilianischer Jugendring*] and Federação 25 de Julho," and provided for the incorporation of the youth organization into the Federação under the leadership of Kopp and Neubert. A copy was to be deposited with the German Ambassador and he was to serve as arbiter in the event of disagreements among the leaders. Although only Brazilian citizens could be full members, German nationals were to be associate members and have the same rights and privileges. "The principle is recognized," the document stated, "that German-Brazilians and Germans must stand and work together since they share a common destiny."

mentioned apprehensions prove to be well founded, cannot be foreseen at the present time. At any rate we must be discreet and cautious in the Kopp case. This is the reason for my proposal in telegraphic report No. 111 of June 27 that the German press ought not to go into the details of this case.

After these events I considered it proper and necessary to afford protection to Party Comrade Neubert, a national of the Reich, by having him remain in the rooms of the Embassy. Neubert had come to the Embassy of his own accord, because he had heard that inquiries had been made by the police in the German school where he was teaching. If Neubert had been arrested, it was to be feared that in view of the police methods here everything they wanted him to say would have been extorted from him. After the Kopp incident it even had to be assumed that his life was in immediate danger.

Meanwhile Party member Barwich, a Reich national and a representative of Transocean,<sup>5</sup> also applied for protection in the rooms of the Embassy. I also sheltered him in the Embassy. Barwich happened to be in Kopp's office in the Federação when Kopp was arrested there on Friday, June 24. Barwich was at that time arrested along with him. He spent the night of June 24 at the police station. After repeated interrogations he was released on June 25. It was from him that the first news came regarding Kopp's arrest, which he unfortunately did not report to the Embassy until early on June 26, when Kopp was already dead. Meanwhile Barwich received two warnings that his rearrest was imminent. He therefore came to the Embassy. A third warning had simultaneously come to me indirectly from the police—that Barwich should leave the country immediately. On this occasion Barwich revealed to the Embassy for the first time that he had had a conversation with Gustavo Barroso, the deputy of Integralist leader Plinio Salgado, in the offices of Transocean on the evening of May 10, i. e., the evening before the last revolt. During this conversation Gustavo Barroso had asked him whether, in case the Brazilian Navy Ministry should be placed under an Integralist, the Reich Government would be prepared to supply weapons for arming the Integralists. He (Barwich) had thereupon replied evasively. Now, after the Kopp incident, he was struck and disturbed by the fact that approximately 8 days later Kopp had shown that he knew of this conversation, although he (Barwich) had told him nothing about it.

During the last few weeks the Italian and Portuguese Embassies have in a considerable number of cases granted the right of asylum in the Embassies. In such cases the Brazilian Government has here-

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<sup>5</sup> A German news agency supplying an overseas service to the South American press.

tofore unhesitatingly granted safe-conduct for departure to Italy or Portugal. In all these cases it has been a question of Brazilian citizens. Therefore I am assuming that in these two cases also, when it is a question of nationals of the Reich, the Brazilian Government will not place any difficulties in the way of safe departure. I shall first await instructions in reply to my telegram report No. 112 of June 28, 1938,<sup>a</sup> and shall then, if so instructed, inform the Foreign Ministry that the two nationals of the Reich have been granted the right of asylum and shall ask for a safe-conduct.

RITTER

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<sup>a</sup> Not printed (235/157018).

## No. 624

6903/E518244-56

*The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

1763

BUENOS AIRES, August 2, 1938.

Received August 20.

Pol. IX 1669.

Subject: Meeting in Montevideo.

With reference to report No. 1704 of July 26, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

The meeting of the Ambassadors to the ABC countries and the Minister to Uruguay took place in Montevideo on July 28 and 29.

I have the honor to submit herewith a memorandum summarizing the results.

THERMANN

[Enclosure]

**MEMORANDUM OF THE MEETING IN MONTEVIDEO OF THE CHIEFS OF MISSIONS IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, AND URUGUAY, JULY 28 AND 29, 1938**

Present: Ambassadors Ritter, von Thermann, von Schoen, and Minister Langmann.

*I. General political situation in South America*

1. The present anti-foreign and particularly anti-German attitude of most of the South American countries is not a transitory phenomenon produced by isolated occurrences. On the contrary, German policy must reckon with it for a long time to come, at least for a matter

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<sup>1</sup> Not found.

of years. Considering this situation, Germany must clearly realize what goals she has in South America. Does she wish to confine herself to economic and cultural problems? Or does she wish to go further than this and pursue aims of power or combat North America politically from South America? In South America and particularly in Brazil the view is held at present—even in authoritative political circles—that Germany is pursuing her own aims of power in South America. It is considered necessary that Germany clearly repudiate such intentions (Plugge)<sup>2</sup> and confine herself to economic and cultural aims. If German policy is thus restricted to economic and cultural aims there is promise of success, particularly in the economic field. Reiterated statements by leading statesmen leave no room for doubt on this score.

Italy and Franco Spain are also desisting from propaganda of a political nature. Wherever these countries have been more active politically, it has led to definite reverses.

2. The withdrawal of South American countries from the League of Nations does not provide Germany with any better political opportunities in South America.<sup>3</sup> These withdrawals only clear the way still more for Pan-Americanism under the leadership of the United States of America; this has already received a strong new impetus owing to the successful conclusion of the Chaco Peace Conference at Buenos Aires.<sup>4</sup> The forthcoming Pan-American Conference at Lima will probably strengthen Pan-American tendencies still more.<sup>5</sup> In the last few months there has been an increase in consultations between South American statesmen under the leadership of Brazil and directed against the Germans in South America. The attempt will probably be made in Lima to crush the Party organizations all over South America.

## II. *Trade policy*

1. It is recommended that economic agreements with South American countries be concluded for several years, or at least—in case of shorter terms—with automatic extension if not canceled.

2. It is necessary to have a specialist in agricultural questions, particularly questions of animal husbandry, assigned permanently to the Missions in the La Plata countries.

3. It is recommended that the Raw Materials Division examine whether purchases of raw material (wool) can be made for stock-

<sup>2</sup> Possibly a reference to Fritz Plugge, an NSDAP member resident in Brazil.

<sup>3</sup> Between May and July 1933, intention to withdraw from the League was announced by Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela.

<sup>4</sup> On July 21, 1933, a peace treaty was signed between Bolivia and Paraguay.

<sup>5</sup> The Eighth Pan-American Conference was to convene at Lima in December 1933. See document No. 635.

piling, particularly by exploiting the incipient commercial difficulties of Argentina and Uruguay with the United States.

### III. *Germanism*

An organizational separation of German nationals and Volksdeutsche is necessary.

The Volksdeutsche should in principle lead themselves. In view of present personnel conditions, however, this goal is only gradually attainable.

The AO's order that the Party observe strict restraint in public and vis-à-vis the host countries meets the requirements of the present situation. Provision must be made for its uniform and strict execution everywhere. Any previous contradictory instructions for use of the German greeting, wearing of Party insignia and uniform, displaying the flag, etc., must be regarded as superseded by this new instruction, particularly in the schools.

The youth groups constitute a principal target of attack and danger. They consist almost entirely of persons of dual citizenship and Volksdeutsche. Training them in the youth groups runs directly counter to the basic population policy of the South American countries. The Argentine solution (Argentine Boy Scouts, with German, English, and Italian groups) is best suited to the situation. It is not readily adaptable to other countries, however.

The Labor Front and the Women's Organization must be made completely non-political, so far as this has not been done already, since in this way they can probably be preserved even in case the Party is banned.

In general, close cooperation based on mutual confidence is noted between the diplomatic missions and the Party offices. When the incidents occurred in Brazil, the Brazilians objected to the existence of a rigid Party organization throughout the country, independent of the Reich Missions. In this connection, the respective advantages offered by the German and the Italian systems were compared. In any case, in critical times such as now exist in South America, the decisive responsibility of the representative of the Reich must be assured.

### IV. *Schools, associations, etc.*

The strong resistance to German schools, churches, associations, etc., which is at various stages of development in the different countries, leads to the following considerations:

1. The volksdeutsch schools must be reorganized to be financially self-sustaining by drawing heavily on the volksdeutsch element. We will have to accept the closing of small schools. A new arrangement will have to be made in order to preserve more important schools;

possibly the whole Winterhilfe funds could be made available in the country for this purpose. The welfare organizations in the individual countries and the central welfare work at home would then have to receive a corresponding welfare allowance out of Reich funds, instead of the Winterhilfe money. It will not be politically easy for the South American governments to contest such a use of Reich funds.

2. The maintenance and expansion of the teachers' colleges should be given precedence over the preservation of the individual schools. In addition to the training in the teachers' colleges, certified volksdeutsch teachers, particularly for the higher schools, should be sent to Germany to continue their studies.

3. To judge from experience in Brazil, it seems desirable as a precautionary measure to adapt to one another the charters of German associations of a social, cultural, sports, or charitable nature. The boards of directors of volksdeutsch associations should be filled chiefly with Volksdeutsche.

4. Part of the propaganda material, particularly in racial-political and religious matters, sent to South America from Germany is not suited to the South American individuality, either of the Volksdeutsche or of the rest of the population. It is therefore recommended that the Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, together with the cultural office of the AO, set up mandatory lists of the only material permissible.

The observance of such directives must be assured through supervision, also in the case of the sponsored reading rooms, the establishment of which is welcomed in principle.

5. The circulation in South America of political (also anti-Communist) documents in *foreign languages* should not be done via the Reich Missions or Party offices until further notice. Rather, such material (anti-Comintern) should, in so far as possible, be sent from other countries (Switzerland) to interested persons who are not German nationals. The sending of propaganda material in foreign languages to Brazil should be stopped entirely for the present.

#### V. Press

The influencing of public opinion through the domestic press is unsatisfactory in the South American countries, particularly in view of possible critical times. If Germany wishes to counteract effectively the great activity of other countries, particularly the United States of America, much more money will have to be spent. The only suitable technique for this is to gain dominant financial influence over a large daily newspaper. The pressure exerted through placing or withdrawing advertisements does not suffice for this purpose.

The reassignment of a full-time press attaché with headquarters in Buenos Aires is necessary.

It is most desirable to have German newspapers sent by air mail to the Missions in South America, as suggested by Rio.

Transocean should supplement its service between Germany and South America with an intra-South American service and one between South and North America.

The political and economic activities of the short-wave transmitter must be extended and improved, particularly in view of the new Anglo-American propaganda activity.

#### VI. *Repatriation*

The reasons for the repatriation of valuable German elements to Germany are entirely appreciated. But the following should be considered in this connection:

1. The return of skilled workers is already taking place on a fairly large scale. German enterprises in South America are already complaining about the lack of skilled laborers.

2. Government-organized repatriation would encounter the opposition of South American governments. It would also probably encourage the repatriation of less desirable elements.

#### VII. *Passenger traffic*

An expansion of the fast German steamer service is necessary. Ships of the Far Eastern type, of average comfort and high speed, would be best suited.

So long as no provision is made for this, in case of urgent official business, officials of the Missions abroad should be allowed, as an exception, to use Italian ships.

#### VIII. *Military attachés*

In view of the great political importance of the army in Brazil and Chile, it is very desirable that military attachés be sent to Rio and Santiago.

#### IX. *Persons of dual nationality*

Relations between Germany and the South American countries are becoming more and more encumbered by the unclarified legal situation of persons of dual citizenship. There seems to be no prospect of a clarification by treaty. Therefore, at least a clarification of German legal practice in accordance with *jus loci* should be attempted, particularly with reference to military service, questions of passports, registration, and civil status.

The repatriation to Germany of persons of dual nationality (and also of German citizens) should be facilitated by a more accommodating attitude on the part of the authorities at home, particularly in tax matters. Perhaps a uniform, accommodating practice could be achieved through the centralization of all such cases in a single financial office.

In cases of doubt, the proper Reich Missions abroad should be heard.

For next year's meeting it is suggested that the Party officials of the four countries meet simultaneously, with a concluding joint conference.

## No. 625

235/157024-25

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 21, 1938.

The Brazilian Ambassador called on me today and said that he had a very unpleasant task to carry out. He had repeatedly indicated in conversations here that Ambassador Ritter is no longer welcome in Brazil. Now that he had heard from the latter himself that he is returning to Rio within the next few days, he had informed his Government to this effect.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon he had had a telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister, who told him to inform us that it would really be very desirable if a way could be found so that Ambassador Ritter did not return.

I told the Ambassador that I was unpleasantly surprised at this step and was convinced that we would not follow such advice. If the Brazilian Government had anything against Ritter, the only way was to state officially what the Brazilian Government wanted. Thereupon the Ambassador replied that he had expected this answer and for this eventuality was authorized to state officially that Herr Ritter is no longer *persona grata*. I arranged with the Ambassador that this official step would not be considered effective today and based this on the fact that such a step could, after all, be taken only with the Minister himself. The Ambassador pointed to the absence of the Foreign Minister and to the fact that the State Secretary, too, is at present so occupied with the Czechoslovakian affair that he does not want to bother him. We finally agreed that I would inform the Ambassador as to who will receive him another time in the matter.

In the course of the conversation the Ambassador assured me repeatedly at the instruction of his Government that the latter harbors the most friendly feelings with regard to Germany and wishes to settle the matter in this spirit. It is also prepared for a frank discussion of all pending matters. Moreover, Ambassador Ritter himself recently told a secretary at the Embassy that he does not intend to remain in Brazil much longer. In conclusion the Ambassador explained the haste of his *démarche* with the fact that he had heard that Herr Ritter is planning to embark at Genoa in a few days. In the end the Ambassador mentioned that if necessary the manner of return and a further short stay might of course be discussed.

WOERMANN

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<sup>1</sup> Ritter was in Germany to attend conferences of the Auslandsorganisation (see document No. 630) and the annual Party Rally at Nuremberg.



## No. 626

2348/487493-96

*Memorandum by an Official of the Auslandsorganisation*

Legal Section

BERLIN, September 24, 1938.

Dr. Scho[maker]/K 11

To the Gauleiter<sup>1</sup> (attention: Section VII) for your information.  
Heil Hitler!

By order:  
DR. SCHOMAKER

[Enclosure]

August 8, 1938.

On August 1 and 2, 1938, conferences between the German Ambassador in Buenos Aires and the Landesgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in Argentina were held, attended also by their consultants and Dr. Schomaker of the Gau headquarters executive of the AO of the NSDAP. The conference concerned the *Gauleiter's instructions*<sup>2</sup> for reorganization of Party activity in South America, and the matters discussed were essentially the following:

1. *The order to proceed cautiously.*

There is agreement on evaluation of the political situation. There is no acute danger that the Argentine Government will ban the Party and its affiliated organizations. However, the situation cannot be considered to have eased, and further intensification of anti-German trends may even be expected. The following points give special cause for concern: (1) Foreign Minister Cantilo's circular letter to all Argentine Missions abroad; (2) the Investigating Committee of Parliament under the chairmanship of Deputy Dickmann;<sup>3</sup> (3) the trip of the newly-appointed Brazilian Ambassador<sup>4</sup> to Washington via Argentina and Chile; and (4) the general activity of Foreign Minister Cantilo, who will look for new fields of endeavor after the Chaco negotiations have been concluded. Even though there is no reason for nervousness, the order to proceed cautiously must continue to be upheld. Anything that might unnecessarily attract public attention to Party activity must be avoided.

<sup>1</sup> Bohle, in his capacity as Head of the AO, which was regarded as a Gau of the NSDAP.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 611.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 620.

<sup>4</sup> On Apr. 28 Mario de Pimental Brandão became Ambassador to the United States succeeding Oswaldo Aranha, who on Mar. 9 had been named Foreign Minister.

2. *The order to separate Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche.*

a. *In the Party.* The Party will be completely cleared of Volksdeutsche and persons of dual citizenship who are Argentines. Preparations have already begun. Dr. Schomaker explained the projected suspension of membership for persons of dual citizenship. The suspension of membership was welcomed by everyone.

b. *In the DAF [German Labor Front].* There are more than 200 persons of dual citizenship here. Measures will be taken to prevent these from appearing as members of the DAF in the future. No final decision can be reached until provisions are issued in Berlin concerning the suspension of membership and maintenance of property claims. There is a plan for possibly transferring the present volksdeutsch members into a special organization similar to the DAF.

c. *In the "Sacrifice-League" [Opferring].* Dr. Schomaker explained that there must in any case be a separation, and that an organization of Argentines and Volksdeutsche for the purpose of giving financial support to the NSDAP activities was out of the question. In general there was agreement on these statements. However, the Landesgruppenleiter called attention to the financial consequences. Furthermore, it was important not to kill the interest of the volksdeutsch members of the Opferring in German activities by brusquely rejecting them. Therefore it was suggested that their willingness to contribute be kept alive and the funds received be applied to other German cultural work. With general approval Party Comrade Sandstede therefore proposed that they be transferred to the Friends of the DAPK [German-Argentine Boy Scouts]. The Ambassador suggested considering whether they might not be incorporated into the Volksbund.

d. *In the social organizations (sport and music associations, etc.).* It was agreed that no separation should be made. Dr. Schomaker emphasized that the AO leaders wished to remove from these associations any semblance of politics. Moreover, the Ambassador thought volksdeutsch direction of these associations was desirable. Thereupon the Landesgruppe called attention to the difficulty of finding suitable volksdeutsch leaders. These could not be appointed until the generation of German-Argentines now growing up became available.

e. *In the Hospital Association.* The Ambassador reported that according to the chairman of the Association separation is possible. Moreover, separation appears advisable in order to place the Association property clearly in the hands of German nationals.

f. *In the school associations.* Maintenance and expansion of the German school system remains the nucleus of German cultural policy

in Argentina. In this field separation of German nationals and Volksdeutsche is contrary to the nature of the thing. Establishment of a school purely for German nationals—which would be at all feasible only in Buenos Aires—is inadvisable. It would be under the supervision of the Argentine school authorities just as any other private school, and yet be more exposed to anti-German attacks. The existence of the German schools can be safeguarded only through tact and political skill, and by renouncing outward appearances and apparent victories of the moment. There was agreement on this point.

*g. In education outside the schools.* The importance of the DAPK is generally recognized. Its incorporation into the Argentine Boy Scout Organization was termed an especially fortunate solution. No separation of German nationals and Volksdeutsche seems necessary here. However, everything must be avoided that could give the impression that German official agencies, especially the Party, wanted to exert an influence on the education of the young. Thus it also appears advisable to consider the naturalization of Laschke, the youth leader, in order to show that Argentine youth is being led by Argentines.

*h. In the German Volksbund.* There is agreement that German nationals and Volksdeutsche are not to be separated. The Volksbund is to be composed of Germans of all nationalities. It is to be given a predominantly volksdeutsch character, however, in order to avoid the impression that it is the means for accomplishing the *infiltración nazi* of which we are constantly being accused. Therefore the board of directors is to include more and more Volksdeutsche. However, the Landesgruppe calls attention to the difficulties regarding personnel. Broadly speaking, the Volksbund is to be *the* organ of volksdeutsch activity.

3. The "Association of German Nationals" [*Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft or RDG*].

The Landesgruppe considers it harmful (disruption of families, destruction of confidence among the Volksdeutsche) to separate German nationals from Volksdeutsche except as laid down under point 2. The Association for German Nationals should therefore not be established. The present moment was especially unsuitable. If the association should actually be ordered established, the Landesgruppe would suggest either that existing organizations be united inconspicuously or that the DAF be transferred to and identified with the RDG. The Embassy, on the other hand, considers it necessary and advisable to organize the RDG as a new group for the following reasons:

(1) An order from headquarters has been received and must be carried out.

(2) The establishment of the RDG is an especially effective precautionary measure in case the Party should be banned, since the RDG could take over the functions of the Party.

(3) The RDG would give many compatriots who now remain aloof for one reason or another the possibility of cooperating for the interests of German nationals.

(4) The dangers connected with establishing a new organization are not great; at any rate, they are much less than the difficulties which would be encountered if an attempt was made to reorganize German nationals in case of a ban on the Party.

No agreement was reached in the conference on the question of the Association for German Nationals. The Landesgruppe will have the matter presented in Berlin by Party Comrade Sandstede. In addition the Embassy and the Landesgruppe will send a joint report\* to Berlin and request a final decision.

DR. SCHOMAKER

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\* No such report has been found, but Thermann on Aug. 16 sent a brief report of the conversation (6967/E519954) which indicated that Schomaker would give a full report in Berlin. In the following month Thermann was in Germany (see document No. 630) and conferred in Nuremberg on Sept. 11 with Richard Zeissig, Head of the Ibero-American Section (Section VII) of the AO. A memorandum by Zeissig (2348/487489-92) indicates that the recommendations of the meeting of Aug. 1-2 were in the main accepted. No Association of German Nationals was to be formed in Argentina "for the present", and German activity there should be inconspicuous, but Party members would still be expected to take a leading part in German associations and clubs. The appointment of Sandstede as Press Attaché of the Embassy was recommended.

## No. 627

235/157027-29

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 30, 1938.

The Brazilian Ambassador called me this morning, saying that he now had strict orders from his Government to make a *démarche* with the Foreign Ministry today in the matter with which we were familiar.<sup>1</sup> Since the Foreign Minister was away and he assumed that State Secretary von Weizsäcker either had not returned or was too busy, he requested that I see him. So I received the Ambassador this afternoon and told him by way of introduction that in case his *démarche* concerned the matter I assumed it did, I should first like to make a personal statement. In the present circumstances I had

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 625. On Sept. 29 Moniz de Aragão once more pressed for an interview, and Woermann again suggested he wait for Ribbentrop or Weizsäcker (235/157026).

been unable to obtain a final decision. However, the question of reciprocity would probably be raised, in other words, a question which concerned him personally. Possibly the further necessary steps would be taken not through him but through our Chargé d'Affaires in Rio.

The Ambassador answered that he would report this to his Government. He had now received orders to transmit a note to the Foreign Minister concerning the case of Ambassador Ritter. Senhor Aragão, who had not brought the note with him, intends to send it to me in the course of the day. I had the impression that he did not bring it along because he still hoped that we might recall Ambassador Ritter on our own initiative.

Senhor Aragão described the contents of the note<sup>2</sup> to me somewhat as follows:

The Brazilian Government was motivated by the most friendly feelings and wished very strongly that the commercial and trade relations between the two countries would thrive. While particularly appreciating these relations, however, his Government was of the opinion that the further sojourn of Ambassador Ritter in Brazil would not serve to promote them. Since Herr Ritter had proved himself unsuitable in dealing with the Brazilian Government (*et comme Mr. Ritter s'est incompatibilisé avec le Gouvernement Brésilien*),<sup>3</sup> the latter requested the German Government to keep Herr Ritter from resuming his post. The Brazilian Government believed this to be in the interest of good relations between the two countries.

I told the Ambassador that his *démarche* sorely distressed us. Herr Ritter had the full confidence of his Government for his activities in Brazil. He had had to fight there against an anti-German campaign in which the conduct of the Brazilian Government had given cause for serious complaint and in which Herr Ritter had done no more than his duty. The Ambassador took notes on this and then only added that the main reason for requesting the recall was that Herr Ritter had not complied with the usual formalities of courtesy. For example, he had sent such an impolite note to the Brazilian Government that he himself had later withdrawn it. I did not pursue this matter further and only stated that if the Ambassador himself had withdrawn the note, it no longer existed and therefore could not be a cause for complaint.

WOERMANN

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (235/157030).

<sup>3</sup> In the document, the words quoted in French appear in parentheses after the German equivalent.

## No. 628

235/157031

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Brazil*

Telegram

No. 183

BERLIN, October 3, 1938.  
zu Pers H 12172.<sup>1</sup>

For the Chargé d'Affaires.

Please hand the Foreign Minister a note with the following content:

"Your Excellency:

"The German Government has learned with great amazement that the Brazilian Government considers it impossible for the German Ambassador, Herr Karl Ritter, to continue his mission.

"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the German Government requests the immediate recall of Senhor Moniz de Aragão, Ambassador of the United States of Brazil in Berlin. Complimentary close."

Please do not enter into any discussion of the matter and do not answer any questions.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Pers H12172: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> An exchange of telegrams (235/157033-43) followed between Berlin and Rio de Janeiro about a possible Brazilian communiqué. The Germans demanded a clear statement that the recall of Ambassadors was not occasioned by any evidence of German complicity in the events of May 10-11, but agreement on a text proved impossible and on Oct. 25 Weizsäcker directed Chargé d'Affaires Levetzow to drop the matter (235/157044).

## No. 629

231/154974-75

*Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department*

No. W VIIIb 3025

BERLIN, October 4, 1938.

Ministerialdirigent Schlotterer informed me today that the Economics Ministry had grave misgivings about the development of our relations with Brazil. From an economic point of view Brazil was for us by far the most important country in South America. Moreover, with the increasing shortage of foreign exchange her significance for us would constantly increase. As an example, Herr Schlotterer pointed out that the Sudeten-German area needed at least 80,000 tons of cotton per year which would now have to be supplied and paid for by us. Actually Brazil was the only supplier that could be considered, since we could hardly increase our purchases from the other great supplier, the United States of America, because of the shortage of foreign exchange.

In these circumstances the Economics Ministry believed it most important that economic relations not be disturbed through further

deterioration in political relations. It was feared that in case the political conflict became more acute, Foreign Minister Aranha would use his influence to disrupt economic relations between the two countries, too. So far he had not done this, but he doubtless would if he continued to consider himself personally attacked.

Herr Schlotterer further stated that the Economics Ministry regretted very much that Duke Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg<sup>1</sup> had been instructed to avoid Brazil. He asked that it be reconsidered whether the Duke might not also be permitted to visit Brazil. Finally, the Economics Ministry had been informed by the German Industrial Advertising Council [*Werberat der Deutschen Wirtschaft*] that the Foreign Ministry had forbidden participation in an exposition in Brazil. The Economics Ministry requested that this case, too, be reconsidered.

I told Herr Schlotterer that the Foreign Ministry shared the opinion that it was advisable to keep political differences of opinion from spreading to the economic field, if possible. On the other hand, of course, we could not give up our position in political discussions because of economic considerations. Furthermore, the deterioration which had occurred during the past days, in particular, had been brought about not by us but by the Brazilians. To dispatch even an unofficial mission of friendship such as the Duke's visit seemed to me impossible, at least at the present time.

In spite of my replies to Herr Schlotterer's statements, briefly summarized above, I consider it nevertheless necessary to give special consideration to the Economics Ministry's standpoint, since it is undoubtedly true that Brazil's economic significance for us is very great and is constantly increasing.

CLODIUS

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<sup>1</sup> On Oct. 4 Wiehl had informed German Missions in Latin America other than Rio de Janeiro, that the Duke of Mecklenburg intended to make an unofficial visit through Latin America in order to study possibilities of increasing German exports, counteracting attacks from the United States, and overcoming boycotts, etc. (231/154964-65).

## No. 630

2348/487497

*State Secretary Bohle to Ambassador Thermann*

[BERLIN,] October 13, 1938.

With reference to Pol. IX 1202 (Report G 299, Buenos Aires, July 5, 1938).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2084/451155-57). A request by Thermann for prompt clarification of the directive of May 17 and for a Berlin decision on the related issues between the Embassy and the Landesgruppe in Argentina. See also document No. 626.

## GERMANS IN ARGENTINA

Referring to my conference<sup>2</sup> in Erlangen on September 9, 1938, with the Ambassadors to the ABC countries, the Minister to Uruguay, and the specialists in the administration of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP, I shall once more set forth below my position on the questions which were discussed with reference to Argentina.

The Auslandsorganisation directives of May 17, 1938,<sup>3</sup> are to be applied to Argentina only insofar as they pertain to the separation of Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche, including those of dual nationality, within the Party, its divisions and directly affiliated organizations (Opferring). They are not to be applied to the German Volksbund for Argentina and other organizations. The establishment of an association for German nationals in accordance with point 3 of the directives of May 17, 1938, is also to be postponed until further notice.

Heil Hitler!

E. W. BOHLE

<sup>2</sup> The minutes of this conference have not been found.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 611.

## No. 631

2351/487670-73

*The Minister in Mexico to the Foreign Ministry*

III D 6

MEXICO CITY, October 22, 1938.

Received November 11.

Pol. IX 1906.

Subject: Attitude of the Mexican Government and public toward Germany resulting from the European crisis.

With reference to your instruction Pol. IX 1709 of October 7, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

There have been no definite signs as to what the Mexican Government's attitude toward Germany might be in the case of a European war. Nor did I believe it advisable to raise the question in the Foreign Ministry, especially since upon my return to my post here the crisis had already been solved in a peaceful manner and the Foreign Minister therefore would hardly have admitted the possibility of an anti-German attitude. Therefore it is possible to draw

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6903/E518259-60). This was a circular instruction sent by Woermann on Oct. 7 to all German Embassies and Legations in Latin America, pointing out that the recent crisis had provided a useful opportunity to test the general attitude of the Latin American republics and their press towards Germany. Other replies found in the files but not printed are from the Embassies in Chile (6902/E518240/1-3) and Argentina (3150/665817-22).



conclusions only from certain happenings and impressions, which of course do not give an entirely accurate and conclusive picture.

Since Mexico at the time made the well-known foolish gesture of protesting Austria's reincorporation into the German Reich,<sup>2</sup> it appeared more than probable that the Mexican Government would also have "followed the straight line of its ideals"—to use the words of the Foreign Minister on the Austrian affair—in the case of a non-peaceful settlement of the fate of the Sudetenland by announcing its sympathy for Czechoslovakia, by considering her the weaker party and the victim, and by proclaiming the solidarity of the "democracies". Judging by past experience the attitude of the League of Nations would presumably also have had a decisive influence. It was altogether possible that the Government here might have given the Czechs moral support by the gesture of immediately breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. Whether it would have gone further and taken an actively hostile stand toward us would doubtless have depended on how strong the pressure of labor organizations aroused by radical leftist leaders would have become, and also on whether a neutral or an anti-German attitude would have brought greater economic advantage; the probability of the disruption of trade with Germany, which is of importance to Mexico in peacetime, and the prospect, on the other hand, of increased sales of Mexican products in England and France, would have represented a strong temptation to engage in hostile measures toward us. Therefore we could not understand here why during the critical days at the end of September no less than seven German ships were ordered from North American ports to the Mexican harbor of Tampico, of all places, in spite of the advice to the contrary by the Hapag and North German Lloyd agencies here; the presence of these ships in Mexican territorial waters would certainly have been a strong temptation for this country to create a merchant fleet of its own at Germany's expense.

I doubt that the attitude of the United States of America would have influenced Mexico as it does other Latin American countries, since the experience of recent years has shown how great an effort Mexico is making to preserve her political independence from her northern neighbor.

A very suspicious governmental measure was the inspection of German firms during the last days of September by officials of the Ministry of the Interior. To be sure, it was explained that the action was taken to investigate whether the firms inspected had 90 percent Mexican employees, as prescribed; however, it was noted that only German firms were subjected to such investigation, so that it was natural to assume that the intention was not so much a check on the Mexican employees as to establish the number of German nationals employed.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 598.

There were even serious rumors that Mexican and especially Jewish groups had already counted on the confiscation of German property and consequently on the possibility of acquiring it cheaply. At any rate the members of the German colony in Mexico were seriously expecting to be removed to concentration camps.

For the rest, the attitude of the public and the press has shown that, in addition to strong opposition by radical leftists, there is some understanding and even sympathy for the German cause in Mexico still today; at least the opinion has been expressed that in Mexico's own interest strict neutrality should be observed.

Thus on September 29 Senator Cándido Aguilar, who is considered an authority on matters of foreign policy because of his experience in the diplomatic service, suggested the following resolution in Parliament:

"That Mexico was in sympathy with the democracies of the world, to be sure, but for special reasons felt obliged to maintain strict neutrality in the regrettable event of war between European countries. Adherence to the League of Nations naturally placed certain obligations on Mexico, but such commitments might greatly compromise not only the economic life of the nation but also its internal policy."

Other senators objected that Mexico should in all circumstances align herself with the weaker nations, also that such a resolution was premature at the moment, but especially that a decision with reference to the country's attitude was reserved for the President of the Republic, and the Senate could do no more than to change or ratify the latter's decision. Senator Aguilar then withdrew his motion and the Senate thereupon confined itself to drawing up a statement with the following text:

"The Senate of the Republic declares that it desires, from the depth of its convictions and in all sincerity, that peace continue to reign unchanged in Europe.

It seems to me that the Senate discussions prove that at the most critical moment nothing was known even in parliamentary circles about the possible attitude of the Government.

Understanding of and even clear sympathy for Germany, as well as recognition of the Munich contribution toward peace, can be found especially in the big daily paper *Excelsior*, which has taken a friendly attitude toward us for some time; the same is true of the evening paper *Últimas Noticias* and the dailies *Novedades*, *La Prensa* and *El Hombre Libre*, as is shown in the enclosed annexes 1 to 16.<sup>\*</sup> On the other hand, the radical leftist papers such as *El Nacional*, which was recently banned in Germany, and the Communist papers *El Popular* and *La Voz de México* (see annexes 17 to 21), preached the fight against

<sup>\*</sup> These and other enclosures subsequently referred to in the report are not printed here.

"Fascist aggression" in their usual propagandistic manner. In annex 20 *El Nacional* quotes a statement by the Confederación de Trabajadores de México, which is headed by the notorious agitator Lombardo Toledano; the union declares solidarity with the Czechoslovak people and voices a protest against violence done them; this is also intended "to defend the autonomy and independence of our own country."

I also take the liberty of enclosing as annexes 22 to 24 an original and two copies from a number of friendly letters which I have received from Mexican groups; hostile letters addressed to the Legation were not received on this occasion.

It might be well to investigate what attitude we can expect from Mexico in the future. I rather assume that the decidedly friendly attitude displayed toward us during the last crisis by what are after all the most important newspapers indicates a departure from radical leftism and thus confirms the impression which also prevails among the German business groups here. Even among the labor groups voices are heard, although for the time being only occasionally, indicating lack of respect for the professional leaders of the organizations opposing us. For example, longshoremen in Tampico openly stated that they had been deceived by their leaders. The rejection of political influence and intervention by the labor unions in matters of state seems to be growing, especially among the military; and the energetic chief of the War Ministry,<sup>4</sup> who is considered one of the most promising candidates to succeed the present President, does not seem inclined quietly to tolerate excesses which would be injurious to the nation. It is significant, to say the least, that some time ago, after the Czech Minister here gave one of his propaganda talks in a local military school, a captain in the audience answered him by stating in the name of his comrades that they could not share His Excellency's views; they were good friends of Germany and had a different point of view regarding the Czech and Sudeten-German question.

On the occasion of my first call on the Foreign Minister following my return from the Party rally I inquired—after having asked him, as instructed, to inform the President of the Reich Foreign Minister's reply to the former's telegraphic appeal<sup>5</sup> for peace—whether the moment might not also have come for reviewing the relations between Germany and Mexico. I pointed out that my efforts to convince Germany that Communism was not dominant in this country failed time and again owing to the fact that newspaper articles and oral statements made before gatherings by labor and party leaders contained insulting attacks on Germany and the Führer as well as hostile propa-

<sup>4</sup> Avila Camacho.

<sup>5</sup> President Cárdenas had addressed an appeal for peace to Beneš and Hitler. See *New York Times*, Sept. 29, 1938. Ribbentrop's reply has not been found.

ganda. If the agitators had the true interests of their country at heart they would realize that their attitude only served to destroy German confidence in domestic developments in Mexico and thus jeopardized commercial relations, from which the Mexican workers and farmers were not the last to profit. We in Germany were by no means dependent on Mexican petroleum, the sale of which was important to Mexico, since we had sufficient offers from other quarters. As President of the Republic, General Cárdenas enjoyed such great respect and high esteem that in my opinion one word from him would suffice to put an end to the anti-German agitation.

The Foreign Minister, who received me with his characteristic cordiality and expressed his satisfaction at my return, seemed at first taken aback when I candidly broached the subject, but then listened to my statements with interest and evident good will and told me in the end that he would do everything in his power to prevent anti-German press attacks and demonstrations.

No basic change in our favor can be expected overnight, of course, especially since the advantages and ideals of democracy—which naturally does not exist here either in the true sense—are praised in this country on every occasion, and opposition to “Communism and Fascism” is emphasized; furthermore, the Mexican authorities, the Foreign Ministry not excepted, are for the moment much too afraid of falling out with the radical leftists and of being suspected of “fascist” leanings.

Nevertheless, I feel that in conclusion I should emphasize at this point, too, that so far German business has not encountered any serious difficulties in Mexico but, on the contrary, is held in high esteem and that the existence of the Party organization, the German community, German schools and other German institutions has not been threatened.

FREIHERR VON RÜDT

## No. 632

6966/E519618-20

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

No. B 5

RIO DE JANEIRO, October 25, 1938.

Received November 1.

Pol. IX 1844.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Brazil's relations with Germany.

Though a year or so ago one had the impression here of being in a friendly country, it must unfortunately be stated today that sentiment has become anti-German, not only in the leading circles, but also far

down into the broad masses of the people, insofar as they are occupied with political questions at all. The forces which are generally known to you—the Democratic-Jewish element, Catholicism, and North America—have united here in the fight against German interests and everything that is German. The ground was well prepared for such an attack, since a wave of nationalist thinking arose in Brazil itself at the same time. Almost the entire Brazilian press participated in the anti-German propaganda. In addition, a number of persons, some of them influential, took an anti-German position in speeches and articles on European and world questions. Germany had only a weak defense against this general attack and even this could not function effectively, since the Brazilian Government benevolently promoted the anti-German and anti-European line and through censorship suppressed any propaganda of a different kind. An additional factor is that a constantly increasing fear of powerful Germany has become evident in a great many quarters as a result of the recent events in Europe, which were so exceedingly favorable for us. One would think that this fear would lead the Brazilians to strive for better relations with Germany. Owing to the influence of North America, however, this is not true, but rather the opposite can be observed. Government circles are still trying to keep economic relations with Germany out of the conflict since these are clearly needed. Politically, however, they are obviously following more and more in North America's wake. Recently the Foreign Minister assured me that Brazil was understood neither in North America nor in Europe; owing to her enormous dimensions and her internal political structure Brazil was forced to be something halfway between an authoritarian state and a democracy; she had the aim of keeping up good political relations both with North America and with Europe and to convince both parties that the Brazilian form of government did not represent anything antagonistic to the conditions prevailing in North America and the authoritarian countries. It was rather surprising to hear these words of wisdom from the mouth of the Foreign Minister, a hireling of North America. However, they are not in accordance with the facts.

It must be expected that the fight against the German element will be consistently pursued as long as the present government remains at the helm. On this point it should be stated that, in the opinion of the general public, the situation of the present government and particularly that of the Foreign Minister has again become weaker of late. Dissatisfaction with Brazil's economic and financial position and with the often strained political relations with foreign countries is increasing in large sections of the country, particularly in São Paulo. It seems to me mistaken to count on an uprising in São Paulo. São Paulo has never yet shown that it is in a position to overthrow a gov-

ernment in Rio. It is the large economic, but not military, center of the country. We must wait and see whether the President's political skill is sufficient to overcome further crises. According to information which I have received from a reliable source, however, the tension between the President and his probable successor, Oswaldo Aranha, has increased again of late. It therefore does not seem impossible that the President might attempt further to undermine the position of the Foreign Minister in order to shelve him at some convenient opportunity, just as he did with his former opponents.

In this connection it is noteworthy that the President did not pick Oswaldo Aranha, the proponent of Pan-Americanism and democratic ideas in Brazil, to head the Brazilian delegation to the Pan-American Conference in Lima. It is an open question whether the President intentionally chose representatives who do not belong among the zealous advocates of Pan-Americanism. It is also possible that Oswaldo Aranha refused to leave the country now when the situation is critical for him. Experience shows that the President has often used such trips to foreign countries for removing the persons in question from their offices.

There seem to me to be two possible courses for German policy at the present time. One course is to utilize Oswaldo Aranha's weakened position in order to obtain advantages in the economic relations between the two countries. Then, however, all friction in other fields would naturally have to be avoided as much as possible, or settled with a friendly gesture; the question of appointing a new ambassador could be disregarded in this connection. The other course would be to proceed very firmly vis-à-vis the present Brazilian Government at every possible opportunity. Perhaps such a policy would rather quickly serve to oust our greatest opponent in Brazil, Oswaldo Aranha. Both courses could keep open the possibility of taking up friendly relations with any new government.

VON LEVETZOW

### No. 633

2336/487025-26

#### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Uruguay to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 300

MONTEVIDEO, October 25, 1938.

Received October 31.

Pol. IX 1837.

Subject: Uruguay's attitude during the recent European crisis.

With reference to your instruction Pol. IX 1709 of October 7.<sup>1</sup>

The impressions gained here during the recent European crisis leave no doubt that in any military conflict between the European

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 631, footnote 1.

countries Uruguay would not have aligned herself with Germany either ideologically or practically. Her neutrality would have been solely dependent upon the amount of political and economic pressure exercised by Britain and North America. If the large neighboring countries of Argentina and Brazil, responding to the same pressure, had participated in a war against Germany, then Uruguay would have done the same, if only for reasons of South American solidarity.

The Uruguayans, however, are not soldiers; the army plays a very limited role in the life of the country. Nevertheless, the people would not have opposed participation in the war, since the anti-German propaganda, which has been going on for a long time, has unfortunately had very extensive effects. The man in the street is very much interested in political matters but is very gullible in accepting anything in print. The greatest damage is caused by the seemingly objective reports by foreign news agencies (Havas, UP, AP, etc.) in all of the papers published here; unfortunately so far it has not been possible to counter them with an equally fast German telegraphic service of a propagandistic nature.

No official or other measures indicating that Uruguay was preparing for war were observed during the days of the crisis. The only thing worthy of note seems to be the fact that the British cruisers *Exeter* and *Ajax* were able to take on crews and ammunition from British merchant vessels in the harbor of Montevideo.

Levillier, the Argentine Ambassador here, the *doyen* of the diplomatic corps and a half-Jew, told me soon after the Munich Agreement was concluded that Germany had been very much favored by the latest developments; as a specialist in European history he did not doubt that the Germans would now feel encouraged to bring up further territorial claims in the East and the Southeast; therefore a war with Russia would be unavoidable in the course of the next few years. Levillier said that this was the opinion prevailing in political and diplomatic circles here. And actually a number of officials of the Foreign Ministry have expressed themselves to me in a similar manner. I have countered these statements in the sense of the telegraphic instruction of October 3.<sup>2</sup>

For the rest I should like to refer to the contents of the previous report, No. 283 of October 4.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZ

<sup>2</sup> Presumably the circular instruction on the outcome of the Munich Conference issued for the guidance of all Missions; see vol. IV, document No. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6469/E484485). A short report stating that Uruguayan press accounts of the Czech crisis were based primarily upon wire services unfriendly to Germany but that the Munich Agreement was regarded in Uruguay as a victory for the German cause.

## No. 634

257/168374-75

*The Minister for Central America and Panama to the Foreign Ministry*

Po. 3

GUATEMALA, November 14, 1938.

Pol. IX 2158.

Subject: Attitude of the Governments and the public in Central America during the recent crisis.

No political, economic, or cultural measures of any kind were taken against Germany by the Governments of the Central American countries during the critical days of September 1938. There are also no indications of measures to be taken in case of war. It can be assumed, however, that such measures would of necessity have conformed to the wishes of the United States. In such a case even El Salvador, the only Central American country which remained neutral during the World War, would hardly have resisted pressure by North America, and the security of the air route across Central America as part of the Panama Canal defenses will offer a military pretext for such pressure in the future.

The dependence of the Central American press on the biased and propaganda reports of the North American news agencies became very evident during the recent political crisis. The headline technique outdid itself in an effort to accuse a bellicose Germany of threatening world peace. The few reports which did justice to the German standpoint were systematically given an inconspicuous place, usually on the inside or last pages of the newspapers. In this way the Central American public was turned against Germany in such a thorough and sudden fashion that pro-German statements were denied any space and any audience. The Transocean News Service, whose reports are sent from Mexico by air and thus arrive here from one to three days late, could not offer the slightest counterweight in favor of Germany, if only on the basis of time, in view of the extremely swift development of the political events.

The results of the unscrupulous propaganda of the North American press are evident here to a frightening degree. Seldom has the entire public been so unanimously oriented against Germany, often to the point of hatred, as during and after the September crisis of this year. This is not changed by the fact that a few intelligent persons here and there do not refuse to recognize the Führer's great success.

The conclusions which can be drawn from the crisis as regards the attitude of the Central American countries in future developments can be summarized to the effect that the measures to be expected will be determined, not to say dictated, by Washington. Whether these



countries will attempt to oppose the pressure of the United States at least for a time probably depends mainly upon how far we are able to awaken understanding among the public here for the objectives of German foreign policy, as well as quite generally for the work of reconstruction and the cultural achievements of the new Germany. Therefore I can only request most urgently that the Legation be put in a position to increase its promotional activity in cultural matters, and particularly to work toward enlightenment through the press. The most urgent need is that of establishing a news agency with headquarters in Guatemala, the preparations for which are under way here. I am convinced that the means which are to be used for this, and also the provision of more or less adequate funds for directly influencing the press, will bear rich fruit in the long run.

REINEBECK

No. 635

6545/E489171-72

*The Minister in Peru to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

LIMA, December 28, 1938—12:16 p. m. [sic]

No. 68 of December 27

Received December 28—9:30 a. m.

Pol. IX 2220.

With reference to my telegram No. 67 of December 18.<sup>1</sup>

Evaluation of the Lima Conference closing today:

1. Owing to the great industry of the commissions and prolonged plenary sessions it was possible during the last week to dispose of a major portion of the program. However, this was for the most part only a formal disposal in that the material was referred to the juridical committee or the study commission. Positive results could be registered in only a few fields of minor importance and with respect to the political resolutions directed against totalitarian states.

2. North America's plan of forming the entire continent into a military coalition under its own leadership has failed as completely as have its plans for establishing its economic hegemony by separating South America from Europe. On the other hand, the United States was successful in further inciting the continent against the authoritarian states, strengthening the democratic idea and forming a united front against ideological influences and other external threats. As a poor substitute for a military alliance, Cordell Hull is taking home the Declaration of Lima (declaration on continental solidarity).

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6545/E489170). A short summary of resolutions, etc., directed against Germany, which is described as a "mute guest" at the Pan-American Conference at Lima.

3. North America's antagonist in the struggles behind the scenes was Argentina, which was very much disgruntled at America's dumping of wheat in Brazil. Argentina at first rallied other countries to her side, but later maneuvered herself into isolation by her obstinacy in the fight about the formulation of the Declaration of Lima, and so finally assured the United States a certain success in the creation of a favorable atmosphere. Otherwise, owing to the common ideological orientation, with which Argentina also identified herself, the general distrust of North America and the differences of the South American countries among themselves dropped into the background. Exception: Bolivia's push for access to the sea.

4. Germany was cited by name [only] by Paraguay, but stood out ahead of Italy and Japan as the chief target of the generally formulated attack. Important resolutions adopted by the Conference are directed against us: Declaration of Lima, Declaration of American Principles, the resolutions denying minority character to foreign ethnic groups and opposing political group activities by foreigners. And especially the proposal on the racial question, which was adopted in considerably mitigated form after days of discussions.<sup>2</sup> Great credit on this point is due to the Brazilian member of the drafting committee, the pro-German Senhora Miller (cf. telegraphic instruction No. 66 of November 19),<sup>3</sup> who managed to sidetrack Cuba's hate-mongering proposal only by introducing and defending a milder counterproposal.

Generally speaking it would seem that the Peruvian Government used its influence to prevent insulting attacks explicitly directed against Germany (cf. telegraphic report No. 64 of December 13).<sup>4</sup>

Same text by cipher letter to Santiago, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Washington.

NOEBEL

<sup>2</sup> Cuba introduced a resolution, which the Conference adopted in modified form, asserting the opposition of the American states to racial and religious persecution.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (6545/E489169).

## No. 636

6966/E519855-58

*Counselor of Embassy von Levetzow to Minister Prince von Bismarck*

RIO DE JANEIRO, January 2, 1939.

DEAR PRINCE BISMARCK: Since I am writing on January 2, I should like to begin my letter by sending you and the Princess my best wishes for the New Year.

These lines are intended to throw some light on the conditions prevailing here, since I am not sure—not having received any reply to my inquiries on this subject—whether my activity in Brazil is in line with the intentions of the Foreign Ministry.

At the outset I should like to say that Brazil and the Brazilian Government must be regarded in a different light from governments in Europe, for example. Here, intrigues play a much greater part, and the same is true of *amizade* (friendship). Any Brazilian, as well as any foreigner who intends to do business here in Brazil, attempts to win *amigos* to advance his interests. Those who have no *amigos* lose their influence and cannot achieve anything. A Brazilian Minister is inclined to do a favor for a foreign diplomat whom he likes, even if it does not strictly serve the interests of his country. On the other hand, he will be just as willing to disregard the interests of his country or of certain commercial circles in his country, if he can thereby hamstring the efforts of a diplomat whom he dislikes. I can imagine, for instance, that in our case Brazilian Ministers might put all sorts of obstacles in the way of cotton exports to Germany, even at the expense of the producers' interests, in order to spite a German Mission they dislike, or the German Government.

In appraising the situation one must also bear in mind that during the period of sharp conflict last year the Brazilian Government gathered from dispatches of its Berlin Embassy, and from practical experience as well, that Germany is unwilling to start a trade war with Brazil, or even to exert social pressures on the Brazilian Embassy in Berlin. One of the complaints made here about Ambassador Ritter is precisely that in order to reinforce his position he made incorrect statements about the exclusion of the Brazilian Embassy from invitations.

Realizing this situation, I have taken pains to create an atmosphere with the Foreign Ministry that makes it possible to bring up even unpleasant matters. After the outbreak of the conflict concerning Ambassador Ritter I was promptly instructed on the one hand to charge the Foreign Minister with having knowingly made incorrect statements in the *démenti* question,<sup>1</sup> and on the other hand to make an attempt toward resumption of trade relations. Then followed several months during which I had to bring up complaints and grievances virtually every time I visited the Foreign Ministry. I have refrained from reporting on every individual case. The press campaign against Germany was at first continued. Provincial authorities, especially the military, committed countless transgressions against Germans in the southern part of the country and deprived them of their

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 628, footnote 2.

rights more and more. The Cossel case also had to be clarified and settled.<sup>2</sup> With regard to the press and Herr Cossel my efforts were not without success. The film propaganda against Germany, which was carried on from North America, was also prohibited. Even the Jewish question may no longer be exploited against Germany in a propagandistic fashion by the press. In the economic sphere some headway has undoubtedly been made. I even hope to report on further progress very soon.

I wish to observe in this connection that the American resistance to these relations is no longer being carried on in the Foreign Ministry, but rather in the Ministry of Finance and the *Banco do Brasil*.

Developments in the matter of nationalization are very unfavorable. On that score I have a whole series of complaints and protests pending with the Foreign Ministry. So far I have found that the Foreign Ministry has followed up every single case I have cited. In dealing with these cases, however, it runs into resistance from the Ministry of the Interior and from military or police authorities. I keep trying to obtain satisfactory settlements in individual cases. To stem the tide of nationalization and turn it back, however, will probably be beyond my power as long as present conditions in Brazil continue. I might add, however, that all the efforts of the Portuguese Ambassador and of the Japanese, Italian and Polish Diplomatic Missions have also failed to improve the treatment of their nationals or societies. The influence of the Vatican and the Catholic Church in Brazil is enormous. Yet neither the Cardinal nor the Nuncio has succeeded in obtaining the demands of the Catholic Church for the holding of services in foreign languages. Through the Polish Minister I have heard what the Nunciature is doing in these matters. In view of the present unfriendly attitude of the Nunciature here it would serve no purpose to establish direct contact.

I believe that of all Missions accredited here we are the one taking the strongest stand in supporting nationals and the interests of Volks-deutschtum. All the other Missions are very cautious, being afraid of arousing opposition by too assertive a stand. In former years the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was accustomed not to reply at all to inconvenient notes, including those from the German Mission. If, for instance, some Germans were shot in the provinces, no satisfaction at all was offered. We have succeeded in seeing to it that this system no longer is practiced with regard to us. Complaints submitted are followed up and I have found out secretly that the Foreign Minister insists on their investigation and attempts to stop abuses. In Brazil, just as in other countries, the Foreign Ministry is not all-powerful.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 622.

The resistance of other Ministries is often very strong and very hard to overcome.

I may perhaps add that, in contrast to some other Chiefs of Mission, I have so far not found that the Foreign Minister tells me lies. Now and then he tries to gloss over something, as for example, in his remarks about the Lima Conference. In view of South American habits, that is perfectly normal.

In the nationalization question I am trying to explain both to the high army officers, who really have the decisive voice in this matter, and to the Foreign Minister, that Brazil is hurting her own interests. She would create three groups. The first one, which has been in the country for a long time and whose power of resistance is exhausted, would comply. The second group would regard itself as a minority and engage in opposition. The third, which would be the best material, would escape from oppression by returning to the homeland. Protests, in my opinion, would rather confirm the Brazilian Government in its belief that it is on the right path. Besides, a protest in behalf of volksdeutsch interests would arouse the feeling here that a foreign power was interfering and would meet with the strongest possible resistance. In this (see the Lima Conference), all the other American countries would concur.

I should be grateful to you, Prince Bismarck, if you would be kind enough to inform me whether the Foreign Ministry is in accord with my methods here or whether it desires me to continue the conflict. As I said, however, I do not believe that through conflict, without the possibility of resorting to really serious steps against Brazil, any advantages could be gained for Reichsdeutsche, for Volksdeutsche, or for the large German commerce in Brazil, on which a considerable number of the Germans living here are dependent, and for whom in the last resort we are also responsible.

With best regards and Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

V. LEVETZOW

No. 637

2636/528479-80

*Memorandum by the Head of Economic Policy Division W VIII b*

BERLIN, January 9, 1939.

e. o. W VIII b 92.

Agents of the new Chilean Government recently proposed to our Embassy in Santiago a large German commodity credit (150 to 200

million reichsmarks) for industrial products and armaments.<sup>1</sup> This would involve the payment of a consideration [*Nützlichkeitsgelder*] of 500,000 pesos (around 50,000 reichsmarks), especially for the Socialist members and backers of the new Chilean Popular Front Government.

Although a commodity credit of this amount seems too high for Chile, the Embassy was authorized, with the concurrence of the Economics Ministry, to enter into negotiations and to promise the payment of the consideration in the form of a commission on successful completion of the transaction. The reasons were the following:

1. The negotiations would offer an opportunity to establish contact with the new Popular Front Government even before it takes office;

2. We expected that this would have a favorable effect on Chile's attitude at the Pan-American Conference in Lima (which appears to be corroborated by Chile's actual attitude) and for the impending negotiations on a new long-term trade agreement between Germany and Chile;

3. The United States is said to be negotiating on a similar offer, and in order to preserve our economic position in Chile we should at least show some interest.

The Embassy in Santiago now proposes in its report W VIII b 36 of December 27, 1938,<sup>2</sup> that an immediate payment be made in order to put the principal wire-pullers of the current Government under some obligation to us, since we could make use of them in a number of ways. Telegram W VIII b 80 of January 5<sup>3</sup> puts the amount to be paid in advance at 10,000 reichsmarks.

Compared with the benefits to be expected, this amount seems paltry and should accordingly be authorized. Pol. IX and the Ministry of Economics share this view. The money need be made available only in reichsmarks and not in foreign exchange; the transfer to Chile would be attended to by the Ministry of Economics. The draft of a

<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Schoen telegraphed on Nov. 21 (236/157500) that leading members of the incoming Chilean Government—President-elect Pedro Aguirre Cerda, General Carlos Ibañez, and Colonel Marmaduke Grove Vallejo—had approached him through an intermediary to propose close economic ties between Chile and Germany. Schoen suggested that since Grove inclined more to the United States than to Germany, it would be advantageous to make 500,000 pesos available to him "according to the custom of the country". Schoen also said that the Chileans concerned asked for a prompt reply from Berlin and insisted that the matter be kept secret from their Embassy there. On Nov. 23 Wiehl replied (236/157496-97) that the proposal should be taken up only if Aguirre's actual assumption of the Presidency was assured; meanwhile nothing should be done to offend the defeated candidate, Gustavo Ross. Nevertheless, Wiehl concluded, it would be politically important to continue the negotiations even though they might not come to anything.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (236/157487). The telegram stated that the negotiations with the Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, and the President of the Popular Front, Grove Vallejo, had favorable prospects, and that payment of the sum requested would serve to commit the leading personalities and create a better political atmosphere.

telegraphic instruction to the German Embassy in Santiago is attached hereto.<sup>4</sup>

BECKER

<sup>4</sup> The telegram (236/157486) was sent on Jan. 10 and read: "Proposed payment approved. Branch *Südamerikabank* there will be instructed to credit the sum indicated."

No. 638

2621/525760-62

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX*

BERLIN, February 27, 1939.

Pol. IX 333.

The Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires informed me Saturday, February 25, at a social gathering that Brazilian President Vargas had sent his son to Germany for 6 months to study at the University of Berlin. Young Vargas would arrive in Berlin shortly. Senhor Graça Aranha added that the German Government could see from this gesture by Senhor Vargas how high a regard he had for Germany. The reception of the Brazilian Air Force officers, the invitation to the Brazilian Chief of General Staff,<sup>1</sup> and the gratifying development of our mutual commercial relations<sup>2</sup> furnished further evidence of the fact that there were no serious fundamental differences between the two countries and that it ought to be possible to overcome the ill feeling which had arisen because of the Ambassador incident.

His remarks are further evidence of how very much the Brazilian Government desires our mutual diplomatic relations to return to normal. They confirm the viewpoint which I have repeatedly expressed, that it is now high time to consider the events of last year closed and to take up the question of exchanging Ambassadors.

Since it was the Brazilian Government which demanded the recall of our Ambassador, the initiative now would have to come from them. At any rate, we could facilitate the initial step by letting it be known either through the Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires here, or through Herr von Levetzow, or possibly even through Count Ciano, who has offered his services as a mediator, that we were prepared to take up the question of sending an Ambassador to Rio after the Brazilian Govern-

<sup>1</sup> In a letter to Chargé d'Affaires Levetzow on Feb. 3 (6966/E519837) General Góes Monteiro had accepted an invitation to attend German Army maneuvers in the fall.

<sup>2</sup> In a report of Dec. 5, 1938 (3828/E043877-79), Levetzow had cited as the most important evidence of an improvement in the Brazilian attitude toward Germany, the extension of the clearing agreement on improved terms for 6 months, and the Brazilian Government's recently expressed desire to begin negotiations for a long-term commercial treaty.

ment had obtained our *agrément* for an Ambassador to be sent to Berlin.

The questions still awaiting settlement between Germany and Brazil, such as the Brazilian nationalization measures, the resumption of the activities of the AO, and the promotion of our trade, could be more easily settled in a satisfactory manner by an Ambassador, who is more effective than a Chargé d'Affaires.

In addition, an Ambassador would be more successful in playing his part opposite the American Ambassador and Foreign Minister Aranha, who unfortunately follows the lead of the Americans in every respect, than a Chargé d'Affaires who had no opportunity for exerting personal influence on the all-powerful Brazilian President.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary through the Director of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary.<sup>3</sup>

FREYTAG

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<sup>3</sup> On initialing the document Woermann wrote: "I support the proposal."

### No. 639

3523/E043886-88

*Minister Prince von Bismarck to Counselor of Embassy von Levetzow*

BERLIN, March 10, 1939.

e. o. Pol. IX 397.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Freytag.

DEAR HERR VON LEVETZOW: This is my first opportunity since returning from an extended leave to reply in greater detail to your letter of January 2, already treated in my letter of January 20.<sup>1</sup>

As we know from your reports and other information received here, you have succeeded under difficult circumstances in restoring good relations between the Embassy and the Brazilian authorities and in making advantageous use of them. We are in full agreement with your skillful procedure and share your view that it would be out of place to continue the conflict in its previous form, particularly since the Brazilians have displayed a cooperative attitude on many questions.

There is also a disposition, therefore, to consider further the question of a replacement for the post of Ambassador. We shall now consider the exchange of notes on this subject as closed, since the two viewpoints cannot be reconciled in any case.

What *modus procedendi* we shall use for the purpose of normalizing diplomatic relations is not yet entirely clear. Count Ciano has

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6966/E519859).



offered his services as mediator and we are seriously considering accepting them since, for reasons of prestige, we would in any case like to have the Brazilians take the first official step. We have already given evidence, through the invitation to the Brazilian Air Force officers and the Chief of the General Staff to our maneuvers, that we, too, are interested in maintaining friendly relations with Brazil. The cessation of the immoderate agitation in the Brazilian press has also created a much more peaceful atmosphere.

We hope it will be possible to check the wave of nationalization with its attendant disadvantages to our German element there until our new Ambassador arrives in Rio de Janeiro. It would then devolve upon him to clarify the material points of difference with the Brazilian Government through personal negotiation. We shall inform you in advance, however, of our attitude on them (reactivation of the Party, school matters, dual citizenship), as soon as the other Government and Party offices concerned have come to a decision on these subjects.<sup>2</sup>

With best regards,

Heil Hitler!

BISMARCK

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<sup>2</sup> Levetzow replied on Mar. 18. He advised against Italian mediation in the matter, pointing out that relations had so much improved that all that was necessary was for him to inform the Brazilian Foreign Minister that Germany would be prepared to receive a Brazilian *démarche* in Berlin on the subject of exchanging Ambassadors (6966/E519882). On Mar. 30 Weizsäcker telegraphed Levetzow (6966/E519884) to proceed along these lines but to take precautions that the affair was not turned to Germany's disadvantage by the press. After further exchanges full diplomatic relations were resumed on June 1, 1939.

CHAPTER X  
THE JEWISH QUESTION  
JULY 8, 1938—MARCH 8, 1939

[EDITORS' NOTE. Anti-Jewish legislation and measures in Germany were primarily a matter of domestic policy and the Foreign Ministry had no direct responsibility or jurisdiction with respect to them. The files of the Ministry contain numerous documents on this subject, however, since Germany's anti-Jewish measures engaged the interests of foreign states. This was particularly true with respect to the problem of refugees, and with respect to the position of foreign Jews in Germany under the Third Reich's discriminatory legislation. It is these aspects of the subject which primarily appear in the documents selected for this chapter. In chapter I there is an episode in German-Polish relations which was occasioned by the anti-Jewish policy (see documents Nos. 84, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95, 97, 98, 103, 107, 127). In chapter VIII there are documents dealing with the emigration of German Jews to Palestine.]

No. 640

3496/E019935-36

*Circular of the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, July 8, 1938.  
83-29 8/7.

The following is communicated for guidance in your conversations:

On the occasion of the opening of the conference at Evian,<sup>2</sup> the British Ambassador here asked the Foreign Minister whether the Reich Government was prepared to cooperate with the other interested countries in the solution of the question of emigrants, particularly in

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Embassies in London, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, and Washington, the Legations in Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, and Sofia, and to the Consulate at Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> The President of the United States had taken the initiative in calling an intergovernmental meeting to consider the problem of "involuntary emigration from Germany," i. e., the refugee question. Thirty-one countries were represented at this meeting which took place in Evian, France, from July 6 to July 15, 1938.

aiding the emigration of Jews of German nationality. No country was prepared to receive the emigrating German Jews, particularly if they were without means. The question therefore arose whether the Reich Government was prepared to cooperate in the transfer of capital in Jewish hands.

The Foreign Minister replied to the British Ambassador that he had to reject on principle any collaboration with other interested countries in the question of German Jews. This was an internal German problem that was not subject to discussion. The question whether Germany could facilitate the transfer of capital in Jewish hands had to be answered in the negative, since a transfer of the capital accumulated by the Jews—especially after the war—could not be expected of Germany. Cooperation with the powers at present in session at Evian was therefore out of the question for Germany.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 641

2184/466938

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, July 27, 1938.

The American Ambassador asked me today at a social gathering whether we would not lend our cooperation in some manner to the Evian Committee for emigrating Jews. I told him that he should not entertain any hopes in that direction.

WEIZSÄCKER

### No. 642

7024/E522338

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, August 10, 1938.

zu R 17034.<sup>1</sup>

The Swiss Minister told me today that he wanted to inform me only tentatively that Switzerland was seriously considering cutting down on the immigration of Jews from Germany.<sup>2</sup> The Swiss Government

<sup>1</sup> R 17034 was the file number of a telegram from the Minister in Switzerland dated Aug. 19 (7024/E522337) reporting Swiss complaints about illegal border crossings by masses of Jewish refugees with the connivance of German authorities.

<sup>2</sup> The stepping-up of German anti-Jewish policies following the Austrian *Anschluss* had resulted in a steadily increasing influx of Jewish refugees into Switzerland which in turn led to frictions between the latter country and Germany. According to a report from Bern, sent on June 24 (7024/E522338),

was decidedly against having the country overrun by Jews, which we would understand. It was possible that in the course of the measures to be decided upon by the Swiss Federal Council, Germany might be approached for her cooperation. One of the things being considered in Switzerland was the introduction of a visa requirement for German nationals. At the present time only persons from the territory of former Austria had to have visas. Evidently, however, German passports which gave no indication of Austrian origin were also issued to Jews from Austria. Recently Jews had even come to Switzerland from Constance with border permits made out there, although the Jews were not residents of the border area. The influx of Jews from the old Reich had recently assumed tremendous proportions. Thus, last Friday 47 Jews had arrived via Basel alone. He believed that the Swiss Alien Police had already called the matter to the attention of the German Legation in Bern.

WOERMANN

Rothmund, Chief of the Police Division in the Swiss Justice and Police Department, had informed the German Legation that "in order to protect Switzerland from the immense influx of Viennese Jews" the Swiss Government had ordered that all holders of Austrian passports would in future need a Swiss visa to enter Switzerland. Rothmund further alleged that the authorities in Vienna were already trying to circumvent this new Swiss regulation and were continuing to promote emigration of Austrian Jews into Switzerland. If this did not stop, he said, "Switzerland, which has as little use for these Jews as has Germany, will herself take measures to protect Switzerland from being swamped by Jews with the connivance of the Viennese police."

No. 643

7025/E522443-45

*The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of German Police to the Foreign Ministry*

S. V. 63654/38-453-20

BERLIN, October 3, 1938.

CONFIDENTIAL

R 20829.

Attention: Senior Counselor Rödiger or his deputy.

Subject: German-Swiss negotiations for settlement of the question of the entry of Jews of German nationality into Switzerland.<sup>1</sup>

I am sending you herewith a copy of the memorandum drawn up on September 29, 1938, regarding the outcome of the above-mentioned negotiations, in which the Foreign Ministry also participated.

<sup>1</sup> Negotiations between Germany and Switzerland over the question of the entry of refugees into Switzerland (see document No. 642) had taken place during August without leading to any results; a German *note verbale* of Aug. 29 (7024/E522408-10) promising that Austrian Jews would be prevented from entering Switzerland did not satisfy the Swiss. On Aug. 31 the Swiss Government in a note (7025/E522438-40) gave notice that it wished to terminate the German-Swiss visa agreement. This would have involved the reintroduction of a visa requirement for all Germans entering Switzerland. On Sept. 2, how-

Please inform me accordingly as soon as the Foreign Ministry is apprised by the Swiss Government of its final decision on the proposed settlement.

I shall meanwhile have the necessary measures prepared for the implementation of the settlement in question.<sup>2</sup>

By order:

KRAUSE

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, September 29, 1938.

On the basis of conversations that took place in Berlin from September 27 to September 29, 1938, between representatives of the German and Swiss Governments, the following procedure was proposed for settling the question of the entry into Switzerland of Jews who are subjects of the Reich:

1. The German Government will see to it that all passports for travel or sojourn abroad held by Jews who are Reich subjects (section 5 of the First Decree issued under the Reich Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935—RGBl I, p. 1333) are provided within the shortest possible time with a mark designating the holder as a Jew.

2. The Swiss Government will permit Jews who are subjects of the Reich and whose passports are marked as described in No. 1, or must be so marked according to the German regulations, to enter Switzerland if the appropriate Swiss Mission has entered on the passport an "assurance permitting sojourn in Switzerland or transit through Switzerland."

3. The German agencies in question which are charged with passport inspection and border patrol at the German-Swiss border will be instructed to prevent the exit to Switzerland of Jews who are subjects of the Reich and whose passports do not show the "assurance permitting sojourn in Switzerland or transit through Switzerland."

The German Government reserves the right, in accord with the Swiss Government, to require also of Jews of Swiss nationality that they obtain an "assurance permitting sojourn in Reich territory or transit through Reich territory," should the German Government consider it necessary.

ever, a Bern telegram (7024/E522414) reported that Dr. Rothmund had intimated to Köcher that the visa requirement might be limited to German Jews only, if their passports would clearly indicate that the bearer was Jewish. The Germans then demanded reciprocity, i.e., that Swiss Jews should also be required to have a visa for entering Germany; according to a Bern telegram of Sept. 17 (7024/E522425), the Swiss turned down this demand. The Swiss finally accepted a German suggestion that Dr. Rothmund should come to Berlin to see whether an agreement could not still be reached which would obviate the necessity of a mutual visa requirement for all German-Swiss travel. On Sept. 26, Senior Counselor Rödiger of the Legal Department recorded (7024/E522433) that Dr. Rothmund would leave for Berlin that day and that the talks would begin on Sept. 27.

<sup>2</sup>Marginal note: "Dr. Kappeler of the Swiss Legation has just informed me by telephone that the Swiss Federal Council has agreed. R[ödiger], Oct. 4, 4:00 p. m." The exchange of notes ratifying the agreement took place on Nov. 11, 1938 (7025/E522455-60).

The Swiss Government revokes its notice of termination of the German-Swiss Agreement of January 9, 1926, regarding the reciprocal abolition of visa requirements.

Should the arrangement proposed above not lead to satisfactory results, the two Governments will again consult each other, particularly with regard to fixing the date for the introduction of a general visa requirement, should it become necessary.

DR. BEST  
KRAUSE  
KRÖNING  
G. RÖDIGER

HEINRICH ROTHMUND  
F. KAPPELER

No. 644

7025/E522446-50

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, October 11, 1938.

zu R 20829.<sup>2</sup>

zu R 20952.<sup>3</sup>

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Rödiger.

By decree of the Minister of the Interior of October 5 (*Reichsgesetzbl.* I, p. 1342), it has been ordered that all German passports of Jews (section 5 of the First Decree under the Reich Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935—*Reichsgesetzbl.* I, p. 1333) who are in the territory of the Reich shall become void. The holders of these passports shall be required to turn them in to the domestic passport authorities within 2 weeks. For Jews sojourning abroad, the 2-week period shall commence with the date of their entry into Reich territory. The passports issued to be valid abroad shall again become valid if provided by the passport authorities with a symbol designated by the Minister of the Interior, marking the owner as a Jew. A copy of the decree is enclosed.<sup>4</sup>

As the decree states, the passports in question shall become void only if the holder stays within the country. The passports of Jews who are sojourning abroad will be affected by the decree only when the holder enters Germany. However, these passports, too, shall in each case be provided with the symbol decreed by the Minister of the Interior.

<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to all German Diplomatic Missions, Consulates, and to those honorary Consulates which were authorized to administer passports in Europe; also to the passport offices in Kehl and Bromberg.

<sup>2</sup> R 20829: See document No. 643.

<sup>3</sup> R 20952: Not printed (7025/E522445/1-7). This was a letter from the Ministry of the Interior of Oct. 5, 1938, acquainting the Foreign Ministry with the steps taken to implement the agreement of Sept. 29, 1938.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (7025/E522453).

The symbol is a red "J", 3 cm. in height, which is to be stamped on the upper left-hand side of the first page. On or directly above the vertical bar of the "J" the date on which the "J" was stamped on the passport, e. g., "10.9.1938", shall be entered from bottom to top in indelible ink.

The symbol is to be stamped by the German passport authorities abroad on the passports of all Jews who are German subjects as soon as a new passport is issued or an old passport is presented for extension of its validity or for any other reason comes into the hands of the Mission. After the symbol is stamped on, the passport is to be returned at once to the owner unless the provisions of section 19 of the Passport Proclamation of June 7, 1932, *Reichsgesetzblatt* I, p. 257, apply in the individual case.

Since the great majority of the Jews now abroad who are German subjects are at present in possession of passports valid for a period of 6 months, most of the passports of Jews abroad can presumably be stamped with the symbol in this way in a short time. However, in order also to include the passports of Jews which are valid for a period of more than 6 months, it is requested that these Jews be summoned individually, in so far as they are known to the Mission, to present themselves at the Mission as soon as possible and submit their passports. In so far as this summons is complied with, the passport of the Jew is to be provided with the above-described symbol unless in the individual case the retention of the passport appears necessary, in accordance with section 19 of the Passport Proclamation. Lists are to be compiled of those Jews who do not answer the summons, or who do answer it but whose passports could not be provided with the symbol. These shall contain details regarding their passports (issuing authority, date, number) and, in particular, the term of validity. The lists shall be submitted to the Foreign Ministry—if necessary after suitable correction—about one month after the expiration of the summons period.

The following statement is made for your information:

The stamping of the foreign passports of Jews who are German subjects has become necessary as the result of an agreement reached with Switzerland for the purpose of avoiding the introduction of the general visa requirement in German-Swiss passenger traffic. Under this agreement Switzerland will permit Jews who are German subjects and whose passports are provided with the symbol mentioned in the decree to enter Switzerland if the appropriate Swiss Mission has entered on the passport an "assurance permitting sojourn in Switzerland or transit through Switzerland".

The Swiss consular agencies abroad will be instructed by Switzerland for the time being to refer to the German Missions Jews who

are German subjects and who apply to them for entry of the above-mentioned "assurance etc.," if their passports do not yet bear the symbol mentioned. The passports of Jews who apply to the German Missions for such reasons are to be provided with the symbol forthwith. It is then up to the persons concerned to re-apply to the appropriate Swiss Mission with respect to their entry into Switzerland.

The passports are to be stamped with the symbol free of charge.

By order:  
G[AUS]

No. 645

1125/321891-02

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 18, 1938.  
[83-24 B 18/10].<sup>1</sup>

The British Ambassador today spoke to me about the attached memorandum,<sup>2</sup> which deals with the Intergovernmental Committee for Facilitating the Emigration of Refugees from Germany. In the memorandum it is suggested—just as was done about two months ago—that Rublee, the American director of the Committee, who resides in London, and his associate, Mr. Pell, should come to Berlin, in order to enter into a discussion with the German authorities as to how best to carry out the removal of the Jews from Germany.

I made it plain to the Ambassador—as I had done once last summer—that in my personal opinion a journey by Mr. Rublee to Germany would be of no value. It was not even definite which countries were prepared to admit German Jews. So far the Committee had proved sterile. In order to justify its existence it now wanted to talk with the German Government. In Germany it would then be ascertained that—for obvious reasons—we would not let the Jews take along any foreign exchange, and thereby the purpose would be achieved, namely to prove that once more it was German obstructionism that was to blame for the misery of the Jews. I could not help to promote Mr. Rublee's journey merely in order to make Germany the scapegoat. After further remarks by the Ambassador I declared myself willing to submit the memorandum to the appropriate authorities, but without promising any kind of positive reply.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The file number is found on another copy of this document (7051/E523542-43).

<sup>2</sup> The British memorandum is not printed (7051/E523536-38).

Marginal note in handwriting: "No reply to be made, by direction of the Foreign Minister. Oct. 21."

<sup>3</sup> When the British Chargé d'Affaires, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, followed up the question in a talk with Woermann 3 days later, he was told that the domestic authorities would require some time to study the British memorandum (7051/E523545).



After the Englishman, the American Ambassador came in and brought up the same subject. See his attached memorandum of today's date.<sup>4</sup> Wilson presented the contents of his memorandum in a more general form. He again mentioned that in the second half of November he would—as already indicated—leave for the United States and that before this he wanted to see the Foreign Minister. His urgent desire to establish better relations between Germany and the United States included, besides the Austrian debts and other matters, the Jewish question too, which *volens volens* was an important factor in German-American relations. As we knew, the United States had provided an annual quota of 27,000 persons for the admission of Jews and thus was willing to admit Jews. It was still hoped in Washington that an orderly procedure could be arranged for the removal of the Jews from Germany, both in the interest of American public opinion and in the German interest. He—Wilson—had no specific plan for such a procedure; nor had Mr. Rublee. But our rejection of it would be just as regrettable as the effect of a settlement of this question would be gratifying for German-American relations.

I made plain to the American Ambassador, perhaps somewhat less bluntly than to Nevile Henderson, the reasons likely to stand in the way of any useful discussions by Rublee with German authorities, but told Wilson also that I was willing to forward his memorandum to the appropriate authorities.<sup>5</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>4</sup>Not printed (7051/E523539-41).

<sup>5</sup>Copies of the American, British, and French memoranda (for the latter, see document No. 647, footnote 2) were sent to the Ministry of the Interior, together with a letter by Weizsäcker dated Nov. 2 (7051/E523554-56). In this letter, Weizsäcker pointed to the problems arising from the increasing tendency of foreign countries to close their borders against Jewish emigration from Germany, while at the same time German local authorities were resorting to the practice of sending German Jews across the frontier against the will of the neighboring countries. The letter then told of the Foreign Minister's decision against cooperation with the Evian Powers and suggested an early meeting of the various German agencies concerned, in case the domestic authorities wanted to discuss Jewish emigration with reference to the receiving countries.

No. 646

7051/E523544

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 20, 1938.

83-24 B 20/10.

During his visit today the American Ambassador again brought up the question of a possible visit by Mr. Rublee, director in London of

the International Committee for the Emigration of German Jews. By direction of his Government, Wilson declared that a visit by Rublee to Berlin would involve an informal step aimed solely at sounding out existing possibilities. It was only intended to determine whether possibly conversations later on held out any prospect of a positive solution for the removal of the Jews.

The Ambassador added parenthetically that he was impressed by the fact that the American newspaper, *Washington Post*, had commented favorably upon the latest pronouncements of Herr Funk, the Minister of Economics. If this newspaper (owned by Eugene Meyer, probably one of America's most prominent Jews, and Morley, his anti-German editor) began to write in such a friendly vein, it might signify a possible change in sentiment.

Wilson hopes that Rublee's informal visit to Germany will materialize.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> This copy of the document, referred to Ribbentrop, was returned to Weizsäcker with the following marginal note: "Visit is out of the question. R[ibbentrop]."

Ambassador Wilson called on Weizsäcker again on Nov. 2 and brought up the question of the Rublee visit. Weizsäcker recorded that he "put him off" (1125/321685). On Nov. 10 the First Secretary of the American Embassy, Donald Heath, raised the subject with Woermann and the latter wrote that he "did not give him any hope" (7051/E523561). See also document No. 651.

## No. 647

7051/E523546

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, October 24, 1938.

83-24 B 24/10.

The Counselor of the French Embassy called on me today and, with reference to the steps already taken by the British and American Ambassadors,<sup>1</sup> handed me the attached note,<sup>2</sup> in which the French Government also recommends that Mr. Rublee visit Berlin on behalf of the Intergovernmental Committee in London and be received here. As the reason for the French step Count de Montbas gave France's own special interest in the settlement of this matter. France was both the transit country and the destination of many emigrants; be-

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 645.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7051/E523547-49). The French note emphasized in particular that none of the nations represented in the London Intergovernmental Committee questioned Germany's right to deal with certain groups of her own nationals as she saw fit. However, the note pointed out, other countries would be affected as well if, as a result of such measures by the German Government, impoverished emigrants crossed the borders and became public charges in their countries of asylum.

sides, the German authorities had in several cases simply taken to shoving emigrants across the border. The French Government had most recently objected to this practice by note No. 692 of October 6.<sup>3</sup> Once these emigrants were on French territory, France could not simply send them all back. In any case, such a practice involved considerable expense for the French Government, since the municipalities or the state had to assist the refugees. The French Government would very much like to see these questions solved in a friendly fashion.

I spoke to the Counselor of Embassy very much as State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker recently did to the British and American Ambassadors and especially pointed out that we could not expect much from a visit by Mr. Rublee, since it would possibly result merely in establishing the fact that we had no foreign exchange for this purpose.

In the course of the conversation Count de Montbas also mentioned that Minister Funk had not spoken to the American Ambassador in an entirely negative vein, according to what the latter had told him, but, on the contrary, had said that we were thinking of setting up a kind of trustee<sup>4</sup> for the emigrants.

WOERMANN

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> The English word "trustee" is used.

No. 648

7051/E523559

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 7, 1938.

83-24 B 7/11.

The British Chargé d'Affaires today again inquired about the state of the Rublee matter. I told him that the matter was being discussed with the domestic authorities and must be given time. Besides, Forbes himself was of the opinion that the Committee by no means had a list in hand of countries which would be prepared to admit a certain quota of German Jews. He also confirmed my statement that the North American quota for immigrants from Germany (27,000 persons per year) was already more than filled for a long time ahead. As Forbes stated that he knew Rublee well from Mexico, I asked him what the percentage of Rublee's Aryan descent was. Forbes believes that Rublee has no Jewish blood.

WEIZSÄCKER

## No. 649

1125/321681-82

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, November 12, 1938.

To be telephoned to the Foreign Minister.

Under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Göring a conference was held today on the Jewish problem.<sup>1</sup>

Results:

1. The Aryanization of the economy will be accelerated. Compensation of the Jews by interest-bearing government obligations. Exceptions solely for the sake of promoting exports.<sup>2</sup>

2. Expropriation of Jewish real estate, art objects, jewelry, stocks, etc. This question was referred to a small committee under the chairmanship of Minister Funk.

3. Immediate examination by the domestic departments concerned of the question of forced labor for the Jewish proletariat. Examination of the question of restrictions upon the freedom of movement of the Jews (ghettos?) as well as a series of special measures such as a ban on visits to health resorts, bathing beaches, forests, use of sleeping cars, attendance at German schools by Jewish children, etc.

4. Barring of Jews from theaters, concerts, cinemas, etc. (already announced by an order of Minister Goebbels having immediate effect).

5. Imposition of a single contribution of one billion reichsmarks upon the German Jews. (Already published).<sup>3</sup>

6. Jewish emigration is to be promoted by all possible means.

7. The damage caused by action against the Jews in the last few days is to be charged to the German Jews in a manner still to be determined. The question of the effect upon insurance, etc., was discussed and is subject to further examination.

<sup>1</sup> A stenographic record of this conference is published in *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg, 1948), vol. xxviii, document No. 1816-PS (U. S. Exhibit 261), pp. 499-540. The conference was called by Göring on Hitler's order and attended by representatives of various Ministries, including Woermann for the Foreign Ministry. Violent anti-Jewish riots had occurred on Nov. 9-10, 1938, following the murder in Paris of the German diplomat, Ernst vom Rath, by a young Polish Jew whose parents had been expelled from Germany. As Göring explained to the conference, the occasion would be seized to apply long-delayed measures which would eliminate Jews from the economic life of Germany.

<sup>2</sup> A set of partly illegible notes on the meeting (2530/520353-56) by Schumburg, who accompanied Woermann, has the following on this point: "As long as a Jew is engaged in export business he is not to be touched. We can link our interests with Jewish interests. The Jews are to be used in the export trade. . . . Jews as sales representatives to be decided according to individual cases. Better than new Aryan representatives. Greatest caution in replacing them. The Party point of view must be eliminated; the business point of view must prevail. . . . every concession involving ideological principles is possible."

<sup>3</sup> The words in parentheses were inserted and the following crossed out: "Must be kept strictly secret until published."

8. A strict prohibition of unauthorized action is to be issued immediately to provincial governors and the Party authorities.<sup>4</sup>

8. I brought up the question of the treatment of foreign Jews and made certain that the Foreign Ministry will participate in all measures generally and in individual cases specifically. The basic rule is that consideration for foreigners is admissible only where the preponderant interest of the Reich enforces it; attention to treaty obligations was promised.<sup>5</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>4</sup> This paragraph is a handwritten insertion in the typed document, the repetition of the paragraph numbers apparently being an oversight.

<sup>5</sup> The notes referred to in footnote 2 have the following on this point: "General line: Toward the *western* Great Powers, England, America, France, with whom precise treaties exist, a willingness to make concessions. Toward *eastern* states, which cannot harm us much, and with which for the most part no treaties exist, no concessions."

## No. 650

7051/E523565-68

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, November 14, 1938.

83-24 B 14/11.

Dr. Fischböck, the Austrian Minister of Economics, Labor and Finance, today called on me and stated the following:

In the conference of last Saturday which dealt with the Jewish question<sup>1</sup> Field Marshal Göring had demanded that Jewish emigration be promoted and in this connection also envisaged collaboration with trusteeships organized abroad.

In a conversation which he, Fischböck, pursuant to a special directive of the Field Marshal, had had today with the Minister of Economics, the Minister of Finance and State Secretary Stuckart of the Ministry of the Interior, the question had been discussed whether the offer of Director Rublee of the London Committee should not be accepted. All those present had been in favor of doing so. He believed that it might yet be possible to obtain practical results through Rublee. From Vienna Mr. Rublee had already been approached, through Sir Otto Niemeyer of the Bank of England, with a project which at any rate had not been entirely rejected by the British. This was a plan linking Jewish emigration with the promotion of exports and so making it possible for the Jews to transfer their government bonds to foreign countries. His project differed from that of State Secretary Brinkmann in so far as the latter wanted to do this individually, while according to the Vienna project the procedure would be somewhat as follows:

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 649.

If 200,000 Jews owned government bonds worth one billion, they would receive annually, contingent upon the supplementary increase in exports, a transfer of 3 percent for interest and 3 percent for amortization, making 60 millions. After 30 years the government bonds would thus be amortized. In England, or elsewhere abroad, an organization would be set up that would advance about 200 million reichsmarks against the one billion worth of government bonds and the interest and amortization service would make the payments to it. The project naturally involved numerous material and technical difficulties. If it were not possible to realize it, we would in any case have contributed something. The London Committee of our opponents would then be left with the sole responsibility of arranging for the placement of the Jews in other countries.

Minister Fischböck then personally made the suggestion that he might be charged with the conversations with Rublee, since, because of his experience in Vienna, he was something of an expert in this field. He had mentioned this to no one except State Secretary Stuckart, who had raised no objection.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request for a decision. I recommend that the suggestion of Minister Fischböck be accepted, after it has been established that the departments concerned, including the Gestapo, approve it.

Perhaps it would be better not to invite Rublee to Berlin, but have the conversation take place in London or at a third place.<sup>2</sup>

WOERMANN

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<sup>2</sup> On Nov. 16 a memorandum by Woermann (7051/E523569) recorded that the Foreign Minister had approved a private meeting between Rublee and Fischböck provided that it was not held in either Berlin or London. On Nov. 21 Woermann wrote to Ambassador Dirksen in London (1125/321675-76) that a German journalist there, Abshagen, who was acquainted with Pell, an associate of Rublee on the Refugee Committee, might be used as an intermediary. See also document No. 651.

## No. 651

7051/E523611-12

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, November 28, 1938.  
83-24 g Rs 28/11 (313 g Rs).

The American Chargé d'Affaires<sup>1</sup> informed me today that he was instructed by his Government to bring up once more the Foreign Minister's recent conversation with Ambassador Wilson regarding

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<sup>1</sup> Prentiss B. Gilbert.

contact with Rublee.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister had told the Ambassador that the matter was under consideration. The matter was becoming more and more urgent, since the Intergovernmental Committee established in London had to hold a meeting soon, and Taylor, the American delegate, had just sailed for London. The Committee had so far kept completely quiet, and his, Gilbert's, advice was that it should continue to remain entirely non-political.

I told Mr. Gilbert that I believed I was informed that the Foreign Minister had conveyed expressly to Ambassador Wilson his refusal of any official contact between representatives of the German Government and the London Committee. On the contrary, it could only be a matter of a purely private contact. Mr. Gilbert acknowledged that such had been the course of the conversation. But he wanted to know how the matter was now progressing. I told him that a private German initiative was actually being taken, of which we were informed. It was possible that within reasonable time a conversation would be held between this private German party and Mr. Pell, Rublee's associate. Upon his question where the conversation was to be held, I told Mr. Gilbert that we had in mind a neutral place because it was absolutely necessary to prevent anything regarding this initial private contact from being divulged by the press. For the same reason the idea had suggested itself that not Rublee, but Pell, his principal associate, should be the other party at the first meeting. I could assure him however that the whole affair would immediately come to naught if any indiscretions were committed. I asked him therefore to treat my statements as very confidential. Mr. Gilbert did not think it wise to have Pell, and not Rublee himself, participate and said that at a certain stage, very soon in fact, the members of the Committee would in any case have to hear of this matter.

Upon his request I promised Mr. Gilbert that I would give him further information in about a week.

The state of the matter is now that Herr Abshagen \* met with Herr Fischböck in Vienna and on Saturday returned to London. He will tell Pell that Fischböck, an acquaintance of his, has certain ideas as a private person and that he will be in Brussels on December 7, when he will be available to Mr. Pell. Herr Abshagen intends to inform

<sup>1</sup>No record of this conversation has been found. According to an account of it which Ambassador Wilson gave the British Chargé d'Affaires (see *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. III (London, 1950), document No. 314), Wilson, who was being recalled to Washington for consultation, saw Ribbentrop on Nov. 16 on the eve of his departure. Ribbentrop said that the Jewish question was an internal German affair not subject to negotiation with other powers, but promised to consider a meeting in Holland between Rublee and some private German person.

<sup>2</sup>See document No. 650, footnote 2.

us by telegraph through the London Embassy whether Mr. Pell accepts this suggestion.<sup>4</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>4</sup> Pell's acceptance of the suggestion was reported in a London telegram by Dirksen of Nov. 30 (7051/E523615). See also document No. 653, footnote 5.

No. 652

7051/E523624-26

*Ambassador Dirksen to Under State Secretary Woermann*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, November 30, 1938.

Received December 5.

83-24 B 30/11 g Rs (315 g Rs).

DEAR HERR WOERMANN: I have not yet thanked you for your letter of November 21<sup>1</sup> regarding our participation in a settlement of the Jewish emigration question, since a special reply was made superfluous through Herr Abshagen's trip to Berlin and Vienna. Herr Abshagen returned today and has reported to me on the result of his trip as well as on his conversation with Mr. Pell. I wired<sup>2</sup> the Foreign Ministry regarding this, so that I have not much that is new to add in this matter. I should now like to state how pleased I am at our decision to play an active part in transporting as many Jews as possible out of Germany in an orderly manner. I believe that through this readiness we shall not only serve our own interests and thereby expedite the emigration of Jews, but I am convinced that our decision will have very favorable effects on sentiment abroad, particularly here in England.

I enclose a carbon copy of a memorandum of a conversation that Herr Abshagen had with Mr. Pell regarding the Polish attitude in the Jewish question. It is quite interesting in many respects.

With best regards,

Yours,

DIRKSEN

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

LONDON, November 30, 1938.

Herr Abshagen gave me the following additional information regarding his conversation with Mr. Pell of the Refugee Committee here:

The Polish Government is now extremely active in the matter of the Polish Jews and is practicing blackmail so to speak. Both in Wash-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 650, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 651, footnote 4.



ington and in The Hague, and also here, it has had representations made demanding a settlement of the question of the Polish Jews threatened with expulsion from Germany<sup>3</sup> before the refugee question of the Jews emigrating from Germany was taken up. If there was not an immediate settlement of the question of the Polish Jews, the Polish people would allegedly become so wrought up that extensive persecutions of the Jews could also be expected in Poland. Mr. Pell, who termed such procedure obvious blackmail, added that Secretary of State Hull had probably often had to make very unpleasant communications to Ambassador Dieckhoff regarding the conduct of the German Government on the Jewish question; but everything he had told Herr Dieckhoff was child's play in comparison with what the Polish Ambassador had to take from Mr. Hull when he made a *démarche* in the above-mentioned sense.

Mr. Pell then told Herr Abshagen that the policy of the Polish Government during the past weeks has in general met with the strongest disapproval of both the British and the American Governments. He meant by this not only the action regarding the Polish Jews living in Germany but also the attempts of Poland to sever the Carpatho-Ukrainian territory from Czechoslovakia, as well as the recent surprise *coup* by Poland (agreement with Soviet Russia).<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Pell said that the Polish Government will one day bitterly regret having pursued such a policy. If a German-Polish conflict should arise, nobody would lift a finger to help Poland.

VON DIRKSEN

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 84, 88, 89, 91, 92, 95, 97, 98.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 105, footnote 1.

## No. 653

7051/E523574-76

*Ambassador Dirksen to Under State Secretary Woermann*

LONDON, December 5, 1938.

83-24 B 5/12.

DEAR HERR WOERMANN: Herr Abshagen, who met Messrs. Pell and Cotton<sup>1</sup> today for lunch, has just reported to me the following interesting details regarding the negotiations of the Evian Committee which have just taken place in London.

At the commencement of the negotiations the French representative, Senator Bérenger,<sup>2</sup> rose to inform the astonished members that

<sup>1</sup> Joseph P. Cotton, Jr., assistant to Rublee on the Intergovernmental Committee.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Bérenger, President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs in the French Senate.

they actually no longer needed to bother about the questions on the agenda. He said that on the occasion of Mr. Chamberlain's Paris visit he had entrusted to M. Bonnet the further handling of this difficult problem, referring to the fact that Herr von Ribbentrop was coming to Paris soon and that France was at present on much better terms with Germany than was England. According to this, M. Bonnet evidently intends to take the matter up with our Foreign Minister on the occasion of his Paris visit.

Mr. Rublee, who is naturally somewhat uneasy about this development because he is afraid that the matter could be jeopardized by clumsy handling on the part of the French, gave the Committee no hints as to the contacts he had meanwhile established. He simply pointed out that his possibilities of negotiation with Germany had not yet been exhausted and that he should be given more time in view of the great care with which the problem had to be handled. The Committee acceded to this and we can, let us hope, look forward calmly to the Fischböck-Abshagen-Pell-Cotton conference which will take place in Brussels on December 8. Mr. Rublee himself urgently requested the French delegation to avoid anything that might prejudice the success of his future negotiations with Germany.

It is nevertheless amazing that Chamberlain "passed the baby on to Mr. Bonnet".<sup>3</sup> The Foreign Office has, strangely enough, not been informed by 10 Downing Street of the subject of this conversation in Paris. Chamberlain probably approached the French because, as Herr Abshagen also learned, he was under strong pressure from Roosevelt to do something in the matter. Roosevelt informed Chamberlain that he had to consider all attempts to create a better atmosphere useless as long as the Jewish question was not dealt with by negotiation.

Pell then also told Herr Abshagen that a few days ago Field Marshal Göring spoke about the project to Ogilvie-Forbes, the British Counselor of Embassy in Berlin, apparently at a social function. The Field Marshal there termed the following conditions indispensable: The solution must be found on a purely business basis, with avoidance of all diplomatic or political intrigues. Foreign exchange could not be made available. In so far as foreign exchange was used for the plan, it would have to be brought in through an increase in German exports.<sup>4</sup> Foreign exchange would have to be advanced from abroad for the temporary financing of the emigration.

Messrs. Abshagen, Pell, and Cotton will leave London Wednesday evening. Herr Abshagen may be reached after 10 a. m. on Thursday

<sup>3</sup> Thus in the original.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Woermann's handwriting: "Yes. That is the Fischböck-Schacht plan."

at the Hotel Metropol in Brussels. Immediately after his arrival he will get in touch with Ambassador von Bülow-Schwante or, in his absence, with Counselor of Legation von Bargaen.<sup>5</sup>

With kind regards and Heil Hitler!

DIRKSEN

<sup>5</sup> On Dec. 7 (Wednesday), the German Missions in London and Brussels and the American Chargé in Berlin were informed (7051/E523621, E523627) that due to Fischböck's having become ill, the conference would have to be postponed; the Foreign Ministry copy of the telegrams to London and Brussels has an explanatory minute recording a telephone message from Fischböck about a discussion which he had with Schacht in this matter. According to Fischböck, Schacht wanted the Brussels talk postponed for a week, since he himself had similar plans under consideration, and therefore the matter would have to be studied further. No evidence has been found in the files that the projected Fischböck-Pell meeting ever took place.

### No. 654

7062/E524154

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy  
in Great Britain*

Airgram

No. 423

BERLIN, December 12, 1938.

e. o. W VI 3621.

For confidential information.

After the close of the present session of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Reichsbank President Schacht, at the invitation of the Governor of the Bank of England,<sup>1</sup> will go to London on a private visit; he can presumably be reached there by the Embassy through the Bank of England after Wednesday morning. The trip is being taken with the consent of the Führer and Chancellor. Herr Schacht will immediately inform the Embassy of the purpose of this trip.

WIEHL

### MINUTE<sup>2</sup>

The Embassy is being informed at the request of Reichsbank President Schacht, which request was transmitted by telephone by Vice President Dreyse. Herr Dreyse added that on the way to Basel, Herr Schacht had reported on the matter to the Führer in Munich and re-

<sup>1</sup> Montagu Norman.

<sup>2</sup> This minute appears on the draft of the telegram by way of explanatory background for officials to whom the telegram was referred for information after being dispatched.

ceived his consent to the trip. In London Herr Schacht wanted to discuss the problem of the international indebtedness of Germany and the financial aspect of the Jewish problem—the latter according to his well-known plan for transfer of part of the assets of emigrating German Jews by the export of German goods financed by a loan fund to be set up by Jews abroad.<sup>3</sup> Herr Dreyse said that Herr Schacht had already discussed this plan in Basel with Montagu Norman, and the fact that Norman had thereupon invited Herr Schacht to London for this private visit was at any rate an indication that he did not regard the plan as hopeless.

<sup>3</sup> The Foreign Ministry files contain a copy (1125/321695-702) of a letter addressed by Schacht on July 7, 1938, to Minister of the Interior Frick commenting on plans then in preparation to effect "the final elimination of Jews from German economic life." He pointed out that serious damage would be done to German credit by the proposed issuance of compensatory bonds which would be depreciated from the outset, and that vital foreign trade and foreign exchange would be lost by the sudden closing of Jewish firms with business connections abroad. He warned also that foreign disapproval would follow any scheme which amounted to expropriation of the Jews and that this in turn would affect adversely the hard-pressed German trade position. He suggested instead that the Jews be allowed over a 5 to 10-year period to dispose of their holdings in German industry in an orderly fashion, possibly in accordance with agreements with foreign governments and Jewish organizations abroad.

## No. 655

7051/E523588-89

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, December 20, 1938.

83-24 B 20/12.

Because of the report, "Schacht's Conversations in London, the Purpose of the Trip", which appeared in the *Börsen Zeitung* of December 19, the Foreign Minister instructed me to telephone President Schacht of the Reichsbank in order to call him to account for this article, especially its concluding sentence, and the discussion of this subject in London.<sup>1</sup> In the telephone conversation with President Schacht I said among other things that the Foreign Minister was astonished at this article, both because of the publication itself and because of the treatment in London of such a basic question of foreign policy. For 6 months the subject had been under discussion between the foreign Diplomatic Missions and the Foreign Ministry and to date it had been treated by us in an entirely negative manner. I had

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 280 in vol. iv is a report by Ambassador Dirksen in London on Schacht's talks there. See also the account in *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. iii, pp. 675-677.

to ask whether there had possibly been an instruction by the Führer to discuss the subject without consulting the Foreign Minister. It would then follow that President Schacht would also have to conduct the further negotiations with the foreign Governments. In the concluding passage of the newspaper article the present policy of the Foreign Minister was disavowed and the question was prejudged for the future.

President Schacht frankly admitted that the article originated with him. It was a question of an assignment by the Führer which he, the President, had carried out in London along the lines laid down for him. The Führer wanted him to report upon his return. He, Schacht, had therefore now requested that he be received by the Führer in order to make his report; he hoped to do so in one or two days, and thereafter he would promptly make a report to the Foreign Minister as well. He would rather not say more on the matter before he had reported to the Führer.

Moreover, continued President Schacht, Field Marshal Göring had told him to undertake in London the conversations which he had conducted. Göring and Schacht had thoroughly discussed the subject. The Field Marshal wished to steer the matter away from the field of politics into that of the purely economic and had, as he stated, an express directive to that effect from the Führer. As to who had jurisdiction in this matter, Schacht stated that he knew no more about that than what the Field Marshal had told him. He therefore believed that he had acted correctly and he had quite deliberately avoided any discussion of a political nature in London, which had been requested of him by prominent Englishmen. His trip to London originated with a private invitation by Norman. It had been a matter of discussions between two banks, in which Jewish emigration constituted a side issue. Despite this express request of the Field Marshal, Schacht, while on his way to Basel, nevertheless had had the Führer expressly repeat the instruction to him personally during a half-hour conference in Munich.

To my objection that President Schacht had not before his departure informed the Foreign Minister of the whole plan, Schacht replied that because of the way the trip was arranged he would have had no time to do so even if he had regarded the matter as being within the competence of the Foreign Ministry.

WEIZSÄCKER

1125/321654-59

*Memorandum by the Head of Sonderreferat Deutschland*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, December 20, 1938.  
82-32 Allg.

SUMMARY LIST OF REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY  
BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AGAINST RECENT LEGISLATION  
CONCERNING THE JEWS

## I.

Against the decree of April 26, 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt* I, p. 414, providing for the registration of Jewish property, representations were made by the following countries:

1. *The United States of America:*

- |          |  |
|----------|--|
| April 29 | —Oral request for details  |
| May 5    | —Oral request for details  |
| May 9    | —Oral request for details  |
| May 9    | — <i>Note verbale</i> (complaint against application to American Jews) |
| June 3   | —Oral request for extension of time limit for registration             |
| June 25  | —Oral inquiry and presentation of an <i>aide-mémoire</i>               |
| June 30  | — <i>Note verbale</i> (exact statement of the American point of view)  |

2. *Belgium:*

- |         |   |
|---------|---|
| July 14 | — <i>Note verbale</i> (against application to Belgian Jews) |
|---------|---|

3. *Britain:*

- |         |  |
|---------|--|
| May 11  | — <i>Note verbale</i> and <i>aide-mémoire</i> concerning application to British Jews |
| May 25  | — <i>Note verbale</i> (complaint against application to British Jews)                |
| June 4  | — <i>Note verbale</i> (renewed statement in behalf of British Jews)                  |
| June 28 | —Letter reasserting the British point of view  |

4. *France:*

- |        |   |
|--------|---|
| May 2  | — <i>Note verbale</i> (protesting against discrimination against French Jews) |
| June 2 | — <i>Note verbale</i> (alleged conflict with Franco-German agreement)         |

<sup>1</sup> This special division for internal German affairs was charged with the handling of questions of German domestic policy insofar as these concerned the Foreign Ministry or were the subject of inquiry by foreign Missions. Jewish policy was one of its main responsibilities.

- June 15 —Reminder by telephone to answer the note
  - June 17 —Request for oral information
  - June 27 —*Note verbale* (concerning former German nationals who have emigrated)
  - June 27 —Inquiry by telephone on this subject
  - July 4 —Intervention in an individual case
  - July 6 —Intervention in an individual case
  - July 11 —*Note verbale* (summary list of reservations)
5. *Latvia:*
- May 10 —Oral protest and memorandum concerning registration of Jewish property
6. *Lithuania:*
- May 3 —Oral inquiry regarding prejudice to rights of Lithuanian Jews
  - June 30 —*Note verbale* (restatement of the Lithuanian point of view)
7. *Norway:*
- June 24 —Oral inquiry regarding registration
  - September 12 —*Note verbale* (alleged violation of most-favored treatment)
8. *Poland:*
- May 16 —Oral request for information
  - June 15 —*Note verbale* (protest against damages suffered by Polish Jews)
  - November 8 —*Note verbale* (intervention in an individual case)
9. *Portugal:*
- July 27 —*Note verbale* (request for information)
  - August 12 —*Note verbale* (intervention in an individual case)
  - September 19 —Oral inquiry concerning former German nationals who have emigrated, and intervention in an individual case
10. *Switzerland:*
- May 25 —Request by telephone for information
11. *Union of South Africa:*
- July 11 —*Note verbale* (concerning registration of the property of South African Jews)
  - October 17 —*Note verbale* (information regarding German nationals who have emigrated)
12. *Sweden:*
- June 29 —Presentation of a memorandum concerning violation of most-favored treatment
  - July 19 —*Note verbale* (exact statement of position)

13. *Czechoslovakia:*

- May 4 —*Note verbale* (whether persons considered aliens under the foreign-currency legislation must register)  
 June 17 —*Note verbale* (alleged violation of most-favored treatment)

## II.

On the occasion of the events of November 8, 9, and 10, 1938, the following countries took steps:

1. *Italy:*

- November 10 —Oral representation because of destruction in a house in Essen in which the Italian coal office was to be located

2. *Britain:*

- November 10 —Telephone call concerning protection for British Jews  
 November 11 —*Note verbale* (concerning damage to British property)  
 November 11 —Note of the British Consulate in Vienna, concerning individual cases  
 November 12 —The same

3. *Netherlands:*

- November 10 —*Note verbale* (damage to stores of Dutch Jews)

4. *Hungary:*

- November 10 —Oral intervention concerning molestation of Hungarian Jews

5. *Brazil:*

- November 11 —Letter concerning damage to Jewish stores

6. *Lithuania:*

- November 14 —Telephone call concerning the wrecking of Jewish stores

7. *Soviet Russia:*

- November 15 —Oral complaint concerning damage to the former legation building in Vienna  
 November 18 —Note concerning damage in individual cases

8. *Guatemala:*

- November 18 —*Note verbale* concerning an individual arrest

9. *Latvia:*

- November 29 —*Note verbale* concerning a case of property destruction



10. *Finland:*

November 16 —Presentation of a letter from former Minister Yrjo Saastamoinen, the owner of 3 furs which have vanished from the shop of a Jewish furrier in Düsseldorf

11. *Poland:*

November 15 —*Note verbale* concerning the probable killing of a Polish Jew in Munich

November 24 —*Note verbale* in the same case

12. *United States of America:*

November 15 —*Note verbale* and oral inquiry concerning the wrecking of Jewish stores and individual cases

## III.

Against the decree of November 12, 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt* I, p. 1581, for the restoration of the normal appearance of streets around Jewish shops, the following countries have protested:

1. *Netherlands:*

November 14 —By *note verbale* and orally (protest against the restoration demanded)

2. *Czechoslovakia:*

November 21 —*Note verbale* (protest against the inclusion of Czech Jews in the restoration)

November 30 —Orally in the same matter

3. *Hungary:*

November 25 —*Note verbale* (protest against identical treatment for Hungarian Jews as German Jews)

## IV.

Against the decree of November 12, 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt* I, p. 1580, for eliminating Jews from the German economy, the following countries protested:

1. *Poland:*

November 22 —*Note verbale* (concerning the padlocking of Polish-Jewish stores by the German Labor Front, citing individual cases)

2. *United States of America:*

November 22 —*Note verbale* (protest against the exclusion of American Jews from the national economy)

3. *Iran:*

November 23 —*Note verbale* (concerning the closing of a store)

4. *Lithuania:*

November 23 —*Note verbale* (concerning the wrecking and closing of 4 stores)

5. *Netherlands:*

November 24 —*Note verbale* (against the exclusion of Dutch Jews, citing an individual case)

6. *Switzerland:*

November 24 —Presentation of a memorandum against the exclusion of several Swiss Jews from economic life

7. *Hungary:*

December 6 —*Note verbale* (concerning the closing of several Hungarian-Jewish stores)

## V.

The decree of November 12, 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt* I, p. 1579, concerning an expiatory fine upon Jews of German nationality was brought up by the following countries:

1. *Union of South Africa:*

November 25 —*Note verbale* (concerning the payment of the fine by a Jew)

2. *United States of America:*

November 15 —Oral inquiry concerning the payment of the fine (see II, 12)

## VI.

Finally, mention should be made in this connection of the incident involving the newly appointed Minister of Colombia, who on November 10 wanted to photograph damaged Jewish stores on the *Kurfürstendamm*.

## VII.

General protest against the application of the Jewish laws of Germany to American Jews:

*United States of America:*

December 14 —*Note verbale*

Submitted for purposes of information to the Under State Secretary, the Director of the Legal Department, the Director of the Economic Policy Department, and to Minister Aschmann.<sup>2</sup>

HINRICHS

<sup>2</sup> On Jan. 25, 1939, the Foreign Ministry addressed to all Missions a long instruction (2959/577777-81) listing the series of steps which had been taken during 1938 to remove Jews from the economic life of Germany. It concluded with the

## No. 657

7051/E523594

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 549 of December 21

LONDON, December 21, 1938—9:10 p. m.

Received December 22—12:35 a. m.

83-24 B 21/12.

With reference to my telegraphic report No. 548 of December 19:<sup>1</sup>

Yesterday there was a meeting of financial experts of England, the United States, France and the Netherlands, with Rublee as chairman. I have learned from a reliable source that the Schacht plan was accepted as a basis for negotiations and Rublee has been commissioned to conduct negotiations in Berlin at the beginning of January.

A written report will follow.

DIRKSEN

(Footnote 2 from p. 918—Continued.)

following general statement of policy toward other states on this subject: "These measures have brought many representations and some protests from foreign governments on behalf of Jews of foreign nationality who are affected. Some of them have requested an assurance in principle that their nationals would not be discriminated against in Germany on account of race or religion. This demand has not been complied with in any instance. It was promised, however, to examine individual cases, taking into consideration the treaty relationships with the country in question."

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (7051/E523587). The telegram reported that Rublee and Pell regarded Schacht's plan favorably and had reported to Washington accordingly.

## No. 658

7051/E523596

*The Head of Sonderreferat Deutschland to the Embassy in Great Britain*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

No. 438

BERLIN, December 23, 1938—8 p. m.

zu 83-24 B 21/12.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to your No. 549 of December 21.

If the Rublee Committee should make inquiries or requests there, you should reply by refusing any discussion, owing to lack of instructions. Please maintain absolute reserve in every respect vis-à-vis the Rublee Committee.

HINRICHS

<sup>1</sup>This telegram was sent on explicit instructions from the Foreign Minister, which were recorded by an official of his secretariat on Dec. 22 (7051/E523595).

<sup>2</sup>See document No. 657.

## No. 659

7051/E523744

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, January 4, 1939.

Today on the telephone President Schacht referred to my recent call<sup>1</sup> in which I had asked him about his authorization for the Rublee conversations. Herr Schacht said that he had reported orally to the Führer 2 days ago. The Führer had approved his—Schacht's—conversations in London and directed him to continue them. Schacht now intends to send for Rublee.

In order to comply with his recent promise to me, the President would like to report orally either today, tomorrow, or Saturday to the Foreign Minister on his conversations in London.

After I had informed the President of the Foreign Minister's schedule Schacht suggested Saturday as the date of his call. It appears that he will leave on Saturday afternoon for a monthly meeting in Basel.

I intentionally refrained from asking Schacht about the content of his conversations in London and the actual basis on which he now intends to continue negotiations with Rublee.

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 655.

## No. 660

1125/321649

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 34

BERLIN, January 13, 1939.

The Foreign Minister has agreed with the President of the Reichsbank that the latter should attempt to effect the removal of German Jews to foreign countries by means of a covert organization. Herr Schacht explained his plan to the Foreign Minister as not likely to have any harmful effects upon the German economy. However, in order to secure the dominant influence of this Ministry in the organization to be set up for this task and also to preserve for the Foreign Ministry a decisive voice in questions of lesser importance, a member of the Ministry staff is to be assigned to the organization. The Foreign Minister reserved the right to select this person.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Woermann's handwriting: "Minister Eisenlohr."

## No. 661

2939/577770-76

*Memorandum by the President of the Reichsbank<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, January 16, 1939.

An exchange of ideas regarding the emigration of the German Jews has taken place during the last few days between Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht and Mr. Rublee. The basic plan is somewhat as follows:

## I.

Those Jews are to emigrate first whose age (15-45 years) and physical condition will still make it possible for them to earn a living abroad. The assumption is that this would involve some 150,000 Jews with another 250,000 dependents (wives, children, etc.), so that in this way some 400,000 Jews can be brought out of Germany in the course of 3 years, or 5 years at the most. The Evian Committee will make every effort to provide places for these 150,000 Jews and their families.

Jewish property in Germany will be brought under a central control. Some 25 percent of this property is to be put into a trust fund. The assets of the trust fund are gradually to be converted into cash and transferred only when Germany's foreign-exchange situation permits it, or even sooner, if supplementary exports can be made. The remaining 75 percent of Jewish property shall remain at Germany's disposal in so far as it is not needed to support the Jews until they emigrate, or to maintain until their death those Jews who are aged or not suited for emigration.

The idea of raising a loan abroad on the security of Jewish property in Germany, with Germany as the debtor, has been abandoned. Rublee intends instead to propose to the Governments represented in the Evian Committee that they themselves raise the funds necessary to provide the entry money for the 150,000 emigrating Jews mentioned above. The debtor for the funds thus raised abroad would not be the Reich, but the emigrating Jews.

## II.

In the discussion of this plan, the following questions arose:

1. The emigrating Jews are to be selected by the receiving countries in accordance with their immigration laws and practice. Emigration

<sup>1</sup>This memorandum was apparently transmitted to the Foreign Ministry in accordance with Schacht's pledge to Weizsäcker, recorded in document No. 655, to keep the Ministry informed of his negotiations with Rublee. The document was initiated by Wiehl, Director of the Economic Policy Department.

offices under the supervision of a Reich commissioner are to be opened by the Jewish communities in the important places in Germany. They may work without interference, consult freely with the emigrating Jews and do the necessary technical work. Mr. Rublee wishes, if necessary, to have assigned to these offices foreign emigration experts taken from interested private organizations abroad. This would concern England, particularly, where the whole complex of questions was being handled not directly by the Government but by private organizations. The function of these experts would be to advise the emigrants—for example, regarding the possibilities of emigration to New Zealand, and the immigration regulations in force there.

2. Would it be possible to make it easier for the emigrating Jews between the ages of 15 and 45 to receive vocational training in Germany until they emigrate? Training on model farms, etc., is particularly contemplated.

3. It is desired that the Jews now in the concentration camps (information is requested as to their number) should be given priority in the matter of emigration in so far as they are not criminals. In this connection, it is proposed that a camp be opened abroad in which these Jews may be quartered temporarily.

4. It is assumed that the German Government will make no difficulties in connection with the issuance of passports for emigrants and that the situation of the stateless Jews, including those who have already left Germany, will be settled.

5. So far as the Jews are concerned who do not come under the category eligible for emigration, they are to be assured satisfactory living conditions—not only economically (housing, food, etc.) but also in the sense that they be permitted to lead a normal life free from molestation.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Rublee realizes that the German Government cannot forthwith give categorical assurances regarding the principle of “freedom from molestation” so long as he cannot promise that Jewish elements outside Germany will likewise cease their criticisms and attacks on the Third Reich. Mr. Rublee intends to discuss these difficulties with the Governments he represents.

6. Until they actually emigrate, the Jews eligible for emigration are, so far as possible, to be employed in some way, either on model or other farms or in factories, and to be segregated from the Aryans. Mr. Rublee would consider it very desirable if such farms and factories could be set up by the Jewish community in Germany. The plan was to use Jewish estates and factories for this purpose. Mr. Rublee would be grateful for as detailed information as possible regarding the views of the German Government on this complex of questions.

7. The relatives of the emigrating Jews, as well as the Jews who cannot emigrate, shall, so far as possible—this is Mr. Rublee's wish—be left where they are, and not be segregated. In other words, Mr. Rublee would like to see the pressure upon these Jews to abandon their present apartments and houses eased. Where segregation is absolutely necessary, a system of old people's homes and blocks of

<sup>2</sup> The last three words are in English in the original in addition to their German equivalent.

boarding houses [*Pensionskolonien*] is to be considered. On this complex of questions, too, Mr. Rublee requests Germany's view.

8. In regard to housing, food, and general living conditions "decent conditions of existence" are to be granted the Jews who emigrate in the course of the next 3 years as well as the older Jews who remain here, and this does not mean maintenance in a concentration camp.

9. As mentioned above, some 25 percent of the Jewish property in Germany is to be put into a trust fund, which is to be transferred when German transfer conditions permit, or at once, if supplementary export possibilities can be created (see below). The interest on this trust fund can be used for the maintenance of the group of Jews who have not yet emigrated. It was clear, however, that this interest would not also suffice for the maintenance of the Jews remaining here: the less so, since at least 1,000 reichsmarks are needed annually for the support of every Jewish person staying here temporarily or permanently. It is proposed to defray the costs of this maintenance from the remaining three-fourths of the Jewish property. Are these means adequate, and how is the maintenance to be organized? Does the German Government wish to take over all Jewish property, with the exception of household and necessary personal articles, in order to set up such a maintenance fund? Where is the money for the support of the Jews to come from if these assets do not suffice?

Mr. Rublee requests the views of the German Government.

10. How is the trust fund, into which some 25 percent of all Jewish property in Germany is to be put, to be administered?

The plan is to have it administered by three persons as trustees: two Germans and a foreigner. If possible and necessary—this is an idea of Rublee's—the Bank for International Settlements in Basel is to be used for making payments abroad.

As mentioned, the assets of the fund are to be slowly liquidated. The proceeds will be invested in easily convertible German securities (Reich loans, etc.) until a transfer is possible.

The fund is from the beginning to serve the purpose of enabling Jews who have emigrated under this plan to purchase equipment which they need for settlement in overseas areas as well as capital goods. The plan is that some sort of company for colonization shall be founded abroad which could take care of part of the purchase of equipment and capital goods for the destitute Jews.

In this connection the following questions have arisen:

(a) Definition of the concept of "supplementary [exports]."

Everything might be considered supplementary that goes into new Jewish colonization areas. Rublee is also considering the possibility of creating organizations abroad for the purchase of supplementary export articles besides the equipment and capital goods previously mentioned.

(b) Payment in foreign exchange for that part of the supplementary goods delivered which are raw materials.

(c) How are the price differences in Germany and abroad to be adjusted in the case of these exports? Shall the domestic or the foreign prices be used as the basis?

\* In English in the original.

(d) In the case of exports to the United States, American tariff legislation must be taken into consideration. Are the rules established for the use of the blocked mark for payment of supplementary goods to the United States applicable also to the fund mark?

(e) In the case of deliveries of equipment or capital goods or supplementary goods to countries with which we have clearing agreements, we might have to obtain exemption from the treaties in question.

(f) Can the Haavara mark system<sup>4</sup> be incorporated into the trust fund? For example, could the rules applying to the Haavara mark in exports to Palestine be applied to exports to British Guiana?

(g) In principle, can all kinds of goods be used for purposes of colonization or for supplementary exports, or what exceptions would have to be made?

(h) Is it feasible to create a special trade-mark if necessary for the exports that serve Jewish emigration, in order to assure the marketability of these supplementary goods also in those countries in which boycott movements exist?

(i) What will happen to the present system of the blocked mark for emigrants? Will it be discontinued entirely or shall it be incorporated into the fund in some way?

(k) Rublee desires that it be made possible to pay in reichsmarks the freight charges for the transportation of equipment and capital goods.

(l) What is the nature of the trust fund in relation to the other kinds of German foreign debt? In case German foreign exchange regulations are done away with or made less stringent, Rublee desires that the fund not be discriminated against with relation to other foreign debts.

11. Rublee desires that the emigrating Jews be permitted to take along, unhindered and free of taxes and charges, their household furnishings and personal articles—with the exception of jewelry and expensive art objects—as well as the articles necessary for carrying on their vocations.

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I could not look over the above memorandum before it was put into final form, because I had to go on a trip. I have the following emendations and additions to make:

On page 2, at the top: <sup>5</sup> It was never the intention to make a German agency the debtor for a loan. A foreign loan should also be borne by the Jewish organizations and not by the Reich.

On page 2, line 8 from the bottom: <sup>6</sup> The idea of emigration experts is only that the formal difficulties attendant upon the immigration into other countries are to be obviated by such consultation.

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<sup>4</sup> See ch. viii, especially document No. 530.

<sup>5</sup> See p. 921, 4th paragraph.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 921, 6th paragraph.



On page 6, line 7 from the top:<sup>7</sup> The Bank for International Settlements is not in any way to participate as a trustee or otherwise to exert influence. It is proposed solely for the sake of uniformity in the keeping of accounts abroad.

On page 6, center:<sup>8</sup> The payments which are made out of the fund for such articles are to be considered as completed transfers. The same is true of page 7 (*k*).<sup>9</sup>

On page 7, (*l*):<sup>10</sup> Only a very vague promise can be given with respect to this wish.

SCHACHT

<sup>7</sup> See p. 923, 5th paragraph.

<sup>8</sup> See p. 923, 7th paragraph.

<sup>9</sup> See p. 924, paragraph (*k*).

<sup>10</sup> See p. 924, paragraph (*l*).

## No. 662

7051/E523604

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 50

BERLIN, January 18, 1939.  
83-24 B 18/1.

By direction of the Foreign Minister I told Minister Eisenlohr<sup>1</sup> the following:

1. Initialing of any agreements with Mr. Rublee is out of the question.

2. Among the agencies, the Foreign Ministry is to have primary responsibility in this matter, but must not give this impression vis-à-vis foreign countries.

3. No promises are to be made to Mr. Rublee concerning future treatment of the Jews in Germany.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 660, footnote 1.

## No. 663

1125/321646

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, January 21, 1939.

Minister Eisenlohr informed me today on my inquiry that Field Marshal Göring had told Reich Minister Schacht yesterday that he would appoint a successor to him for the Rublee negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Schacht was removed from his post as President of the Reichsbank on Jan. 20. American Chargé d'Affaires Gilbert called on Woermann on that date (1125/321647) to ask whether Rublee could not be informed whether someone was to be named to continue negotiations with him. He had merely been told on the telephone by the Reichsbank that "Dr. Schacht was not in a position to continue the discussions."

Schacht had told Rublee in such categorical terms of the termination of his (Schacht's) part as intermediary that it was out of the question for Schacht to review the memorandum of the negotiations which Rublee had drawn up. Besides, attempts were being made to induce Field Marshal Göring to carry out his intention of appointing a successor to Schacht for the Rublee negotiations as speedily as possible. Whether this appointment could still be made in the course of the day was uncertain. Eisenlohr gave it as his personal opinion that Schacht's successor would get in touch with Rublee on his own. It was out of the question for the Government agencies to deal with Rublee directly. Moreover, despite the present interruption the latter was in a position to report to the Evian Committee on the attitude of the German Government, since Schacht had expressly told him that he was not conveying his personal opinions, but the views of the agencies concerned. He (Schacht) described himself to Rublee as a "go-between".<sup>2</sup>

DR. SCHMIDT  
*Minister*

<sup>2</sup> In English in the original.

After Schacht's removal Rublee continued his negotiations with Helmuth Wohlthat, of the Office of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, whom Göring had designated for this task. A plan was eventually drawn up in negotiations between Rublee and Wohlthat on Feb. 1-2, 1939. The plan was along the lines of the original Schacht plan, but was less far-reaching. A memorandum by Rublee (7051/E523632-38) concerning these negotiations is in the files together with a letter from Wohlthat to Rublee (7051/E523631) stating that the negotiations had been correctly represented in the memorandum. It was also agreed to treat this memorandum as strictly confidential, but its content was nevertheless published in the *New York Times* of Feb. 14, 1939.

## No. 664

1520/373206-19

### *Circular of the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, January 25, 1939.  
83-26 19/1.

Subject: The Jewish Question as a Factor in Foreign Policy in 1938.

1. Germany's Jewish policy as cause and consequence of the foreign policy decisions in 1938.
2. The goal of German Jewish policy: emigration.
3. Ways, means, and destination of Jewish emigration.
4. The emigrant Jew as the best propaganda for Germany's Jewish policy.

<sup>1</sup> This circular was addressed to all German Diplomatic Missions and Consulates.

It is probably no coincidence that 1938, the year of destiny, has not only brought the realization of the concept of a Greater Germany, but at the same time has also brought the Jewish question close to solution. For the Jewish policy was both cause and consequence of the events of 1938. The advance of Jewish influence and of the corrupting Jewish mentality in politics, economics and culture paralyzed the German people's strength and will to rise again, more perhaps than the opposition of our former World War enemies which was inspired by power politics. The cure of this disease of the body politic was therefore one of the principal prerequisites for the strenuous effort which in 1938 enforced the consolidation of the Greater German Reich against the will of the whole world.

The necessity for a radical solution of the Jewish question resulted also, however, from the developments in foreign policy which augmented the 500,000 persons of Jewish faith living in the old Reich by another 200,000 in Austria. The influence of the Jews in the Austrian economy, which under the Schuschnigg system had increased beyond all bounds, made it necessary to take immediate measures aimed at the elimination of the Jews from the German economy and the use of the Jewish resources in the public interest. The campaign launched in reprisal for the assassination of Secretary of Legation vom Rath has speeded up this process to such an extent that Jewish retail trade—so far with the exception of foreign stores—has entirely vanished from our streets. The liquidation of Jewish wholesale and manufacturing establishments and of houses and real estate in the hands of Jews is being carried forward step by step so that within a reasonable time Jewish property in Germany will be a thing of the past. It must be pointed out, however, that all this by no means involves a seizure of Jewish property without compensation, such as, for instance, the confiscation of church property during the French Revolution. For his property the expropriated Jew receives Reich bonds on which interest is due him.

The ultimate aim of Germany's Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living on German territory. It is to be anticipated that the incisive economic measures, which have obliged the Jews to live from "savings instead of profits," will in themselves enhance their willingness to emigrate. In reviewing the past 5 years since the seizure of power, however, it must be admitted that neither the law for the restoration of the civil service, nor the Nuremberg Jewish legislation with the regulations for its application, which halted any assimilatory tendencies of the Jews, have substantially contributed to the emigration of the German Jews. On the contrary, in every period of domestic tranquillity such a return stream of Jewish emigrants set

in that the Gestapo found it necessary first to place Jewish returnees with German passports in a training camp for political screening.

The Jew had been eliminated from politics and culture; but until 1938 his economic position in Germany, and thereby his tenacious will to hold out until "better times" should come again, was unbroken. Characteristic of these tactics of passive resistance is the program of a Jewish party recently founded in Poland to challenge all Polish measures for the emigration of Jews. As long as the Jew could still make money in the German economy there was in the eyes of world Jewry no need to give up the Jewish bastion in Germany.

But the Jew had underestimated the consistency and strength of the National Socialist idea. Together with the system of countries in Central Europe created at Versailles to keep Germany down, the dominant Jewish positions in Vienna and Prague also collapsed in 1938. With her racial legislation, Italy took her place at Germany's side in the struggle against Jewry. In Bucharest Professor Goga, an expert on the Jewish question, took over the government with a program directed against Jewry—without, however, being able to prevail against the overwhelming international pressure from Paris and London. In Hungary and Poland the Jews were subjected to special laws. Now the German political success at Munich, like an earthquake with its distant tremors, is beginning everywhere, even in remote countries, to shatter the position which the Jews have consolidated for centuries.

It is understandable that world Jewry, which "has chosen America as its headquarters", regards the Munich Agreement, which in the American view signifies the collapse of the democratic front in Europe, as its own defeat. For the system of parliamentary democracy, as experience has shown, has always helped the Jew to obtain wealth and political power at the expense of the host peoples. Probably for the first time in modern history Jewry now has to retreat from a secured position.

That decision was only taken in 1938. It manifested itself in the effort of the Western democracies, particularly the United States of America, to place the Jewish retreat from Germany, or the emigration of the Jews, which had now been definitely decided upon, under international control and sponsorship. The American President, Roosevelt, "whose close advisers are known to include a whole array of supporters of the Jews", called an inter-governmental conference as early as the middle of 1938 for the discussion of the refugee question, which convened in Evian without any particular material results. The two questions, the answers to which constitute the prerequisite for an orderly Jewish emigration, remained open: first, the question as to *how* this emigration is to be organized and financed, and, second, the question as to *where* the emigration should be directed.

International Jewry did not seem to be inclined to contribute toward a solution of the first question, in particular. Rather, the conference—and the committee which it set up later in London under the chairmanship of Rublee, an American—considered that its main task was to force Germany, through international pressure, to release Jewish assets to the greatest possible extent. Thus Germany was to purchase the emigration of her 700,000 Jews by the sacrifice of German national assets. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether international Jewry seriously desires the mass emigration of its fellow Jews from Germany and other countries at all, without the equivalent of a Jewish state. In any case the tactics behind the Jewish proposals so far aim less at a mass emigration of Jews than at the transfer of Jewish assets.

It goes without saying that the transfer even of a fraction of Jewish capital would be impossible from a foreign-exchange standpoint. The financing of a mass emigration of German Jews is therefore not yet clarified. Inquiries in conversations should be answered to the effect that in Germany it is expected that international Jewry—particularly the relatives of emigrating Jews—would assist in the emigration movement just as vigorously as it had done in enabling penniless fellow Jews to immigrate to Germany at a time when Germany in her weakness could not stop the influx of East European Jews. At any rate it can be proved with the help of police and tax office records that the great majority of the Jews immigrated to Germany penniless and in a few years or decades had amassed fortunes, while the German people lost their possessions through the tribute stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles or were ruined by unemployment. Germany therefore has no understanding for the sympathy which moved an allegedly humanitarian world to complain of the injustice involved in the expropriation of this property of which the German people were deprived by Jewish business methods.

The Evian Conference could find no better answer to the second question, namely, to which countries an organized emigration of the Jews should be directed; for each of the participating countries, while in principle sympathizing with the problem of the refugees, declared itself unable to admit any large numbers of Jewish emigrants to its territory. Since the time in 1933-34 when more than 100,000 Jews found their way from Germany to foreign countries either legally or illegally, and with the help of their Jewish relatives living abroad or the sympathy of humanitarian circles were able to establish themselves in new host countries, almost all the countries of the world have hermetically sealed their boundaries against the undesirable Jewish intruders. The problem of Jewish mass emigration has thus practically come to a standstill for the time being. Many countries

have already become so cautious as to demand that Jews who enter in a regular manner with German passports produce certificates from the German authorities to the effect that there is no objection to their return.

Even the migration movement of only about 100,000 Jews has been sufficient to awaken in many countries an interest in, if not an understanding for the Jewish threat. We can well imagine that the Jewish question will expand into a problem of international politics when great masses of Jews from Germany, Poland, Hungary and Rumania are put on the move by the growing pressure of their host peoples. The Jewish question will not be settled for Germany, either, when the last Jew has left German soil.

Even today it is an important task of German policy to control and as far as possible to direct the current of Jewish migration. To be sure, there is no reason for cooperating in the solution of this problem with other countries such as Poland, Hungary and Rumania, who themselves are striving for the emigration of the Jewish sectors of their populations. As experience has shown, parallel interests compete with one another in such a procedure and retard the realization of the pressing German claim to the admission of German Jews to other countries.

It is true that the Rumanian Government made an official appeal to the German Government, under the slogan of humane morality and justice, to collaborate in an international move for the solution of the Jewish question. On the other hand, however, Poland issued a decree at the end of October last year which would have made the return of 60,000 Jews of Polish nationality domiciled in Germany practically impossible. As is known, the German Government therefore had to take the decision of deporting to Poland about 16,000 Jews of Polish nationality, who will be followed by their families, shortly before the Polish decree went into force.<sup>2</sup> However, the Hungarian Government has shown understanding for Germany's Jewish policy in so far as it has, on its own initiative, promised to aryanize Hungarian-Jewish business enterprises in Germany, that is, to replace the Jewish owners by Hungarian nationals. But in general the situation is such that the self-seeking interest of the countries concerned in getting rid of the Jewish parts of their populations first has precedence over any international solution. Germany will therefore herself take the initiative in finding the ways and means and the destination for the emigration of the Jews from Germany.

Palestine, which has already been popularly designated as the country of emigration, is out of the question as an objective for Jewish

<sup>2</sup> This episode is treated in ch. 1. The relevant document numbers will be found in the Editors' Note at the head of ch. x.

emigration, if only because it is unable to absorb a mass influx of Jews. Under the pressure of Arab resistance the British Mandate Government has restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine to a minimum. At first the immigration of German Jews to Palestine received extensive support by Germany through the conclusion of an agreement with the Jewish representation in Palestine permitting the transfer of Jewish property by way of supplementary exports (the *Haavara Agreement*).<sup>3</sup> Apart from the fact that this method enabled only a small number of well-to-do Jews to emigrate, but not the mass of Jews without property, there are also basic foreign-policy considerations against this form of emigration: the transfer of Jewish property from Germany contributed in no small measure to the development of a Jewish state in Palestine. But Germany must recognize a danger in the creation of a Jewish state which even in miniature would serve world Jewry as a base of action, as does the Vatican State for political Catholicism, and which could absorb only a fraction of the Jews. The realization that world Jewry will always be an irreconcilable opponent of the Third Reich compels the decision to prevent any strengthening of the Jewish position. A Jewish state would bring world Jewry increased power in international relations. Alfred Rosenberg formulated these thoughts in his Detmold address on January 15, 1939, as follows:

"Jewry is striving today for a Jewish state in Palestine. Not in order to offer a home to Jews all over the world, however, but for other reasons: world Jewry has to have a little miniature state in order to send extraterritorial ministers and representatives to all countries of the world and through them to promote its lust for domination. But above all they want a center of Jewry; a Jewish state where Jewish swindlers from all over the world, hunted by the police of other countries, can be sheltered, provided with new passports and then sent to other parts of the world. It is to be hoped that the friends of the Jews in the world, especially the Western democracies who dispose over so much space on all continents, will allot the Jews a territory outside of Palestine, *not in order to establish a Jewish state, however, but a Jewish reservation.*"

That is the program of German foreign policy on the Jewish question. Germany has a major interest in seeing that the Jews continue to be dispersed. Those who calculate that boycott nests and anti-German centers would thereby be created all over the world disregard the development already evident that in all parts of the world the influx of Jews arouses the resistance of the native population and thus provides the best propaganda for Germany's Jewish policy.

In North America, South America, France, Holland, Scandinavia and Greece—wherever the Jewish migratory current flows—a marked

<sup>3</sup> See ch. VIII, especially document No. 530.

growth of anti-Semitism is already noticeable. It must be a task of German foreign policy to encourage this anti-Semitic wave. This will be accomplished less by German propaganda abroad than by the propaganda the Jews are forced to spread in their own defense. In the last analysis it will work against them. The reports of the German Missions abroad prove the correctness of this view:

The press and official reports from North America continually speak of anti-Jewish manifestations by the population. It is perhaps symptomatic for domestic developments in the United States that the audience of the well-known anti-Jewish "radio priest" Coughlin has grown to over 20 million.—The Legation in Montevideo reported on December 12 "that for months the Jewish influx has been continuing week after week. There is no question that anti-Semitism is growing here."—Salonika reported on November 30, 1938, "that forces are at work to fan the hatred of the Jews", and at the same time that the Greek Freemasons are trying to stem the anti-Semitic movement.—In France, the Paris City Council was to deal in April 1939 with a motion denying naturalization to Jews in the future. The discussion of the Jewish question ended with a brawl among the speakers in the debate.—Lyon reported on December 20: "The immigration of Jewish refugees has lately led to unpleasant incidents here. The general French dislike of the new intruders for reasons of business and competition is unmistakable."—This dislike has grown in the meanwhile to such an extent that a Jewish defense against anti-Semitism has already been organized in France (report of November 19, 1938, from Paris).—The Legation in The Hague reported on December 30: "Under the impact of the numerous emigrants from Germany, who are conspicuous especially in Amsterdam, anti-Semitism in Holland is growing apace. And if it goes on like that it may easily occur that the Dutch will not only begin to understand Germany's treatment of the Jews but even develop a desire to do the same thing."—The Legation in Oslo reported on April 8, 1938: "Whereas a few years ago the streets of Oslo were rarely disfigured by Jews, lately a great change has taken place. In the streets, in the restaurants, and particularly in the coffee-houses, the Jews sit lumped together in loathsome clusters. The Norwegians are being pushed aside more and more. The Norwegian press, which hitherto had no understanding whatever for the Jewish question, has suddenly become aware of what it means when the children of Israel suddenly invade a country like locusts. It will be quite a salutary lesson for Norway."

These examples of reports from our Missions abroad may be multiplied at will. They confirm the correctness of the expectation that the criticism of our measures for eliminating the Jews from the German *Lebensraum*, which many countries could not understand for lack of experience, is of a temporary nature and will turn against the Jews themselves at the moment when visible evidence brings home to the population what the Jewish threat signifies for their own existence. The poorer the immigrant Jew and thus the greater



burden he is to his country of immigration, the more strongly will the host country react and the more desirable will be the effect in the interest of German propaganda. The goal of this German policy will be an international solution of the Jewish question in the future, not dictated by false sympathy for the "Jewish religious minority which has been expelled," but by the mature realization by all peoples of the danger which the Jews represent for the racial preservation of the nations.

By order:  
SCHUMBURG

No. 665

7051/E523699-704

*The Chief of the Security Police to the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, February 14, 1939.

Received February 17.

83-24 B 14/2.

Attention: Counselor Dr. Schumburg.

Subject: Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration.

Enclosures: 1 (Secret)

With reference to letter S-PP (II) No. 231/39 of February 10, 1939.<sup>1</sup>

I am sending you, for your information, a copy of the minutes of the working session of February 11, 1939.

By order:  
LISCHKA

[Enclosure]

MINUTES OF THE FIRST WORKING SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE  
CENTRAL REICH OFFICE FOR JEWISH EMIGRATION, AT 11:00 A. M.  
ON FEBRUARY 11, 1939, IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRET STATE POLICE

The session was conducted by the Chief of the Security Police, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich, whom Field Marshal Göring has commissioned to direct the Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration.

The participants in the conference were:

1. SS-Standartenführer Oberregierungsrat Müller,
2. SS-Sturmbannführer Regierungsrat Lischka,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7051/E523679).

3. Ministerialrat Dr. Zindel,
4. Ministerialrat Krause from the Main Office of the Security Police,
5. SS-Standartenführer Dr. Six,
6. SS-Obersturmführer Ehrlinger,
7. SS-Hauptsturmführer Hagen from the Main Security Office,
8. Zollinspektor Bunke from the Foreign Exchange Investigation Office [*Devisenfahndungsamt*],
9. Senior Counselor Hinrichs from the Foreign Ministry,
10. Oberregierungsrat Dr. Gotthardt,
11. Regierungsrat Marwede from the Ministry of Economics,
12. Regierungsrat Dr. Freiherr von Langen as deputy of Ministerialrat Dr. Schwandt from the Ministry of Finance,
13. Regierungsrat Dr. Schiedemair as deputy of Ministerialrat Dr. Lösener from Department I of the Ministry of the Interior,
14. Minister Eisenlohr,
15. Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat.

Proceeding from the decree issued January 24, 1939, by Field Marshal Göring,<sup>2</sup> as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, on the basis of which the Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration under the direction of the Chief of the Security Police was established, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich laid down the general directives. He explained that the function of the Committee of the Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration is to ensure smooth cooperation among the participating central government agencies in all questions relating to Jewish emigration. The Committee is not, however, to be burdened with settling detailed questions; rather such matters are to be dealt with by way of direct contact with the responsible representatives of the various departments. The Committee as a whole will be con-

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (7051/E523688-89). This directive issued by Göring listed among the tasks of this new agency the preparing of an increased flow of Jewish emigration with special regard for the financial problems involved, the finding of suitable immigration countries, and the speeding up of the process of emigration in individual cases. The directives stated furthermore that the Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration had been placed under the Chief of the Security Police but that basic policy decisions were to be made by Göring who was also to receive regular information on the activities of the new agency. The Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration was to be formed primarily by representatives of agencies normally concerned with matters of Jewish emigration; as additional members were listed: Minister Eisenlohr, officially assigned to the conduct of international negotiations, and Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat, appointed specially for negotiations on the Rublee plan.

This Göring directive on the establishment of the Reich Central Office was sent to the Foreign Ministry and to other agencies on February 11, with a cover letter from Heydrich (7051/E523688-87).

Heydrich's letter stated that the new agency had been set up according to Göring's directive and then gave the names of several of its members, among them Counselor Schumburg representing the Foreign Ministry. Heydrich finally requested to be consulted in everything touching on the question of Jewish emigration.

vened only on basic questions of general interest and at definite intervals for information on the general situation at any given time.

After a short review of the events of November 9 and 10, 1938,<sup>3</sup> and the necessity, created especially by this development, to deal with the problem of Jewish emigration in a unified way, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich explained the specific tasks of the Central Reich Office and next discussed the Rublee plan. This is meant, to be sure, to create a basis for an organized Jewish mass emigration, but the implementation of this plan does not by any means seem to be assured as yet, so that we should not count on this alone. Therefore we should continue to promote emigration by all other means available, regardless of this plan. In the first place the Jews themselves should be approached; on the basis of their international connections they can best find opportunities for entry into other countries and for obtaining the necessary foreign exchange. The correctness of this opinion was best shown in Vienna, by the establishment there of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration as early as August 1938. Through the connections of the Jews with foreign Jewish organizations, foreign exchange and opportunities for immigration were obtained there which have made it possible for about 100,000 Jews altogether to emigrate from Vienna up to the present time. Assuming that such support from abroad was obtained without any German *quid pro quo*, not even by "supplementary" exports, nevertheless the Ministry of Economics should issue a special authorization applying generally also to the distribution of foreign exchange brought in in this way; this is already being done in connection with the Central Office in Vienna.

A special task of the Reich Central Office is to encourage the emigration of Jews of very limited financial means by providing the necessary assistance. For this purpose all of the funds so far raised by various agencies must be concentrated under a single management and the whole procedure uniformly regulated anew for the entire Reich. SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich stressed in particular the special tax on rich Jews imposed by the Police President in Berlin, by which, according to the reports of the Police President, a sum of 3 million reichsmarks has so far been handed over to the Ministry of Economics.

SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich then went into the subject of utilizing Jewry itself in solving the emigration question. In the first place the Jews have been organized into a Reich association of all racial Jews, through which the Jews themselves are to be prepared for emigration

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 649, footnote 1.

and to which, among other things, it is intended to transfer the entire Jewish educational and welfare work. Contact can also be established with foreign Jewish organizations via this Reich association, in order to increase the emigration from Germany.

SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich then discussed in detail the technical implementation of the emigration. He said it was the function of the Central Reich Office to streamline the entire present procedure, which has been contradictory on many points, and make it as simple as possible for the Jews. Moreover, precise directives should be issued to set the standard for all authorities dealing with the emigration. In order to ensure an orderly procedure in the emigration under these directives the agencies of the State Police are to take over the general direction. With Vienna as a model, central offices for Jewish emigration are to be established in the principal places of Jewish concentration. Such central offices are planned for Berlin, Breslau, Frankfurt/Main and Hamburg. Through these central offices the Jews would be processed on an assembly line, so to speak. For this purpose representatives of all the local offices concerned in any way with the emigration should be sent to the central office. The first office is to be established in Berlin.

SS-Sturmabführer Regierungsrat Lischka explained in this connection the operating procedure of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Vienna established and directed by the Sicherheitsdienst of the Reichsführer SS; the work of the other central offices is to follow this pattern.

Finally SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich brought up for discussion the question of the illegal emigration of Jews to Palestine. He stated that any illegal emigration should be opposed on principle, to be sure. In the case of Palestine, however, matters were such that illegal transports were already going there at the present time from many other European countries, which were themselves only transit countries, and in these circumstances this opportunity could also be utilized by Germany, though without any official participation. Senior Counselor Hinrichs and Minister Eisenlohr from the Foreign Ministry had no objection to this and expressed the viewpoint that every possibility for getting a Jew out of Germany ought to be taken advantage of.

Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat stated that he had heard in London that Palestine could still absorb about 800,000 to 1,000,000 Jews, and that this quota would be filled from other countries in case no Jews from Germany went to Palestine.

In conclusion, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich stressed as the next objective the establishment of the projected central agencies in Berlin, Breslau, Frankfurt/Main and Hamburg.

## No. 666

7051/E523712-14

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

A 702

LONDON, February 18, 1939.

Received February 24.

83-24 B 18/2.

Subject: The latest deliberations of the Evian Commission.

With reference to my telegraphic report No. 40 of February 15.<sup>1</sup>

From persons connected with the Evian Commission I have learned reliably the following details of the latest proceedings in the Commission and the present status of its work:

Mr. Rublee has informed the representatives of the various powers of conversations which he had recently in Berlin,<sup>2</sup> especially his conversation of one and one-half hours with Field Marshal Göring, as well as the conferences with Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat, who has been commissioned by the Field Marshal to handle the special problem of "refugee questions". Regarding the readiness of the Dominican Republic to resettle 100,000 Jews,<sup>3</sup> it is said that the Dominican Republic wishes to increase the stability of its economy by distributing national production over a number of economic sectors. To this end the Dominican Republic would welcome the cooperation of Jews who would be in a position to set up small industries. The President of the United States has already sent a commission to study the conditions under which the Dominican Republic could receive [the refugees]. Mr. Rublee is said to have been deeply impressed by the manner in which the Field Marshal conducted the conversation in Berlin. He became certain from this conversation that the Reich Government desires to solve the problem of the Jewish refugees in a methodical way. In Rublee's opinion the further conversations with Herr Wohlthat provided a substantial basis for solving the problem.

The reaction of the powers represented on the Commission is said to have been quite varied. In the first place the French Senator, Béranger, refused to participate in the London conference "because the German proposals are not in accord with the dignity of France". In the opinion of my informant the absence of Béranger was advantageous. Béranger, he said, belongs to the category of pompous fellows who by their long speeches of little substance can only hamper serious efforts to find a solution. In place of Béranger, the French

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7051/E523707).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 663, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 667.

Ambassador, Corbin, and the Financial Attaché at the Embassy, Monick, took part in the conferences. The attitude of these two French delegates was marked by good sense and objectivity.

The most difficult participants in the negotiations were the South Americans, who merely made fine speeches to the empty galleries, with the tendency to represent the German offer as inadequate and incompatible with the dignity of the Evian Commission. The South Americans—and not without some justification—suspected that the Europeans want to unload their undesirable elements on them for resettlement. They were reinforced in this belief by a bulky Polish memorandum in which the Poles pointed to their 3½ million Jews, whom they also want to get rid of. Evidently the British had promised the Poles that they would recommend this memorandum with a few friendly words to the Commission for consideration, a step which almost proved to be fatal; for “though the representatives of certain countries are willing to take in the Jews who have gone through German schools, *all* of them without exception are very reluctant to have anything to do with proletarianized Polish Jews.” In the end, however, a discussion of the Polish memorandum was dispensed with and it was decided to send a letter to Berlin replying favorably to the German ideas. This letter, however, was the result of deliberations among more than 20 representatives and consequently displayed all the features of a compromise worked out by a large editorial committee. The statements to be made orally to the representatives of the German Government are said to be more important than this letter.

In the Evian Commission they seem to be counting on positive progress of the negotiations. England and America supposedly are favorably disposed toward the German ideas. The reaction in Washington is even said to be decidedly good.

V. DIRKSEN

## No. 667

7051/E523791-92

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, March 8, 1939.

Subject: Jewish emigration from Germany.

Mr. Pell, who has been appointed Vice Chairman of the Evian Committee, had a conference with Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat on March 3,<sup>1</sup> having come from London for that purpose. On this

<sup>1</sup> This conversation was recorded by Wohlthat in a memorandum dated Mar. 6 which is not printed (7051/E523782-89).

occasion Mr. Pell brought Herr Wohlthat a letter of February 17<sup>2</sup> from Rublee, the retired Chairman of the Evian Committee, and gave information on the efforts being made by this Committee. Mr. Pell promised written confirmation of his statements in this regard; this has not yet arrived, however. In the meantime Herr Wohlthat—who is returning to Rumania this evening—described the content of the conversations in the attached memorandum of March 6.<sup>3</sup> Copies of Rublee's above-mentioned letter of February 17 and a letter of February 24<sup>4</sup> from Pell are appended to this communication.

The following is of importance regarding the content of the conversations: The Evian Committee accepted Rublee's memorandum of February 1,<sup>5</sup> summarizing the outcome of his conversations with Schacht and Wohlthat, as the basis for the further treatment of the question of Jewish emigration. No inquiries or requests were addressed to the German side.

The two problems that have to be solved by the other countries in order to make possible an organized mass emigration of the Jews from Germany, namely the assignment of settlement areas and the establishment of a foreign finance commission, are already being worked on. The United States and England are sending out four commissions to examine the possibilities of settlement in British and Dutch Guiana and Northern Rhodesia, as well as in the Dominican Republic and the Philippines. Negotiations concerning the creation of a committee of American and English bankers, who would operate mainly with Jewish money, are in progress (point 5 in the Wohlthat memorandum).<sup>6</sup>

The appointment of Sir Herbert Emerson as Rublee's successor does not mean a merger of the functions of the Evian Committee and the Office for Emigrants of the League of Nations; on the contrary, the two agencies are to work entirely separately and in the Evian Com-

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7051/E523662-63). In this letter, handed to Wohlthat by Pell on Mar. 3, Rublee informed Wohlthat that the Evian Committee, in its meetings on Feb. 13 and 14, had been told of the result of the Rublee-Wohlthat negotiations on Feb. 1 and 2 (see document No. 663, footnote 2). The Committee had then instructed Rublee to convey to Wohlthat that it would endeavor in the future as it had in the past "to develop opportunities within the next 5 years for permanent settlement of 'involuntary emigrants' from Germany within the limits of the laws and practices of the member governments".

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1 above.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (7051/E523666). In this letter, handed to Wohlthat by the American Chargé d'Affaires on Mar. 1, Pell informed Wohlthat that Rublee had resigned as Director of the Evian Committee and would be succeeded by Sir Herbert Emerson, who would also retain his separate function as League High Commissioner for Refugees. He would be assisted, however, by Pell, now appointed Vice Director in charge of the Evian Committee activities. Pell then requested an opportunity to see Wohlthat in Berlin and to deliver to him a formal letter from Rublee written on behalf of the Committee (see footnote 2 above).

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (7051/E523632-38). See document No. 663, footnote 2.

<sup>6</sup> Of Mar. 6; see footnote 1 above.

mittee Sir Herbert will deal mainly with the question of settling the emigrants in suitable areas. The connection with Herr Wohlthat will not be maintained through Sir Herbert Emerson but through the Vice Chairman, Mr. Pell, who accompanied Mr. Rublee previously.

For the time being nothing need be undertaken on the German side, except for a statement as to whether Professor Bruins is acceptable to us as the foreign trustee proposed for the German emigrants' fund;<sup>7</sup> rather we should wait for Mr. Pell's further reports on the question of establishing the Jews abroad and on the setting up of the finance commission.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

Referat D[Deutschland] has been informed.

E[ISENLOHR]<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> A memorandum by Eisenlohr of Mar. 10 (7051/E523824-25) identified Professor Bruins as head of the Netherlands Clearing Institute, well known to many German officials in the field of economics, and stated that the Foreign Ministry had no objections to his appointment. This favorable opinion concerning Bruins was confirmed in a report from the Embassy in the Netherlands dated Apr. 21 (7051/E523858).

<sup>8</sup> There is in the files a memorandum of June 6, 1939, signed by Schumburg of Referat Deutschland (7051/E523905-06), dealing with an interagency meeting on the establishment of the trust fund as provided by the Rublee plan. Various technical objections by the participating agencies and the position of the foreign trustee were central in this discussion. It was finally decided to await the outcome of certain discussions between Wohlthat and the President of the Evian Committee which were anticipated in connection with Wohlthat's journey to London in the summer of 1939. On other significant aspects of Wohlthat's mission to London, see vol. vi of this series.

As for schemes to settle the refugees in the Dominican Republic and the Philippines, which ultimately resulted from the activities of the Intergovernmental Committee, see "Meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees", Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1939, vol. i, pp. 397-402.



## SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER I

[Editors' Note. The following additional documents bearing on the Danzig problem were discovered by the editors after documents in chapter I had been edited and numbered. Footnote cross references have been provided in chapter I to the documents below so that the reader will have no difficulty in following the story. The additional documents have been included in the Analytical List at their proper dates.]

### No. 668

7032/E522549-51

#### *The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

No. IG 1513

DANZIG, November 2, 1937.

Received November 3.

Pol. V 7101.

Subject: Announcement of New Laws in Danzig.

I am informed by the President of the Volkstag that certain new laws will be promulgated in Danzig in the near future. It is a question first of a law providing for a ban on the founding of parties, further of the amnesty law which was announced in connection with the dissolution of the Center Party,<sup>1</sup> and finally of a state youth law (dissolution of all youth organizations, assumption of youth leadership by the state). It appears that discussion is still continuing as to whether these laws, which would in part bring about a change in the Constitution, should be given effect by a vote in the Volkstag, or whether it would be better to issue them as ordinances by a Senate resolution taken on the basis of the delegation of powers contained in the Enabling Act of June 1933, and then later have this Senate resolution confirmed by a Volkstag resolution.

I have the honor to enclose a report of a conversation on this subject between the Senate President and the High Commissioner of the League of Nations.

<sup>1</sup> The Center Party in Danzig was dissolved on Oct. 21, 1937, by order of the Danzig Police President. A memorandum by Bergmann of the same date (7033/E522633/6) states: "The dissolution was undertaken after it had been established that a member of the Central Committee of the Center Party was guilty of repeated serious offenses in violation of paragraph 129a of the penal code." The memorandum notes that the paragraph in question "is a general statement that violations of the laws and ordinances of the state are subject to penalty."

The same announcements were made yesterday evening by the Gauleiter at two heavily-attended mass meetings. In his speech he also stated that Benno von Arant would come to Danzig in the next few days to undertake the decoration of the city, since important visitors were expected from Germany next year. The Gauleiter mentioned further that by spring Danzig would provide itself with Jewish legislation similar to that of the German Reich, and that in general they were on the way to attaining complete and "openly manifest" assimilation to Germany. These words are being connected with the flag question, the solution of which, according to rumor, is to be effected at the end of January.

On the basis of my personal impressions in the Gau organization, the Senate, and population I am pleased to be able to confirm that, since the dissolution of the Center Party, feelings in Danzig have been noticeably calmed and settled down.

LUCKWALD

[Enclosure]

MINUTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT GREISER AND THE  
HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON OCTOBER 31,  
1937

*President Greiser* spoke with Professor Burckhardt concerning certain laws which are to be promulgated in Danzig and which must probably be regarded as effecting a change in the Constitution. It was a question first of adopting the Reich's youth law, and then of a law which would forbid the founding of new parties. In addition, an amnesty law would be issued.

*Professor Burckhardt* suggested that it would be better not to use Volkstag resolutions to introduce these innovations which would effect changes in the Constitution. The cumbersome procedure involving two sessions of the Volkstag and the intervening period of one month would attract unnecessarily the attention of world opinion, of the press, and also of League of Nations circles. It was his opinion that as long as the legislative power was to a certain extent delegated to the Senate, the innovations of which President Greiser had spoken should be put into effect by Senate resolution on the basis of the delegation of powers contained in the Enabling Law. The Senate resolution could be given a quasi confirmation by a Volkstag resolution only to show that far more than two-thirds of the Volkstag deputies approved of it. He would then report these facts, and it was to be assumed that no objections would be raised.

DR. BÖTTCHER

## No. 669

7032/E522553-56

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
No. IG 1521DANZIG, November 4, 1937.  
Received November 5.  
Pol. V 7206.

Subject: I. Early Vote in the Danzig Volkstag on New Laws and Ordinances.  
II. Intended New Laws for the Free City of Danzig.  
III. Anticipated Flag Law.

With reference to report IG 1513 of November 2.

## I.

I am reliably informed that the Volkstag which is to assemble on November 8 will concern itself with the following matters, which are to be handled partly as legislation and partly as ordinances:

a) The amnesty announced in connection with the dissolution of the Center Party will be promulgated as a *law* and will be brought up for a vote in the Volkstag. This law, which is designed to cover the offenses of Kurowski, the former Consul General for Austria and Center Party leader, should at the same time provide an answer to the question as to how many Volkstag deputies will declare themselves in agreement with the recent measures of the Senate.<sup>1</sup>

b) To be promulgated merely as *ordinances* under authority of the Enabling Act of June 1933 there will be:

1. An ordinance concerning the youth of the state,
2. An ordinance concerning the ban on formation of new political parties.

I submit as Enclosure 1<sup>2</sup> the text of the ordinance mentioned under 2 which is based on the Reich law of July 14, 1933. The following may be noted in this connection:

The ordinance under 2 is in fact of such a character as to constitute a revision of the Constitution. If formally stated to be a law involving a *revision of the Constitution*, the revision which it contains could only come into force when, following approval by a two-thirds majority of the Volkstag in accordance with article 49 of the Danzig Constitution, it had been submitted to the League of Nations and the latter had raised no objection. In order to circumvent this procedure it has been decided (see the previous report cited above), on the advice of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, to issue an

<sup>1</sup> The amnesty law was passed by a vote of 55 to 21. See *Gesetzblatt für die Freie Stadt Danzig*, No. 70, Nov. 8, 1937.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7032/E522557).

ordinance. The following reasoning—as set forth in the confidential memorandum of the Senate attached as Enclosure 2<sup>3</sup>—is to be employed: article 85 of the Danzig Constitution gives “the right to form associations for purposes which do not run counter to the penal laws”. It follows from this that an *ordinary law* suffices to ban an association dangerous to the state. To make this applicable to the case in question it must therefore be stated in a preamble to the new ordinance that political parties are to be regarded as bearers of the danger of unrest and instigators of criminal activities and can no longer be allowed to come into existence.

In this manner the round-about procedure involving Geneva is avoided; it is a question merely of a decision by the High Commissioner as to whether he wishes to make a statement to the League of Nations. The heart of the ordinance under 2 lies therefore in the preamble of the new ordinance, although in general more attention will be paid to paragraph 1.<sup>4</sup>

The Volkstag is to be informed of both ordinances on Nov. 8, and will take its stand on the matter in a resolution the text of which is in preparation.<sup>5</sup>

## II.

At a later date it is intended to introduce the following laws:

1. A Civil Service Law which will contain provisions concerning the law applicable to public officials, the rules of discipline, and concerning racial origin. The German professional civil service legislation will serve as a model.

2. A revision of the citizenship law. Hitherto a Danziger could only be deprived of his citizenship if he had entered into the service of a foreign state. In future such a penalty is to be extended also to persons who engage in anti-German or anti-Danzig activities abroad. Former Senate President Rauschnig would probably be liable under it, as he is known to have written anti-German articles, especially in the Kattowitz newspaper *Der Deutsche in Polen*.

3. Introduction of Jewish legislation patterned on the German laws.

I request that the foregoing statements be treated as confidential and for official information only.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (7032/E522558-59).

<sup>4</sup> The preamble of the ordinance stated: “In fulfillment of the most important of the state's duties, to provide for order and security in its territory, the Free City of Danzig has dissolved political parties, which it has recognized as sources of unrest; it will be its further duty no longer to permit the rise of political parties as these are bearers of the danger of unrest and instigators of criminal activities.”

Paragraph 1 of the ordinance stated: “The formation of new political parties in the territory of the Free City of Danzig is forbidden.”

<sup>5</sup> The Volkstag merely took cognizance of the new ordinances. See *Gesetzblatt für die Freie Stadt Danzig*, No. 72, Nov. 10, 1937.

*Secret!*

4. A law to change the names of Jews which are offensive to national sensibilities is in the very earliest stage of consideration. A hint uttered by the Gauleiter on this matter in a public meeting drew loud applause; he referred to the fact that in Danzig, for example, there is a proprietor of a Jewish firm who bears the name "Deutschland".

## III.

In addition, a change in the Danzig flag is to be expected, undertaken as a separate political measure, in all probability on January 30 of next year. What legal formula is to be employed is as yet undecided.<sup>5</sup>

LUCKWALD

\* See document No. 28.

## No. 670

7032/E522575-76

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

IG 1500

DANZIG, October 1, 1938.

Received October 2.

Pol. V 7421.

Subject: Proposed publication of the Civil Service Law and of a Law for the Protection of the German Race.

As I stated in report IG. 1156 II of September 29,<sup>1</sup> now that the activity of the Jewish physicians in Danzig has been suppressed by the ordinance of September 23, 1938, of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, the intention is to enact during October in the form of ordinances the Civil Service Law as well as a Law for the Protection of the German Race, which were already under active consideration at an earlier date.<sup>2</sup>

The Senate of the Free City of Danzig has taken occasion to discuss the matter with Professor Dr. Burckhardt, High Commissioner of the League of Nations, and has stated to him that it considers it appropriate first to apprise Lord Halifax of the proposed measures, since the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Senate, Staatsrat Dr. Böttcher, as was reported, discussed the pertinent questions with him in June of this year. (Cf. report IG 808 of June 30, 1938.)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7031/E522545/1-45/2).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 669.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 45.

Professor Dr. Burckhardt expressed misgivings as to whether it was expedient just at this moment to enact the two laws in question. It was perhaps a mistake to believe that world public opinion would not concern itself with these questions at present. He said Lord Halifax and the British had told him repeatedly that such legislation could surely wait until after the Volkstag elections;<sup>4</sup> then there would be no difficulties made at all. But serious objections would have to be expected from England, which always proceeded from the position that the League of Nations and England had assumed the protection of Danzig.

It was arranged with the High Commissioner that he should first inform Lord Halifax of the proposed measures by a letter, which is to be delivered to Shepherd, the British Consul General here, for forwarding.

I shall report again regarding developments in the matter, if necessary.

JANSON

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<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Bergmann's handwriting: "At the latest the spring of 1939!"

No. 671

7032/E522579-80

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division V*

BERLIN, October 20, 1938.

[zu] Pol. V 7934.<sup>1</sup>

The Government of the Free City of Danzig has proposed to enact shortly a new Civil Service Law with Aryan provisions and a Law for the Protection of the German Race.

It has been ascertained that the few non-Aryans who served as Danzig officials have left the service in the course of the last few years. Consequently Danzig officials would no longer be affected by the introduction of the Aryan section in the Danzig Civil Service Law now in preparation.

Through the proposed Law for the Protection of the German Race, the race protection legislation of the Reich (prohibition of marriages between Aryans and non-Aryans and provisions regarding race pollution) will be introduced in Danzig.

League of Nations Commissioner Professor Burckhardt has expressed misgivings as to whether it is expedient at this time to enact the two laws in question. He said Lord Halifax and other English-

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<sup>1</sup> Pol. V 7934: Document No. 73. The memorandum printed here was evidently prepared in response to Weizsäcker's request as stated in his marginal note attached to the final paragraph of document No. 73.

men have told him repeatedly that such laws should wait until after the Volkstag elections. (No decisions have yet been taken regarding the Volkstag elections, which must take place in the spring of 1939 at the latest.) Furthermore, if the Law for the Protection of the German Race is enacted, complaints from the Poles are to be expected, since numerous Polish citizens of Jewish extraction, as well as Jews of other nationalities who have joined the Polish minority, live in Danzig.

Despite the above-mentioned misgivings, Pol. V considers it inappropriate to obstruct the further assimilation of Danzig law to the law in the Reich. No objections should therefore be raised against the enactment of the Civil Service Law. In view of the fact, however, that for obvious reasons some consideration for German-Polish relations is indicated, the question arises whether it is expedient at the present time to allow publication of the Law for the Protection of the German Race—particularly since, as has been ascertained, the Danzig administration is in a position for the present to guarantee the protection of the German race through police measures.

Pol. V therefore recommends that a decision be obtained from the Reich Foreign Minister as to whether it should be suggested to Gauleiter Forster that the enactment of the Law for the Protection of the German Race be postponed for the time being.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary.

SCHLIEP

## No. 672

7032/E522581

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, October 25, 1938.

[zu] Pol. V 7934.

The enactment in Danzig of the laws in question has been discussed by the Reich Foreign Minister with Gauleiter Forster by order of the Führer and Chancellor. Gauleiter Forster was told on this occasion that approval is given for enactment of the laws.<sup>1</sup>

Respectfully submitted to the State Secretary, the Under State Secretary, the Deputy Director of the Political Department, and Geheimrat Schliep, for their information.

BRÜCKLMEIER

<sup>1</sup> On Nov. 15 an ordinance dated Nov. 2 was published (see *Gesetzblatt für die Freie Stadt Danzig*, No. 74) which barred Jews from the civil service (*Beamtengesetz*). On Nov. 23 another ordinance, dated Nov. 21, (*Gesetzblatt*, No. 77) prohibited marriages between Jews and so-called "Aryans".

## No. 673

7032/E522582-800

*Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department  
of the Danzig Senate<sup>1</sup>*

DANZIG, November 18, 1938.

Subject: A conversation with Professor Dr. Burckhardt, the High Commissioner.

Professor Burckhardt asked me to call on him, and I took the opportunity to inform him, by direction of President Greiser, that Danzig would enact the Racial Purity Law within the next few days.<sup>2</sup> I said it had not been possible for me to make this communication earlier, since Professor Burckhardt had been out of town.

M. Burckhardt told me that he had been in Berlin, after having waited until the incidents with the Jews seemed to be over and he thought nothing would happen in Danzig. In the meantime, unfortunately, some things had also happened here. He had wanted to speak to Minister Goebbels; in the last moment the conference was called off, since Minister Goebbels had to be out of town. He then called on Ambassador Lipski and spoke with him about the fact that Minister Beck had taken the stand previously that the League of Nations should not concern itself with the internal affairs of Danzig, but that Minister Chodacki now seemed to be of another opinion.<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Lipski had replied that Minister Beck probably still took this view in principle, but that because of the special circumstances in the incidents that were now occurring one could not help involving the League of Nations in these questions.

M. Burckhardt said that since State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker was in Paris<sup>4</sup> he had only been able to speak to Herr Bergmann in the Foreign Ministry; the latter had expressed himself to the effect that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, in contrast to Freiherr von

<sup>1</sup> The document was transmitted to the Foreign Ministry on Nov. 19 by the Consul General at Danzig (7032/E522597).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 672, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> According to reports of the Consul General at Danzig of Nov. 9 (7032/E522582-84) and Nov. 12 (7032/E522585-86) Burckhardt informed Böttcher on Nov. 4 and again on Nov. 10 that he had been approached by the Polish diplomatic representation in Danzig with the suggestion that he should bring the new Civil Service Law to the attention of the League since it was clearly a violation of the Danzig Constitution.

On Nov. 18 the Consul General reported (7032/E522591-94) that the Polish diplomatic representation in Danzig had on the previous day handed Böttcher the following memorandum: "Matters affecting the non-Polish part of the population of the Free City of Danzig belong to the competence of the League of Nations. The Polish Government nevertheless expects that the new Danzig laws will not adversely affect the interests of Poland or the rights of Polish citizens or the proper functioning of the Danzig port."

<sup>4</sup> Weizsäcker represented the German Government at the funeral in Paris of Ernst vom Rath. (See document No. 649, footnote 1.)



Neurath, had recently informed the Gauleiter that no consideration need be given England any longer in connection with the introduction of measures directed against the Jews.

M. Burckhardt said he has now been asked by Minister Beck to visit him. He is going to Warsaw this afternoon and will have a talk with M. Beck on Saturday. He thinks it is certain that he will then be summoned to Geneva, and he is even expecting to be recalled from Danzig. He does not know, to be sure, whether the Committee of Three will meet now. He hopes that it will still be possible to have the whole matter postponed until January.

He had hoped that measures that are not entirely in harmony with the Constitution would be put off and that new elections would come in January; the League of Nations Council would then surely have said that it would approve all measures proposed by the new Volkstag. He still hopes that aside from the Racial Purity Law no further laws will be enacted against the Jews, and that confiscations, for example, will not be undertaken. That would facilitate his work of conciliation. It would also be well if special attention were not called unnecessarily in the Danzig newspapers to all measures against the Jews, as was done, for example, in yesterday's issue of the *Danziger Neuesten Nachrichten*, which attached principal importance precisely to the Aryan paragraphs in the Civil Service Law.

The present British Government had been caused extraordinary difficulties by the Jewish measures, he said, and its influence had been greatly weakened. Perhaps it was thought better for an openly hostile government to be at the helm in England, so as to be able to proceed all the more ruthlessly. At least this was conceivable. Lord Halifax was in any case extremely just and well-intentioned, also regarding the colonial question. He honestly wanted to avoid a war. M. Burckhardt was not entirely clear about Chamberlain. Undoubtedly he also wanted to avoid a war, if at all possible. It was conceivable, however, that he had only postponed it at present because he considered that England was not strong enough.

M. Burckhardt again stressed that in a former conversation with Beck, which he had not as yet reported, Beck also had not been entirely averse to a settlement of the Danzig question favorable for Germany, if only the prestige of Poland were respected. Even now much could perhaps be smoothed over again if a decision could only be made to hold new elections in January. The Committee of Three and Lord Halifax could then state that they consented to the procedure by which subsequent approval of the Volkstag would be obtained for all measures of the Government. England attempted already a year ago to extricate herself from Danzig issues, and would even now be glad to steer clear of interference in Danzig questions if she were not forced into it for reasons of prestige.

Should he be recalled to Geneva, M. Burckhardt said that he intends to stop off at Berlin after his visit to Warsaw, if at all possible, and he hopes that in the interval at least, aside from the Racial Purity Law, no further measures will be passed against the Jews.

Incidentally, M. Burckhardt restrained British Consul General Shepherd from making an over-hasty report on the Jewish question.

DR. BÖTTCHER

No. 674

7032/E522608-09

*Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL<sup>2</sup>

DANZIG, December 7, 1938.

The High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt, visited Senate President Greiser in the presence of the undersigned. He said that Gauleiter Forster visited him recently. In contrast to their last conversation, Herr Forster had told him that he should by all means remain in Danzig. M. Burckhardt had replied that the situation would then become very difficult for him in Geneva in January. He had asked whether the Gauleiter had informed the principal authorities in Berlin how Lord Halifax would have to construe the enactment of the new Danzig laws. The Gauleiter stated that he had explained that the British were very much annoyed about the new laws. This could be regarded with some indifference, however. Professor Burckhardt had again pointed out that it was not a question of whether the British were annoyed, but that certain promises had been made to Lord Halifax that no amendment of the Constitution (and this was undoubtedly contained in the laws) would be undertaken without consultation with him. Lord Halifax had stated repeatedly that the opposition in England would take up the situation in Danzig, that he would necessarily be reproached for not doing his duty as a member of the Council of the League of Nations, as a member of the Committee of Three, and finally as *rapporteur* of the League of Nations for affairs of the Free City of Danzig, and that as a result the greatest difficulties would arise for him and his Government.

The Gauleiter had replied that Professor Burckhardt should write to him. He would then give him a letter for the League of Nations stating that he would see to it that possible constitutional changes were regularized by a general election to be held in April. M. Burckhardt said that such a letter would not satisfy the League

<sup>1</sup> This and the following document, both signed originals and not copies, were found in a Foreign Ministry file but without indication as to how and when the documents were transmitted to Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> Added in handwriting by Böttcher.

of Nations. The letter had to be signed by the Chief of the Government. The Gauleiter did not formally have this position.

They spoke further of the fact that such a statement would serve the purpose only if there was certainty that it would also really be fulfilled. If Danzig did not keep her promises, conclusions would be drawn as to the mentality of the German Reich, also.

M. Burckhardt also said in a somewhat aggrieved manner that he had come here with very good intentions, but that he was beginning to cut a rather comical figure. He had believed that a transitional period would be good for Danzig, in the sense of making it a sovereign state with representatives in Berlin and Warsaw, and keeping it closely allied with Poland economically—somewhat along the lines of Minister Beck's proposal.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

### No. 675

7032/E522606-07

*Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate*

DANZIG, December 9, 1938.

Today I brought the High Commissioner the latest volume of *Danzig at the League of Nations*.

We spoke of the proposal of the Gauleiter to write the High Commissioner a letter about what has been happening in Danzig. We reached the conviction that it would be best if the High Commissioner wrote two letters, one [also] to the President of the Senate. In this he intends to point out that there might be doubts as to the constitutionality of certain laws in Danzig, and that Poland, for example, objects to the Compulsory Service Law<sup>1</sup> and the Civil Service Law. He would inquire whether the Senate was prepared to give him an explanation. The answer of the President of the Senate would then contain, aside from the purely factual reply, the statement that, in the first place, it was not a matter of laws but of ordinances which the Volkstag, in which there were 70 National Socialist deputies, would doubtless approve, and also that a new election of the Volkstag in the spring was planned, a two-thirds majority was expected then, and the ordinances would be approved by this majority. But it would be best to have the correspondence pre-dated. A further exchange of letters could take place between the High Commissioner and the Gauleiter.

If President Greiser, with whom the matter was already briefly dis-

<sup>1</sup> According to this ordinance, which was dated Oct. 10 and published on Oct. 19, 1938 (see *Gesetzblatt für die Freie Stadt Danzig*, No. 68), Danzig citizens could be inducted for compulsory service in a police organ of the Free City called the Security Service.

cussed on December 7, agreed, the High Commissioner said he would first await the return of the Gauleiter.<sup>2</sup>

We were also of the opinion that, since for the first time in 2 years Danzig issues will be on the agenda of the January 1939 session, it would be very desirable for formal and practical reasons if Danzig were represented in Geneva. We considered it especially important for President Greiser to become acquainted with Lord Halifax personally.

At the very outset, however, I made it a condition for the appearance of a Danzig representative that any report made by the *rapporteur* must not contain even a veiled reproach to Danzig. The High Commissioner said that in view of the general sentiment prevailing among the powers concerned and since, after all, only ordinances and not actual laws were involved, and if a general Volkstag election was planned, it would be easy to arrange for the Englishman's report to read that he had no cause for objections of any kind and for the report to be accepted without discussion—if it was submitted to the Council at all.

M. Burckhardt told me further that the Gauleiter had said to him, when speaking with him about the proposed election, that he was not yet clear as to the treatment of the Poles in the election. He, Burckhardt, had spoken with Chodacki, who expressed himself to the effect that he would be satisfied to have the same number of Polish deputies as are in the Volkstag at present.

The High Commissioner also told me that Minister Chodacki had expressed misgivings to him regarding the Danzig Compulsory Service Ordinance. There was originally talk of 400 men, and now there were already 800, an entire regiment, who have been recruited.

VIKTOR BÖTTCHER

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<sup>2</sup> On the arrangements made for an exchange of letters see also document No. 117.

### No. 676

7032/E522625-28

*Danzig Gauleiter Forster to High Commissioner Burckhardt*<sup>1</sup>

DANZIG, December 31, 1938.

Pol. V 437.

DEAR HIGH COMMISSIONER: I take this opportunity to wish you and Mme. Burckhardt a very happy New Year at this time and also

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<sup>1</sup> This document, marked "Confidential" in Böttcher's handwriting, was found in a file of the Foreign Ministry's Political Division V, where it was registered on Jan. 14, 1939. The file gives no indication as to how or when the document was transmitted to Berlin. However, the files of the Consulate General at Danzig contain the following handwritten minute (7248/E532038): "By agreement with the High Commissioner, the Gauleiter has also written him a letter in which the standpoint of the Party is stressed. The contents of this letter were discussed with me and I have read it. With minor changes it will be sent to the High Commissioner. Greiser, Jan. 6."

to express the hope that your activity in Danzig may continue to have its effect in the interest of the domestic and international peace desired by all of us.

I should also like to refer to your letter of December 12, 1938,<sup>2</sup> in which you express your misgivings regarding the ordinance pertaining to the Security Service, the Danzig Civil Service Law, and the ordinance for the protection of German blood and German honor. I believe that you take a much more serious view of the effects of these laws and ordinances in Danzig than is justified by the facts. It is not my task as Gauleiter of the Party in Danzig to justify these ordinances and laws to you on legal grounds; that is the affair of the competent governmental authorities. I should like in a very general way to inform you of my opinion on this matter, in order that you may realize that the Party, by agreeing to these ordinances and laws, had no intention of making any difficulties for you in your capacity as representative of the League of Nations.

As a result of the severance of Danzig from the Reich nearly 20 years ago it has become impossible to fill the vacancies on our police force with young people trained in the police service. The consequence is that our entire police force has become over-aged in the last few years. Men who 15, 10, or 5 years ago were still able to discharge their duties as police officers efficiently are today no longer in a position to do so because they are too old. For the Free State of Danzig the question of the replacement of these over-age policemen therefore became acute. Because of the severance it is impossible, even forbidden, to supplement them from the Reich. Unfortunately, moreover, the police training school that formerly existed in Danzig was closed about 7 years ago. As a result of this measure, the Free State of Danzig was deprived of every means for providing the necessary training of new recruits for the police force. The obvious thing, therefore, was that the state should on its own initiative create the possibility of obtaining young people and training them for the police service. Thus the ordinance regarding the Security Service, which you mentioned, came to be enacted. To impute to the Danzig authorities the intention to found a disguised military organization with this newly established unit is ridiculous. What could the small Free State of Danzig do with these few men if it were attacked from the outside? It is therefore superfluous to waste words on this subject, for it is obvious to every discerning person that this ordinance was enacted

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

in order to meet the most urgent requirements with respect to police recruitment.

So far as the newly published Danzig Civil Service Law is concerned, it does not have such great importance in its practical application as you perhaps assume. The decisive point, which probably gives rise to your concern, namely, that Jews may not be officials and must therefore be discharged, does not apply in Danzig, since there is not a single Jew in the entire civil service, and therefore no discharges need take place as a result of the new law. This law was passed in Danzig in order to carry out the same measures in the Danzig civil service, which is entirely German, as have been in force in the Reich since 1934. These measures will work out to the advantage of the entire civil service, exactly as in the Reich. I cannot conceive of any reason for a legitimate objection to this law on the part of the League of Nations, particularly since it does not in its application affect any member of a foreign national group or any Aryan.

Now just a short comment on the ordinance for the protection of German blood and German honor, the last one mentioned by you. This law has been in force in the Reich since 1935. The Free State of Danzig refrained until November 1938 from the enactment of this law, although it has had a National Socialist Government for 5½ years. That alone is proof of our restraint in such matters. When the action against Jewry started in the Reich in November of this year, we in Danzig also considered it proper to introduce this law in keeping with these developments. After all, precautions had at long last to be taken in German Danzig, too, to prevent Jews from violating German women and girls at will. A protest against this law is unfounded because it applies only to the Jew who violates it or, in other words, the Jews need only to leave the German women and girls alone; then they will never encounter difficulties. At a time when defense measures are being taken against Jewry everywhere in the world either directly or by closing of frontiers, the Free State of Danzig, which is 97 percent German and has been governed by National Socialists since 1933, cannot be blamed if it also takes measures for the protection of the German population.

I take the liberty of mentioning in conclusion that the objection made by the League of Nations that the majority of the Danzig population are not in agreement with these measures and the present Volkstag did not acquire its National Socialist two-thirds majority by orderly processes is untenable by reason of the fact that in 1939 in all probability a plebiscite or election will take place, in which, by reason of the National Socialist beliefs of the Danzig population,

a Volkstag will be elected which will then subsequently sanction all ordinances and laws previously enacted.

And so I believe, dear High Commissioner, that in this letter I have given you the information you need. Let me repeat my best regards and wishes for the New Year.

Yours truly,

ALBERT FORSTER

No. 677

7032/E522617-23

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

No. P 42

DANZIG, January 12, 1939.

Received January 14.

Pol. V 401.

Subject: Exchange of letters between the High Commissioner and the President of the Senate.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 9491 of December 23, 1938.<sup>1</sup>

The proposed exchange of letters between the High Commissioner and the President of the Senate in the matter of the unconstitutionality of various Danzig ordinances has now taken place. I have the honor to send you, as enclosure 1, a copy of the letter of the High Commissioner to President of the Senate Greiser, which is pre-dated to December 3, 1938, and, as enclosure 2, a copy of the reply of the President of the Senate of December 10, 1938.

As the Director of the Foreign Department of the Senate, Staatsrat Dr. Böttcher, further informed me, the High Commissioner intends to have it arranged before the Council of the League of Nations convenes in Geneva, where he will go in the next few days, that the Committee of Three will declare the matter not yet ripe for decision. The High Commissioner will then go on vacation and will not be present in Geneva during the Council session. Professor Burckhardt envisages further developments as follows: the Committee of Three will convene in London before the May session of the Council of the League of Nations and there take a final stand on the Danzig question to the effect that it renounces entirely the guarantee of the Danzig Constitution and the High Commissioner merely retains a position somewhat like that held previously by M. Calonder in Upper Silesia.<sup>2</sup> The London meeting of the Committee of Three mentioned would

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 117.

<sup>2</sup> Felix Calonder, former President of the Swiss Federal Council, was appointed by the League of Nations to preside over the Polish-German negotiations for a settlement of the Upper Silesia question. The negotiations began in November 1921 and a treaty was signed in May 1922. Calonder then served as President of the Mixed Commission for Upper Silesia until the latter was dissolved on July 15, 1937, in consequence of the expiration of the treaty.

also be attended by the High Commissioner, who is anxious that the Director of the Foreign Department of the Senate likewise be available there.

JANSON

[Enclosure 1]

*High Commissioner Burckhardt to Danzig Senate President Greiser*

ref. 21/35/II C

DANZIG, December 3, 1938.

MR. PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE: Referring to our conversations regarding the decrees of the Senate of the Free City:

- 1) Ordinance of October 10, 1938, regarding the Security Service,
- 2) Danzig Civil Service Law of November 2, 1938,
- 3) Ordinance of November 21, 1938, for the protection of German blood and German honor,

I take the liberty of inquiring as to the construction placed by the Senate of the Free City on the conflict between the Constitution and these ordinances.

Accept, Mr. President, assurances of my highest consideration.

BURCKHARDT

*High Commissioner*

[Enclosure 2]<sup>\*</sup>

*Danzig Senate President Greiser to High Commissioner Burckhardt*

DANZIG, December 10, 1938.

MR. HIGH COMMISSIONER: I have the honor to reply to your letter No. 21/35/II C of December 3, 1938, regarding the ordinances of October 10, November 2, and November 21, 1938, and to state that I am glad to give you every clarification that you desire. I must state at the outset, however, that my Government does not perceive any manifest conflict between the Constitution and the ordinances. I therefore have to refer to the misgivings that you expressed to me orally.

If it is asserted that there is a conflict between the ordinances and the Constitution, I should like to state that an amendment of the Constitution was certainly not intentional in this case, and that no *laws* are involved that constitute a deliberate violation of the Constitution; these are rather ordinances that were issued on the basis of the Enabling Act of June 24, 1933, and May 5, 1937, and which may at any time be repealed by the Volkstag within 3 months if the Volkstag considers it advisable (section 3 of the Enabling Act). The Volkstag,

<sup>\*</sup> A version of this letter in final draft and signed by Greiser has been found in the files of the Consulate General at Danzig (7248/E532025-30). It has the following handwritten note: "Minor changes made by agreement with the High Commissioner and delivered on Jan. 11, 1939. B[öttcher], Jan. 11, 1939." For the changes see footnotes 5 and 6.



moreover, consists, except for two Polish deputies, only of deputies of the National Socialist Party, that is, the party that supports the Government, and there is no doubt that the ordinances would at any time be approved by far more than a two-thirds majority of the Volkstag, and that if the Council of the League of Nations should construe them as an amendment of the Constitution, the Volkstag's approval of the laws could then be obtained. Such clear-cut, definitive formulations in the form of laws have thus far not been made, however.

As far as the individual ordinances are concerned, the ordinance regarding the Security Service might perhaps, as I have been told, be construed as a violation of article 5 of the Constitution.<sup>4</sup> The ordinance regarding the Security Service has nothing to do with military matters, however. On the contrary, this ordinance was issued for the following reasons:

Several years ago the police training school in Danzig was closed and the Civilian Guard is now practically nonexistent. Also, the regional police were abolished 3 years ago. The police force is over-aged, and young volunteers are not obtainable for the Danzig security police, particularly since many young Danzig people are going to Germany, where they find easier and better-paying jobs than in Danzig. The same situation is to be observed in the professions. There are no more young engineers and physicians entering on practice of their professions in Danzig today, since many of them, too, are being absorbed by Germany.

The ordinance regarding the Security Service was issued in order to guard against over-aging in the security police. By April 1, 1939, about 400 Danzig young men are to be inducted and given about 2 years of training, after which those who show fitness will be taken over into the police service. The possibility of 2- to 3-day exercises has been introduced for the sole purpose of providing a small substitute for the former Civilian Guard.

The ordinance regarding the Security Service thus has no military purpose of any kind, but purely a police purpose, as will be evident from the limited way in which it is applied.

In the case of the ordinance covering officials, two provisions are supposed to conflict with the Constitution to some extent: First, there is the so-called Aryan paragraph. This provision does not create a new law, but through the ordinance gives legal status, also for the future, to a feeling that is already deeply rooted in the consciousness of the people of Germany and Danzig. The ordinance does not harm anyone at all either retroactively or at the present time.

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<sup>4</sup>Article 5 of the Constitution: "The Free City of Danzig cannot, without the previous consent of the League of Nations, in each case: (1) Serve as a military or naval base. (2) Erect fortifications. (3) Authorize the manufacture of munitions or war material on its territory."

There is no non-Aryan official in Danzig. Thus a condition that already actually obtains is sanctioned by an ordinance.<sup>5</sup>

I have also been told that certain groups take offense at the fact that in various places in this ordinance the state and its National Socialist leadership are spoken of, and that section 4 provides for an oath to be taken by officials to "the Free City of Danzig and its National Socialist leadership." In this, too, I can perceive no unconstitutionality. Evidently it was inferred from the paragraphs in question that the officials are obligated to render obedience to the National Socialist Party or that purely Party organs may interfere in the government or the administration of the state or issue orders. This is not correct, because the words quoted mean nothing more than that the state has a National Socialist leadership, that its senators therefore, and thus its government, are National Socialist. It is precisely in a National Socialist state, however, that private persons or party organs are not permitted to arrogate to themselves *direct* governmental powers.

Also, with respect to the ordinance of November 21, 1938, for the protection of German blood and the German way of life, I cannot see in what way it is manifestly unconstitutional. It, too, expresses a feeling, long and deeply ingrained in the people, that even before the Great War was taken as a matter of course by large classes of the German population. It is also difficult to grasp how anyone could be injured by this ordinance. It expresses the feeling of the great mass of the people and formalizes a law heretofore sanctioned by usage.<sup>6</sup>

I am sure that every Volkstag—both present and future—will beyond all doubt give the ordinances you mentioned its almost unanimous approval. I am, moreover, prepared at all times to obtain this sanction by the Volkstag.

I hope that I have succeeded in my statements in clarifying any discrepancies arising between the ordinances and the Constitution. Accept, Mr. High Commissioner, the assurances of my highest consideration.

GREISER

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<sup>5</sup> In the version of the letter referred to in footnote 3 this paragraph has an additional sentence which reads: "Moreover, there is no mention in the Constitution of the idea of, nor of protection for, race."

<sup>6</sup> In the version of the letter referred to in footnote 3 this paragraph has the following additional passage: "Moreover, as already stated above, the Constitution does not acknowledge the idea of race at all, and therefore does not anywhere protect a race as such. Further, it is hardly possible to construe a conflict with article 73 of the Constitution. Then, for example, persons with mental or physical defects would have to be admitted to all state positions, which is certainly not the case in any civilized state."

Article 73 of Danzig's Constitution reads in part as follows: "All nationals of the Free City shall be equal before the law. Exceptional laws shall be inadmissible. . . . There shall be no legal privileges or disqualifications due to birth, position or creed."

## APPENDICES



## Appendix I

### ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY<sup>1</sup>

#### THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Constantin, Freiherr von Neurath—June 2, 1932–February 4, 1938

Joachim von Ribbentrop—February 4, 1938–1945

#### The Foreign Minister's Secretariat:

Senior Counselor Hans Ulrich von Kotze (under Neurath)

Counselor Erich Kordt (under Ribbentrop)

*Attached:* Minister Paul Otto Schmidt from January 1939

#### Personal Staff of the Foreign Minister:

Counselor Walther Hewel (Personal Representative of the Foreign Minister with the Führer)—from June 1938

*Attached:* Counselor Paul Karl Schmidt—from February 1938

#### THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Hans Georg von Mackensen—April 15, 1937–March 31, 1938

Ernst, Freiherr von Weizsäcker—April 1, 1938–April 1943

#### Secretariat of the State Secretary:

Counselor Herbert Siegfried

#### THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

State Secretary Ernst Wilhelm Bohle

#### STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

Wilhelm Keppler—from March 1938

#### PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Director: Minister Vicco von Bülow-Schwante—1933–June 1938

Minister Alexander, Freiherr von Dörnberg—from July 1938

#### *Special Party Section—from December 1938*

Counselor Martin Luther

#### *Special Section for German Internal Affairs (Referat Deutschland)*

Minister Vicco von Bülow-Schwante—1933–June 1938

Counselor Walther Hinrichs—1938–1939

<sup>1</sup> This table of organization and officials of the German Foreign Ministry is a summary by the editors of longer tables taken from the files of the Ministry and published in previous volumes. The full tables dated within the period covered by this volume may be found in vol. I (December 1, 1937), vol. II (June 1, 1938), and vol. IV (February 15, 1939).

## PERSONNEL AND BUDGET DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director: Ministerialdirektor Curt Prüfer

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Carl Dienstmann

## POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director: Ministerialdirektor Ernst, Freiherr von Weizsäcker—August 1936–March 1938

Under State Secretary Dr. Ernst Woermann—April 1938–April 1943

Deputy Director: Minister Otto Christian, Prince von Bismarck

## Political Divisions:

- I League of Nations, military questions, etc.: Senior Counselor von Kamp-hoevenier.
- II Western Europe: Senior Counselor Emil von Rintelen
- IIIa Spain, Portugal: Counselor Schwendemann
- IIIb Vatican: Counselor Haidlen
- IV Southeast Europe (including Italy): Senior Counselor Curt Heinburg  
In 1938 Pol. IVb, Austria (liquidation) and Czechoslovakia, was formed as a separate division under Counselor Günther Altenburg
- V Eastern Europe (Poland, Danzig, Soviet Union): Senior Counselor Martin Schliep
- VI Scandinavia and Baltic states: Senior Counselor Werner von Grundherr
- VII Near and Middle East: Senior Counselor Otto von Hentig
- VIII Far East and Australia: Senior Counselor Werner von Schmieden—to July 1938  
Counselor Knoll—from February 1939
- IX America: Senior Counselor Freytag
- X Africa: Senior Counselor Gustav Stroh—1937–1938  
Counselor Harald Biefeld—from December 1938

## ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (W)

Director: Ministerialdirektor Emil Wiehl

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor (Minister from December 1938) Carl Clodius

## LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

Director: Ministerialdirektor Friedrich Gaus

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Erich Albrecht

## CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director: Ministerialdirektor Friedrich Stieve

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Fritz von Twardowski

## INFORMATION AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Director: Minister Gottfried Aschmann

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Wolf—to 1938

Counselor Dr. Paul Karl Schmidt (Special Assistant to Foreign Minister)—from 1938

## Appendix II

### LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. The documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, and each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (\*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where a recheck of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
26	Pol. VI: Northern Europe—Military Affairs.
28	German Legation in Czechoslovakia: Secret Papers—Telegrams to and from the Foreign Ministry and other authorities.
33	Director Political Department: [Files on Visits of Foreign Statesmen].
52	State Secretary: Poland.
54	State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Non-Diplomatic Personages.
72	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Ibero-America; Racial Laws; Palestine; Propaganda.*
73	State Secretary: Hungary.
74	German Embassy at the Vatican: Secret Papers.
90	Reich Foreign Minister: Palestine; Panama.*
96	State Secretary: Turkey.
97	State Secretary: Danzig.
102	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Canada; Colombia; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg.*
115	Reich Foreign Minister: Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Latvia; Luxembourg; Memel; Austria.*
116	Reich Foreign Minister: Africa; Albania; Danzig; Estonia; Croatia.*
119	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Yugoslavia; Italy.*
122	State Secretary: Memel.
140	State Secretary: Czechoslovakia.
141	State Secretary: Belgium.
147	Reich Foreign Minister: Poland; Conflict with Poland; Poland-Danzig.*

*Film Serial  
Numbers**Title of File*

- 167 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the U. S. S. R. with Other States (Except Documents in Separate Files) and Political Relations Between Other States.
- 169 State Secretary: Rumania.
- 183 State Secretary: Switzerland.
- 200 Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Uruguay.
- 223 State Secretary: Austria.
- 231 Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Brazil.
- 235 State Secretary: Brazil.
- 236 Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Chile.
- 241 State Secretary: Polish-Lithuanian Border Incident.
- 257 Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Argentina; Paraguay; Mexico; Central America; Peru.\*
- 263 Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Brazil; Bolivia; Chile.\*
- 315 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: [Miscellaneous Papers, 1938.]
- 328 State Secretary: Luxembourg.
- 334 Under State Secretary: Czechoslovakia, vol. 4.
- 348 State Secretary: Visit of Italian Foreign Minister Ciano to Berlin, 1936; Material for Führer's Visit to Rome, 1938; Visit of the Führer to Rome, 1938.\*
- 376 Under State Secretary: Czechoslovakia, vol. 7.
- 379 Under State Secretary: Czechoslovakia, vol. 6.
- 381 State Secretary: Correspondence of the State Secretary on Political Matters, vols. 1 and 2 (1936-1937).
- 383 Under State Secretary: Czechoslovakia, vol. 5.
- 395 State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vols. 1 and 2 (1936-1937).
- 429 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of the Soviet Union with the Northern States—Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark; Åland Question, Finnish Islands.
- 438 State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service, vol. 3 (1938).
- 440 State Secretary: Correspondence of the State Secretary on Political Matters, vol. 4 (1938).
- 441 German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Political Relations of Germany with the Northern States—Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark.
- 442 State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service, vol. 4 (1938).
- 472 State Secretary: Political Correspondence of the State Secretary with Officials of the Foreign Service, vol. 6 (1939).
- 485 State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 6 (1939).
- 504 *Pol. IV*: Yugoslavia—Foreign Policy, General.
- 509 *Pol. IV*: Political Relations of Yugoslavia with Germany.
- 511 *Pol. IV*: Yugoslavia—Political Relations of the Specified Country with Germany—Exchanges of Visits by Statesmen.
- 631 *Pol. II*: Political Relations of France with Poland.
- 718 State Secretary: Memoranda on Visits of Diplomats, vol. 4 (1938).
- 723 Referat Partei (Inland I): Western Europe, Political Affairs.
- 878 *Pol. Geheim*: Poland—Political Affairs, vol. 7.
- 879 *Pol. Geheim*: Poland—Political Affairs, vol. 8.
- 906 Under State Secretary: Stoyadinovich Visit.
- 920 Inland II g: German-Brazilian Police Treaties.



<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
969	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Austria.
1097	<i>Pol. VIII</i> : Anti-Comintern Pacts.
1125	Under State Secretary: Jewish Question.
1143	<i>Pol. II</i> : Political Relations of Belgium with Germany, vol. 2.
1144	<i>Pol. II</i> : Political Relations of Belgium with Germany, vol. 3.
1145	<i>Pol. II</i> : Political Relations of Belgium with Germany, vol. 4.
1170	<i>Pol. II</i> : Belgium—Foreign Policy, General.
1173	Inland II A/B: Formation of a South American Anti-Bolshevist Axis (Brazil, Argentina, Chile).
1190	<i>Pol. II</i> : Political Relations of the Netherlands with Germany.
1204	<i>Pol. II</i> : Liechtenstein.
1209	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Yugoslavia—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
1212	<i>Pol. II</i> : Belgium—Military Affairs.
1213	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Political Relations of Yugoslavia with Hungary.
1224	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Political Relations of Yugoslavia with Rumania.
1244	<i>Pol. II</i> : Belgium—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
1251	<i>Pol. II</i> : Eupen—Malmédy.
1256	<i>Pol. V</i> : Political Relations of Poland with Russia.
1339	<i>Pol. V</i> : Political Relations of Poland with Czechoslovakia, vol. 1.
1340	<i>Pol. V</i> : Political Relations of Poland with Czechoslovakia, vol. 2.
1346	<i>Pol. V</i> : Political Relations of Poland with Hungary.
1444	German Legation in Belgium: Secret Papers.
1486	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Italy—Foreign Policy, General.
1494	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Poland; Rumania; Russia; Switzerland.*
1495	Under State Secretary: Palestine Question. Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Palestine, Haavara, Jews.*
1518	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Italy—Mussolini's Visit to Germany in September 1937.
1520	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Palestine—Jewish Question.
1522	Reich Chancellery: Poland.
1526	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Plan for Partition of Palestine and Views of Other Countries, vol. 1.
1541	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Plan for Partition of Palestine and Views of Other Countries, vol. 3.
1542	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Political Relations of Palestine with Germany.
1546	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Political Relations of Italy with Yugoslavia.
1550	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Political Relations of Italy with Hungary.
1554	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Palestine—German Communities Abroad.
1578	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Baltic States—Welfare Activities.
1586	<i>Pol. Geheim</i> : France—Political Affairs.
1593	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Political Relations of Turkey with Germany.
1595	<i>Pol. II</i> : Political Relations of Great Britain with Germany.
1597	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Baltic Entente.
1605	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Political Relations of Saudi Arabia with Germany.
1626	<i>Pol. VII</i> : Arabia.
1647	State Secretary: International Commission for the Cession of Sudeten- German Territory.
1650	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Political Relations of Rumania with Russia.
1661	<i>Pol. Geheim</i> : Special File on Poland.
1675	<i>Pol. V</i> : Danzig—Foreign Policy, General; Political Relations with Ger- many;—with Other States.*
1724	<i>Pol. V</i> : Political Relations of Danzig with Poland.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
1728	<i>Pol. V: Danzig Shipyard.</i>
1729	<i>Pol. V: High Commissioner in Danzig.</i>
1730	<i>Pol. V: Political Relations of Danzig with England.</i>
1766	<i>Pol. VI: Political Relations of Denmark with Germany, vol. 1.</i>
1776	<i>Pol. V: Political Relations of Poland with Rumania.</i>
1785	<i>Pol. V: Exchanges of Visits by German and Polish Statesmen.</i>
1792	<i>Pol. V: Political Relations with Poland—Joint Declarations on Minorities, vol. 1.</i>
1798	<i>Pol. IV: Political Relations of Austria with Germany.</i>
1818	<i>Pol. V: Political Relations of Poland with Germany, vols. 7-11.</i>
1823	<i>Pol. V: Political Relations of Poland with Germany, vols. 1-6.</i>
1833	<i>Pol. IV: International Political Problems—Dardanelles Question.</i>
1834	<i>Pol. V: Political Relations with Poland—Joint Declarations on Minorities, vol. 2.</i>
1836	<i>Pol. V: Political Relations with Poland—Joint Declarations on Minorities, vol. 3.</i>
1847	<i>Pol. IV: Hungary—Internal Politics; Political Relations with Germany; Foreign Policy, General.*</i>
1850	<i>Pol. VI: Political Relations of Latvia with Germany.</i>
1858	<i>Pol. VI: Political Relations of Finland with Germany.</i>
1861	<i>Inland II g: Führer Directive of July 2, 1938 Concerning Responsibility in the Party for German Minorities Questions.</i>
1863	<i>Pol. IV: Political Relations of Czechoslovakia with Hungary.</i>
1881	<i>Pol. IV: Hungary—Jewish Question; National Socialism; Internal Politics.*</i>
1890	<i>Pol. VI: Political Relations of Lithuania with Germany, vol. 1.</i>
1895	<i>Pol. IV: International Political Problems—The Little Entente.</i>
1910	<i>Pol. VI: Åland, vol. 1.</i>
1930	<i>Pol. VI: Political Relations of Lithuania with Germany, vol. 2.</i>
1932	<i>German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Secret instructions of the [German] Foreign Ministry.</i>
1933	<i>Pol. IV: Political Relations of Rumania with Germany, vol. 1.</i>
1945	<i>Pol. IV: Political Relations of Rumania with Germany, vol. 2.</i>
1975	<i>Pol. IV: Political Relations of Rumania with Hungary.</i>
1988	<i>Pol. IV: Rumania—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.</i>
1998	<i>Pol. V: Poland—Foreign Policy, General.</i>
2003	<i>Pol. IV: Slovakia—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.</i>
2025	<i>Pol. II: Political Relations of Switzerland with Germany.</i>
2029	<i>Inland II A/B: Founding of a Palestine State.</i>
2040	<i>Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Poland.</i>
2043	<i>Pol. IV: Political Relations of Czechoslovakia with Hungary.</i>
2061	<i>Pol. VI: Political Relations of Lithuania with Poland, vol. 1.</i>
2069	<i>Pol. VI: Political Relations of Lithuania with Poland, vol. 2.</i>
2084	<i>Pol. IX: Political Relations of Argentina with Germany.</i>
2104	<i>Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Rumania, vol. 2.</i>
2128	<i>German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers (1937).</i>
2129	<i>German Embassy in Italy: Secret Papers (1938).</i>
2134	<i>Supplementary to 395, 485, 718.</i>
2162	<i>Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Yugoslavia.</i>
2168	<i>Inland II g: Secret Papers of Kult. B. and Referat Deutschland IX.</i>
2175	<i>Under State Secretary: Belgium—Declaration [Neutrality Guarantee].</i>
2181	<i>Supplementary to 906.</i>
2183	<i>Pol. IV: Political Relations of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia.</i>

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
2185	State Secretary: Memoranda on Internal Directives, Views of Specific Questions, Telephone Conversations, etc.
2196	Supplementary to 438, 442, and 472.
2206	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Peru.
2228	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Bulgaria.
2261	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Rumania.
2292	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Mexico.
2321	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Yugoslavia.
2334	Inland II g: Secret Papers of Kult A.
2336	<i>Pol. IX</i> : Political Relations of Uruguay with Germany.
2348	Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Congresses and Meetings (Discussions on German Groups in Latin America).
2349	Reich Chancellery: Croatia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg.
2351	<i>Pol. IX</i> : Political Relations of Mexico with Germany.
2369	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Czechoslovakia—Racial Question, Nationality Question, Minorities.
2385	<i>Pol. V</i> : Poland—Jewish Questions.
2396	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Carpatho-Ukraine.
2435	Supplementary to 2104.
2446	Supplementary to 2334.
2448	Supplementary to 2261.
2465	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Memel Territory—Internal Politics; Propaganda; Annual Political Surveys.*
2470	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Political Relations of Lithuania with Germany;—of Lithuania with Memel; Internal Politics; Jewish Question.*
2471	<i>Pol. IV</i> : Bulgaria—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
2479	Supplementary to 509.
2480	Supplementary to 1224.
2499	Inland II D: Denmark, North Schleswig, Re-settlement Plan, Credit.
2524	Supplementary to 1945.
2525	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Hungary.
2528	Supplementary to 2185.
2530	Inland II g: Secret Papers.
2534	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Political Relations of the Memel Territory with Germany; vol. 1.
2547	<i>Pol. V</i> : Poland—Press Organs.
2596	Supplementary to 1522.
2600	<i>Pol. II</i> : Switzerland—National Socialism, Fascism, and Similar Movements.
2601	<i>Pol. II</i> : Switzerland—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
2602	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Political Relations of Denmark with Germany, vol. 2.
2604	Reich Chancellery: Baltic States.
2608	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Åland, vol. 2.
2609	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Åland, vol. 3.
2619	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Political Relations of Sweden with Germany.
2621	<i>Pol. IX</i> : Political Relations of Brazil with Germany.
2630	Inland II D: Denmark and North Schleswig—Questions of Land Ownership, Industry and Economic Questions.
2636	<i>Pol. IX</i> : Political Relations of Chile with Germany.
2642	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Schleswig—German Minority.
2643	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Schleswig—Press Organs.
2653	Supplementary to 1766.
2669	Inland II D: "Excelsior" A. G.: Cover Measures for Volksgruppe Communications with the Foreign Ministry; Medals and decorations.*

*Film Serial  
Numbers**Title of File*

- 2677 *Pol. VI: Denmark—Racial Question, Nationality Question, Minorities.*  
 2679 *Pol. VI: The German Element in the Northern States.*  
 2725 Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Turkey.  
 2726 Supplementary to 96.  
 2768 Supplementary to 1766, 2602, 2653.  
 2789 German Embassy in Turkey: Military, Naval, Air Matters.  
 2871 Political Department: Treaties, 1936-1944.  
 2883 *Pol. IV: International Political Problems—The Revisionist Question.*  
 2887 *Pol. VI: Northern Europe—Neutrality Questions.*  
 2906 German Embassy in Poland: Secret Papers.  
 2959 Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Jewish Question.  
 3023 Supplementary to 2334, 2446.  
 3037 Reich Chancellery: Hungary, vol. 2.  
 3039 *Pol. IV: International Political Problems—The Balkans, vol. 2.*  
 3046 Head of the Auslandsorganisation: Hungary.  
 3062 Supplementary to 485, 2134.  
 3122 German Missions in Belgrade, Bern, The Hague, Copenhagen, Kaunas, Riga, Stockholm, and Warsaw:\* [Files relating to Czechoslovakia, especially the taking over of Czech missions abroad.]  
 3150 Supplementary to 2084.  
 3155 Supplementary to 1546, 1550.  
 3325 Supplementary to 1244.  
 3326 *Pol. II: Belgium—Foreign Policy, General.*  
 3403 *Pol. IV: International Political Problems—The Balkans, vol. 1.*  
 3409 *Pol. IV: Rumania—Ministries.*  
 3410 Supplementary to 1988.  
 3412 *Pol. IV: Political Relations of Hungary with Germany (Supplementary to 1847).*  
 3420 *Pol. IV: Political Relations of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia.*  
 3435 Supplementary to 1881.  
 3495 Supplementary to 1593.  
 3496 Supplementary to 1542.  
 3514 German Legation in Sweden: Sweden 1937-1939.  
 3558 *Pol. VI: Political Relations of Finland with the Soviet Union.*  
 3561 Supplementary to 1833.  
 3568 *Pol. IV: Yugoslavia—Stoyadinovich Visit, January 1938.*  
 3626 German Legation in Hungary: Secret Papers (1937-1939).  
 3658 *Pol. VI: Political Relations of the Memel Territory with Germany, vol. 2.*  
 3667 Supplementary to 2679.  
 3684 Supplementary to 2619.  
 3696 *Pol. VI: Sweden—Foreign Policy, General.*  
 3726 Supplementary to 2534.  
 3767 German Legation in Bulgaria: Secret Papers—Arms Deliveries.  
 3774 German Legation in Bulgaria: Secret Papers.  
 3823 Supplementary to 2600.  
 3825 Supplementary to 2025.  
 3828 Supplementary to 2621.  
 3832 Supplementary to 2601.  
 3873 Supplementary to 1251.  
 3890 German Embassy in Turkey: Auslandsorganisation.  
 3945 Supplementary to 2292.  
 4008 German Embassy in Poland: German Foreign Policy.  
 4470 Supplementary to 1251, 3873.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
4471	Supplementary to 328.
4473	Under State Secretary: Switzerland.
4487	Supplementary to 2534, 3658, 3726.
4488	Supplementary to 1890, 1930, 2470.
5163	Economic Policy Department: Treaties with Turkey.
5482	Göring Personal Staff [ <i>Stabsamt</i> ]: Reports on Foreign Countries (1933-1939).
5555	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers—Trade in War Matériel, Rumania.
5558	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers—Trade in War Matériel, Bulgaria.
5570	Economic Policy Department: Secret Papers—Trade in War Matériel, Yugoslavia.
5749	Economic Policy Department, IX a: Petroleum—Mexico.
5804	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Finland.
5953	Supplementary to 1766, 2653, 2768.
6216	Supplementary to 1998.
6226	<i>Pol. V</i> : Relations of Danzig with the League of Nations.
6237	<i>Pol. V</i> : Political Relations with Poland, Joint Declarations on Minorities, vol. 2.
6249	German Embassy in Poland: German Representations About the Polish Press, etc.
6321	Supplementary to 1204.
6367	Supplementary to 1522, 1675, 2596.
6381	German Embassy in Italy: Political Relations of Italy with Poland.
6382	Legal Department, V: Expulsion of Polish Jews, Passport Control.
6469	Supplementary to 2336.
6545	<i>Pol. IX</i> : International Political Problems—Pan-America, vol. 5.
6590	Supplementary to 2034.
6595	<i>Pol. IX</i> : Argentina—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
6635	Supplementary to 718, 2134.
6636	Supplementary to 1945, 2524.
6637	Supplementary to 1988, 3410.
6638	Supplementary to 1847, 3412.
6639	Supplementary to 1881.
6640	Economic Policy Department: Treaties with Bulgaria.
6641	German Legation in Greece: Sudeten Germans.
6642	Supplementary to 3626.
6643	German Legation in Rumania: Political Relations of Rumania with Germany.
6644	German Legation in Rumania: German Press Representatives in Rumania.
6646	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Rumania, vol. 1.
6669	Economic Policy Department, IV b: Rumania—Trade Treaty Relations with Germany.
6705	Supplementary to 3658, 4487.
6706	Supplementary to 2061.
6707	Supplementary to 2465.
6708	<i>Pol. VI</i> : Memel—Incidents Involving Ships in the East Prussian Service.
6711	<i>Pol. I</i> : League of Nations—Scandinavia.
6712	Press Department: Serial File, 1938.
6716	Supplementary to 1910.
6793	Supplementary to 1766, 2653, 2768, 5953.
6794	Supplementary to 2608.

*Film Serial  
Numbers**Title of File*

- 6808 *Pol. IV: International Political Problems—Western Pact, Five Power Conference.*
- 6809 German Legation in Luxembourg: Reports.
- 6810 German Legation in the Netherlands: Annual Reports, Situation Reports on the Netherlands.
- 6811 German Embassy in Italy: Belgium's Policy.
- 6853 Supplementary to 3403.
- 6854 Supplementary to 2725.
- 6855 Supplementary to 3890.
- 6857 Press Department: The Press in Switzerland.
- 6858 Supplementary to 2025, 3825.
- 6859 German Legation in Switzerland: Swiss National Socialism and Front Movements.
- 6860 German Legation in Switzerland: Swiss Press, General.
- 6861 German Legation in Switzerland: Anti-German Agitation, Atrocity Propaganda, vol. 2.
- 6862 German Legation in Switzerland: Anti-German Agitation, Atrocity Propaganda, vol. 3.
- 6901 Supplementary to 2621.
- 6902 Supplementary to 2636.
- 6903 *Pol. IX: Ibero-America—Political Relations of Central and South American States with Germany.*
- 6904 Supplementary to 2351.
- 6905 *Pol. IX: International Political Problems—Pan-America, vol. 4.*
- 6906 German Embassy in Italy: Chile's Policy.
- 6907 Inland II A/B: Anti-Comintern.
- 6939 *Pol. IX: Brazil—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.*
- 6966 Supplementary to 2621, 3828.
- 6967 Supplementary to 2084, 3150.
- 6971 *Pol. IX: Political Relations of the United States with Germany.*
- 7024 Legal Department, V: Passport Control, Passport Relations in and with Austria.
- 7025 Legal Department, V: Questions Involving Jews and Refugees.
- 7026 Supplementary to 1792.
- 7028 German Legation in Denmark: Scandinavia (1938).
- 7029 Supplementary to 1724.
- 7031 *Pol. V: Danzig—Jewish Questions.*
- 7032 *Pol. V: Danzig—Legal Aspects.*
- 7033 *Pol. V: Danzig—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.*
- 7051 Inland II A/B: Jewish Emigration.
- 7052 Special Economic Section: Palestine, 1932-1934.
- 7054 Economic Policy Department: Trade in War Matériel, General.
- 7055 Inland II A/B: Jewish Emigration—General (Palestine State).
- 7057 Supplementary to 1605.
- 7058 Supplementary to 1541.
- 7059 Supplementary to 1542, 3496.
- 7060 Supplementary to 1554.
- 7061 Supplementary to 1526.
- 7062 Economic Policy Department, II b: Financial Institutions.
- 7182 Economic Policy Department, IV b: Trade—Rumania.
- 7248 German Consulate General at Danzig: Miscellaneous Secret Papers. F2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19: German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

## Appendix III

### LIST OF PERSONS <sup>1</sup>

- ANTONESCU**, Victor, member of the Rumanian National Liberal Party; Foreign Minister, September 1936–December 1937.
- ARANHA**, Oswaldo, Brazilian Ambassador in the United States, 1934–1938; Foreign Minister, March 1938–1944.
- ARAS**, Tewfik Rustu, Turkish Foreign Minister, 1925–November 1938; Ambassador in Great Britain, 1939–1942.
- ARPAĞ**, Hamdi, Turkish Ambassador in Germany, 1934–1939.
- ASCHMANN**, Gottfried, Minister, Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1933–1939.
- ATTOLICO**, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador in Germany, 1935–1940.
- AVENOL**, Joseph, French diplomat, Secretary General of the League of Nations, 1933–1940.
- BÁRDOSY**, Ladislas de, Hungarian Minister in Rumania, 1935–1940.
- BECH**, Joseph, Luxembourg Minister of State, President of Government, and Foreign Minister, 1926–1937; Foreign Minister since November 5, 1937; (in London and Montreal, May 1940–September 1944).
- BECK**, Jozef, Polish Foreign Minister, November 1932–September 1939.
- BENEŠ**, Eduard, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, December 18, 1935–October 5, 1938.
- BIBRA**, Sigismund, Freiherr von, Counselor of the German Legation in Switzerland, 1936–1943; leader of the NSDAP Landesgruppe in Switzerland.
- BISMARCK**, Otto Christian, Prince von, Counselor of the German Embassy in Great Britain, 1928–1936; Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, 1936–1940.
- BLOMBERG**, Werner von, Field Marshal, German War Minister and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, 1935–February 4, 1938.
- BOHLE**, Ernst Wilhelm, Gauleiter and Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the Nazi Party, 1933–1945; also State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, 1937–1941.
- BOSSY**, Raoul, Rumanian Minister in Hungary, 1936–1939.
- BÖTTCHER**, Viktor, Staatsrat, Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Danzig Senate.
- BRATIANU**, George, Rumanian politician, leader of a National Liberal Party opposition group, 1930–1939.
- BURCKHARDT**, Carl J., League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, February 18, 1937–September 1, 1939.
- CAROL II**, King of Rumania, 1930–1940.
- CHAMBERLAIN**, Neville, British Conservative M. P., 1918–1940; leader of the Conservative Party; Prime Minister, May 1937–May 1940.
- CHODACKI**, Marjan, Polish diplomatic representative in Danzig, 1937–1939.

<sup>1</sup> The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister, 1936-1943.
- CINCAR-MARKOVICH, Aleksander, Yugoslav Minister in Germany, December 1935-February 1939; Foreign Minister, February 1939-March 1941.
- CLODIUS, Carl, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937-1943.
- COMNEN. See PETRESCU-COMNEN.
- CSÁKY, Count István, *chef de cabinet* to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1936-1938; Foreign Minister from December 1938 until his death January 27, 1941.
- DARÁNYI, Kálmán, Hungarian Minister President and Minister of Agriculture, October 1936-May 1938; President of the House of Deputies from December 1938 until his death November 1, 1939.
- DAVIGNON, Vicomte Jacques, Belgian Minister in Germany, April 30, 1936; Ambassador, November 21, 1938-May 10, 1940.
- DIRKSEN, Herbert von, German Ambassador in Japan, December 1933-February 1938, and in Great Britain, May 1938-September 1939.
- DÖHLE, W., German Consul General in Jerusalem, 1935-1939.
- DRAGANOV, Parvan, Bulgarian Minister in Germany, April 22, 1938-1942.
- EDEN, Anthony, British Conservative M. P. since 1923; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, December 1935-February 1938.
- EISENLOHR, Ernst, German Minister in Czechoslovakia, February 1936; ordered to Berlin for consultation c. September 16, 1938; head of economic commission dealing with problems arising from the dissolution of the Czechoslovak State, 1939-1940.
- ERDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary, May 1937-July 1941.
- FABRICIUS, Wilhelm, German Minister in Rumania, April 1936-January 1941.
- FORSTER, Albert, Gauleiter of the NSDAP for Danzig, 1930-1939; after the conquest of Poland, Gauleiter and Reich Governor of Danzig-West Prussia.
- FROHWEIN, Hans, German Minister in Estonia, 1936-1940.
- FUNK, Walter, German Minister of Economics, November 1937-May 1945; President of the Reichsbank, January 1939-May 1945.
- GAFENCU, Grigore, Rumanian newspaper editor, politician; Foreign Minister, December 1938-June 1940.
- GAUS, Friedrich, Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1923-1943.
- GÖRING, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag, 1932-1945; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air, 1933-1945; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, 1935-1945; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945.
- GOGA, Octavian, Minister President of Rumania, December 29, 1937-February 10, 1938; died May 7, 1938.
- GREISER, Arthur Karl, National Socialist President of the Danzig Senate and Senator in charge of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Senate, November 1934-September 1939.
- GROBBA, Fritz, German Minister in Iraq, December 1932-September 1939; accredited also to Saudi Arabia, February 1939.
- GRUNDEHR, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI in the German Foreign Ministry, 1936-1945.
- HALFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Conservative Party leader; Lord Privy Seal, 1935-1937; Lord President of the Council, 1937-1938; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1938-December 1940.
- HAUSHOFER, Karl, Professor of Geography at Munich University, retired Major General; President of Society for Geopolitics; publisher of the periodical *Die Geopolitik*.



- HEEREN, Viktor von, German Minister in Yugoslavia, 1933-1941.
- HENTIG, Georg Werner Otto, German Consul General at Amsterdam, 1936-July 1937; Head of Political Division VII, July 1937-1939.
- HEWEL, Walther, personal representative of the Foreign Minister with the Führer, 1938-1945.
- HODŽA, Milan, Minister President of Czechoslovakia, November 6, 1935-September 22, 1938; member of the Agrarian Party.
- HOLSTI, Rudolf, Finnish Foreign Minister, 1919-1922, October 1936-November 1938; Minister in Switzerland and Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, 1927-1936, December 1938-1940.
- HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA, Miklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary, 1920-1944.
- AL-HUSAYNI, Haj Amin, Mufti of Jerusalem since 1921; President of the Supreme Moslem Council of Palestine from 1922 to 1936, when he was removed by the British for seditious activity; President of the Arab Higher Committee since its formation in April 1936.
- IMREÉDY, Béla, Hungarian Minister President, May 1938-February 1939.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, General, Turkish Minister President, 1923-1924, 1925-October 25, 1937; President of the Republic, November 11, 1938-1950.
- JANSON, Martin von, German Consul General at Danzig, June 1938-September 1939.
- KÁNYA, Kálmán, Hungarian Foreign Minister, 1933-November 1938.
- KEITEL, Wilhelm, German General, Chief of the Wehrmachtsamt in the Reich War Ministry, 1935-1938; Chief of the OKW, 1938-1945.
- KELLER, August Friedrich Wilhelm von, German Ambassador in Turkey, October 1935-November 1938.
- KIOSSEIVANOV, Georgi, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, April-November 1935; Minister President and Foreign Minister, 1935-1940.
- KOCH, Erich, Gauleiter of the NSDAP for East Prussia, 1928-1945.
- KÖCHER, Otto Carl Albrecht, German Minister in Switzerland, 1937-1945.
- KÖRNER, Paul, State Secretary and permanent deputy to Göring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, 1936-1945.
- KORDT, Erich, Counselor of Legation in the German Embassy in Great Britain, November 1936-February 1938; Foreign Minister's Secretariat, March 1938-February 1941.
- KOTZE, Hans Ulrich von, member of Foreign Minister von Neurath's Secretariat; German Minister in Latvia, December 1938-1940.
- KRAUEL, Wolfgang, German Consul General at Geneva, 1932-1943.
- KROFTA, Kamil, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, March 1936-October 4, 1938.
- KROLL, Hans Anton, Counselor of the German Embassy in Turkey, July 1936-April 1943.
- LAMMERS, Hans, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1934-1945, with rank of State Secretary, 1934-1937, and Reich Minister, 1937-1945; member and Executive Secretary of the Secret Cabinet Council, 1938-1945.
- LIPSKI, Josef, Polish Ambassador in Germany, November 15, 1934-September 1, 1939.
- LITVINOV, Maxim Maximovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 1930-1939.
- LOHSE, Heinrich, Gauleiter of the NSDAP for Schleswig-Holstein, 1925-1945; Oberpräsident of Schleswig-Holstein, 1933-1945; President of the Nordic Society.
- LORENZ, Werner, SS-Obergruppenführer, Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, 1937-1945; NSDAP representative for foreign policy questions on the staff of the Führer's Deputy; member of the Reichstag.

- LOZORAITIS, Stasys, Lithuanian Foreign Minister, June 13, 1934–December 5, 1938.
- MACKENSEN, Hans Georg von, German Minister in Hungary, 1933–1937; State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, April 1937–March 1938; Ambassador in Italy, April 1938–September 1943.
- MAGISTRATI, Count Massimo, First Secretary of the Italian Embassy in Germany, 1934; Counselor, 1936–1940.
- MENEMENCIOGLU, Numan Rifaat, Ambassador, Under State Secretary in the Turkish Foreign Ministry until 1937; Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, 1937–1942.
- METAXAS, John, General, Greek Minister President, April 13, 1936; also Foreign Minister and Minister of War, Navy, and Air by *coup* of August 4, 1936, until his death January 29, 1941.
- MOLTKE, Hans Adolf von, German Minister in Poland, 1931; Ambassador, 1934–September 1, 1939.
- MOTTA, Giuseppe, Chief of the Political Department (Foreign Ministry) of the Swiss Federal Council, 1920–1940.
- MUFTI. *See* AL-HUSAYNI.
- MUNCH, Peter R., Danish Foreign Minister, 1929–1940.
- MUNTERS, Vilhelms, Latvian Foreign Minister, 1936–1940.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, founder of the Italian Fascist Party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister, 1922–1943; Commander of the Armed Forces, 1938–1943.
- NEURATH, Constantin, Freiherr von, German Foreign Minister, June 2, 1932–February 4, 1938; Reich Minister and President of the Secret Cabinet Council, February 4, 1938–May 1945.
- PAUL, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, 1934–1941.
- PETRESCU-COMNEN, Nicolas, Rumanian Minister in Germany, June 1932–February 1938; Foreign Minister, March–December 1938; Ambassador to the Holy See, 1939–1940.
- RENTHE-FINK, Cecil von, German Minister in Denmark, 1936–1942.
- RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Ambassador in Great Britain, 1936–1938; Foreign Minister, February 4, 1938–1945.
- RICHTHOFFEN, Herbert, Freiherr von, German Minister in Denmark, 1930–1935; in Belgium, May 1936–July 1938; in Bulgaria, May 1939–1941.
- RITTER, Karl, Ministerialdirektor in the German Foreign Ministry, in charge of economic affairs, 1924–1937; Ambassador in Brazil, June 1937–October 1938; Ambassador on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1939–1945.
- ROSENBERG, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Ausserpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, 1933–1945; deputy of the Führer for supervision of spiritual and ideological training of the NSDAP, 1934–1945.
- RUBLEE, George, American attorney, Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, August 1938–February 1939.
- RÜMELIN, Eugen, German Minister in Bulgaria, March 1923–May 1939.
- RYDZ-SMIGLY. *See* SMIGLY-RYDZ.
- AL-SAID, Nuri Pasha, Major General, Iraqi Minister President, 1930–1932; Foreign Minister, 1933–1934, 1934–1936; Minister President and Foreign Minister, December 26, 1938–January 1941.
- SANDLER, Rickard Johannes, Swedish Foreign Minister, September 1932–June 1936, September 1936–December 1939.
- SARACOGU, Sükrü, Turkish Minister of Justice, 1932–1938; Foreign Minister, November 1938–1941.
- SAUCKEN, Reinhold von, German Consul General at Memel, 1934–1939.
- ŠAULYS, Jurgis, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, 1931–December 1938.

- SCHACHT, Hjalmar, President of the German Reichsbank, March 1933–January 1939; Minister of Economics, August 1934–November 1937; Minister without Portfolio, November 1937–January 1943.
- SCHLIEF, Martin, Head of Political Division V of the German Foreign Ministry, 1937–1941.
- SCHMIDT, Paul Otto, as interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry, 1923–1945, was present at many of the meetings between German leaders and foreign statesmen; in January 1939, was formally attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, October 1934–June 1941.
- SELTER, Karl, Estonian Minister of Economics, 1933–1938; Foreign Minister, May 1938–October 1939.
- SKIRPA, Kazys, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, February 28, 1939–July 1940.
- SMIGLY-RYDZ, Edward, Marshal of Poland, Inspector General of the Army, 1936–1939.
- SPAACK, Paul-Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1936–1938; Minister President and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 15, 1938–January 21, 1939, and Minister President until February 1939.
- STAUNING, Thorvald, Danish Minister of State, 1924–1926, 1929–1942.
- STOYADINOVICH, Milan, Yugoslav Minister President and Foreign Minister, June 1935–February 4, 1939.
- SZEMBEX, Count Jan, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister.
- SZTÓJAY, Döme, Major General, Hungarian Minister in Germany, 1935–1944.
- THERMANN, Edmund, Freiherr von, German Minister in Argentina, 1933; Ambassador, 1936–1943.
- TWARDOWSKI, Fritz von, Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, 1936–1939; Director, 1939–1943.
- ULMANIS, Karlis, President of Latvia, 1936–1940.
- URBŠYS, Joseph, Secretary General of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, 1936–1938; Foreign Minister, December 5, 1938–June 1940.
- VANSITTART, Sir Robert, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1930–1938; Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Secretary, January 1938–1941.
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst, Freiherr von, Director of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, August 1936–March 1938; State Secretary, April 1938–April 1943.
- WIEHL, Emil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, November 1937–1944.
- WOERMANN, Ernst, German Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain with the rank of Minister, 1936–1938; Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary, April 1938–April 1943.
- WOELTHAT, Helmut, official of the German Ministry of Economics from 1934; appointed by Göring to collaborate in the Four Year Plan, 1938; on economic mission in Spain, 1939, and in charge of negotiations for German-Rumanian commercial treaty, February–March 1939.
- ZECHLIN, Erich Wilhelm, German Minister in Lithuania, 1933–1940.

# Appendix IV

## GLOSSARY

### OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

- AA**, Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Ministry
- Abwehr**, counterintelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the OKW
- Anschluss**, the annexation of Austria by Germany
- AO**, Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the NSDAP concerned with German nationals living abroad
- Auslandsdeutsche**, German nationals or persons of German origin residing abroad
- Auslandsinstitut**, see Deutsches Auslandsinstitut
- APA**, Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign affairs office of the NSDAP; headed by Alfred Rosenberg
- DAF**, Deutsche Arbeitsfront, the German Labor Front
- Deutsches Auslandsinstitut**, German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, for research and propaganda among Auslandsdeutsche
- DNB**, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda
- Dienststelle Ribbentrop**, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister
- e. o.**, ex officio; where this precedes the file number, it indicates a draft for which there are no preceding papers (see zu)
- g**, geheim, secret
- Ganleiter**, highest official in a Gau, the largest territorial administrative unit of the NSDAP, 43 in number
- Geheimrat**, Privy Councilor, title conferred on high Government officials prior to 1918
- g Rs**, geheime Reichssache, top secret
- Ha Pol**, Handelspolitik, Handelspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry; renamed Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung in March 1938
- Hauptsturmführer**, SA and SS rank, equivalent to army captain
- Hitlerjugend**, the Hitler Youth Organization
- K or Kult.**, Kulturpolitische Abteilung, Cultural Policy Department
- Korvettenkapitän**, German Navy rank equivalent to lieutenant commander
- Kreis**, political subdivision; also, largest subdivision of an NSDAP Gau, headed by a Kreisleiter
- Landesgruppe**, NSDAP organization for a foreign country, controlled by the Auslandsorganisation, headed by a Landesgruppenleiter
- Landeskreisleiter**, leader of an NSDAP kreis in any country outside Germany
- Ministerialdirektor**, grade in the Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry
- Ministerialdirigent**, grade in the Civil Service, usually deputy director of a department in a Ministry
- NSDAP**, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Workers' Party, the full title of the Nazi Party
- NSDAPN**, the NSDAP of North Schleswig
- OKW**, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
- Oberführer**, SA and SS rank approximately equivalent to colonel
- Obergruppenführer**, SA and SS rank approximately equivalent to lieutenant general

- Ortsgruppe**, subdivision of an NSDAP Kreis, headed by an Ortsgruppenleiter
- Pers.**, Personal- und Haushalts-Abteilung, Personnel and Budget Department of the Foreign Ministry
- Pol.**, Politische Abteilung, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided according to geographic areas, each designated by a Roman numeral, e. g. Pol. IV (see appendix I)
- R, Recht**, Rechtsabteilung, Legal Department, in the German Foreign Ministry
- RAM**, Reichsaussenminister, Reich Foreign Minister
- Referat**, division within a department of a German Ministry in charge of a particular field of work
- Referat Deutschland**, also Sonderreferat Deutschland, special section for German internal affairs in the Foreign Ministry
- Regierungsrat**, a grade in the German Civil Service
- Reichsbahn**, the German State Railway
- Reichsdeutsche**, Reich Germans, i. e. those Germans who were Reich subjects, used usually with reference to those living outside the frontiers of the Reich (see *Volksdeutsche*)
- Reichsleiter**, highest NSDAP rank
- R Gbl.**, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, official publication of the Reich Ministry of the Interior giving the text of new laws, decrees, and regulations
- Rk**, Reichskanzlei, Reich Chancellery, office of the German Chancellor
- RM**, Reichsmark, the unit of German currency
- RM**, Reichsminister, Reich Minister; any member of the Reich Cabinet but in Foreign Ministry documents usually the Reich Foreign Minister
- SA**, Sturmabteilung, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
- SD**, Sicherheitsdienst, security service; intelligence and counter-intelligence agency of the SS
- SS**, Schutzstaffel, elite corps of the NSDAP, used for military and police purposes
- Standartenführer**, SA and SS rank equivalent to colonel
- St. S.**, Staatssekretär, the highest career official of a Reich Ministry
- Sturmabführer**, SA and SS rank equivalent to major
- U. St. S.**, Unterstaatssekretär, Under State Secretary
- VB**, *Völkischer Beobachter*, the principal daily newspaper of the NSDAP
- VDA**, Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, League for Germanism Abroad
- Vereinigte Finanzkontore**, United Finance Office, a covert agency controlled by the Foreign Ministry and used to give financial support to German minorities
- Volksdeutsche**, ethnic Germans, i. e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich citizens
- Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle**, (VomI), central agency for problems concerning Volksdeutsche; formed as the Büro von Kursell in 1936, renamed and placed under SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz in 1937; directed covertly the political agitation of German minorities
- W**, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry
- Wehrmacht**, Armed Forces
- Winterhilfswerk**, Winterhilfe, Winter Relief Organization
- zu**, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this number.